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The Means to what End?

India, Australia and their Navies

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ABSTRACT: Geoffrey Till's recent development of the modern – post-modern naval paradigms intend to allow the categorisation of navies into those which exist for exclusive national statist purposes and others which exist to uphold the international globalised system. As navies are key indicators of strategic behaviour, the Indian and Australian navies' positions within Till's paradigms allow us to understand that these two significant players in the Asia-Pacific region are hedging against a return to state-on-state competition, yet not neglecting their responsibilities as participants and benefactors of the post-modern international system. This dissertation attempts an understanding of New Delhi's and Canberra's grand strategies. Their respective maritime strategies and capabilities are surveyed to identify harmonies and dissonances within and between the two states. The dissertation concludes that despite differences in geostrategic conditions, culture, military and economic potential, both states adhere to a hedging strategy over the durability of the 'long-peace' and do not want to be caught unprepared for a state-on-state conflict.

The word length of this dissertation is 14,843.

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1: Introduction

I - Globalisation and Navies

Globalisation is the central strategic fact of the twenty-first century.¹ Whether it waxes or wanes, globalisation will play a significant role in the strategic calculi of states: “either way, the present and future state of globalisation will... be a major determinant of strategy”.² Navies provide the military and diplomatic capability that directly and indirectly reinforces the security of shipping on the most traversed medium of international trade.³

This study will help inform the continuing debate over anarchy and globalisation in the international system. If the most powerful navies of the world are becoming post-modern, it could be an indication of the modern state system ‘collapsing’ into the ‘greater’ order of the post-modern system.⁴ A post-modern naval shift may indicate a sea-change in international relations since 1991. Conversely, a perpetuation of modern naval capabilities would cast doubt on an “imperfect equilibrium of interests” - in this study the shared interest over free trade yet conflicting interests over energy security - ending the “necessity of each state standing ready to marshal its strength in order to defend its interests.”⁵ Australia may become an offshore balancer in the century ahead in the Asia-Pacific; a ‘Perfidious Albion’ *redux*.⁶ Practicing the balance-of-power⁷ could become the norm for both India and Australia; this would be manifested in one way through modern

¹ Till, G. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century* (London: Routledge, 2009) p. 1

² Ibid.

³ Marisec.org, a website designed to advance the interests of the international shipping industry, <http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/worldtrade/index.php?SID=fcaab0cd465e1de6ab862bc12bd0d0cf> (access 13/07/2011)

⁴ Cooper, R. *The Breaking of Nations* (London: Atlantic Books, 2003) p. 26

⁵ Waltz, K. *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) p. 119

⁶ Mearsheimer, J.J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001) pp. 261-266

⁷ Keohane, R.O. *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) pp. 115-119

naval capabilities. This would create the impression that the post-modern system is not sufficient to satisfy the security interests of the states in question. Nye claims that a tripolar world between the United States, China and India will be distinctly 'modern' as they are the most reluctant to accept a post-Westphalian order.⁸ From this point of view the United States' role as the guarantor of the world's post-modern globalised maritime trading system appears to serve Washington's self-interest. Retention of distinctly modern capabilities would confirm Gray's doubts over the durability of the 'long peace'.⁹

Geoffrey Till's modern and post-modern naval analysis links the development of navies to the nature of the state they serve and to their competing attitudes over globalisation.¹⁰ Given the maritime nature of the globalised trading system navies provide an insight into their governments' beliefs over the shape of geopolitics to come. The relative weight assigned to both post-modern or modern maritime capabilities and strategies helps understand where some states are placing their bets for the outcome of the twenty-first century.

The 'use of the sea' as Booth describes it has not changed in its core principles: (1) for the passage of goods and people, (2) for the passage of military force and diplomacy, or for use against targets on land or at sea and (3) for the exploitation of resources in or under the sea.¹¹ In the post-modern and modern paradigms, these core uses of the sea still apply. For the first and second uses, the degrees of difference are in whom uses the sea and for what purposes (modern or post-modern).

⁸ Nye, J.S. *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011) p. 215

⁹ Gray, C.S. *The Navy in the Post-Cold War World* (Pennsylvania University Press, 1994) pp. 163-165

¹⁰ Till, *Seapower: A Guide ...* p. 2

¹¹ Booth, K. *Navies and Foreign Policy* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979) p. 15

Why study the Indian and Australian navies? India is one of the 'new players in the game' that must be accommodated if globalisation is to be sustained.¹² India will grow to influence more events in the century ahead. The Indian Ocean is a vital route for international trade and energy for Europe and the Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, India is likely to overtake China as Earth's most populous state and "take her place as a major power in a multi-polar world."¹³

Australia's technological advantage and its status as the bulk source of Chinese raw materials make it a strategically significant entity, despite its relatively small stature in population. White Australia is a creature born of the Royal Navy,¹⁴ its roots are in the sea, and its perceptions of it should help inform us of what this player in Southeast Asia intends to do in the twenty-first century. Compared with states such as the United States, India and China, why does Australia merit an analysis alongside India? Australia sits at the southern flank of the Asia-Pacific - it has interests like any other that is proximate to a region where military capabilities are generally increasing, perhaps crystallised by the Chinese pursuit of naval air capabilities.¹⁵ The potential for offshore balancing exists in an Asian 'great game'.

The study of Australia alongside India is revealing for the modern - post-modern paradigms espoused by Till. India is generally a power in its own right, whereas Australia is under the shadow of its American alliance. One would expect India to be immediately 'modern' in its naval approach, and Australia 'post-modern'. However, as the investigation progresses it shows a more nuanced reality; a greater power is not

¹² Till, *Seapower: A Guide ...* p. 3

¹³ Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence (MoD, UK) *Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends - Out to 2040, 4th Edition*, January 2010 p. 53

¹⁴ Reeve, J. 'Conclusion: Maritime nations - the lucky league' in Stevens, D., Reeve, J. (eds.) *The Navy and the Nation: The Influence of the Navy on Modern Australia* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2005) p. 374

¹⁵ Agence France-Presse, 'Chinese General: Country Needs 3 Carriers', *Defense News*, 30/07/2011 <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7248942&c=SEA&s=TOP> (accessed 06/08/2011)

neglecting its post-modern concerns, and a weaker power is not abandoning modern capabilities. This gives weight to Colin Gray's position on culture and strategy - culture is not determinative, despite its pervasiveness.¹⁶ Cultural impulses do not necessarily frequently override the state's (or any politically organised unit's) calculations of interest, which is about power and influence.¹⁷ Despite cultural differences, India and Australia share a few approaches to their maritime problems. The continued investment in naval capabilities raises the question 'why'? For what purposes are these navies increasing their capabilities; for the system (post-modern ends) or their national interests (modern ends)?

II - Research Questions

1. What are the 'ends' of the Indian and Australian navies?

- Are their governments' grand strategies relatively post-modern or modern?

2. What are the capabilities of both navies?

- What are the primary physical components of the navies?
- Is there strategic continuity between government and navy?

3. Do the navies exhibit identifiable modern or post-modern tendencies?

- Do India and Australia wish to uphold the system of globalised states?
- Are both states preparing for statist war?

III - Methods and Limitations

Both India and Australia lack a coherent National Security Strategy (NSS). This makes a clear official definition of their grand strategies impossible. As a result, this study is not only an investigation of the Indian and Australian navies; it is also a tentative construction of New Delhi's and Canberra's geopolitical and military spheres of their grand strategies with a maritime bent. The maritime feature of Australian grand strategy

¹⁶ Gray, C.S. *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005) pp. 92-93

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 94

may be natural due to its island conformation, but this study may place a skewed emphasis on the sea in India's grand strategy due to its preoccupation with Pakistan's landward threat.

This study acknowledges the ontological assumptions associated with the positivist paradigm of social research and the realist paradigm of international relations.¹⁸ This investigation falls within the sub-discipline of strategic studies due to its emphasis on the state, military capabilities and geopolitics. The navies studied are expected to use force in the long-term future, both in 'modern' and 'post-modern' contingencies. "War... is an act of policy," and a "continuation of policy by other means".¹⁹ From peacekeeping to a war of survival, all are considered possible acts of rational policy, irrespective of their perceived likelihood. This dissertation rests along a blurred line between the 'macro' and the 'micro' levels of analysis.²⁰ Whilst globalisation (macro level) is unavoidable and underpins the post-modern paradigm, the focus of the study is on the two states (micro level). Yet this is relevant in how they ultimately relate to, and perceive the future of, globalisation.

The research questions (RQ) inform the methods which should identify which sources should be used.²¹ The first RQ relies on a qualitative analysis of secondary (academic) sources and some primary (government) documents. Such an approach is selective and subjective, and does not claim to provide a comprehensive portrayal of grand strategy. The second RQ requires an empirical analysis; the prized hobby of any strategist – bean-counting. These 'beans', however, will signify post-modern and modern tendencies in the navies. A mixture of government and academic sources inform the

¹⁸ Grix, J. *The Foundations of Research* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) pp. 81

¹⁹ Clausewitz, C. *On War*, Howard, M., Paret, P. (eds., trans.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) p. 87

²⁰ Grix, *The Foundations of Research...* pp. 48

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 31

empirical bean-counting exercise, yet its *subjective interpretation* is informed by Geoffrey Till's paradigms. The final RQ is an interpretation of the evidence accumulated according from the second RQ, and gives an answer as to whether they wish to uphold the international trading system or prioritise their own national maritime interests first.

2: Conceptual Framework

I - Introduction

This study is by no means a thorough analysis of all maritime theorists, rather, this chapter intends to understand Geoffrey Till's new concepts and insist on the continued relevance of Mahan and Corbett. A conceptual framework emerges from such a review that helps answer the critical question guiding this study: what are the purposes and capabilities of New Delhi's and Canberra's navies? However, 'seapower' and 'globalisation' must first be understood using existing literature. Thereafter, Geoffrey Till's modern - post-modern navy ideals are described. Subsequently Mahan in particular is interpreted to still be relevant today. Maritime power is used interchangeably with 'seapower', as seapower is nothing if it is not relevant to events on land. 'Seapower' is the 'great enabler'; it is not a power that stands alone in a state's capabilities. Gray noted that maritime excellence enables, but does not decide, victory. Coordination with the other armed services is paramount to success.²² However, a thorough study of inter-service coordination is beyond the scope of this study.

II - Globalisation

There is considerable debate over the origins, present character, future, nature and effects of globalisation.²³ This study is not an extensive debate of the issue. It is nonetheless possible to identify certain themes of globalisation - as it is today - that are common to several authors and are arguably most relevant to maritime strategy. McGrew highlights Giddens' definition as local events having a distant impact and vice versa,

²² Gray, *The Navy in...* p. 13

²³ Smith, S. And Baylis, J. 'Introduction', and McGrew, A. 'Globalization and Global Politics', in Baylis, J., Smith, S. (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) pp. 1-14, 19-40

Gilpin's as the integration of the world economy, Scholte's de-territorialisation, and the compression of space and time according to Harvey.²⁴ Tangredi echoes Gilpin by defining globalisation as a "substantial expansion of cross-border networks and flows," using Kugler's and Frost's definitions. Furthermore, Tangredi also defines globalisation as the "dominant element of the [post-Cold War] security environment", in agreement with Till over the significance of globalisation. Tangredi finishes by categorising globalisation as both a process and an important part of the international system.²⁵

Till believes that globalisation encourages the development of a 'borderless world', in which the autarky of states is undermined by transnational economic and technological trends. Till also claims that globalisation is a dynamic system built on trade and business which constantly changes the hierarchy of winners and losers. Finally, Till maintains that the system "depends absolutely on the free flow of sea-based shipping."²⁶

Near the end of the Cold War, Eric Grove observed the 'growing internationalisation of marine activities'. Economic liberalism has largely survived the old clash of autarkic empires competing for slices of a finite 'cake'.²⁷ As is widely known, the opening of more markets to the global trading system since the collapse of the Soviet Union has put an end to the specific mercantile historical context of Mahan's writings, as Grove noted, for the conceivable future.

This study will predominantly insinuate the economic integration of the global marketplace among states when referring to globalisation. It is most relevant when discussing modern maritime strategy due to the volume and value of international trade that crosses the seas. As an implication of globalisation, events in one region may affect a

²⁴ McGrew, 'Globalization and Global Politics'... p. 24

²⁵ Tangredi S.J. 'Introduction', in Tangredi, S.J. (ed.) *Globalization and Maritime Power* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), pp. xxiv - xxv

²⁶ Till, *Seapower: A Guide...* pp. 2-3

²⁷ Grove, E. *The Future of Sea Power* (London: Routledge, 1990) p. 4

distant region, or the entire system. For example, the Japanese earthquake in March 2011 had mixed effects for importers and exporters in the Asia-Pacific region.²⁸ In sum, globalisation is thought of in politico-economic terms and in an interconnected nature; events that occur on the seas will usually affect more than the immediate parties involved.

III -The post-modern navy

Geoffrey Till has constructed a conceptual spectrum to attempt to classify the navies of today and the century ahead.²⁹ One end of the spectrum is the 'modern navy', and the other is the 'post-modern navy'. Both ideals have their own priorities and purposes which in turn shape the capabilities that are believed to be necessary. Both ideals need to be explained as they form the opposite ends of the spectrum this study relies upon, and being relatively new concepts deserve digestion.

The purpose of a post-modern navy is to **defend the system**, and as a result, protect the general interests of the state(s) that depends on that system for its general well-being. Till elucidates four 'aspirational deliverables' of a post-modern navy: sea control, expeditionary operations, good order at sea and the maintenance of a maritime consensus. The first two are different interpretations of traditional aspirations, the latter two are new.³⁰ **Sea control** for the post-modern navy is still a 'grand enabler' and remains the heart of maritime strategy for both ideals. However, post-modern navies tend to emphasise more on operations in littoral regions and less on opposing fleets. Freedom on the high seas is taken for granted. A post-modern navy is likely to face asymmetric but low-intensity threats. Sea control in this instance is security not only for oneself, but to all

²⁸ *The Economist*, 'Who relies on Japan?', 22/03/2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/03/after_earthquake (accessed 14/07/2011)

²⁹ Till, *Seapower: A Guide...* pp. 6-19

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7

users of the system from its enemies. Till uses the French notion of *controle*, that of supervision, rather than command, of the seas.³¹ Till echoes Julian Corbett by citing that navies must be able to influence events ashore via **expeditionary operations**. Deriving its origins from liberal-interventionist thinking and the need to defend the conditions for trade to take place, operations may need to be taken on land in a littoral region that influences the ability to trade in the region in question. An expeditionary operation is different to amphibious operations due to its shorter duration, the absence of a beach assault, high politicisation, a great distance from home, a greater likelihood to be a coalition operation, and is not a precursor to a larger war.³² Thus Geoffrey Till:

“...power projection in an expeditionary mode can be seen as a defence of the trading system against the instabilities and conflicts ashore that might threaten it... By contrast, in earlier ages... defence of the trading system was based primarily on the *direct* defence of shipping at sea.”³³

Keeping good order at sea is a necessary aspiration for the system of globalisation to work. Weak coastal states that suffer from poor governance and the lack of maritime policing jeopardise international trade. It is a threat or risk that must be dealt with by post-modern navies if the coastal state in question cannot provide a secure medium of maritime transport.³⁴ Good order at sea can be seen as an enabler of global peace and security by contributing to geopolitical and economic stability. True to its multilateral nature, the post-modern navy’s final aspiration is to **maintain a maritime consensus**. Till states that winning hearts and minds, building coalitions and securing allies are essential to maintain the globalising system. This includes a shift from realist assumptions and more towards cooperation and humanitarianism. Till mentions the international rescue

³¹ Ibid., pp. 7-8

³² Ibid., pp. 8-9

³³ Ibid., p. 9, emphasis Till’s.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 10-11

and relief operations of the Asian tsunami in 2004, and the evacuation operation in Lebanon in 2006 as examples of such behaviour.³⁵

Post-modern navies are also unique in their enablers. They depend on contributory fleets which promote a popular coalition and an open defence market. Till uses the examples of the Scandinavian navies and New Zealand to show how they are drifting towards cooperation and the post-modern navy ideal.³⁶ A more recent example would be the Anglo-French defence agreement signed in 2010. Among other details, the agreement promises the development of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force and an integrated carrier strike group.³⁷ International defence equipment and licence sales are a norm of inter-state relations, adding weight to the process of globalisation and reducing the economic attractiveness of autarkic defence industries.

IV - The modern navy

A modern navy is one that is more wary about the implications of globalisation to its security and sovereignty, adopts more protectionist economic policies and partakes less in the maintenance of the world's trading system. Modern navies have contingency preparations against the collapse of the trading system and the national preoccupations prevail over the collaborative. A modern navy's first priority is the **defence of its state and interests, not the system**.³⁸ The modern navy has a similar structure of aspirations to the post-modern navy, but it has one more aspiration: nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defence (BMD). This first aspiration of modern navies clearly anticipates a possible **state-on-state conflict**, and the role of strategic sea-based nuclear forces should

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 11-12

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 11-13

³⁷ *The Telegraph*, 'Anglo-French defence treaty: at a glance', 02/11/2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8105134/Anglo-French-defence-treaty-at-a-glance.html> (accessed 14/07/2011)

³⁸ Till, *Seapower: A Guide...* p. 14

not be omitted. The modern navy's conception of sea control is more 'traditional'. Till refers to Mahanian concepts of sea control – whereas naval preparations are framed by what possibly competitive navies are doing. Gorshkovian fleet-on-fleet capabilities are the focus for sea control, and Till cites the example of the Australian Defence White Paper in 2000 as echoing these tendencies to defend against hostile ships and aircraft.³⁹ Modern navies and their governments have a **narrower definition of maritime power projection**, and are less drawn to the ideals of liberal interventionism. The emphasis falls back to traditional maritime power projection with amphibious operations and maritime strike capabilities – actions more associated with war against a state than a liberal intervention or expeditionary operation.⁴⁰

A modern navy's conception of '**good order at sea**' is geared towards the **defence of national interests and the maintenance of sovereignty** in its home waters. Any action would be for itself first, the system would only benefit as a fortunate side-effect, if at all. A modern navy would not look favourably on extensive naval cooperation and integration, with a **preference for bilateral arrangements** on specific issues and scepticism of international institutions.⁴¹ The enablers of a modern navy are a well-balanced national fleet and an independent, if not autarkic, national maritime defence industrial base.

These ideals are only differences of degrees. The boundaries between them are 'fuzzily drawn', are not mutually exclusive and certain ships and facilities may have dual-use capabilities that lend themselves to both modern and post-modern purposes.⁴² However, *tendencies* may be identified "as most navies exhibit a blend of both approaches,

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 14-15

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 15-16

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 16-17

⁴² Ibid., p. 17

and so tend to situate themselves in a spectrum of possibility between ‘modern’ at one end of the scale and ‘post-modern’ at the other.”⁴³

V - Mahan and Corbett

As Mahan’s and Corbett’s theories are widely known and discussed in detail by Geoffrey Till,⁴⁴ only Till’s main conclusions are repeated here due to their relevance to the modern – post-modern inquiry. The word ‘maritime’ is used deliberately to treat the subject of navies in a holistic manner relative to their significance in influencing events on land and within the realms of national interest, or grand strategy; in both peace and war. Whilst Alfred Thayer Mahan could be considered a *naval* theorist due to his general *emphasis* on battles and military history,⁴⁵ Mahan was not closed to the other aspects of maritime strategy such as commerce, trade and influencing events ashore. According to Till, Mahan conceded that battle was not always necessary, that brute force was not enough to satisfy the economy of force and acknowledged that smaller fleets were not powerless.⁴⁶ Indeed, “history has shown that such evasions [of sea control held by a stronger adversary] are always possible, to some extent, to the weaker party, however great the inequality of naval strength.”⁴⁷ Julian Corbett echoes this *relativity* of sea control (or as Corbett called it ‘the command of the sea’) by stating that the control of the sea is normally contested.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the ability to wield superiority at sea means little in war if one cannot “complete the occupation of [the enemy’s] inland communications and principal points of distribution.”⁴⁹ Corbett acknowledged that the Mahanian concepts of sea control and ‘decisive battle’ were valid, but Corbett was a heretic in his time for

⁴³ Ibid., p. 18

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 20-82

⁴⁵ Mahan, A.T. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890)p. 1

⁴⁶ Till, *Seapower: A Guide...* p. 53

⁴⁷ Mahan, *The Influence of...* p. 14

⁴⁸ Corbett, J.S. *Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Mineola: Dover, 2004) pp. 87, 211

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 90-91

saying that it was not always necessary to win battles at sea.⁵⁰ Raja Menon's assertion that Mahan's directives towards achieving sea control are out of date today is not entirely accurate. According to Menon, Mahan "wrote at a time when sea control was achievable and he is now of limited relevance."⁵¹ Mahan allowed for the fact that sea control was never absolute; ergo *total* sea control was not achievable in the nineteenth century and it is not so in the twenty-first. Menon's postulated theory rests on the application of "Relevant Force, applied in a Relevant Space over a Relevant Time" to achieve the greatest effect over the speed of battle as a result of information-enhanced and networked warfare.⁵² The concepts of a relevant force in a relevant space at a relevant time are not incompatible, as Menon appears to claim, with Mahan due to his recognition of the permeable nature of sea control. However, it would be dangerous to take Menon's 'speed of battle' too far – Menon himself warns against a repetition of the Schlieffen plan which was based on promises of a hasty war.⁵³ Indeed, Clausewitzian friction cannot be ignored.⁵⁴ A 'plan B' is always required should things go wrong and 'tunnel vision' according to one operational doctrine or plan should be avoided; a risk the German military overlooked before 1914.⁵⁵

Mahan and Corbett are not out of place in the modern paradigm. What is important to consider is the drift in the significance attached by navies to blue water or littoral operations. For example, the U.S. Navy (USN) has shifted in doctrine and strategy away from blue water fleet-on-fleet actions towards littoral operations since the early

⁵⁰ Till, *Seapower: A Guide...* p. 62

⁵¹ Menon, R. *Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars* (London: Frank Cass, 1998) p. 106

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 157

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 74

⁵⁴ Clausewitz, *On War...* pp. 119-121

⁵⁵ Showalter, D. 'From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War 1890-1914', *The Journal of Military History* (64:3, 2000) pp. 703-704

1990s.⁵⁶ However, the shift is a matter of degree, true to the relative nature of the concepts used in this study. The USN still possesses an unmatched capability in blue water operations. The USN has 11 aircraft carriers, 81 cruisers, 57 submarines, and 31 'principal amphibious ships'. China is the only state to possess more of one naval asset than the USN – the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has 65 frigates to the USN's 31. The quality of Chinese vessels is another matter.⁵⁷

The Mahanian and Corbettian theories largely emphasise the military application of maritime strength, and the purposes of protecting maritime trade from other states. The mundane or less glamorous everyday tasks of contemporary navies are omitted. These tasks include anti-piracy, counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking and the protection of seaborne economic assets – tasks more associated with the post-modern navy paradigm.⁵⁸ Perhaps most strikingly, the post-modern paradigm treats sea control as a *fait accompli*, bypassing Corbett's and Mahan's well-known preoccupations. However, Corbett wrote that maritime communications are shared between oneself and the enemy, and one cannot attack the other's SLOC without simultaneously defending one's own.⁵⁹ This is true enough in the modern paradigm; however, in the post-modern paradigm it is largely assumed that sufficient sea control has been won (for expeditionary operations). Achieving sea control and struggling over SLOCs may yet be relevant in the case of anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa; pirates have innovatively developed a system of mother ships and maritime supply networks to extend their operations into the Indian

⁵⁶ Rhodes, E. "'...From the Sea" and Back Again: Naval Power in the Second American Century', in Dombrowski, P. (ed.) *Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century: Newport Papers* (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2005) p. 140-144

⁵⁷ Hackett, J. (ed.) *The Military Balance 2011*, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Routledge, 2011) p. 35

⁵⁸ Till, *Seapower: A Guide...* p. 81

⁵⁹ Corbett, *Principles of Maritime Strategy...* pp. 97-98

Ocean.⁶⁰ Consequently, anti-piracy forces have pirate SLOCs to dispute and their own to secure.

Jon Sumida attempts to counter misconceived interpretations of Mahan's work bring to the fore Mahan's affinity with the post-modern paradigm:

"Mahan's essentially liberal political-economic views, moreover, led him to reject the mercantilist conception of a world consisting of competing players with mutually exclusive interests. Mahan believed that free trade between nations promoted increases in the volume of international exchanges of goods, which worked to the benefit of all participants."⁶¹

Mahan, who may at first be associated with the primacy of naval fleet battles, appears to be more attuned to the globalised system of maritime free trade today. Eric Grove's insistence that the multinational character of maritime trade today has complexities that exceed Mahan's mercantilist notions seem to miss this aspect of Mahan's work.⁶² As one power would not be able to uphold the maritime trading system by itself, it would have to rely on an informal consortium of naval powers.⁶³ Whilst Mahan was referring to British naval decline in the twentieth century, this has pertinence today as the United States is facing a *relative* decline in naval strength against the rise of the Indian and Chinese navies. In this light, Pugh's criticisms of Mahan as being narrowly focused on national interest and mercantilism⁶⁴ are precisely the judgements Sumida attempts to combat. Pugh claims that Mahanism is irrelevant in Europe and the Americas due to the disjointery between the mercantilist significance of Greece and Panama and the naval might of the United States. A turn towards supranational security concerns, and the

⁶⁰ BBC News, 'NATO seizes 'pirate mother ship' off Somalia', *BBC News Website*, 13/02/2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12442330> (accessed 12/08/2011)

⁶¹ Sumida, J. 'New insights from old books: The case of Alfred Thayer Mahan', *Naval War College Review* (54:3, 2001) p. 105

⁶² Grove, E. *The Future of...* pp. 4-5

⁶³ Sumida, 'New insights from old...' p. 106

⁶⁴ Pugh, M. 'Is Mahan still alive? State naval power in the international system', *Journal of Conflict Studies* (16:2, 1996)

mitigation of state sovereignty in the international system in favour of cooperative ventures in favour of the system makes Mahan irrelevant apart from in Asia, where Pugh believes there are clear Mahanist bluewater tendencies. This is a misconceived argument. As shown above, Mahan is not out of place in a global system, where a consortium of states acts together for the benefit of the system and themselves. Bluewater navies may be Mahanian, but so is a joint global maritime partnership!

In a self-contradictory manner, Pugh stumbles upon Mahan's comfort in the post-modern paradigm in stating that Mahanist bluewater capabilities may be needed against an entity that threatens the system. According to Pugh, we are entering a post-Mahanist world with exception to Asian navies; navies are no longer an accurate or relevant measure of national power. If we accept Till's and Sumida's interpretations of Mahan, Pugh is wrong on the end of Mahan's relevance – post-modernism is not post-Mahanism. On Pugh's rejection of naval power as national power, the significance of maritime energy security is overlooked. The United States has an interest in keeping the oil and gas flowing from the Middle East as much as India and China do, and the navy is a critical means of doing so. Without oil, contemporary civilisation would come to a halt.

A final example of Mahan's affinity for the post-modern paradigm is his basing strategy, or more specifically, setting up and multiplying 'points of safety' for both military and commercial purposes.⁶⁵ If shipping is to become under threat from post-modernist assailants such as pirates, global SLOCs need chains of 'points of safety' where shipping can retreat to and military vessels can set forth on patrols and expeditionary operations from. Needless to say, this is critical in the modern paradigm but against the threats posed by other states.

⁶⁵ Mahan, *The Influence of...* p. 28

As the USN faces no immediate peer-competitor, it can assume that a necessary level of sea control is largely won by default *where it chooses to commit itself*. As Chinese and Indian naval capabilities grow in this century, American sea control may not be taken for granted across the board. Without sea control (in general or in a relevant zone at the right time), littoral operations are a moot point. It appears that the preconceptions of post-modern maritime navies rely on a satisfaction of modern issues, namely, sea control.

VI - Summary

Table 1: Modern and post-modern navies

	Modern Navy	Post-modern Navy
Purpose	Defend the state	Defend the system
Aspirational Deliverables	Strategic Deterrence Traditional sea control Narrow power projection Good order in home waters Preference for bilateralism	Sea control for littoral operations Expeditionary operations Good order at sea Maintaining a maritime consensus
Enablers	National defence industry Balanced fleet	International defence market Contributory fleets

This table summarises the purposes, ‘aspirational deliverables’ and enablers of the modern and post-modern navies as discussed in this chapter. These paradigms render Booth’s naval trinity inadequate to understand navies as the terminologies fail to encompass all of the roles expected of a navy that melds both modern and post-modern means and ends.⁶⁶ Furthermore, Eric Grove’s reworked Booth trinity fails to encompass the broad spectrum of tasks expected of a navy in this study.⁶⁷ This is not to say they are obsolete; both triangles may be used to understand a ‘modern’ navy. Yet such tools fail to emphasise the post-modern nature of tasks such as keeping good order at sea or counter-

⁶⁶ Booth, K. *Navies and Foreign Policy...* pp. 16

⁶⁷ Grove, E. *The Future of...* p. 234

piracy, with exception to Grove’s ‘future international peacekeeping’. The Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) span of maritime tasks displays the complementary nature of the two paradigms to make a navy capable of handling modern and post-modern contingencies.⁶⁸ The roles in table 1 are found in one form or another in figure 1. Figure 1 uses the basic trinitarian analysis that Booth developed (military, diplomatic and constabulary). The RAN’s triangular diagram of maritime tasks is more detailed and accurate for the modern – post-modern analysis used in this study. It includes roles from ‘benign’ and ‘maintenance’ (of the system perhaps) to combat operations at and from the sea.

VII – So what?



Fig 1.

The RAN’s span of maritime tasks

If navies today exhibit a mesh of both the modern and post-modern maritime trinitaries, what is the point of such theoretical distinction? The end of the Cold War

⁶⁸ Royal Australian Navy (RAN), *Australian Maritime Doctrine* (Seapower Centre, Australia, 2010) p. 100

certainly brought about a change of emphasis on the roles of the navy.⁶⁹ As naval forces cannot be built and trained overnight, long-term strategic planning should come to the fore in building resource-heavy ships and personnel training. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, navies reveal insights into their governments' views on the prospects of state-on-state conflict; are states 'keeping their powders dry' as a hedge against a collapse of globalisation?⁷⁰ The conceptual framework illustrated in this chapter provides a method to shed light on what New Delhi and Canberra are thinking and doing, and whether actions are matching their thoughts.

⁶⁹ Smith, M.L., Uttley, M.R.H., 'Tradition and Innovation in Maritime Thinking', in Dorman, A., Smith, M.L. (eds.) *The Changing Face of Maritime Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999) p. 6

⁷⁰ Till, *Seapower: A Guide...* p. 6

3: Indian and Australian Grand Strategy

“Conference is always necessary, and for conference to succeed there must be a common vehicle of expression and a common plane of thought.” - Corbett⁷¹

“The welfare of a state depends on an active foreign policy.” - Kautilya⁷²

I - Introduction

A study of the Indian and Australian grand strategies gives an insight into what they deem the sea to be used for. An acknowledgement of the strategic environment and the grand strategies of the two states help position their maritime strategies and navies in their respective, and occasionally shared, contexts. A study of their maritime strategies will shed more focused light on the intended use of the sea and any dissonance between what the government interprets as the purpose of the navies and what the navies deem to be their own purposes. One cannot easily claim that India is a great power and Australia is a middle power. Using Hill's definition of a 'middle power', both states are described by his categorisation of a power lying “between the self-sufficient and the insufficient”.⁷³ In the post-modern globalised trading system, not even the greatest power can be claimed of being completely self-sufficient. For this reason, relative and potential power is what matters most in comparing India and Australia; in short India is greater in potential power to Australia as explained in economic, demographic and quantitative military terms below.

⁷¹ Corbett, *Principles of Maritime Strategy*... p. 5

⁷² Kautilya, *The Arthashastra*, Rangarajan, L.N. (ed., trans.) (London: Penguin, 1992) p. 505

⁷³ Hill, J.R. *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers* (Worcester: Billing and Sons, 1986) pp. 20-25

II - Setting the scene

Maritime geography is unavoidable to New Delhi and Canberra. Both India and Australia are states that must deal with maritime realities due to their expansive coastline and island status, respectively. India's main coastline amounts to approximately 3,400 miles in length, has over one thousand islands under its jurisdiction and its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is over 1.3 million square miles. The Indian Ocean could well be part of India's geopolitical destiny.⁷⁴ Australia is even more entwined with the ocean given its (continental) island geography, with 85% of its population living within approximately 30 miles of the coast and its continental and island-based EEZ covers over 3 million square miles, before counting the EEZ from the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT). Its coastline is over 30,000 miles long, and with the AAT included, Australia's claim to jurisdiction is over a quarter of Earth's surface.⁷⁵ Despite their massive jurisdictional claims, the population of both states are in stark contrast - India contains approximately 1.2bn citizens, and Australia a relatively miniscule 21.5 million subjects.⁷⁶ This disparity crystallises, but does not determine, the greater power *potential* of India compared to Australia - India has a much larger manpower and talent base to draw upon. This cautions against simplistic comparisons of India and Australia as maritime powers.

How dependent are India and Australia on the sea? The indicators chosen here are oil and hydrocarbon imports/production and the general feature of the globalised market - import-export balances and trading. These two indicators are chosen due to the limited

⁷⁴ Scott, 'India's "Grand Strategy" for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions', *Asia-Pacific Review* (13:2, 2006) p. 99

⁷⁵ Bateman, S. Bergin, A. 'Sea Change: Advancing Australia's Ocean Interests', *Strategy* (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia, 2009) pp. 10-11

⁷⁶ Hackett, *The Military Balance...* pp. 223, 237

scope of the essay in a thorough analysis of their economies, and hydrocarbon and general trade data is very accessible. 'Energy security' is very much a maritime concern. India is already a large importer of energy – nearly 80% of India's energy comes via imports, much from Africa and via the sea. By 2050, the International Energy Agency believes that India will be importing 90% of its petroleum supply alone.⁷⁷ Indeed, the quest for energy security has contributed to Beijing's and New Delhi's gaze moving seaward and can be seen as one of the main drivers of New Delhi's maritime forward positioning.⁷⁸ India ran a trade deficit of US\$5.9bn in 2010-2011, and is expected to increase to over US\$7.6bn for the following year. Oil imports in June 2011 alone reached a value of over US\$10bn, a US\$3bn increase from June 2010.⁷⁹ According to these figures, there are tens of billions of dollars traversing to and from India alone, every month. Given that 95% of world trade is seaborne, the value of the sea is apparent to Indian wealth.

Australia's immediate energy security is in a much more favourable position. Less than a quarter of its energy consumption is met by imports, but as the decades progress, Australia's domestic hydrocarbon output decline will take its toll, and increase dependence on imports travel by sea.⁸⁰ In the meantime, Australia is largely self-sufficient in its energy supply in absolute terms; yet it exports approximately half of its production to the lucrative international market.⁸¹ The majority of Australia's oil imports come from Southeast Asia.⁸² Australia's offshore production may increase as technology and economics moves in favour of ship-based extraction and processing of natural gas. The

⁷⁷ Tao, G., Shanggang, L. 'Energy, investment among key issues of upcoming India-Africa summit', Xinhuanet.com, 20/05/2011 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-05/20/c_13885787.htm (accessed 25/05/2011)

⁷⁸ Holmes, J.R., Winner, A.C., Yoshihara, T. *Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century* (London: Routledge, 2009) pp. 32, 170

⁷⁹ Government of India, 'Press Release: India's Foreign Trade: June 2011', 01/08/2011 http://commerce.nic.in/tradestats/Indiastrade_press.pdf (accessed 03/08/2011)

⁸⁰ Wesley, M. 'Power Plays: Energy and Australia's Security', *Strategy* (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia, 2007) pp. 2-3

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 24

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 26

Floating Liquid Natural Gas (FLNG) platform is being pioneered by the Royal Dutch Shell energy company.⁸³ It will be positioned off the north-western Australian coast, directly south of the 'arc of instability'. Like India, Australia's trade is primarily seaborne. China is by far Australia's largest trading partner at 17% of all trade, Japan is second at 11%, and India is a meagre 4%, trailing behind the USA and South Korea.⁸⁴ Bilateral trade with Beijing alone provided Canberra with a trade surplus of US\$7.18bn between January and June 2010, after rapid growth in bilateral trade during the 2000s.⁸⁵ The importance of Australian coal and iron ore to China's economic and industrial development is evident. Australia is riding high on the commodity price boom. Together, Australia and Indonesia account for almost half of the world's coal exports.⁸⁶ China, India, and the rest of Asia are thirsty for minerals and energy; "the tyranny of distance, so long Australia's enduring curse, has been turned on its head. It is now the antipodean advantage of adjacency."⁸⁷ The significance of trade and energy is now evident; in the present phase of globalisation the old Cold War paradigm of the economy supporting the military may have been inverted.⁸⁸

China and India are likely to be the largest and third largest world economies, respectively, by 2040. Bilateral trade between New Delhi and Beijing grew from US\$350m in 1993 to US\$30bn in 2007, and may reach US\$50bn by 2015.⁸⁹ Australia, as a point of contrast, is currently ranked 18th in the world in terms of gross domestic product (GDP)

⁸³ Shell Australia, 'Prelude', http://www.shell.com.au/home/content/aus/aboutshell/who_we_are/shell_au/operations/upstream/prelude/ (accessed 02/08/2011)

⁸⁴ Lyon, R. 'Forks in the river: Australia's strategic options in a transformational Asia', *Strategy* (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia, 2011) p. 18

⁸⁵ Yu, C. S., Xiong, J. 'The dilemma of interdependence: Current features and trends in Sino-Australian relations', *Australian Journal of International Affairs (iFirst Article)*, 2011) p. 3

⁸⁶ Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, *Strategic Trends Programme...* p. 64

⁸⁷ Grimond, J. 'No worries?', Special Report: Australia, *The Economist* 28/05/2011 pp. 6-7

⁸⁸ Bennett, T.P.M., 'Asia's Energy Future: The Military-Market Link', in Tangredi, S.J. (ed.) *Globalization and Maritime Power* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002) p. 198

⁸⁹ Till, *Seapower: A Guide...* p. 323

per capita.⁹⁰ As Australia is already developed and is much smaller in demographic terms, it is reasonable to assume it will not be in the same economic league as India in 2040. India and China as twin, yet not identical, powerful and growing civilisational entities, and how the existing heavyweights in Asia – the USA and Japan – deal with their rise will be a key determinant of regional stability.⁹¹ Given the interconnected nature of maritime trade, Asia-Pacific stability will impact upon the shores of distant as well as local regions. Lawrence and Prabhakar list the significant forward basing of Australia, the UK, France and the US in and around the Asia-Pacific region, implying stakes and interests in the future direction of geopolitics there. They correctly claim that the Asia-Pacific is a region of high geoeconomic and energy stakes.⁹² India must deal with China's expansive Indian Ocean policy, laying its 'string of pearls' to protect its sea lines of communication (SLOC) by financing Gwadar port in Pakistan, setting up a signals intelligence (SIGINT) facility on Great Coco near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and providing US\$2bn for modernising naval bases in Myanmar.⁹³ Conversely, China must deal with a growing Indian Navy (IN) and what may be an emerging Monroe Doctrine (see chapter four) which could hold its energy transport routes from the Middle East hostage. China sources 80% of its oil imports through the Malacca and Lombok Straits, and the Asian Meridian.⁹⁴ In what is already a security *dilemma*, the China-India relationship could become a security *paradox*.⁹⁵ According to Booth and Wheeler's definitions, the *dilemma of interpretation* accompanies India's 'Look East' policy and China's 'string of pearls' strategy. Rivalling naval and military development may result in

⁹⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, 'Australia-Oceania: Australia', *The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/as.html> (accessed 05/08/2011)

⁹¹ Ho, J.H. 'Cooperation or Competition in Maritime Asia-Pacific?' in Prabhakar, L.W., Ho, J.H., Bateman, S. (eds.) *The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea* (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2006) p. 4

⁹² Lawrence, W., Prabhakar, S. 'Maritime Strategic Trends in the Asia-Pacific: Issues and Challenges', in Prabhakar, L.W. et al (eds.) *The Evolving Maritime Balance...* pp. 38-43, 45

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52

⁹⁴ Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, *Strategic Trends Programme...* p. 64-65

⁹⁵ Booth, K., Wheeler, N. *The Security Dilemma* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) p. 9

greater tension and insecurity, i.e. the security *paradox*. Yet this is to take place under US military superiority - within a *Pax Americana*.⁹⁶ Pakistan will continually play a thorn in New Delhi's side, and considerable effort could justifiably continue to be expended to secure India's most perilous land frontier. As long as the Pakistan issue is not resolved, India will continue to be restrained by Pakistan.⁹⁷

India and Australia are generally beneficiaries of a largely benign maritime environment.⁹⁸ India faces no direct threat from the United States, and Australia is allied to the USA. They indirectly benefit from its role as the 'system administrator'.⁹⁹ If the strategic triangle of the US, China and India preoccupies New Delhi - yet not to the detriment of India's regional priorities¹⁰⁰ - where does Australia sit? It may have to strike a delicate quadrilateral balance between the US, China and India, as it may well be caught in the middle.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, as Australia straddles the juncture between the Pacific and Indian oceans, Indonesia plays a prominent role in the Australian strategic calculus.¹⁰² Indonesia is labelled Australia's greatest strategic asset and problem by Behm.¹⁰³ Indonesia lies along Australia's northern approaches and as a result of simple strategic logic Jakarta is important to win as a friend, at least on military terms and potentially economically and politically. Indonesia, a fledgling populous democracy, to which Australia has conducted a 'good neighbourhood policy' and maintained significant military-to-military ties over the years (not without fault) to, according to Behm, try and avoid two unfavourable scenarios if democracy fails: (1) Indonesia could become a highly centralised autocratic Islamic state with a clash of values against Australia on its doorstep;

⁹⁶ Gray, *The Navy in...* p. 7

⁹⁷ Cohen, S. P. *India: Emerging Power* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001) p. 266

⁹⁸ Holmes et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* p. 9

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 109

¹⁰⁰ Holmes, *Indian Naval Strategy...* p. 150

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 160

¹⁰³ Behm, A. *Strategic Tides: Positioning Australia's Security Policy to 2050*, Kodoka Paper 6 (Kodoka Foundation, 2007) p. 8

an alternative possibility (2) is the disintegration of Indonesia into a loose confederation of mini-states with a failed or failing state syndrome which would only worsen the 'arc of instability'.¹⁰⁴ Other geostrategic factors of note for Australia include its defence pact with New Zealand and the USA under the ANZUS treaty and the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) with New Zealand, Britain, Malaysia and Singapore.

III - Strategic Harmonies

Now that the general strategic environments surrounding India and Australia have been illustrated, we can better understand New Delhi's and Canberra's grand strategies.

"Grand strategy is the direction and use made of any or all of the assets of a security community [including states], including its military instrument, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics. Military strategy is the direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy... strategy is the only bridge built and held to connect policy purposefully with the military and other instruments of power and influence."¹⁰⁵

Gray's definition of grand strategy (interchangeably labelled as 'national security strategy') finds harmony in the Indian *Maritime Military Strategy* (MMS) and the 2009 Australian Defence White Paper (DWP). The MMS states that non-military aspects must be considered in any grand strategy, and implies that Indian grand strategy is a coordinated execution of statecraft.¹⁰⁶ The DWP lists a cacophony of rationales for its publication in 2009, citing threats beyond direct military aggression. Some of the threats listed are the global economic downturn, regional instability, climate change, and

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 9-12

¹⁰⁵ Gray, C.S. *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 262

¹⁰⁶ Integrated Headquarters of Defence (Navy) (hereafter IHD), *Freedom to Use the Sea: India's Maritime Military Strategy* (New Delhi, 2007) p. 1

energy/resource scarcity.¹⁰⁷ No Australian 'grand strategy' is specifically articulated; yet the themes of an embryonic grand strategy are apparent in the acknowledgement of non-military threats to Australian well-being. It is clear that Gray's definition is valid, at least in the cases of India and Australia, and provides a common lens with which to compare New Delhi's and Canberra's ultimate purposes.

The limited scope of this study cannot accommodate a discussion of all New Delhi's and Canberra's perceived threats and the tools to address them. This study is focused on the military and specific maritime aspects of achieving grand strategic objectives. New Delhi's and Canberra's maritime strategies inform us of their grand strategies as much as discussions of their national security strategies. Indeed, "navies represent a physical expression of strategic thought."¹⁰⁸

The first harmony in Indian and Australian grand strategy is that both states lack an articulated national security strategy. India is 'characterised' by the absence of it,¹⁰⁹ its strategic thought is 'not obvious' and suffers an intellectual vacuum in the field.¹¹⁰ Dupont asserts that it is an oxymoron to talk about Australian 'grand strategy', and claims that DWPs are the most authoritative official pronouncements of national intent and perceptions from Canberra.¹¹¹ Dupont pushes for a national security strategy as the essence of effective grand strategy, which in his view is the process by which a state matches means and ends.¹¹² Behm also cites the worrying lack of depth in Australia's

¹⁰⁷ Australian Government, *Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030* (Canberra, 2009) p. 15-16

¹⁰⁸ Holmes et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* p. 2

¹⁰⁹ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power...* p. 63

¹¹⁰ Holmes et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* p. 9

¹¹¹ Dupont, A. 'Grand Strategy, National Security and the Australian Defence Force', *Lowy Institute Perspectives* (Sydney, 2005) p. 1

¹¹² *Ibid.*

national capacity for strategic analysis, evident in numerous commentators on Australian strategy.¹¹³

New Delhi's and Canberra's perceptions of themselves in the world can be envisaged within a series of geographic concentric circles. In their first concentric circles, both India and Australia fashion a **second harmony** in believing that deterring and defending from conventional state aggression from the sea is the key to preventing influence in, and foreign occupation of, their homelands. India's past is a harsh lesson in the consequences of maritime neglect: 'the cessation of sovereignty', in the words of the former commander of the Indian Western Fleet, Kailash Kohli.¹¹⁴ K. M. Panikkar asserted that India had "never lost her independence till she lost command of the sea in the first decade of the sixteenth century", and that "the economic life of India will be completely at the mercy of the power which controls the seas."¹¹⁵ India's immediate threat may be from land, but potential future threats could be maritime in nature. India may be, according to Gray, a rare case of a country that has doubts whether it's more pressing dangers were maritime or continental.¹¹⁶ As seen below, the Australian Defence Force's (ADF) primary task is to deter attack and defend Australia via its sea and air approaches.

A **third harmony** exists in the tendency that both states want to promote a close ring of tolerant or friendly states, and further project their interests and influence into the wider regions surrounding them. In general, both states wish to preserve the international maritime trading system, but India desires a greater degree of global influence than Australia. As seen below, New Delhi appears to be taking a relatively stronger independent streak throughout, whereas Canberra becomes more multilateral in its tone the further away from the shores of Australia its interests carry it. These concepts bear a

¹¹³ Behm, *Strategic Tides...* p. iv

¹¹⁴ Scott, 'India's "Grand Strategy" ...' p. 98

¹¹⁵ Holmes et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* pp. 23-24

¹¹⁶ Gray, *The Navy in the...* p. 64

strong realist bent – little to no reference is made of international institutions as a means of providing security and satisfying strategic needs. Indeed, the United Nations (UN) is seen by many in India as a platform for realpolitik and the advancement of Indian interests.¹¹⁷ Indeed, ‘order-building’ from the Australian perspective emphasises the participation of states, not the leadership of the UN.¹¹⁸

Raja Mohan’s inner circle for India is concerned with its immediate neighbourhood (Pakistan, Bangladesh and other South Asian states) and vetoing any unwanted action by extraregional powers.¹¹⁹ The gravest immediate threat to India is in this inner circle. The relatively little attention given to the Pakistani issue in this study is not a reflection of its importance. New Delhi wants to deal with Islamabad in its own way, and keep the UN and extraregional parties out of the dispute(s).¹²⁰ According to Cohen’s analysis, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are of most interest due to their weakness, location and potential susceptibility to Chinese or Pakistani influence – particularly in the case of Nepal and Sri Lanka.¹²¹ It is a clear sphere for India to ‘make friends and influence people,’ and to isolate Pakistan.¹²² The second ring encompasses India’s ‘extended neighbourhood’: continental Asia, the Indian Ocean region’s littoral¹²³ and logically the SLOCs that traverse it. In this ring we also see China’s ‘string of pearls’ in its entirety (not only its influence in Pakistan and Myanmar) and general US maritime capability and influence, including its base in Diego Garcia. India’s final and third ring encompasses the rest of the globe – where India wishes to be among the world’s

¹¹⁷ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power...* p. 57

¹¹⁸ Lyon, ‘Forks in the river...’ p. 16

¹¹⁹ Holmes, et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* pp. 74-75

¹²⁰ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power...* p. 57-8

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 232

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 242

¹²³ Holmes et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* p. 76

heavyweights, and perhaps most critically to this study, the IN is to support the public, and Indian, good of the freedom to use the seas.¹²⁴

The 2009 DWP provides a relatively more authoritative illustration of Canberra's perception of itself in the world. Australia's concentric rings are not too unlike India's. It is geographically-minded with its direct deterrence and defence of Australia against state and non-state armed attack in its first concentric ring. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) must be able to deter and defend Australia from armed attacks independently by controlling its sea and air approaches. The second ring encompasses the security, stability and cohesion of the 'immediate neighbourhood', which includes Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, East Timor and the Pacific Islands. For Canberra, these states must not be allowed to become a threat, or the source of a threat. In this ring, the ADF is expected to partake in more coalition-based stability and security operations, akin to past missions in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. However, unilateral missions are not excluded. Moving into the third ring, Canberra's interests in the wider Asia-Pacific region are shown in desiring general strategic stability and securing the northern approaches of Indonesia. Here, the ADF is expected to contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific, meet the 'external' challenges of its partners and fulfil Canberra's alliance obligations. Finally, its fourth concentric ring is the manifestation of Canberra's desire to preserve the international order in the face of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, state fragility and failure, climate change and resource scarcity. Here, the ADF is again pictured as operating in a multilateral and coalition environment.¹²⁵

New Delhi and Canberra echo a **fourth harmony** in a concentric-ring analysis of their grand strategic positions. Underpinning all of these concentric rings are continued

¹²⁴ Holmes et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* p. 77

¹²⁵ Australian Government, *Defending Australia* pp. 12-13

economic development and trading within the globalised system, as their widest concentric rings show. To secure their shared global interests in trading via the seas, their immediate concerns must be addressed or contained.

To clarify the harmonies they are summarised here: **(1)** neither state has an NSS. **(2)** Both states see 'modern' threats and deterring and winning statist wars as the first priorities for their armed forces. If Australia's first and second concentric rings are combined – and aligned with India's first concentric ring – **(3)** influencing neighbours and the defence of the homeland are common themes to both states. Indian wishes to counter Chinese influence in its neighbours, and Australian desires in keeping Indonesia as a (friendly or permissive) democratic state, a valuable counter-terrorism partner and a crucial member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)¹²⁶ are similar in the way that they seek to surround themselves with friends, or permissive states. Indeed, Indian overtures to Bangladesh seem to be gaining ground with closer ties developing between the political elites of both states; relations are 'blossoming'.¹²⁷ And finally, **(4)** both states wish to participate in the global trading system.

IV – Strategic Dissonances

In their outer concentric rings India and Australia wish to see their influences extend beyond their immediate neighbourhoods. Here dissonances emerge. The **first dissonance** is that whilst the end of influencing neighbours is the same, the means are different (unilateralism and multilateralism). India may influence the entire Indian Ocean region independently; showing the manifestations of a Monroe Doctrine (see chapter four). Australia however, wishes to influence its neighbours as part of an 'order building' plan. This 'order-building approach' is the centrepiece of Australia's efforts in Asia, and

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 35

¹²⁷ *The Economist*, 'Embraceable you', 30/07/2011, p. 47-48

may be the most direct route to the sort of Asia that Australia wants; a stable one that participates in the rule-based international order.¹²⁸ This ‘most direct’ route to the Asia that Australia wants is indicative of its final ring, participation within the rule-based system, contributing to the protection of the system where and when needed around the globe. As for India, its ‘system-protection’ duties such as preserving good order at sea and preserving general stability, even with Australia in the ‘arc of instability’¹²⁹, are mixed in with its greater aspirations as a nuclear weapons state (NWS) and a potential permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Australia has supported India’s bid, perhaps as a result of the potential compatibility of Australian and Indian interests in the Indian Ocean region and the Asia-Pacific.¹³⁰

Moving on from the concentric ring analysis, the different long-term aspirations bring to the fore the **second dissonance** between India and Australia – demographic and economic differences preclude Australia from aspiring to the same degree of military and economic influence as India, even if it desired it. As demographics have ‘significant strategic moment’, Behm describes Australia as a population dwarf – less than 2% of that of either China or India.¹³¹ Indeed, India’s small neighbours sometimes see India as a giant imperial neighbour.¹³² Whilst Australia may be a giant relative to Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia, they are peripheral in strategic terms compared to the ending era of weak Asian powers, and the relative decline of the United States, long Australia’s ultimate security guarantee. As Lyon notes, Australia is not looking for a replacement to the USA as a guardian, yet its primacy may become ‘patchy’ in the decades ahead.¹³³ In short, India will become a power beyond Australia’s league. An Australian trinity (or

¹²⁸ Lyon, ‘Forks in the river...’ p. 3

¹²⁹ Holmes et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* p. 160

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 160-163

¹³¹ Behm, *Strategic Tides...* pp. 25-26

¹³² Cohen, *India: Emerging Power...* p. 266

¹³³ Lyon, ‘Forks in the river...’ pp. 2, 23-26

tripod, as Lyon calls it) of grand strategic objectives between alliance, self-reliance and engagement with Asia¹³⁴ needs to be balanced for Canberra to find its place within the greater triangle of relations between the two Asian giants and the Americans. Behm resonates in so far as the Australian need for continuing partnership with the United States and New Zealand and the imperative for action against 'strategic lodgement'.¹³⁵ For India, the need for alliance is not critical as it is for Australia as a relatively weaker power in potential terms for the century ahead. Autonomy, self-reliance and freedom from external restraints are important in Indian strategic thinking.¹³⁶

As Australia has to centre its position in a growing Asia, it also has to find itself. In stark contrast to India's confident self-image as a civilisation, not merely a nation-state,¹³⁷ Australia is struggling to recognise its own identity. This is the **third dissonance**. Indeed, by Australian standards, Behm's assertion that India has yet to develop a strong sense of itself as a strategic entity¹³⁸ seems un-justified. India today looks to Kautilya, Ashoka, Gandhi and Nehru for inspiration.¹³⁹ India's history, traditions and culture may predispose India towards a benevolent role (in their view) in the world.¹⁴⁰ This may run contrary to Kautilya's teaching of treating neighbours with common borders as antagonists,¹⁴¹ yet states such as Nepal and Bangladesh may be given vassal status.¹⁴² Nevertheless, the Kautilyan example shows that modern India may pick and choose from various influences as a civilisational entity. If Australian identity is not the subject of an established consensus, strategic culture may be difficult to identify in the way it may inform grand strategy, and vice versa. Strategic culture is circular in nature, provides and

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 1

¹³⁵ Behm, *Strategic Tides...* p. 7

¹³⁶ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power...* p. 14

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 52

¹³⁸ Behm, *Strategic Tides...* p. 32

¹³⁹ Holmes et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* pp. 18, 154, 176,

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 61, and Cohen, S. *India: Emerging Power...* p. 52

¹⁴¹ Kautilya, *The Arthashastra...* p. 520

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 521-522, 572-573

constrains strategic options for decision-makers based on culture, society, and shared experiences.¹⁴³ However, it is essential to understand that strategic culture, as a distinctive set of beliefs, values and habits regarding the threat and use of force, exerts *some* influence in the formation and execution of strategy. Strategic culture does not necessarily determine policy choices, yet it is a tool to attempt to see the world through the eyes of others.¹⁴⁴

This is important to note because it could well be that “one of the principal hurdles to Australia’s fuller Asian engagement lies not in Asia but in [Australians themselves]”.¹⁴⁵ Lyon continues:

“We seem likely to find ourselves drawn into a more intense debate about our own identity as we contemplate our regional role. Such debates have proven divisive before and may well do so again. Indeed, the closer the ties between Australia and its potential Asian partners, the greater the need for Australians to see their strategic future as irrevocably tied to the region.”¹⁴⁶

The debate surrounding Australia’s ‘torn’ identity, as Samuel Huntington put it, will likely continue well into this ‘Asian century’.¹⁴⁷ Suffice to say, Australia is distinctly Western in culture, yet has Confucian economic ties¹⁴⁸ – and to add to Lyon’s analysis, an increasingly Confucian-dominated strategic environment. Australia may suffer from a touch of permanent exile; being the ‘odd man out’ in Asia.¹⁴⁹ This is in stark contrast to India’s millennia-long civilisational history.

¹⁴³ Holmes et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* pp. 12-13

¹⁴⁴ Macmillan, A., Booth, K., Trood, R. ‘Strategic Culture’ in Booth, K., Trood, R. (eds.) *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999) pp. 5, 8

¹⁴⁵ Lyon, ‘Forks in the river...’ p. 2

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 12

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 13

V - Domestic Politics

This study is centred on general grand strategy and navies; a thorough analysis of domestic politics is beyond its scope. Cohen and Dasgupta ascribe restraint as a characteristic of Indian strategy - while India's economic growth may reduce the traditional burden of limited resources to strategic assertion, it does not guarantee an end to strategic restraint.¹⁵⁰ Despite the general strategic continuity between New Delhi and the IN, "India's military modernization suffers from weak planning, individual service-centred doctrines, and disconnect between strategic objectives and the pursuit of new technology."¹⁵¹ The service-centred doctrines may exist in reality, despite the IN asserting the value of joint operations with the other services.¹⁵² Public opinion in India may have a restraining 'default setting' on Indian military assertion, and the prospect of setting up an inter-service chief of defence staff has met resistance from the military-wary public and the pride-sensitive air force and navy.¹⁵³ The IN may indeed have a challenging task ahead of as it wishes to educate its people, particularly during peacetime, over the merits of an active and competent navy.¹⁵⁴ Similarly, the RAN faces the same task in educating the Australian people over the peacetime tasks and relevance of itself to Australia's needs.¹⁵⁵

VI - So what?

What does the study above tell us about the intended Indian and Australian uses of the sea, and what ends will their maritime strategies and assets serve? Both states use the sea for the post-modern notion of participating in the globalised maritime trading

¹⁵⁰ Cohen, S. P., Dasgupta, S. *Arming Without Aiming: India's Military Modernization* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010) p. 1

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2

¹⁵² IHD, *Freedom to Use the Seas...* pp. 2-3, 12, 18

¹⁵³ Cohen, Dasgupta, *Arming Without Aiming...* pp. 14, 40

¹⁵⁴ IHD, *Freedom to Use the Seas...* p. 97

¹⁵⁵ RAN, *Australian Maritime Doctrine...* p. 46

system. However, as the illustration of New Delhi's and Canberra's concentric circles show, Australia may be more post-modern in its approach as it only refers to independence and self-reliance in the direct defence of Australia. Indeed, "[Australia] is a country that's never gone to war alone. [It] would have to accept some important constraints on [its] strategic options. [Australia] could still be a force for good in the world – but, frankly, not much good."¹⁵⁶

This chapter concludes that whilst both states are inherently post-modern in their desire to see 'the use of the sea for all' in 2011, both are preparing for a shift (or a reversion?) to the modern concepts of national uses of the sea for national life and critical resources should the political and strategic environment worsen in future. Despite the three dissonances above, both states seem to be strategising for a modernist turn in future events yet do not neglect post-modern capabilities. A hedging behaviour is evident; both states seem to wish to enjoy the benefits of the post-modern system yet are retaining modern capabilities as the modern system and the threats related to it are not trivial.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 33

4: Maritime Strategy and Capabilities

“In a disaster, you don’t rise to the level of the situation; you sink to the level of your training.”

John L. Levitow¹⁵⁷

I - Introduction

This chapter’s aims are twofold: first, to describe the IN’s and the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) stated intentions and classify them according to the modern and post-modern paradigms; second, to illustrate the current capabilities, assets and planned future acquisitions of the two navies. This chapter determines that there is general continuity between navy and government in both states. The previous chapter dictated that India should have a greater modern disposition, and Australia to be more inclined towards the post-modern paradigm. Both states wish to participate in the global maritime trading system, yet only if their modern concerns of direct defence are satisfied.

This chapter first discusses the Indian maritime strategy in a continental war with Pakistan. The role of the IN in a continental war is paramount, and likely to be the key driver of Indian threat perceptions for at least the next decade or so.¹⁵⁸ However, this is not the sole concern of the IN – it has broader interests and may be pursuing a Monroe Doctrine in the Indian Ocean. Second, Australia’s Creswellian continental defence strategy is illustrated to demonstrate its strongest modern tendencies, coupled with the Fosterite expeditionary defence strategy to show Australia’s post-modern flair. Both

¹⁵⁷ Soh, S., United States Air Force (USAF), ‘Ethics’ http://truthout.org/files/nuclear_ethics.pdf USAF ethics briefing for nuclear missile staff. Related news article on disclosure of document: Leopold, J. ‘Bible-Based Ethics Program For Nuclear Missile Officers Quashed by Air Force After Exposé’, *Alternet*, 05/08/2011, http://www.alternet.org/news/151929/bible-based_ethics_program_for_nuclear_missile_officers_quashed_by_air_force_after_expos%C3%A9 (accessed 06/08/2011)

¹⁵⁸ IHD, *Freedom to Use the Seas...* p. 99

India's and Australia's broader visions enmesh the modern and post-modern paradigms together to show a hedging strategy from both states.

Before moving on, a short survey of the budgets is required to show the investments both states are committing to their armed forces. The Australian defence budget has been steadily declining since 1994, hovering at around 1.7% of gross domestic product (GDP) with 2008 and 2009 being the exceptions in the downward trend with increases to 1.82% and 1.94%, respectively.¹⁵⁹ The Indian defence budget has remained steady since 2008 and at the 2010 budget was 2.5% of GDP.¹⁶⁰ The 2010 defence budget of India reached US\$38.4bn, and Australia's at US\$24.5bn.¹⁶¹ The IN received 14.54% of the defence budget in 2009 – a reflection of the landward priorities of India.¹⁶² Unfortunately ascertaining a similar proportion of the budget for the RAN has proven to be difficult. However, given the greater joint and post-modern nature of Australian naval activities (the Fosterite pragmatism) one may assume a greater allocation of funds to the RAN than the IN in their respective defence budgets. With approximately \$14bn between the defence spending of India and Australia, we may see greater disparities grow in favour of India if its economy continues to develop at high growth rate into the 21st century.

II - Continental war

India's immediate threat is Pakistan. This inquiry does not deal with the nuclear equation in great detail for two reasons: it is beyond the scope of this study and the sea-leg of a possible Indian nuclear triad is still in an embryonic stage;¹⁶³ and the IN believes that there is space and time for conventional maritime operations under the nuclear

¹⁵⁹ Khosa, R. *Australian Defence Almanac 2010-2011* (ASPI, Australia, 2010) p. 90

¹⁶⁰ Hackett, *The Military Balance...* p. 33

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 223, 237

¹⁶² Cohen, Dasgupta, *Arming Without Aiming...* p. 17

¹⁶³ Holmes et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* pp. 96-105.

shadow.¹⁶⁴ Suffice to say, the IN subscribes to the deterrent and 'no first use' role of India's nuclear arsenal.¹⁶⁵ It appears that the IN subscribes to Waltz's 'more may be better' and nuclear rationality arguments.¹⁶⁶

IN Rear Admiral Raja Menon attempted to articulate a maritime strategy for a continental war; he criticised Mahan and Corbett in their skirting of the issue where a continental power has no interest in fighting overseas.¹⁶⁷ Menon's discussion of Gorshkov's coastal flanking and of Castex's hypothetical land war between two adjacent coastal powers lead to the realisation of a critical function of the IN: coastal flanking in a war with Pakistan.¹⁶⁸ Castex believed that one had to use manoeuvre to the greatest possible extent to overcome limitations imposed by geography; the (relative) speed and scope of naval warfare favoured the offense against a tied-down defender.¹⁶⁹ To Menon's liking, Castex was not fixated on the glorified oceanic battle; in a maritime war, the final goal of navies in continental wars would be amphibious operations.¹⁷⁰ Using the case studies of the American Civil War, the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and the French experiences in 1870-1 and 1914-18, Menon convincingly argues over the greater significance of coastal and riverine operations compared to bluewater operations for neighbouring coastal powers at war with each other.¹⁷¹ However, in defence of Mahan's continental views, Sumida wrote:

"Mahan criticized... Nelson's advocacy of amphibious operations in support of land campaigns and... opposed overseas expeditions. But these views were applied to circumstances in which the opposing side possessed—or was supposed to possess—the

¹⁶⁴ Cohen, Dasgupta, *Arming Without Aiming...* p. 23

¹⁶⁵ IHD, *Freedom to Use the Seas...* p. 75

¹⁶⁶ Waltz, K. 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better', *Adelphi Papers* no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981)

¹⁶⁷ Menon, *Maritime Strategy and...* pp. 30-32

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-39, 42

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-61

capacity to dispute sea command. Mahan reasoned that in such a case any attempt to project power from water to land risked naval assets that were needed to preserve the general control of the oceans, upon which all depended.”¹⁷²

As discussed in chapter 2, Menon missed the permeability of sea control in Mahan’s work, but the point remains: India would need to achieve a relevant amount of sea control at a relevant time in a relevant place to enact amphibious operations against Pakistan. This requires a coastal ship-to-ship capability to attain a *sufficient degree* of sea control so that the IN could undertake operations in more direct support of the land war through coastal flanking.

This does much to support the coastal utility of aircraft carriers. RAN Rear Admiral James Goldrick asserted that the IN’s deployment in the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 war was a “text book example of how a clear superiority in both technology and numbers... can allow the effective use of naval forces in support of a land campaign.”¹⁷³ The carrier INS *Vikrant* was deployed to the Bay of Bengal where it could take advantage of a weak Pakistan Air Force (PAF).¹⁷⁴ Goldrick noted the ‘amphibious question’ over Karachi, and criticises the lack of IN and Indian Air Force (IAF) coordination.¹⁷⁵ This is echoed in the MMS: “an opportunity for conduct of an outflanking amphibious assault was missed in 1971.”¹⁷⁶

The fact that the IN’s aircraft carrier was sent to the most important objective of the 1971 war¹⁷⁷ and deployed in an offensive posture during the 2001-2002 war scare¹⁷⁸ shows that in a continental war and crises aircraft carriers are valuable (not only for

¹⁷² Sumida, ‘New insights from...’ p. 102

¹⁷³ Goldrick, J. *No Easy Answers* (South Godstone: Spantech & Lancer, 1997) p. 68

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 75

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 100

¹⁷⁶ IHD, *Freedom to Use the Seas...* p. 18

¹⁷⁷ Goldrick, *No Easy Answers...* p. 70-71

¹⁷⁸ Scott, ‘India’s “Grand Strategy” for...’ pp. 107-108

bluewater operations). As a result, we cannot interpret investments in naval air capabilities as infallible indicators of a bluewater or oceanic approach to maritime strategy. The INS *Viraat's* extension of service until after 2020 and the acquisition of MiG-29Ks to replace the ageing *Harrier* aircraft cannot be pinned exclusively as part of either a coastal or bluewater strategy.¹⁷⁹ The same dual-use logic applies for ambitious Indian plans for a three-carrier fleet based on the *Vikramaditya* and two indigenously-built carriers.¹⁸⁰

At present the IN consists of ten destroyers, twelve frigates, one nuclear-powered submarine (SSN), six conventionally powered submarines (SSK), 24 corvettes, 27 amphibious ships and 48 logistics and support craft.¹⁸¹ Contrasting this with Pakistan's eight attack submarines, nine frigates and ten patrol and coastal craft (India has 48), India enjoys a clear numerical advantage over Pakistan in the maritime domain. However, a fuller comparative analysis of Indo-Pakistani littoral military strength must take into account Pakistani and Indian coastal land-based forces. Naval forces must contend with stiffer levels of non-naval resistance as they approach a hostile coast.¹⁸² There is doubt over the *actual* as opposed to the perceived Indian advantage over Pakistan on land.¹⁸³

The IN's MMS allows us to attempt to match Menon's coastal-continental thinking with the IN's stated doctrine. The MMS describes the IN's primary ends as deterring and winning wars; its means would be a bluewater navy.¹⁸⁴ At first we see dissonance between Menon's continental maritime strategy and the oceanic tendencies of the MMS.

¹⁷⁹ *The Economic Times* (India), 'Navy to operate *Viraat* aircraft carrier for another decade', 19/01/2011 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-01-19/news/28430950_1_indigenous-aircraft-carrier-hms-hermes-ins-viraat (accessed cached copy of page on 16/08/2011)

¹⁸⁰ Holmes et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* pp. 83-84

¹⁸¹ Hackett, *The Military Balance...* pp. 239-240

¹⁸² Menon, *Maritime Strategy and...* p. 85

¹⁸³ Cohen, Dasgupta, *Arming Without Aiming...* pp. 15-16

¹⁸⁴ IHD, *Freedom to Use the Seas...* p. 9

The MMS displays a schizophrenic contrast. It adopts an oceanic, rather than a coastal, outlook, yet at the same time it declares greater emphasis towards littoral operations when compared to India's old maritime strategy.¹⁸⁵ It speaks of adopting an oceanic approach to strategy on one page yet declares that influencing operations ashore is the primary role of maritime force employment on the next!¹⁸⁶ Menon claims that India has learned that a pure bluewater maritime strategy does not affect the outcome of a critical land war.¹⁸⁷ These apparent contradictions are not juxtaposed if we consider the IN's broader remit. So far, the IN has a clearly 'modern' approach: it recognises state-on-state conflict as a major concern (irrespective of perceived likelihood). Finally, Menon believes that national strategies should plan for wars that take longer than predicted, and for navies to become more significant the longer a war drags on.¹⁸⁸ For example, a blockade may require time to begin to bite. In a long war, crippling Pakistani oil supplies may require an Indian bluewater task force to selectively blockade the Gulf of Oman from Pakistan-bound tankers. The MMS describes blockade as one of its roles, alongside a recognition that the IN must prepare for long, as well as short, wars which would make blockade more effective.¹⁸⁹

III - Indian Ocean interests

If India is to realise all of its grand strategic objectives, it must look beyond the Pakistani threat. As illustrated in the previous chapter, the Indian Ocean region cannot be neglected by the IN and New Delhi. The deployment of the USN's 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal, as much as anything else, led to India's development of a Monroe Doctrine (MD),

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 10-11, 101

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 10-12

¹⁸⁷ Menon, *Maritime Strategy and...* p. 55

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 70

¹⁸⁹ IHD, *Freedom to Use the Seas...* pp. 43, 106

which Cohen described as a tough and uncompromising attitude to its neighbours.¹⁹⁰ Holmes, Winner and Yoshihara (hereafter Holmes et al) expanded the concept of the Indian Monroe Doctrine: they reject it as a slogan to justify regional hegemony, and an apparent rough consensus now exists on its meaning which informs Indian foreign and military policy: India *should* be preeminent in the Indian Ocean region.¹⁹¹ They outline three possible futures for India's MD: free-rider, constable and strongman.¹⁹² The details shall not be repeated here as it speculates over the future course of Indian policy and does not provide a useful lens of analysis for the modern and post-modern paradigms. Suffice to say, all versions of the Indian MD appear to include elements of both the modern and post-modern approaches. Even the 'free-rider' navy expects the continued development of a sea based nuclear deterrent (SSBNs)! Holmes and his colleagues' MD categorisation hold little direct utility for this study as the IN does not presently meet the requirements of the 'free-rider' navy - two to three aircraft carrier task forces (only one exists). This categorisation uses aircraft carriers and SSBNs as primary quantitative indicators, and differing degrees of multilateralism, unilateralism, militarism and defence industry indigenisation as qualitative indicators of which MD policy India would have adopted. Recognising the blurred nature of these categorisations, it may be a useful tool for analysing the Indian Navy in the decades ahead when it successfully (re)develops a multi-carrier capacity.¹⁹³ What is most relevant from Holmes et al for this study is that, in general terms, India certainly feels that it should be preeminent in the Indian Ocean region. The method of using aircraft carriers as a key indicator of a Monroe Doctrine is imperfect; as stated above, aircraft carriers can prove their worth in a continental war for India, not only in projecting power across the Indian Ocean.

¹⁹⁰ Cohen, *India: Emerging Power...* p. 137

¹⁹¹ Holmes et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* p. 45

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 50-52

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55

David Scott illustrates Mahanian visions from India over its strategy in the Indian Ocean, and echoes Holmes et al in claiming that India sees its manifest destiny; the IN is the heir of the British Royal Navy's Indian Ocean regional dominance.¹⁹⁴ In reviewing the Mahanian tendencies of the IN in the Indian Ocean, Scott covers a mixture of modern and post-modern missions. The well-known Mahanian tendencies of large fleet(s) for state-on-state war, power projection, control of chokepoints and a string of naval bases do fit into the modern paradigm easily.¹⁹⁵ The MMS invokes the Albuquerque strategy of securing critical chokepoints into the Indian Ocean.¹⁹⁶ As mentioned in the previous chapter, India has scepticism over international institutions and perceives the UN as a forum for realpolitik.

To situate the modern task of keeping good order at sea in home waters, one must bring in the other post-modern elements raised by Scott. If New Delhi wishes to keep good order in neighbouring littorals, the IN and the coastguard would logically be policing its own. For example, India has agreed to patrol the Mauritian EEZ.¹⁹⁷ The MMS encourages assistance to weaker neighbours to keep good order at sea.¹⁹⁸ Another powerful example of Indian naval post-modernism is its performance during the 2004 Tsunami HADR operation.¹⁹⁹ Scott's interpretation of India's assertiveness in Sri Lanka and the Maldives in the late 1980s and early 1990s rests on external recognition of India's responsibilities as an interventionist in the Indian Ocean region.²⁰⁰ As Sri Lanka and the Maldives were facing non-state threats, the IN has proven to be acting in a post-modern sense already. Former Western Fleet Commander Awati stated that the IN needs to

¹⁹⁴ Scott, 'India's "Grand Strategy" for...' p. 119

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 98-101

¹⁹⁶ IHD, *Freedom to Use the Seas...* p. 59

¹⁹⁷ Scott, 'India's "Grand Strategy" for...' p. 114

¹⁹⁸ IHD, *Freedom to Use the Seas...* p. 40, 60-61

¹⁹⁹ Scott, 'India's "Grand Strategy" for...' p. 114

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 104

expand and encourage 'geo-cultural' links with many of the island states.²⁰¹ This could be interpreted as a post-modern tendency in trying to build a maritime consensus. The MMS displays strong post-modern credentials: "many of the concerns – such as the stability of mis-governed states, the fight against fundamentalism and terrorism, the safety of SLOCs and the use of state power to prevent [weapons of mass destruction] proliferation – are common interests of the navies in the region."²⁰² This hints at a necessity for post-modern sea control and expeditionary operations, but the MMS does not explicitly mention them. However, 2011's TROPEX exercise was the first to use the IN's new amphibious craft which were interned from the USN.²⁰³

The Indian anti-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa is difficult to describe as being post-modern as it is concerned with the *direct* defence of (international) shipping, and is not part of the American-led Combined Task Force-151 anti-piracy operation. Despite this the Indian Navy touts the post-modernist merits of preserving international trade.²⁰⁴ The IN has been active in engaging with other naval powers: 2003-2005 saw joint naval exercises between India, Iran, Russia and France.²⁰⁵ The annual Malabar exercises, a joint Indo-US programme since 1992, now sees Japanese and Australian participation. China has depicted this as a "Quadrilateral Initiative" intent on encircling China.²⁰⁶ The IN views these joint exercises as opportunities to enhance cooperation, understanding and *intra*-IN interoperability.²⁰⁷ This blends together modern ends and post-modern means.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 106

²⁰² IHD, *Freedom to Use the Seas...* p. 41

²⁰³ *India Defence*, 'TROPEX 2011 - Indian Navy to Exercise Amphibious Capabilities in Tri-Service Wargames', 12/02/2011 <http://www.india-defence.com/reports-5033> (accessed 17/08/2011)

²⁰⁴ Indian Navy, 'Exercise with Foreign Navies', *Indian Navy* website, <http://indiannavy.nic.in/ForeignVisits.htm>, (accessed 17/08/2011)

²⁰⁵ Scott, 'India's "Grand Strategy" for...' p. 114

²⁰⁶ Holmes, et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* p. 162

²⁰⁷ IHD, *Freedom to Use the Seas...* p. 88

Scott's lengthy details on Indian naval acquisitions portray India's twin track approach, which is modern and post-modern. India's 'beefing up' of its domestic naval infrastructure is a modern enabler, whereas India's extensive cooperation with Russia, for example, belies post-modern acquisition practices and enabling.²⁰⁸ This is echoed in the MMS as the IN states indigenisation as a goal, but it must 'occasionally' yield to the necessities of combat readiness.²⁰⁹

In sum, the IN retains a generally balanced fleet of bluewater and littoral capabilities. India is constructing a modern navy, so that it has the decision of action over a wide range of missions from SLOC and blockade control to littoral HADR. Perhaps the most convincing indication that India is going down the modern path for its *means* is the shift from Soviet-designed and -built ships in the 1970s and the 1980s towards stealth ships co-designed by Russia and India, built in Indian shipyards and other ships built and designed entirely within India.²¹⁰

IV - Creswellian and Fosterite strategy

The two schools of Australian strategic thought are the Creswellian and the Fosterite. Michael Evans describes their twenty-first century descendants as the defender-regionalists and the reformer-globalists, respectively.²¹¹ For simplicity's sake, the Creswellian and Fosterite terms will be retained. The Creswellian school is described by Evans as upholding the Cold War-era 'Defence of Australia' doctrine forged in the 1980s. This strategy focuses on the direct defence of Australia via its own national means in the 'sea-air gap' to the north of the island continent. Geographically determined, this school is inward-looking and is primarily concerned with statist threats to Australia's shores and

²⁰⁸ Scott, 'India's "Grand Strategy" for...' pp. 115, 118

²⁰⁹ IHD, *Freedom to Use the Seas...* p. 116

²¹⁰ Holmes, et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* p. 88

²¹¹ Evans, M. 'Overcoming the Creswell-Foster divide in Australian strategy: the challenge for twenty-first century policy-makers', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* (61:2, 2007) p. 198

sea lines of communication. This school is adverse to expeditionary and coalition operations and heavy land forces as they divert resources from combat aircraft and submarines.²¹² Against a materially superior Asian foe, Australia may consider turning towards submarine warfare to counter the enemy's numerical superiority on the surface. Perhaps a Corbettian 'fleet-in-being' strategy may have to be considered if the United States fails to provide battlespace dominance in a conflict with Australia against a capable navy.²¹³

The 2010 RAN Doctrine touts the merits of an Australian bluewater capability (minus aircraft carriers) as bluewater conditions exist just beyond Australia's shores, and traffic en route to Australia must pass through numerous chokepoints and densely populated SLOCs, or wide expanses south of the Sandison line.²¹⁴ Australia's fleet is much smaller in number than its Asian contemporaries – to Australia's 18 major surface combatants and submarines, China boasts 145, Japan has 68 and South Korea manages a sum of 60.²¹⁵ As daunting as the numerical differences are, this does not mean that these navies are an immediate threat to Australia. Despite the lack of immediate statist threat, the RAN Doctrine echoes the 2009 DWP in its main missions – that it must first be able to defend Australia via the 'sea-air gap'.²¹⁶ The 2009 DWP announces the replacement of the current six *Collins* class submarines with twelve new 'future submarines'.²¹⁷ The 'Defence of Australia' is not wholly defensive in nature; it adopts offensive imperatives such as strategic strike. The three air warfare destroyers (AWD), eight future frigates and twelve future submarines will provide a diversified strategic strike menu, as Canberra currently

²¹² Ibid., pp. 198-202

²¹³ Corbett, *Principles of Maritime Strategy...* pp. 214-215

²¹⁴ RAN, *Australian Maritime Doctrine...* pp. 19-23

²¹⁵ Khosa, *ASPI Australian Defence Almanac...* p. 46

²¹⁶ RAN, *Australian Maritime Doctrine...* p. 46

²¹⁷ Australian Government, *Defending Australia...* p. 70

relies on the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) for its strategic strike capabilities.²¹⁸ This century may see the emergence of an Australian ballistic missile programme as well as a ballistic missile defence programme, if certain parts of the 2009 DWP are to be realised.²¹⁹ Therein lie the limitations of the Creswellian school – a strategic strike capability means nothing if Canberra has no land forces to neutralise enemy targets ashore. Dug-in hardware and personnel may not be nullified by sea and air superiority.

The Fosterite school moves beyond the sole determinant of geography. Although one can argue that a coastal outlet, as a geographical determinant, compels any government to be outward looking and not to treat the sea as merely a barrier. Fosterites seem to pay greater dues to (white) Australian history as a colony and maritime-dependent nation. Fosterite strategy views coalition operations with the United States as beneficial as it helps uphold the global maritime trading system upon which Australia depends, and Washington is Canberra's most efficient means to maximise its grand strategic objectives. Australia has rarely acted alone in its security interests. Creswellian strategy may have shaped the ADF for the 'wrong wars' and gave insufficient weight to transnational threats and to the necessity of 'winning the peace', as well as the war. For Fosterites, a maritime strategy is based on a 'sea-air-land' gap with a strong emphasis on joint operations between all ADF services, including a combined arms Army. Unlike the Creswellian school, the Fosterites claim to have a strategy for an army, and an army with a strategy.²²⁰

At this juncture of the study, the modern and post-modern affinities of both strategies are clear. The Creswellian strategy favours national autonomy in military capabilities for a continental-island defence. Under this paradigm the statist and modern

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 71, 81

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 53, 62

²²⁰ Evans, 'Overcoming the Creswell-Foster...' pp. 202-207

notions of sea control, maritime protection and 'domestic' good order at sea are comfortable. However, power projection beyond critical Australian SLOCS does not appear to fit in the Creswellian camp. Evans' depiction of Creswellian thought does not allow much room for bilateralism, let alone multilateralism. The Fosterite strategy favours international cooperation in global missions and in defence procurement. No mission is too far from Australia's shores if the stakes to the system are high enough. Indeed, the post-modern navy's littoral and expeditionary operations, good order at sea and multilateral consensus find a welcome home in the Fosterite camp.

Evans criticised official government direction of the ADF as being too Creswellian, yet claimed that in practice Canberra had shown Fosterite pragmatism.²²¹ His criticism rested on the 2000 DWP and the two subsequent 'updates' in 2003 and 2005. Since Evans' article the 2009 DWP has been published. The 2009 DWP appears to give Fosterite strategy its due attention, according to the understanding of Australian grand strategy in the previous chapter. The 2009 DWP continues to state that *primary* force structure determinant of the ADF is the ability to deter and defeat a direct attack on Australia through the sea and air approaches. However, if Australia was to face an insurmountable invader, Canberra appears to expect assistance from Washington.²²² The 2009 DWP appears to subscribe to the notion of the Fosterite 'sea-air-land' gap as it cites expansive geography as a reason for an expeditionary orientation (not a reason to shy away from the world), and the Indian Ocean and South Pacific region are primary strategic and operational regions where Australia has interests in the transnational 'security risks'.²²³

²²¹ Ibid., pp. 207-211

²²² Australian Government, *Defending Australia...* pp. 49-50

²²³ Ibid., p. 52

The DWP continues to show a post-modern flair as it recognises the use of land forces in a littoral role in a maritime strategy.²²⁴

V - Comprehensive Hedging

Canberra views the Creswellian-Fosterite divide as a false one. Whilst both the Creswellians and Fosterites have legitimate strategic arguments, both are flawed unless they accept some validity from the opposing camp. A direct defence of Australia is meaningless if Australia does nothing to uphold the international trading system it depends upon. Furthermore, Creswellian strategy risks standing aloof from regional security risks as the strategic environment could worsen to an intolerable position for Australia. However, Fosterite activism should not be followed to a critical detriment of the RAN's state-on-state fighting and deterrence capabilities. A capability to defend Australia is still needed as a hedge against a reversion to state-on-state wars, especially should post-modern attempts at building a maritime consensus fail. The DWP specifically articulates Canberra's strategic hedging intention.²²⁵

As part of this hedging strategy, Canberra is not neglecting its modern nor post-modern capabilities. As seen above, a significant selection of frigates, submarines and destroyers are on order. At present the RAN has six SSKs, twelve frigates, fourteen patrol and coastal combatants, nine mine warfare craft, thirteen amphibious craft and 24 logistics and support ships.²²⁶ Any operation which requires naval air power in the form of fixed wing aircraft would have to be within the RAAF's continental range. Perhaps the most telling of Australia's views of future conflict are in the acquisition of the AWDs – they would provide air cover for RAN forces from enemy aircraft (which would only be useable by states that can support an air force) and they would provide a maritime strike

²²⁴ Ibid., pp. 53-60

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 29

²²⁶ Hackett, *The Military Balance 2011...* p. 224

capability. Transnational threats are unlikely to provide an airborne threat, thereby making AWDs a primarily, yet not exclusively, 'modern' asset. Australia boasts a range of modern and post-modern capabilities, yet if the RAN is to undertake missions beyond its immediate neighbourhood, it will have to rely on its post-modern internationalised replenishment assets – the RAN claims to be completely interoperable in at-sea replenishment with more than thirty other navies.²²⁷ Australia's strategic trinity (alliance, self-reliance, engagement) determines a post-modern tendency in arms procurement and defence industry. Lyon lists defence technology as one of the key benefits of the ANZUS alliance.²²⁸ As the years pass, this may become increasingly important for Canberra because its technological edge over China and India will have lessened. Even if relative technological excellence is maintained, small numbers may not be enough for Australian interests.²²⁹ The United States may be Australia's way to keep at least on a par in technological terms in the decades to come. Canberra has outlined an intention to pursue a more modern turn in its 'Priority Industry Capabilities', which includes shipbuilding.²³⁰ However, this remains an intention as of 2011 – the same year has seen the continued purchases of foreign naval assets. To name one example, the RAN has acquired the British landing ship dock *Largs Bay*.²³¹ The need for a balance between native industry and foreign purchases is similar to both New Delhi and Canberra.

VI – Grand strategic continuities

The most important conclusion from this analysis is that there appears to be a high level of congruence between both states' interpreted grand strategies and what their

²²⁷ RAN, *Australian Maritime Doctrine...* pp. 1-2

²²⁸ Lyon, 'Forks in the River...' p. 34

²²⁹ Babbage, R. *Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030*, Kodoka Paper no.15 (Kodoka Foundation, 2011) p. viii

²³⁰ Australian Government, *Defence Capability Plan (Public Version)* (Canberra: Defence Materiel Organisation & Defence Capability Group, 2011) pp. 13-16

²³¹ RAN, 'Capability boost as Navy acquires new ship', 06/04/2011

http://www.navy.gov.au/Capability_boost_as_Navy_acquires_new_ship (accessed 14/08/2011)

navies are thinking and are made of. The IN is relatively more modern in its make-up than the RAN. Yet this is not to say the RAN has renounced modern capabilities and does not preclude the possibility of state-on-state war. However, the IN is pushing for modern capabilities beyond its inner concentric rings, and wishes to promote its benign image through post-modern methods both close and far away from Indian shores. New Delhi's and Canberra's grand strategies are built upon core modern defence needs, but furnished with the post-modern end to participate in the global trading system. For example, India, Australia, Japan and the United States use a collective ship reporting system.²³²

As a power dealing with an acute modern threat, India has a much stronger justification for retaining modern capabilities. Furthermore, the Chinese 'string of pearls' strategy mandates an Indian hedge against Chinese encirclement, seen through India's forward basing in the Andaman and Nicobar islands and its improving ties in the Malacca region in its Look East policy. Indeed, some Southeast Asian states hope that India will provide a geostrategic insurance policy against a belligerent China.²³³ Simultaneously, New Delhi has set up shore-based assets for extending India's reach into the Arabian Sea.²³⁴

Australia faces no direct modern threat, yet Canberra still wishes to hedge against possible modern contingencies in the decades ahead. The limits of the Australian economics and population base will be putting brakes on any adventurous intervention policy from Canberra.²³⁵ However, Canberra will have a key leading role to play if it is to deal with possible post-modern crises in this century; Australia will have to deal with the

²³² Rao, P.V. 'Indian Ocean maritime security cooperation: the employment of navies and other maritime forces', *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* (6:1, 2010) p. 134

²³³ Holmes et al, *Indian Naval Strategy...* p. 153-155

²³⁴ Behm, *Strategic Tides...* p. 43

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 64

'inevitable' fate of the small nations of the Pacific sliding into anarchy from poor governance and climate change.²³⁶

²³⁶ Ibid., p. vi

5: Conclusion

I -The paradigms and maritime theory

Chapter two set out the conceptual framework for the analysis of the Indian and Australian navies in this study. The modern naval paradigm focused on state-on-state warfare, narrow self-interested power projection, good order in home waters and a preference for bilateralism and scepticism of international institutions. The modern navy is enabled by a national military-industrial complex and a balanced fleet for full spectrum operations. The modern navy (and state) is solely concerned with its own interests, not that of the system. The post-modern paradigm rested on sea control for the exclusive purpose of littoral operations, expeditionary operations for interventionist ideals, international good order at sea and the maintenance of a maritime consensus. The post-modern navy is enabled by contributory fleets and the international defence market and industry. The post-modern navy is interested in the defence of the international system, not solely national interests. The conceptual framework allowed for the compatibility of Mahanian and Corbettian theories to show that neither are irrelevant today. Mahan in particular has been associated with bluewater battle concepts, but he did foresee an era shaped by an international consortium defending a system of international maritime trade from those who would work against it. Mahan's recognition of the permeable nature of sea control (like Corbett) is applicable to both modern and post-modern paradigms, as a post-modern threat (like the Somali pirates) may develop their own SLOCs.

II - India, Australia and concentric rings

Chapter three illustrated the Indian and Australian governments as active participants of the globalised maritime trading system with a blend of modern and post-

modern strategic 'ends'. Using a concentric ring analysis, India and Australia have immediate and latent modern concerns, respectively. India is concerned with its land borders with Pakistan and China, where the IN is should prove useful in a continental war or crisis with Pakistan. Australia's first concentric ring shares the modern trend with concerns over its direct military defence in the sea and air approaches. Australia, like India, is trying to influence its immediate neighbours to maintain a favourable strategic position. The grand strategic harmonies were not shared throughout the outer rings. Unlike India, Australia cannot count on being a regional behemoth. India may seek to make the Indian Ocean region its sphere of interest, yet Australia seeks an order-building stratagem. The third chapter concluded that despite differences in culture, geography and the statist threat-level, both India and Australia wish to use the sea for modern and post-modern ends.

The fourth chapter concluded that Indian maritime strategy needs to be both oceanic and continental if it is to secure India's holistic interests ranging from the containment of Pakistan to energy security and winning friends and influencing people. Indeed, China's string of pearls may demand a consequent Indian ability to counter it. India cannot afford to let its energy routes be threatened, much like China. Australia's maritime strategy may indeed be more post-modern, particularly at greater distances and Australia's strategic tendency to be a 'team player'. However, it retains a modern maritime strategy for its own defence. The fourth chapter also showed the physical realities of these thoughts. India's aircraft carriers will prove useful in a littoral and oceanic context, its large order of naval combatants underline its hedging against state-on-state conflicts. Australia is intent on doubling its attack submarine fleet and is considering diversifying its strategic strike options to include ballistic missiles and

maritime assets, not only the RAAF. However, both navies exhibit a (relative) significant amphibious capability.

III – A Modern and post-modern hierarchy: keep your powder dry

True to Till's claims over the modern and post-modern paradigms,²³⁷ both New Delhi and Canberra exhibit a blend of modern and post-modern grand strategies. Hedging against a return of state-on-state conflict is common to both states, and their navies reflect this by modernising their bluewater warfighting capabilities yet not neglecting interventionist and multilateral interoperable capabilities. As the years pass, it will be important to note if India realises its potential in resources and becomes more assertive as its naval capabilities grow. Australia will have to position itself in the India-China-USA triangle.

Maritime and naval capacities are one of the key indices of understanding what the states in question believe the prospects for cooperation and conflict are to be in future. We can determine from this study that Canberra and New Delhi are not averse to post-modern tendencies, but are hedging their bets and not neglecting their modern concerns. Their use of the sea is both for themselves and for the system that they are parts of; neither will forgo the capabilities to defend their national use of the sea.

Till ascribes the reluctance to participate in the protection of the global trading system and protectionist economic policy to 'modern' states²³⁸ – therefore by inverse definition, India and Australia are 'post-modern'. However, they are 'modern' in the sense that they "make contingency preparations against the possibility that should globalisation collapse... the world would indeed have a warlike future."²³⁹ According to

²³⁷ Till, *Seapower: A Guide...* pp. 17-19

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14

²³⁹ *Ibid.*

Till, post-modern states “adopt defence policies that are likely to produce navies whose focus is on the maintenance of *international* rather than national security”.²⁴⁰ Given the grand and maritime strategies illustrated, that does not appear to be the first *raison d’être* of neither the IN nor the RAN. As the modern – post-modern paradigms are not mutually exclusive, we may be able to assign ‘modern’ and ‘post-modern’ means to a hierarchy of modern and post-modern ends within a single state or more. The inner concentric rings of India and Australia show a ‘modern’ attitude to the employ of their navies. Yet, as we traverse the outer concentric rings, the attitude does shift (in different degrees) somewhat towards the ‘post-modern’. Post-modern strategic ends may be dependent on a prior satisfaction of modern strategic ends.²⁴¹

The blend of both modern and post-modern approaches lends itself to an understanding of ‘smart power’.²⁴² The ability of the IN and RAN to act against modern and post-modern threats is aimed to give their governments the widest array of military and diplomatic options to deal with a wide degree of immediate and potential problems. These should complement other tools of grand strategy or national power, such as cultural attraction and economics. It is certain that these two navies do not view the modern state system as a thing of the past, or the globalised maritime trading system as a mechanism to prevent state-on-state conflict. Both India and Australia are hedging their bets. The IN and RAN retain modern capabilities to defend their territories and critical SLOCs, yet open themselves to post-modernist system-protection and HADR capabilities. This is situated within the higher modern priority of India and Australia’s concentric rings; there is no indication that the IN and RAN are investing more in post-modern capabilities *to the detriment of* their modern defence needs. Here the point of comparison

²⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 13. Emphasis Till’s.

²⁴¹ Ibid., p. 349

²⁴² Nye, *The Future of Power...* pp. 209-210

shows that India's greater power potential and cultural identity, contrasted with Australia's relatively lesser-power status and uncertain cultural identity, has not given it a unique approach to the international system – in so far as its attitude to globalised post-modernism and statist modernism are understood. Despite the 'long peace', there is evident scepticism from New Delhi or Canberra on whether it will last indefinitely.

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