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**“In whose Interest?”**  
**: Securitisation of European Commission**  
**Development Aid**

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## List of Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
APF	African Peace Facility
AU	African Union
BOND	British Overseas NGO for Development
COPRI	Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
CGD	Center for Global Development
CS	Copenhagen School
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DG	Directorate General
DSE	Direct Security Enhancement
EC	European Commission
ECD	European Consensus on Development
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP	European Parliament
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organisation
IPA	International Peace Academy
ISE	Indirect Security Enhancement

LDC	Least Developed Countries
LIC	Low Income Countries
MIC	Middle Income Countries
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Overseas Development Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RCT	Rational Choice Theory
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

*For Dad*

# **“In whose Interest?”**

## **:Securitisation of European Commission**

### **Development Aid**

#### **Abstract**

In light of the increased merging of the security and development concepts, this dissertation intends to analyse to what extent European Commission development aid has been securitised since its era of ‘passivism’ ended at the start of the century. In affirming this occurrence in other developed countries, this dissertation explores how and why the Commission has securitised their aid. Additionally, the ramifications of this process on conceptualising the Commission and its degrees of independence will be examined. Given the unique status of the EU, this paper will also explore what effects securitisation of European Commission aid has on securitisation theory and European integration theory.

## Chapter One: Introduction

Much of the contemporary debate surrounding development centres on its alleged subrogation to the interests of donor's national security. While questions of donor self-interest have always been at the heart of development aid, the trend in the post-Cold War era was to nonetheless focus on poverty alleviation in the developing world. However, in the post 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001 environment, the emerging concern regarding development aid is its merging with security (McDonald, 2004).

This dissertation will argue that there has been a partial shift in donor development policy from poverty alleviation to donor (national) security, as of late, and this trend can be recognised in the discourse and delivery of European Commission (EC)<sup>1</sup> development aid. The case will be made that the gradual increase in competency of the Commission in this area, and the securitisation of development aid, has wider implications on how to view the European Union (EU) beyond its intergovernmentalist conceptualisation as an International Organisation (IO).

Securitisation theory evolved primarily in the mid 1990s, however, the field is still lacking in empirical substance (Leonard, 2007,p.73). In addition, while there have been many comments on the shift of development aid towards an increased focus on security, the research into this

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<sup>1</sup> In this dissertation, EC will exclusively be used to represent the European Commission. Where it signifies the European Community, the distinction will be made. The European Union (EU) represent the collective body of the institutions and it's 27 member states.



occurrence with regards to the European Commission is understudied (Holland, 2002). This dissertation aims to fill both of these voids in addition to providing an analysis on the aforementioned implications for the EU.

The substantiation of a trend towards securitisation has extensive implications for the developing world. The utilisation of development aid to increase the security of donors diverts funds away from the alleviation of poverty in developing countries. Michael Brzoska(2008,p.134) notes that some academics see it as an attack on the very essence of development as an anti-poverty policy. Rita Abrahamsen (2005) concluded that in Africa, securitisation may have damaging implications as it subtly reframes Africa from a humanitarian/development issue to a security issue, thus creating suspicion and hostility towards Africa's people.

Therefore, the overarching research question of this dissertation is, to what extent has the European Commission sought to securitise its development aid? Within this, the sub-questions this dissertation intends to analyse are; 1.) Has there been a merging of the concepts of development and security in the field of development aid? 2.) Has the European Commission utilised aid for its security interests? 3.) Can the European Commission be recognised as an independent actor in the development field? 4.) What implications does the securitisation of aid have on conceptualising the European Union through European integration theory?

The dissertation will be structured on three principal chapters. Chapter two will provide an overview of development and securitisation theories, and outline how they have merged in general. Chapter three will examine the EC's historical role in the field of development. It will then proceed to investigate how the EC's discourse and delivery of aid has changed to reflect an increased security focus. Chapter four questions why the EC has further linked development and security. In essence, what are the EC's motives or is this member state action in disguise? Additionally, this chapter will explore the implications of greater securitisation of aid on the integration of the EU through rational choice theory.

## **Chapter Two: Securitisation and Development: In Theory and Practice**

### **Introduction**

Historically, the academic and policy linking of security and development was, for the most part, excluded from either discourse. Both fields of study focused on areas that reinforced this separation; for example, development studies as a field focused on the negative effects of military spending in recipient countries (Brzoska, 2008,p.133). While development aid can be seen to have played an indispensable role in swaying developing countries during the Cold War to either side of the ideological sphere(Wanlin, 2007), the explicit inclusion of security, beyond the geo-political interests of the Cold War, can be recognised in the rethink of development in the 1990s(Woods, 2005). Security, in this sense, focused on ‘human security’, as poverty in developing countries was increasingly related to conflict(Paris, 2001). Human security, the formulation of security in terms of the individual and not territories, as presented in the United Nations Human Development Report (1994), was then the clearest linkage yet of development and security. However, in the post September 11<sup>th</sup> (henceforth 9/11) environment, security is increasingly being re-conceptualised to represent the security of the donor. In effect a repositioning in part to the Cold War mentality of national security(Suhrke, 2004, McDonald, 2004). The national security of the donor (henceforth, ‘donor security’) recognised the state as the principal referent object of security as it is the highest source of governing authority (Booth, 1994,p.34).

Given the historical academic separation of the development and security fields, this chapter will overview the changing nature of the development concept and argue that these two fields were explicitly linked in the 1990s through human security. The recent theoretical evolution in security studies of securitisation will be outlined and defined in terms of this dissertation. Thereafter, reasons pertaining to why states give aid will be presented. It will be argued that donor self-interest has been, in most cases, a fundamental attribute of providing aid. Thereafter, in the post 9/11 environment, it will be argued that a trend has emerged of aid being utilised for the security interests of donors, thereby shifting the priorities of aid from human security to national security.

### **Development Theory**

Roger Riddell (2007,p.17) notes that foreign aid is often defined by its *purpose*; however, to understand the purpose, of development aid, it is first necessary to ask the essential question of *what is development?* President Truman's 1949 inauguration speech is often credited as the commencement point of the modern-day development era(Abrahamsen, 2005,p.63, Sachs, 1992). President Truman(1949), while initially stating that the primary threat in the world was communism, perceived development in *economic* terms but recognised that “[t]heir [developing countries] poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas”; in essence, linking United States (US) development and stability to the economic and democratic development of the wider world.

The early focus of development concentrated on the reduction of poverty in the South primarily through the promotion of economic growth (Duffield, 2001, p.23). Development, in this sense, or otherwise known as Modernisation Theory, was seen as developing countries following the same growth path as pioneered by Western nations (McKay, 2004, p.186). Proponents of this view, for example Walt Rostow (1960), understood development in a linear economic fashion that was measured through such narrow indicators as Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Des Gasper (2004, p.28) notes that in its crudest form, development equates to economic growth. However, this *narrow* understanding of development raised criticisms from other academics. David Hulme and Andrew Shepherd (2003, p.403) noted that it understood “the poor as a single homogeneous group whose primary problem is low monetary income and has led policymakers and their advisors to search for ‘the policy’ that increases the income of ‘the poor’”. John McKay (2004, p.189) remarks that new theories on development emerged in the 1960s due to the persistent failure of developing countries to actually develop. These theories looked at *wider* development issues such as the structure of the international system in dependency theory; or the expansion on this idea in World Systems theory; or proponents of ‘wider development’ posit the expansion of freedom to the individual<sup>2</sup>.

However, over time new theories developed, with two of them being prominent today; Neo-Liberalism and Human Development. The former emerged in the 1980s and can be seen as a resurgence of modernisation theory. It proposes the liberalisation of international trade and sees development in economic terms that occurs through market and private investment. It requires

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<sup>2</sup> For Dependency Theory see Raul Prebisch (1959); World Systems Theory see Immanuel Wallerstein (2004); Wider Development (also Human Development Theory) see Amartya Sen (1999).

developing nations to undergo structural adjustment programmes to configure their economies to the western formats (McKay, 2004, Duffield, 2001, p.29, Hall et al., 2004). This form of development was favoured by the US under the idea of the Washington Consensus<sup>3</sup>. Conversely, Human Development posits that “[d]evelopment can be seen... as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy...[f]ocusing on human freedom” (Sen, 1999, p.3). This approach emphasises the improvement in individual capabilities (Riddell, 2007, p.133-4). It considers other factors beyond the economic progress such as the ability to attain education, health and security. Moreover, security, in this sense, is the concern of the individual; human security. It is measured by the Human Development Index from the United Nations (UN), with the 1994 report being a turning point in linking development and (human) security.

Human security came to prominence in the mid 1990s, owing to it being seen as an alternative to the *narrow* economic growth models of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It was developed in tandem with many other security theories as academics began to analyse security beyond the traditional state centric military approach that was dominant, and rarely challenged, during the Cold War (Paris, 2001, Wæver, 1995). One such theory, developed primarily by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), is securitisation theory. This theory has sought to ‘broaden’ and ‘deepen’ the security concept, however, the state remaining as the primary object; a fundamental disparity from human security. The next section will present a theoretical overview of securitisation and define it in terms of this dissertation.

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<sup>3</sup> The Washington Consensus, as developed by John Williamson, are a set of market-orientated reforms for sluggish states to utilise for development (see Maxwell 2005; Clift 2003).

## Securitisation Theory

While still recognising security in terms of 'survival', the Copenhagen School (CS) has sought to 'broaden' the understanding of security to consider issues of the state beyond the military realm such as environmental, economic, societal and political issues. In addition this theory has sought to 'deepen' the security concept by considering the *influence* other actors beyond the state have on security, such as individuals and international organisations (Buzan et al., 1998, Williams, 2003, Wæver, 1995).

In securitization theory, security is not regarded as an objective condition but as the outcome of a specific social process(Williams, 2003,p.513).The act of securitising an issue is a social construct. As initially posited by Wæver(1995), security is established as a *speech act*. That by simply uttering the word an individual moves a particular issue into a specific area and claims the right to use whatever means are necessary to block it (Wæver, 1995,p.55). The CS plot issues within a three staged spectrum; non-politicised, politicised and securitised. The act of securitising moves an issue beyond the realm of politics to the latter stage and a securitising agent claims a right to treat an issue by extraordinary means(Buzan et al., 1998,p.26). However, the securitising act should not been seen as a positive. The CS appreciates that the act itself can have negative connotations. Wæver(1995,p.56-7) seeks to reposition the traditional debate from *what* or *whom* threatens to *should* a phenomenon be treated as a security issue in the first place, as the act itself frames an 'other' in a negative light in the mind of the audience. Michael Williams(2003,p.523) affirms that casting an issue in security terms potentially risks contrasting the 'other' in Schmitt terms of either friend or enemy.

Buzan *et al* (1998) stipulate that in order for a securitising act to be effective they require the approval of the relevant audience<sup>4</sup>. The facilitating condition of this approval is dependent on; (1) the speech act following the grammar of security; (2) the securitiser having a level of authority for which the audience will believe the claims to be valid; (3) the threat can be validated through demonstrable 'evidence'. They go on to state that a successful securitisation has three components; (1) it is framed as an existential threat; (2) thus requiring emergency action; (3) the binding rules between securitiser and audience are affected thus permitting the act(Buzan et al., 1998).

Thierry Balzacq(2005,p.172) criticises the CS's approach as it conceptualises security as a conventional procedure and the felicity circumstances hold a high degree of formality. Balzacq(2005), Abrahamsen(2005) and Bigo (2002) see securitisation as a gradual *process* along a more open-ended spectrum from normalcy to risk, where an issue can be placed on the security agenda without it being recognised as an immediate existential threat. Accordingly, the conditions of success for a securitising act are less meticulous. In this light, securitisation is seen as a *process* and not as a rigid structure as presented by the CS. Moreover, Ralf Emmers(2004,p.6) is critical of securitisation being solely understood as a speech act. According to Emmers, securitisation has two dimensions; discursive (speech act) and non-discursive (policy implementation and action).

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<sup>4</sup> The audience is the designated group that the securitising agent seeks to convince as they have the power of approval for a specific action (Buzan *et al*,p.41).



Conceptualising securitisation as a singular discursive act in strict three point structure, as the CS seeks to, limits the operational ability of the theory as it would only conform to near perfect events. Therefore, this dissertation, taking in the criticisms of the theory, understands securitisation as a gradual process to remove an issue from the political sphere that involves both discursive and non-discursive actions where an existential threat is not mandatory for an issue to be securitised.

Given the analysis of development and securitisation theory, the next section will seek to answer the question ‘why give aid?’ by analysing the donor motives. Subsequently, development aid will be defined in terms of this dissertation.

## **Development Aid**

### *Donor Motives*

President Truman’s speech is considered to be the commencement of the modern era in development and consequently, development aid. However, aid had existed before. Riddell(2007,p.24) notes that the United Kingdom (UK) and France both provided aid to their colonies in the 1920s and 1940s. Therefore, while President Truman’s speech was not a revolution in designing a new concept, it did shape the existing concept. It conveyed the idea more broadly to the developed world and beyond aid solely to colonial territories. The principal that underpins foreign aid, according to Riddell(2007,p.1), is “[t]hose who can should help those

who are in extreme need”. The underlying assumption of this principal is that it is the donor’s responsibility to selflessly help. Initially, US aid cannot be seen in this light. President Truman(1949) stated that the motives for US assistance lay in helping poor people “realize their aspirations for a better life”. However, this ‘better life’ was underpinned in a capitalist nature and posited communism as the threat. Additionally, President Truman(1949,para. 46 & 55) linked the success of these developing countries to the success and security of the US. Consequentially, any aid that was provided went to nations supporting US views(Thorbecke, 2000, Aderinwale, 2006). As aid is rarely given solely for altruistic reasons(Berthelemy, 2005), when examining aid, it is essential to understand the motives of the donor as they can often conflict with the altruistic principal Riddell proposes.

Riddell(2007,p.91-2) outlines eight motives in donor decisions to give aid; (1) to help address emergency needs; (2) to assist recipients achieve their development goals; (3) to show solidarity; (4) to further the donor national political and strategic interests; (5) to help promote donor-country commercial interests; (6) historical/colonial ties; (7) to strengthen global public goods; (8) aid based on human rights decisions. While simultaneously appeasing to many motives, most donors have strong tenets to a few. The UK and France have traditionally been large sponsors to their former colonies; in 2006, eight of their top ten recipients of aid were former colonies(OECD, 2008b). Scandinavian aid is focused towards reaching the poverty goals of their target countries(Cox et al., 2000). In this regard, Scandinavian aid is often rated highly for its effectiveness by the Commitment to Development Index(CGD, 2007) while other countries receive a unfavourable review; US, Italy and Japan. Aid from these countries is often criticised

for being highly tied<sup>5</sup>, with a principal focus on developing donor commercial interests and/or dependent on national, political and strategic interests(Shah, 2008, Riddell, 2007, Otter, 2003). Unsurprisingly, these motives can be recognised in the donor's public discourse and delivery of aid. Taro Aso (2006), the then Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that aid was given to enhance the Japanese national interests and that the first use of the Japanese people's money was to benefit the Japanese later on. US aid is also explicit in stating that its purpose is to "furthering America's foreign policy interests"(USAID, 2008). This discourse is reflected in the delivery of their respective aid. Japanese aid is highly concentrated around East Asia and highly tied to Japanese companies and interests(OECD, 1999). During the 1980s and 1990s US aid was greatly linked to the promotion of the Washington Consensus. With the exception of US special interest in Egypt and Israel, Alberto Alesina and David Dollar (2000) note that US aid in the 1990s was focused on poverty, democracy promotion and encouraging economic openness. In addition, over 70% of US aid has been tied to promoting US commercial interests to the extent that this practice was formalised in US law in 2002(Riddell, 2007,p.99-100, Cornell University Law School, 2002).

### *Defining Aid*

Craig Burnside and David Dollar(2000) concluded that when aid is given with a high regard for donor self-interest then it is often ineffective in achieving development. Accordingly, in such incidents, aid can be seen as a foreign policy tool of donors. Jean-Claude Berthelemy (2005)

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<sup>5</sup> Tied aid is aid with a donor stipulation on where the money must be spent (invariably in the donor country). It is estimated to cut the value of aid by 25-40% (United Nations 2004: see also Deen 2004).

concur and in his study notes that all donors, with the possible exception of Switzerland, are egoistic in the delivery of their aid to differing degrees. Riddell(2007,p.17) remarks that definitions of aid are driven and shaped by those (invariably donors) who have an interest in particular types and forms of aid. Therefore, any definition of aid is dependent on the motives of donors and will have a self-interested edge to it. Consequently, in defining development aid, this dissertation seeks to utilise the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definition. The definition is not absolute, as it is formulated by the members of the 30 developed countries in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD and, therefore, donor driven. However, it is widely cited, reached by consensus by the major donors and utilised by the UN. OECD defines Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) as:

“Grants or Loans to countries and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having a Grant Element (q.v.) of at least 25 per cent]. In addition to financial flows, Technical Co-operation (q.v.) is included in aid. Grants, Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded ... Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance payouts) are in general not counted.”(OECD, No Date)

This definition is still contested by certain members of the OECD. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) are concerned as some OECD member states seek to expand the definition to incorporate additional donor security spending (BOND, 2006). Since all OECD members are committed to meeting the UN Resolution 2626 in 1970 of providing 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI), and currently, as many states are failing, any expansion of ODA would

facilitate donors in achieving this goal(United Nations, 1970, Riddell, 2007, Brzoska, 2008). By linking development aid to conflict, some donors want to include spending on the removal of landmines, prevention of child soldiers and even international peacekeeping. British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND) (2006) is concerned that the inclusion of military/security costs into ODA would permit a diversion of funds away from non-strategic countries. Furthermore, the use of ODA to meet the security objectives of ‘donors’ reframes a military/security action in terms of a development/humanitarian act; thereby, securitising aid and making it more acceptable to the public (or audience).

Riddell(2007,p.103) affirms that aid is a tool used by the donor to promote development. During the Cold War the different sides of the ideological divide used aid as a self-serving tool to promote *their* conception of development, establish commercial interests and/or as a coercive instrument(Robinson et al., 2000,p.2). The fall of the Berlin Wall did not change this(Hjertholm et al., 2000). Donors focused their aid toward either the Washington Consensus (USA, IMF and World Bank), thereby instilling the neo-liberal model upon developing states, or, to a lesser degree, Human Development/Security strategy (Canada, Norway and United Nations). However, after 9/11 the focus of donor aid can be seen to have changed (Paris, 2001, Reality of Aid, 2002, Aderinwale, 2006, Brzoska, 2008). Donors became increasingly concerned with the security of their own state. The early proponents of human security have shown little interest in the topic post-9/11(Suhrke, 2004) as academics questioned the usefulness of the concept and policy makers had difficulty applying it<sup>6</sup>. Moreover, by framing the referent object as the individual,

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<sup>6</sup> See *Security Dialogue* 2004, 35(3), for a wide range debate into the theoretical and practical usefulness of human security.

many of the self-interest motives outlined above are redundant. Donors refocused aid from the external promotion of Western ideas on development to more inwardly looking policies that sought to protect the donor from external security threats. This process, of refocusing aid towards the security of the donor, has been termed the securitisation of development aid (Aderinwale, 2006, Bagoyoko et al., 2007). The final section will now link the two previous theoretical concepts with a contemporary analysis of development aid.

### **Security and Development**

The development economists of the Cold War era held that development was a precondition for security; in essence, with economic prosperity came security. However, after the Rwandan genocide, a country that was considered an aid darling previously, human security proponents argued the opposite (Krause et al., 2005, p.455-6). Debate regarding the primacy of either facet over the other illustrates the merging of the two fields in the 1990s and led to the increased discussion on the security-development nexus. David Chandler (2007, p.365) cites the nexus as a fashionable way of depicting the increased linkage between security and development. The International Peace Academy (IPA) sought to balance the debate in affirming that both were co-conditioned on the other; “[l]ong-term development is regarded as hinging upon security, and lasting security depends upon sustainable development” (Hurwitz et al., 2004, p.1). Thus, the security-development nexus becomes an inseparable and mutually reinforcing relationship (Aning, 2007, p.4).

Nonetheless, as Ngaire Woods(2005,p.393) asserted “[a]fter 9/11 the global security agenda shifted” and with it the interests of donors. While human security sought to position the individual as the referent object, post 9/11 donors refocused towards the recipient state<sup>7</sup>. With the greater belief that ‘their security effects my security’, in line with the earlier Truman Doctrine, and terrorism being linked to poverty; donor interest changed to enhancing their own security through strengthening the security of recipient countries (see OECD, 2003, DFID, 2005, Ardenne, 2005). Security is still conceived as a precondition for development, but, in a state centric manner and not of the individual. By donors framing recipient countries as the source of existential threats, they securitised aid, thus permitting the utilisation of aid beyond its traditional scope, consequently, serving the security self-interest of the donor. Boosting the volume of aid was no longer seen as the only way to eradicate world poverty, but as ‘a non-military response’ to international terrorism (Carbone, 2005,p.125). Consequently, donor aid policy shifted to include security interests and none more so than US foreign aid. While the 2002 National Security Strategy placed development aid at the forefront of US foreign policy, on par with defence and diplomacy, the OECD(2006) criticises the US for not making poverty reduction a primary objective of US foreign policy. Riddle(2007,p.95) notes that for many this blurred the distinction between aid for development and aid for national interests. In 2004, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)(2004,p.7) declared that their role was “a vital cornerstone of national security”, thus attempting to advance their value to, but moreover, protect their role in US foreign policy as development agencies have increasingly been actively engaging with security related matters to safeguard their own existence(Youngs, 2007, Duffield, 2001). While USAID has been aligning itself closer to US national interests, their relative

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<sup>7</sup> See Charlotte Bunch (2003) on the set back of human security and the resurgence in national security post 9/11.

control of US ODA has fallen. While chartered in 1961 as the primary US agency for managing US aid (OECD, 1998b), in 2005, USAID controlled 38% of US ODA, down from 50% in 2002. In the same period, the US Department of Defence management of ODA rose from 5% to 21%(OECD, 2006). In addition, even the make-up and direction of US aid has changed as it repositions itself closer to national interests. In 2005, over 7% of USAID's budget was devoted to counter terrorism initiatives, a seven-fold increase on the previous year (Padilla et al., 2006). Despite the fact that US aid to Africa has increased since 9/11, Ayodele Aderinwale(2006) notes that “[m]ost of American aid to African countries is security related and aimed at furthering the war on terror”. Pre 9/11, the US utilised aid as an instrument of foreign policy coercion. Yemen's no vote on the UN Security Council's approval of the 1990 US action in Kuwait was immediately 'rewarded' with all US aid being suspended(Deen, 2002). US aid as an instrument of coercion continued after 9/11. Kwesi Aning(2007-8) observes how the US used aid (and the threat of violence) to attain Pakistani support in the “war on terror”. In the six years before 9/11, Pakistan received \$245 million in ODA from the US; in the same period after 9/11, they received \$3450 million<sup>8</sup>. US ODA, which was central to Congressional budget cut politics of the 1990s (Milner et al., 2006), is now insulated from such debates as it directly seeks to serve its own security interests.

This phenomenon of aid used for the national security interests of the donor is not exclusive to America. The trend can also be seen in aid from Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Japan, and UK (Kiyokazu, 2004, Padilla and Tomlinson, 2006, Woods, 2005, Spillane, 2003). However,

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<sup>8</sup> Own workings from OECD(2008) CRE Database. All US allocations to Pakistan in 2001 included in post-9/11.



this is a trend; it is not a revolution in the use of aid. Aid has always had an element of self-interest but, in post-9/11 there has been a greater enhancement on this trait. Nevertheless, poverty alleviation, in line with the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG), is still the substantial element of donor aid(Hayman, 2007,p.371). The Netherlands, for example, have applied an integrated approach of simultaneously serving their own security interests and meeting other *wider* development goals(Ruysenaars et al., 2006).

It is fundamental for democratic governments to have a development aid policy to at least appease the public(Otter, 2003). In general, however, the public has little knowledge of the particulars of this policy and hence, its mere existence is enough to satisfy them, leaving the policy formulation in the privy of the political elite(Otter, 2003). Consequentially, this has ramifications when considering the securitising agent-audience relationship in securitisation theory. If the audience has a limited interest in the area, then the establishment of a strong existential threat is not a requirement for the issue to be securitised. With regards to aid, a casual link has been made between the beneficial use of aid and the ‘war on terrorism’ in the donor discourse(DFID, 2005). Security is now seen as a precondition for development, when previously the opposite belief was held(Ball, 2001, Ardenne, 2005). Through positioning security first, securitising agents have sought to manipulate aid budgets to meet their geo-strategic goals.

While the audience has shown little interest in terms of their state’s development policy, when it comes to aid from the European Commission, a more complex situation is present.

## **Chapter Three: European Commission Development Aid: Past and Present**

### **Introduction**

It was at the behest of France that the founding treaty of the European Economic Community<sup>9</sup>, the Treaty of Rome (1957), included a section on an external development policy. This policy sought to integrate (pool resources) a proportion of member states development aid budgets under the EU flag and in theory, under EC control. Initially, the European Development Fund (EDF), was established as a preferential trading and economic assistance agreement between the EU's member states and their colonies and territories(European Commission, 2007, Cameron, 2007,p.158)<sup>10</sup>. While early direction of the EDF focused on francophone Africa, this changed with each enlargement of the EU thereby instilling the national preference of each member state. With the UK joining the EU in 1973, the majority of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific<sup>11</sup>(ACP) were inaugurated into the Lomé Convention in 1975(Cox et al., 1997). Early agreements were negotiated out of a sense of responsibility and this was reflected in the favourable trading terms that the developing countries received(Vogt, 2006,p.162). However, this is contested by William Zartman(1975,p.325) who noted that the underlining purpose of this assistance was for EU countries to retain influence in these countries given that their military and

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<sup>9</sup> The European Economic Community was renamed the European Union (EU) in 1992 under the Treaty of Maastricht. For simplicity, the EU will be used when referring to the organisation before and after the Treaty of Maastricht.

<sup>10</sup> EDF agreements were signed, normally on a five year term (however, more recently in ten year cycles), by the EU and the participating developing states. While the first agreement has no particular name, later agreements are entitled after the cities there were signed in: Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou. See European Union (2007).

<sup>11</sup> See European Commission (2007) for list of countries that are included in the ACP

sovereign control was near an end, thereby further instilling the member states self-interests in the project. While early agreements were economic in nature, the asymmetric relationship between the EU and the ACP permitted the former to gradually impose more political conditions on the latter due to their lack of cohesion and relative low development(Hunt, 2003,p.162)<sup>12</sup>. It is upon these conditions today, and in its proportional focus of development aid to the ACP states, that the EC has sought to partially securitise its aid in a discursive and non-discursive manner. Beyond the ACP agreements, the EC has also implemented different development instruments with non-ACP states in Latin America, Asia, Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, which also have a partial securitisation focus.

Given the brief historical overview of the EU's development policy above<sup>13</sup>, this chapter will seek to analyse *how* the EC securitised 'its' proportion of EU aid. In addition, particular focus will be given in this chapter, and the next, to the degree of independence the EC has. Firstly, the relationship between the EC and the member states in development policy will be discussed through a historical analysis of control in the formation of EC policy. The new leadership role the EC has attempted to create for itself will be examined. Subsequently, it will be outlined how the EC has sought, in discursive and non-discursive means, to securitise its aid in the post-9/11 environment.

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<sup>12</sup> Note, Hunt (2003) argued that political conditions were always present but in a development ideological manner.

## **Development Policy: Member States versus European Commission**

Understanding the relationship between the EC and the member states in the EU's development policy is crucial because it "represents the oldest form of the international activities of the EU"(Vogt, 2006,p.159). Therefore, any commanding role on the part of the EC in this field would indicate a primitive form of foreign policy by the EC and consequentially, would have ramifications for the understanding of the integration of the EU<sup>14</sup>. In addition, a greater role for the EC would demonstrate the organisations ability to overcome the historic unwillingness of states to cede control of their ODA.

Historically, member state interests have been central to the policy direction of EC development aid. However, as this section will argue, in recent years it has been an active EC that has increasingly asserted itself in directing the focus of its own aid. Nevertheless, this role is primarily dependent on the ability of the EC to continually serve the interests of the member states and not, as it publicly claims, to provide more effective aid.

Carbone(2005,p.31-5) divides the history of the EC-member state relationship in foreign aid into three stages. The first stage posits that from its inception until the mid 1980s, EC policy was highly focused on developing regions that member states sought to retain influence in,

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<sup>13</sup> See Carbone (2007) and Holland (2002) for detailed history of EU development policy.

<sup>14</sup> This will be discussed further in chapter four.

particularly France<sup>15</sup>. France was adamant on protecting its interests in its former colonials and utilised EC development to that end in the ACP(Cameron, 2007,p.173). The EC, given its then intergovernmental nature, followed the policy guidelines of member states, thereby failing to establish a distinct role for itself(Cameron, 2007,p.161). After successive enlargements of the EU, from the end of the 1980s until the late 1990s the EC development policy, in rhetoric and focus, underwent a profound transformation; Carbone's(2007,p.32) second stage. French hegemony was reduced as Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic states and the UK (also known as the northern states) pressed for more conditions on EC aid and sought to widen its focus beyond the ACP countries. With the end of the Cold War, aid to Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean became a significant focus of the EC due to the concerns from southern member states who sought aid allocations on the basis of domestic political concerns; i.e. migration or strong colonial links(Woods, 2005,p.405). This aid was notably more politicised than ACP and, significantly, was managed by Directorate General (DG) External Relations, and not by DG Development which previously administered aid to this region(Carbone, 2007,p.48). This has led to a division of labour within the EC where now three DG's seek to play an active role in development policy; DG Development, DG External Relations, and DG Trade. This internal divide will be analysed later with regard to foreign policy security goals.

The third stage commenced in the early 2000s, notably before 9/11, with the emergence of a distinct role for the EC and the ending what Carbone(2008b,p.339) described as EC 'passivism'. This stage had its foundations laid in the Treaty of Maastricht, 1992. While the Treaty structural

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<sup>15</sup>Carbone (2007,p.39) states that France 'hegemony' captured EC Development policy in the initial stages. Notably, every DG Development commissioner from 1958-1984 was French.

provided a limited role for the Commission in development policy as it formed part of the second pillar<sup>16</sup>, the intergovernmentalist section, it did legally, for the first time, establish a strong constitutional basis for development co-operation policies in the Commission and gave the Commission a restricted leadership role(Schrijver, 2005, Colofon, 2007). The Treaty's three main competencies with regard to development policy are: Coherence, Co-ordination and Complementarity (Three C's). The treaty agreed that member states and the Commission would seek to co-ordinated their aid; would ensure that there was coherence between their aid policies and other policies like agriculture and trade; and that aid from each member state and the EC would not conflict with each others thereby seeking to complement each others activities(European Commission, 1992). However, there was barely any implementation by member states initially. Recognition in their official documents was limited and there was even less operation of the agreed competencies in the early years after the treaty's agreement(Colofon, 2007).

Preceding the on set of the third stage, the period from 1990-2000 witnessed an increase of close to 600% in the EC's aid budget. Independent of the member states, the EC rose from the 9<sup>th</sup> largest donor to the 3<sup>rd</sup> largest, with aid distributed all over the world<sup>17</sup>. This rise was supported by claims from the EC that it could achieve greater efficiencies in the delivery of aid. Nevertheless, this phenomenal growth was not without its detractors. It spurred on heavy criticism by some member states; particularly the UK. Claire Short's(2000) much cited piece

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<sup>16</sup> See Simon Hix (2005) for detail on the EU Pillar system.

<sup>17</sup> See OECD CDC database.

described the EC as “the worst development agency in the world” for its poor quality and delayed delivery of aid, and even went on to threaten to withdraw UK funding for EC development policy unless changes were made. Soon afterwards the OECD(2002) referred to the EC as a “timid giant” when it came to aid effectiveness and Holland(2002,p.1) lambasted the EC for its bureaucratic nature and its policy patchwork. More recently, Mikaela Gavas(2006)<sup>18</sup> affirmed that “EU-15 aid is currently delivered by 16 different sets of development agencies”; thereby insinuating that the Commission’s aid is simply an extension of the member states as it fails to differentiate itself. In response to the criticism, the EC has actively made efforts to transform its development policy. Significantly, this transformation appears<sup>19</sup> to have been led by the Commission as it sought to further operationalise the Maastricht Treaty’s competencies towards the end of the decade with increasing success(Colofon, 2007). The EC declaration on development policy in November 2000 cleared up the ambiguity surrounding the competencies and the 2006, European Consensus on Development (ECD) (European Commission, 2006), was a milestone in defining the role of the EC in development policy(EL-Agraa, 2007,p.507-8). This declaration by the EC and the member states significantly utilised the Three C’s and through them assigned the EC a leadership role in the EU’s development policy. Hence, the EC has repositioned itself away from simply duplicating a dominant member state’s policy. In addition to delivery of its own aid, the ECD sought to establish the EC as the primary agent in facilitating coordination and harmonisation in the EU, and, promotion of development best practice and policy coherence with individual member states. Even though it explicitly states in the ECD that the Community’s policy in the sphere of development aid shall be complementary to the policies

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<sup>18</sup> Gavas analyses the EU aid pre-2004 enlargement.

<sup>19</sup> This will be analysed further in Chapter four.

pursued by the member states, Carbone(2007,p.48) affirms that after a previous ECJ ruling, once the EC adopts a decision, no member state can undertake actions that will have adverse consequences for the development policy pursued by the EC . Thus, a dependent leadership role primitively evolves into an authoritarian role. By consequence of the EC's actorness<sup>20</sup> in the third stage, the intergovernmental political debate on the direction of EC aid has diminished thus affording the EC the opportunity to direct its own aid and influence the policies of member states. However, as will be outlined later in this chapter and the next, it has been the focus of aid on security related issued that reduced the political sensitivity of EC development aid.

Throughout this, what has remained core to the EC new leadership role has been its ability to frame its actions in the interests of the member states. The Cotonou agreement, the latest round in the EDF, negotiated by the EC with the ACP states in June 2000, expanded on the Lomé agreements to incorporate recipient's performance of their democratic status and human rights, thereby permitting the EC to suspend aid if the recipient fails certain EU standards. In addition, it strengthened the EU position on *trade*; the EU had sought to end the favourable trading terms to the ACP states and requested reciprocity on trade agreements in the future with ACP states. On *security*; the EC, as will be discussed, has linked its aid to security interests of the member states, and *political make up*; greater conditions for aid have been placed on human rights and free elections in recipient countries, with particular emphasis on border countries of the EU, thereby feeding back into security(Carbone, 2007,p.34-7). These conditions, if used as strictly intended

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<sup>20</sup> Actorness being defined as a level of independent action by the EC.



can ensure the better delivery and effectiveness of aid. However, they do open up the possibility of ‘legitimising’ the coercive use of aid as a foreign policy tool.

### **European Commission Aid in post-9/11**

While it is argued above that wider security interests have inherently been present in EC development aid through its underlining focus on the interests of member states, in the post 9/11 environment, these interests have further manifested themselves in a narrowing of security from the *external* to the *internal*. The 1990s were underpinned by the promotion of the neo-liberal structure culminating in a less recipient favoured, and more coercive, Cotonou agreement with the ACP(Hunt, 2003), thereby enhancing the *external* economic promotion and success of the EU. The events of 9/11 have witnessed a greater refocus of aid towards improving the *internal* security of the donor. The OECD(2007,p.13) was unequivocal in noting the Commission’s resolve to play its part, through the use of development aid, in fighting world terrorism after 9/11. This process, the securitisation of EC aid, occurred both in the discursive and non-discursive as will be outlined below.

#### *Discursive*

The securitisation of aid, as defined in chapter two, is a process of removing an issue from the political sphere that occurs both in the discursive and non-discursive fields. Institutions and academics alike have noted the greater inclusion of security matters in EC development policy (OECD, 2007, Gavas, 2006, Carbone, 2007, Kovach et al., 2006, Vogt, 2006, Woods, 2005, Youngs, 2007). The process of securitising EC aid in the discursive can be recognised in the

more recent linkage of security and development, and the formal and informal downgrading of DG Development within the Commission. The *European Security Strategy (ESS)* (*The Council of the European Union, 2003*), which was overseen by Javier Solana, the High Representative for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, can be seen as a milestone, or a 'revolution' as Loisel(2005) prescribes, in subrogating development aid to the security interests of the EU. It links the security of Europe to the wider world and affirmed that "security is a precondition for development" and noticeably does not mention the reverse possibility, thus taking a firm stance in the security-development nexus. While Henri Vogt(2006,p.168) notes that the logic of this shift is based on that premise that "underdevelopment, poverty, and desperation tend to breed violence, in the worst case terrorism, and there can be no development without security and political stability", he affirms that it is more important to recognise how local insecurity can materialise itself in Europe, thereby underpinning the interest donors retain in giving aid. The ECD(European Commission, 2006) sought to rebalance the security-development nexus by noting that "[w]ithout peace and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur". However, when compared against the EU's statements to assist vulnerable countries in enhancing their counter-terrorism capabilities at the 2004 Madrid Council(Gavas, 2006), the inclusion of "the war on terror" in the latest EDF agreement with the ACP(Kovach and Wilks, 2006), and the open recognition by Louis Michel(2005), the Commissioner for DG Development, on the implications that security and terrorism have had on development policy post 9/11, any attempt to rebalance the nexus in ECD are only fleeting.

The formal and informal downgrading of the DG Development in the Commission only further emphasises the subrogation of aid to security. Carbone(2008b,p.330) notes that EC development policy is a “soft policy” and is vulnerable to more powerful interests. After the Seville reforms in June 2002, the autonomous EU’s Development Council, which dealt with development issues, was abolished and henceforth incorporated into the General Affairs and External Relations Council thus increasing the political direction of development policy(Youngs, 2007,p.15, Bretherton et al., 2005,p.114, Lighfoot, 2008). In addition, a common judgment in Brussels is that since 9/11 the EC Development Commissioner has progressively been excluded from policy deliberations(Youngs, 2007,p.15). This was emphasised in the reduced role DG Development played in the latest agreement EDF as the negotiations on the trade section with the ACP, previously handled by DG Development, were conducted by DG Trade(Carbone, 2008b,p.336). The subsequent inclusion of many issues beyond traditional development issues was cited by one commission employee as to have “killed the EU’s development policy”(Vogt, 2006,p.168). Therefore, statements by Louis Michel and DG Development on the security-development nexus, while moving beyond the traditional conception of development, are recognised as an attempt to protect the DG’s own role in development policy(Youngs, 2007,p.8), in similar retrospect to USAID (see chapter two). The increase utilisation of security language in EC development policy, the downgrading of DG Development and refocus in policy of EC development to incorporate more donor security related issues are part of the discursive process of securitising aid. In addition to this, securitisation of EC aid occurs in the non-discursive as will be outlined below.

### *Non-Discursive*

Whilst the grand formation of policy, EC aid's independence from other interests and DG Development's hierarchical position have changed to reflect the increased security focus of the EC, especially in the aftermath of the Madrid and London bombing (Dover, 2008, p.113-4), the external rhetoric and delivery of this aid has also changed to reflect an 'increased' instability in certain countries (indirect security enhancement) or to meet the security goals of the donor (direct security enhancement). Indirect Security Enhancement (ISE), as defined here, is the use of aid to increase the security/stability in third countries that indirectly increases the security of the donor on the premise that 'their security is my security'; the Truman Doctrine revisited. Direct Security Enhancement (DSE) is the use of aid that purposefully seeks to enhance the security of the donor.<sup>21</sup> This does not delimit aid from also improving the security of the recipient too. Often aid given with a security focus will be beneficial to the recipient; however, it is frequently not focused towards the most pressing needs of the recipients, and consequently, limits its effectiveness in achieving development (Aderinwale, 2006).

### *Indirect Security Enhancement*

EC aid to Sub-Saharan Africa and further a field have had increased incidents of ISE, particularly when placed under the banner of conflict prevention. While the evolution of this terminology in itself is a distinct link of security and development, it will be argued below that the EC has used aid beyond the constricts of ODA. Frequently cited is the use of EC aid in

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<sup>21</sup> What differentiates ISE's and DSE's from aid that sought to increase the donor's security during the Cold War is the high focus and directionality of aid in the post-Cold war era.

funding of the African Peace Facility (APF). The APF, approved by the EU in 2004, is used to fund African Union (AU) peacekeeping operations in Africa, particularly in Burundi, Sudan and Chad (McDonald, 2004, Loisel, 2005). However, €250 million budget is financed by shaving 1.5% of the long term development budget allocations to each African country party to the EDF (McDonald, 2004, Gavas, 2006). The APF is not poverty focused and, even after the expansion of the ODA term by the OECD to include more conflict relevant issues in 2004, the APF is still not considered by the OECD as ODA; in essence, the EC's development budget is funding military peacekeeping operations of the AU (Kovach and Wilks, 2006, Woods, 2005, p.406). This raised concerns with some member states at the time but was finally approved after agreement on it being a one-off measure (McDonald, 2004). Youngs (2007, p.8) affirms that it is routinely listed by diplomats as one of the main achievements in the development-security linkage and one policy maker, noting the leap since 9/11, even suggests that it would have never been agreed five years previously. Hetty Kovach and Alex Wilks (2006) assert that the EDF opened up the possibility of this practice of aid funding security being replicated again, especially in the proposed Stability Instrument<sup>22</sup>. Furthermore, the APF as a 'one-off measure' was overlooked as it was extended, and had its allocation increased to €300 million, in the 2008-2010 budget. Thus, the willingness of member states to permit the continuation of the APF without any significant debate is further evidence of security related aid being removed from the EU's political scope.

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<sup>22</sup> See European Commission (2008b).

Further afield, EC aid to the Philippines has been criticised by the European Parliament (EP) for its focus on combating terrorism. The EC used development aid to support the Philippines in improving the security of their borders. In taking the matter to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the EP argued that the EC over stepped its mandate in seeking to use aid to implement a UN Security Council Resolution 1373 on the fight against terrorism. In its judgement the ECJ ruled in favour of the EP and annulled the original decision on funding the project (European Court of Justice, 2007). While institutional oversight was upheld in this instance, Shennia Spillane (2003) asserts that aid for counter terrorism activities is often incorporated under the 'catch all, ill defined' area of good governance. Therefore, given the marginal role of the EP in development policy (Carbone, 2007, p.50), it can reasonably be assumed that there are other EC counter terrorism projects that have not received the same oversight.

#### *Direct Security Enhancement*

In the commercial sphere the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)<sup>23</sup> and the EDF have benefited the business interests of EU companies, thus underpinning EU economic security. Robert Dover (2008, p.122) notes that the ENP has the explicit aim of shoring up the countries involved as it will create a good and stable trading environment between the EU and the ENP states. Furthermore, many of the programmes tendered in the ENP and the EDF have been awarded to EU companies, thereby providing a measure to boost the profits of EU companies, in addition to providing them market access to developing countries (Dover, 2008, p.124, Cameron, 2007, p.170).

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<sup>23</sup> See European Commission (2008a) for details of the Mediterranean and East European states involved.

EC aid to the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, the 'near abroad', while infrequent during the Cold War, took hold in the mid-1990s and can be seen as a representation of DSE. While encompassing 11%<sup>24</sup> of EC aid in 1987, by 2005 its share had increased to 24% of the total EC aid(OECD, 1998a, OECD, 2007). Consolidated in the ENP in 2004 and under the control of DG External Relations, this aid is considered to have a higher degree of politicisation than DG Development's programmes(Carbone, 2007) and the explicit aim of preserving the EU's security in the region(Carbone, 2008a,p.112). Furthermore, most of the recipients of this aid are middle income countries and consequently, the high focus of aid to this region is in conflict with the national policies of some member states. For example, the UK aims to deliver 90% of its aid to Low Income Countries (LIC) while only 56% of EC aid, less than the OECD average for donors, was directed in 2006 to LIC. Furthermore, out of the top ten recipients of EC aid, only two are considered by the World Bank as LIC(Rosa, 2006, World Bank, 2008, DFID, 2008). Wanlin(2007,p.20), noting that the eradication of poverty is the main objective of EC development policy, affirms that the ENP is inconsistent with this objective as it serves the EU's broader political goals of enlargement and enhancing the Union's own security. Simon Maxwell(2006) cites that the EC's approach is to create a 'ring of friends' in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, thereby externalising the immediate border security of the Union. Thus, a conflict exists internally in the discursive, i.e. aid for poverty eradication as proposed by in the ECD or aid for securing Europe in the *ESS*, and in the non-discursive with the relative high proportion of aid delivery to the 'near abroad' of the EU, in line with the goals of the *ESS*.

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<sup>24</sup> This figure includes EC aid to Middle East. Therefore, the actual figure to the Mediterranean and European region would be less.

Through conditions on receiving aid, the recipients are obliged to implement certain aspects of the *acquis communautaire*, the principle body of EU law, without the definitive prospect of membership(Edwards, 2008). Acceptance of the *acquis* gradually extraterritorialities EU norms and governance on the recipient creating ‘soft security’ as proposed by Sandra Lavenex(2004) , and therefore, has the potential to disarm rogue neighbouring countries. In addition, it creates a barrier against more volatile states further afield and strengthens, what Edwards(2008,p.47) described as the ‘porous’ borders of the EU against international crime, drug and people trafficking, and terrorism. In essence, by securing its neighbours, Europe’s secures itself. The DG External Relations Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner(quoted in Edwards, 2008,p.47), spoke in the same vein when she noted on the agreement of the ENP that “[t]he EU gains improved security around its borders. Increased cross border cooperation will help us to tackle problems from migration to organized crime. The EU gains because our partners sign up to stronger commitments on the fight against terrorism, non-proliferation of WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction], and to the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts”.

The ENP seeks to improve the internal social, economic and military security of the EU by stemming the flow of migrants into Europe. By providing aid to improve the border controls of ENP countries and seeking these countries to enact and enforce stronger laws against third nationals (i.e. nationals from non EU or ENP countries), the EC externalises its own internal security(see Belguendouz, n.d). For example, in Morocco, the EC highest recipient of aid, one third of EC aid in 2003 was channelled towards improving the Moroccan border controls. Additional, Alex Kreienbrink(2005) argues that the recent toughening of Moroccan immigration laws were as a result of longstanding demands from the EC. Furthermore, the EC obligates



ENP countries, in receipt of aid, to sign readmission agreements, thereby permitting the EU to return immigrants to their country of origin or country of transit(see European Commission, 2005). In support of this policy the EC allocated €250 million to fund anti-migration programmes in countries that signed readmission agreements(Mollett, 2004). Fundamentally though, by making migratory movements a security issue after 9/11<sup>25</sup>, the EU framed the migrant as a security threat, subsequently securitising the issue and permitting extraordinary means in utilising aid to resolve the issue. However, Dover(2008p.114) argues that this is a self-fulfilling prophecy as it breeds resentment in migrants, thus creating a security threat.

### **Understanding the European Commission in Securitisation Theory**

The last section detailed the increased incidences of aid focused on the security goals of member states. This section will concisely analyse this phenomenon in terms of securitisation theory and detail some discrepancies between the theory and its applicability to the EC. As noted in chapter two, this dissertation understands securitisation to be the gradual process of removing an issue from the political sphere that occurs both in the discursive and non-discursive. The emergence of a leadership role for the EC as of late and its ability to quell the previous criticisms of EC aid through better serving the interests of member states is the essence of how the EC partial removed developed aid from the intergovernmental and member state-institutional politics of the past. Moreover, the EC's(2003,p.1) ability to frame its role as providing for "A Secure Europe in a Better World", as stated in the ESS, and thereafter, utilising its aid to enhance the direct and indirect security of member states in light of the 'increased' existential threats post-9/11, further

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<sup>25</sup>See Leonard (2007,p.54).

emphasises how the EC, when associating its goals to the security interests of member states, can partially remove an issue from the political sphere. Consequently, the EC has been able to create a significant role for itself in the delivery of aid. However, this raises some inconsistency with securitisation theory.

The EU is the world's largest donor representing 60% of the world's total ODA. Individually, the EC is the EU's largest and world's third largest donor with a budget over \$12,300 million in 2006(OECD, 2008a). Nevertheless, the EU is not a state(Hix, 2005,p.3-4, Siebert, 2002,p.213). It does not have a 'monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion' nor does it have authorisation to directly tax the citizens of the EU. Consequently, the EC is completely dependent on funding from member states. This unique status has ramifications for conceptualising the EC in terms of the referent audience in securitisation theory. Given the public's lack of knowledge in the particulars of development aid (see Chapter two), and their even less awareness of EC development policy compared to national policy(Eurobarometer, 2005), when understanding the audience, as per scribed in securitisation theory, it is necessary to look beyond the public to the member state governments; in essence, the member state governments are the audience, not the public. This immediately presented a barrier for the Commission in seeking a commanding role over its policies and aid programmes. A disinterested public are more inclined to 'approve' EC aid than member states are given the public's lack of information and direct involvement in the decision making process.

Moreover, the unique position of the EC has implications for understanding the facilitating conditions of securitisation theory. Can the EC securitise aid? With regards to the three facilitating conditions outlined in chapter two, the ESS clearly meets the condition of a speech act as it follows the grammar of security given the context in which the act is set and it can be framed/validated through demonstrable evidence in light of 9/11. However, whether the securitiser, the EC, has a level of *authority* for which the audience will *believe* the claims to be valid is questionable. Given that the EU is not a state and the EC does not have any elective mandate, officially the EC does not have any legal level of authority as its powers are derived from the member states and ultimately retained by them. In essence, the vital question is what understanding do member states, the audience, have of the EC? Do they see it as an institution that facilitates intergovernmental bargaining or do they recognise a certain independent level of actorness in the EC? Given the leadership role conferred on the EC in the Maastricht Treaty, the latter is tentatively true. Additionally, the other key point on this facilitating condition is the presence of belief in statements from the EC; thus, questioning the level of trust member states have in the institution. Due to brevity, this cannot be explored further here but to affirm that utilising respected figures in the construction of statements enhances the belief, and thus, acceptability with the member states. Significantly, it is noteworthy to assert that the ESS was written by Javier Solana, the former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), thus bringing a high degree of respectability to the ESS given Solana's previous experience.

This chapter has detailed how the Commission's role evolved from a facilitator of the dominant member states to a tentative 'independent' leadership role as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty and the ECD. From this, the focus of aid, in policy and delivery, from the EC was analysed in the post-9/11 environment. In the discursive, through security leveraged policy statements and the downgrading of DG Development, and in the non-discursive, through the APF and the motives behind the ENP, it was argued that the EC has utilised part of its aid to serve the interests of member states. While this chapter has analysed the *how* question, the vital question that remains is *why*. This will be examined in the next chapter in addition to analysing the ramifications of the EC's new role in conceptualising the EU in European integration theory.

## **Chapter Four – Motives and Interests in Securitisation of European Commission Development Aid**

### **Introduction**

Given the substantial increase in the EC development aid budget in recent years and the increasingly distinctive leadership role being played by the EC, as discussed in the last chapter, this chapter will outline *why* member states have permitted / encouraged the pooling of aid under EC control. In addition, the EC leadership role raises questions of how to understand the EC through integration theory. Therefore, the conceptual link will be made between the EC development policy and European integration, as such a consideration is essential to understanding the motivations and rationale behind European policies (Holland, 2002). It will be argued here that, like in other areas of EU integration, member states seek to pool their resources when it is rational for them to do so and not because of ‘spillovers’ pertaining to other decisions. Nevertheless, the Commission does have a role in this process as at times it is the driver towards greater integration and has the ability to influence the member states interests through its ‘agenda setting’ authority.

This chapter will first outline the motivations for member states in pooling their development aid resources and furthermore, the rationale on *why* the EC in part securitised its aid. Subsequently, a step back will be taken to briefly detail EU integration theory in order to make the conceptual link between EC development policy and European integration by analysing EC development aid through rational choice theory. In summation, the question will be to ask to what degree is this

EC's new role independent from the past? Is this third stage really the end of European Commission passivism as proposed by Carbone (2008b,p.339) or is it the member states acting in disguise through the European Commission?

### **Motivations for Integration**

#### *Member States*

In the past, member states motives for integration were attributable to the high degree of influence from the intergovernmental bargaining process. In Carbone's first stage, member states motivations for integrating were highly influenced by French demands and, thus, came about after the Germans compromised to keep the French 'happy'. Motivations in the second were once again intergovernmental in nature as the northern states sought to widen the focus of aid after the fall of the Soviet Union (Hewitt and Whiteman 2003). The third stage is, conversely, an exception due to the more prominent role the EC has sought to play, thus, limiting the intergovernmental process of the past. While the EC can provide certain 'added value' that no single member state can supply, there are certain sacrifices that member states are required to undergo if the EC is to be effective. These costs will be outlined below and, subsequently, the EC's capacity to overcome them will be detailed.

There are few incentives for member states to pool their development aid budgets under the EU flag. Development aid is often seen as part of a member states foreign policy. Therefore, states have traditionally been reluctant to cede sovereignty in this area(Maxwell, 2006,p.3). Furthermore, Aurore Wanlin(2007,p.1-13) cites that the principal obstacle in advancing Europe's

development aid lies with member states unwillingness to relinquish a potential coercive foreign policy instrument and the positive internal and external visibility benefits they solely receive in giving aid. The immediate benefits of integrating aid are weak when compared to what must be relinquished, especially since nearly all states have shown a certain degree of self-interest in the direction of their aid (Berthelemy, 2005). When utilising a cost-benefit analysis, the benefits from the self-interest view of integrating aid primarily amount to permitting a greater impact in EU foreign policy. However, this foreign policy is owned by each member state. Therefore, it must be agreed through intergovernmental bargaining, thus not guarantying a preferred outcome for each involved. On the other hand, the benefits from an altruistic standpoint of integrating include greater cohesion and coordination of EU aid thus, increasing the effectiveness of aid on the recipient, eliminating many duplication costs between the different donors and providing a centre for expertise and best practice in development; what, collectively, the EC (2006) explicitly describes as its 'added value' to member states. From either standpoint, the costs of integrating outweigh the benefits; unless every member is absolutely intent on pursuing an altruistic course, unlikely given Berthelemy's conclusions, or their foreign policy goals are identical. Furthermore, subrogating control to a supranational institution condors up a paradox as to the benefits member states hope to achieve since the EC aspires to an altruist status in the delivery of aid through best practice (see ECD). Therefore, why do states continue to integrate?

## *European Commission*

An internal conflict exists in the EC with regards to its public discourse on aid policy and in delivery of aid. While DG Development aims more to the altruistic motive of eradicating poverty through increasing the proportion of its aid to the Least Developed Countries (LDC) (see ECD), DG External Relations attains to the more selfish concept of utilising aid in securing Europe (see ESS). In practice, a greater proportion of EC bilateral aid goes to Middle Income Countries(MIC) than most other members of the OECD DAC(OECD, 2008a)<sup>26</sup>. This, in addition to the incidences of aid for security related projects outlined in chapter three, portrays the EC, in part, as a self-interested donor. With this in mind, it must be recognised that given the diverse nature of member state foreign policy goals, it is highly unlikely the EC will be able to achieve complete integration in EU aid as achieved in other fields such as the European Monetary Union (EMU).

As it will be argued below, it has been the EC ability to frame its policy in the self-interest of donors, through securitising its aid, which led to continuing integration of member states aid policies. However, this approach of serving the interests of member states also serves the pro-integrationist EC<sup>27</sup>, thus conceptualising the EC as a power seeking institution. Increased

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<sup>26</sup> Own workings.

<sup>27</sup> The EC as 'pro-integration' is often assumed by many academics without consideration, with the notable exception of Christophe Crombez(1997) (Majone 2001). However, Fabio Franchino (2007,p.140-9) statistically analysis supports the original hypothesis that, in general, the Commission is pro-integration.



integration in the EU permits the EC to act beyond the normal institutional boundaries thus deriving an expanded role for the EC<sup>28</sup>.

The EC ability to frame the direction of its aid to the self-interest of the member states has been vital to its success and not the ‘added value’ items it proclaims, since its effectiveness in delivery of aid, while improving (House of Lords, 2004), has been rated poorly by the OECD (2002). Even Alexander Baum, Head of Unit of DG Development, noted that the EC policy needed a sense of self-interest for it to survive (Latt, 2004). Consequentially, the EC’s new ‘independent’ role is dependent on serving the interests of member states. However, this is not the continuation of member state dominance of EC policy as in stage one and two, but, the emergence of an active Commission/‘policy entrepreneur’ that can set the agenda in policy formation thus framing the context and influencing the outcome. In summation, the EC must satisfy the interests of member states if it is to survive, but the EC can influence these interests through its ability to set the agenda and discretion in implementation. This division of authority raises questions on how to conceptualise in European integration theory the EC-member state relationship in development policy.

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<sup>28</sup> See Pollack (2003) for further reading on agency ability of the EC through its authority to set the EU agenda, its role as guardian of the Treaties and its discretion in implementing EU policies.

## **Integration Theory**

Early debate on European integration theory was divided between neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists. Seen as the first grand theory of European integration in the late 1950s (Hix, 2005,p.14), neofunctionalists posited that integration is a gradual and self-sustaining process(Pollack, 2001) thus, leading to the occurrence of ‘spillovers’ from other policy areas in order to meet the initial goal. For example, with regards to development aid, in order for this policy to be more effective it is argued that reform/spillover in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is necessary(Bigsten, 2007). Neofunctionalists further that the driving forces behind integration are non-state actors; the European Commission, European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. Neofunctionalists failure to explain the slowdown in European integration in the 1960s lead to the emergence of intergovernmentalism, derived from the realist school, which argued that integration was driven from the actions and interests of nations states with non-state actors having a limited role(Hix, 2005,p.15). In a broad sense, this theory best represents the EC-member state relationship in the first and second stages of EC development policy as it was hindered by intergovernmental politics.

More recently, liberal-intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance have risen as moderate advances from the initial grand theories. The former, as developed by Andrew Moravcsik, places the state as the key actor where integration is realised through interstate bargaining. Governments are considered to be influenced by their domestic settings and supranational institutions (non-state actors) having a limited role(Hix, 2005,p.16). In this regard, Holland(2002,p.237) notes the change in scope of DG Development after each enlargement and the requirement for member states to sign off on EDF agreements as aspects of

intergovernmentalism with the EC development policy. Multi-level governance identifies a range of actors across different policy areas that are dependent on each other to variant degrees. Moreover, it posits that member states share decision making authority with some supranational institutions and therefore, states cannot guarantee desired outcomes as they are constrained by these institutions and domestic interests and influences(Holland, 2002,p.239)<sup>29</sup>. Holland(2002,p.240) cites the role the EP played in the on-mass resignation of the EC in 1999 as a representation of multi-level governance.

### *The EC, Development Aid and Rational Choice Theory*

Neither liberal-intergovernmentalism nor multi-level governance accurately conceptualise the EC's relationship with member states as the former does not take into account the influence the EC has on the outcome of EU decisions and the latter over-emphasises the power/authority the EC has in the decision process. Rational Choice Theory (RCT), however, can be seen as a bridge between the aforementioned theories(Schneider et al., 1994) because, as Pollack(1997,p.101) argued, it transcended the grand theoretical debates by acknowledging the initial primacy of the member states (RTC's intergovernmental characteristic) in addition to recognising the ability of supranational institutions to attain, in Kenneth Shepsle words, "structure-induced equilibrium"; the process of supranational institutions, though their agenda setting powers, narrowing the outcomes and structuring the voting powers of decision makers (RTC's multi-level governance characteristic). While this is not a 'grand theory' through which to conceptualise all aspects the of EU, in this incidence, given the recent activism on the part of the EC and its defined

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<sup>29</sup> See Rosamond (2000) for further details on theories of European integration.

leadership role in the Maastricht Treaty and the ECD, it is the pre-eminent theory in understanding the relationship between the EC and member states in European development policies.

As noted above, there is little incentive for member states to integrate based on a simply cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, it is the member states, sometimes in co-operation with the EP, that make the decisions of high politics and set the policy, thus leaving the EC with little formal power (Peterson et al., 1999, Cassidy, n.d). However, the EC has engaged in structure-induced equilibrium. Through securitising aid, the EC has been able to create a valuable interest to the member states, this reframing continued integration in a positive light for member states. Consequently, this changes the benefit aspect of the analysis. In addition, to achieving the EC's 'added value' dimensions, the provision of security to member states induces a rational decision on their part to integrate. In light of 9/11, the EC has been able to frame the need for increased security against existential threats in correlation with the 'war of terror' thus encouraging the EC to engage in structure-induced equilibrium. This summation is reliant on a certain degree of independent actorhood from the EC. It has been argued throughout this dissertation that in the third stage of EC development policy, the EC has asserted itself to achieve a tentative independent role. This role will now be scrutinised further to determine if indeed this is the EC acting or possibly the member states in disguise.

## **Member States in Disguise?**

It has been argued above that in this third stage of EC development policy, the EC can be seen to exert a significant degree of independence in the formation and direction of its aid. However, this independence is dependent on the EC serving the interests of member states, but these interests have been influenced by the EC through its agenda setting authority. This final section seeks to open the debate on how independent is the EC really? This section seeks to understand to what extent is this new distinct role of the EC's permitting it to exert its independence or is it the member states acting through the EC, for reasons that will be outlined, to achieve their national goals. EC-member state situations will be examined here through a more speculative prism with substantiation in empirical data. Due to brevity, this concept will not be analysed here from point of view of firmness of oversight controls that member states have on the EC. For further analysis from this angle see Pollack(2003).

While outlined earlier the 'added-value' of integrating through the EC, there remains certain other benefits that would make it advantageous for member states to channel their aid through the Commission in seeking certain national priorities, thus hollowing out the independent role of the EC. Aid from certain member states can often carry a certain degree of colonial baggage that limits its effectiveness, whether that be altruistic or coercive, in the recipient country. The House of Lords(2004,p.35) report into EC aid notes the advantages EC aid has over certain bilateral aid as "it is easier for the Commission to impose conditions without this appearing "neo-colonial" ". Vogt(2006,p.172-3) noted from his interviews that Commission officials found it much easier to get access to state executives in recipient countries as an EU bureaucrat than as a representative of a member state. Consequently, this has led to certain incidences of member states using the

EC as a front to achieve their goals. When France dominated EC development policy, Vogt(2006,p.173) notes that France used the relative neutrality of EC development aid “as a means to retain their influence in the world”.

To what extent this activity of using the EC as a front to achieve the direct goals of member states is difficult to determine. However, Woods analysis of UK and EC aid to Afghanistan appears to be one aspect of a member state acting in disguise. Woods(2005,p.405) notes that in attempting to meet its public service agreement of 90% of bilateral aid from the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) directed to LIC’s, UK development aid channelled through the EC is increasingly been focused towards meeting new security imperatives. Thus, the EC is being used as a front for UK security related aid. Consequently, it is not surprising that EC aid to Afghanistan has increased nine fold from 2000 to 2006(OECD, 2008a), thus a representation of what Woods(2005,p.407) affirms as the greater susceptibility of EC aid to member state demands than recipient needs.

Nevertheless, to maintain that the recent emergence of EC leadership is in reality member states in disguise is a difficult hypothesis to prove given the degree of leadership and oversight that the EC obtained in the ECD. Furthermore, given the recent expansion of the EU to 27 member states and the diverse views held by Northern, Southern and now Eastern regions of the EU on the focus of aid as outlined by Gavas (2006), it is very implausible for any one, or small number of, member state(s) to dominate EC development policy as in the past. However, as outlined above,

incidences of powerful member states intermittently influencing the focus of aid cannot be ruled out; thus, limiting the independence of the EC.

In summation, the EC's era of 'passivism' has ended. However, the era of 'activism' is not as independent as some campaigners have argued for<sup>30</sup>. As discussed above, there is little rationale for member states to integrate aid under the leadership of the EC as a consensus among the member states is improbable. However, it has been the EC's ability to frame its policy in the self-interest of donors, through securitisation of aid, thus creating a broad consensus, which formulates a positive rational choice to integrate on the part of the member states. This broad consensus is dependent on EC aid serving an aspect of each member state's foreign policy goals; in this case security. Further integration is unlikely, unless the existential threat can be proven to be imminent, as it further limits the foreign policy tools of each member state and achieving consensus in development aid beyond security is improbable. Nevertheless, the present situation portrays the EC's independence as dependent on what degree it serves the interests of member states. However, infrequently member states can continue to supersede the EC to partial refocus towards their own goals as seen in the UK case above. Nonetheless, given the understudied nature of the field (Holland, 2002), further empirical research is required to substantiate to what degree the EC must serve the interests of member states and how this correlate to the level of aid they give.

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<sup>30</sup> Maxwell (2006) argued for greater independence for EC and up to 80% of member state's aid channelled through the EC rather than the present 20%.

## **Chapter Five: Conclusion**

There are a number of broad conclusions that can be drawn from this dissertation. Chapter two set out to argue that there has been a merging of the development and security concepts in line with the general academic literature. However, as sometimes missed or omitted by some academics, this merging initially occurred through human security. This opened up possible fruitful avenues of progress between the two fields as by framing the referent object as the individual and not the state, the self-interest motives of the donor were, in many cases, redundant. However, in the post-9/11 era, the global security agenda shifted and with it donors interests. In this respects, it was argued that developed states in general sought to utilise their aid for their own security interests. Government agencies, for example USAID, engaged in this process as a measure to protect its role vis-à-vis the American government. Consequently, when aligned to security interests, in the US case at least, development aid proved to be insulated from congressional politics. However, to what degree this aid can be classified accurately be classified as ‘development aid’ is debatable.

Chapter three argued that the EC, emerging from its intergovernmental past, established a leadership role that sought to distinguish itself from solely being an additional provider of aid on top of the member states. The three core competencies of this leadership role were cohesion, cooperation and complementarity. Upon these, the EC established its ‘added value’ to the member states’ role. While viewed as foreign policy instrument and not solely based on the EC’s primary objective of poverty eradication (OECD, 2007,p.24), EC aid sought to align itself to the



interests of member states. Given the events of 9/11, it was argued that the EC framed its aid in mitigating the increased existential threats that the member states faced by focusing its aid on programmes that had either a positive direct or indirect effect on the EU's internal security. This process of securitisation of EC aid occurred both in the discursive and non-discursive. By serving the security interests of member states, it partially removed EC development policy from the general politics of the EU. This was illustrated in the continuation of the APF, a programme, funded from the development budget but not considered ODA by the OECD, which caused a great deal of controversy in its initial approval. Furthermore, the disproportional funding of the ENP relative to other developing countries and its explicit endorsement by the DG External Relations commissioner as serving the security interests of the EU is but yet another example of securitisation. Finally, the case was made that securitisation of aid in the EC has ramifications for understanding securitisation theory. Given the unique status of the EU and the public's lack of knowledge of EC development policy, it was argued that the member state is most appropriately defined as the audience in terms of securitisation theory, especially considering its previous direct involvement in the policy.

In the last principal chapter of this dissertation, the reasons why member states continued to integrate development aid were outlined given the considerable costs, beyond monetary, that were involved. It was concluded that by framing its aid against an existential threat and then securitising its aid, the EC aligned itself to the interests of member states. Furthermore, by serving the interests of member states, the EC served its own interests of continued integration of aid under its control. Thus, this permits the EC to act beyond the normal institutional boundaries of international organisations. Moreover, conceptualising the EC through Rational Choice

Theory, it was argued that the EC, through its powers of agenda setting, has the ability to influence the high decisions of member states. From this, it was deduced that the independence of the EC in development policy was dependent on it serving the interests of member states, but these interests being influenced by the EC.

EC development policy and the role the EC commands have, in some respects, changed dramatically since its formation at the Treaty of Rome. Included after a compromise to France, it now represents one of the foremost areas of EC leadership in external relations. Intergovernmental bargaining has passed on to supranational leadership, thus re-conceptualising the EU. However, in other respects, there has been very little change. Aid is still utilised for the interests of donors, merely now on a more grand and effective way. Only aid's terms of reference have changed, be it aid for ideological support during the Cold War, economic integration in the 1990s or internal security of the donor now; the underlying interests remain the same. The EC, encouraged on by some member states, and not by others, has shown some signs of providing aid in the primary interests of the recipients; however, in other instances, as outlined in this dissertation, it has been for the member states or possibly for itself. Given that EC activism in this field has only come about in recent years, the jury is still out with regards to the question, "*in whose interest?*"



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