

MScEcon in the Department of International Politics,
Aberystwyth University

2 September 2011

**Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
MScEcon in International Politics (Specialist).**

Nicolas E. Boring

**THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL:
A TRUSTING RELATIONSHIP?**

DECLARATIONS

The word length of this dissertation is: 14,636

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any other degree.

Signed..... (Nicolas E. Boring)

Date.....

This work is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. No correction services have been used. Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

Signed..... (Nicolas E. Boring)

Date.....

I hereby give consent for my work, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

Signed..... (Nicolas E. Boring)

Date.....

TABLE OF CONTENTS

• Acknowledgments	p.3
• Abstract	p.4
• Introduction	p.5
• Chapter I: An Overview of the Theories of Trust in International Relations	p.8
A. The Rationalist Approach to Trust	p.10
B. The Binding Approach to Trust	p.12
C. Identifying Trusting Relationships	p.16
• Chapter II: Applying the Rationalist Approach to the U.S.-Israeli Relationship ..	p.19
• Chapter III: Applying the Binding Approach to the U.S.-Israeli Relationship	p.30
• Chapter IV: Evidence of a Trusting Relationship	p.39
A. Intelligence cooperation	p.40
B. Military cooperation	p.45
C. American foreign aid to Israel	p.47
1) Economic Aid	p.49
2) Military Aid	p.52
D. Nuclear weapons	p.55
E. Dealing with Iran	p.60
• Conclusion	p.66
• Bibliography	p.68

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank my advisor, Dr. Huw Williams, for his valuable advice throughout the process of researching and writing this dissertation.

I would also like to thank Professor Nick Wheeler and Dr. Jan Ruzicka, who jointly taught the class which inspired me to write about this topic, and whose ideas and suggestions were extremely helpful to me.

Last but not least, I wish to thank my wife, Erin, for her kind and patient support throughout this master's program.

ABSTRACT

The United States and Israel have an unusually close relationship, and this relationship is a major factor in Middle Eastern politics. The concept of trust, which has only recently become a subject of study in the field of international politics, can be useful to fully understand the U.S.-Israeli relationship. There are two main theories of trust in international relations: the rationalist approach and the binding approach. The rationalist approach focuses on how the parties perceive their interests, and whether these interests encapsulate each-other. The binding approach is more subjective, as it looks at whether the parties perceive each-other as honest and reliable. This perception comes from feelings of friendship and collective identity, which is fostered by extensive positive interactions. The U.S.-Israeli relationship fits well within both of these approaches, and there is substantial evidence that they have a trusting relationship. The best way to identify a trusting relationship is to see whether the parties voluntarily accept some degree of vulnerability to each-other. A look at the behaviour and policies of Israel and the United States reveals several instances of accepted vulnerability, particularly on the American side. This evidence, interpreted in light of the two main approaches to trust, shows that the two states have a trusting relationship.

INTRODUCTION

The study of trust in international politics is relatively new, and little has been written about it yet.¹ As recently as 1997, Deborah Welch Larson noted that there was no theory of trust in international relations.² However, the last few years have seen a sharp increase in interest for this topic. Several authors have come to recognize that although “trust is elusive, both conceptually and in the games nations play,” it is a central element of social life, including among states.³ It is therefore a useful concept to understand at least some international relationships.

As could be expected, there have been attempts to look at several international relationships through the concepts of trust and trust-building. These include, among other examples: the end of the Cold War,⁴ European cooperation,⁵ the Oslo peace process,⁶ the rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s,⁷ and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

¹ Jan Ruzicka & Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” *International Affairs*, Vol.86:1 (January 2010), p.71

² Deborah Welch Larson, “Trust and Missed Opportunities in International Relations,” *Political Psychology*, Vol. 18/3 (September 1997), p.703

³ Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.229

⁴ Larson, “Trust and Missed Opportunities,” pp.703-34; Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation,” *International Organization*, Vol. 54/2 (Spring, 2000), pp.325-57; Andrew Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp.183-244

⁵ Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust*, pp.142-79

⁶ Booth & Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p.245-51

⁷ Nicholas Wheeler, “Beyond Waltz's Nuclear World: More Trust May be Better,” *International Relations*, Vol.23/3 (September 2009), pp.428-45

Treaty.⁸ However, there have been no attempts to examine the relationship between the United States and Israel from the perspective of trust.

This is somewhat surprising, given the strength and importance of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Lee Marsden refers to it as “one of the closest and most controversial relationships the [United States] has experienced since the end of World War II.”⁹ Furthermore, this relationship is an important factor in world politics, and in Middle Eastern politics in particular. Examining whether Israel and the United States have a trusting relationship not only contributes to understanding the concept of trust in international relations, but also adds to the understanding of an important international dynamic.

The present dissertation endeavours to determine whether Israel and the United States have a trusting relationship. It should be noted from the outset that this dissertation is not concerned with normative judgment. It strictly looks at whether there *is* trust between the two states, not whether there *ought* to be. Drawing evidence from various aspects of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, and guided by the principal theories of trust in international relations, this dissertation argues that the two states have a trusting relationship.

The first chapter will provide an overview of the two main theories of trust: the rationalist approach and the binding approach. The third and fourth chapters will show that each of these approaches is consistent with the hypothesis of a trusting relationship between the United States and Israel. Finally, the fifth chapter will explore various American and Israeli actions and policies, to assess whether they show signs of trust. Although there are some

⁸ Ruzicka & Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships,” pp.69-85

⁹ Lee Marsden, “US-Israel Relations: A special friendship,” in John Dumbrell, and Axel Schäfer (eds.), *America’s ‘Special Relationships’* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p.191

exceptions, the balance of the evidence confirms that there is a high level of trust between the two states.

CHAPTER I

AN OVERVIEW OF THE THEORIES OF TRUST IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The traditional view of trust in international relations is that it is impossible, or even undesirable.¹⁰ Scholars such as John Mearsheimer claim that “there is little room for trust among states,” because “any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them.”¹¹ Yet, anarchy does not necessarily lead to fear and mistrust. As Alexander Wendt famously put it, “Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it.”¹² Even a cursory glance at the state of world politics shows that interactions between states vary over a wide spectrum, from war to friendship.¹³ This has led some scholars to study the possibility that there may, in fact, be room for trust among states.

The first question, of course, is how to define trust. Trust is an elusive concept, which can be understood in several different ways.¹⁴ The term can be used in ways ranging from describing the confidence that one might have that a machine will function properly, to describing the trust that may exist between a husband and wife.¹⁵

¹⁰ Wheeler, “Beyond Waltz’s Nuclear World,” p.429; Ruzicka & Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships,” p.71

¹¹ John Mearsheimer, “The false promise of international institutions,” *International Security*, Vol.19:3, (Winter 1994), p.11

¹² Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization*, Vol.46/2 (Spring 1992), p.395

¹³ Ruzicka & Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships,” p.71

¹⁴ Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust*, p.6

¹⁵ Booth & Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p.229

Some basic aspects of a definition of trust seem to be widely agreed upon. First, scholars agree that the concept of trust only makes sense in a context of uncertainty and vulnerability.¹⁶ Indeed, trust is a way to overcome uncertainty, and it would be irrelevant in a world of certainty. As Diego Gambetta wrote, “trust is particularly relevant in conditions of ignorance or uncertainty with respect to unknown or unknowable actions of others.”¹⁷ Trust is what makes social and personal relationships possible in an uncertain world, and without the capacity to trust one would be condemned to a constant state of paranoia.¹⁸

Aside from the question of context, there also is some agreement about the elements that a definition of trust should include or imply. As Aaron Hoffman noted, “scholars agree that *trust* refers to an attitude involving a willingness to place the fate of one’s interests under the control of others. This willingness is based on a belief, for which there is some uncertainty, that potential trustees will avoid using their discretion to harm the interests of the first.”¹⁹ However, the consensus ends there. There is no single agreed-upon definition of trust beyond these basic elements.²⁰

Most definitions of trust fall into one of two ways of thinking about this topic: the rationalist approach, or the binding approach.²¹ The rationalist approach, sometimes also called the predictive approach²² or strategic trust,²³ sees trust as confidence in expectations. The

¹⁶ Brian Rathbun, “It takes all types: social psychology, trust, and the international relations paradigm in our minds,” *International Theory*, Vol.1:3 (2009), p.349; Booth & Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p.230

¹⁷ Diego Gambetta, “Can We Trust Trust?” in Diego Gambetta (ed.) *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations* (Oxford ; Cambridge, Mass., USA : B. Blackwell, 1988), p.218

¹⁸ Larson, “Trust and Missed Opportunities,” p.713

¹⁹ Aaron Hoffman, “A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Sept. 2002), pp.376-77, and *Building Trust* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), p.17

²⁰ Hoffman, “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” p.376, and *Building Trust*, p.17

²¹ Ruzicka & Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships,” pp.72-73

²² Hoffman, “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” p.379, and *Building Trust*, p.20

binding approach, which is sometimes referred to as the fiduciary approach²⁴ or as moralistic trust,²⁵ sees trust as a judgment about the other's integrity and character. In other words, the binding approach sees trust as "confidence in expectations *that others will do 'what is right.'*"²⁶

A. The Rationalist Approach to Trust

As its very name implies, the rationalist approach sees trust as the result of rational calculation. More specifically, the rationalist approach looks at the interests and preferences of the parties involved in a relationship, and whether these interests and preferences are opposed or aligned in a similar direction. Russell Hardin describes this trust as encapsulated interest.²⁷ A's interest encapsulates B's interest when it is in A's interest to promote or preserve B's interest. This is not the same as to say that the interests of A and B are the same, but rather that they align in such a way that A will somehow benefit from promoting or preserving B's interest.²⁸

The rationalist approach is usually explained through the use of game theory. Andrew Kydd, for example, contrasts the Prisoner's Dilemma with the Assurance Game.²⁹ Both players in a Prisoner's Dilemma will be untrustworthy, because the only Nash Equilibrium of the Prisoner's Dilemma is for both players to defect. However, there are two possible Nash Equilibria in the Assurance Game: where both players defect, or where both cooperate. Cooperation between two players can therefore take place when both have a preference for

²³ Rathbun, "It takes all types," pp.346-47

²⁴ Hoffman, "A Conceptualisation of Trust," p.379, and *Building Trust*, p.20

²⁵ Rathbun, "It takes all types," pp.346-47

²⁶ Hoffman, "A Conceptualisation of Trust," p.379, and *Building Trust*, p.20 (emphasis added)

²⁷ Russell Hardin, *Trust and Trustworthiness* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), pp.3-13

²⁸ *Ibid*, p.4

²⁹ Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust*, pp.6-12

cooperation, and both are aware that the other has such a preference.³⁰ Kydd therefore defines trust as “a belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s own cooperation, while mistrust is a belief that the other side prefers exploiting one’s cooperation to returning it.”³¹ Kydd stresses the importance of the players’ awareness of the other’s inclination, since even players with a preference for cooperation will fail to cooperate if one is not certain about the other’s preferences. This leads him to “think of the level of trust one actor has for another as the *probability it assesses that the other actor is trustworthy*.”³²

Followers of the rationalist approach clearly see the game’s payoff structure as crucial to determining whether there is trust between players. Indeed, a central point of approaching the question of trust through game theory is to show how much it depends on the payoff structure within a relationship. Several factors can affect this payoff structure, but one of the most important is whether the said relationship is an on-going, long-term one, or if it is a short-term, one-off matter. A player may have more of an incentive to exploit the other – and more reason to fear being exploited by the other – if the relationship is a one-time deal. On the other hand, when the relationship is an on-going, long term one, the “shadow of the future”³³ provides incentives for the players to be both more trusting and more trustworthy. For this reason, Rathbun describes “strategic trust” as “a belief that potential partners have a self-interest in cooperation, generally an incentive in building or sustaining a long-term, mutually beneficial

³⁰ Ibid, p.7

³¹ Ibid, p.6

³² Ibid, p.8

³³ Rathbun, “It takes all types,” p.350

relationship.”³⁴ Similarly, Hardin argues that trust is typically rooted in the context of an ongoing relationship which is beneficial to the parties involved.³⁵

A defining feature of the rationalist approach is that it does not see states as ascribing any normative value to trust.³⁶ It sees trust as simply the product of a cost/benefit analysis combined with a risk analysis. Some authors see this as an important shortcoming of the rationalist approach. Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas Wheeler, for example, write that “what this approach overlooks is the possibility that actors might develop trusting relationships which they value independently of the pay-off structure.”³⁷ This has led them, as well as other scholars, to suggest that trust can best be understood through another approach.

B. The Binding Approach to Trust

The binding approach seems to provide a response to the perceived shortcomings of the rationalist approach. Contrary to the latter, the binding approach incorporates a normative element. As Hoffman writes in describing the binding approach (which he calls the fiduciary approach): “Trust involves more than predicting the behavior of others. It includes trustors’ perceptions that their trustees have a *responsibility* to fulfill the trust placed in them even if it means sacrificing some of their own benefits.”³⁸ In this view, trust is “based on beliefs about the honesty and integrity of potential partners.”³⁹

³⁴ Ibid, pp.349-50

³⁵ Hardin, *Trust and Trustworthiness*,” p.4

³⁶ Ruzicka & Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships,” p.73

³⁷ Ibid, p.73

³⁸ Hoffman, “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” p.379, and *Building Trust*, p.20 (*emphasis added*).

³⁹ Rathbun, “It takes all types,” p.351

The complexities of the normative notions that are tied to the binding approach make it more “slippery” than the rationalist approach.⁴⁰ However, the binding approach contains an interesting element which is wholly absent from the rationalist approach: emotion. Guido Möllering points out that “by subsuming as a form of rational choice, routine behavior, or reflexive reinforcement, the concept is stripped of its *unique* explanatory power. . . Trust only ever enters as a meaningful construct when decisions cannot be made in a strictly calculative way.”⁴¹ To proponents of the binding approach, the emotional aspect is what sets trust apart from simply making a well-calculated bet. This is not to say that trust is purely an emotional state, as it does retain some cognitive element. But, as Booth and Wheeler point out, trust is a mix of feeling and rational thinking.⁴²

What, exactly, is this emotional element which defines trust? Möllering calls it “leap of faith” or “suspension,” with the latter being his preferred term.⁴³ Möllering considers suspension to be “the process that enables actors to deal with irreducible uncertainty and vulnerability.”⁴⁴ It is a combination of three phenomena. First, it includes an “as-if attitude,” which consists of treating uncertainty and vulnerability as unproblematic.⁴⁵ It essentially consists of a socially-constructed fiction, where the trustor pretends that the future is certain. This fiction relies on both the trustor and the trustee, as the trustee must create an impression of trustworthiness in the trustor’s eyes for the “as-if attitude” to take hold.⁴⁶ The second

⁴⁰ Martin Hollis, *Trust Within Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.10-11

⁴¹ Guido Möllering, *Trust: Reason, Routine and Reflexivity* (Oxford: Elsevier, 2006), pp.105-6

⁴² Booth & Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p.232

⁴³ Möllering, *Trust*, pp.109-126

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p.110

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, pp.111-15

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pp.112-13

phenomenon underlying suspension is “bracketing.”⁴⁷ Bracketing is also a socially-constructed fiction, but it is one which consists of “blending out issues that actors might be aware of but cannot penetrate or resolve fully. . . The logic of the ‘as if’ in trust is specified further with a logic of ‘despite,’ ‘although,’ and ‘nevertheless.’”⁴⁸ Finally, suspension requires a “will to believe.”⁴⁹ Here, Möllering draws upon the thoughts of American psychologist and philosopher William James to explain that trust requires a will to believe “even when there is no conclusive evidence,” so long as the thing believed is a real possibility.⁵⁰

Booth and Wheeler refer to Möllering, among other authors, when they write about a “leap in the dark” as being a component of trust.⁵¹ They explain this idea through the use of examples instead of pulling apart its different components, but it seems to be similar to Möllering’s concept of leap of faith/suspension. Booth and Wheeler do not stop there, however. Indeed, they see this “leap in the dark” as being one of four interrelated sets of attributes which constitute trust at the international level. The other sets of attributes are: empathy/bonding, dependence/vulnerability, and integrity/reliability.⁵²

Trust requires empathy, which can be defined as “the self-conscious effort to share and accurately comprehend the presumed consciousness of another person, including his thoughts, feelings, perceptions.”⁵³ This requires both the ability and the will to see things through the other’s eyes. For there to be trust between two political collectives, such empathy

⁴⁷ Ibid, pp.115-19

⁴⁸ Ibid, p.115

⁴⁹ Ibid, pp.119-121

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.119

⁵¹ Booth & Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p.234

⁵² Ibid, pp.234-245

⁵³ “Sympathy and Empathy,” in David Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York : Free Press London : Collier Macmillan, 1968), Vol.15, p.441

must then lead to bonding. Bonding refers to the development of a sense of friendship and collective identity, something that can take much time and often does not really happen at all.⁵⁴

Dependence/vulnerability refers to one's willingness to put something valued under another's control, and the willingness to accept the vulnerability that this entails.⁵⁵ Indeed, the essence of trust is that it exposes one to betrayal. This is of particular interest because, as will be discussed more in depth later, the extent of this exposure can be considered a measure of the level of trust between two entities.

The last set of attributes identified by Booth and Wheeler is integrity/reliability. These terms embrace the idea, expressed by Hollis, that trust is confidence that the trustee will "do what is right."⁵⁶ These terms encompass both the normative ("integrity") and predictive ("reliability") aspects of trust.⁵⁷ The perception of reliability and integrity is what will make a trustor believe that the trustee will not betray him.

All of these attributes are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. For example, a trustee's strong integrity and reliability makes it more likely for a trustor to take a leap of faith, thus making the trustor dependent and vulnerable. If the trustee does not betray the trustor, the perception of integrity and reliability is strengthened, increasing the likelihood of another leap of faith. Similarly, empathy and bonding can increase the perception of integrity and reliability, and dependence and vulnerability can increase feelings of empathy and bonding. Of course, there is no guarantee that such mutually reinforcing dynamics will occur. But when they do occur, the overall result is the existence of trust.

⁵⁴ Booth & Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, pp.237-39

⁵⁵ Ibid, p.241

⁵⁶ Hollis, *Trust Within Reason*, p.10; Booth & Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p.243

⁵⁷ Booth & Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p.243

C. Identifying Trusting Relationships

Even if one were to settle on a single definition of trust, identifying trusting relationships presents a challenge of its own. The current literature provides a couple of ways to go about this task. One of these was put forth by Hoffman, who argues for using a set of three indicators: (1) “discretion-granting policies and decision-making data,” (2) “oversight indicators,” and (3) “rule indicators.”⁵⁸

The first of Hoffman’s indicators, “discretion-granting policies and decision-making data,” refers to when a state transfers some capacity to determine political outcomes to another state.⁵⁹ The second measurement, “oversight indicators,” refers to the extent to which states oversee the exercise of discretion they gave other states under Hoffman’s first indicator. The level of trust is inversely proportional to the strictness of the oversight: there is a high level of trust if the trustee is given a large amount of leeway to make decisions.⁶⁰ Finally, “rule indicators” refer to the types of rules which states include in treaties. This measurement applies specifically to the rules which actors include in their written agreements, but it is otherwise very similar to Hoffman’s second indicator. As with the oversight indicators, treaty rules which provide higher degrees of decision-making freedom are a sign of trust.⁶¹

In contrast to Hoffman’s three indicators, Vincent Keating and Jan Ruzicka argue that the existence of trust can be determined by looking at one key criterion: the presence or absence of hedging strategies in a particular relationship. According to Keating and Ruzicka, it

⁵⁸ Hoffman, *Building Trust*, pp.26-36, and “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” pp.384-93

⁵⁹ Hoffman, *Building Trust*, pp.26-28, and “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” pp.384-87

⁶⁰ Hoffman, *Building Trust*, pp.28-31, and “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” pp.388-91

⁶¹ Hoffman, *Building Trust*, pp. 31-34, and “A Conceptualisation of Trust,” pp.391-93

is meaningful to speak of a trusting relationship only when the parties abstain from adopting hedging strategies.⁶²

A theme common to all the definitions of trust covered above, as well as Hoffman's and Ruzicka and Keating's indicators, is vulnerability. The more a trustor allows himself or herself to be vulnerable to a trustee, the more it can be said that he or she trusts the trustee. This theme is what underpins Hoffman's three indicators: a state makes itself more vulnerable when it grants high levels of discretionary authority to another, when the oversight levels are low, or when it signs a treaty granting broad decision-making freedom to others. Similarly, an absence of hedging strategies leaves the trustor vulnerable. A trusting relationship is therefore one where each party voluntarily accepts to make itself, or leaves itself, vulnerable to the other parties.

The main key to determining whether the United States and Israel have a trusting relationship is to look for areas where they voluntarily accept to make themselves vulnerable to the other. Trust is a matter of degree rather than a simple "yes-or-no" question, so the evidence may be ambiguous in some areas. Nevertheless, if these two states accept vulnerability on a number of important issues, then a convincing argument can be made that they have a generally trusting relationship. If, however, they tend not to accept vulnerability on any significant issues, it cannot be said that they trust each-other.

Before looking at specific areas where the United States and Israel accept to make themselves vulnerable to each-other, it is also useful to see whether their relationship is consistent with either of the main theories of trust. If either the rationalist or the binding

⁶² Vincent Keating and Jan Ruzicka, David Davies Memorial Institute Symposium on "Nuclear Rivalries: Prospects for Cooperation and Trust-Building" (Aberystwyth, 14-15 June 2011), symposium report accessed online at <http://www.aber.ac.uk/en/media/Aberystwyth-symposium-June-2011---Final-Report.pdf> on 15 August 2011, pp.3-4; podcast of Keating & Ruzicka's presentation: <http://www.aber.ac.uk/en/media/Session-1---Moellering-Keating-Ruzicka.mp3>, 25:46 to 46:20.

approach would lead one to expect the United States and Israel to trust each-other, then the interpretation of any instance where they accept vulnerability towards each-other as a sign of trust is that much more likely to be correct. Examining the relationship between the two states through the prisms of the rationalist and binding approaches will therefore help determine whether they have a trusting relationship.

CHAPTER II

APPLYING THE RATIONALIST APPROACH TO THE U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP

As was explained earlier, the rationalist approach requires the existence of “encapsulated interests” for there to be trust between two nations. For Israel to trust the United States, it must perceive that it is in the United States’ interests to attend to Israel’s interests. And for the United States to trust Israel, it must believe that Israel’s interests include attending to the United States’ interests. To determine whether these two states can be expected to trust each-other under the rationalist approach, we should therefore examine whether their interests are aligned in such a way as to qualify as encapsulated interests.

The two states’ interests did not encapsulate each-other in the early years after Israel’s declaration of independence. Although the United States was the first nation to offer de facto recognition to the state of Israel in 1948,⁶³ the two nations were not particularly close.⁶⁴ Washington’s hesitance to support the Jewish state was partly due to the fear that it might eventually align with the Soviet Union, a fear based on the fact that much of Israel’s leadership came from Eastern Europe and had leftist political orientations.⁶⁵ More importantly, certain American policy-makers were afraid that supporting Israel would hurt American interests by putting the United States in conflict with the United Kingdom and the Arab world.⁶⁶ All in all,

⁶³ Bernard Reich, *The United States and Israel* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), p.4

⁶⁴ Ian Bickerton, “America’s Israel / Israel’s America,” in John Dumbrell and Axel Schäfer (eds.), *America’s ‘Special Relationships’* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p.179

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p.179

⁶⁶ David Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.61

Israel's interests were of little weight to American policy-makers compared to access to Arab oil and preserving the Arab states' loyalty against the Soviet Union.⁶⁷

This situation changed by the early 1960s, however. As Egypt, Syria and Iraq turned towards the Soviet Union, the Kennedy and subsequent administrations increasingly saw Israel as a valuable ally.⁶⁸ Israel's location near the Suez Canal was seen as a strategically valuable situation,⁶⁹ and its impressive victory over Soviet client states during the Six Day War hurt Moscow's prestige and proved that Israel could help the United States contain Soviet expansion in the Middle East.⁷⁰ Furthermore, Israel was able to provide valuable intelligence to the Americans, including access to various Soviet weapons captured from Arab states.⁷¹ Additionally, Israel assisted the United States by sharing its training facilities, its counterterrorism expertise, and advanced technology developed by its defence industry.⁷²

In return, Israel benefited greatly from American economic and military assistance. The first significant procurement of American weaponry to Israel occurred in 1962, when, in response to a large shipment of Soviet arms to Egypt, Iraq and Syria, the United States agreed to sell Hawk surface-to-air missiles to Israel.⁷³ Despite a short embargo following the Six Day War, which delayed the delivery of Skyhawk ground attack aircraft by a few months, the United States provided an increasing amount of sophisticated weapons to Israel in the subsequent decades.⁷⁴ Such American weapons and supplies proved vital to Israel's survival. This was

⁶⁷ Reich, *The United States and Israel*, p.5

⁶⁸ John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy* (London : Allen Lane, 2007), p.51

⁶⁹ Schoenbaum, *The United States and Israel*, pp.81-82

⁷⁰ Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, pp.51-52

⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.52

⁷² *Ibid*, p.52

⁷³ Reich, *The United States and Israel*, p.156

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, pp.157-67

particularly true during the 1973 October War, when the United States airlifted military supplies to replace Israel's heavy equipment losses and to help counter a massive Soviet airlift of arms to Egypt and Syria.⁷⁵ The United States also provided a large amount of financial support to Israel: Israel became the largest recipient of American foreign assistance by 1974, and it would remain so for decades to come.⁷⁶ This mitigated the economic burden of repeated conflicts, and helped Israel develop a relatively strong economy.

The cooperation between the United States and Israel increased as the Cold War progressed, and both benefited from it. From a rationalist perspective, the relationship between these two nations was a trusting one, inasmuch as each side surely realized that the other had a clear interest in on-going cooperation. However, the United States' interests in this relationship stemmed from the broader context of its competition with the Soviet Union. Did the end of the Cold War change the interests of Israel and/or the United States to the point where they no longer encapsulate each-other? To use more game-theoretical terminology: did the demise of the Soviet Union change the "payoff structure" of the U.S.-Israeli relationship in such a way as to make trust less likely?

The end of the Cold War did not change Israel's situation very much. Its interests are strongly linked to its identity as the world's sole Jewish state, born in the aftermath of the Holocaust, in a region which is largely hostile to it. From the moment it declared its independence in 1948, Israel has had to deal with openly antagonistic neighbours and several wars. Despite reaching peace agreements with Egypt (in 1979) and with Jordan (in 1994), Israel still has to contend with the animosity of much of the Muslim world. Its continuing occupation

⁷⁵ Ibid, p.164

⁷⁶ Jeremy Sharp, U.S. Congressional Research Service, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel" (RL33222, 16 September 2010), p.22, accessed at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf> on 27 July, 2011

of the Palestinian territories is marked by frequent violence. The Golan Heights are still the subject of a territorial dispute with Syria, and the Shebaa Farms are still the subject of a dispute with Syria and Lebanon. As recently as 2006, cross-border raids by Hezbollah led to Israeli military operations in Lebanon. Iranian leaders regularly call for Israel's destruction. As Zeev Maoz noted, some observers claim that "a fundamentally hostile environment, one that has yet to accept the Jewish state into the community of nations, imposed on Israel the need to become "the Sparta of modern times.""⁷⁷ The demise of the Soviet Union has improved Israel's situation slightly by depriving some of Israel's historical enemies of their main source of weapons and support, but these enemies still remain.

The end of the Cold War has therefore not significantly changed Israel's interest in American support, and the United States can be confident in Israel's desire to continue the close relationship which they developed. This means that, from a rationalist perspective, one can expect the United States to generally trust Israel. But should Israel be expected to trust the United States? The answer to this is not as clear.

Walt and Mearsheimer explain that "even if Israel was a valuable ally during the Cold War, that justification ended when the Soviet Union collapsed. . . As the Cold War receded into history, Israel's declining strategic value became hard to miss."⁷⁸ They make a convincing case that the United States' close relationship with Israel hurts, rather than promotes, American interests.⁷⁹ The reason seems relatively straightforward: the United States' close connection with Israel complicates its relationship with the rest of the Middle East, a region in which the United States still has vital interests.

⁷⁷ Zeev Moaz, *Defending the Holy Land: a Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy* (University of Michigan Press, 2009), p.5

⁷⁸ Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.58

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, pp.58-77

As Dennis Ross points out, “the United States has had critical interests in the Middle East for as long as it has been a global power.”⁸⁰ Chief among these interests is access to the region’s vast oil resources.⁸¹ Indeed, the Middle East accounted for 29% of global petroleum production in 2010,⁸² and 55% of proven reserves were located there as of 2009.⁸³ Given the American economy’s dependence on oil, successive administrations have made it clear that the United States regards access to oil a vital interest.⁸⁴ Indeed, it was largely to prevent Saddam Hussein from gaining control over the region’s oil resources that President George H. W. Bush led an international coalition to war with Iraq in 1990-1991.⁸⁵

Israel’s share of Middle Eastern petroleum resources is negligible, so the overwhelming majority of those resources belong to Arab states and to Iran.⁸⁶ It is therefore in the United States’ interest to cultivate good relations with the Arab world, especially the Persian Gulf states which have the most oil. Washington’s close relationship with the Jewish state has not made this easy. The 1973 OPEC oil embargo provides a perfect historical illustration, as it was explicitly aimed at countries which helped Israel during the October War.⁸⁷ Even if the prospect of a new Arab oil embargo seems very unlikely today, there are other ways in which

⁸⁰ Dennis Ross, “The Middle East Predicament,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.84/1 (Jan.-Feb. 2005), p.61

⁸¹ Ibid, p.61; Kenneth Pollack, “Securing the Gulf,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.82/4 (Jul.-Aug. 2003), pp.3-4; Christopher Layne, “America’s Middle East Grand Strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol.35/1 (2009), pp.8, 13-15

⁸² U.S. Energy Information Administration website, *International Energy Statistics*, accessed at <http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=53&aid=1> on 1 August, 2011

⁸³ U.S. Energy Information Administration website, *International Energy Statistics*, accessed at <http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=6> on 1 August, 2011

⁸⁴ Rose, Euclid, “OPEC’s Dominance of the Global Oil Market: The Rise of the World’s Dependency on Oil,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol.58/3 (Summer 2004), p.426

⁸⁵ Pollack, “Securing the Gulf,” pp.3-4

⁸⁶ U.S. Energy Information Administration website, *International Energy Statistics*, accessed at <http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=6> on 1 August, 2011

⁸⁷ Roger Stern, “Oil Market Power and United States National Security,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, Vol. 103/5 (Jan. 31, 2006), p.1651

Israel complicates the United States' relationships with the rest of the region. During the First Gulf War, for example, the United States had to go to great lengths to keep Israel from retaliating to Iraqi scud attacks, as an Israeli intervention would probably have divided the American-led coalition against Saddam Hussein.⁸⁸ This led Bernard Lewis, among others, to regard Israel as a strategic burden during that conflict. As he wrote shortly after the war, "whatever value Israel might have had as a strategic asset during the Cold War, that value obviously ended when the Cold War itself came to a close. The change was clearly manifested in the Gulf War last year, when what the United States most desired from Israel was to keep out of the conflict, to be silent, inactive and, as far as possible, invisible. . . . Israel was not an asset, but an irrelevance, some even said a nuisance."⁸⁹

Another area where the United States is arguably hurt by its relationship with Israel is terrorism. Walt and Mearsheimer argue that "the United States has a terrorism problem in good part because it has long been so supportive of Israel."⁹⁰ Indeed, support of Israel has been recognized as a main motivation of international terrorist attacks against the United States, even if other issues factor in as well. A 2010 opinion poll among citizens of several Arab countries found that a full 85% of respondents had an unfavorable view of the United States, and 77% considered it to be a threat.⁹¹ The same poll clearly shows that the United States' poor image in the Arab world is largely due to its strong support of Israel (although the occupation of Iraq was also a strong factor).⁹² Similarly, research by Abdel Mahdi Abdallah found that anti-

⁸⁸ John Cooley, *An Alliance Against Babylon* (London, Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005), pp.180-185

⁸⁹ Bernard Lewis, "Rethinking the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71/4 (Fall 1992), pp.110-11

⁹⁰ Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.64

⁹¹ 2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll conducted by the University of Maryland and Zogby International, accessed at http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2010/0805_arab_opinion_poll_telhami/0805_arabic_opinion_poll_telhami.pdf on 1 August 2011.

⁹² Ibid.

American sentiment among Arabs has three primary reasons: the invasion and occupation of Iraq, American support for a number of authoritarian Arab regimes, and “U.S. political, economic and military support of Israel, which enables Israel to defeat the Arabs and continue its occupation of their land.”⁹³ Yet another study found that negative assessment of American foreign policy, which prominently includes support for Israel, is one of the main contributing factors of support for terrorist acts against American targets among Arabs.⁹⁴ It should come as no surprise that some individuals would seek to translate this hostility into concrete acts. And indeed, the 9-11 Commission Report makes clear that American support of Israel was among the main motivations for Al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States.⁹⁵

In short, it can be said that “unconditional support for Israel is undermining relations with other US allies, casting doubt on America’s wisdom and moral vision, helping inspire a generation of anti-American extremists, and complicating US efforts to deal with a volatile but vital region.”⁹⁶ In such circumstances, how can Israel trust that the United States will continue to support it? From a rationalist perspective, it would seem quite unlikely.

Yet this argument misses something crucial: the role of belief and perception. Indeed, rationalists such as Kydd define trust as “a *belief* that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s own cooperation.”⁹⁷ As was explained in Chapter I, this is based on beliefs about the trustee’s incentives towards the trustor.⁹⁸ The rationalist approach is

⁹³ Abdel Mahdi Abdallah, “Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: a Socio-Political Perspective,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 7/ 4 (December 2003), p.62

⁹⁴ Mark Tessler and Michael Robbins, “What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts against the United States?” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 51/ 2 (Apr. 2007), pp. 305-328, 324

⁹⁵ *The 9/11 Commission Report*, accessed at <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf> on 1 August 2011.

⁹⁶ Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.77

⁹⁷ Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust*, p.6 (emphasis added)

⁹⁸ Hardin, *Trust and Trustworthiness*,” p.11

consistent with Robert Jervis' proposition that "it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers' beliefs about the world and their images of others."⁹⁹ Thus, Kydd acknowledges the subjectivity of states' preferences when he writes that both liberals and constructivists provide insights on these preferences, and that "a complete understanding of trust in international relations must integrate realist analysis of international strategic interaction with other theories of preference and identity formation offered by nonrealist theories."¹⁰⁰

Rationalist authors tend to focus on the trustor's beliefs and perceptions, but the trustee's beliefs and perceptions are relevant as well, in that they shape his or her preferences and incentives. There is therefore a double perception question in the rationalist approach to trust: it depends on the trustor's beliefs about the trustee's beliefs.

In the present case, Israel can be expected to trust the United States if it perceives that Washington believes that its interests continue to be aligned with Jerusalem's. Israel seems to have good reasons to believe this. Indeed, despite arguments to the contrary put forth by a few authors such as Walt and Mearsheimer, most Americans believe that it actually is in their strategic interest to remain closely allied to Israel.

There was a period of doubt regarding the strategic value of the American-Israeli alliance during the nineties, which was recognized even by Israel's supporters within the United States.¹⁰¹ However, the relationship with Israel was seen to be strategically important again as the Soviet threat was gradually replaced by Islamic fundamentalism and so-called "rogue states"

⁹⁹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.28

¹⁰⁰ Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust*, p.22

¹⁰¹ Leon Hadar, "Thawing the American-Israeli Chill," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 22/2 (Winter 1993), pp.86-87

such as Iraq and Iran. Indeed, certain authors conflated Iranian terrorist attacks against Israel with attacks against the West in general.¹⁰² This line of thought became generally accepted after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. In the aftermath of these attacks, Americans came to see Israel as a “partner against terror.”¹⁰³ Little does it matter that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are quite distinct from Hamas and Hezbollah. Despite their differences in identity, organization, objectives, etc., groups targeting Israel and groups targeting the United States were lumped together under the rubric of Islamist terrorism. Thus, in 2002, both houses of Congress passed resolutions proclaiming that “the United States and Israel are now engaged in a common struggle against terrorism” with overwhelming majorities.¹⁰⁴ More recently, US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates declared that “with the new threats and challenges our nation faces in the region, it is even more important to maintain and bolster our partnership [with Israel].”¹⁰⁵ And in a 2010 speech at the Brookings Institution, Andrew Shapiro, then Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, repeatedly stated that Israel’s security was in the United States’ strategic interest.¹⁰⁶

Few Americans seem to question the value of their alliance with Israel now. Walt and Mearsheimer wrote an academic essay, followed by a full-length book, claiming in part that

¹⁰² See for example: Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, “Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.72/1 (1992/1993), p.126

¹⁰³ Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, pp.60-61

¹⁰⁴ S.Res. 247, “Expressing solidarity with Israel in its fight against terrorism,” (22 April 2002), accessed online at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:S.RES.247>; on 5 August 2011; H.Res.392, “Whereas the United States and Israel are now engaged in a common struggle against terrorism and are on the front-lines of a conflict thrust upon them against their will,” (2 May 2002), accessed online at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c107:2:./temp/~c107lnVrp0:> on 5 August 2011.

¹⁰⁵ Robert Gates, “Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Arlington, VA, Monday, October 15, 2007,” accessed at <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1185> on 5 August 2011.

¹⁰⁶ Andrew Shapiro, “The Obama Administration’s Approach to U.S.-Israel Security Cooperation: Preserving Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge,” Remarks at the Brookings Saban Center for Middle East Policy on July 16, 2010, accessed at <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/144753.htm> on 5 August 2011.

Israel was a strategic liability for the United States, rather than a strategic asset.¹⁰⁷ The amount and virulence of criticism generated by their arguments¹⁰⁸ is an indication of the extent to which the relationship's value is accepted. Most Americans strongly perceive the United States strategic interests and Israel's as encapsulating each-other.

It can be safely assumed that Israeli policy-makers are aware of the United States' beliefs and preferences regarding the Middle East. As the statements cited above show, American policy-makers tend to express these preferences quite openly. Furthermore, Israelis seem to share the belief that their interests are aligned with American strategic interests, and they actively promote this view in the United States. Shortly after the 11 September attacks, for example, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared: "America, we are with you, because the struggle against terrorism is also our struggle."¹⁰⁹ Similarly, in a 2006 speech to Congress, Ehud Olmert declared that "our countries do not just share the experience and pain of terrorism, we share the commitment and resolve to confront the brutal terrorists that took these innocent people from us."¹¹⁰ Many other statements made by Israeli leaders in the last ten years go towards reinforcing this idea.¹¹¹ Though this idea is probably sincerely felt by most Israelis, they probably would not promote it so consistently if they did not feel that it resonates with Americans. It is therefore safe to assume that Israeli policy-makers perceive that the United

¹⁰⁷ Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*

¹⁰⁸ Michael Massing, "The Storm Over the Israel Lobby," *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 53/10 (June 8, 2006); Mitchell Plitnick and Chris Toensing, "'The Israel Lobby' in Perspective," *Middle East Report*, Vol.243 (Summer 2007), p.42

¹⁰⁹ "PM Sharon addresses solidarity rally: three months since terror attacks in the US" (Jerusalem, 11 December 2001), accessed at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches%20by%20Israeli%20leaders/2001/PM%20Sharon%20addresses%20solidarity%20rally-%20Three%20months> on 5 August 2011.

¹¹⁰ "Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's address before Congress," *Haaretz*, 24 May 2006, accessed online at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/prime-minister-ehud-olmert-s-address-before-congress-1.188571> on 5 August 2011.

¹¹¹ Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.61

States believes its interests are aligned with Israel's. Consequently, the existence of a trusting relationship between these two states would be consistent with the rationalist approach to trust.

CHAPTER III

APPLYING THE BINDING APPROACH TO THE U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP

As was explained in Chapter I, the binding approach takes into account the more emotional element of a trusting relationship. As the very term “binding” implies, this approach rests on the idea that parties trust each-other when they feel that there is a bond between them. This bond occurs “when actors translate a level of empathy and sympathy into a political relationship characterized by positive feelings and the forging of a new collective identity.”¹¹² These positive feelings, and that sense of common identity, are what lead the parties to think that the other will do “what is right” and not betray. In this sense, familiarity tends to breed trust.¹¹³ Under the binding approach, therefore, one can expect to find trust in a relationship where the parties have frequent and positive interactions with each-other.

This chapter will show that there is an undeniable bond between the United States and Israel. Not only have these two nations had extensive contact with each other over time, thereby fostering a sense of familiarity, but Americans and Israelis tend to have very positive feelings for each-other, and there exists a definite sense of common identity between them.

Contacts between Israel and the United States are varied and extensive. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the two nations have cooperated closely on military and security issues since the 1960s. But they also have a deep economic relationship. In addition to providing extensive aid, the United States is Israel’s principal trading partner. Israel is a

¹¹² Booth & Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, pp.238-39

¹¹³ Möllering, *Trust*, pp.94-95

relatively small market, which means that it does not rank particularly high among the United States' trading partners: it was 23rd largest recipient of American exports, and the 20th largest source of imports for the United States in 2010.¹¹⁴ However, Israeli trade with the United States is quite impressive when taking account of Israel's population. Indeed, US exports per Israeli capita was approximately \$1,512 in 2010.¹¹⁵ While a few countries, such as Canada or the Netherlands, account for more US exports per capita, Israel accounts for much more than the United Kingdom (about \$772) or even Mexico (approximately \$1,438). Furthermore, the United States provides 12.3% of Israeli imports, and receives as much as 35% of Israeli exports, far more than any other country.¹¹⁶

Migration between the two countries is also significant: as of 2009, there were approximately 110,850 Israeli-born residents in the United States, and over 92,800 American-born residents in Israel.¹¹⁷ Israeli immigration to the United States may seem weak in comparison to immigration from certain Latin American countries.¹¹⁸ However, these numbers must be seen in the context of Israel's relatively small population, which is under 7.5 million.¹¹⁹ Indeed, it should be noted that far more American residents were born in Israel than in any other

¹¹⁴ U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration: "Top US Trade Partners," accessed online at http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf on 9 August 2011.

¹¹⁵ This figure was calculated by dividing U.S. Department of Commerce data from the source in Footnote 114 by the total population of Israel as indicated in the C.I.A. World Factbook, accessed online at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.html> on 9 August 2011.

¹¹⁶ C.I.A. World Factbook: Israel, accessed online at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.html> on 9 August 2011.

¹¹⁷ O.E.C.D., International Migration Database, accessed at <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG> on 9 August 2011.

¹¹⁸ For example, close to 12 million residents of the United States were born in Mexico; see: OECD, International Migration Database

¹¹⁹ C.I.A. World Factbook: Israel

O.E.C.D. member-state, and only the United Kingdom is home to more American-born residents than Israel.¹²⁰

Tourism is also an important area of contact between Israel and the United States. In 2009, approximately 538,000 Americans visited Israel, by far the largest proportion of tourists to the Jewish state.¹²¹ Similarly, an average 294,000 Israeli visitors have come each year to the United States from 2003 to 2010.¹²² Interestingly, a majority of Israeli tourists come to the United States for the purpose of visiting friends and/or relatives,¹²³ which is an indication of the familiarity between these visitors and the host country. Furthermore, the Israeli government actively encourages American tourism to Israel, particularly from Evangelical Christian tour groups, not just as a source of income but also to solidify these groups' support for Israel.¹²⁴ Similarly, an affiliate of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (A.I.P.A.C.), a pro-Israel lobby organization in the United States, funds free trips to Israel for members of Congress. The purpose of these trips is, in great part, to "expose [legislators] to the policy preferences and basic worldview of Israel's leaders."¹²⁵ Eighty-one Congressmen were scheduled to visit Israel in August 2011, for example.¹²⁶ As a result of such efforts, approximately ten percent of all congressional trips abroad are to Israel.¹²⁷

¹²⁰ O.E.C.D., International Migration Database

¹²¹ Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Tourism and Accommodation Services: Visitor Arrivals by Country of Citizenship, accessed online at http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton61/st23_05.pdf on 9 August 2011.

¹²² U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Office of Travel and Tourism Industries: "2010 Market Profile: Israel," accessed online at http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2010_Israel_Market_Profile.pdf on 9 August 2011.

¹²³ U.S. Department of Commerce, "2010 Market Profile: Israel"

¹²⁴ Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.136

¹²⁵ Ibid, p.161

¹²⁶ Herb Keinon, "81 Congressmen to visit Israel in coming weeks," *The Jerusalem Post* (8 Aug. 2011), accessed online at <http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=232876> on 9 August 2011.

¹²⁷ Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.161

Given the extensive contacts between Americans and Israelis, there can be little doubt that they are familiar with each-other. There is also a high level of sympathy between them. A 2007 poll conducted by Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and the Anti-Defamation League found that 64% of Israelis had a positive perception of the United States, and 65% viewed it as a loyal ally, while only 8% had a negative view.¹²⁸ A more recent opinion poll organized by the Brookings Institution found that a full 78% of Jewish Israelis¹²⁹ hold very or somewhat favourable views of the United States, while only 12% have a very or somewhat unfavourable view.¹³⁰ American views of Israel are similarly positive: a 2010 poll conducted by Zogby International found that 65% of Americans have a favourable view of Israelis.¹³¹ Jewish Americans have a particular affinity for Israel, and a full 63% of them report feeling at least somewhat connected with Israel.¹³² However, the high rate of favourable views towards Israel in the United States goes far beyond the Jewish community, which only comprises 1.7% of the American population.¹³³

Americans have long held positive views of Israel. Although the U.S. government was ambivalent towards Israel during much of the 1950s, Israel quickly gained support among the American population. One of the earliest signs of private support for the

¹²⁸ Anti-Defamation League: "Poll Shows That Israel is a Staunch American Ally" (18 May 2007), accessed online at http://www.adl.org/PresRele/IsIME_62/5055_62.htm on 10 August 2011.

¹²⁹ Over 75% of the Israeli population is Jewish (C.I.A. World Factbook: Israel).

¹³⁰ 2010 Israeli Jewish Public Opinion Survey conducted by the University of Maryland and Dahaf Institute, Israel (9 December 2010) accessed at http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2010/1209_israel_public_opinion_telhami/israeli_jewish_pollwerpoint.pdf on 10 August 2011.

¹³¹ American Opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, poll conducted by Zogby International (March 2010), accessed at <http://www.aaiusa.org/page/-/Polls/AmericanOpinionsOnIsraeli-PalestinianConflictReportMarch2010.pdf> on 10 August 2011.

¹³² "Still Connected: American Jewish Attitudes about Israel," Brandeis University (August 2010), p.9, accessed online at <http://www.brandeis.edu/cmjs/pdfs/still.connected.08.25.10.3.pdf> on 10 August 2011.

¹³³ C.I.A. World Factbook: United States, accessed at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html> on 10 August 2011.

young Jewish state was the fact that Americans bought \$850 million worth of Israeli bonds between 1951 and 1967, compared to \$150 million bought by Canadian, West Europeans, and others.¹³⁴ The American Jewish community was a major force in this development, but public support for Israel extended across the American religious and political spectrum.¹³⁵ Writing in 1993, Schoenbaum stated that “from 1947 to the present, U.S. support for Israel has outweighed sympathy for Arabs by margins as large as 10:1. . . Presented a menu of moral or other characteristic qualities in 1975, half the respondents identified Israelis with ‘like Americans’; 46% with ‘friendly’; 41% with ‘peaceful’; 39% each with ‘honest’ and ‘intelligent’.”¹³⁶

The affinity between American and Israelis is, to a large extent, due to a sense of identification between the two people. Both Israel and the United States are settler nations, with similar foundational narratives of persecuted religious minorities (Jews for Israel, Puritans for the United States) fleeing Europe to become fearless pioneers taming the wilderness.¹³⁷ As an illustration of this identification, Schoenbaum cites an American senator who, returning from a trip to the Middle East in 1957, claimed that Israel was “reminiscent in many ways of the old American West. . . An American can feel very much at home in Israel – that is, an American who loves adventure, and who realizes that our own great country was once a little nation wedged between the sea and the wilderness.”¹³⁸

An even more important factor of identification is the fact that Israel and the United States regard each-other as fellow democracies with similar values. Lee Marsden points

¹³⁴ Schoenbaum, *The United States and Israel*, p.65

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, pp.64-66

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, p.4

¹³⁷ S. Ilan Troen, “Frontier Myths and Their Applications in America and Israel: A Transnational Perspective,” *The Journal of American History*, Vol.86/3 (Dec. 1999), pp.1209-30

¹³⁸ Senator Hubert Humphrey, cited in: Schoenbaum, *The United States and Israel*, p.79

out that “the shared ideals of freedom, liberty, democracy and ultimately prevailing through adversity to a peaceful future is a narrative that has become a mantra for US and Israeli leaders.”¹³⁹ For example, US Vice-President Biden declared in 2009 that “the bond between Israel and the United States was forged by a shared interest in peace and security; by shared values (...) and a common, unyielding commitment to democracy.”¹⁴⁰ President Obama said something very similar during a 2010 joint press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu: “the bond between the United States and Israel is unbreakable. It encompasses our national security interests, our strategic interests, but *most importantly, the bond of two democracies who share a common set of values* and whose people have grown closer and closer as time goes on.”¹⁴¹ This theme is also brought up by Israeli leaders. In his recent speech to Congress, Prime Minister Netanyahu declared that “we stand together to defend democracy,” and contrasted Israel’s democratic government to the more authoritarian regimes of other Middle-Eastern countries.¹⁴² His predecessor in the Israeli Prime Minister’s office, Ehud Olmert, also drew implicit parallels between the two democracies in his 2006 speech to Congress, where he recounted that his parents “immigrated to Israel to fulfil their dream of building a Jewish and democratic state living in peace in the land of our ancestors,” and that “We have succeeded in building a Jewish democratic homeland.”¹⁴³ As this last example illustrates, the theme of

¹³⁹ Marsden, “US-Israel Relations,” p.192

¹⁴⁰ “Remarks by the Vice President at the Annual Policy Conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee” (5 May 2009), accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-vice-president-annual-policy-conference-american-israel-public-affairs-comm> on 12 August 2011.

¹⁴¹ “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel in Joint Press Availability” (6 July 2010), accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-netanyahu-israel-joint-press-availabilit> on 12 August 2011.

¹⁴² “Transcript: Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s address to Congress,” WashingtonPost.com (24 May 2011), accessed at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israeli-prime-minister-binyamin-netanyahus-address-to-congress/2011/05/24/AFWY5bAH_story.html on 12 August 2011.

¹⁴³ “Address by PM Olmert to a Joint Meeting of the US Congress” (24 May 2006), Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, accessed at

democracy is often paired with that of common settler origins into the broad narrative of “a pioneer nation, making the desert blossom and bringing civilization or democracy at least to a lawless region.”¹⁴⁴

The shared narratives of frontier settlement and democracy, along with the extensive contacts between Israel and the United States, foster a sense of closeness between the two nations. But a discussion of the bonds between the two countries would be incomplete without mentioning the religious dimension. Given Israel’s explicit character as a Jewish state, it is to be expected that Jewish Americans would have special affection for it. That does not mean that American Jews will reflexively support all of Israel’s policies – on the contrary, many American Jews feel free to criticize Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and its treatment of Palestinians, among many other things.¹⁴⁵ However, a vast majority of them feel a special connection to Israel, as is reflected in the opinion poll cited earlier in this chapter. On the Israeli side, the United States is greatly respected as the home of the world’s largest Jewish community, a community which is highly educated, prosperous, and well organized.¹⁴⁶

Like the American Jewish community, many American Christians feel a special attachment to Israel. The strongest form of Christian support for Israel is found in the Christian Zionist movement, which sees the Jewish state as the fulfilment of Biblical prophecy.¹⁴⁷ However, American Christian sympathy for Israel goes beyond this particular movement. As Bernard Reich explains:

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2006/Address+by+PM+Olmert+to+a+joint+meeting+of+US+Congress+24-May-2006.htm> on 12 August 2011.

¹⁴⁴ Marsden, “US-Israel Relations,” p.192

¹⁴⁵ Bickerton, “America’s Israel / Israel’s America,” p.176

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, p.177

¹⁴⁷ Ronald Stockton, “Christian Zionism: Prophecy and Public Opinion,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 41/2 (Spring 1987), pp. 234-53; Marsden, “US-Israel Relations,” pp.197-200

“The original settlers of the United States brought their religious identity and concerns with them, and the Old Testament served as a guide to both history and daily life. The religious faith of the Pilgrims later became a factor in support for Israel throughout the U.S. Christian, and especially fundamentalist, community. Hebrew was a significant language of study in U.S. colleges and universities in their early days, and there was a religious and spiritual connection with the land of the Bible and its inhabitants – universally seen as Jews, not Arabs.”¹⁴⁸

The Cold War greatly bolstered the American Christian identification with Israel. The years immediately following Israel’s independence saw a broad Christian revival in the United States which, in the context of the fight against “godless Communism,” strengthened the identification of American Christians with Jews and Israel under the broader label of Judeo-Christianity.¹⁴⁹ Many Christian Americans thus “came to view Israelis as religious brothers, sharing an understanding of moral and political values in a Cold War world.”¹⁵⁰ This view survived the fall of the Soviet Union, and many American Christians, particularly Evangelicals, still have strong sympathies for Israel.¹⁵¹

All of these ties – economic, political, cultural and religious – closely bind the United States and Israel, and foster a feeling of kinship between the two nations. Americans see

¹⁴⁸ Reich, *The United States and Israel*, p.205

¹⁴⁹ Michelle Mart, “The ‘Christianization’ of Israel and Jews in 1950s America,” *Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation*, Vol. 14/1 (Winter 2004), pp. 109-147

¹⁵⁰ Mart, “The ‘Christianization’ of Israel,” p.131

¹⁵¹ “American Evangelicals and Israel: Public Opinion on Religion and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” (15 April 2005), The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life website, accessed at <http://pewforum.org/Christian/American-Evangelicals-and-Israel.aspx> on 12 August 2011.

Israel as “a tiny extension of their nation’s own hopes and history,”¹⁵² while Israelis view the United States as “Israel’s closest friend.”¹⁵³ This sense of close friendship – of kinship, even – should naturally lead each nation to be confident that the other will do “what is right.” One could therefore expect the two states to have a trusting relationship according to the binding approach.

¹⁵² Schoenbaum, *The United States and Israel*, p.79

¹⁵³ Bickerton, “America’s Israel / Israel’s America,” p.177

CHAPTER IV

EVIDENCE OF A TRUSTING RELATIONSHIP

The previous chapters show that the relationship between the United States and Israel can reasonably be expected to be a trusting one. This is definitely true under the binding approach, as the two states have close historical, cultural, economic, and political ties, leading to a strong sense of common identity. This is also true under the rationalist approach, if one considers that the United States perceives its interests as being aligned with Israel's. But are the actual policies of these two states indicative of a trusting relationship? For the most part, yes.

As was discussed in Chapter I, voluntary acceptance of some form of vulnerability is evidence of trust. If such evidence is observed in a number of different aspects of a relationship, this would mean that it is a generally trusting relationship. The present chapter will examine some of the most important features of the U.S.-Israeli relationship to assess whether there is enough evidence to confirm that they have a trusting relationship.

The field of intelligence will be discussed first, and although Israel and the United States are known to cooperate in this field, it is not clear that this cooperation shows much trust. This chapter will then discuss military cooperation between the two countries, American economic and military aid to Israel, and Israel's development of nuclear weapons. These aspects of the U.S.-Israeli relationship all tend to show that the United States has a high level of trust towards Israel, but they do not reveal much with regards to Israel's level of trust toward the United States. This illustrates a practical problem in determining the existence of trust in highly unequal relationships. One detects trust by looking for instances of voluntary acceptance of

vulnerability. However, this is a relationship where Israel is in a position of dependency towards the United States, and therefore it is already inherently vulnerable to it. Furthermore, it is often difficult to determine how voluntary the actions of a much weaker party are in such an unequal relationship. Despite those considerations, though, there is one issue which arguably shows that Jerusalem trusts Washington: dealing with Iran's nuclear ambitions.

A. Intelligence cooperation

It is sometimes said that “one of the strongest Western intelligence links is that between the United States and Israel.”¹⁵⁴ The US Ambassador to Israel, Dan Shapiro, recently claimed that the two states “face the same threats and therefore have built excellent cooperation between the two governments in the field of intelligence.”¹⁵⁵ If true, this would be a sign of trust. Intelligence falls under the category of “decision-making data” which Hoffman refers to in his list of trust indicators. The state providing intelligence must be confident that it will not be used in a way contrary to its interests. Any recent example of intelligence collaboration would be classified information, making it hard to verify how strong U.S.-Israeli intelligence cooperation really is today. However, some information about past collaboration between American and Israeli intelligence services is available, and this history paints an ambiguous picture.

Intelligence cooperation between the two states began in the early 1950s, after James Angleton, then the head of the C.I.A.'s counterintelligence unit, organized a meeting

¹⁵⁴ Jeffrey Richelson, *The US Intelligence Community* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), p.351

¹⁵⁵ “Peres tells new U.S. envoy: No doubt Obama is friend of Israel” *Haaretz* online, 8 March 2011, accessed at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/peres-tells-new-u-s-envoy-no-doubt-obama-is-friend-of-israel-1.376762> on 16 August 2011

between Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion and the director of the C.I.A.¹⁵⁶ From then on, Israel passed valuable intelligence about the Soviet Union to the United States. Much of this intelligence came from recent Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union, who were able to provide Israel with a wealth of information from the other side of the Iron Curtain, information which often would have been extremely difficult for the United States to obtain on its own.¹⁵⁷ Israel was also willing to pass on Soviet weaponry captured during wars with its Arab neighbours.¹⁵⁸ Among the best examples of valuable intelligence provided to the United States by Israeli intelligence during the Cold War was the sharing of Khrushchev's famous 1956 speech denouncing Stalin's excesses, and the sharing of a full Soviet-made Mig-21 which it obtained from an Iraqi defector.¹⁵⁹ This cooperation continued after the end of the Cold War. Israel shared intelligence with the United States during the 1991 Gulf War, provided information about the transfer of sensitive technology from China to Iran in 1997, and assisted the United States and U.N. Special Commission in their efforts to uncover Iraqi nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.¹⁶⁰

It is safe to say that Mossad's provision of high quality intelligence to the C.I.A. "was without doubt for quid pro quo purposes."¹⁶¹ Indeed, there are known examples of the C.I.A. providing information to Israel. However, this reciprocation by the United States only took place after several years, and was not always consistent. The C.I.A. readily provided

¹⁵⁶ Ephraim Kahana, "Mossad-CIA Cooperation," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol.14/3 (2001), p.410

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, pp.410-11

¹⁵⁸ Richelson, *The US Intelligence Community*, pp.351-52; Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.52

¹⁵⁹ Kahana, "Mossad-CIA Cooperation," pp.411-12; Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.52

¹⁶⁰ Richelson, *The US Intelligence Community*, pp.353-54

¹⁶¹ Kahana, "Mossad-CIA Cooperation," p.413

information to Israel in certain cases, but was reluctant in others.¹⁶² A striking example was reconnaissance satellite imagery: the United States sometimes agreed to provide Israel with full access to such data, and at other times restricted or denied Israeli access to it.¹⁶³ In particular, the C.I.A. has been unwilling to provide information regarding Arab states friendly to the United States.¹⁶⁴

The 1991 Gulf War provides the strongest example of the United States' ambivalence towards sharing sensitive information with Israel. Indeed, Washington provided only very limited access to intelligence about Iraq during that period. Israeli requests for an electronic downlink to American intelligence satellites were turned down, as were requests to acquire U.S. aircraft identification codes to differentiate between "friend or foe" warplanes.¹⁶⁵ American leaders were clearly afraid that Israel would use such information to retaliate against Iraq's missile attacks, something which Washington feared would unravel the U.S.-led coalition against Saddam Hussein.¹⁶⁶ The United States' unwillingness to make its interests vulnerable to Israel reveals a definite lack of trust at that particular time. But as mentioned above, American intelligence cooperation has tended to be inconsistent even at other times.

The unreliability of American intelligence-sharing has led Israel to engage in some hedging strategies. One of these is espionage. In all fairness, it is common for even closely allied nations to spy on each-other to at least some degree, and the C.I.A. collects

¹⁶² Ibid, p.413

¹⁶³ Richelson, *The US Intelligence Community*, pp.352-53

¹⁶⁴ Samuel Lewis, "The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance," *Middle East Journal*, Vol.53/3 (Summer 1999), p.374

¹⁶⁵ Efraim Inbar, *Israel's National Security* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p.80

¹⁶⁶ Inbar, *Israel's National Security*, pp.77-81

intelligence on even the closest American allies.¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, Israel's efforts to spy on the United States are reported to be particularly aggressive, and some sources regard Israel as "the second most active foreign intelligence service in the United States."¹⁶⁸ One of the most famous examples is the case of Jonathan Pollard, an American naval analyst who passed on large quantities of classified documents to Israel during the early 1980s.¹⁶⁹ More recently, in 2006, a U.S. Department of Defence analyst named Lawrence Franklin was sentenced to over 12 years of prison for disclosing classified information to an Israeli diplomat.¹⁷⁰ Furthermore, the inconsistency with which American agencies share satellite imagery has led Israel to launch its own spy satellite system. An unclassified 2007 C.I.A. report on the Israeli space reconnaissance effort explicitly states that it is in response to the unreliability of American intelligence-sharing with regards to satellite imagery.¹⁷¹ Just as the American ambivalence about sharing satellite intelligence shows a lack of trust, this demonstrates that Israelis do not trust the United States on this issue.

Writing in 2001, Kahana argued that "cooperation between the U.S. and Israeli intelligence communities exists on a tit-for-tat basis, and only when it serves the interests of the side providing information to the other."¹⁷² This is consistent with the rationalist approach to trust: a party will share information when its interests are aligned with the other's interests in

¹⁶⁷ Richelson, *The US Intelligence Community*, p.395

¹⁶⁸ Former head of the U.S. Justice Department's internal security section, quoted in Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.76

¹⁶⁹ Casey Addis, U.S. Congressional Research Service, "Israel: Background and U.S. Relations" (RL33476, 14 February 2011), p.34, accessed at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33476.pdf> on 25 August 2011; Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.76

¹⁷⁰ Addis, "Israel," p.34; Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.76

¹⁷¹ E.L. Zorn, "Expanding The Horizon: Israel's Quest for Satellite Intelligence" (8 May 2007), CIA website, Studies Archives Indexes Vol.44/5, accessed at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol44no5/html/v44i5a04p.htm> on 17 August 2011.

¹⁷² Kahana, "Mossad-CIA Cooperation," pp.418-19

having that information. However, there is little indication that beliefs about the other's integrity have much to do with it. This picture therefore does not fit well within the binding approach. In any case, one could say that Israel and the United States trust each-other in the specific instances when they share intelligence, but it cannot be said that they *generally* trust each-other in the field of intelligence.

Any conclusion on this topic can only be tentative, however. Indeed, the secretive nature of intelligence means that little information is available on this topic. This is especially true about recent information, which is largely unavailable to the general public. It is therefore practically impossible to draw conclusions about the current state of Israeli-American intelligence-sharing. Indeed, American cooperation may have increased substantially since the events of 11 September 2001. On 16 January 2009, for example, the two states signed a memorandum of understanding on the prevention of the supply of material to terrorist groups, in which they agreed to share intelligence regarding the smuggling of weapons to Gaza.¹⁷³ There reportedly are also high levels of intelligence-sharing about Iran,¹⁷⁴ and the C.I.A. and Mossad are said to cooperate closely on covert efforts to sabotage Iran's nuclear program.¹⁷⁵ But recent information on these topics is scant and vague, which makes it impossible to reach a definite conclusion on whether Israel and the United States generally trust each-other with regards to intelligence.

¹⁷³ "Memorandum of Understanding Between Israel and the United States Regarding Prevention of the Supply of Arms and Related Materiel to Terrorist Groups," 16 January 2009, accessed at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Israel-US+Memorandum+of+Understanding+16-Jan-2009.htm> on 16 August 2011.

¹⁷⁴ David Sanger, "U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site," (10 January 2009), *The New York Times* online, accessed at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/washington/11iran.html?pagewanted=all> on 19 August 2011.

¹⁷⁵ Yossi Melman, "Report: Israel waging covert war against Iranian nuclear program" (18 February 2009), *Haaretz* website, accessed at <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/report-israel-waging-covert-war-against-iranian-nuclear-program-1.270399> on 25 August 2011.

B. Military Cooperation

Beyond the murky world of intelligence, there is little doubt that the United States and Israel cooperate extensively on military and security issues. Cooperation with regards to covert operations in Iran is but one illustration. Israel and the United States also have a history of sharing military tactics and know-how. For example, the two states share expertise on fighting terrorism, particularly within the framework of the Joint Counter-Terrorism Group which was created in 1996 to facilitate such exchanges.¹⁷⁶ They also have conducted a large-scale joint military exercise every two years since 2001, in an effort towards integrating their weapons, radars, and other systems.¹⁷⁷ Such sharing of military doctrine and tactics requires a certain level of trust on the part of both countries, as this type of information could potentially be used against the one sharing it. In other words, sharing this knowledge involves accepting a degree of vulnerability. Both Israel and the United States are willing to accept this.

The United States also maintains stockpiles of military materiel – including missiles, artillery ammunition, and armored vehicles – at Israeli bases for use in case of conflict.¹⁷⁸ The initial value of this equipment was \$100 million, but it increased over time to \$800 million by 2010.¹⁷⁹ The material remains property of the United States, but the Israel Defense Forces may use it in case of emergency – as they did, with prior American permission, during the 2006 war in Lebanon.¹⁸⁰ This arrangement is not unique. Indeed, the United States

¹⁷⁶ “U.S. - Israel Joint Statement, 30 April 1996,” accessed at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1995-1996/Israel-US+Joint+Statement.htm> on 28 August 2011.

¹⁷⁷ Addis, “Israel,” p.29

¹⁷⁸ Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” p.12; Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, pp.33-34

¹⁷⁹ Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” p.12

¹⁸⁰ Ibid; Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.33

maintains similar stockpiles in other allied countries, such as South Korea.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, it takes trust for the United States to store a substantial amount of material, which it might need in case of crisis, in the hands another country. With such an arrangement, the United States makes itself vulnerable to having the stockpiled material stolen or misused by the host country. Maintaining these stockpiles in Israel is therefore a strong indication of trust.

Yet the extent of U.S.-Israeli military cooperation is not limited to sharing best practices and storing military supplies. Perhaps the most important aspect of this cooperation is the high degree of collaboration on military technology development. Indeed, the two states frequently participate in joint research and development programs.¹⁸² Current joint projects include several important missile defense systems such as the Arrow anti-ballistic missiles, the Iron Dome system to intercept Palestinian and Iranian-made rockets and mortar rounds, and a defense against long-range rockets and cruise missiles called David's Sling.¹⁸³

Although those are joint projects, which implies technology sharing from both sides, these arrangements really should be seen as a form of technology transfer from the United States to Israel. Indeed, American military aid plays a crucial role in this cooperation, as these joint research and development projects are mostly financed by the United States.¹⁸⁴ While a significant amount of work is done by Israeli researchers, the United States is absolutely in a position to conduct this research by itself if it wanted to. Israel, by contrast, would probably not be able to develop many of these weapon systems without American assistance.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ Amos Harel, "U.S. to store \$800m in military gear in Israel," *Haaretz* (11 January 2010), accessed at <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/u-s-to-store-800m-in-military-gear-in-israel-1.261162> on 28 August 2011.

¹⁸² Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.32

¹⁸³ Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," pp.8-10

¹⁸⁴ Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.32

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid*

The United States has therefore helped Israel become one of the most technologically advanced military powers in the world.¹⁸⁶ The fact that the United States would help another country develop its armed forces to such an extent is a sign of trust, as it rests on the belief that these armed forces will not be used against its interests. This idea will come up again in the section on American aid to Israel, further below.

Technology transfer is also a sign of trust in that it rests on the belief that Israel will not then convey this technology to a third party which may be hostile to the United States. There are limits to the Americans' trust of Israel with regards to this. Indeed, there have been some tensions between the two states over Israeli attempts to sell sensitive technology to other nations, particularly China.¹⁸⁷ This issue led a 2005 bilateral agreement mandating Israeli consultation with the American government on sensitive arms transfers to third parties.¹⁸⁸ So while the United States trusts Israel enough to share and co-develop sensitive technology with it, a mechanism was put in place to hedge against the possibility that Israel would pass this technology on in ways that would be adverse to American interests. This shows that there are some limits to how much the United States trusts Israel, given Israeli interest in selling sensitive technology to other nations.

C. American Foreign Aid to Israel

One of the most remarkable aspects of the U.S.-Israel relationship is the considerable amount of aid which Israel has received from the United States. American military aid has helped transform Israel into one of the world's most advanced military powers, and

¹⁸⁶ Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," p.2

¹⁸⁷ Addis, "Israel," pp.32-33

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, p.33

American economic aid has substantially subsidized the Israeli economy over the last several decades.¹⁸⁹ Overall, Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of American foreign assistance since World War II, and it was the largest annual recipient of American foreign aid from 1976 until it was supplanted by Iraq in 2004.¹⁹⁰

Providing aid can often be seen as a sign of trust. This is certainly true at the level of individuals: one who gives money to charity, for example, does so because he or she trusts that this money will be used for the advertised purposes as opposed to lining the pockets of the charity's leaders. Similarly, a state will provide aid with a specific purpose in mind, such as economic development or as an incentive for cooperation on some other issue. The donor state gives with the hope that the resources in question will be used for their intended purpose, or at least not used in a way contrary to the donor's interests. In this sense, the donor state makes itself vulnerable to betrayal as soon as the resources leave its control and come into the recipient's hands. This acceptance of the possibility of betrayal is an indication of trust.

States can hedge against the possibility that their aid will be misused. One of the strongest hedges against misuse of aid would be to provide it without giving the recipient country's government any control over it. For example, food aid can be distributed directly to a population in need, bypassing government authorities which may steal or waste part of it. The American foreign aid agency, USAID, does this in parts of West Africa, for example.¹⁹¹ Another, less drastic, hedging mechanism consists in monitoring the recipient's use of foreign

¹⁸⁹ Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," p.2

¹⁹⁰ Ibid

¹⁹¹ "Overview of programs in West Africa," USAID website, accessed at <http://www.usaid.gov/westafrica/ffp/> on 24 August 2011.

aid, a practice which is a standard USAID policy.¹⁹² In any case, as was discussed in Chapter I, the level of hedging is inversely proportional to the level of trust. Giving a high level of unsupervised control over a substantial amount of aid is a strong sign of trust.

With this in mind, it is extremely interesting to look at American aid to Israel. This aid is multifaceted, with a broad array of military and economic grants, loans and assistance programs.¹⁹³ This section will first examine civilian economic aid, and then discuss military assistance.

1) Economic Aid

The United States provided a limited amount of economic aid to Israel throughout the 1950s and 1960s, mostly in the form of loans.¹⁹⁴ This aid increased significantly after 1971, and it also changed in nature. Whereas early American aid mostly consisted of project aid, Export Import Bank loans and some relatively minor other programs, it changed to include a broader Commodity Import Program, as well as increased loans, Jewish refugee resettlement grants, and substantial loan guarantees.¹⁹⁵ Contrary to most other recipients of American foreign assistance, who normally receive it in instalments, all U.S. foreign aid earmarked for Israel is delivered within the first thirty days of the fiscal year.¹⁹⁶ In other words, the United States is willing to grant Israel full control over the funds allocated to it much sooner than other recipients

¹⁹² “Use of Reliable Partner Country Systems for Direct Management and Implementation of Assistance,” USAID website, accessed at <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/220.pdf> on 24 August 2011.

¹⁹³ Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel”

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p.21

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, pp.21, 17-18, 24-26

¹⁹⁶ Addis, “Israel,” p.26

of U.S. aid. This is just one out of several examples of American willingness to give Israel high levels of control over its aid allotment.

The Commodity Import Program, which soon became the main vehicle for non-military American aid, was replaced by mostly unconditional cash grants after 1979.¹⁹⁷ These grants ended in 2008, as Israel's economy has developed to the point where it is considered a fully industrialized nation and no longer needs such aid.¹⁹⁸ But until that year, Israel received a considerable amount of economic grant aid, with an average \$827.49 million per year between 1972 and 2007.¹⁹⁹ More importantly, Israel obtained full control over these sums, with very little American oversight. In fact, as Walt and Mearsheimer point out, Israel was the only recipient of U.S. economic aid that did not have to account for how that aid was spent.²⁰⁰

Loan guarantees are now the principal vehicle for non-military American aid to Israel.²⁰¹ Since 1972, the United States has given loan guarantees to help Israel deal with housing shortages, the absorption of new immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, and its economic recovery after a 2000-2003 recession caused by the Second Palestinian Intifada.²⁰² Such loan guarantees allow Israel to borrow funds from commercial sources at significantly lower interest rates than it otherwise would be able to. Contrary to the economic aid grants, there are some conditions attached to the American loan guarantees. Under a 2009 agreement, the U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Development Group establishes budgetary benchmarks for Israel, such as deficit and spending caps, and the United States must give written

¹⁹⁷ Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," p.21, fn.67

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, p.2

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, pp.24-26

²⁰⁰ Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.28

²⁰¹ Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," pp.17-18

²⁰² Ibid, pp.17-18

determination of the realization (or waiver) of these benchmarks.²⁰³ Meeting these benchmarks is not an insignificant condition, but it is somewhat diluted by the fact that the benchmarks are set by a joint American-Israeli group. This gives Israel some influence over the conditions it needs to meet to qualify for the loan guarantees. Another constraint on Israel's use of these loan guarantees has to do with its settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza. The United States opposes the construction of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian Territories, and American legislation requires that loan guarantees be reduced by an amount equal to the amount Israel spends on settlements.²⁰⁴ Thus, the \$3 billion loan guarantees for 2003 were reduced by \$289.5 million because Israel continued to build such settlements.²⁰⁵ This is a rather minor constraint, though. As Mearsheimer and Walt argue, "this reduction is not as severe as it may sound. . . as it involved no decrease in direct U.S. aid and merely forced Israel to pay a slightly higher interest rate on a small portion of the borrowed fund."²⁰⁶ Thus, the relatively limited conditions attached to these loan guarantees do not significantly change the perception that Israel has close to full discretion over how to use the American economic assistance it gets. The fact that the United States is willing to provide so much economic aid under these conditions shows a strong level of trust.

²⁰³ Ibid, p.18

²⁰⁴ Ibid, pp.15, 17; David Francis, "US can raise the pressure on Israel without cutting aid" (5 April 2005), *The Christian Science Monitor*, accessed at <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/David-R.-Francis/2010/0405/US-can-raise-the-pressure-on-Israel-without-cutting-aid> on 24 August 2011.

²⁰⁵ Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," p.17; "US cuts Israeli loan guarantees" (27 November 2003), BBC News website, accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3238632.stm on 24 August 2011.

²⁰⁶ Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.29

2) Military Aid

Israel has received a substantial amount of American economic aid over the years, but it has received even higher levels of military aid. American military grants to Israel came to a total of more than \$61 billion from 1948 to 2010, over fifty percent of all U.S. aid to Israel during that time period.²⁰⁷ The proportion of military to economic aid has recently grown even larger. In 2007, just as the economic aid grants were being phased out, the United States announced that it would increase military assistance to Israel by \$30 billion over the following decade.²⁰⁸

American military aid aims to help Israel maintain a “qualitative military edge” over other military forces in the region.²⁰⁹ Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Dan Shapiro explained in 2010 that “the cornerstone of our security commitment to Israel has been an assurance that the United States would help Israel uphold its qualitative military edge. . . . Israel’s QME is its ability to counter and defeat credible military threats from any individual state, coalition of states, or non-state actor, while sustaining minimal damages or casualties.”²¹⁰ This commitment to Israel’s “Q.M.E.” has its roots in the 1968 sale of Phantom jets, then one of the United States’ most sophisticated warplanes, which was partly encouraged by a U.S. Senate resolution calling on the President to take the necessary steps to “provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force,” counteract new Arab weaponry, and replace losses from the

²⁰⁷ Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” p.24

²⁰⁸ Marsden, “US-Israel Relations,” pp.200-01; Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” p.4

²⁰⁹ Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” p.3; Addis, “Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,” pp.31-32

²¹⁰ “The Obama Administration's Approach to U.S.-Israel Security Cooperation: Preserving Israel's Qualitative Military Edge,” Remarks by Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Political-Military Affairs (16 July 2010), U.S. Department of State website, accessed at <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/144753.htm> on 26 August 2011.

Six Day War.²¹¹ Successive American administrations have confirmed this commitment repeatedly since then, and Congress translated this policy into law with the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008.²¹²

The very fact that the United States provides substantial assistance in building up the armed forces of another nation is a sign of trust, for it indicates a belief that these armed forces will not be used against American interests. It is therefore significant that Israel has consistently had access to the best, most advanced American weaponry.²¹³ For example, Israel is one of the few countries scheduled to take delivery of the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter within the next few years.²¹⁴

American military aid to Israel is not completely unconditional. According to a 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and subsequent agreements between the two states, American military equipment may only be used “to maintain internal security, for legitimate self-defense, or to participate in United Nations collective security arrangements.”²¹⁵ This has led to some friction between Israel and the United States, as the former has occasionally used American equipment in offensive actions. Thus, the Reagan administration temporarily suspended shipments of new F-16 fighter jets after Israel used U.S.-made planes to bomb the Iraqi nuclear installation at Osirak in 1981.²¹⁶ A year later, the White House prohibited the export of cluster bombs to Israel for six years to protest Israel’s use of these U.S.-supplied

²¹¹ Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East,” p.22; Schoenbaum, *The United States and Israel*, pp.168-69

²¹² Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” p.3

²¹³ Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.31

²¹⁴ Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” p.7

²¹⁵ “Defense Trade: Information on U.S. Weapons Deliveries to the Middle East,” U.S. General Accounting Office report to Representative John Conyers, Jr. (GAO-01-107, 21 September 2001), p.8, accessed at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d011078.pdf> on 29 August 2011.

²¹⁶ Schoenbaum, *The United States and Israel*, p.278

munitions against civilian targets in Lebanon.²¹⁷ The sale of cluster bombs to Israel was again restricted in reaction to their use during the 2006 war in Lebanon.²¹⁸ Nevertheless, the impact of such restrictions on American military aid to Israel is very limited. Like the loan guarantee reductions to protest settlement construction, these restrictions seem more symbolic than substantive. They do not change the overall fact that the United States is very willing to help Israel develop a strong military force.

Several specific aspects of American military assistance reinforce the perception that the United States has a high level of trust towards Israel. The main component of American military aid is the payment of Foreign Military Financing (F.M.F.), which Israel receives in a lump sum during the first month of each fiscal year.²¹⁹ Like the early payment of economic aid grants mentioned earlier, this gives Israel immediate control over each yearly package of aid. Israel is also the only nation for which military procurement contracts worth less than \$500,000 are exempt from prior review by American authorities.²²⁰ This shows that the United States does not feel that it has to impose strict oversight over how Israel uses its military aid.

Normal American policy requires recipients of F.M.F. to spend these funds on American equipment. Israel is the sole exception to this rule, and it is allowed to spend a substantial amount of its F.M.F. on Israeli equipment.²²¹ Again, this gives Israel more discretion on the use of these funds. It also helps maintain and develop Israel's own defense industry. Interestingly, Israel's domestic military industry partly grew out of a desire to reduce dependency on outside suppliers, particularly the United States. A healthy domestic defense

²¹⁷ Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," pp.12-13

²¹⁸ Ibid, pp.13-14

²¹⁹ Ibid, p.5

²²⁰ Mearsheimer & Walt, *The Israel Lobby*, p.32

²²¹ Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," p.5

industry was seen as a hedge against the possibility that the United States would stop providing military equipment to Israel.²²² This shows that Israel does not completely trust the United States – or anyone, for that matter – to always provide military assistance.

One should not read too much into this hedge, however, as it is rather weak compared to the extent of Israeli dependence on U.S. military aid. It would be an exaggeration to claim that the Jewish state *distrusts* the United States based on its efforts to develop a strong domestic arms industry. However, it would also be an exaggeration to claim that Israel's dependence on American aid is a sign of trust. Indeed, Israel's perceived defense needs are much bigger than it can afford on its own, and it has little choice but to depend on help from the United States.²²³ This is the case whether or not Israel has much trust for its powerful benefactor.

D. Nuclear Weapons

The topic of nuclear weapons can provide an interesting test for trust, given their tremendous destructive power. In the present case, Israel's attitude towards American nuclear weapons is largely irrelevant. The United States developed a nuclear arsenal before the Jewish state even existed, and it is so much more powerful than Israel that the latter never had any choice but to accept the former's nuclear status. The reverse is not true, though. The United States could have exerted more pressure on Israel to stop it from developing a nuclear capability. Even after Israel successfully developed nuclear weapons, the United States could have made more of an effort to convince Israel to reduce or limit its nuclear arsenal. Instead, the United

²²² Inbar, *Israel's National Security*, pp.31-32, 35-36

²²³ *Ibid*, pp.24-36

States chose to tacitly accept Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. This is a strong sign of American trust towards Israel.

Israel set about to develop its own nuclear energy capabilities in the 1950s, taking advantage of President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" initiative and substantial technical help from France.²²⁴ Following the Suez Crisis, Israeli leaders became increasingly convinced that they needed to develop a military nuclear capability as well as civilian nuclear power. In close collaboration with France, which also decided to develop its own nuclear weapons after the Suez Crisis, Israel proceeded to build a secret research reactor and reprocessing plant at Dimona.²²⁵ The existence of the Dimona reactor was publicly acknowledged by Prime Minister Ben Gurion in 1960, but Israel never acknowledged any plan to produce nuclear weapons.²²⁶ It is widely believed that Israel has manufactured a number of nuclear weapons, although the exact number is an open question.²²⁷ The Federation of American Scientists and other organizations have estimated that Israel has between 100 and 200 nuclear warheads.²²⁸

The American government first realized that Israel was possibly developing a nuclear weapon towards the end of the 1950s.²²⁹ The United States was officially opposed to military nuclear proliferation, but maintained an ambiguous stance from early on.²³⁰ Avner Cohen notes that "the Eisenhower administration had knowledge of the Dimona project as early as 1958-59 but did not act on it, setting the precedent that Israel's nuclear weapons program was

²²⁴ Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp.41-55

²²⁵ *Ibid*, pp.57-78

²²⁶ *Ibid*, pp.91-93; Schoenbaum, *The United States and Israel*, p.126

²²⁷ Zeev Maoz, "The Mixed Blessing of Israel's Nuclear Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 28/2 (Fall 2003), p.47

²²⁸ *Ibid*, p.47; Federation of American Scientists webpage on Israeli nuclear weapons, accessed at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/index.html> on 20 August 2011.

²²⁹ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp.81-85

²³⁰ *Ibid*, p.97

treated as a special case.”²³¹ The United States exerted a certain amount of pressure to ensure that Israel’s nuclear program was only for peaceful purposes, and was able to send inspectors to the Dimona site several times.²³² But the Americans did not push very hard. For example, they accepted important limits to the Dimona visits, as they were unwilling to risk a crisis over the issue.²³³ There were some strong-worded exchanges between Israel and the United States, particularly under the Kennedy administration, but the American government accepted less-than-full compliance to their demands.²³⁴ Israel is thought to have succeeded in acquiring a military nuclear capability by 1969.²³⁵ It has never confirmed nor explicitly denied that it possesses nuclear weapons, stating only that it would not be the first Middle Eastern country to “introduce” nuclear weapons in the region.²³⁶ This ambiguous posture, which allows the United States to treat Israel as a de facto nuclear-weapon state without explicitly acknowledging it, seems satisfactory to Washington.²³⁷

The United States’ tacit acknowledgement of Israel’s nuclear status contrasts sharply with its current policies towards Iran and North Korea. Indeed, the United States explicitly considers the latter countries’ pursuit or possession of nuclear weapons as unacceptable, and it has deployed a wide array of diplomatic and economic sanctions to pressure

²³¹ Ibid, p.84

²³² Ibid, pp.101-13; 153-66; 175-94

²³³ Ibid, p.193

²³⁴ Mordechai Gazit, “The Genesis of the US-Israeli Military-Strategic Relationship and the Dimona Issue,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.35/3 (July 2000), pp.418-20

²³⁵ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp.327-29; Schoenbaum, *The United States and Israel*, p.169

²³⁶ Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp.333-38

²³⁷ Ibid, pp.333-38

them into abandoning their nuclear ambitions.²³⁸ There are important distinctions, of course. One of them is that Iran and North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (although North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2003), whereas Israel never did.²³⁹ Pakistan, which is also a non-N.P.T. state, might therefore provide a better point of comparison. Yet, again, the United States exerted much stronger pressure on Pakistan than it ever did on Israel. Washington cut off military and economic aid, and imposed additional sanctions after Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998.²⁴⁰ The United States lifted these sanctions in order to secure Pakistan's cooperation in the "War on Terror" after the 11 September 2001 attacks.²⁴¹ However, American authorities still see Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons as a cause for worry, particularly regarding the possibility that some of these nuclear weapons could end up in the hands of a terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda.²⁴² By contrast, the United States does not see Israel's nuclear arsenal as a cause for concern.

If it wanted to, Israel would theoretically be able to launch a nuclear attack against the United States: its Jericho III missile, which was first tested in 2008,²⁴³ is thought by some sources to have a range of up to 11,500 km,²⁴⁴ enough to reach most of the continental

²³⁸ Testimony of Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, before the House Armed Services Committee, 14 April 2010, accessed at <http://www.state.gov/t/us/140226.htm> on 20 August 2011.

²³⁹ "Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Background Information," United Nations website, accessed at <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/background.html> on 20 August 2011.

²⁴⁰ Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, U.S. Congressional Research Service, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues" (RL34248, 20 July 2011), p.4, accessed at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf> on 22 August 2011.

²⁴¹ Kerr & Nikitin, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons," p.4

²⁴² Ibid, pp.16-23

²⁴³ Yuval Azoulay, "Missile test will improve deterrence" (18 January 2008) *Haaretz*, accessed at <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/missile-test-will-improve-deterrence-1.237555> on 22 August 2011.

²⁴⁴ Andrew Feickert, U.S. Congressional Research Service, "Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries," (RL30427, 26 July 2005), p.36, accessed at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30427.pdf> on 22 August 2011.

United States. Israel also has three submarines which are reputedly able to launch nuclear-armed missiles.²⁴⁵ Yet, the United States is clearly not worried about an Israeli nuclear attack. Some might explain this with the concept of nuclear deterrence. Indeed, Israel would be greatly deterred from ever entering into a nuclear conflict with the United States, as it would be completely destroyed in the space of a few minutes. This may be part of the explanation. Yet the same should be true about Iran and North Korea, nations whose nuclear ambitions clearly worry the United States. There must therefore be another factor at play, and this factor is trust.

The United States' acceptance of Israel's nuclear capabilities is a strong sign of trust. Some efforts were made to prevent the Jewish state from developing nuclear weapons, but these efforts were relatively weak. Once the Americans realized that Israel had succeeded, they readily accepted an ambiguous promise that Israel would not be the first Middle Eastern country to introduce nuclear weapons in the region, and they abandoned any further effort on this issue. Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity makes it unnecessary for the United States to officially acknowledge Israel's nuclear status. This is helpful to the Americans, as it allows them to "look the other way" about Israel's nuclear capabilities without undermining their official stance against nuclear proliferation. Notwithstanding such efforts to save appearances, however, the United States knows that Israel is a nuclear power and is evidently not bothered by it. Such an attitude strongly suggests that the United States has a high level of trust towards Israel.

A rationalist explanation of this trust can be found in the fact that, unless it felt it had no choice, Israel would be extremely unlikely to use nuclear weapons in any way that may jeopardize its relations with its most important ally. But the binding approach also provides a strong possible explanation. As was discussed earlier, Americans perceive Israel as a fellow

²⁴⁵ Federation of American Scientists webpage on Israeli submarines, accessed at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/sub/index.html> on 22 August 2011.

democracy with similar values. They are therefore quite likely to think that Israel is a responsible and ethical state which can be trusted with nuclear weapons. Whatever the underlying reason, though, the United States' acceptance of Israel's nuclear capabilities is an important sign of trust.

E. Dealing with Iran

So far, this chapter has been much more successful at finding evidence of American trust towards Israel than signs of Israeli trust towards the United States. This is due to a practical problem in looking at trust in highly unequal relationships. When one party is much stronger than the other, or when there is a strong relationship of dependency which largely goes one way, it is difficult to accurately detect instances of voluntary acceptance of vulnerability. For one thing, the weaker/dependent party in such a relationship is inherently vulnerable to begin with, and it may not have many options to reduce this vulnerability. How can that party be said to voluntarily accept a situation which already exists anyway, and which it can do little about? Israel is in such a position: it is heavily dependent upon American support if it wants to remain the regional power that it is, and, for now at least, it cannot significantly reduce this dependence. Having a nuclear arsenal does provide Israel with something of a last-option insurance policy, but it is of no help in conflicts such as the 2006 Lebanon War or the Palestinian Intifada. The effort to build a domestic defence industry, mentioned above, was initially devised as a hedge against American defection, yet it depends on substantial American aid to be economically viable, simply displacing dependence rather than reducing it. Israel would maybe have more options in a more competitive, multi-polar world, but at present, there is no world power which would be willing or able to provide the level of support that Israel gets from the United States.

Israel's dependence to the United States is such that it actually has few opportunities to take on more vulnerability towards the latter. Furthermore, instances where the weaker/dependent party in a highly unequal relationship actually does accept some additional vulnerability are suspect. Does the weaker/dependent party really accept this additional vulnerability because it trusts the other party, or is it because it has no choice but to submit to the other party's demands? For a state like Israel, would accepting additional vulnerability be a sign of trust, or simply a sign that it does not want to jeopardize its relationship with the United States? Either could be true, and it is therefore very difficult to reliably differentiate situations of trust from situations of duress when the parties are as unequal as Israel and the United States are.

That being said, there is one variable which can help compensate for the parties' inequality when analysing a relationship for trust: the extent of the vulnerability in question. Even in an extremely unequal relationship, there can be a point where the level of vulnerability in question is so high that the weaker state would not be willing to accept it unless it deeply trusted the stronger state. This consideration allows one to interpret Israel's current policy of restraint towards Iran as a sign that it trusts the United States.

Although Iran's government claims that its current nuclear program is for purely civilian purposes, many believe that Tehran is trying to develop a nuclear weapon.²⁴⁶ The prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is seen as a threat by the United States and Europe, who fear that it would destabilize the region and potentially allow international terrorist groups to obtain a nuclear weapon.²⁴⁷ Hence the many declarations from American leaders expressing the view

²⁴⁶ "Iran's Nuclear Program," *The New York Times* online (8 June 2011), accessed at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_program/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=iran%20nuclear&st=cse on 18 August 2011; See also: Alexei Arbatov, "The Inexorable Momentum of Escalation," in Patrick Cronin (ed.), *Double Trouble: Iran and North Korea as Challenges to International Security* (Westport and London: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp.64-66

²⁴⁷ Scott Sagan, "How to Keep the Bomb from Iran," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.85/5 (Sept.-Oct. 2005), pp.52-53

that it is “unacceptable for Iran to possess a nuclear weapon.”²⁴⁸ But there is no doubt that Israel is the most worried about the idea that Iran might obtain nuclear weapons.²⁴⁹ Iranian leaders have expressed extreme animosity towards Israel, as exemplified by President Ahmadinejad’s famous 2005 speech calling for “Israel to be wiped off the map.”²⁵⁰ This aggressive attitude is compounded by the fact that, contrary to the United States, Israel is located within the range of existing Iranian ballistic and cruise missiles which are probably capable of carrying nuclear warheads.²⁵¹ As a result, Israelis view Iran as their arch-enemy, and would consider a nuclear-armed Iran to be an existential threat.²⁵²

Fearing that its very survival may be at stake if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, Israel clearly has an incentive to organize a military strike to prevent this from happening. Israel has already done this against Iraq in 1981, when it bombed a nuclear reactor at Osirak to prevent (or at least delay) Saddam Hussein from developing nuclear weapons.²⁵³ Similarly, Israel bombed what is thought to have been a secret nuclear reactor in Syria in 2007.²⁵⁴ Conducting a similar airstrike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be substantially more complicated: Iran is much more distant from Israel than Iraq or Syria, it is not certain that all Iranian nuclear facilities are known, those facilities which are known are spread out over several sites, and they are often

²⁴⁸ “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel After Bilateral Meeting” (20 May 2011), accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/20/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-netanyahu-israel-after-bilate> on 18 August 2011.

²⁴⁹ Inbar, *Israel’s National Security*, pp.207; 214-15

²⁵⁰ Ibid, pp.214-15

²⁵¹ Ibid, p.211

²⁵² Ibid, pp.214-15

²⁵³ Cooley, *An Alliance*, pp.159-62

²⁵⁴ “IAEA: Syria site bombed by Israel ‘was likely nuclear’,” (24 May 2011), BBC News, accessed at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13530945> on 19 August 2011.

built underground.²⁵⁵ Yet, despite the difficulties, it may be possible for Israel to deal a strong military blow to Iran's nuclear program,²⁵⁶ and this option seems to have been seriously considered in 2005²⁵⁷ and in 2008.²⁵⁸

A military strike against Iran would probably have very negative consequences for the region, for the United States, and for the world economy. Iran would certainly retaliate against Israeli and Western interests as hard as it could, perhaps fomenting unrest in the Middle East through proxy militant groups, organizing terrorist attacks against Israeli, European, or American targets, or shutting off the flow of oil shipping through the Straits of Hormuz.²⁵⁹ As former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation Mark Fitzpatrick explains, "assuming that air strikes could set back Iran's program for a few years, those years would be bought at a high cost in lives, property, alliance relationships, oil prices, and regional stability."²⁶⁰

Given the potential consequences of a military strike against Iran, the United States would rather counter Tehran's nuclear ambitions through alternative means, such as negotiations, diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions. The American government has dissuaded Israel from conducting airstrikes, deflecting its requests for specialized "bunker-busting" bombs and refusing its requests to fly over Iraq.²⁶¹ Although it would obviously be

²⁵⁵ Inbar, *Israel's National Security*, p.219; Mark Fitzpatrick, "Is Iran's Nuclear Capability Inevitable?" in Patrick Cronin (ed.), *Double Trouble: Iran and North Korea as Challenges to International Security* (Westport and London: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp.37-38

²⁵⁶ Inbar, *Israel's National Security*, pp.219, 221

²⁵⁷ Ibid, p.219

²⁵⁸ Sanger, David, "U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site," (10 January 2009), *The New York Times*, accessed at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/washington/11iran.html?pagewanted=all> on 19 August 2011.

²⁵⁹ Fitzpatrick, "Is Iran's Nuclear Capability Inevitable?" p.38

²⁶⁰ Ibid, p.38

²⁶¹ Sanger, "U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site."

very difficult for Israel to launch strikes against Iran without American approval, then-Vice-President Dick Cheney acknowledged in January 2005 that it remained a possibility.²⁶² The fact that Israel has, to date, abstained from organizing an overt attack against Iran's nuclear sites should therefore be considered a choice. In other words, Israel is accepting a substantial level of vulnerability.

This is a sign that Israel trusts the United States on this issue. It trusts that the United States will make a strong and sincere effort to curb Iranian nuclear ambitions through the current diplomatic and economic means. If those fail, it trusts that the United States will strike Iranian nuclear facilities, or at least facilitate an Israeli strike. It is interesting to note that, although the United States has declined Israeli requests for specialized bombs and permission to fly over Iraq in 2008, it has increased intelligence-sharing with Israel about Iran.²⁶³ The American government also briefs Israeli officials about covert efforts to sabotage Iran's nuclear infrastructure.²⁶⁴ These measures, which themselves indicate that the United States trusts Israel enough to share such sensitive information with it, are evidently aimed at reinforcing Israel's trust.

Israel's trust of the United States on the question of Iran neatly fits the rationalist approach. Indeed, Israel recognizes that the United States perceives the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran as a serious threat. American and Israeli interests are therefore strongly aligned with regards to this issue. This logically supports Israeli confidence that the United States will act in a manner which is consistent with Israeli interests. Israel's trust can also be explained through the binding approach: it trusts that the United States will do "what is right" and not betray a country

²⁶² Inbar, *Israel's National Security*, p.219

²⁶³ Sanger, "U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site."

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

with which it has such close and emotional ties. As was discussed previously, there is considerable support for the claim that the United States and Israel are bound by particularly strong ties of friendship.

CONCLUSION

It seems clear, from the preceding analysis, that the United States trusts Israel. There are certain specific areas and issues where this is not true, such as certain aspects of intelligence-sharing, but as a general rule, the United States has a high level of trust towards Israel. There is less evidence of a reciprocal attitude on the Israeli side. This does not necessarily denote a *lack* of trust on Israel's part. Rather, it stems from the difficulty of identifying reliable evidence of trust on the part of the weaker side of a very unbalanced relationship. Whereas the stronger side can open itself to additional degrees of vulnerability, this is not so true of the weaker side, which is already inherently vulnerable. Yet, the issue of dealing with Iran's nuclear ambitions provides one area where Israel can be seen to trust the United States. It would be helpful to have more examples of Israeli trust towards the United States, but this is enough to reasonably say that the two states have a trusting relationship.

This interpretation is strongly supported by the two main theories of trust. The rationalist approach, which depends on the trustor's beliefs about the trustee's interests and whether they encapsulate the trustor's interests, seems problematic. While it clearly is in Israel's interest to have a close relationship with the United States, the reverse is not so obvious. Nevertheless, there seems to be a strong perception among Americans that it actually is in their strategic interest to support Israel. The latter is aware of this perception and encourages it. The two states therefore have grounds to believe that their interests encapsulate each-other, and that they each have a preference for mutual cooperation. This belief corresponds to the rationalist definition of trust.

The binding approach supports this finding even more obviously. Indeed, if feelings of friendship and collective identity tend to foster trust, then one would fully expect the United States and Israel to have a trusting relationship. The two countries have strong economic, political, cultural and religious ties, and they clearly regard each-other as close friends. This is a solid foundation for trust under the binding approach, and this trust grows further as it leads to yet more close interaction.

It is hard to say that one approach is better than the other. As Ruzicka and Wheeler write, “the distinction between the rationalist and the binding approach is more analytical than empirical,” and both are necessary to understand trust.²⁶⁵ In any case, trust between Israel and the United States is consistent with both approaches. This, combined with strong evidence drawn from the states’ actual behaviour and policies, supports the view that Israel and the United States have a trusting relationship.

²⁶⁵ Ruzicka & Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships,” p.74

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll conducted by the University of Maryland and Zogby International, accessed at http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2010/0805_arab_opinion_poll_telhami/0805_arabic_opinion_poll_telhami.pdf on 1 August 2011.
- 2010 Israeli Jewish Public Opinion Survey conducted by the University of Maryland and Dahaf Institute, Israel (9 December 2010) accessed at http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2010/1209_israel_public_opinion_telhami/israeli_jewish_powerpoint.pdf on 10 August 2011.
- Abdallah, Abdel Mahdi, “Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: a Socio-Political Perspective,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 7/ 4 (December 2003)
- Addis, Casey, U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Israel: Background and U.S. Relations” (RL33476, 14 February 2011), p.34, accessed at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33476.pdf> on 25 August 2011
- “Address by PM Olmert to a Joint Meeting of the US Congress” (24 May 2006), Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, accessed at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2006/Address+by+PM+Olmert+to+a+joint+meeting+of+US+Congress+24-May-2006.htm> on 12 August 2011.
- “American Evangelicals and Israel: Public Opinion on Religion and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” (15 April 2005), The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life website, accessed at <http://pewforum.org/Christian/American-Evangelicals-and-Israel.aspx> on 12 August 2011
- American Opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, poll conducted by Zogby International (March 2010), accessed at <http://www.aaiusa.org/page/-/Polls/AmericanOpinionsOnIsraeli-PalestinianConflictReportMarch2010.pdf> on 10 August 2011.
- Anti-Defamation League: “Poll Shows That Israel is a Staunch American Ally” (18 May 2007), accessed online at http://www.adl.org/PresRele/IsIME_62/5055_62.htm on 10 August 2011.
- Arbatov, Alexei, “The Inexorable Momentum of Escalation,” in Cronin, Patrick (ed.), *Double Trouble: Iran and North Korea as Challenges to International Security* (Westport and London: Praeger Security International, 2008)
- Azoulay, Yuval, “Missile test will improve deterrence” (18 January 2008) *Haaretz*, accessed at <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/missile-test-will-improve-deterrence-1.237555> on 22 August 2011.

- Bickerton, Ian, “America’s Israel / Israel’s America,” in Dumbrell, John, and Schäfer, Axel (eds.), *America’s ‘Special Relationships’* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009)
- Booth, Ken, and Wheeler, Nicholas, *The Security Dilemma* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)
- C.I.A. World Factbook: United States, accessed at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html> on 10 August 2011
- CIA World Factbook: Israel, accessed at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.html> on 9 August 2011
- Cohen, Avner, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1998)
- Cooley, John, *An Alliance Against Babylon* (London, Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005)
- “Defense Trade: Information on U.S. Weapons Deliveries to the Middle East,” U.S. General Accounting Office report to Representative John Conyers, Jr. (GAO-01-107, 21 September 2001), p.8, accessed at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d011078.pdf> on 29 August 2011.
- Federation of American Scientists webpage on Israeli nuclear weapons, accessed at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/index.html> on 20 August 2011.
- Federation of American Scientists webpage on Israeli submarines, accessed at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/sub/index.html> on 22 August 2011.
- Feickert, Andrew, U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries,” (RL30427, 26 July 2005), accessed at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30427.pdf> on 22 August 2011.
- Fitzpatrick, Mark, “Is Iran’s Nuclear Capability Inevitable?” in Cronin, Patrick (ed.), *Double Trouble: Iran and North Korea as Challenges to International Security* (Westport and London: Praeger Security International, 2008)
- Francis, David, “US can raise the pressure on Israel without cutting aid” (5 April 2005), *The Christian Science Monitor*, accessed at <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/David-R.-Francis/2010/0405/US-can-raise-the-pressure-on-Israel-without-cutting-aid> on 24 August 2011.
- Gambetta, Diego, “Can We Trust Trust?” in Gambetta, Diego (ed.) *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations* (Oxford ; Cambridge, Mass., USA : B. Blackwell, 1988)
- Gates, Robert, “Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Arlington, VA, Monday, October 15, 2007,” accessed at <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1185> on 5 August 2011.

- Gazit, Mordechai, "The Genesis of the US-Israeli Military-Strategic Relationship and the Dimona Issue," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.35/3 (July 2000)
- H.Res.392, "Whereas the United States and Israel are now engaged in a common struggle against terrorism and are on the front-lines of a conflict thrust upon them against their will," (2 May 2002), accessed online at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c107:2:./temp/~c107lnVrp0::> on 5 August 2011
- Hadar, Leon, "Thawing the American-Israeli Chill," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 22/2 (Winter 1993)
- Hardin, Russell, *Trust and Trustworthiness*, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002)
- Harel, Amos, "U.S. to store \$800m in military gear in Israel," *Haaretz* (11 January 2010), accessed at <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/u-s-to-store-800m-in-military-gear-in-israel-1.261162> on 28 August 2011
- Hoffman, Aaron, "A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Sept. 2002)
- Hoffman, Aaron, *Building Trust* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006)
- Hollis, Martin, *Trust Within Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
- "IAEA: Syria site bombed by Israel 'was likely nuclear'," (24 May 2011), BBC News, accessed at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13530945> on 19 August 2011.
- Inbar, Efraim, *Israel's National Security* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008)
- "Iran's Nuclear Program," *The New York Times* (8 June 2011), accessed at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_program/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=iran%20nuclear&st=cse on 18 August 2011.
- Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Tourism and Accommodation Services: Visitor Arrivals by Country of Citizenship, accessed online at http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton61/st23_05.pdf on 9 August 2011.
- Jervis, Robert, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1976)
- Kahana, Ephraim, "Mossad-CIA Cooperation," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol.14/3 (2001)

- Keating, Vincent, and Ruzicka, Jan, David Davies Memorial Institute Symposium on “Nuclear Rivalries: Prospects for Cooperation and Trust-Building” (Aberystwyth, 14-15 June 2011), symposium report accessed online at <http://www.aber.ac.uk/en/media/Aberystwyth-symposium-June-2011---Final-Report.pdf> on 15 August 2011, pp.3-4; podcast of Keating & Ruzicka’s presentation: <http://www.aber.ac.uk/en/media/Session-1---Moellering-Keating-Ruzicka.mp3>, 25:46 to 46:20
- Keinon, Herb, “81 Congressmen to visit Israel in coming weeks,” *The Jerusalem Post* (8 Aug. 2011), accessed at <http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=232876> on 9 August 2011
- Kerr, Paul, and Nikitin, Mary Beth, U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues” (RL34248, 20 July 2011), accessed at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf> on 22 August 2011.
- Kydd, Andrew, “Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation,” *International Organization*, Vol. 54/2 (Spring, 2000)
- Kydd, Andrew, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005)
- Larson, Deborah Welch, “Trust and Missed Opportunities in International Relations,” *Political Psychology*, Vol. 18/3 (September 1997)
- Layne, Christopher, “America’s Middle East Grand Strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol.35/1 (2009)
- Lewis, Bernard, “Rethinking the Middle East,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71/4 (Fall 1992)
- Lewis, Samuel, “The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol.53/3 (Summer 1999)
- Maoz, Zeev, “The Mixed Blessing of Israel’s Nuclear Policy,” *International Security*, Vol. 28/2 (Fall 2003)
- Marsden, Lee, “US-Israel Relations: A special friendship,” in Dumbrell, John, and Schäfer, Axel (eds.), *America’s ‘Special Relationships’* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009)
- Mart, Michelle, “The ‘Christianization’ of Israel and Jews in 1950s America,” *Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation*, Vol. 14/1 (Winter 2004)
- Massing, Michael, “The Storm Over the Israel Lobby,” *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 53/10 (June 8, 2006)
- Mearsheimer, John, “The false promise of international institutions,” *International Security*, Vol.19:3, (Winter 1994)

- Mearsheimer, John, and Walt, Stephen, *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy* (London : Allen Lane, 2007)
- Melman, Yossi, “Report: Israel waging covert war against Iranian nuclear program” (18 February 2009), *Haaretz* website, accessed at <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/report-israel-waging-covert-war-against-iranian-nuclear-program-1.270399> on 25 August 2011.
- “Memorandum of Understanding Between Israel and the United States Regarding Prevention of the Supply of Arms and Related Materiel to Terrorist Groups,” 16 January 2009, accessed at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Israel-US_Memorandum_of_Understanding_16-Jan-2009.htm on 16 August 2011.
- Moaz, Zeev, *Defending the Holy Land: a Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security and Foreign Policy* (University of Michigan Press, 2009)
- Möllering, Guido, *Trust: Reason, Routine and Reflexivity* (Oxford: Elsevier, 2006)
- “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Background Information,” United Nations website, accessed at <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/background.html> on 20 August 2011.
- OECD, International Migration Database, accessed online at <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG> on 9 August 2011
- “Overview of programs in West Africa,” USAID website, accessed at <http://www.usaid.gov/westafrica/ffp/> on 24 August 2011.
- “Peres tells new U.S. envoy: No doubt Obama is friend of Israel” *Haaretz*, 8 March 2011, accessed at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/peres-tells-new-u-s-envoy-no-doubt-obama-is-friend-of-israel-1.376762> on 16 August 2011
- Pipes, Daniel, and Clawson, Patrick, “Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.72/1 (1992/1993)
- Plitnick, Mitchell, and Toensing, Chris, “‘The Israel Lobby’ in Perspective,” *Middle East Report*, Vol.243 (Summer 2007)
- “PM Sharon addresses solidarity rally: three months since terror attacks in the US” (Jerusalem, 11 December 2001), accessed at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches%20by%20Israeli%20leaders/2001/PM%20Sharon%20addresses%20solidarity%20rally-%20Three%20months> on 5 August 2011.
- Pollack, Kenneth, “Securing the Gulf,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.82/4 (Jul.-Aug. 2003)

- “Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s address before Congress,” *Haaretz*, 24 May 2006, accessed at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/prime-minister-ehud-olmert-s-address-before-congress-1.188571> on 5 August 2011.
- Rathbun, Brian C., “It takes all types: social psychology, trust, and the international relations paradigm in our minds,” *International Theory*, Vol.1:3 (2009)
- Reich, Bernard, *The United States and Israel* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984)
- “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel in Joint Press Availability” (6 July 2010), accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-netanyahu-israel-joint-press-availabilit> on 12 August 2011.
- “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel After Bilateral Meeting” (20 May 2011), accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/20/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-netanyahu-israel-after-bilate> on 18 August 2011.
- “Remarks by the Vice President at the Annual Policy Conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee” (5 May 2009), accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-vice-president-annual-policy-conference-american-israel-public-affairs-comm> on 12 August 2011.
- Richelson, Jeffrey, *The US Intelligence Community* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008)
- Ross, Dennis, “The Middle East Predicament,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.84/1 (Jan.-Feb. 2005)
- Ruzicka, Jan, and Wheeler, Nicholas, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” *International Affairs*, Vol.86:1 (January 2010)
- S.Res. 247, “Expressing solidarity with Israel in its fight against terrorism,” (22 April 2002), accessed online at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:S.RES.247:> on 5 August 2011
- Sagan, Scott, “How to Keep the Bomb from Iran,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.85/5 (Sept.-Oct. 2005)
- Sanger, David, “U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site,” (10 January 2009), *The New York Times*, accessed at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/washington/11iran.html?pagewanted=all> on 19 August 2011.
- Sanger, David, “U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site,” (10 January 2009), *The New York Times* online, accessed at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/washington/11iran.html?pagewanted=all> on 19 August 2011.

- Schoenbaum, David, *The United States and the State of Israel* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)
- Shapiro, Andrew, “The Obama Administration’s Approach to U.S.-Israel Security Cooperation: Preserving Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge,” Remarks at the Brookings Saban Center for Middle East Policy on July 16, 2010, accessed at <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/144753.htm> on 5 August 2011
- Sharp, Jeremy, U.S. Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel” (RL33222, 16 September 2010), accessed at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf> on 27 July, 2011.
- Sharp, Jeremy, U.S. Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2011 Request” (RL32260, 15 June 2010), accessed at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32260.pdf> on 27 August 2011
- Sills, David (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York : Free Press London : Collier Macmillan, 1968)
- Stern, Roger, “Oil Market Power and United States National Security,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, Vol. 103/5 (Jan. 31, 2006)
- “Still Connected: American Jewish Attitudes about Israel,” Brandeis University (August 2010), accessed at <http://www.brandeis.edu/cmjs/pdfs/still.connected.08.25.10.3.pdf> on 10 August 2011.
- Stockton, Ronald, “Christian Zionism: Prophecy and Public Opinion,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 41/2 (Spring 1987)
- Tessler, Mark, and Robbins, Michael, “What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts against the United States?” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 51/ 2 (Apr. 2007)
- Testimony of Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, before the House Armed Services Committee, 14 April 2010, accessed at <http://www.state.gov/t/us/140226.htm> on 20 August 2011.
- *The 9/11 Commission Report*, accessed at <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf> on 1 August 2011.
- “The Obama Administration's Approach to U.S.-Israel Security Cooperation: Preserving Israel's Qualitative Military Edge,” Remarks by Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Political-Military Affairs (16 July 2010), U.S. Department of State website, accessed at <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/144753.htm> on 26 August 2011.

- “Transcript: Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s address to Congress,” WashingtonPost.com (24 May 2011), accessed at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israeli-prime-minister-binyamin-netanyahus-address-to-congress/2011/05/24/AFWY5bAH_story.html on 12 August 2011.
- Troen, S. Ilan, “Frontier Myths and Their Applications in America and Israel: A Transnational Perspective,” *The Journal of American History*, Vol.86/3 (Dec. 1999)
- “U.S. - Israel Joint Statement, 30 April 1996,” accessed at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1995-1996/Israel-US+Joint+Statement.htm> on 28 August 2011.
- U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Office of Travel and Tourism Industries: “2010 Market Profile: Israel,” accessed online at http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2010_Israel_Market_Profile.pdf on 9 August 2011.
- U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration: “Top US Trade Partners,” accessed online at http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf on 9 August 2011.
- U.S. Energy Information Administration website, *International Energy Statistics*, accessed at <http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=6> on 1 August, 2011
- “US cuts Israeli loan guarantees” (27 November 2003), BBC News, accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3238632.stm on 24 August 2011.
- “Use of Reliable Partner Country Systems for Direct Management and Implementation of Assistance,” USAID website, accessed at <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/220.pdf> on 24 August 2011.
- Wendt, Alexander, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization*, Vol.46/2 (Spring 1992)
- Wheeler, Nicholas, “Beyond Waltz's Nuclear World: More Trust May be Better,” *International Relations*, Vol.23/3 (September 2009)
- Zorn, E.L, “Expanding The Horizon: Israel's Quest for Satellite Intelligence” (8 May 2007), CIA website, Studies Archives Indexes Vol.44/5, accessed at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol44no5/html/v44i5a04p.htm> on 17 August 2011.