
Penny Stanley,
Department of International Politics,
University of Wales,
Aberystwyth,
Wales.
PART THREE

IMPLICATIONS
INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE

Part Two described and analysed the reports of rape during the Balkan conflict as represented in key sections of the British press. Throughout the analysis of these representations some powerful and recurring themes began to emerge, many of which were based around ideas originally emanating from feminist theory. The primary aim of Part Three is to demonstrate the complex relationships between feminist theorising and the social world and to identify some of the social and political implications of those interrelationships.

In order to illustrate this, the chapters in Part Three highlight the ways in which the press has adopted ideas that originated from feminist theorising (Chapter Seven), and also the ways in which feminist theorists have utilised some press analyses to develop further their own theories and explanations for mass rape in war (Chapter Eight). In Chapter Nine, various 'solutions' to the problem of mass rape in war are proposed by four feminists: each of these individuals, specifically makes the point that they have used press reports of mass rape in the Balkans both as a motivating factor in their desire to develop solutions and as a source of information.¹ Prior to examining these 'solutions' and other issues in Part Three, it would be useful to first make some points about how 'feminist thought' is used in the thesis. This is important because of the clear argument in the thesis that feminist ideas have been utilised by the media, and vice versa, and also in order to explain why it is important for the issue of mass rape in war that this relationship is acknowledged and understood.

Feminist Thought

What does it mean to say that a piece of research, or a theory, is 'feminist'? For the purposes of the thesis, I argue that there are two senses in which research and theories might be considered feminist. First are those approaches that examine the experiences of women. Here the aim is to highlight marginalised, forgotten or ignored aspects of social phenomena. This type of research may not be explicitly feminist, but insofar as it illuminates previously ignored aspects of women's lives, then it can rightly be considered as having a feminist inspiration. Second are those approaches that attempt to bring a woman's perspective to the study of particular phenomena. Of course, what constitutes 'a woman's perspective' (and whether such a perspective is attainable, or even desirable) has been hotly debated, most notably by 'postmodern feminists'. Yet even in those 'postmodern feminist' approaches which begin by problematising the very idea of 'woman', it seems clear that some notion of 'feminism' and 'woman' must be in play. Despite all their disclaimers, it is interesting to note that postmodern feminists still cannot escape the use of the word 'woman', and so it must remain for them a set of ideas. That is to say, it makes no sense for an approach that places difference at the centre of its analysis to obliterate the difference between 'postmodernism' and 'postmodern feminism'. I argue that this difference is a concern


6 Indeed, a consistent postmodernism would have to reject feminism. As Toril Moi has put it, postmodernism 'sees all metanarratives, including feminism, as repressive enactments of metaphysical authority'. Quoted in Andrew Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 175. For an insightful analysis of the danger inherent in this obliteration, see, Somer Brodribb, Nothing Matters: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism (Melbourne: Spinifex, 1992).
with women, their experiences, and (possible) ways of knowing, however defined. It is this unity-within-diversity that explains the continuing validity of the label feminism to what appears to be a disparate group of approaches.

The two forms of feminist research just mentioned are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, most feminist research tends to focus on the experiences of women and is conducted from a perspective that makes clear its commitment to some form of feminist epistemology. Nonetheless, I consider that either of these elements is sufficient in order for research to be considered 'feminist'. Ann Tickner, for example, analyses central IR concepts such as global security and Hans Morgenthau's six principals of political realism from a feminist perspective. In her analysis the experiences of women are not central, rather, she analyses traditional IR concepts and attempts to rethink them from a perspective acutely aware of gender considerations. Cynthia Enloe, on the other hand, takes an avowedly 'woman's' perspective to analyse the experiences of women.

Contemporary feminism is generally portrayed as consisting of various 'conflicting' schools. Often these schools of thought are portrayed as incompatible or incommensurable. Contrary to this, however, I argue that this attempt to name, divide, and place boundaries around the various strands of feminist thought is a

residue of 'male-centred' thinking. Feminist analysis from its inception has always tended to regard Western antinomies of subject and object, mind and body, reason and emotion as 'instrumentalities of power' related to the hierarchical division of male and female. Given this, even the attempt to portray feminist analyses as modern or postmodern could be rejected as instances of a continuing 'male-centred' binary thinking.

The adopted stance throughout the thesis has been one described as 'integrative pluralism'. This is an approach that recognises the validity, strengths and weaknesses of the various feminisms, and which rejects any attempt to treat these discourses as hermetically sealed and incompatible bodies of thought. I acknowledge that this may seem to be a problematic stance; however, it is not without its intellectual precedents and supports. Indeed Sondra Farganis has noted that feminist theory must 'walk a tightrope between the generalising that tries to capture the zeitgeist, or spirit of the times, and the particularising of events that directs attention to a specific cast of characters'. Moreover, the thesis is not concerned to resolve these fascinating philosophical and epistemological issues. Research has to proceed from somewhere, and researchers should not have to wait until epistemologists settle their differences: not least because contemporary philosophy seems to suggest that no such a settlement will be forthcoming.

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Since the focus of the thesis is on the press 'representations' I want to reiterate a point made in the Introduction regarding the question of the accuracy of the reports. These reports analysed in Part Two represent 'objective' accounts of the events reported - or the phenomenon being studied - and my aim has not been to uncover the 'truth' of these accounts. I accept, completely the postmodern contention (although this insight is hardly unique to this position) that there is no unvarnished access to 'reality', either for journalists or academics. But this does not mean that the attempt to approach objectivity is totally passé. Recognising the limits of objectivity is not at all the same thing as denying it. As a researcher, I am bound by a commitment to norms of behaviour that entail I strive for objectivity even as I realise the impossibility of its 'full' realisation. And this is the view that has been offered in correspondence with some of the journalists whose work has been discussed in Part Two.

Journalists have commitments to norms of behaviour (see pp. 107-111). They have played an important role in providing information and in offering explanations for mass rape in war to society at large. Therefore, how feminists and journalists alike write about rape and who they choose to write about, constitutes an important part of the discourse of rape. As will be argued in Chapter Nine, their combined influence contributes to the changing and developing of both theory and practice in the social world. The central aim in Part Three is to attempt to illustrate the complex relationships between press representations, feminist thought and the social world, and to identify some of the social and political implications - including international political implications - of that interrelationship.

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PRESS AND FEMINIST THEMES

In this chapter, three of the most interesting themes emanating from Part Two will be identified. The ensuing analysis of these themes will illustrate how the British press have used ideas that stem from feminist theory to develop their explanations for mass rape in war, thus enabling their readers to gain a greater understanding of the issues. Analysis of these themes and related issues will be discussed in relation to how these issues have been reported by journalists juxtaposed with how they are theorised within feminist writings. Moreover, it will also be illustrated how some feminist work on rape attempts to reconceptualise the 'norms' on which broad contemporary explanations of these issues are based and which, when adopted by journalists within their writing, contribute to the mainstreaming of these ideas/theories, and how, therefore, discourses of rape within society are formed and developed.

The selection of the themes was based on an analysis of some of the most debated issues within feminist circles in recent years and those chosen were favoured for their strong intellectual currency and their longevity within feminist discourse, and for the interesting ways in which the journalists have debated these issues within their writings. The three themes chosen are: first, the use of rape as a 'weapon'; second, the issue of the representation of women; and third, the 'biological determinist' debates surrounding men and rape.

Rape as a 'weapon'

Throughout the analysis of the press representations, it was concluded on numerous occasions that journalists' reports had referred to the use of rape in the Balkan conflict specifically as a 'weapon' against the rape victims. For the most part the journalists utilised this feminist theme by suggesting that rape had been used deliberately as an extension of the aggressor’s military armoury, although not always. One example of the way in which the journalists often used this theme is highlighted in the following passage from The Times and analysed in Chapter Four. The article states:

The European Community last night confirmed in an official interim report that rape was being used as a systematic weapon of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As many as 20,000 Bosnian Muslim women may have been raped by Serb soldiers as part of a plan to enforce the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of captured districts and to drive them and their families from their homes.

In Chapter Six, journalist Wendy Webster, writing for The Guardian, also reported the use of rape as a weapon of war. She reported that the Women’s Rights Committee of the European Parliament had stated that, ‘[w]e cannot be passive spectators while innocent women in their thousands, only a day’s drive from Brussels, are being torn and broken. We want action to stop the sexually violent use of women as a weapon’.

Many feminists scholars, writing in response to the reports of rape in the Balkans, have echoed the notion that women’s bodies are specifically targeted in times of war. Croatian feminist Slavenka Drakulic, writing in 1994, discusses the rape of ‘hundreds of thousands’ of Russian, Jewish and German women during the Second World War. She also mentions the rape of Chinese women by Japanese soldiers in the 1930s and the rape of Vietnamese women by American GIs in the Vietnam War. In summarising the similarities of these events, Drakulic states that ‘[w]omen have been raped in every war - as retaliation, as damage to another man’s ‘property’, as a message to the enemy. Rape is an efficient weapon for demoralisation and humiliation’. She also concludes

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that when rape is used in war on a massive scale its use as a weapon takes on strategic connotations and becomes 'ethnic cleansing'.

Some feminists have long recognised the extensive degree of rape and sexual violence that occurs in 'peacetime' and have written at length on the links between rape and demoralisation, humiliation and women as 'property'. Indeed, Georgina Ashworth, writing in 1985, explicitly made a connection between rape in wartime and rape in peacetime, stating that in either setting rape is used as a weapon. She comments that:

Rape is a weapon in small and large wars against the property of the 'other side' which is approved, and, like many practices which change their morality between war and peace, still effectively a weapon in peace ... against a different side. Like war itself, rape and the threat of rape, keep the balance of society ... or, from a women's perspective, the imbalance of society.

However, while no direct correlation can be drawn between rape in war, which has been intentionally used as a weapon, and rape as it occurs in 'peacetime' - a 'weapon' used against women as the 'other side' - nevertheless, if soldiers and military commanders recognise the ability of rape to dehumanise, humiliate, destabilise populations and undermine political will and if rape is so widespread in today's Western societies, then it is necessary to ask, as many feminists do, what relationship rape in 'peacetime' has to the politics of violence. As many feminists have observed, rape is first and foremost an act of aggression with a sexual manifestation and is just one of the many forms of violence suffered by women in 'peacetime' - a fact that has recently led the United Nations to appoint a Special Rapporteur on the subject.

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6 ibid.
9 ibid.
Moreover, given the extended international networks of militarisation and the media, some feminists have also begun to question the relationships that exist between rape in war and non-war situations. As Catharine MacKinnon has suggested, the relationship between rape in 'peacetime' and rape in war is what anti-Semitism is to the Holocaust. One is the 'inevitable' result of the other, but the scale of horror is vastly different. In other words, MacKinnon is claiming that the general acceptability of sexual violence against women in 'peacetime', notably through the acceptance of violent pornography, can lead to its more frequent use in war when social constraints lapse: as anti-Semitism was the driving force behind the Holocaust, so 'peacetime' social indifference to violence against women is, according to MacKinnon, the driving force behind men's propensity to rape in war. The link which feminists claim to be one of the strongest is violence, particularly sexual violence; both in peacetime and during war.

Nordstrom's definition of this 'dirty war practice' - the use of sexual violence and rape as a weapon of war against women - does not appear to be a new phenomena. Miriam Cooke has observed that the reported mass raping of women in the Balkan conflict simply 'reminded a forgetful world that this is not the first time that women's bodies have been officially and systematically targeted'. She continues:

Even only in the past sixty years the list of mass rapes includes those during the 1930s by Japanese against Chinese women; during World War II by Nazis against Russian and Jewish women, by Soviets against German women, and by Japanese against Korean women; during the 1960s and 1970s by Americans against Vietnamese women; during the early 1970s by Pakistanis against Bengali women; during the late 1980s by


V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan (1993).


Iraqis against Kurdish women and then Kuwaiti and Palestinian women during the Gulf War.\textsuperscript{17}

Indeed, in 1992 alone, there were 54 armed conflicts in progress, and hundreds have taken place since the Second World War.\textsuperscript{18} Therefore, there is no doubt a high probability that sexual violence and rape has been used as a weapon in the majority of them and that countless numbers of women have suffered as a result.

Although, as demonstrated in Chapter Two, rape has been a feature of wars throughout history, these twentieth century wars have proved particularly disastrous for women. As mentioned in Chapter Two, even their status as civilians has offered them little protection. In fact, in twentieth century wars the plight of all civilians has worsened considerably. In World War I approximately five percent of those killed were civilians; in World War II the figure rose to 50 percent; in some more recent conflicts, for example in Lebanon, it has been as high as 80-90 percent.\textsuperscript{19} In reviewing these figures Jeanne Vickers has suggested that the war in the former-Yugoslavia is likely to have exacted a 'similar toll' on civilian women and children.\textsuperscript{20} Simply as a matter of probabilities, women are now more likely to suffer war's 'consequences', including sexual abuse and rape. In addition, some feminists claim that rape, which has always proved to be an effective weapon of war, has recently become more overtly so. Ruth Seifert, for example, claims that rape, used as a weapon of war, has now been recognised as an effectual means to demoralise and destroy the enemy.\textsuperscript{21} Using a similar term to Nordstrom's, Seifert states that rape as a weapon is particularly useful in 'dirty wars' (a concept which will be explored further in Chapter Eight) as 'it is not necessarily the conquest of a foreign army, but rather the deconstruction of a culture that can be seen as a central objective of war actions'.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{17} ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} ibid.
Thus, according to Seifert, as women are central to the continuation of a state's cultural heritage, in 'dirty wars' they are specifically targeted.23

In The Times on 16 April 1993, journalist Janet Daley made a similar comment to Seifert's regarding rape as a weapon of war. Daley stated that in Bosnia rape has become a weapon of war and almost an entire generation of women have been 'subjected to indiscriminate degradation, which they must know, has nothing to do with them as individuals'.24 Yet, in this case there is a clear contrast between the interpretation of this journalist and the explanation given by radical feminists Carolyn Schafer and Marilyn Frye. Their analysis of rape suggests that although the raison d'être for using rape as a weapon of war is not to target specific individuals, it is precisely the individual whose core is 'disintegrated' during rape. Indeed, Schafer and Frye suggest that it is the individual's very 'domain' (defined as a set of 'person-properties' - the ability to reason, the capacity for self-awareness, the ability to deliberate and make choices, and so on) that is infiltrated by rape. For Schafer and Frye, rape is 'a use of a person which involves tampering with parts of its self which are for most people centrally rather than peripherally involved in their personal identity'.25 Moreover, they conclude that to violate the centre of a person's 'domain' is to inflict maximum harm by threatening to disintegrate the woman, that is, to make her less of a woman by depriving her of her bodily autonomy.26 Therefore, to deprive a woman of her 'domain' is to separate her from what literally constitutes her identity. Catharine MacKinnon has made a similar point, although linking a woman's identity with her sexuality. She states that, analogously, sexuality is also an important issue in any feminist theory on rape because a woman's personal identity is inextricably linked to her sexuality and, according to MacKinnon, through rape it is principally her sexuality (and therefore her 'identity') that is 'mostly taken away'.27

26 Ibid.
Various feminist studies have attempted to theorise rape and the effect that it has on the individual, however, feminist researchers in specific war sites, such as the Balkans, the Middle East, and Latin America, have also investigated the interplay of local cultural concepts such as family honour, religious shame, sexual purity, and gender identity to explain why rape has been so widely, and destructively, employed as a terror tactic, or weapon of war, in these areas. One common aspect of this feminist research, despite diverse locations and cultural differences, and an issue that has been used repeatedly by the press as noted in Part Two, is the conclusion that rape and sexual violence is a universal feature of war - one which seems to transcend all language, cultural, religious and geographical differences. Perhaps the answer lies, in part, with the fact that if rape has been used as a weapon of war it cannot be seen solely as a sexual assault. Judith Herman has explored this possibility suggesting that rather than a sexual assault when used as a weapon rape is intended as an attack on the core constructions of identity and ontological security in its most personal and profound sense. It destroys the victim's fundamental assumptions about the safety of the world, the positive value of the self, and the meaningful order of creation, which has far-reaching consequences for both the individual and when used on a large scale, as in the Balkans, there are far-reaching consequences for the community as well, and possibly the nation.

Feminist activists Rada Boric and Mica Desnica have set up counselling groups for rape victims in Croatia, and have used quotations from rape victims in their latest writings which seem to accord with Herman's suggestions. One survivor of wartime rape is quoted as saying that the rapist 'robbed my soul and my body,' another that her 'barometer of self respect was a long way below zero', and yet another 'we were put in a shell not of our own request, now [with the group's help] it is splitting and we

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are like new-born babies we are needing lots of care. Rape, as with all terror warfare, is regarded by some feminists as not exclusively an attack on the individual's physical and mental body, but to them it appears to be an attack on the 'body politic'. Its aim is not simply to maim or kill one person, but to control an entire socio-political group by crippling it from within. Therefore, it appears to be an attack directed equally against personal identity and cultural integrity.

This attack on the rape victim's identity is regarded by some feminists more widely as an effective means of social control. Indeed, Catherine Niarchos suggests that merely the fear of rape, more than fear of other crimes, lead women to 'consciously or unconsciously, restrict [their] movements and [their] life choices'. This suggestion concurs with Susan Brownmiller's now oft-quoted argument that states:

> From prehistoric times to the present, I believe, rape has played a critical function. It is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear.

Betty Reardon concurs with Brownmiller's position by defining rape as a form of 'system maintenance'. She expands further by stating that '[w]omen are conditioned to deal with the fear of violence, not only by developing behaviours of accommodation and avoidance but also by learning to cope with it as a fundamental given of the human condition'. Rape in war, then, if used in the same terms as suggested here by Brownmiller and Reardon, equates 'peacetime' male to female relations with the behaviour of the dominant aggressor troops to the civilian rape victims in the Balkans. Rape is, therefore, regarded as a traditional weapon in war, which is used for symbolic or deterrent purposes as well as the basic intimidating terror mechanisms to maintain submission. Some feminists regard rape as both 'a deliberate device to keep women in line' and 'a conscious tactic of warfare'.

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37 ibid.
38 ibid.
Whether taken singly or as a joint strategic move, this threatens to be a very effective means of social control - both in war and during 'peace'.

Another issue that has emerged from the feminist literature on rape and which indirectly stems from the journalists' discussions and explanations for rape and its use as a weapon of war and one possible reason for its perpetuation throughout history, is 'silence'. None of the writings of the journalists analysed within the thesis directly commented on 'silence' as a rape-related issue and on one level, because these issues have been reported at all may appear to be an direct contradiction to the suggestion that the rapes have been silenced. However, it tends to be the gaps in the reporting, the silences in the media's discussion of rape in war, even as the Balkan conflict was progressing, that are important here. In Chapter Six an article written by Roger Boyes for The Times includes a comment from the World Council of Churches which firstly states that 'rape has become a systematic weapon of war in the Bosnian conflict and the rapists should be put before war crimes tribunals'. The article also argues that the experiences of the rape victims are not being taken seriously by the 'authorities', nor the 'international community'. Following the article there is a period of five months before the issue is raised again in any of the newspapers analysed. And on this occasion, Ian Black, writing for The Guardian, relays the moral, legal, political and financial problems besetting the instigators of the War Crimes Tribunal to be set up in The Hague, as if these were legitimate reasons for the lack of attention or interest shown - legitimate reasons for the 'silence'.

Writing on the legal challenges facing the Tribunal and its contribution towards the 'silence' of rape, feminist and legal specialist Catherine Niarchos suggests that the Tribunal is bound up within a patriarchal legal discourse which favours a form of parochial conventionalism over the truthful recall of experience. In making the argument for stemming the traditional silence that surrounds rape, Niarchos makes the following observation of typical courtroom procedures:

40ibid., p. 40.
41Roger Boyes, "Church says Serbs are using rape as a weapon," The Times, 23 December 1992, p. 6.
42ibid.
When atrocities are discussed, the tones are usually hushed. The crimes are described as "unspeakable", there is a reluctance to confront the murderous side of human nature ... to accept, in the words of playwright Arthur Miller, that "we are very dangerous". Traditional legal discourse tends to play along with the conspiracy: lawyers shun drama, emotion, and "unnecessary" detail.  

Niarchos also admits that she has to fight the tendency to censor when writing as a feminist on the rapes in the former Yugoslavia. However, the rapes have been brutal and to merely state that 'x' number of rapes occurred in 'x' region does not, as Niarchos argues, 'express the whole egregious story'. She continues to suggest that if one simply relates the palatable facts of the 'story', as in the court-room scene described above, then a 'significant part of the tragedy is suppressed; when the endeavour is to establish truth, there is a great disservice to the victims', and in effect silencing the experiences of the rape victims.

This silencing of the rape victim's experiences has also been a subject for discussion by Rada Boric and Mica Desnica. They state that one of the dimensions of war 'crimes' against women, that of 'crimes against gender', is 'minimised', 'silenced' and 'forgotten' by official state politics, and if it is talked about it is often 'manipulated for political reasons', or 'misused by the media'. Boric and Desnica continue to suggest that it is 'only women's groups that are still trying to press the issue of rape, to open trials, to have access to a War Tribunal'. This notion of the wartime silencing of women and the reluctance of rape victim's to speak out about their suffering has also been touched upon by Cynthia Enloe. In *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* she states:

The silencing of women to preserve the honour not only of individual men but of a nation turns out to be an integral part of the processes of war and post-war order in societies as seemingly different as Kuwait and the United States.

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45 ibid.
46 ibid.
48 ibid.
49 ibid.
50 Cynthia Enloe (1993), p. 188.
It is significant that Enloe comments on the preservation of the men's honour, not the women's. Furthermore, it should be noted that if one concentrates on the concept of women's 'honour' being at stake and primarily harmed during rape, it tends to obscure and silence the fact that in practice rape is fundamentally violence against the woman; against a woman's body, autonomy, integrity, identity, security, and self-esteem, as well as her honour and her standing in the community. This, according to Enloe, is not a problem which is confined to traditional Muslim society, nor indeed other societies which operate under an overtly religious-based patriarchal authority, but it also operates in those Western societies generally considered to be 'liberal' such as the United States. One of the main institutions mentioned by Enloe where women rape victims are silenced is in the military, where she claims that incidents of rape are silenced both to preserve the rapist's 'honour' and to preserve their careers. As Enloe explains:

Although the women soldiers were willing to tell at least some of their colleagues about their experiences, they were afraid to tell their stories for the record. They were silenced by a (probably realistic) fear that the Pentagon would use it as an excuse to keep women out of the combat zones, out of chances for promotion and out of the ranks.\footnote{ibid., p. 191.}

War, and one could argue also the military, have typically been viewed as 'above' the question of gender, by, in one respect, promoting silences to preserve the status quo. And the question that all these feminist scholars mentioned here seem to be challenging is; how can gender be relevant when life and death and the defence of our nation are at stake? But war seems to exaggerate and mask the conflicts of gender (sexual violence and rape, pornography, sexual harassment, the public/private dichotomy\footnote{See, for example: Jeanne Vickers (1993); Miriam Cooke (1996); Alexandra Stiglmayer (1994); Chris Corrin (1996).}) and these feminist scholars have an important role in challenging these prevailing war 'myths', exposing the patriarchal mechanisms of power and questioning the dominant hegemonic discourse, thereby voicing what has previously been silenced.
However, it is not only after the rapes, in the aftermath of war, that the patriarchal structures within Western society work implicitly to maintain this silence. Even the victims themselves are restrained into silence by the power of the dominant societal structures that abound during wartime. In countless wars women suffer rape, sexual violence, terror, and intimidation, yet women are often made to feel ashamed to think about such self-centred problems when the nation and their 'men' are fighting on the battlefield to preserve their honour and freedom. Is it not the women's patriotic duty during war to ease the soldier's pain, to be understanding and patient, to put her individual suffering aside and to think only of the suffering of the men fighting on the battlefield for the nation? Chris Corrin, commenting on just this situation, has stated that 'it is viewed as unpatriotic for women to speak out against male violence ... when the 'national interest' is at stake'. Indeed, this reiterates the popular feminist sentiment that the 'personal is political', and in IR terms that the 'personal is international'.

Many of these patriarchal structures which allow the perpetuation of male sexual violence have been powerfully challenged by feminist writers. Particularly in areas where male violence has 'trained' or 'frightened' women into remaining silent about it. For example, where women are raped, sexually abused, or exploited, they are often ordered by their attackers to remain silent for fear of further attack. In addition, the fear of shame and humiliation or guilt that they are in some way 'responsible' for the attack, 'wanted it', or 'led him on', serves to compound this silence. When women do speak out, their voices, their experiences, their 'truths', are too infrequently listened to, or disregarded as lies. One example, 'The London Inquiry into Rape and Sexual Assault', offers an interesting illustration of this situation in the following statement:

It is often said that women are prone to 'lying' in relation to rape and sexual assault, or at the very least we make 'too much of a fuss' over 'trivialities' (such as being raped), or that we exaggerate the details of our experience. As a result our experiences and fears walk around with us - in many cases never being revealed, discussed, reported or acted upon. Accusations about women's wild imaginations and/or 'complicity' in sexual offences ensure that there are many people we cannot tell the truth to, and our assaults remain invisible or

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trivial - particularly in the eyes of those who are supposed to protect us from rape.\textsuperscript{54}

This quotation offers an example of the many ways in which women can be blamed for the male violence perpetrated against them, which serves to divert the focus of analysis away from the violent men, while at the same time, diverting attention away from the masculinised political context in which the violence occurs, and this analysis is just as applicable for wartime violence and rape. It is important, therefore, that terms such as 'male sexual violence' and 'men’s violence against women' should not be reduced to simply 'violence against women', because, according to Ailbhe Smith, to do so leaves out men as the perpetrators and contributes to the construction of women as 'victims'.\textsuperscript{55} The terms 'male sexual violence' and 'men’s violence against women' incorporates a range of violent harm deliberately inflicted upon women - physical, psychological, and sexual - and this should not be rendered invisible. Somer Brodribb, appreciating the burden of women's traditionally silent role has made the following comment:

For us, then, to speak is difficult ... Loss of memory, loss of speech: it is as though we cannot speak and cannot remember at the same time. Being fully conscious is dangerous. Women’s memory, women’s language, women’s body and sexuality have been annulled in the patriarchal tradition which has feared the female sex. What we are permitted, encouraged, coerced into, and rewarded for, is loving the male sex: the bad girls are the ones who don’t, and who thereby risk man’s rage and women’s fear.\textsuperscript{56}

There are, of course, exceptions to this, women who have been very outspoken about militarism, poverty, racism and their links to masculinity and sexism. But these women tend to be branded as irresponsible and irrepressible, often earning themselves misogynist nicknames. Such defensive, yet aggressive, reactions reveal how profoundly threatening such assertions are to the established patriarchal order, and this will issue will be addressed in the next section.

\textsuperscript{54}R. E. Hall, \textit{Ask Any Woman: A London inquiry into rape and sexual assault} (Report of the Women’s Safety Survey conducted by Women Against Rape Bristol: Falling Wall Press, 1985).
In analysing the issue of rape as a weapon of war from both a journalistic and a feminist perspective it has been illustrated how certain feminist ideas have become mainstreamed and have been used by journalists to explain the occurrence of rape in war. However, while the journalists have used the concept with surprising regularity, it appears that in the press reports analysed in Part Two, many of the features of feminist analyses of the issue have become tempered. Thus, the ideas explaining rape as a weapon of war have somewhat lost their radical element - a feature which is often regarded as a fundamental characteristic of feminist theorising. While this development is not entirely remarkable, it nevertheless demonstrates that feminist ideas have to some extent permeated the social discourse surrounding rape and its use as a weapon in war primarily against women. It is how women have been represented in the press, in comparison to some feminist notions of 'women', that will now be examined.

The Representation of 'Women'

This section examines the way in which women were represented in the press reports analysed in Part Two. In particular, it highlights the way in which some feminist writing has challenged the prevailing gendered notions of women - many of which were regularly used in the journalists' representations of women. This investigation is set against a backdrop of an assumed patriarchal society, both in terms of the societal structures that the journalists and feminist scholars were working under and in terms of the generally accepted societal 'norms' that were at work during any events and experiences that have been retold within the journalists' reports. This presupposition - that a patriarchal society exists - is central to much feminist work and it is a term that is invoked throughout this argument.

In everyday language, 'patriarchy' is often used interchangeably with 'male dominance' or a 'system of male dominance'. There have been numerous attempts to develop systematic theories of patriarchy, for example Kate Millett in the 1970s, 57

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Carole Pateman in the 1980s,⁵⁹ and Sylvia Walby in the 1990s,⁶⁰ but given the enormity of the task, it is not surprising that ambiguities remain - concerning both the central features of patriarchy and the means by which it is perpetuated. For example, and generally speaking, socialist feminists attempt to integrate explanations of patriarchy with the analysis of capitalism⁶¹ and radical feminists tend to emphasise the role of gendered hierarchies within society and, in particular, the use of violence to maintain those hierarchies.⁶² The term patriarchy is used as simply a form of shorthand to denote a societal structure that supports, either explicitly or implicitly, the systematic male dominance of women.

The representation of women under patriarchy is one issue which has to some extent dominated the analysis of the press representations in Part Two. Through the newspaper reports it was apparent that some journalists were more 'gender-aware-than others - at least in terms of the language they used to represent women. For example, some journalists tended, on occasion, to almost 'caricature' women: they have been represented as 'womenfolk', as 'breeders', as 'liking shopping' and as 'natural pacifists'. Furthermore, the issue of the mass raping of women in war was regarded by one journalist as not even a 'political' problem.⁶³ Although it should be noted that often even the most gender-sensitive journalists (for example, Linda Grant mentioned below) cannot control the gendered language used by their interviewees. However, as with the previous section which looked at 'rape as a weapon', this section will be identifying specific ways in which women were represented in the press and comparing them to the thoughts some feminist theorists have on the issue. This move will highlight similarities, differences, and the extent to which feminists have expanded and developed the prevailing theories and issues surrounding rape and rape in war.

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⁶² ibid., ch. 9.
⁶³ Alice Thomson, "Truth that the world finds hard to hear," *The Times*, 1 January 1993, p. 11.
An article by Ed Vulliamy begins this examination of how women have been represented in the journalists' reports of mass rape in war.\textsuperscript{64} In writing for The Guardian, he describes the women of a predominantly Muslim village as 'womenfolk', which in one sense denotes 'ownership', or 'belonging to someone', presumably to the men of the village - their 'protectors'. This theme of men as 'protector' and women as their 'property' is continued by another article in The Guardian and written by Linda Grant, in which Grant quotes the president of the Red Crescent in Croatia as commenting that Muslim women who have been raped during the Balkan conflict will be welcomed as 'second or third wives' in North African Muslim states. The report states that these North African Muslim men are willing to 'forgive them' their impurity and will protect them in exchange for 'owning' these 'light-skinned' women.\textsuperscript{65} In addition, another article in The Guardian, written in December 1992, states that Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl offered the female rape victim's of the Balkans a haven in Germany', presumably with himself as 'protector in chief' of the women.\textsuperscript{66}

These ideas which circulate around the notion that women should, at all times, be protected by men has been discussed at length by feminist Frances Power Cobbe. Writing in Femicide: The Politics of Women Killing, she states that the idea that women are a man's property (usually property of the father or husband) 'is the fatal root of incalculable evil and misery'.\textsuperscript{67} While this statement may appear a little strong, Cobbe goes on to expand her ideas further:

Every brutal-minded man, and many a man who in other relations of life is not brutal, entertains more or less vaguely the notion that his wife is his thing, and is ready to ask with indignation (as we read again and again in the police reports), of anyone who interferes with his treatment of her, "May I not do what I will with my own?" It is even sometimes pleaded on behalf of poor men, that they possess nothing else but their wives, and that, consequently, it seems doubly hard to meddle with the exercise of their power in that narrow sphere!\textsuperscript{68}

\begin{itemize}
\item Linda Grant, "Anyone here been raped and speak English?" The Guardian, 2 August 1993, sec. G2T, p. 10.
\end{itemize}

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Cobbe explains that this was the reality in Britain until relatively recently and in other less Westernised societies this remains the 'norm' for many women - they are men's property and rely on them for their protection, indeed their lives. This entitlement of men to 'women as property' appears to have been institutionalised in exactly the same manner as the rights of men to be entitled to land, chattel and other economic resources. Historically, and to a certain extent cross-culturally, men have been entitled to own slaves, servants, wives and children, and have enjoyed the benefits of ownership without interference. They have also been able to act towards their property in any way they saw fit without legal consequences, while the 'property' had little or no legal status in 'its' own right.

This 'male' tendency, to think of women as sexual or reproductive 'property' that they can own, protect, exchange, and treat violently if they please, is questionable, particularly when one focuses on the male 'protector' role. In fact, if one accepts Cobbe's arguments above, then women appear to be more threatened at home by their own 'loved' ones than in other more seemingly dangerous situations - i.e. war.69 Indeed, the social myth that the family and home are sanctuaries for women is frequently challenged by feminists, organisations such as Women's Aid, and occasionally journalists.70 And furthermore, the ideology of the 'safe' home has helped to keep women subordinate by making them feel insecure and even frightened away from the home environment.71 Yet, in many instances, women are much safer away from the 'protection' of home and husband (or partner, boyfriend, father, brother, uncle, stepfather, and so on).72

Ruth Seifert, writing about the 'man as protector' has also suggested that this assumption is a myth - particularly in wartime. She states that '[a]s experience teaches us, the myth of man as protector that is mobilised in most wars is really nothing more

72Ibid.
than a myth', and Seifert concludes that during wartime there is no means by which men can protect women from war's, almost inevitable, consequences. Therefore, whether in 'peacetime' or during war, men either cannot, do not or will not protect women from rape, violence and sexual abuse, albeit for different reasons. Betty Reardon, on the other hand, while accepting that men during wartime frequently show 'little or no concern for other women', nevertheless, they 'cherish' their own wives, daughters and other female relatives. By way of explanation, Reardon states:

Most men are ... able to objectify virtually all women, except those for whom society has given them special responsibilities, mainly female relatives. Much as the nation-state encourages citizens to accept violence against those outside the national boundaries but generally prohibits it against those within, men are conditioned to protect and cherish the women for whom they have been given responsibility but to have little or no concern for other women. This psychic conditioning makes women emotionally dependent on men as well as physically vulnerable to them.

This particular feminist analysis does not sit easily with Cobbe's suggestion that women's traditional 'protectors' - men - are in fact a threat to their safety rather than, as Reardon suggests, their 'cherishers'. However, if one adheres to Reardon's argument, that men have a certain responsibility for their female relatives, then one could reasonably define these women as 'womenfolk', as mentioned in The Guardian article above.

As noted earlier, the 'caricatures' of women readily used in the British press tend to be associated with traditional notions of what constitutes 'women' and what women's roles are deemed to be within a patriarchal society. For example, writing in The Guardian, Ed Vulliamy discussed a 'breeding programme' which was reported to have been introduced in Croatia to 'restrict Muslim women having children'. Throughout the article there is no mention of men or men's role in the 'breeding programme', the assumption being that conception, the use of contraception (or not), giving birth,

73Ibid.
74Ibid.
75Betty Reardon (1985), p. 51. (emphasis added)
76Ibid.
77Ibid.
bringing-up children, and so on, is solely the women's domain and men do not play a significant part in this area of traditional life. Now, this may or may not be the case in contemporary Croatian/Muslim life, but to accept this without question or comment would be regarded in feminist circles as an omission on the part of the reporter which merely serves to reinforce these gender stereo-types. Moreover, these socially constructed gender and reproductive roles play a major part in restricting women's identity and behaviour. As feminist and literary critic Eve Sedgwick has remarked, gender is the 'dichotomised social production and reproduction of male and female identities and behaviours' and is produced 'inextricable from a history of power differentials between genders'. In other words, far from being natural, gender is a cultural code that shapes social expectations for both men and women. Consequently, each sex tends to grow up differently and the majority act in ways which conform to their culture's prevalent gendered images and values. It is through seemingly innocuous comments in journalists' reports - like the one above - which serves to perpetuate those gendered social 'norms'.

Further examples of the caricaturisation of women in the articles analysed can also be found in the press representations analysed in Chapter Six. Alice Thomson, writing in The Times, comments that Dame Anna Warburton, having just returned from leading an EU (or EC as it was reported then) fact-finding mission to Bosnia, had unfortunately missed the 'pre-Christmas shopping period'. This implicitly suggests that, as a woman, Dame Anna would 'naturally' be wanting to shop during the Christmas period and would have been disappointed to have missed the opportunity: and implies that the mission was a lower priority. In addition to this rather artless piece of reporting, in her article Thomson also used a quotation from the Foreign Office which stated that they would need to find a woman for the mission, but they needed to find one that 'wouldn't squirm' at what she found and would not be 'blinded by sympathy'. The implication being that most women are 'naturally' too 'soft and emotional' for what has traditionally been considered a man's role. In addition to these sentiments, Rosalind Coward's thousand-word article in The Guardian a few months

80Alice Thomson, 1 January 1993.
81Ibid.
later explicitly suggested that women have a 'natural alliance with pacifism'.\(^{82}\) again, this is a view which is commonly replicated throughout Western society and for many Radical feminists.\(^{83}\)

Many feminists would, of course, take issue with these suggestions. Not necessarily because the suggestions are 'wrong' or 'right', but because of the image that they portray of women and also because of the contribution they make to society's beliefs about women. Some feminists, for example, would argue that women are perfectly capable of taking on traditional male roles.\(^{84}\) While others would strongly deny the classic gendered hierarchical dualisms which are evident in the above article - man/woman, war/peace, hard/soft, rational/emotional. Kate Millett, for example, in line with much mainstream feminist thinking, has stated that a patriarchal ideology, which exaggerates these differences between men and women, ensures that men always have the dominant or 'masculine' roles and women are given the subordinate or 'feminine' ones.\(^{85}\) However, while most feminists would criticise the hierarchical nature of the above dualisms, some radical feminists appear to accept these dichotomies, indeed, they are often seen as defining themselves in opposition to the 'male' culture. One consequence of this is that the patriarchal culture is therefore defined as the 'norm' from which women deviate. Thus, while aligning oneself with emotion, passion, fertility, sexuality, creativity, and so on, and celebrating these traditional 'feminine' characteristics, some radical feminists are in danger of placing themselves, and women in general, in the same space as the patriarchal culture has placed women, which, it could be argued, ultimately serves men not women.\(^{86}\)

However, in general, radical feminists would agree with Adrienne Rich when she states that patriarchy has been a great success when measured in terms of its ability to determine both women's gender behaviour and gender identity through force, direct

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\(^{85}\)Kate Millett (1972), p. 43-46.  
pressure ... ritual, tradition, law and language, customs, etiquette, education and the
division of labour. Betty Reardon has similarly suggested that women's behaviour
and identity has been successfully moulded by our Western patriarchal culture. In
commenting on why women have been traditionally depicted as pacifists she states
that 'it is to be expected that women are more likely to show concern for peace and
fear of war than men, not because it is inherent in their hormonal systems, but because
of their social conditioning to focus on the human and personal'. These gendered
social expectations are evident, and are perpetuated, in the press representations
analysed here, and while feminist ideas have had some effect on the perceptions and
assumptions of journalists, the influence of social conditioning by our dominant
patriarchal culture appears to remain strong.

The press representations analysed have also tended to characterise Muslim women in
traditional terms. In Alice Thomson's article in The Times she states that the Bosnian
Muslim women are very 'inhibited' and that they 'traditionally do not come out of their
houses'. And, indeed, some feminists would endorse this view of Muslim women's
lives living under Islamic law and within a patriarchal religious-based society. Marie
de Lepervanche, for example, writing in Woman - Nation - State uses the following
quotation from M. Humphrey, who concurs with Thomson's view concerning the role
of some Islamic women:

[T]he primary role of women ... is that of homemaker and
childbearer. This role is reinforced by various patriarchal
ideologies, the most common of which is the ideology of
honour. Men invest their honour in the virtue of their women
and thereby idealise and control them. One consequence is that
women's mobility is often very restricted since their
independence is always seen as potentially threatening to the
reputation of males and their families.

It is undeniable that these traditional religious belief systems and institutions play an
important role in perpetuating and legitimating existing gender stereotypes. However,

87 Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution (New York: W.W.
89 Alice Thomson, 1 January 1993.
90 Marie de Lepervanche, "Women, Nation and the State in Australia" in Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya
feminist and freelance journalist Azra Zalihic-Kaurin and a Muslim woman living in Sarajevo, has suggested that life for Muslim women in the former-Yugoslavia was not as conservative as it has often been portrayed by the Western press. According to Zalihic-Kaurin travel, city life, education and Communist ideology had all played a part in changing the life-style of Muslim women. Although useful for members of the press to characterise groups of people by generalising about their behaviour and identity, thereby saving valuable research time, their tendency to assign labels to groups of people, of whom they have no personal knowledge, leads to misinformation and false impressions being disseminated throughout society. Moreover, given the background of our patriarchal society, when these gendered messages are given out by the press they merely serve to reinforce the traditional discourses which state that women are resigned and happy to remain in demeaning and subordinate positions.

Perhaps more disquieting is the way in which the press representations seem to use the rape victims as a means of sensationalising the reports as a means to sell more papers - not an allegation that the newspapers would admit to and not one generally levelled at 'respectable' broadsheet newspapers. Within Western patriarchal society there are certain images which our culture determines to be beautiful, sexy, 'worth' looking at or reading about. According to feminist and journalist Linda Grant, the British press on occasion constructed the images of 'pretty Muslim virgins sobbing out their tales of sexual violation' for this purpose. Moreover, Grant claims that when no 'rape babies' materialised and there were 'no more weeping girls posing prettily' the media attention diminished and 'silence' reigned. This preoccupation by some journalists with the images of the rape victims is also evident in the way in which the rape victims are described as being 'of all ages'. While, on one level, the journalist is simply relaying the facts of the situation, however, it is the context of surprise that is unnerving, as though journalists assume that the rapists are always selective in choosing their victims and they only rape young, attractive women. This is just one more example of how patriarchy, reinforced through the writings of the

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92 Linda Grant, 2 August 1993.  
93 ibid.  
95 ibid.
British press, perpetuates the way in which women's behaviour and identity is thought about and how societies expectations of them are profoundly gendered.

Returning to the issue of 'silence', mentioned at length in the previous section and also briefly alluded to above, within a patriarchal society, the representations of women are often loud and blatant, as with the images of sobbing, young, Muslim virgins. However, frequently it is the silences, whether forced upon women or by simply ignoring their experiences, which contributes to their continued oppression and debility. There are a number of examples of this within the articles analysed, all which work in some way to silence the rape victims and/or encourage the dismissal of their experiences.

Examining again the article written by Alice Thomson, we see she quotes Dame Anna Warburton as saying that with the 'propaganda war in full flow in Bosnia' one has to be extremely careful' that one does not 'exaggerate' the numbers of rape victims, the methods used, and so on. This has been a recurring theme found throughout the analysis of the press representations, and one which although makes an important point, nevertheless, has been used as a justification for political elites to dismiss the reports as simply propaganda and therefore not worthy of governmental resources. One example of this 'hypocrisy', as Alexandra Stiglmayer has called it, is a quotation from George Kenney, as already mentioned in Chapter Three. He was a US State Department Assistant, who resigned 'for reasons of conscience' when the Bush Administration purposely dismissed the allegations of mass rape in the Balkans as propaganda as a justification for US inaction. Quoted in Alexandra Stiglmayer's book Mass Rape in War: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kenney makes the following admission:

My job was to make it appear as though the U.S. was active and concerned about the situation ... [the administration] managed to downplay the gravity of the crisis and obscure the real issues. Of course, it did so at the expense of civilian casualties ... the trick was to ignore the facts - whether they pertained to atrocities, rumours of concentration camps, or starvation.  

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56 Alice Thomson, 1 January 1993.
In reply to Kenney's admissions, Stiglmayer argues that journalists and political elites alike appear to collude simply to further the ends of the dominant discourses within Western patriarchal society. Moreover, while I appreciate that there are other issues bound up in Kenney's admission above, for example, that male civilians and unarmed Muslim soldiers were also killed and maimed as a result of the inaction of political elites, nevertheless, mass rape in war has been one of the major issues emanating from reports of the Balkan conflict and this, for the most part, has affected women. Therefore, it is easily understood why feminists, such as Stiglmayer, have come to these conclusions. Journalist Barbara Hewson summarises her own feelings regarding this matter perfectly when she stated in an article written for The Times in September 1992, in war '[w]omen it seems are peripheral, rape is so much propaganda'.

Yet, many feminists would also argue that far from being peripheral, during wartime women and rape acquire 'strategic importance'. Women are seen as becoming symbols of the nation while rapists can be regarded as men merely representing their national interest. Cynthia Enloe, for example, points out that:

> It is precisely because sexuality, reproduction, and child-rearing acquire such strategic importance with the rise of nationalism that many nationalist men become aware of their need to exert control over the women.

Undoubtedly much information has been used, via the British press, for propaganda purposes by all the warring factions as well as British and European governments and political elites with women rape victims on all sides of the warring factions being used to justify either retaliatory violence and violations of human rights, or inaction and the disregard of the victim's experiences. One could almost argue that in this respect women's experiences have to move through two patriarchal barriers before they have been allowed to be heard. First, if the experiences do not fit the media's established self-built imagery (based on patriarchal ideals) then the media has the

98 Ibid.
99 Barbara Hewson, "Rape is a war crime too; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Modern Times," The Times, 8 September 1992, sec. LT, p. 4.
capacity to ignore it; and second, political elites have the power to silence feminist voices with, as George Kenney admitted, pretence and propaganda of their own.

To illustrate the above sentiment, Brenda Fitzpatrick, being interviewed by Roger Boyes on behalf of the World Council of Churches, stated in December 1992 that having spoken to, and aided, many Bosnian rape victims 'many victims believe that the rapes are not being taken seriously when they are reported to the authorities'.

Alison Jaggar has looked at this issue and blames the contemporary perception of women within our patriarchal culture as the root of the problem. By way of explanation, Jaggar states that:

The perception of women as sexual objects restricts more than their sexuality: it also encourages sexual harassment, makes it difficult for women to be taken seriously in non-sexual contexts, and provides a covert legitimation of rape.

One form of socially constructed conditioning for women in today's Western society, is that they are expected to be 'titillating' to men: whether subtly or blatantly appears to be of no consequence, as long as they are presented for men's gratification as sexual objects. Their identity as individual women is silenced. It could be argued that wartime propaganda reinforces the link between war and sexuality which serves to further objectify women: the enemy are portrayed as the rapists who rape and murder 'our' women and our boys are fighting to save and protect 'our' women. However, at the same time, women are frequently portrayed as the enemy themselves during wartime. According to Susan Gubar women are often deemed to be untrustworthy or unworthy of this male protection: they are 'irresponsible in their garrulity (loose lips sink ships)', 'sinister in their silence (the treacherous femme fatale)' and/or carriers of venereal diseases, and as Betty Reardon suggested above, through such images of

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106 Susan Gubar, "This is my Rifle, This is my Gun: World War II and the Blitz on Women," in Margaret R Higonnet, ed., Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars (London: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 227.
women, soldiers are conditioned to cherish certain women and have no regard for others. Moreover, the perpetuation of these stereotypes depends on the absence and/or the silence of women who might challenge them.

Another form of silencing is evident in the comparison between male and female responses to the reports of mass rape in the Balkan conflict. While the examples used below are not meant to be representative of the opinions of all women or all men, they were nevertheless the only reports of their kind in the newspapers analysed, and therefore they are possibly, or have possibly been made to be by the journalists, representative of general male/female feelings on the matter. Rosalind Coward writing for The Guardian in April 1993 used a quotation from Sarah Dunant, feminist and founder member of Women Against War Crime, who, along with 199 other 'influential women', was attempting to 'let women's voices be heard' on the issue of mass rape in war by lobbying for government action. As mentioned in Chapter Six, Dunant was apparently motivated to put her name to a petition calling for military intervention because, in her words, 'I have two little girls and I kept thinking, what will I tell them in fifteen years if they ask me what I did about the atrocities in Bosnia?'

This response - direct action based on an empathetic reaction to the rape victim's experiences - is almost diametrical opposed to the 'male' response of Roy Hattersley that was also written in April 1993. For example, Hattersley states that he no longer reads 'the descriptions of the horrors which are inflicted on Bosnian women and children' and the justification he gives for ignoring the plight of these women and children is that 'an improvement in my knowledge would not save one life'. He continues to admit that mass rape is 'literally beyond my comprehension', and once again the justification for this lack of understanding is that the 'taboos of our society

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108 Rosalind Coward, 30 April 1993.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
have prevented me from previously thinking about such things and I am not equipped to think about them now'\textsuperscript{113}

The differences between these two attitudes are almost tangible; one would have the victim's experiences explicitly voiced - even the article is entitled 'Loud and Clear'. Yet, the other would have the rape victim's and their experiences silenced, albeit by turning a blind eye to the problem rather then openly denouncing the validity of the rapes. However, silence remains corrosive, undermining, and inappropriate regardless of the means of enforcement. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Hattersley put the blame squarely on the society in which we live as having created his inability to deal appropriately with what has often been regarded in the media as merely a 'women's problem'. Feminists would, of course, argue that the society Hattersley is describing is a patriarchal society. However, it should be noted that neither response was probably typical of the British public's response to the reports: although it was the fact that they were extraordinary responses that they were reported in the press.

According to Susan Brownmiller, the significant silences surrounding mass rape in war will continue to be regarded in political circles as lacking any real significance as long as 'women's silence' remains an integral part of our Western patriarchal society. As an illustration of her pessimism, she has made the following prediction:

\begin{quote}
The plight of raped women as casualties of war is given credence only at the emotional moment when the side in danger of annihilation cries out for world attention. When the military histories are written, when the glorious battles for independence become legend, the stories are glossed over, discounted as exaggerations, deemed not serious enough for inclusion in scholarly works. And women are left with their shame. [And their silence.\textsuperscript{114}]
\end{quote}

Mass rape in war, it seems, might briefly warrant the attention of society's political hierarchy if it cannot be ignored completely or talked away by media-satisfying 'soundbites', but in the long-term it does not appear to be worthy of serious political discussion or political solutions. Perhaps, in part, the problem lies with the general

\textsuperscript{113}ibid.

failure of governments and political elites to recognise rape in war as a political problem. One example of the inability of (even a female) European political representative to recognise that mass rape in war is indeed a political problem, with political consequences, is demonstrated in a statement by Dame Anne Warburton included in Alice Thomson’s article mentioned above, in which Dame Anna states that her investigation into mass rape in war in the Balkans ‘was just humanitarian not political’. However, one could argue that even the workers in women’s refuges across the Balkans are engaged in political work: they are creating space where women can talk about their experiences and deal with any consequential problems in an empowering way. Bringing an issue such as mass rape in war out from the private sphere, making it visible, offering a social diagnosis and a public solution is the essence of feminist politics and, therefore, can never remain simply a humanitarian issue.

Feminists are engaged in challenging these patriarchal assumptions based on the separation of women’s/men’s issues, humanitarian/political events and the private/public spheres. Feminists are attempting to make their voices heard and the issues that concern them visible. Rada Boric made a similar point when she stated:

As women we are organising because this is the only way to make our issues visible. We want to be activists, not passive victims. In all this nationalistic euphoria it is easy for me to choose my nationality: Woman. It is not enough to look at the world through women’s eyes’ (as the Beijing Women’s Conference says). We must make the world a reflection of women’s minds and women’s efforts.115

In other words, their aim was to listen and attempt to understand women’s thoughts needs and experiences. Feminists, it seems, are making efforts to move the debates on rape in war forward and this is particularly evident in the calls to expand existing human rights legislation to incorporate the specific experiences of women117: this issue will discussed further in Chapter Eight. Linda Grant, writing in The Guardian, also mentioned the ‘demands by women’s organisations that rape be included as a war

115Alice Thomson, 1 January 1993.
crime within the Geneva Convention,\textsuperscript{118} and is challenging the notion that gender-based violence in war is generally not recognised as a violation of human rights, but is regarded as a by-product of war and/or simply interpreted as the isolated actions of individual soldiers. This notion of challenging the prevailing patriarchal assumptions which are considered the 'norms' within our society will be raised again in the final chapter; however, Nadezhda Mandelstam's statement in a different context sums up feminist feelings about women's enforced suffering and 'silence': '[i]f nothing else is left, one must scream. Silence is the real crime against humanity'.\textsuperscript{119}

The discussion above has shown how in some instances the journalists have mirrored the writings of the feminists in their criticism of the gendered ways in which women have been represented, both by the journalists themselves and in interviews with a third party for the journalists' articles. However, perhaps more typically, many of the reports have carried persistent gendered assumptions concerning women and in particular the prescribed gendered roles they should play; these have either remained unchallenged by the journalists, or have been suggested by the journalists themselves. Whether these oversights were subconscious or not remains immaterial as, either way, it appears that feminist ideas still have considerable work to do until society's 'norms' regarding the representation of women are not based on a gendered and hierarchical patriarchal discourse. Although the notion of a gender-free society may be an impossible ideal, the inherent assumptions of worth and value that are given to the gendered roles and divisions of labour by society need to be abolished before a real sense of equality can be attained. These issues can now be developed through a discussion of biological determinism and the way in which it has played a role in the standard media explanations for rape in war.

\textsuperscript{118}Linda Grant, "Anyone here been raped and speak English?" \textit{The Guardian}, 2 August 1993, sec. G2T, p. 10.

Biological Determinism

Biological determinism has long proved to be a popular idea, particularly in its assertion of a relationship between human biology and the way in which society is organised. There are, of course, many ways in which the strands of biological determinism have been utilised, Conservatives have traditionally used this notion for advocating the merits of the status quo, thus endorsing the prevailing distribution of power, wealth and social standing. However, all strands of biological determinism claim that the basic genetic constitution of human beings determines certain specific unchangeable features of human social life. Although this stance has been used to justify many social practices, the one which most concerns us is the propensity for men to have 'natural' biological urges which lead to a 'high sex drive' and thus a predilection to rape - one of the explanations introduced in Part One.

Many feminists would refute this claim, suggesting instead that through our social construction under the influence of our Western patriarchal society, men have instilled in them specific expectations and ways of acting. Moreover, most feminists would claim that while patriarchal ideology overtly condemns rape, covertly, it legitimises rape by viewing it as 'normal'. Alison Jaggar, for example, has stated:

Under patriarchy, not only are women defined as sexual objects but men are regarded as having a 'drive' toward heterosexual intercourse that is almost overwhelming and kept in check only by the fear of the law and by respect of women's 'honour'. Sometimes these restraints are inadequate. Law enforcement may be uncertain, as in times of war.

Therefore, although within our patriarchal society rape is officially condemned, its gendered definitions of male and female sexuality appear to provide an implicit authorisation to rape. Furthermore, here Jaggar's sentiments link the notion of an unchangeable biological 'drive' with the social construction of a patriarchal society,


ibid., p. 261.

ibid.
perhaps suggesting that patriarchal society itself may be based on biological drives. It is also interesting to note that the hierarchical dualisms which, in part, form the basis of any patriarchal society run in stark contrast to these biological determinist arguments, which suggest that men are uncontrollable and are swayed by the influence of base natural urges, with no means to resist. Within the hierarchical dualisms, however, men are assigned reason and rationality, as opposed to women’s emotion; they are linked with ‘high’ ‘culture’ while women are associated with ‘low’ ‘nature’.124 These binary oppositions which portray men as clear-thinking, level-headed human beings in touch with all things rational and high-minded seem to contradict the notion of men as base, primitive creatures controlled by physical desires prescribed for them by nature and biological determinist arguments.125

The notion of men being at the mercy of ‘natural urges’ was raised in The Guardian by Catherine Bennett in January 1993. Bennett interviewed Helena Harbraken, an Amnesty International researcher and asked her opinion on whether the mass raping of women in the former-Yugoslavia was used as a strategy in the war. In reply, Harbraken suggested that any explanation for the rapes which implies that the rapes were ordered from ‘above’ is unhelpful and masks the real root of the problem, which according to Harbraken is that ‘men never need an excuse to rape and if you say they rape because it’s an order you take all the power out of that first statement, and you’re saying actually they don’t want to rape, and in general they’re really good, brave guys’.126 Bennett also uses a quotation from Susan Brownmiller, which supports Harbraken’s viewpoint by stating that ‘you don’t need orchestration or commands from on high when you have a young soldier with a gun. You don’t need any orders to rape’.127

These arguments, that all men are capable of rape and that they are simply at the mercy of their biologically determined ‘natural urges’, have been put forward by both a journalist and a feminist scholar. However, not all feminist writers would agree with

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127Ibid.
them. Some radical feminist writers, for example, while accepting some biological determinist arguments, have stated that rather than it being men who have been biologically imbued with 'high sex drives' it is, in fact, women who have a biologically determined, inordinately high, cyclic sexual drive, and it is because of these uncontrollable female urges that men found it necessary to instigate women's oppression. Mary Sherfey explains her viewpoint by stating that:

[T]he forceful suppression of women's inordinate sexual demands was a prerequisite to the dawn of every modern civilisation and almost every living culture. Primitive woman's sexual drive was too strong, too susceptible to the fluctuating extremes of an impelling, aggressive eroticism to withstand the disciplined requirements of a settled family life.

Sherfey continues to clarify her position by stating that if women were allowed the 'free expression of female sexuality' then 'rigid, enforced suppression [would] be inevitable and mandatory.' This is an alternative viewpoint to the one advocated by Harbraken and Brownmiller above, even though all three writers, on one level, emanate from the same radical feminist camp. However, although Sherfey's article was published in a pioneering radical feminist anthology, her clear advocation of women's continued subordination could not be associated today with any feminist stand-point, let alone a radical feminist one. Yet her proposition that women have just as many 'uncontrollable urges' - if not more - is an idea that has found the occasional supporter among journalists.

In general though, radical feminists do accept some of the biological determinist arguments and their contemporary writings are replete with references to 'the power inherent in female biology' and the 'native talent and superiority of women'. Therefore, many radical feminists prize the qualities that have been assigned to

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131 Dan Britten, "Why men are the good guys really - and not all that keen on sex," The Observer, 13 July 1997, p. 6.
women through biology or nature. However, while these radical feminists have highlighted the fact that feminists should not ignore biological differences and that the problem of women's oppression is not based solely on gender, but also on sex, there is the tendency to ignore the implication that human biology is a fixed, unchanging, pre-social given, thus buying further into biological determinism arguments.

To return to the idea of 'natural male urges' giving men the biological propensity to rape, two radical feminists who discount the biological determinist argument are Jane Caputi and Diana Russell. They state that rape is not due to biology or 'some inexplicable deviance' but due to an 'extreme form of sexual terrorism' which 'serves to preserve the gender status quo'. Furthermore, they make the following assertion:

[R]ape ... is not, as common mythology insists, a crime of frustrated attraction, victim provocation, or uncontrollable biological urges. Nor is rape perpetuated only by an aberrant fringe. Rather, rape is a direct expression of sexual politics, an act of conformity to masculinist sexual norms.

Catherine Bennett, writing in The Guardian discussed this particular facet of rape with Carol Sellars, a principal clinical psychologist at Broadmoor Hospital. Sellars explained that in her experience of talking to rapists she has concluded that it is about two main things, both of which tie in with the suggestions of Caputi and Russell. Sellars states that, 'one is about asserting domination and humiliating the victim, and sexual degradation is seen as the ultimate form of degradation. The other is to do with asserting masculinity, which again is essentially about domination and aggression, not really about true sexuality'. While I am not suggesting that convicted rapists are representative of all men, this nevertheless gives us an interesting insight into the alleged motivations behind some rapes. And if rape is indeed an 'act of conformity to masculinist sexual norms' as Caputi, Russell and Sellars assert, then it begs the questions, could all men rape? If not, which men rape?

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Susan Brownmiller, in a quotation cited a number of times in the thesis, claims that all men are capable of at least threatening rape as a manipulative tool against women. To use the last section of the quotation again, Brownmiller states that rape is 'nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear'.

Catherine Bennett, in a Guardian article entitled 'Ordinary Madness', concurs with Brownmiller's idea that rape is not simply an act committed by aberrant fringe of men. In challenging the claim that the majority of rapists have criminal tendencies, Bennett suggests that '[w]hatever the figures, the collective testimony of the women who have been sexually abused in this war still challenges the assumption that rape is the preserve of a criminal minority'. Moreover, sociologist Robert Bly, an author interviewed by Catherine Bennett also claimed that following his own research he has concluded that '50% [of men] are capable of doing it [raping]' and as for the other 50% he claims that 'they’re not the type, they would be the ones who are expressing emotion and doing art'. Finally, Catherine Bennett also interviewed Slavenka Drakulic, a Croatian feminist and writer, who categorically stated that Susan Brownmiller was right and that in her opinion all men are potential rapists. By way of explanation, she made the following statement:

I'm very unhappy to say that, I really am - but what can you conclude? How do they do it under the conditions? How can they do it when a gun is pointed at their head? You would say they cannot do it if a women is revolting against it, and screaming - but they do it!

Alongside other suggestions, these conclude that between 50-100% of men could be capable of rape due in the main to biological factors and because 'that is just the way men are'. These statements also appear to be implying that men who have not yet raped, or even those who actively protest against rape, are not being true to their 'real' identity as men: to be true to the real essence of manhood one must constantly reaffirm one's identity by oppressing and intimidating women. This essentialist notion that men are 'just men' and that there is no way to change this pre-social fact appears to be analytically barren, and it is questionable whether these suggestions are anymore

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137 Susan Brownmiller (1975), p. 5.
138 Catherine Bennett, 20 January 1993.
139 ibid.
140 ibid.
helpful than the suggestion that all women are potential baby murderers, prostitutes and/or castrators. Moreover, if one concentrates on men's biological-determined selves as having the propensity to rape, then any notion that the propensity to rape may be socially constructed, thereby offering some hope for change, is quashed.

Indeed, this point has been raised by Jean Elshtain, who insisted that unless an analysis offers some potential for change, it is empty.\textsuperscript{141} So, what else is at work? Are there other factors involved that prompt some feminist writers and journalists alike to assert so explicitly that the majority of 'ordinary' men have a propensity to rape? Although it could, as many feminists suggest and has already been mentioned above, be the gendered attitudes and behaviour of within a patriarchal culture that is responsible instead. But whether these 'urges' are 'natural' or socially constructed, for the majority of men they are not a continual feature of everyday life that have to be consciously subdued. If one accepts that the propensity to rape is biologically determined (as some journalists and feminists believe), then what are the explanations of what unleashes these 'urges'? Protagonists from both camps have suggested one socially constructed product of a patriarchal society that could contribute to the metamorphosis of 'ordinary' men into rapists - pornography.

Feminists have often suggested that we cannot escape the virulent misogyny that thrives in many forms beneath the surface of many twentieth century societies. Andrea Dworkin has suggested that these feelings of hatred and contempt for women are evident, indeed are cultivated, by socially acceptable pornography. This pornography, much of which is violent and overtly misogynist appears to celebrate the physical and mental power of men over women and, according to Dworkin, has become 'normalised' within Western society.\textsuperscript{142} Catharine MacKinnon, who has also written extensively on pornography and its effects, has defined pornography in the following manner:

\begin{quote}
[T]he graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures or words that also includes women dehumanised as
\end{quote}

sexual objects, things, or commodities; enjoying pain or humiliation or rape; being tied up, cut up, mutilated, bruised, or physically hurt; in postures of sexual submission or servility or display; reduced to body parts, penetrated by objects or animals, or presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture; shown as filthy or inferior; bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.\textsuperscript{143}

Earlier, in this section, Alison Jaggar implied that it was only social restraints that kept men's 'natural urges' in check. According to Diana Russell, it is pornography that has the ability to break down those barriers and release men's tendency towards sexual violence. For example, she states that 'pornography causes sexual violence through its capacities to normalise that violence, give ideas to receptive male viewers, and break down some men's personal and social inhibitions against behaving in a violent manner'.\textsuperscript{144}

Whether the desire for sexual violence is inherent, though latent, in men's psyche, or alternatively if it is socially constructed by societies misogynist values, partly through the acceptability of violent pornography, the result remains the same - violence against women. Jane Caputi, in her article "The Mass Media, Pornography, and Gorenography", uses the words of a rape victim to illustrate the link between the use of pornography by men and sexual violence and rape. The rape victim is explaining how her rapist implicitly told her that he was living out his pornography fantasy:

He told me he had seen whores like me in [three pornographic films mentioned by name], and told me he knew how to do it to whores like me. He knew what whores like me wanted. ... after he finished raping me, he started beating me with his gun all over. Then he said, 'You were in that movie. You were in that movie. You know you wanted me to kill you after this rape just like [specific pornography film] did.'\textsuperscript{145}

Feminists have long claimed that the use of pornography promotes the view of women as objects, as things to be owned, used and abused. Moreover, Diana Russell


has combined feminist and social scientific research from the past decade to suggest a theoretical model that, she claims, illustrates the ways in which pornography causes rape.  

Generally, feminists and some journalists are both advocating that rape and pornography are inextricably linked and, along with issues such as sexual harassment and the physical abuse of women, are all connected expressions of male sexual violence, rather than discrete, disconnected issues. Catharine MacKinnon has asked similar questions regarding the links between the use of pornography and the raping of women in 'detention camps' in the Balkans. She asks, 'Is there a relationship between the pornography consumed, the sexualisation of the environment of torture and predation, and the sexual acts that are performed?' In attempting to demonstrate these links MacKinnon goes on to describe some of the rape victims' experiences and how their rapes mirrored the pornography plastered on the walls of the soldier's living quarters and detention centres.

The question then arises: Do feminists and some journalists regard rape in war as an extension of 'peacetime' rape? In other words if mass rape is not regarded as part of a wartime military strategy, perhaps it is seen instead as merely an extension of 'peacetime' sexual violence and is committed for the same 'peacetime' reasons. In Catherine Bennett's article in The Guardian in which she interviewed Susan Brownmiller, Brownmiller was unequivocal in her suggestion that the anarchy of war was at least partly responsible for the mass raping of women in the Balkans. Brownmiller condemns the situation in the former-Yugoslavia by stating that every army has rules of conduct in warfare, and we know that rape is outlawed in the terms of the Geneva Convention - but what is the authority that's going to court martial these guys? There is no authority there, so they have permission to rape, the way they have permission to kill'. Is war, like pornography, another factor which encourages 'ordinary' men to develop the propensity to rape due to the peacetime 'normalising' of

\[148\] Ibid.
\[149\] Catherine Bennett, 20 January 1993.
pornography and violence against women, or merely constructed by the anti-social conditions of war?

Cynthia Enloe, commenting on the mass raping of women in the Balkan conflict has suggested that people tend to view these wartime rapes in one of two ways, we either 'take rape seriously, see it as a conscious attempt to control and humiliate women' or we 'adopt the patriarchal convention of imagining men's rapes of women as merely a natural part of wartime's politically dulling litany of 'murder-pillage-rape".150 Rada Boric and Mica Desnica appear to take the first option as they conclude that war is an extension of Western patriarchal society, replete with all the raping, controlling and humiliation of women that Enloe suggests. For example, they state that 'war is an extreme pattern of patriarchal social structure, and that civil violence against women and war violence have things in common'.151 So, regarding wartime violence against women, some feminist scholars are, once again, in agreement with certain journalists' perceptions that in the anarchy of war some men are free to act out their pornographic fantasies, engage in gratuitous sexual violence against women, and so forth. Moreover, they tend to concur that the gender conflicts that are prevalent during 'peacetime' are very much in evidence, in fact are exaggerated, during war.152

These 'men' that have been so freely discussed by journalists and feminists alike, and who are committing these atrocities in 'peacetime' and during war, cannot, of course, be all the same men. So, the question is whether war releases the 'natural urges' of hitherto 'ordinary' men, and not just a criminal minority? Or does war at least offer men the opportunity to indulge their 'natural urges' and/or sexual fantasies with less chance of being indicted for certain unlawful sexual practices? Alternatively, are there yet more factors involved in the changing of these men's social behaviour in wartime?

A significant proportion of both the journalists and the feminists discussed in the thesis have been in agreement on one other factor which they suggest has played a

152 While individual women may under certain circumstances be able to choose a variety of roles in war some of which do not have negative consequences for women - for example: terrorists, guerrilla fighters or soldiers. Most frequently, however, women are civilians who, in the midst of war, suffer profoundly as casualties, rape victims, refugees, and so on.
significant role in changing men's attitudes and behaviours in war, namely the role of
the military institutions and in particular, military training. This issue will be
discussed in Chapter Eight.

In Chapter Five, references were made to journalists' reports of rape and other sexual
atrocities committed by soldiers in the United States, in Cyprus, Kuwait, India, Japan, and in numerous other
countries throughout the world. However, many of these countries were not at war, but the articles reported sexual violence
against women committed by United Nations peacekeeping forces stationed there at
the time. Although statistics are not often included in these reports, the overall
impression is that there are proportionately more rapes carried out by men in the
military than by civilian men. Although it could, of course, be the case that military
personnel are just expected to be more disciplined and to show more self-restraint
than 'ordinary' men. Although, once again, this suggestion implies that men have
'natural urges' that need to be restrained.

One of the most authoritative feminists on this subject and one who has written at
length on the militarisation of society and in particular women's lives, is Cynthia
Enloe. Writing in 1994, Enloe observed that a feminist analysis of rape can prove to
be a useful tool in highlighting the misogyny which forms an integral part of military
training. She has also stated that feminists have 'used women's experiences of rape as
a searchlight to reveal the inner workings of their country's military structure. Using
rape as a starting point, these women discovered the military's heavy reliance not just
on men as soldiers, but on misogynist forms of masculinist soldiering'. Rather than
adopting the theory that these men's 'natural urges' are due to a biological 'pressure
cooker' and that the 'anarchy' of war with its relative lack of recrimination allows

158 Michael Simmons, "Rape of women by soldiers and police 'is global occurrence'" The Guardian, 5 February 1992, sec. FOR, p. 9.
them to release that pressure at will, Enloe is suggesting that the misogynist values that military trainees are indoctrinated with is a more likely explanation for the rapes. Many feminists would agree with Enloe's argument.

Chris Corrin, for example, has stated that '[h]ierarchical systems of patriarchy are generally based on strict military rules and values. Military values such as physical strength, aggressiveness, persistence, and insensitivity are 'prized' and men are trained and conditioned in these 'values'. Within such systems, women are viewed purely from a male perspective with women's sexuality under constant scrutiny and strict control'. These sentiments are also held by Sister Mary Soledad Perpinan, the founder of the Third World Movement Against the Exploitation of Women. While writing on the 'sexploitation' of women in the Philippines by US military personnel, she asked a simple question and made some basic observations, which implies a certain innate biologically determined 'animal' in men - or at least in soldiers. She asked '[w]hy is it that a military presence has become synonymous with sex and violence? The military system has a way of priming aggression to a high point that unleashes the animal in men. Sexual rampage is the by-product. It happens everywhere'. Furthermore, Perpinan also claims that a number of Vietnam veterans have seen and acknowledged the 'connection of sexism in basic training with the prevailing sexism in military service'.

Also using the atrocities committed in Vietnam by American GIs to make comparisons with the mass raping of women in the Balkan conflict, Ruth Seifert comments on how reports of gang rapes in war reveal how important the amalgamation of power and masculinity can be in cultural representations, with that 'cultural representation' being the need for soldiers to be perceived by their peers as matching up to the socially-accepted 'macho' military image. This image is in turn produced during military training by the building of a shared discourse of male sexual identity through the obligatory male bonding and shared military and masculinist

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163 ibid.
values. In illustrating the result of this volatile combination of power and masculine sexuality promoted by the military, Seifert states that '[w]e know that in [Vietnam] gratuitous atrocities to the victims were taken as a competition for greater masculinity'. It could be argued, therefore, that the creation of armies and the subjective identities that are prescribed for the soldiers through the cultivation of an 'ideal', and very heterosexual, view of masculinity, results in an inclination, though one could probably not go as far as to call it a predetermination, to rape and engage in sexual violence.

The traditional exclusion of women from the military has also played a role in instilling in soldiers that there must be a strong connection between the male monopoly of power and masculinity. Moreover, it is not only women themselves that have been historically barred from the military sphere (this point will be raised again in Chapter Nine), but also what have traditionally been regarded as 'female' traits have also been denied much worth or value within military training regimes. Joan Smith has argued that the military's characteristic rejection and repression of feelings of gentleness and sensitivity have resulted in a military where each individual soldier must constantly brandish their masculinity like a weapon, to be inspected and deemed ready for 'action' by his peers and his commanders. Such a continual defence of masculinity could therefore result in an inability to deal adequately with 'feminine' emotions when they arise. Then, when 'feminine' traits do surface, perhaps in times of extreme stress such as war, soldiers revert to their now instinctive 'learned' reactions, they invoke their masculine values and fight (literally) against the feminine, against women.

Sara Ruddick has also commented on how the military training philosophy is based on the devaluation of emotion and its association with women. Throughout training the commanders encourage and reward aggressive masculine impulses, and force

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165 ibid.
trainees to control emotions of fear, desire and sensitivity. Moreover, women and their supposed emotional natures are frequently degraded and referred to in misogynistic terms. Therefore, as Ruddick suggests, it should not be surprising that many soldiers actual engage in rape and sexual assaults on women. In summary, therefore, it would seem from these arguments by both feminists and some journalists, that women are not necessarily raped in war on a massive scale because they belong to the enemy camp. On the contrary, mass rape in war seems to occur because they are the objects of a fundamental hatred of women that has been carefully developed, fed and nourished by a patriarchally-based military culture, and this hatred is actualised in war.

It should also be remembered that men as well as women were raped in the Balkan conflict and many of the above theories and suggestions could be equally relevant to their experiences of rape as well. Within institutions such as military forces, boarding schools and prisons men and boys may be subjected to rape and sexual abuse and although this fact may weaken some of the above arguments, for example, Susan Brownmiller's suggestion that rape is the archetypal act 'by which all men keep all women in a state of fear'; nevertheless, the humiliation of rape for men lies precisely in the fact that the raped man is being treated like, and even referred to as, a women. In 1971, Barbara Mehrhof and Pamela Kearon remarked that they regarded rape as 'a punishment without crime or guilt - at least not subjective guilt. It is punishment, rather, for the objective crime of femaleness. That is why it is so indiscriminate'. This view could be appropriated to instigate an analysis of male rape. While I am not suggesting that the only men who are raped are those who demonstrate 'feminine' characteristics it could, however, be a starting point.

169 Ibid.
171 Susan Brownmiller (1975), p. 5.
Conclusion

It has been argued that the journalists' representations of the phenomenon of rape appear in many instances to mirror feminist theories, particularly those theories that have been established for some time; there are no links, for example, with feminist postmodern thought. Moreover, the feminist theories favoured by the journalists also appear to be those which have pragmatic applications and even a 'direct action' element to them. A case in point would be the radical feminist theories concerning pornography. These ideas, combined with past 'direct action' by anti-pornography activists, have become a commonly used discourse within society and drawn upon by journalists to illustrate and strengthen their own arguments.\(^\text{173}\)

It was apparent that within the press representations that journalists, due to time and space limitations, generally have to take the bare bones of a theory to illustrate their ideas. In contrast, academic scholars are continually trying to expand, develop, and deepen their theories. There is an inevitable delay, therefore, before current feminist theories are developed from women's experiences and feed back into the discourses of society as a whole. It might take years (if ever), for example, for a theory to move from 'experience', to the feminist scholar, to academic bookshelves, to journalists researching a topic and requiring support for their 'story', to the summarised theory being disseminated to the newspaper reader.

Although this illustration of information dissemination is perhaps simplistic, it nevertheless demonstrates one way in which feminist theories gradually develop wider acceptance within society. It should be noted, however, that those theories that do call for direct action from grassroots feminist activists have the ability to by-pass the anachronistic problems involved in the above process. And as this chapter has already shown, it is precisely those theories that the journalists tend to use the most. However, in general it has been shown that feminist theorists are reconceptualising and extending the theories which have already been accepted by journalists and also, to some extent, society at large. And these theories are, in turn, playing a role in the

construction of society and the construction of popular discourses that serve to challenge the current hegemonic discourses within society.

Throughout this chapter, three of the most interesting and powerful themes that emerged from Part Two have been identified and analysed in more depth. They were chosen primarily because of their close relation to established feminist thought and, thus, for the ways in which existing feminist theories could lead to a greater understanding of these rape-related issues. In turn, with the journalist's ideas juxtaposed against the feminist theories it was possible to highlight the ways in which journalists have adopted feminist ideas and have been instrumental in moving them into current social discourses, thus making them and/or confirming them as widely accepted explanations for mass rape in war and associated issues.

Following the illustrations in Chapter Seven of how certain sections of the British press based some of their explanations for mass rape in war on feminist ideas, the primary aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how feminist scholars have, since the outbreak of the conflict, utilised specific press representations to further their theorising on the issue. Indeed, the following feminist explanations for mass rape in war were written, for the most part, in response to the reports of the mass raping of women in the Balkan conflict as reported through broadsheet newspapers. Thus, as with Chapter Seven, the chapter demonstrates the complex relationship that feminist theorising has with the social world. The feminist explanations for mass rape in war outlined in this chapter are framed around issues that proved to be popular themes for some journalists.

The detailing of these contemporary feminist explanations for mass rape in war is an important step for the thesis if the complex mutual relationships which exists between feminist theorising, the British press, and contemporary social attitudes to mass rape in war are to fully appreciated. In short, press representations have been influenced by feminist theorising, but the development of feminist theorising in turn has been influenced by press representations. This chapter, then, is an attempt to widen our understanding of how feminist scholars, using the press as a primary source of information, began to explain the phenomenon as they read about its development in the press after the start of the break up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.
The feminist explanations for mass rape in the Balkans as outlined below fall into five principal categories. The first suggests that women were simply pawns in a 'war game': that they were consciously used as an integral factor in a strategy of war. This, accompanied by suggestions of 'ethnic cleansing', was a key issue for the journalists who were searching for reasons for the rapes. The second category cites nationalism as the primary cause and again, as highlighted in Part Two, this is one causal factor that many journalists wholeheartedly endorsed. The third section follows up suggestions that women have been raped because of their identity as women and the symbolic values that that role entails. On one level this explanation appears obvious, however, as the journalists' views differed concerning the primary female identity under threat in Part Two, so the feminists' explanations vary as to which identity is at the heart of the rapist's motivation: religious, national and ethnic identity are all argued for, as well as the rape victim's identity as simply a woman.

The final category is 'misogyny', and looks at both the 'peacetime' social construction of men's attitudes to women and also investigates some feminist ideas regarding the military training that young male recruits receive. For example, it is suggested that the military as a training institution actively promotes the objectifying and abuse of women, which during wartime results in violence against women. This notion was referred to by journalists, although it should be noted that those journalists who did discuss misogyny were self-confessed feminists themselves, such as Linda Grant and Catherine Bennett. Linked to the debates surrounding misogyny are also those explanations which, while finding some supporters in the press, are generally disregarded by most contemporary feminist scholars, due to their reliance on theories of biology. Yet as some feminist theorists have addressed these issues - if only to point out the weaknesses in the arguments - they will also be discussed briefly in this chapter.

Mass Rape in the Balkan Conflict

As was suggested in Chapter Two, rape appears to have occurred in almost every documented war, and the 'standard' arguments used to explain rape in war or in 'peacetime' are theories based on the inevitability of actions and/or that rape is merely an unavoidable and peripheral by-product of war. However, following journalists' reports and subsequent EC and NGO investigations into the incidence of the mass raping of women during the war in the former Yugoslavia, many feminists have concluded that these rapes, rather than being part of 'normal' wartime practice, were in fact a basic component in the modus operandi called 'ethnic cleansing', 4 that is, the pre-meditated expulsion and destruction of a nation. As a Belgrade journalist described it, following his trip into a Serb occupied area:

There is no such thing as coexistence, there are no Muslims and Croats, it is entirely a matter of indifference whether they move away voluntarily or under force, or whether they are killed in the cleansing actions. There is no pathos. There is no mercy. 5

While within mainstream political science most issues surrounding 'ethnic cleansing' have been widely discussed, rape, for the most part, has not. This is possibly because rape has traditionally been viewed as a woman's issue and therefore generally not regarded as suitable material for 'scientific' research. 6 However, it could also be due to the difficulty in substantiating claims of rape, which brings into question the credibility of the statistics themselves, and in turn the scale of human rights abuses against women in general. 7 Also affecting the credibility of rape statistics during wartime - the numbers of reported rapes in the Balkan conflict ranges from 10,000 to 70,000 8 - is the use of these statistics for propaganda purposes. 9 Moreover, while

studies have concluded that rape in peacetime is generally under-reported\textsuperscript{10}, due to specific circumstances during wartime, such as fear for the safety of family, increased emotional pain and social stigma, and lack of societal support systems, and so on, the chances of disclosure of rape during wartime are even slimmer.

Furthermore, an argument could be made which suggests that the gathering of data on rape in war could actually be detrimental to the victim’s recovery. For example, even the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has confirmed their opposition to the compilation of rape statistics because, as spokesperson Irina Petrovic claimed, the profundity of the interview needed to verify the allegation would further traumatised the victim.\textsuperscript{11} In July 1995, one UNHCR spokesperson stated that, [i]f one day someone did collect official statistics, you could be accused of misinterpreting the reality and of being irresponsible if you could not provide evidence for your claims\textsuperscript{12}. However, if one moves away from political/social science analysis, and looks to wider sources for verification of rape statistics in the Balkan war, one can find some convincing theories. A medical team, sent by the United Nations (UN) to the former Yugoslavia in January 1993 to investigate press reports of widespread rape, collected data on abortions, deliveries, known pregnancies due to rape, and sexually transmitted diseases. The methodology was as follows:

The team identified 119 pregnancies that resulted from rape in a small sample of six hospitals in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. According to estimates established in medical studies, a single act of unprotected intercourse will result in pregnancy between 1% and 4% of the time. Based on the assumption that 1% of acts of unprotected intercourse result in pregnancy, the identification of 119 pregnancies, therefore, represents some 11,900 rapes.\textsuperscript{13}

However, there are still problems even with this ‘scientific’ methods of verification, as the team suggested, these figures have to be interpreted carefully:

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.
Under-reporting, along with the reluctance of many physicians to ask women seeking abortions or prenatal care whether they had been raped during the war, would lead to an under-estimate of the number of women raped. On the other hand, multiple and repeated rapes of the same women were frequently reported and could lead to an over-estimate of the number of women (as opposed to the number of incidents of rape) involved.14

However, at some level the exact number of women raped is immaterial. If the number of raped women was 10,000 or 70,000 it would certainly make a difference to the 60,000 extra rape victims, but the significance of the event as an abuse of women's human rights through male sexual violence and aggression would not be altered.

**War Games**

Arguably, until the Balkan conflict, rape had generally been accepted as a natural, if abhorred, side effect of wartime activities. Again, we can refer back to the almost throw-away line of General George Patton in 1947, saying that during any war there would 'unquestionably' be raping because 'men are men'.15 While no journalist in Part Two openly endorsed General Patton's view, nevertheless, many were not unduly shocked at the occurrence of rape in war, but simply the scale on which it appeared to have been orchestrated.16 Therefore, is rape in war just another part of the established doctrine of the 'game' called 'war'? Perhaps it is simply another strategy, another scheme, another 'war-game', which can be called into play by the warring parties to assist them in achieving their objectives. Although, most recognised 'rules' of war, for example, who the identifiable enemy is, the demarcation of territory, and so on, are generally openly discussed and negotiated.17 However, feminist Carolyn Nordstrom, writing in response to media reports, argues that despite all manner of war negotiations 'dirty war' practices - for example, the use of rape in the Balkans - are still commonplace. Moreover, she claims that the use of rape and sexual violence

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14 ibid.
against women is a strategic tactic of dirty warfare that is condoned by those imbued in the 'culture of militarism'. By way of explanation, Nordstrom states that:

Despite the existence of some 70,000 treaties ensuring that 'just war' practices and human rights are respected, dirty war tactics - those that use terror against both civilian and military populations to try to control political acquiescence through fear - are a major form of warfare today. Sexual violence is a mainstay of dirty war practice.\(^{18}\)

Using Nordstrom’s notion of 'dirty war practices', mass rape in war appears to be defined as one weapon in the armoury of those military commanders, governments, or political elites who practice dirty war tactics.\(^{19}\) These suggestions of 'rape as a weapon' have, of course, been explored further in Chapter Seven.

In the Balkan conflict the primary objectives of the forces of the main contenders was the defence of their own people and the displacement of other ethnic communities by whatever means possible, to make way for ethnically homogeneous areas. They had various strategic means at their disposal, some 'dirty' tactics, some SOP (Standard Operating Procedures). For example, they used the following means: murder of civilians, mass executions, detention camps, deportations, torture, and, of course, rape. If one looks more closely at the 'dirty' option of rape one can see that (initially) rape is cheap, as it does not take fuel or ammunition. Rape is effective, as it affects not only the victim, but the victim's family and community too.\(^{20}\) Moreover, rape in inherently unforgivable. It has been suggested that no woman has ever forgiven the man that has raped her and no man has ever forgiven the man who has raped his wife or daughter or mother.\(^{21}\) Rape, in some sense, ensures the continuation of tensions, hatreds, and thus conflict. Because of these strategic 'advantages', gained through the use of 'dirty war tactics', Alexandra Stiglmayer, motivated to write in response to the press reports,\(^{22}\) has stated that rape 'cannot be seen as incidental to the main purpose of

\(^{21}\)Ibid.
the aggression but as serving a strategic purpose in itself. Mary Kaldor is one who sees rape as one of the defining ‘war games’ of violent conflict in the contemporary era.

Betty Reardon, writing in her monograph Sexism and the War System, also concludes that one of the main objectives in using rape in war is as a ‘conscious tactic of warfare’. Reardon also states that rape ‘is the ultimate metaphor for the war system, wherein violence is the final arbiter of social relations and force is the mortar holding together the structure of the public order.’ Perhaps, rather than a part of the established ‘game’, rape in war is just one strategic option which can be utilised for military or political gain when other strategic methods have failed, prove too costly, or are too slow in achieving the desired effect.

Picking up on the point suggested by Reardon and by certain journalists in Part Two - that rape in war is ‘a conscious tactic of warfare’ - Cheryl Benard has written a comparison between the mass raping of women during the First World War and the occurrence of mass rape in the Balkan conflict. She has concluded that there is documentary evidence to suggest that the Germans ‘conducted a campaign of terror during the early phase of that war, including a policy of mass rape...these rapes were quantitatively and qualitatively different from ‘normal’ wartime rapes and that they were a conscious part of military strategy’. Catharine MacKinnon also seems to take a similar standpoint, arguing that there is a qualitative difference between ‘genocidal’ rape and ‘everyday’ rape. For example, MacKinnon argues:

‘Genocidal’ means for the destruction of an entire people. On another level, women are people. And rape is always about our destruction. This is and is not like everyday rape - in the same way that the Holocaust is and is not like everyday anti-

22ibid., p. 85
Semitism...you can't act like it's business as usual only a little bit worse.28

What Benard and MacKinnon are suggesting here is that there are two different forms of wartime rape, the mass raping of women which has been implemented as a strategic military or political policy and individual instances of rape where the motive has been particular to individual soldiers. This point will be discussed further in Chapter Nine, however, while it is easy to differentiate between the two categories in terms of numbers of women affected and as such claim that the first category is therefore the 'greater' atrocity, I would suggest that categorisation for 'ranking' purposes is not helpful. Yet, while on one level I can sympathise with their view, the systematic use of rape as a strategy of war aimed at the total destruction of a society is as reprehensible as any other genocidal war crime. However, to compare 10,000 (for example) wartime rapes with 10,000 'peacetime' rapes and to suggest that one is worse than the other is to create a hierarchy of rape which, for the rape victims themselves, would no doubt seem abhorrent. Whether the rapes occurred during war or during 'peacetime' there is no way of knowing just how different or how similar the experiences of the rape victims were; even interviews would be inconclusive as no-one relates their experiences in the same way.

Certainly being held by the military for months in a 'rape camp' and repeatedly raped and terrorised does not appear to equate to a single rape experience, nevertheless, many 'peacetime' rapes and other sexual abuses do occur over long periods; for example, children suffering abuse long-term or women trapped within a violent relationship. Moreover, one could also argue that when women testify to having been raped in war they are, perhaps, more likely to be believed, because their status as 'enemy' is recognisable within the context of war, and because on some level rape in war is regarded as a product of exceptional circumstances. Yet, when women testify to having been raped in 'peacetime', they are more often disbelieved largely because the ubiquitous 'war against women' is denied. Nevertheless, the fact remains that rape is a human rights abuse wherever, and to whomever, it occurs.29

There has been a similar controversy within the feminist debates on explanations for rape and this time it has focussed on whether 'ethnic' rape - the raping of a women by a man from a different ethnic grouping - should carry a harsher punishment and is, therefore, regarded as a more heinous crime. Cited in an article by Silva Meznaric, I. Sklevicky, a feminist writer from the former-Yugoslavia, has criticised radical feminists for analysing rape in war as purely a political act 'as a means of revenge between conflicting groups of men' without introducing an ethnic component to the analysis. And she continues to assert that '[s]tronger punishment is sought by feminists for 'ethnic' rape than for the ordinary one'. However, the same response that was levelled at Benard and MacKinnon above, could be directed at this argument too, in that it is attempting to rank some rapes as more 'horrific' than others. Indeed, Slavenka Drakulic, a Croatian feminist writer living in Zagreb, has asked the question: 'Could it be possible that political rapes are more offensive to women than an 'ordinary' rape - after all, for a woman being raped the fact that the rapist is a Serb, an Albanian, a Croat or a Bosnian makes no difference'?

We can, of course, only speculate on the answer to this question, however, in defence of Sklevicky's argument, one Belgrade feminist, Lepa Mladjenovic, has stated that 'in Serbia...violent sex underlines the social organisation; passion is based on violence that women have to suffer'. She cites a research study conducted by a feminist group in Belgrade in 1988 and summing up the findings she notes that '35 percent of women explicitly talked about being forced to make love against their will and asked if they had ever been hit by a man, only 17 percent of the interviewees answered negatively'. Her point being that sexual violence and rape from men within their own ethnic grouping is just one form of violence that the majority of women within that particular society have to bear in order to survive, therefore, being raped by a man from another ethnic group is, from their perspective, judged as 'worse'.

31Ibid., p. 87.
32Ibid.
33Ibid.
There is just one more point which I would like to make regarding the Benard and MacKinnon proposal, and that is to take issue with the implication, although not necessarily intended, that by distinguishing qualitatively between 'genocidal' and 'everyday' rape, the latter is 'normalised' and therefore made less significant than wartime rapes, which could possibly have the effect of helping to culturally legitimise 'peacetime' rape. And as general cultural dynamics inform both everyday and wartime practices, the final message to Western society as a whole could be that rape, however subtly legitimised, is acceptable in war too. However, to return to Benard and MacKinnon's suggestion of categorising the rapes, perhaps the differentiation of the two groups might prove useful in a theoretical context when searching for explanations for the occurrence of rape in war per se.

The suggestion that the rapes in the Balkan conflict occurred due to a military and political strategy which ordered the soldiers to rape, an explanation suggested by some journalists, stemmed in part from the fact that many Muslim, Croat and Serbian women were raped by men who had previously been friends and neighbours and from whom the women could not imagine such brutality. The soldiers, according to this theory, had to have been under orders. To give limited support to this view, Claudia Card has suggested that the strategic theory has become convincing because it is an easier level at which to develop explanations. Illustrating this idea Card makes the following statement:

At the level of the motivations of the individual rapist soldiers, it can be difficult to see patterns. It is at the level of strategy - of order-giving, hate-mongering, rewarding and penalising, and, equally important, of refusing to investigate and penalise on the part of military authorities - that coherent strategic patterns emerge.

Cheryl Benard, in agreement with this view, has also commented that many journalists and other observers believe that the raping of women, and particularly Muslim women, was ordered by the Serb leadership because investigations could discover no attempts by those in positions of power, either military or political, to

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35 Alexandra Stiglmayer (1994), p. 120.
stop the rapes'. 37 This is just one of the three indications that Benard suggests points to the rapes being permitted, 'if not actually encouraged'. 38 The other two indications are first, that camp commandants were observers and participants in the rapes within detention camps and that appeals to them by the inmates were ignored; and also that soldiers from outside the camps were brought in to sexually abuse the prisoners at will. 39 Secondly, the reports of the victims of rape have stated that those soldiers who did try to stop the rapes did so by appealing to the abusers by using personal, moral, ideological and religious arguments, instead of calling for a superior officer. These officers, according to Card, might have sanctioned such behaviour. 40 Although alternatively, the soldiers may have been reluctant to report a fellow soldier die to the imbued sense of camaraderie through military training.

Rape in war, according to this theory, is a practice defined by the *unwritten* rules of the game of war. Rules, for example, that state that all women are 'fair game': that soldiers who rape enemy women are not reported for it, and that the rapes may be used for propaganda purposes - although anonymity is assured. 41 Any action in accord with these 'rules' serves purposes identifiable independently of the motives or intentions of individual rapists. A soldier may rape because he was ordered, or because he felt like it. But, superior officers, on the other hand, may choose to 'turn a blind eye' because of the strategic purposes such rapes serve; to facilitate 'ethnic cleansing' by increasing the populations incentive to flee; to demoralise the opponent; to destroy the opponent's society; and/or provide his men with R&R. However, until such time that the War Crimes Tribunal produces corresponding evidence, or a change of Serbian regime makes Serbian internal documents available, if they ever existed, then the possible explanation suggested above will remain just that - one unverifiable theory of rape in war.

38 ibid., p. 33.
39 ibid.
40 ibid.
Although this 'strategy' theory is no doubt useful in illuminating certain aspects of rape in war, an exclusively tactical interpretation of rape in war is insufficient. Atrocities and mass rape are not necessarily essential to the outcome of a war and the question must therefore be asked why rape is used in war to achieve these strategic purposes. Many other forms of terrorism or torture can achieve similar ends. To view rape in war as a pragmatic, functional instrument may be to exaggerate its rational component. And while many of the above points indicate that for a military strategy, allowing or even encouraging large-scale rape can be an effective instrument of political or military policy, this does not solely explain the behaviour of the participants.

Nationalism

Nationalism in the Balkans can be seen as a major factor in the systematic subordination of women and the subsequent rape of women of one patriarchal culture by another, and this was a theme much repeated by the representations in the British press, as noted in Part Two. The relationship between nationalism and women is complex, and not within the scope of the thesis, suffice to say that nationalism prescribes certain gender roles for women which are frequently subordinate and inequitable when compared to those roles nationalism traditionally prescribes for men. These concerns about nationalism are eloquently described in the manifesto of the Young Belgrade Feminists:

Nationalism produces and promotes a set of conservative ideas and values, and threatens basic human rights, especially women's rights. Woman as a public and private being is subordinated to the alleged public interest ... Instead of channelling the social energy released during the process of the social pluralisation into emancipation of men and women ... the role of woman and man is being instrumentalised. At a time of national segregation's, and due to the quick impoverishment of

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the whole society, woman is regarded as 'reproductive machine'.

Within nationalistic patriarchal structures women's traditionally prescribed sexual/gender roles are recognised as integral to the survival of the nation. One illustration of this point comes from a well-known Muslim proverb, which translated, says, 'as our women are, so also is our community'.

Carolyn Nordstrom has also linked rape in war to both a woman's identity as a purveyor of her particular culture and her identity as simply a 'woman', giving them equal weight in any explanation. For example, she has stated that:

Rape, as with all terror-warfare, is not exclusively an attack on the body - it is an attack on the 'body politic'. Its goal is not to maim or kill one person, but to control an entire socio-political process by crippling it. It is an attack directed equally against personal identity and cultural integrity.

It has been noted within feminist academic work that within religious or nationalistic patriarchal social structures, a woman's traditionally proscribed sexual and gender roles are recognised as integral to the survival of the culture and/or nation. And as mentioned in the discussion of Bangladesh in Chapter Two, in a patriarchally-defined nation women are particularly important to the national cause. For example, the specific roles that are assigned to women - reproducers of the race, preservers of culture, and so on - women have come to symbolise family, ethnic and national honour. This role, though, also carries with it a certain liability, as a woman's role is so central to the nationalistic cause, they could be singled out for attack by another nation with similar values. Ruth Seifert, in support of this possible explanation, suggests that 'as tactical objectives, women [are] of special importance. If the aim is to destroy a culture, they are prime targets because of their cultural position and their importance in the family structure'.

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the opposition's army, but rather to destroy the opposition's culture and one of the most effective ways of achieving this aim is to target women.\(^{48}\)

The breakdown of the family structure, as one consequence of an organised rape attack on women during wartime, is one explanation expanded on by Michael Sells. Writing in his book *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* he comments that in some societies 'women who have been raped are often unable to find a husband and have a family. Patriarchal traditions of shame and honour make it difficult - and in some cases, impossible - for women who have been raped to be accepted as wives and mothers.'\(^{49}\) This is an issue which was also discussed at length in Chapter Four and one that some journalists suggested formed an integral part of their explanations for the mass raping of women in the Balkan conflict.\(^{50}\)

Sells continues his explanation for rape in war by claiming that it is impossible to fully understand the implications of the attacks on women due to their religious and cultural identity without analysing the 'underlying religious mythology'.\(^{51}\) He suggests that in wars in which one or more of the belligerents adhere to a strong patriarchally-based religious culture, the raping of women becomes a form of desecration, which he claims is closely related to the desecration of the sacred spaces symbolised by mosques.\(^{52}\) This is an interesting explanation for furthering our understanding of rape in war in particular religious-based cultures, but when one transcends specific cultures and locations one has to ask why, given the cultural differences among countries, has the raping of predominantly women been such a common human rights abuse - although only recently described as one - in almost every war documented, in every area of the world and through every time period?

In traditional cultures, where women have come to symbolise the honour of the nation,\(^{53}\) this role has also served to guarantee women's vulnerability in times of war,


\(^{52}\)Ibid.

particularly when the 'enemy' is another strongly patriarchally-defined nation. Amnesty International's investigations into the reports of mass rape in the Balkans, detail many cases of rape and confirm this view: claiming that in almost all investigated cases of rape 'the victims are of different nationality from the perpetrator, that is, women have been singled out for humiliation on account of their nationality'. They also state that in many investigated cases of rape, the rapes are 'apparently part of an inclusive pattern of war conduct characterised by massive intimidation and infringements against Muslims and Croats'. This 'nationalistic' explanation for the rapes has been championed by a large section of the British press (as detailed in Part Two). It is interesting to note how these ideas dovetail with feminist work on patriarchy and are expanded by feminist writers to incorporate the experiences of women in the Balkans.

In Balkan Muslim culture, as it was in Bangladesh in the 1970s, rape is arguably one of the worse forms of humiliation and ignominy that could happen to a woman of any age and any position. If unmarried, the victim would probably never marry, and she would be ostracised from her community. If married, her husband would probably reject her, thus destroying the family unit. As Azra Zalihic-Kaurin has stated, in response to Roy Gutman's reports of raped Muslim women, 'there is no greater shame'. Rape results in a dishonour so profound that women frequently prefer death, at least then she regains some esteem, as a martyr for her family's honour. Zalihic-Kaurin tells the story of a Muslim woman called Emina facing rape from invading soldiers:

Emina took up a gun to defend her village against the loyalist Serbian Chetniks but was not able to hold them back. When she fell into their hands she begged one of the Chetniks, "Only leave me my honour; I will forgive you my death." Emina is taken to be a model Muslim woman; her honour and dignity were worth more to her than her life. She forgives the Chetniks for her murder so that she will not be raped, humiliated, and defiled.

55 Ibid.
This passage could, of course, be regarded as an attempt at nationalist propaganda. However, if taken at face value, one could argue that it demonstrates that rape, when used as a 'genocidal'59 weapon of war (i.e. destroying the very foundation of the community and the nation) can be more effective than killing, particularly when used against such nationalistic patriarchal cultures. Rape, particularly in these traditional Muslim cultures, violates and mutilates, not only the individual women, but also the community as a whole, to the extent that its very survival is put in doubt. Killing, could, of course, fulfil this role too, however, rape does not leave bodies to dispose of, an important consideration when one is acting under the gaze of the international community at large. Moreover, under international legislation 'genocidal rape' would be far more difficult to prove than 'genocide' at a War Crimes Tribunal. It is interesting to note that while the notion of 'rape as a weapon' is a 'classic feminist theme, the idea of 'genocidal rape' in war as an explanation for the mass raping of women in the Balkans is one that has been widely used in the press and consequently developed further by feminist scholars. As already mentioned, this notion of 'genocidal rape' will be dealt with further in Chapter Nine.

It is also interesting to note that of greater importance within the cultural structure outlined above, and therefore more damaged through rape, is not the honour of the woman (the rape victim), but the honour of the man (the husband, father, brother, uncle, and so on). Roy Gutman alleges that this divisive effect on the Muslim communities was precisely the aim of the Serbian government when they sanctioned the use of rape against Bosnian Muslim women. For example, he states:

Women of childbearing age were the primary targets. In the conservative society in which the Muslims of rural Bosnia grew up, women traditionally remain chaste until marriage. Rape is a trauma with far-reaching consequences for these victims, who have well-founded fears of rejection and ostracism and of lives without marriage or children. In this regard the pattern of rape of unmarried women of childbearing age fulfil another

59The question of whether the rapes can be regarded as 'genocidal' is discussed at length in Chapter Nine. Also, an interesting debate concerning the merits and problems in referring to the rapes in the former Yugoslavia as 'genocidal' can be found in Rhonda Copelon, "Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualising Crimes against Women in Time of War," in Stiglmayer (1994), pp. 197-218.
The question of whether or not the rapes in the former Yugoslavia, particularly of the Serbs against Muslim women, were part of a direct policy of 'genocide', or 'ethnic cleansing', through 'impregnation' remains a contested area. And until such time as evidence becomes available, investigators will have to rely on mostly uncorroborated evidence. At present, the only evidence consists of a apparently leaked Serb government memo which was allegedly circulated among the 'Bosnian Serb military brass' and 'pointing out the tactical benefits of rape'. The newspaper Delo, quoted the memo as saying: 'Analysis of the Muslims' behaviour showed that their morale, desire for battle, and will could be crushed more easily by raping women, especially minors, and even children'. Again, it should be reiterated that these are only allegations and remain uncorroborated by any documentary evidence.

The US Human Rights organisation Helsinki Watch, however, has also claimed that following their investigations into the media reports of rapes on a massive scale in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they were convinced that 'mass rape in war' was used as a 'weapon of war', as was discussed at length in Chapter Seven. Helsinki Watch has stated that:

> Whether a woman is raped by soldiers in her home or is held in a house with other women and raped over and over again, she is raped with a political purpose - to intimidate, humiliate, and degrade her and others affected by her suffering. The effect of rape is often to ensure that women and their families will flee and never return.

Not only has Helsinki Watch been convinced of the use of rape as a tool in a nationalist agenda, but the UN has come to a similar conclusion - but with the added suggestion of 'enforced impregnation'. They have stated categorically that there is also evidence of women being held in Serb detention camps or 'rape camps' until they are sufficiently pregnant that an 'abortion' is not a viable option. Writing on the

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use of rape, nationalism and the Balkan conflict, Michael Jordan, cited a United Nations report which states that:

During [Serb] troop advances in different regions of Bosnia - where the communication lines were such that rumours of atrocities could not travel easily - near-identical patterns of rape emerged: villagers were rounded up and younger women collected and placed in separate detention facilities where captors had unlimited access to them. Rape, the theory goes, in full view of family members, neighbours, or other detainees, would be so traumatic and humiliating that victims would never again return to their towns and villages.\(^64\)

An alternative theory, however, would be that rape is inefficient genocide and does not guarantee flight or the elimination of the 'problem'; unlike, say, murder.\(^65\)

Moreover, the use of rape, arguably more so than murder, builds up hostilities for the future making it a dubious strategy. It is also interesting to note that in Serbian culture, children automatically take on the nationality of their father, no matter what the ethnicity of the mother. Therefore, all the babies born of Serbian rapes would be regarded as having 'pure' Serbian nationality.\(^66\) Many Serb soldiers, while committing acts of rape, have told the women that they would bear Chetniks who eventually kill their Muslim/Croat families. On one level, this might seem pointless given the consequential lack of parenting from the Serb father. However, the primary motivation for this policy is not the raising of a new generation of Serbs, but it is the disruption and disintegration of the family and the community\(^67\) which ensues when they are left having to deal with children who have the 'enemy's birthright'. The following quotation is typical of many reports from women who have been held captive by Serbian\(^68\) forces and threatened with Serb impregnation:

Serb soldiers beat us and tore our clothes off...They pushed us on the floor. Two of the men held me down while two others raped me. I shouted at them and tried to fight back but it was no

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\(^66\) For further discussion of this point see Catharine Mackinnon, "Rape, Genocide and Women's Human Rights," in Stiglmayer (1994), pp. 183-196.
\(^68\) Evidence of the raping of Muslim and Croat women is overwhelmingly in the majority of reports, however, Alexander Stiglmayer has also documented cases of Serbian women being raped. See Stiglmayer (1994), pp. 137-144.
use. As they raped me they said they'd make sure I gave birth to a Serbian baby, and they kept repeating that during the rest of the time that they kept me there.  

Yet, as Roy Gutman points out, so many of the reported rapes are of women who are incapable of bearing children; women over sixty years of age, or young girls who have not yet reached puberty having been raped. In fact, although the majority of victims have been aged between 13 and 35, there have been reported cases of girls as young as 5 years old and women over 80 years old being subject to vicious rapes. Therefore, the 'impregnation thesis', while possibly one causal factor, does not adequately explain every case of rape.

There are clear national and political implications to mass rape in war that revolve around manipulations of national honour, racial purity, and national integrity. These factors could be seen to ensure, first, the effectiveness of rape when used as a widespread 'weapon of war'; and second, that women are identified as the crucial group at the centre of nationalist warfare. Above, are attempts to highlight the possibility of there being a premeditated strategy behind the policy of mass rape in war in the Balkans, as was frequently suggested in the journalists' reports. However, if that proves to be the case, then an integral part of that strategy would be targeting specific people: they would be targets primarily because of their identity.

Identity

While the issue of 'identity' has been a central topic for feminist writers for decades, the press have also utilised this theme as an explanation for the occurrence of mass rape in the Balkan conflict. For example, Susan Brownmiller commented on a news report in the following manner:

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"This is all about identity," the television newscaster said earnestly, attempting to shed some light on the murderous ethnic rage that has torn apart the former Yugoslavia. Perhaps the newscaster should have amended his analysis to say male identity.74

Brownmiller makes an interesting point, as placing women within the nationalistic framework mentioned in the previous section, rape in war could be regarded as the ultimate symbolic expression of the humiliation of the enemy; not primarily, as already stated, of the woman, but of the man. Following the rape of women in war, the 'menfolk' of those women, have had their masculinity brought into question because of their inability to adequately protect 'their' woman. Thus, the myth of 'man' as 'protector' is shattered. Ruth Seifert supports this argument, stating that in wartime, the rape of a woman carries a certain message with it:

It communicates from man to man, so to speak, that the men around the women in question are not able to protect 'their' women. They are thus wounded in their masculinity and marked as incompetent...many men regard their masculinity as compromised by the abuse of 'their' women.75

Note again, however, that at the core of this explanation is not the suffering and humiliation of women, but the consequences of the outcome for men. Indeed, it would be useful at this juncture to recall that the word 'rape' is derived from the Latin rapere: to steal.76 Although, one could argue that rather than the property of the man that is stolen, there is also a part of the woman that is stolen - her bodily integrity (at the very least).

Looking briefly at this notion of 'woman as property', it is a theory that deals with rape in war as a matter of the victor taking what he believes to be rightly his - the property of the conquered. While some journalists have highlighted this issue as a probable reason for the rapes,77 possibly due to the commonly portrayed images of traditional Balkan society, few feminists seem to accept that this explanation alone can account for rape in war, at least in the present day. 'Rape and pillage' has been a

77Michael Evans and Joel Brand, "Serbian heavy guns hit British base in central Bosnia," The Times, 9 January 1993, p. 11.
familiar concept since the earliest history of territorial conquest and stems from the notion that a victorious army needs and deserves a period of excess in which they are entitled to the 'spoils of war'. And one example of this is the taking of the property of the defeated enemy. But, in more recent times, the actual property value of women—as slaves or trophies—has been replaced with a subtler system of values. Triumph over a woman by rape has perhaps become a way to measure victory, as part of a soldier's proof of masculinity and success, and a tangible reward for services rendered. Originating in the days when women were literally regarded as a man's property, access to a woman's body still appears to be considered one actual reward of war. Susan Brownmiller, in writing about rape and women as property, has made the following suggestion:

Like assault, rape is an act of physical damage to another person, and like robbery it is also an act of acquiring property: the intent is to 'have' the female body in the acquisitory meaning of the term. A woman is perceived by the rapist as both hated person and desired property. Hostility against her and possession of her may be simultaneous motivations, and the hatred for her is expressed in the same act that is the attempt to 'take' her against her will. In one violent crime, rape is an act against person and property.\(^7\)

This explanation for rape in war, while implying that it is an in-built part of a soldier's mind-set to 'take' women of the defeated side as property and could possibly explain victorious soldiers raping en masse, nevertheless, does not imply that there is any behind-the-scenes sophisticated political motivations for the rapes; none, that is, beyond a general disregard for the bodily integrity of women.

Zorica SpoIjar, a volunteer working with the Kareta feminist organisation visiting refugees from the Balkan conflict, has also commented on rape in war and its link to women as property. However, contrary to Brownmiller's explanation, SpoIjar implies that in the Balkans a woman is still regarded as having some property value and this fact alone accounts for why women have been raped in this particular conflict. For example, she has stated that

\[\text{men rape during war because it is considered an act of the victors. In traditional societies, like those in the occupied areas}\]

\(^7\)Brownmiller (1975), p. 185.
of Bosnia], women have always been considered property, so violating them is a way for the winners to show who now controls that property.79

Slavenka Drakulic, on the other hand, believes that the link between women and property is just one in a number of complex motivations for rape in war. She comments that [w]omen have been raped in every war - as retaliation, as damage to another man's property, as a message to the enemy. Rape is an efficient weapon for demoralisation and humiliation'.80 The general response from feminists, on the issue of 'women as property' as an explanation for rape in war, is that this explanation, based as it is on ancient notions of the woman being owned by father, husband, master, and so on, does not necessarily offer a complete and satisfactory explanation for the incidence of mass rape in war. 

As well as women having their identity altered during war, Brownmiller has also commented on how during wartime some men voluntarily shift their identity - from civilians to soldiers - as suggested in the newspaper reports of Borislav Herak in Chapter Four.81 For women, however, and in particular those who have become victims of rape in war, they 'have been thrust against their will into another identity',82 from mothers, wives, daughters, into enemy property, to be seized, used, defiled and destroyed. Cynthia Enloe83 and other feminist theorists,84 have argued that the accompanying 'macho' behaviour when some men, through military training, change their identity to soldiers is symptomatic of the wider socially constructed expected behavioural patterns surrounding militarisation. Modernity, it is argued, through its modern technology (i.e. 'clean' bombs) has sanitised war to such an extent that soldiers are constructed into a single, autonomous body, devoid of 'real' emotion and clinically detached. They are then transported from the cold disconnected world of

modern military training into the pre/post-modern war of hand-to-hand and street-to-
street fighting. The argument then follows that these soldiers with their 'dehumanised'
mentality also regard women as dehumanised. Thus, the conditions are such that these
soldiers can use rape and sexual violence for their own ends, without regard, or even
the conscious realisation that the women they are violating are human. To the
soldiers they are dehumanised. As for the soldiers, it could be argued that they
resemble something akin to a biological weapon. This argument will be discussed at
length in Chapter Nine.

Linking the notion of identity and the issue of 'man as protector', as mentioned above,
and the dehumanising of the rape victim, Claudia Card has commented on how this
results in a position of extreme vulnerability for women. Writing in the feminist
journal Hypatia, Card suggests that women could be subject to 'martial rape' (her term
for wartime rape) first, because they are women, and second, because the men simply
wish to dominate the women. In explaining her standpoint she makes the following
point:

Martial rape...breaks the spirit, humiliates, tames, produces a
docile, deferential, obedient soul. Its immediate message to
women and girls is that we will have in our own bodies only the
control that we are granted by men and thereby in general only
that control in our environments that we are granted by men...If
there is a fundamental function of rape, civilian or martial, it is
to display, communicate, and produce or maintain dominance,
which is both enjoyed for its own sake and used for such
ulterior ends as exploitation, expulsion, dispersion, murder. Acts
of forcible rape, like other instances of torture, communicate
dominance by removing our control over what enters or
impinges on our bodies.

In this form, Card's explanation for rape in war equates the taming or dehumanisation
of rape victims to dominance and control, as was suggested by Malamuth, Burkhart
and Fromoth in Chapter One. Diana Scully and Joseph Marolla, following a lengthy
research project, also adhere to this view, stating that the rapist's aim is to gain
'control over the only source of power historically associated with women, their

bodies. In the final analysis, dominance was the objective of most rapists, the intent being to break down all political will and resistance. This dehumanisation is not always employed to end life, but to end the 'humanness' of the rape victims, to sever person from personhood and individual from identity. Once dehumanised, the rape victims - indeed, possibly the whole population - can then be controlled like domesticated animals.

Card goes on to state that not only do these rapes aim to dominate women because they are women, but in doing so they also aim to dominate the women's men, their traditional protectors. This appears to have some kind of symbolic cross-cultural meaning of dominance, not only dominance of women, but perhaps more importantly in wartime, of the men who are presumed to be their protectors: albeit generally regarded in most feminist circles that the 'man as protector' is an out of date 'myth' which is often mobilised in times of war to keep women in their place 'at home' (this is not to say, of course, that this 'myth' is not a social reality for some). Rape symbolises who is dominant by forcibly removing the most basic of controls, control over one's body. And in a society governed by the rules of patriarchy, the message to the presumed male protectors of women's bodies is that they have failed.

This could be considered the final symbolic expression of the humiliation of the male opponent and thus have far-reaching consequences for the future identities of both the rape survivors and their 'male protectors'. Rape, therefore, in a patriarchal culture has the potential to disrupt family relationships and to carry the reminder of the perpetrator's dominance into future generations. Seifert again cites an example of this explanation, stating that 'this communicative function from man to man is clearly evident when buses filled with women in their sixth, seventh, or later month of pregnancy are sent back over enemy lines, usually with cynical inscriptions in the vehicles regarding the children about to be born'. Episodes such as this could, of

course, distract the absent men who are away fighting with feelings of guilt for having abandoned their wives and children to the mercy of the enemy. However, reports of rapes and other atrocities could arguably have the opposite effect, giving the soldiers on the victimised side an added motive for revenge.

Although women have been the central focus of this analysis, they are not the only targets of rape and sexual violence. All groups which are seen as having a particular 'emotional value' - and this could include children, elderly people, the sick, the disabled, or prisoners of war - represent a collective vulnerability and are therefore could be specifically targeted for their symbolic value. But it does appear that women have been predominantly singled out, possibly because of what they represent in terms of their religious, cultural or nationalistic standing, because of their place in a patriarchal society, and because they are supposed to call forth an emotional, protective response among their male defenders. Thus, women appear to make extremely effective targets in war.

Misogyny

As with the other motives or possible explanations for 'mass rape in war', the rapes remain an act of extreme violence, mostly by men, against women. And according to Ruth Seifert, an assistant professor at the German Federal Army's Institute for Social Science, mass rape in war 'would not be possible without hostility toward women ...[and]... the dimension of rape and hatred toward women is crucial to explaining specific acts of sexual violence'. Certain journalists, as noted in Part Two, have commented on the possibility that misogyny has played a role in the mass raping of women in the Balkans. In particular, Seifert mentions acts of sexual violence which appear to have an element of ritualistic, or at least sadistic, misogyny in them, for example, the severing of women's breasts or cutting open of their wombs following

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rape. This murder by mutilation echoes the experiences of women raped and murdered by American GIs during the Vietnam War as discussed in Chapter Two.\textsuperscript{93}

An important question to be considered here, and linked to the above section, is whether this male violence which is manifest in the raping of women in war is grounded in an innate culturally-rooted hostility and contempt for women? There are feminist reports from Croatia and Bosnia setting out the almost ritualistic character of the attacks on women’s bodies. For example, Catharine Mackinnon repeats a story told to her by a Bosnian soldier named Haris. Although it should be noted that there is no further reference nor footnote available to verify the ‘truth’ of this story. There are probably atrocities of this nature carried out in most wars, their details are just rarely available so soon after the event, which somehow affects their believability. One wants to disbelieve the events, to dismiss them because people of ‘our’ generation, on ‘our’ continent, with ‘our’ Western values, could not perform such barbaric acts. The incident is as follows:

Haris, hiding in a tree, observed a small concentration camp in Serbian-occupied Croatia in April 1992. It was wholly outdoors, with ‘hungry, tortured people, beaten, bloody.’ He watched a man and a woman - who appeared to be seven or eight months pregnant - being taken to a clearing in the woods. The women was tied vertically to a cross, legs pressed together and arms extended. They ripped her pregnant belly open with a knife. ‘It was alive... it moved.’ The woman took fifteen minutes to die. The man, apparently her husband and father of the baby, was bound to a nearby tree and forced to watch. The attackers attempted to force him to eat the baby’s arm. Then ‘they hacked him up, cut the flesh on him so that he would bleed to death.’ While they were doing this, ‘they were laughing... We’re going to slaughter all of you. This is our Serbia.” Haris is certain it was filmed.\textsuperscript{94}

Whether propaganda or not, this report is not unusual. There are many accounts of soldiers who after raping, ritualistically mutilate and/or kill their victim.\textsuperscript{95} Although in this instance the husband and baby were also victims, some feminists, for example Mackinnon and Brownmiller, argue that this dimension of violence towards women

\textsuperscript{93}See, for example: Susan Brownmiller (1975), pp. 87-119.
\textsuperscript{94}Mackinnon (1994), p. 80.
\textsuperscript{95}For further accounts of atrocities see, Stiglmaier (1994), pp. 82-169; and Mackinnon (1994), pp. 73-81.
cannot be interpreted as anything other than a misogynistic in-depth rage and hatred of women. Brownmiller has even proposed that women in war are raped, not only because they belong to the enemy camp, but because they are women, and therefore the 'enemy'. Yet, in war the enemy is generally well-defined and one can identify explanations for 'why' the enemy is who it is; attacks are anticipated and preparations can be made to defend and/or retaliate. This opportunity has never been afforded women in war. Moreover, 'women' as a group do not generally expect hostility and violence on such a scale purely by virtue of their sex. Women in 'peacetime' are led to believe that a patriarchal society connotes 'fatherly' concern and guardianship and will serve to protect them. Therefore, it is possible that the women in the Balkans did not expect sexual violence on the unprecedented scale which they witnessed simply because they were women: why should they assume that being civilian 'women' makes them the enemy, particularly when UN legislation assures them to the contrary.

Supporting Brownmiller's suggestion, and in response to biological determinist arguments, which are predicated on the theory of a 'natural' and insatiable male sexuality, Ruth Seifert cites a German study of rape which purports to show that rape has little to do with either 'nature' or 'sexuality'. She states:

> Studies show that rape is not an aggressive manifestation of sexuality, but rather a sexual manifestation of aggression. In the perpetrator's psyche it serves no sexual purpose but is the expression of rage, violence, and dominance over a woman. At issue are her degradation, humiliation, and submission.

Therefore, as mentioned above, at the root of this particular search for an explanation for mass rape in war is the question; are women raped, not because they 'belong' to the 'other side', but because they are the objects of a fundamental masculinist contempt

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56 Brownmiller (1975), p. 64.
that is revealed in times of crisis? This argument may appear to be slipping back within the realms of biological determinism, but discussion here is not concerned with 'natural' biological traits, but with socially constructed, learned, behaviour.

The notion of misogyny, which was explored by some journalists in Chapter Five, had already been taken a step further by feminists such as Andrea Dworkin. Taking the radical feminist viewpoint, she has argued that this seemingly profound contempt of women by men is cultivated during peacetime through the use and social acceptance of violent pornography.\textsuperscript{99} The link between certain types of pornography and rape in war will be discussed later in this section, however, supporting this view, and writing in response to the press reports, Rolf Pohl states that '[t]imes of war and crisis are the external conditions that permit those thresholds that inhibit direct sexual violence, fragile and porous from the outset, to subside...[war becomes] an adventure that affirms and acts out unconscious destructive fantasies against women'.\textsuperscript{100} A strong allegation, but one which has supporters in many feminist camps.

Catharine MacKinnon has researched at length this 'legitimate' construction of aggressive sexuality, regarded as 'normal' or 'natural' during 'peacetime'. She has also looked at the \textit{dehumanising} of women through pornography and has attempted to contextualise it within war in an effort to account for the mass raping, the sexual abuse and violence suffered by women in the Balkans. She has compiled eyewitness reports of tanks rolling into Bosnian villages plastered with pornography and she has also heard rape victim's testimonies of how they were held in 'rape camps' and forced at gunpoint to act out positions from pornographic magazines hung on the walls.\textsuperscript{101} In conclusion, Mackinnon states that '[x]enophobia and misogyny merge here; ethnic hatred is sexualised; bigotry becomes orgasm'.\textsuperscript{102}

Again, we return to the issue of military training and its construction of the soldier, as both journalists and feminists have commented on the link between misogyny and the

\textsuperscript{100} Seifert (1994), pp. 65-66.
\textsuperscript{101} Also see, Editorial, "Dispatches from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Young survivors testify to systematic rape," \textit{Ms.}, January/February 1993, pp. 12-13.
\textsuperscript{102} Mackinnon (1994), p. 75.
training given to recruits in military establishments.\textsuperscript{103} Two, four, six, eight. Rape, kill, mutilate.\textsuperscript{104} This popular exercise drill chant in the American army is one example of why feminist research into the military and its training regime may reveal possible explanations for why women are raped in war. Karen Warren and Duane Cady cite other examples of 'marching songs' and claim that woman-hating is deliberately taught at US military institutions, often through the use of such repetitious songs as the one above.\textsuperscript{105} Another example of these marching songs, as cited by Warren and Cady, is as follows:

\begin{quote}
'My girl is a vegetable...my girl ain't got no eyes, just a socket full of flies.' The song continues to boast of 'cutting a woman in two with a chain saw and ramming an ice pick through her ears, then using the pick as a handlebar to ride her like a Harley motorcycle'.\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}

According to Warren and Cady, marching songs such as this one which sport misogynistic lyrics set 'the stage for the depth and historical reality of this hatred' of women.\textsuperscript{107} Sara Ruddick has also commented on the soldier who goes off to war singing about the 'faggot assholes' he is ready to 'sodomise' and the 'whores' he is ready to rape. Ruddick claims that these songs express attitudes that may be actualised in rape, sexual assault, and torture in war.\textsuperscript{108}

To take a step back, some feminists have often suggested that one of the fundamental reasons why young men consider it attractive to join the armed forces is that military service serves a symbolic function in the rite of passage into manhood; basically it confirms and reinforces their masculinity.\textsuperscript{109} Moreover, it should be noted that many of the biologically-based theories relayed by some journalists in Part Two, although now mostly regarded in feminist circles as theoretical 'myths', are thought to stem from traditional military concerns with reconciling soldiers' presumed insatiable

\begin{footnotes}
\item[106] ibid.
\item[107] ibid.
\end{footnotes}
‘macho’ sex drive with military efficiency. Cynthia Enloe, for example, has researched the origins of the military’s attitude to this issue and suggested that the military were concerned that if left uncontrolled, the soldier’s ‘natural sex drive’ would lead him into a vicious downward spiral of indebtedness, drunkenness, illness and poverty. If men serving the military were allowed to satisfy their sexual needs with greedy, unclean women, so the [military] reformers reasoned, they would continue to undermine the country’s capabilities.¹¹⁰

However, despite changes in recent years, the military is still dependent on those particular notions of masculinity and femininity that pervade Western society. Moreover, the attractiveness, status, and social privilege of the military are also dependent upon those constructions. As Enloe has also observed, military service is frequently seen as a symbolic stage in the confirming and reinforcing of men’s masculinity and inextricably linked to this constructed masculine identity are seemingly ‘God-given’ rights of power, domination, and a certain ‘masculine privilege’.

By inspecting the military a little closer, especially its use of both misogyny and the construction of masculinity and how these issues are related to rape in war, Enloe has also suggested that ‘rape in war is never simply random violence. It is structured by male soldiers’ notions of their masculine privilege’.¹¹¹ Furthermore, she suggests that the construction of the military and the ideal of masculinity that they cultivate could result in an inclination (although not necessarily a predetermination) to rape.

David Marlowe, a military psychiatrist, supporting this feminist standpoint has suggested that the military’s promotion of a collective male military identity results in a superior shared image and one that reinforces the hierarchical gendered discourses prevalent in patriarchal societies. He has stated that the collective male identity - or male bonding - is produced through the shared language of male sexual identity,

resulting in a strong and superior shared image. This construction of military identity appears to reinforce the hierarchical dualisms prevalent in Western society. Take, for example, the gentle, emotional, peaceful, so called 'feminine' characteristics that have traditionally been relegated to the less-valued areas of Western culture. Such feminine traits are regarded as a threat to the carefully constructed masculine, heterosexual world of the military, and thus invoke feelings of fear. Consequently, in war when faced with this particular threat, which the soldier has been socialised into rejecting, do soldiers revert to the masculine solution offered by their military culture, violence - and specifically violence against the feminine, against women?

Along with the power, domination, and masculine privilege that some feminists claim that military service offers comes the implicit rejection of a woman's humanity. This quotation from a Vietnam veteran reiterates this point:

I had a sense of power. A sense of destruction...the power to take life. You had the power to rape a woman and nobody could say nothing to you. That godlike feeling you had was in the field. It was like I was God. I could take a life. I could screw a woman.

This statement is remarkably similar to a quotation used by Sanday in her study of rape, outlined in Chapter One, and clearly illustrates why feminists who are searching for explanations for rape, and rape in war, concentrate on the issues of male power and domination. Sanday quotes a 'peacetime' rapist as commenting that:

It gave me a sense of power, a sense of accomplishing something that I felt I didn't have the ability to get. You see something or somebody that you want, and you know that under normal circumstances you wouldn't be able to attract this person, so you take her.

113 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).
However, what appears to be pertinent here, particularly in the case of incidents of 'gang-rape' as mentioned by some journalists, is the notion of collective action and in particular rape performed as a group with that same group - itself - as the audience. As such, the men within that group continue to act in accordance with the collective, reinforcing their status within the 'masculine-bonded group', or face total rejection. And rape appears to be one of the most violent enforcements of the collective in the Vietnam War narrative, or arguably, in the discourse of all wars. If this male-bonding and the 'collective' is such an integral part of the male identity, even in its most destructive form, then perhaps May and Strikwerda's theories of 'collective responsibility' - as a constructive measure to combat rape (as discussed in Chapter One) - might be feasible.

Cynthia Enloe has offered an interesting insight into one possible explanation for rape in war based on a similar theme to the 'men in groups' theory proposed by May and Strikwerda. This extract from one of Enloe's books, Does Khaki Become You, is rather lengthy, but makes several key points. The passage begins in the following manner:

Rape is obviously not an exclusive preserve of military men. But it may be that there are aspects of the military institution and ideology which greatly increase the pressure on militarised men to 'perform' sexually, whether they have a 'need' or emotional feelings or not. First, military men live more exclusively among other men than do most men (except perhaps prisoners), and thus are subjected 24 hours a day to pressures to conform to the standards of 'masculine' behaviour. Second, military officiandom seeks to make men feel secure within the cocoon of the 'military family', while it simultaneously encourages men as soldiers to see the rest of the world as chaotic, fearsome and needing to be controlled and conquered. Trying to cope with the confusion and dangers of warfare, military men, more than most men, feel the need to have 'buddies'. But to acquire buddies a soldier has to prove he is trustworthy, able to face death and violence while remaining 'cool'. Thus, while a militarised man needs a buddy, a friend to whom he can reveal his fears and vulnerability, he can only earn buddies by proving he is a 'man', that he isn't squeamish in the

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face of violence. Such contradictory pressures can make it especially hard to say 'no' to gang rape.  

This does not mean, of course, that every soldier rapes. But it could possibly mean that the social or military construction of a soldier, or to put it in more theoretical terms, the subjective identity that the military makes available - by over-emphasising already gendered notions of masculinity as being a necessary element of a soldier's make-up - suggests that those soldiers have a greater propensity to act in certain ways rather than others. For, as Enloe has alluded to, confronted with an extremely stressful wartime situation, how anyone reacts depends not only on the specifics of the situation, but also on how that person has been socialised to react.

Jocelynne Scutt in writing about the violence in war has also commented on military training and its impact on the socialisation of soldiers. Consider the following passage that follows on from a poem (retold in full in Chapter Nine) which Scutt has quoted concerning the raping of a young Vietnamese woman by an American soldier. She concludes the poem by asking 'but where did he learn it? Where did the soldier learn to abuse, rape, and kill women? Was it during the war, or at home, in so-called peace?' Linking in with this 'learned misogyny through military training' theme, Scutt suggests the following:

To be trained for war, men learn domination, control, and violence. Or they build on the learning that has already been done through the socialisation in the broader world. To learn to kill, one must learn to despise the killed, to debase them as a group, to downgrade them from human beings to less than human. Violence [against women] is an issue for the military not only on the battle field, but in their own homes.  

Scutt's final words - 'in their own homes' - is an issue which has been the focus of some of Georgina Ashworth's writing, who claims that the effects of the violent socialisation of the soldier are felt not just by 'enemy' women on the battlefield, but are felt by their own wives and partners 'in their own homes'. Ashworth has claimed

\footnote{118}Cynthia Enloe (1988), pp. 35-36.  
\footnote{119}ibid., p. 107.  

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that research from Europe has indicated that men who wear uniforms,\textsuperscript{121} and are thus likely to have been influenced by a culture of masculinised training resulting in a 'shared superior image', are more likely to abuse their 'womenfolk'. And research in both the United States and Canada has also pointed to the fact that 'men in authority' such as men of the law, of the church and in the police force have a 'far higher than average wife-battering rate'.\textsuperscript{122} Furthermore, Ashworth suggests that the socialisation of the armed forces, and those in other uniforms, which often results in sexual abuse and rape is just part of a wider cultural phenomenon of misogyny which is instrumental in the oppression of women. In explaining this phenomenon, which could be named 'patriarchy', Ashworth offers the following evidence:

\begin{quote}
Studies of the police in Britain show that their main 'bonding' mechanism is the verbal denigration of women, meanwhile violent pornography is in the training manuals of the armed forces. If the forces of law and order are taught, or teach themselves, to hate women, what hope is there for a battered wife or a rape victim in the finding of help or justice? What hope, too, when she reaches the courts, where the privilege of masculinity is upheld by men educated by Aristotle and Freud to regard woman as a 'stunted man' and the bearer of men's children, or by Hugh Hefner that women's purpose is to provide pleasure to men? Or by a priesthood which has spent his lifetime searching for quotations in contradictory scriptures to support their own misogyny?\textsuperscript{123}
\end{quote}

While Ashworth's sentiments do not deal exclusively with the issue of rape in war, she nevertheless makes the valid point that the social construction of a soldier's identity is just one of a number of areas within 'peacetime' society where complacent, misogynistic attitudes are tolerated and even encouraged.

Just as feminists such as Dworkin and MacKinnon earlier in this section suggested a link between pornography and rape in war, Georgina Ashworth has suggested that the use of pornography and its role in military training promotes an environment where


\textsuperscript{123}ibid.
these complacent, misogynistic attitudes are condoned: thus potentially playing a role
in the sexual abuse and rape of women in war.\textsuperscript{124} Indeed, Dworkin and MacKinnon
have also searched for causal factors and explanations for rape in war by looking at
gendered structures within society, and they have argued that this inherent misogyny
or contempt of women by men, mentioned above, is cultivated during 'peacetime'
through degrading, abusive, aggressive and socially-accepted pornography which is a
'peacetime' manifestation of men's power over women.\textsuperscript{125} During 'peacetime', then,
this construction of aggressive sexuality is 'normalised', 'naturalised' and subsequently
'legitimised', only to be unleashed during the anarchy or freedom of war as 'an
adventure that affirms and acts out unconscious destructive fantasies against
women'.\textsuperscript{126}

Furthermore, Dworkin, who as well as questioning the use of pornography in forging
a potentially sexually violent collective male identity within the military, has also
challenged the rationality of the construction of 'hyper-masculinity', not only through
intense military training, but through the general construction of boys within Western
society. Talking to a predominantly male 'military' audience, she made the following
assertion:

Because you're turned into little soldier boys from the day that
you are born and everything that you learn, about how to avoid
the humanity of women, becomes part of the militarism of the
country in which you live and the world in which you live.\textsuperscript{127}

Western societies are continually bombarded with 'rape-supportive' symbols. A
significant amount of advertising, films, popular literature, and images from the media
in general, tends to glorify and informally legitimise aggressive sexual violence. And
while there are also social 'counter forces', such as feminist action groups which have
attempted to outlaw violent pornography, and formal legal structures which attempt to
outlaw rape and other sexual abuses, they often appear swamped by this 'rape-
supportive' infrastructure which is constantly giving out signals that sanction these

\textsuperscript{124}ibid.
\textsuperscript{125}Catharine MacKinnon, "Turning Rape into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide," in Alexandra
Stiglmayer (1994), pp. 73-81.
\textsuperscript{126}Rolf Pohl cited in Ruth Seifert (1994), p. 66; also see Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men
acts in everyday life. Carolyn Nordstrom has made a similar point concerning the use of pornography and has attempted to link this issue with rape in war. She makes the following observation:

People who have worked on cultures of militarisation throughout the world have reported that, similar to the United States, militaries use pornography in training and for 'encouraging' their troops. The same literary and media sources that legitimise rape in Western civil society serve a similar purpose for militaries world-wide. And as soldiers, mercenaries, advisers, power-elites, tourists, and a host of others cross international borders to work, war, and 'play', they carry these idea(l)s with them into new contexts. It is by this process that parallels between rape in wartime and 'peacetime' can be drawn.  

This explanation, which takes its primary motivational source as the military and in particular the violence, pornography and rejection of all things feminine which form such an intrinsic part of military training, has proved to be a popular one with feminists from various theoretical stand-points. Despite theoretical differences all the feminists mentioned take the broad view that the military's characteristic denial and suppression of all the gentle, sensitive and traditionally feminine aspects of a soldier's personality, results in a situation where the soldier must constantly display his masculine identity and have it approved by his peers. To reiterate the point made in the last chapter, entrenched in this continual defence of masculinity, it becomes difficult for these men to deal reflectively with any threatening 'feminine' emotions, and as such, in a crisis (war), they resort to the well-rehearsed solution - violence.

As mentioned in Chapter Seven, Sister Mary Soledad Perpinan, working with rape victims in the Philippines has asked: 'Why is it that a military presence has become synonymous with sex and violence? The military system has a way of priming aggression to a high point that unleashes the animal in men. Sexual rampage is the by-product. It happens everywhere'. Perpinan was commenting, in particular, on her

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experiences in the Philippines, but the sentiment could be equally relevant to the Balkan conflict, or indeed any experience of mass rape in war.\textsuperscript{130}

For feminists and journalists alike (and, indeed, those journalists who were also feminists), trying to identify specific explanations for the mass raping of women in the Balkan war, was a task fraught with theoretical and empirical difficulties. However, Alexander Stiglmayer, has attempted to summarise what she considers to be a comprehensive list that incorporates both press and feminist ideas, and both empirical and theoretical explanations for rape in war. Moreover, it attempts to move the debate away from rape being perceived as 'normal' practice in war to one that includes socially created reasons for rape - and therefore the hope is that there can be socially created solutions. Stiglmayer begins by stating that '[a] rape is an aggressive and humiliating act, as even a soldier knows, or at least suspects', and she continues:

He rapes because he wants to engage in violence. He rapes because he wants to demonstrate his power. He rapes because he is the victor. He rapes because the woman is the enemy's woman, and he wants to humiliate and annihilate the enemy. He rapes because the woman herself is the enemy whom he wishes to humiliate and annihilate. He rapes because he despises women. He rapes to prove his virility. He rapes because the acquisition of the female body means a piece of territory conquered. He rapes to take out on someone else the humiliation he has suffered in the war. He rapes to work off his fears. He rapes because it is really only some 'fun' with the guys. He rapes because war, a man's business, has awakened his aggressiveness, and he directs it at those who play a subordinate role in the world of war.\textsuperscript{131}

It should be noted, however, that not all men/soldiers in war do rape, even those who have been exposed to military training. Therefore, perhaps a useful avenue of research, although not one within the remit if this thesis, would be to ask the question: why do a large proportion of men not rape in war? This might reveal a multitude of previously hidden explanations for the phenomenon of mass rape in war.


\textsuperscript{131}Stiglmayer (1994), p. 84.
Nevertheless, every rape, no matter what explanation is given, remains a grave violation of both the woman's physical and mental integrity. Every rape in war has the ability to profoundly debilitate, to render the woman homeless in her own body and potentially destroy her sense of security within her own culture. Moreover, no matter what explanation is given, every rape appears to be an expression of male domination and misogyny and is used to terrorise and subordinate women. Like any form of torture in war, rape takes many forms, occurs in many contexts, and has different repercussions for every individual victim.

Conclusion

In this chapter, some interesting and potentially valuable theories have been suggested by feminist scholars and, as illustrated, some of their ideas have come from their own analysis of press reports of the mass raping of (predominantly) women in the Balkans. Taken together with the conclusions from Chapter Seven, it can be argued, therefore, that there is an important symbiotic relationship between press representations and feminist thinking. Moreover, when one juxtaposes the press representations against emerging feminist thought on mass rape in war, it is possible to see that feminist scholars use the press to develop their own theorising.

Some of the feminists who have recently developed theories about mass rape in war, with acknowledged input from press representations, have also extended their theories in an attempt to answer the question: What is to be done? In the next and final chapter this issue will be addressed, and four feminists will be identified who offer a mixture of social analysis, political action and agendas for change in a bid to resolve the historical problem of rape and sexual violence against women in war. It is to their 'solutions' that I now turn.
This final chapter will identify and analyse the work of several feminist theorists who have put forward 'solutions' to the continuing wartime phenomenon of mass rape in war. All these were specific responses to press reports of the mass raping of women in the Balkan conflict. These feminists have proposed solutions to this international problem of both a theoretical and practical nature. Moreover, those theories that have a practical 'direct action' element and have been instigated to a limited degree, the impact of that 'direct action' will also be discussed. Through the theories analysed these feminists offer a mixture of social analysis, political action and agendas for change in a bid to resolve the historical problem of rape and sexual violence against women in war. This chapter will: first, identify the differing ways in which each particular feminist writer defines mass rape in war; second, describe the social moves which each feminist believes is necessary in order to eliminate, or at least limit, the problem; and third, investigate why the individual writers feel that current social practices are proving insufficient in dealing with this on-going international problem.

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Infiltration and Resistance

Claudia Card, writing in the feminist journal *Hypatia*, has coined the phrase 'martial rape' when discussing the raping of women in war, as was briefly discussed in the previous chapter. She defines this form of rape as 'a weapon wielded by male soldiers of one country (or national, political, or cultural group) against typically unarmed female civilians of another'. Card refers to martial rape as an 'ancient practice' and one which has many 'continuities with patterns to be found also in civilian rape', with its most immediate message to women and girls being that they 'will have in [their] own bodies only the control that [they] are granted by men'. This forcible withdrawal of women's control through rape is regarded by Card as a form of terrorism and exploitation, but first and foremost, of domination. Furthermore, Card suggests that rape is part of a cross-cultural discourse of male domination, with this domination being its ultimate 'symbolic social meaning'. This discourse does not only consist of the domination of women by men, but also of men by men: not in the sense of male rape, but in the sense that the raping of the enemy's women can be seen as a form of domination over the enemy as a whole and in particular over the men who were unable to protect their women (an issue discussed in Chapter Seven). Although the use of the word 'enemy' relates this scenario immediately to occurrences of martial rape, according to Card, this notion of domination is equally applicable to cases of civilian 'peacetime' rape - i.e. women being the 'enemy'.

For Card, then, martial rape is a deep-rooted problem which crosses cultural and historical divides and it appears to have become as deeply entrenched a political institution, as war itself. Moreover, due to current social practices, soldiers who rape in war are unlikely to be reported, or punished, because of the 'martial purposes rape serves', and as Card suggests, it is only by investigating these purposes served by martial rape that strategies of resistance can be developed. In summarising her

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3 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
personal theories regarding these 'purposes' of martial rape, Card again refers to the rapist's desire for dominance and the victim's consequential lack of personal control. For example, she states that martial rape 'symbolises who is dominant by forcibly, dramatically removing the most elementary controls anyone could be presumed to want: controls over one's intimate bodily contacts with others'.

Card's social strategies for change begin with the supposition that women who lack 'martial training' are, as a consequence, very easy prey for 'those who would communicate the message of domination', whether in wartime or in 'peace'. By way of explanation, Card states that women who live within a patriarchal system are generally untrained for physical combat. Furthermore, she suggests that they are, on the whole, also unarmed and therefore the rapist 'need fear little direct reprisal'. Card's suggestion here, then, and part of a strategic social solution, is that all women should be given the opportunity to attend state-funded self-defence classes. She also goes on to propose that women should not only be trained to cope with violence from men in civilian situations, but that women should also either 'infiltrate' the existing military at every level, or alternatively, women could themselves 'construct independent military organisations'. The ultimate goal is to eliminate patriarchal values both in civilian life and within the military, and to attempt to change the social meanings attached to 'female'. The term would no longer connote 'victim', but would indicate strength, resistance and would personify women who are informed, armed, trained, and who are prepared to fight back. As further explanation of the suggestion that more women should join the ranks of the military, Card suggests the following consequences to this event:

Suppose women entered military institutions in large numbers, at every rank, in every department. There would be, first, fewer civilian women to be raped, although there would still be children, the old, the sick, and their caretakers. But what is the likelihood that males would rape if they fought side by side with equally trained and armed females and under the command of

9ibid.
10ibid.
11ibid.
even more powerful females, in a society in which this phenomenon was not exceptional?\textsuperscript{14}

Although Card does question whether it is possible for women to belong in such numbers to military institutions without themselves succumbing to traditional 'martial values', she does not address the issue of the oft-cited raping of female military personnel by their own 'brothers-in-arms'. With increasing numbers of women joining the military, this has become a significant issue in recent years, with regular reports concerning the sexual harassment and rape of female soldiers within their own barracks.\textsuperscript{15} However, if women were to 'join-up' in the kind of numbers that Card is suggesting, with women also taking some of the most senior military positions, then perhaps her vision is feasible. Although there is no suggestion of time-scale, and even if women were keen to participate in this overhaul of the military and its current patriarchal values, it would be some years before women, in sufficient numbers, had climbed the ranks and Card's vision could be in place.

On a practical level, if one was to accept the lengthy time-scale for this 'project', it could become a viable proposition. However, one is left a little uneasy regarding several unanswered, or unanswerable, questions. First, as Card mentioned above, there can be no guarantees that women will not take on the current 'martial values' of power and domination, as highlighted in Chapter Eight. Second, how will those feminists accept the male/war-like versus female/pacifist dichotomy react? Those feminists that also accept that women are 'naturally' more connected to pacifism could question whether women can be sufficiently trained to become aggressors and whether they should even attempt such training \textit{en masse}? But others might argue that a military of 'Amazons' is ultimately preferable to the threat of mass rape in war? Perhaps there is an alternative of somehow re-training men to reject their patriarchal 'martial values'? These questions all suggest certain problems with Card's suggestion, not that they are necessarily insurmountable, but there is obviously need for a certain amount of reflection and refinement to these ideas.

\textsuperscript{14}ibid.

\textsuperscript{15}One of the most well-known incidents was the Tailhook Scandal. For a feminist analysis see Cynthia Enloe, \textit{The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War} (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 212-214.
Radical Penalties

Claudia Card has another solution to the problem of mass rape in war, however, which is more radical in its inception and its application. She initially conceives the idea by attempting to construct an alternative way in which the symbolic meaning of rape might be achieved. One way Card suggests that this might occur is by 'attaching different social consequences and penalties - legal or extra-legal - to rape'. She claims that rape is highly tolerated and has even been 'naturalised' within both military and civilian society, and even though the traditional penalty for 'martial rape' has, in some cultures and at certain points in history, been death, this penalty has rarely been carried out. Therefore, Card's suggestion is that both 'martial' and civilian rape should carry a penalty that communicates that rape is not natural or acceptable and that its reward is not power and domination. Furthermore, she suggests that having a punishment that communicates these new concepts would need to be so dramatic as to be effective even if inflicted on a relatively few but well-publicised perpetrators.

Card admits that this penalty is just a 'fantasy', although a 'serious' one. Primarily, she considers it a fantasy as she would not trust a patriarchal state with the power to carry it out. Moreover, Card also states that she doubts whether a patriarchal state would inflict such a punishment even if they had the power to do so. The punishment is an extension of the traditional 'feminist' fantasy of castration as a penalty for rape. However, Card suggests that straight-forward castration only requires the removal of the testicles which, according to her theory, does not go far enough. Although castration would prevent impregnation - a particular issue in the Balkan conflict - it would not prevent sexually transmitted diseases, and moreover, the power and domination associated with rape is not necessarily based on the ability to impregnate the victim, but is based on the ability of the rapist to forcibly penetrate the victim both physically and mentally. For Card the removal of the penis as well is essential if one is to 'attack the primary symbol of male dominance'. It is interesting to note that

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18 ibid.
19 ibid.
21 ibid.
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gendered genocide should finally be ‘renamed’ as, at last, it has been recognised as having gendered connotations; Nenadic suggests re-using Radford and Russell’s term *femicide*. Nenadic also claims that there have been many moments in history when the killing of women has taken on genocidal proportions, and that at any of these instances the term *femicide* would have been appropriate. She cites, for example, the mass sexual slavery of ancient Greece, the burning of millions of women in Europe as witches, the slavery and rape of African women in the United States, the sexual atrocities against Korean and other Asian women by Japanese soldiers during the Second World War, to name a few. All of these examples, although unrecognised as such at the time, were *femicide*, only the ‘technology’ of these gendered forms of genocide were specific to each event.

According to Nenadic, then, these and other historical atrocities against women were not perceived as systematic assaults on women - *femicide* - while they were taking place. For the most part these events went unnoticed to almost all but the victims, however, yet another form of femicide would re-emerge at a later date, resulting in a series of seemingly unconnected historical incidents. Furthermore, Nenadic claims that these events continued to be perceived as unconnected as traditionally men have been the primary recorders of history, therefore femicide - in the sense of monumental crimes against women - were little recorded or historicised. Consequently, women, as a group, did not have a collective memory which allowed them to build a coherent theoretical framework that was able to recognise *femicide* as an ongoing ‘event’ and as politically motivated.

In discussing the reports of mass rape in the recent Balkan conflict, Nenadic explains the relation between this latest ‘historic-event’ on the continuum of specific assaults on women and the ‘technologies’ that are particular to this event. Nenadic states that ‘[t]his genocide targets women and girls of these national and religious groups in specific and additional ways’, that is, additional to standard definitions of genocide. She continues, ‘[s]exual atrocities are a central technology of it. Rape is an efficient

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37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.

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Furthermore, Nenadic makes it clear that this particular 'femicidal' assault in this 'genocide' demonstrates that the destruction of any group of women, whether planned or unplanned, is a specific and separate crime which goes beyond the traditional bounds of genocide. For example, along with men, women are killed and abused in every genocide, however, genocidal sexual atrocities on the scale reported from the Balkans constitute part of a larger continuum of global and historical crimes against women. Therefore, these crimes are genocide, but have an additional element to them. This, according to Nenadic, is what should be named and recognised as femicide.

As mentioned above, Nenadic contends that although there have been genocidal events throughout history that should have been defined as femicide, it was not until the twentieth century that a coherent theoretical framework has been available to focus women's attention on these politically motivated crimes against themselves. She suggests that it has been feminism and the associated 'Women's Movement', although still largely inchoate, which has nevertheless allowed women the opportunity to identify and document the existence and the occurrence of these atrocious crimes against women and to recognise their political function within a society based on patriarchal values. With Nenadic's particular definition of femicide explained, the question is now how it can achieve recognition and acceptance on the international legislative level.

Following the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal genocide was charged as a separate category of crime and this specific event had global implications. In response to the Holocaust an international precedent was established and the world was told 'never again' to any ethnic-, national-, racial- or religious-based genocide. This precedent not only drew the world's attention to anti-Semitism, but also lent legitimacy to other attempts to end subordinations based on ethnicity, nationality, race and religion, and in 1948 the United Nations instituted the Genocide Convention. Nenadic concludes, then, that if femicide was charged as a separate category of crime within The Hague War Crimes Tribunal, then an international precedent would be set and could do for

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women what Nuremberg did for subordinated national, racial and religious groups: it would tell the world 'never again' would sexual atrocities and other crimes against women be tolerated.\(^{42}\) Granted, as with Nuremberg, an international precedent in response to the \textit{femicide} in the Balkans could also lend legitimacy to global struggles to end women's subordination and could possibly prevent another \textit{femicide} happening elsewhere. However, in reality, genocide has continued, regardless of the Genocide Convention, therefore, would a Femicide Convention be equally as well-meaning, but toothless?

In concluding this analysis of Nenadic's solution to the on-going problem of mass rape in war, there is the temptation to dismiss her idea as, while theoretically sound, in practice ultimately ineffectual. However, while a Femicide Convention may lack the practical power to which Nenadic ascribes it, I would suggest that it nevertheless would make three worthwhile points. The first is that naming these genocidal sexual atrocities against women as \textit{femicide} and following through with international legislation against it, would bring visibility to the wartime sexual abuse and subordination of women everywhere: perhaps any future perpetrators would be put on the defence rather than on the attack. The second point is linked, in that as well as focussing attention on the historical and culturally specific assaults on women during wars, it could also highlight the daily systematic ways women and girls are abused and subordinated during 'peacetime'. To draw attention to the rape, battery, sexual harassment, incest, child sexual abuse, sexual murder, objectification, violent pornography, and so on, could deny the perpetrators their traditional cover of society's 'acceptance through silence'.

Finally, without a clear recognition by political elites that a serious crime has been committed against these women in the Balkans (a crime which, as Nenadic suggests, has an added dimension to the crime of genocide), what message is sent out to the women of the world? In other words, how will women perceive political elites who have failed to recognise a crime which has been specifically committed against them? Women have already been sent the message that they can be raped, sexually abused and held against their will - i.e. 'targeted for destruction' - yet because these genocidal

\(^{42}\text{Natalie Nenadic (1996), p. 462.}\)
sexual atrocities did not constitute a domestic or foreign policy concern of governments, their circumstances was of little interest. This may be an oversimplification of the situation, but that is how many rape victims 'on the ground' perceived the lack of international intervention. Therefore, if the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague does not recognise or charge those responsible with genocidal sexual atrocities - *femicide* - then, as Nenadic concludes, *[I]his would tell us that the world is even less ours than we thought*.  

**Redefinition**

In a similar vein to Natalie Nenadic's ideas, Beverly Allen's 'solution' to the problem of mass rape in war is wrapped up in a reconceptualisation of what she terms 'genocidal rape'. Allen, however, wants more than simply recognition and acceptance of the term, therefore, it is important to be clear at the outset of this analysis exactly how she defines the term 'genocidal rape' as her solution is based on her particular definition. Writing in 1996, while the war in the Balkans was on-going, Allen interpreted the term in the following manner:

> Genocidal rape: a military policy of rape for the purpose of genocide currently practised in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia by members of the Yugoslav Army, the Bosnian Serb forces, Serb militias in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the irregular Serb forces known as Chetniks, and Serb civilians ... Such rapes are either part of torture preceding death or part of torture leading to forced pregnancy ... In the first case, the death of the victim contributes to the genocidal goal; in the second, the birth of a child does, for the perpetrator - or the policy according to which he is acting - considers this child to be only Serb and to have none of the identity of the mother.

Allen, then, believes that the mass raping of women in the Balkans was first and foremost due to an actual Serb *policy* of rape and not simply due to the concerted

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raping by individual soldiers. Although, of course, it was the concerted actions of the soldiers that actually carried out the rapes, Allen's point is that they were acting on a policy of 'genocidal rape', rather than for any other reason. This is, of course, a contested and unproven point. Nevertheless, it is an assumption which is crucial to Allen's thesis and one that journalists have promoted as noted in Chapter Five.

Before elaborating on her solution to rape in war, Allen dismisses other possible means of finding a solution to the problem. For example, she refuses to discuss 'military' solutions as they are too dependent on the allies own military agendas,\(^{46}\) similarly, Allen states that 'political' solutions are not true solutions but are \(a \text{ priori}\) and would depend on holding negotiations with 'the architects and top producers of the most blatant international aggression and the most atrocious war crimes in Europe since Hitler's Nazis'.\(^{47}\) Allen also dismisses 'humanitarian' remedies, as any aid, particularly when it is organised on a large scale is, she suggests, 'liable to be severely perverted', 'easily ambushed' and/or 'end up on the black market'.\(^{48}\)

Allen is a little more hopeful that legal or juridical actions may more effectively stem military aggression and war crimes such as rape in war. However, she does conclude that since the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia is designed on the basis of the 'common law' tradition, which states that no person can be tried in \textit{contumacia} - that is, without being present for the trial - then the whole process is handicapped.\(^{49}\) For example, the only people the tribunal will be able to judge are those few individuals who have been captured and accused of isolated incidents of rape, or that has been the situation to date. Thus, Allen is disturbed that the UN Tribunal cannot try the authors of the policy of 'genocidal rape' and other war crimes.

Allen blames the current inadequacy of international law on its historic development and crucially that it has been founded on the patriarchal notion of 'male honour, with

\(47\) Ibid.
all its attendant attributes of power, property and privilege'. In other words, according to Allen, all the international laws involving relations between nation-states and those which regulate actions in war, have been developed 'to produce meaning - or a culture - in which male hierarchies ... provide the dominant social structure'.

Thus, they appear to intensify the gender divisions which in turn, from a feminist perspective, serve to perpetuate the women's need for protection from a heterosexual male individual who is honour-bound to fulfil this role within a 'feudal patriarchy'. Allen draws an analogy between this individual male as protector and the individual nation-state within an international framework. In theory, Allen is suggesting that all that changes is the player - from a single male to a multitudinous state, the code of action within a patriarchal discourse remains the same.

However, Allen does concede that in recent years international law has begun to move from definitions of 'war crimes' to definitions of 'crimes against humanity', which on the surface suggests that women are no longer singled out as a 'special' category and that it is no longer their victimisation that separates them from the rest of humanity; but that is not the case. One would expect that the sole characteristic that an individual would have to display to qualify for coverage under international human rights law is the characteristic of being human. However, Allen claims that even human rights law often inadvertently reinforces women's 'second-class status as a 'special' category of human', as some of these laws suggest that women are in need of 'special' protection. Allen is probably not suggesting that women do not have 'special' needs, indeed, in a practical sense women sometimes do have particular needs, given the way in which society's dominant patriarchal values have dictated what is 'natural' and the way in which these 'norms' are biased against women. What Allen is suggesting, however, is that international human rights law contains unhelpful language and contradictions when discussing 'women's' human rights.

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51 ibid.
52 ibid.
54 ibid.
For example, Allen cites one very valuable piece of human rights legislation as an example of these inherent contradictions. The United Nations Human Rights Document HR1/GEN/1 of 4 September 1992 contains a law based on the elimination of discrimination against women. Allen states that 'On the one hand, this instrument clearly defines some of the gravest modes of sex- and gender-based oppression that female persons suffer on a global scale ... On the other hand, it defines these sex- and gender-based crimes simply as forms of discrimination'. Allen's problem with this wording is based on the use of the word 'women'. While in human rights law the word 'human' is theoretically a universal biological condition, which is not determined by culture, 'woman', however, is a cultural definition, with its meaning varying from culture to culture. Her point being, that any mention within international human rights law of the category 'women' utilises a cultural definition, whereas human rights law should, by definition, transcend culture. This inherent contradiction allows for the paradox of 'special' categories of humans (usually women or children) to be regarded as needing protection from the 'real' humans (the males), thereby producing a cyclical pattern that appears 'natural' and unalterable.

Allen mentions the work of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, ex-Polish Prime Minister and a Special Rapporteur of the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights, as having transcended this problem. This was in his report 'The Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia' written in February 1993, in which he devised a definition for rape in war which Allen describes as 'a great accomplishment'. (This is all the more noteworthy coming from a male politician who achieved such national pre-eminence.) According to Allen, Mazowiecki's definition satisfies several urgent theoretical and practical needs and she lists its three main accomplishments in the following manner:

(1) it defines rape as a crime of violence; (2) it defines rape in ungendered terms - that is, it does not naturalise women as rape's victims nor does it depend on a cultural definition of women; (3) it clarifies the dynamic of power and subjugation

attendant to rape, thus making it difficult to think of rape as related in any way to sexual desire.\textsuperscript{58}

The passage from Mazowiecki's report which most impressed Allen states that rape is an 'abuse of power and control in which the rapist seeks to humiliate, shame, embarrass, degrade and terrify the victim. The primary objective is to exercise power and control over another person'.\textsuperscript{59} However, even though Allen praises this 'enlightened' definition for the three points set out above, particularly for clearly stating that rape is an 'abuse of power and control' which interprets rape as neither 'natural', nor a serious crime of violence, Allen points out that by suggesting that rape is an \textit{abuse} of power and control then the intimation is that any \textit{normal} use of 'power and control' is legitimate.\textsuperscript{60} Moreover, Allen derides this wording for implying that there are circumstances when male power and control could be appropriate. However, in Mazowiecki's defence, I would suggest that his wording might have been referring to the wartime situation where one side had a military advantage, were perhaps on the offensive, and therefore had a degree of power and control over the territory it was taking. To rape women within that territory was, as Mazowiecki indicated, \textit{abusing} that power and control. Nevertheless, Beverly Allen, disillusioned by what she sees as the inadequacies of international human rights law decided that due to the inherent male bias in those instruments of law she must look to other possibilities for her solution to the continuing problem of mass rape in war.

Allen returns to her analysis of 'genocidal rape' as a starting point for an alternative solution. In analysing and defining 'genocidal rape' - a notion that has been utilised by numerous journalists in Part Two and by feminists in Chapter Eight - Allen suggests that although being female is a \textit{necessary} condition for being raped in accordance with her own definitions of 'genocidal rape' as mentioned earlier, being female is not always a \textit{sufficient} condition.\textsuperscript{61} For example, one area of genocidal rape identified by Allen is that which is aimed at enforced reproduction, therefore, a necessary condition which the victim must satisfy before being forced into this 'state' is not only that she must be female, but also that she must be capable of gestating a pregnancy. There are

\textsuperscript{60}ibid.
\textsuperscript{61}Beverly Allen (1996), p. 121.
many women who do not fit into this category; they may be too young, too old, or have other biological reasons why they cannot become pregnant, therefore, this version of 'genocidal rape' is not operable on them, but only on those women whose reproductive systems are active and functioning 'normally'. Allen calls this version of 'genocidal rape' biological specificity and concludes that all standard definitions of rape within international law that depend on derivative versions of gender and sex are inadequate as definitions of 'genocidal rape'. Having got to this point Allen began to look elsewhere in established international war crimes legislation for a more satisfactory means of dealing with 'genocidal rape' under international law. She questions this possibility in the following manner:

If gender in international jurisprudence works as a reductive category ('women' being implicitly second-class humans and 'natural' rape victims), and if the biological specificity I have isolated in genocidal rape for enforced pregnancy is a universal requirement for the implementation of that specific version of genocidal rape, can I find an adequate - even if not intentionally so - description of such genocidal rape elsewhere in international war crimes conventions and protocols?

In researching other more diverse areas of international law, particularly regarding conduct in war, Allen discovered one section which appeared to 'fit' more closely with her definition of 'genocidal rape' than any other she had previously analysed: that section was biological warfare.

Biological warfare, as conventionally defined, depends on the use of bacterial, viral, or other living agents. When directed against an enemy target, these agents are intended to induce both short-term and long-term harmful effects on those who are on the receiving end of the attack. However, biological warfare also presents some problems for the attackers. Perhaps some of the most fundamental problems are ensuring safe containment prior to 'delivery'; the safe and accurate 'delivery' to a specific target; and protection against 'blowback' - where the biological agent would literally be 'blown back' onto the attacking forces. Allen discusses many UN, NATO, and individual states' definitions of biological warfare in an attempt to find a definition which mirrors her definition of genocidal rape. Perhaps one of the most

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63 Ibid.
useful definitions for her purposes is a definition by Michel Veuthey, International Committee of the Red Cross (1983), in which he states that '[a] biological war is the voluntary use of living organisms or their toxic products with the aim of killing or harming persons, useful animals, or plants'. Allen suggests that the three main elements which make up this definition could pertain to all definitions and instances of biological warfare. For example, it states that there must be a policy on the part of the attacker ('voluntary use'); it is clear about the intent to kill or harm; and it defines the victims biologically (as human, animals or plants) and not 'civically' (as soldiers or civilians). Another section of a wider NATO definition of biological warfare also has a small but useful section for supporting Allen’s claims. It states that one reason an enemy would employ biological warfare against a targeted population would be to 'reduce the will to war by adversely affecting the morale of the personnel'. Furthermore, another NATO document (The NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations) also states that ‘The susceptibility of the target population is an important factor in the selection of biological agents’.

It is probably clear by now that Allen intends to use these definitions of biological warfare because she claims that they more closely describe the biological specificity of genocidal rape than do the definitions of rape in the international conventions and protocols, or the human rights documents, mentioned above. Moreover, it could be argued that a structural analysis of the effective elements of genocidal rape, as defined by Allen, indicates that the particular element of rape in war which achieves, or at least attempts, enforced pregnancy, could qualify as a form of biological warfare.

Allen’s justification for this conclusion are four-fold. First, she claims that, in her opinion, the 'genocidal rape' carried out by the Serbian soldiers in the Balkans was a systematic policy with the specific aim of harming, and even eradicating, a human population. Second, she asserts that this 'biological weapon' attacked a highly vulnerable sector of the population. Third, and perhaps more in line with traditional

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65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
definitions of biological warfare, the biological agent (sperm) attacks a specific biological system in its victims - the reproductive system of women capable of gestating a pregnancy. Fourth, she suggests that genocidal rape produces both short-term and long-term effects. In the short-term it produces both physical and mental pain and suffering, while in the long-term enforced pregnancy could produce psychological trauma, social ostracism, and possible death by abortion, suicide or childbirth. Furthermore, it also produces unplanned children for whom material, social and cultural provision must be made.69

Moreover, according to Allen genocidal rape qualifies as a crime of biological warfare not only because of its effects on its victims. As Allen states, '[a]s biological warfare, the use of sperm in genocidal rape not only is effectively destructive; it also constitutes a highly perfected form of biological warfare for its chemical stability, ease of storage, and capacity to deliver to a specific target'.70 Moreover, Allen also makes the observation that the biological mechanisms involved in the production and delivery of sperm as a biological agent mean that the attackers need not take precautions against 'blowback'. By definition, they cannot get pregnant themselves.71 However, it could be argued that there is a possibility that 'blowback' might occur in another form. Granted the rapists cannot become pregnant themselves, but in years to come when a new generation of 'rape babies' grow into adults, and they discover the circumstances surrounding their conception, will they want to take revenge? Will future 'blowback' result in another Balkan tragedy? One could even define the recent Balkan conflict as a result of 'blowback' from a previous generation's atrocities. (An important factor in whether this form of 'blowback' is likely to occur or not, is how the societies raising these 'children of rape' accept them and how they represent the situation that produced them - a difficult task.)

Beverly Allen's solution, then, suggests that the United Nations International War Crimes Tribunal should consider 'genocidal rape' aimed at enforced pregnancy to be a crime of biological warfare. Such a reconceptualisation could be a positive move as it would emphasise the universalising specificity of the crime, in that it attacks one

70ibid.
71ibid.
biological system of the victim in order to eradicate a particular nation. Therefore, the victim is identified neither culturally (as 'woman'), nor biologically (as 'female'), but as a human being capable of gestating a pregnancy - although, of course the former are also necessary requirements, they are not sufficient requirements nor the ultimate focus. By identifying the victim in these terms, the notion of genocidal rape as a form of biological warfare implicitly universalises the rape victim, thereby victimising any human being with any biological specificity, not necessarily this particular one.

In addition, this reconceptualisation of the crime of rape in war also emphasises the seriousness of the crime and highlights the possible genocidal intent of the aggressor. If 'genocidal rape' were treated as a form of biological warfare under international law, then the crime is moved away from traditional concepts that limit it to a crime that 'naturally' happens to women as a by-product of war. For these reasons Allen's solution is an interesting one, particularly as it involves a re-interpretation of the crime of rape in war under a universally recognised legislative body, even though in practice the executing of international legislation is notoriously difficult. However, once on the statute books, one aim of this 'solution', like Claudia Card's, would be as a form of deterrent and an acknowledgement that the crime is considered to be one of extreme gravity.

Allen's proposed solution appears to be an attempt to answer the call by Swedish researchers from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, who, in 1993, suggested that international conventions and protocols be open to re-interpretation. In addition, they have warned of the dangers of voluntary blindness' and a lack of 'interpretative imagination' in any attempted reconceptualisations. In suggesting the re-thinking of international legislation and their appeal for re-interpretation, they state:

Today it seems valid and urgent to reimplement the Genocide Convention, interpret its coverage and perhaps add interpretations that would explicitly prohibit preparation for genocidal actions, including the development and use of genetic

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weapons of any type, whether conventional, chemical or biological weapons.  

Beverly Allen's work can be regarded as just such an added interpretation. And as no definition of 'genocidal rape' as such exists in international conventions and protocols regarding the conduct of war at present, Allen's work will, no doubt, continue to call for a redefinition of the words 'genocide' and 'rape' within international legislation and a recognition of the composite term 'genocidal rape'. By attempting to offer solutions which will fill the gaps in current international definitions, Allen's work will help to discourage the notion of the specificity of both the victim and the perpetrator as 'other' (as if only Serb war criminals committed rape and only Bosnian Muslim women suffered from rape) and will also attempt to stem the persistence of naturalised and gendered notions of rape within these laws.

**Ending the Silence**

Jocelynne Scutt, writing in an article entitled 'The Personal is Political', has based her 'solution' to mass rape in war on rectifying the years of what she describes as the 'dominance of silence' - a feminist theme which has been in evidence throughout this thesis. She states, for example, that '[w]here the violence of men's world has penetrated the world of women, women have been trained to be silent about it. And where women have been permitted to enter into the violent world of men, women have similarly been frightened into maintaining that same silence'. This is a familiar point which is frequently reported by women who have been raped, children who have been sexually abused, and who have been ordered by their attackers to maintain silence. Furthermore, abused women and children often comment that the feelings of humiliation and/or guilt that they are somehow to blame for the attack compounds this silence.

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73 ibid., p. 305.  
Scutt also describes women's enforced silence during wartime atrocities and observes two differing experiences that women can have in war, yet in both circumstances women are similarly silenced. First, Scutt comments on nurses and female military personnel who have first-hand experience of wartime activities. She suggests, as does Cynthia Enloe, that the male military personnel 'get nervous' when these women start to 'tell their stories of wartime' because they reveal too much about 'the nature of war itself' and are consequently silenced by the constructed military 'taboos' which determine what (and whose) experiences can and cannot be voiced openly. Second, the women who are sexually abused or raped in war are often also silenced by the notion that their bodily integrity and individual suffering is of minimal importance when the integrity of the nation is at stake. Even where they do speak out, generally women's voices, their experiences, are rarely listened to, and as discussed in Chapter Seven, when they are they are frequently dismissed as fiction, as lies. But men also maintain this silence. Historically men have remained silent about their part in class violence, race violence and violence against women. And again, as Scutt states, '[w]here women have spoken out, [their] voices have often been swamped in that male silence'. The first step in Scutt's 'solution', then, is to acknowledge the extent of the global violence exercised against women, both in wartime and during 'peace', and to recognise that every man is involved, implicitly if not explicitly, as long as men condone the violence by their silence and/or by enforcing the silence of women.

Scutt moves on to comment on the 'violence of war' and in doing so she uses a piece of verse written by Chris Domingo about the link between men's gratuitous use of sexual violence in war and in 'peace'. Domingo wrote:

    an ex-marine who had been to Vietnam raped me.
    He saw my small dark female body in the woods.
    He had learned to rape.
    He had learned to kill.
    He pointed his rifle at my head
    He had learned this somewhere maybe on tv.

    Maybe over there in a country of small dark people.
    He had learned to rape.

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76 Ibid. For further reading on this point see Cynthia Enloe (1993), p. 184.
He had learned to kill.

At a slide show about violent pornography
i see the photographs that some men use to ejaculate by.
Among the slides of nude wimmin bound by ropes,
in a meat grinder,
misrepresented, degraded, demeaned in various ways
was an actual photo from Vietnam
of a small dark woman's dead body under a tree,
taken from a series of such photos in a popular porn magazine.
i affirmed aloud
THAT COULD HAVE BEEN ME.78

As mentioned in Chapter Eight, Scutt follows this verse with the question: But where did he learn it?79 Did this rapist learn this violence against women in Vietnam, at war, or at home - in 'peace'?

As has been mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, military training includes the 'learning' or social production of domination, of control, of violence against the feminine, against women. However, Scutt is questioning whether men's 'training for war' is solely to 'blame' for wartime sexual violence against women, or is it merely built on the foundation of civilian socialisation which has already imbued men with the knowledge that women are somehow less than human. By way of explanation, Scutt suggests that '[t]o learn to kill, one must learn to despise the killed, to debase them as a group, to downgrade them from human beings to less than human'.80 Scutt is suggesting, then, that the basic tenets behind the subordination, domination and violence against women in war are laid down in 'peacetime' through the process of 'normal' socialisation. Then, these established male convictions of male domination and female subordination are merely heightened by military training and unleashed in war. The second step in Scutt's 'solution', then, is to recognise that what transpires in society and in individual lives during 'peacetime' is crucial to what transpires in war, and that personal 'peacetime' violence is inseparable from the violence of war.81

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79ibid.
Scutt’s solution to be effectual this point must be acknowledged and the silence surrounding it lifted.

Step three of Scutt’s ‘solution’ involves breaking the silences in a more pragmatic way and in illustrating this point she retells a series of events which attempted to begin the task of enabling women to openly challenge the silence which surrounds mass rape in war. Scutt recalls how in the 1970s small groups of Australian women openly marched on Anzac Day to ‘mourn for all women raped in all wars’. Their actions were not applauded by the regular marchers who stated categorically that ‘the rape of women had nothing to do with war’. Although the opposition to the women marchers continued, their numbers swelled and every year on 25 April - Anzac Day - the women marched alongside ex-servicemen in remembrance of all women who had suffered in war. Scutt, however, documents how the opposition to the women’s presence on the marches stirred up deep-rooted anger, which was voiced by the Representatives of the Returned Servicepersons League (RSL). Scutt summarises their reactions in the following manner:

The notion that home-grown, Aussie soldiers might be implicated in rape of women, any women, was absurd, they claimed. It was a slur on every man who fought for his country. The women ought to be ashamed of themselves and their perfidy, it was said. They were an insult to Anzac Day and to Australia.

Yet, the women’s primary aim was simply to stem the silence which has always surrounded the sexual atrocities and raping of women, by soldiers of all nationalities, in war. They wanted their voices heard, the truth told, and the women who have been ignored and omitted from war’s casualty lists to be remembered in a fitting manner. In demanding the right to mourn those women who had died as ‘war spoils’, or those who lived on carrying the burden of their rape, this band of women marchers drew attention to the way in which their ‘sisters’ experiences had been silenced by the dominant patriarchal culture. In making this point and in response to the opponents

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83ibid.
84ibid.
of their actions, Scutt quotes a simple verse which is taken from the song 'Lest We Forget' by Judy Small. It candidly demonstrates why any form of Remembrance Day should ensure that all who have suffered in war should be acknowledged and should not simply advocate the remembering of only our 'brothers in arms':

Lest they forget the countless children
burned alive in napalm's fire
Lest they forget the dead civilians lying
tangled in the wire
And the faces of the women raped and
shattered to the core
It's not only men in uniform who pay the
price of war. 86

Scutt's third step, then, is for the crime of rape in war to be recognised by governments and political elites and for the women who have suffered to be acknowledged on casualty lists and openly remembered with all the other victims of war.

There do appear to be a few signs that (some) women raped in war are now being remembered and that (some) governments are purporting to take some responsibility for those rapes. The main example of this being the suffering of Korean, Chinese and other Asian women at the hands of Japanese soldiers during World War Two. 87 However, while lauding the gradual crumbling of the 'wall of silence', the invention of the grand euphemism 'comfort women' does little to acknowledge the real pain and suffering of the women. Whose 'comfort' is at issue here, certainly not the women's 'comfort' whose abuse, sexual assaults and rapes by soldiers were condoned by the Japanese government. 88 If Scutt's 'solution' is actualised then the women should

88 Ibid.
rightly be called 'survivors of rape in war', acknowledged as such and possibly compensated for their suffering.\textsuperscript{89}

Scutt's solution, then, offers us a series of practical steps which enables the crime of (mass) rape in war to become both seen and heard, thereby removing the opportunity for men, political elites and governments to hide behind their 'wall of silence'. As Ailbhe Smyth has commented: 'Silence is never broken all at once and of a piece. It breaks down now and then, here and there, voice by voice, gradually making sound and sense where before there was none.'\textsuperscript{90} However, the full extent of the violence against women in war has first to be recognised, as does the reality that every man is in some way implicated in this violence, even if it is by simply keeping quiet and not speaking out against the actions of their fellowmen: as May and Strikwerda argued in Chapter One, neither ignorance, nor silence, are valid defences.\textsuperscript{91}

In addition, the violence of war and its traditional depiction as extreme, and the result of extraordinary circumstances, shades the reality of violence in 'peacetime'.\textsuperscript{92} Few women are immune from these 'peacetime', 'domestic', socialised forms of violence - the social construction of gendered hierarchies. Yet, until these gendered processes of male/female socialisation are acknowledged and understood, women will remain unrecognised as 'fully' human and the silence will remain impenetrable. The status of women is crucial to the way in which women's voices are perceived. Therefore, if women remain in a subordinate position to men, their voices will continue to be ignored or silenced, thus, all forms of violence, both socialised violence and physical violence, against women will persist during 'peacetime' and during war.

\textsuperscript{89}Italy has recently ruled that a wartime rape victim was eligible for compensation (including a quarter of a century of back payments) due to 'moral damages arising from violence suffered'. See, John Hooper, "Women raped by 'liberators' win payout," The Observer, 20 July 1997; also see, Karen Parker and Jennifer Chew, "Compensation for Japan's World War II War-Rape Victims," Hastings International and Comparative Law Review Vol. 17, no. 3 (Spring 1994): pp. 497-549.
\textsuperscript{91}One group that is attempting to raise men's awareness of their collective responsibility for rape is the White Ribbon Campaign, Toronto, Canada. It is headed by Michael Kaufman and further information can be found at the following site: www.comm.plusc.com/mkaufman.
Scutt's final proposal is a relatively simple, yet dignified, step to take and one that could have a practical application wherever and for whoever it is appropriate. If those who openly fought for their country and sacrificed their health, their limbs, or their lives, can be remembered nationally with honour and dignity, then why should those women who were forced to sacrifice their health, their bodily integrity, their cultural honour, or their lives, not be remembered with the same 'respect'. (Indeed, why not all civilians casualties.) Simply having their names acknowledged on memorials and remembered along with all victims of war on Remembrance Days would be a start. To reiterate the sentiments voiced in Judy Small's song, '[i]t's not only men in uniform who pay the price of war'. Moreover, according to Mary Kaldor, in post-Clausewitzian war, rape will be an increasingly common feature of modern warfare.39

Conclusion

Each of the 'solutions' suggested by the four feminists above offered different routes to the same destination. In attempting to devise strategies for social change, whether primarily theoretical- or practical-based, each feminist writer sought to stem the occurrence of mass rape in war. They all suggested ways in which current social practices are inadequate in dealing with this international problem in war. Moreover, they have combined social analysis, clear strategies for change and in Scutt's case direct political action.

Scutt, and to a lesser extent Card, advocates women at grassroots level taking direct action to show collective resistance to the overwhelming social acceptance of silence which surrounds the issue of rape in war. While Scutt proposes that women literally 'take to the streets' and march in commemoration of all rape victims in war during national days of remembrance, one of Card's 'solutions' was the suggestion that women begin to join the services in increasing numbers, thereby allowing all potential soldiers who rape in war no male bastion behind which to hide. Both of these

suggestions could serve to ensure that the issue of mass rape in war, which has been raised in public consciousness in the West due to the media’s reporting of the issue in the Balkans, continued to be openly discussed and debated within the public domain. Furthermore, an intended result of these actions would be to impede the discourse of male domination by stemming both the enforced suppression of women’s voices and the voluntary silences of men.

All the 'solutions' are dependent on a certain amount of reconceptualisation of the traditional gendered norms of society: these are international legislation, the term 'female', victims of war, and genocide. Moreover, if all these reconceptualisations could be actualised they would help create new terms of reference and new symbolic meanings for rape in war. For Card and Nenadic, this new symbolism which would then surround the issue of 'martial' rape - for example, the international recognition of the seriousness of the crime and the need for 'physical' punishment - would act as a deterrent to any soldier 'on the ground', or military elite in the 'strategic planning' office, contemplating using rape as a weapon in war.

Furthermore, Allen and Nenadic’s calls for the re-thinking of international legislation regarding the crime of rape in war, which at present they suggest is at best unhelpful and at worst explicitly biased, would not only draw attention to the extent of the violence perpetrated against women world-wide, but would emphasise the 'unnaturalness' of the crime of rape. This, of course, would appear in stark contrast to the traditionally accepted view that rape is simply a 'natural', though unfortunate by-product of war.

Each of the 'solutions' put forward by these four feminists has something to offer, both in terms of thought-provoking ideas and/or practical challenges for the future. Although some of the 'solutions' would no doubt prove to be more difficult for contemporary Western society to accept than others, and some of the ideas require more consideration before practical implementation would be possible, nevertheless, they represent a preliminary exploration of some possibilities for social change and

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I do not intend to be either Euro-centric, or Western-centric in this statement. I acknowledge that there is a strong possibility that some 'publics' in the world have not been made aware of the occurrences of mass rape in war in the Balkans.
expand the currently limited discourse on mass rape and in so doing aid the move to eliminate it from war.
CONCLUSION: MASS RAPE IN WAR, PRESS REPRESENTATIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE

In the Introduction it was stated that the primary aims of the thesis were to investigate the occurrence of mass rape in war historically, to gauge current attitudes to the phenomenon, and to discuss some ideas about its elimination. It is hoped that these aims have been achieved: in addition the analysis of press representations has highlighted the inter-relationship between feminist thought and social discourse as disseminated through the press. Another outcome of the thesis is the way it lends support to the idea that the press shapes 'interested opinion' and hence can be a potent force in placing issues on the international political agenda.¹

In Part One it was shown that mass rape in war is an ancient problem. Despite this, little has been written about it compared with research on 'strategy of war' or general issues of 'ethics and war'.² Moreover, given the numbers of victims and the degree of suffering over the centuries, there has been virtually no progress in finding and implementing solutions. It is too soon to say whether the military's renewed interest in the laws of war will have any affect on its occurrence.³ However, at the end of the twentieth century mass rape in war is now being discussed on a scale that is unprecedented. This includes not only human rights activists and feminists, but also governments and political elites from almost one hundred and sixty countries⁴ in relation to the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court⁵ with the

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¹This argument is suggestive of further avenues of research. For example: the relationship between press representations and public/elite opinion; the role of the press as a generator of international public/elite opinion; the relationship between the press in particular and the media in general and policy makers; the processes of press/media interest, issue formation, and so on.
²As mentioned in Chapter Two (note. 21) of the thirty general academic books on war consulted, twenty-eight did not make any reference to rape in war, or violence against women in war.
UN and the Vatican contributing to the debate. Although in the summer of 1998 it is too soon to have access to the detailed diplomatic discussions surrounding the establishment of the ICC, it is interesting to speculate, at the end of this thesis, about the reasons for this apparent change in the political salience of the issue. After a history of silence, what has made mass rape in war become such a 'talked about' issue - and one that now features on the international agenda?

The evidence of this thesis points to the conclusion that the media has played a decisive role in making the issue of rape in war visible in a way that has not been possible to contemporary opinion ever before. The press reports from the Balkan conflict alleging the occurrence of rape in war on an unprecedented scale as detailed in Part Two, have played a significant part in raising awareness of the issue and putting it on the international agenda. While there have undoubtedly been problems with the press representations, such as disputed facts, the use of gendered language, the use of some theories which stymie debate, and so on, it is undeniable that the issue is now on the international agenda and developments with regard to its position as a war crime are underway.

From the 1960s onwards there has been a raising of feminist consciousness, albeit uneven, throughout the West. Furthermore, the growth in awareness of women's human rights has run parallel to the general growth of a 'human rights culture' which began in 1945. Thus, in the 1990s, reported incidents of mass rape from the Balkan wars touched a raw nerve in the West - a West that thought it would 'never again' have to witness such barbarity. This growing awareness of feminist and human rights issues was a necessary factor in sensitising opinion to the issue of mass rape in war, but the sufficient factor in making visible the issue was the analyses by journalists in


reputable newspapers. It was their 'facts', data, interviews, and so on that constituted the historically novel factor.

Throughout the twentieth century, there have been major shifts in both individual and collective attitudes towards important social and political phenomena. Examples of such issues are racism, colonialism, human rights, development, and women's rights. And while there may have been disputes over the details of the changes as they occurred, nevertheless, over the past one hundred years there have been fundamental transformations in attitudes that have resulted in historic developments in political and social policy toward these issues. It is obviously a complex process by which some issues become international issues - not all 'human wrongs' reach the agenda of the UN - but one of the conclusions of this thesis is that mass rape in war is an issue that the print media has been influential in helping to place on the international agenda, even though it cannot determine the eventual diplomatic and legal outcome.

In the course of the 1990s we have witnessed the way in which an important phenomenon - one that has threatened and destroyed the lives of countless women over the centuries - has moved from a realm of silence through the beginning stages of acknowledgement and recognition and finally onto the international agenda. And this movement has been due, for the most part, to the media's attention, although as suggested above there has possibly been a more receptive audience in recent years than there has been throughout history. Indeed, the media itself would presumably not have been involved to the extent it has been had it not in turn been made more sensitive by earlier consciousness-raising by feminist concerns and human rights concerns. It is a two-way process, as was suggested in Chapters Seven and Eight. The journalists who wrote about mass rape in war could mostly be described as 'feminists', or 'feminist-influenced', whatever their sex. The press more than other parts of the media was instrumental in raising awareness of the issue by using its pages as a forum for discussion and debate, as well as reporting. Indeed, as was detailed throughout Part Two, the broadsheet press was used as a medium through which a number of

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\[9\] For a discussion on the role of the UN regarding the collective legitimisation of certain international humanitarian issues and the delegitimisation of other issues reconsidered to be in humane, see: Inis Claude, Jr., The Changing United Nations (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 73-103. Also see
significant voices could air their views and challenge the current silence surrounding the issue. Given this significant role that the press has played in bringing the issue of mass rape in war onto the international agenda, it is interesting to note Martha Gellhorn’s assertion in 1959 that ‘keeping a true record is the only honourable form of behaviour for [journalists]’.10

Subsequently, as was discussed in Chapter Eight, some feminist writers welcomed some of the journalists’ ideas and explanations of mass rape in war and incorporated some of the journalists’ themes into their own theorising. Furthermore, the search for solutions by the feminist scholars discussed in Chapter Nine explicitly acknowledged the role of the media in engendering their concern for the subject. More recently the UN, in the year which celebrates the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, has begun to constitute the future permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) which, in Kofi Annan’s words, will judge those accused of genocide and other comparable crimes.11 Moreover, Richard Goldstone, a Justice of South Africa’s Constitutional Court and former chief prosecutor of the UN War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague, has also stated that the establishment of ‘an effective system of international justice for these violent and illegal acts against civilians [in the Balkans] becomes the only deterrent to atrocity, and a deterrent that is urgently needed’.12

While acknowledging that those indicted of war crimes, including rape, should be tried by an effective international judicial body, the UN decision as to whether or not to include the crimes of ‘wartime rape’ and ‘enforced pregnancy’ in the latest War Crimes Treaty appears to have caused some controversy. For although there is wide consensus among countries that rape is a war crime and should be included in the treaty (being drawn up as a precursor to the establishment of the ICC), the Vatican has objected to ‘enforced pregnancy through rape’ also being included as an official war crime. While agreeing that along with ‘wartime rape’ it is indeed a war crime, the Vatican has voiced its concern that if it is officially recognised as such it could be

interpreted as an 'invitation to challenge anti-abortion laws in many countries'. This not only demonstrates the inherent difficulties in negotiating a war crimes treaty, and the complex religious and cultural issues surrounding the subject of rape, but for the purpose of this thesis, it also shows that the issue of 'rape in war' is being discussed at the highest level - a level whose decisions can affect the 'international community' as a whole. And although this new engagement with the issue politically does not guarantee an end to the phenomenon, there is now a greater possibility than previously that practical policies against it might be implemented.

The primary aim of this thesis has been to explore press representations of mass rape in war in the Balkan conflict, and discuss the complex inter-relationship between those ideas and feminist thought. The thesis has not been concerned to make a case about its possible political influence. However, it does seem certain that the media has played a significant role in moving forward the debate surrounding mass rape in war, both in terms of giving the issue public visibility and by placing it on the international decision-maker's agenda. The media has influenced change at several levels: from academic literature to law we appear to be witnessing an 'advance on all fronts' with regard to mass rape in war. This adds legitimacy to those seeking to raise awareness of this issue further, and to combat its continuation.

It is my belief that the weight of evidence in this thesis gives support to the idea that the academic discipline of International Relations should now play its part in this advance by recognising that this violent phenomenon, which has been such a feature of the history of war and has destroyed or damaged the lives of countless numbers of people (mainly women), is a legitimate area of study. It needs further research and further visibility, if the far-reaching consequences of mass rape in war are to be more fully understood and eliminated from international affairs.

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13 Alessandra Stanley, 10 July 1998.


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