The British Intelligence Services in the public domain

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**Introduction**

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- Dependent relationship
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- Laudatory relationship
- Supportive relationship

**Views of British Intelligence**

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- Capable and Effective
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- Legal and Ethical Activity
- Human Dimension
- Secrecy
- Conclusion

## Chapter 6: A Fractious Relationship: British Intelligence and Popular Culture

**Introduction**

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- Popular Culture Portrayals of the British Intelligence Services: An Evolution

**Themes in popular culture**
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- Surveillance
- Science and Technology
- Secret Diplomacy
- Deception and secrecy
- Acting legally and ethically
- Threats and Society
- Role of Gender

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Abstract

The thesis explores ‘what are the avenues through which the public are provided with a portrayal of the British Intelligence Services and, what depictions of the British Intelligence Services do these provide? Undertaking an empirical approach throughout, the thesis begins by using the intelligence cycle to assess who constitutes the British Intelligence Services, and what portrayals the Big 3 – the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) provide of themselves on their websites and by speeches made by the respective heads. This is compared to the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services provided by key avenues of information, namely, the Government, academia, news journalism and popular culture. Whilst all the avenues provide an overall positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, with a consistent emphasis upon acting legally and ethically, due to the diversity of these avenues, each provides a subtly different depiction of the British Intelligence Services. Due to the pervasiveness of secrecy surrounding the British Intelligence Services, these avenues are in an influential position of informing the public domain about the intelligence realm. But, by finding a balance between openness and secrecy and increasing their own public engagement beyond the websites which require an individual to know they exist and actively access them, the British Intelligence Services could limit the role of the avenues by having a more cohesive and ongoing relationship with the public domain.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Chief of Secret Intelligence Service (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPNI</td>
<td>Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Director General of the Security Service (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defence (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation (US)</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)</td>
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<td>FOI</td>
<td>Freedom of Information (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FoIA</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act (UK)</td>
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<td>GCS</td>
<td>Government Communication Service (GCS)</td>
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<td>GC&amp;CS</td>
<td>Government Code and Cipher School (UK)</td>
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<td>GCHQ</td>
<td>Government Communication Headquarters (UK)</td>
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<td>GDS</td>
<td>Government Digital Service (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Investigatory Powers Act (UK)</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>IRD</td>
<td>Information Research Department (UK)</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>Intelligence Services Act (UK)</td>
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<td>ISC</td>
<td>Intelligence and Security Committee (UK)</td>
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<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Committee (UK)</td>
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<td>JIO</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Organisation (UK)</td>
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<td>JTAC</td>
<td>Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (UK)</td>
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<td>KGB</td>
<td>Soviet Intelligence</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>MET</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police</td>
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<td>MI5</td>
<td>Security Service (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI6</td>
<td>Secret Intelligence Service (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Crime Agency (NCA)</td>
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<td>NCND</td>
<td>Neither Confirm Nor Deny Policy (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCSC</td>
<td>National Cyber Security Centre (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency (US)</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council (UK)</td>
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<td>NTAC</td>
<td>National Technical Assistance Centre (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORCON</td>
<td>Originator Control Principle</td>
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<td>PMQ</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Questions (UK)</td>
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<td>RIPA</td>
<td>Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service (UK)</td>
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<td>SBS</td>
<td>Special Boat Service (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Security Services Act (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCA</td>
<td>Serious and Organised Crime Agency (UK)</td>
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<td>SOE</td>
<td>Special Operations Executive (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Watching the numerous fictional portrayals of espionage and intelligence on television and in films while growing up sparked my interest in this topic, but my love of this subject developed while I was an undergraduate student in the International Politics Department at Aberystwyth University. When I was in my second year, I had the opportunity to take the Intelligence and International Security module with Professor Len Scott, and it was his lectures that truly made the topic come alive. Writing an essay for this module that assessed the problems posed by demands for greater accountability and how the Intelligence Services could overcome them developed my interest further. Following advice from the wonderful Dr Chikara Hashimoto, this became the topic of my Undergraduate dissertation.

Under the guidance of Dr Huw Bennett, my awareness of how the British Intelligence Services can engage with the accountability process by placing information into the public domain expanded and deepened. I was fortunate to be the successful candidate for an ESRC-funded studentship on the topic “Secret Intelligence: Public Attitudes, Expectations and Accountability”. The question of how the British Intelligence Services engage with the public became a continual topic of interest during the master’s and into the PhD, thus resulting in the PhD seeking to examine what understandings of the British Intelligence Services are in the public domain. Originally, it was hoped that this would include public perceptions of the British Intelligence Services; however numerous methodological challenges such as gaining public perception data meant this was not viable, although the importance of assessing it remains. As a result, the research evolved into assessing the key-ways in which the public are provided with a portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, namely the transmission of these depictions, and what portrayals these provide.

Research Puzzle
The former Chief (C) of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Sir Richard Dearlove argues that Governments have been pushed into the democratisation of national security due to high levels of public anxiety in the post-9/11 counter-terrorism environment. This
public anxiety is due in part to the fact that what citizens may fear and what genuinely threatens the security of the nation are not necessarily the same, although there may be overlap.\(^1\) Dearlove is scathing about the practice of providing information about intelligence to the public, arguing that it results in calls from the media and public alike that something must be done about the perceived threat, which can increase levels of worry amongst the public. This is what he terms ‘the democratisation of national security policy’. His analysis suggests that with public and media scrutiny, national security policy panders to this. However, as this thesis argues, a certain degree of openness about intelligence is fundamental to ensure the public’s willingness for the British Intelligence Services to act on their behalf, and thus maintain their democratic legitimacy.\(^2\)

But while placing information about the Intelligence Services in the public domain addresses the issues of legitimacy and accountability, it also risks compromising operational effectiveness, which reveals a fundamental tension between openness and secrecy. This tension in British intelligence between openness and secrecy lies at the heart of the research puzzle explored in this thesis. Although the British Intelligence Services, and indeed the intelligence services of all democratic states, require a degree of secrecy for their work. By shrouding everything they do in secrecy, they risk reducing public understanding of the need for such services, and therefore public support for them.

Therefore, with too much secrecy surrounding their work, the democratic legitimacy of the Intelligence Services can be hampered as there is no understanding of the intelligence realm in the public domain. Although in the post-Cold War context there is a delicate balance between openness and secrecy, arguably instigated by the Waldegrave

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2 In his analysis, Sir David Omand explores the interplay between the Intelligence Services and the media where he argues that with increased counter-terrorism activities, there is a tense relationship between the media and the Intelligence Services which leads to his assertion that it has now become essential for the Intelligence Services to ensure public and legislative support for their continued collection of secret intelligence.

Initiative, prior to this, the British Intelligence Services were shrouded by an almost obsessive focus on secrecy. The investigative journalist Chapman Pincher highlights this as in the late 1940s and early 1950s:

*The general Whitehall view was that any official information was an official secret covered by the Official Secrets Act until it was officially released.*

In 1984, Pincher suggested in *Too Secret Too Long*, that much of the secrecy surrounding the actions of the Secret Service (MI5) and their counterpart MI6 was unnecessary, and even damaging to democracy, for example on those occasions when the commitment to secrecy has meant that ‘Parliament and the public have often been misled by official statements’. The extent to which secrecy has often been emphasised over openness has been described by the BBC as a ‘culture of secrecy’ that has governed Whitehall.

But while the pervasiveness of secrecy continues to impact upon the British Intelligence Services’ engagement with the public domain, there is now more of an emphasis on openness than has been previously evident, which can in fact be beneficial to the British Intelligence Services as the public have a more informed understanding of their actions. This aids not only public accountability, but also public support and trust for the

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Intelligence Services. Trevor McCrisken and Christopher Moran believe that ‘securing public trust is essential’, and this is a point with which Geoffrey Treverton agrees, albeit for rather different reasons. He argues that:

Because intelligence agencies operate in secret and because they engage in activities that are sensitive or even illegal at home, they depend on public trust.

This demonstrates the tensions between secrecy and openness and how Intelligence Services require a degree of both. The issues that emanate from seeking to ascertain where this balance should be struck is a theme central to the overall research puzzle explored in this thesis. Although writing about the American context where issues of intelligence oversight were addressed in 1975 following the Watergate scandal where the Intelligence Services had been directed by the Government to undertake constitutionally questionable domestic security operations, With the creation of oversight mechanisms, the American public allowed the Intelligence Services, who they realised they could not know everything about, to operate in their name, even to undertake illegal or unsavoury acts. For more information, please see:

8 The gaining of legislative and public support for continued intelligence collection is something Sir David Omand has highlighted as being crucial in the counter-terrorism era. For more information, please see: Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners,’ p. 44
9 They argue that public trust is imperative in ensuring recruitment, funding and perhaps most importantly the morale of Intelligence Officers, as poor perceptions can have a direct impact on the efficiency of a particular intelligence assignment. For more information, Please see: MCCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary between the ‘real’ and the imagined’, Intelligence and National Security, 33/6 (2018), p. 808; This is a theme also discussed by Chapman Pincher as he highlights how the bad publicity surrounding Peter Wright’s Spycatcher autobiography (who was a retired MI5 officer, convinced that the former Director General Sir Roger Hollis was a member of the Cambridge 5) directly impacted upon MI5 recruitment. For more information, please see: Pincher, C, The Truth About Dirty Tricks, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd, 1991), p. 331; Phythian, M, ‘Cultures of National Intelligence’, p.39
11 Examples of the constitutionally questionable operations undertaken include how President Nixon approved individuals to break in, and install eavesdropping equipment in the Democratic National Campaign headquarters as Nixon prepared for his election. Another example is how the CIA was spying on anti-war protestors for over a decade. For more information, please see:
United States Senate, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (The Church Committee), Available From: https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/ChurchCommittee.htm (Accessed 25th February 2017);
actions, but to understand the limits imposed by American values. This formed a social contract between the Intelligence Services and the American public. Treverton’s American centred analysis focuses on the social contract, arguing that this was first broken following the Watergate scandal and was subsequently damaged in the mid-2000s following allegations of the torture of detainees accused of committing acts of terrorism as part of al Qaeda carried out by US military personnel operating under the instructions of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.12

Undoubtedly, the social contract was further undermined following the Snowden revelations which revealed how America’s National Security Agency (NSA), had implemented the bulk collection of domestic telephone, internet and email records by collecting data from telephone companies.13 Along with the NSA, Britain’s Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) was a key partner in the Prism surveillance

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Treverton, G, Intelligence for an age of Terror, p. 236;
Originally, the American news broadcaster CBS broke the story of the inhumane treatment of Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad on the 60 Minutes programme, before photos of the abuse appeared in an article written by Seymour Hersh for The New Yorker. These photos, including a hooded individual stood on a box and naked prisoners forming a human pyramid with American service personnel stood behind them, received worldwide coverage and were synonymous with allegations of the US use of torture. For other articles please see:
The New Yorker, Torture at Abu Ghraib, Seymour Hersh, 10th May 2004, Available From: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib (Accessed 13th March 2018);
Researching this topic did highlight how it was also covered in the non-English speaking media as well such as Germany’s Der Spiegel. However as I am not a native speaker, I have not included these in the list of references.
programme where the NSA tapped directly into the servers of nine global internet firms, including Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo.14

Therefore, the British Intelligence Services must actively engage with the public domain if they are to continue to secure public trust and ensure their democratic legitimacy continues via a British version of the social contract described by Treverton, something which can only occur with openness. Without it, public trust can be significantly affected, particularly, as Ian Leigh argued in 2012, if there are damning disclosures which progressively undermines public confidence in the Intelligence Services.15

When damning disclosures occur, they not only impact on the democratic legitimacy of the Intelligence Services, but can also lead to a more adversarial relationship when the Intelligence Services are forced to engage with the public at ‘fire alarm’ moments. This is due to the fact that there is more coverage of their actions16 and therefore there is a need to defend themselves to society. By retreating from engagement with society except when forced to do so in times of trouble, the Intelligence Services will only ‘fight’ battles

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The closeness of cooperation between the NSA and GCHQ has always been evident, with Ian Leigh highlighting this theme in 2005 and how legislation did not include matters of cooperation. Please see: Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ in Who’s Watching the Spies?, edited by Hans Born, Loch K Johnson and Ian Leigh, (Dulles, Potomac Books, 2005), p. 82
Leigh’s assertion proved accurate in 2013 following Edward Snowden’s leaked revelations that the American NSA was undertaking numerous surveillance programmes, with GCHQ’s cooperation. These included the bulk collection of US domestic telephone, internet and email records, amalgamated by gathering data from telephone and internet companies as the NSA hacked firms such as Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo. For more information, please see:
The Guardian, GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world’s communications, Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davies and James Ball, 21st June 2013, Available From: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa (Accessed 16th November 2015);
for public support and legitimacy from a defensive position, when the depictions of intelligence are framed by the specifics of issues that highlight negative aspects of the operation of the Services, such as intelligence failures. This thesis examines how more regular, routine engagement with the public by the Intelligence Services can be a key form of intelligence accountability, and a form that allows wider and potentially more positive depictions to create the basis for the public’s awareness of the operation of the Services in support of the state and society.

With the British Intelligence Services reluctant to engage directly with the public due to concerns surrounding secrecy, and that public engagement is viewed as a ‘necessary evil’, much of the engagement between the intelligence realm and the public occurs via key avenues of wider Government, academia, news journalism, and popular culture. In order to explore these puzzles, the central research question of this thesis is:

*What are the avenues through which the public are provided with a portrayal of the British Intelligence Services and what depictions of the British Intelligence Services do these provide?*

Another way of explaining what the thesis examines is through the diagram below (Figure 1), created when wording the research question. The red arrows demonstrate upon which areas the PhD centres. Namely, exploring both what information the British Intelligence Services place in the public domain, either directly to the public via their websites, or indirectly via four key avenues: British Government, British academia, news journalism and popular culture. The portrayals that these individually provide to the public of the British Intelligence Services are analysed (arrow 3) in order to fully comprehend what views are in the public domain when they are such a crucial form of intelligence accountability.

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18 Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017
Assessing these depictions will help to fill a gap in the intelligence studies literature about how the British Intelligence Services engage with the public and what views are therefore in the public domain. Although numerous academics such as Sir David Omand, Simon Willmetts and Karen Lund Petersen have stressed the need to examine what portrayals of Intelligence Services are in the public domain,\textsuperscript{19} research investigating the details of the specific content of such portrayals has not yet been undertaken, it instead focuses on exploring how the communication occurs and the implications for intelligence scholars of taking a more cultural approach. This is particularly surprising as since 9/11, there has been the necessity for Intelligence Services to place more information in the public domain as they have been increasingly involved in the communication tasks of Government, through the public issuing of threat warnings, and the preparation of Government assessments.\textsuperscript{20} And yet the academic debate thus far merely acknowledges

\begin{itemize}
  \item Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners, pp. 37 – 56;
  \item Willmetts, S, ‘The Cultural Turn in Intelligence Studies’, Intelligence and National Security, (2019) 34/6, p. 800, 810–813;
  \item Petersen, K. L, ‘Three concepts of intelligence communication: awareness, advice or co-production’, Intelligence and National Security, 34/3 (2019), p. 325;
  \item Phythian, M, ‘Cultures of National Intelligence’, p.39;
  \item Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’ in Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services, edited by Daniel Baldino, (Sydney, The Federation Press, 2010), p. 195;
  \item Gill, P, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq,’ p. 15
\end{itemize}
the importance of examining these messages, despite the crucial role the public have in intelligence accountability. The absence of scholarly analysis of the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services that are in the public domain is a gap that this thesis seeks to fill and is thus an original contribution that it makes to the study of the British intelligence Services.

The thesis argues that whilst there is an attempt by the British Intelligence Services to engage directly with the public, due to tensions between openness and secrecy, information remains hidden in plain sight, and therefore the avenues, which all provide a subtly different portrayal, retain an important capability to inform the public about the intelligence realm. An important aspect of the argument of this thesis is that, whilst there is an attempt by the British Intelligence Services to directly engage with the public, this primarily occurs via their websites, leaving the onus on the individual both to know the websites exist, and to access them in order to inform themselves about the nature and work of the British Intelligence Services. This places the four key avenues of wider Government, academia, news journalism, and popular culture in a more influential position to provide the wider public with portrayals of the British Intelligence Services than would be the case if the Services took more extensive, pro-active steps to engage the public directly. Due to the diversity of these avenues, each one provides subtly different depictions of the British Intelligence Services. Yet, there are often strikingly similar features in the depictions that the different avenues provide. The four avenues tend to converge around portraying the British Intelligence Services as always striving to act both legally and ethically, while any failures to adhere to these standards emanate from limitations of legislation. 21

Whilst there remains an onus on the individual to watch the news, read a particular newspaper article or watch a certain programme, the four avenues all independently place more accessible information, in the public domain than the British Intelligence Services do, thus making the information more readily accessible as opposed to being hidden in plain sight. This reflects the fact that the four avenues are freed from the need to balance the tension between openness and secrecy in the same way that the British Intelligence

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21 Limitation of legislation is a phrase used throughout the thesis and refers to how the existing British legislation had loopholes, or themes weren’t explored in enough detail to fully stipulate what actions the British Intelligence Services were able to undertake.
Services do. Similarly, there are times when this is a consideration for both the wider British Government and news journalism, although not to the same extent as it is for the British Intelligence Services.

Tensions posed by the balance of openness and secrecy are not unique to the UK, as was intimated by Treverton’s analysis, mentioned above. The fieldwork conducted for this thesis in the United States brought out the Americans’ different approach to secrecy and openness. In the United States there is a much greater willingness to engage with the public on intelligence matters. One way of comparing the differing levels of public engagement is by comparing efforts by the two countries’ intelligence services to work with museums on exhibitions that inform the public about espionage and intelligence. The United States has the National Cryptologic Museum, which is the NSA principal way of engaging with the public.\(^\text{22}\) Originally created to house artefacts from key cryptologic historical moments and for NSA employees to reflect on successes and failures, the museum opened to the public in 1993. Alongside the artefacts which provide a glimpse into the history of the NSA, the museum now includes information about the individuals who have who have devoted their lives to cryptology and national security, details about the heritage of the profession of cryptologists, as well as a library full of NSA archives, and of course, a gift shop.\(^\text{23}\)

This is in stark contrast to the practice of Britain’s Intelligence Services, which most definitely do not undertake such activities. Britain not only lacks an entire museum devoted to intelligence work, but perhaps the closest it comes, the “Secret War” exhibition at the Imperial War Museum in London. This is based on publicly available sources and was put together without any engagement from the British Intelligence Services.\(^\text{24}\) Another example of the differences between American openness and British secrecy in intelligence matters is the fact that in Washington, DC the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Building is clearly signposted, on both a street sign, and a plaque outside the building (see Figures 2 and 3 below). While the locations MI5 and MI6.

\(^\text{22}\) National Cryptologic Museum, \textit{Home}, Available From: https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic-heritage/museum/ (Accessed 27\textsuperscript{th} March 2019)

\(^\text{23}\) National Cryptologic Museum, \textit{About Us}, Available From: https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic-heritage/museum/about/ (Accessed 3\textsuperscript{rd} December 2019)

\(^\text{24}\) Imperial War Museum, \textit{Secret War Exhibit}, London, United Kingdom, 16\textsuperscript{th} September 2015
buildings in central London are known by most (perhaps in part due to the inclusion in films), they are not formally acknowledged by signposting or identification in the same manner that American Intelligence Services were.

(Figures 2 and 3)²⁵

Figure 2 (left) shows a street sign on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington D.C directing where to go to find the FBI Building. Figure 3 (right) is the sign outside the FBI Headquarters and reads 935 Pennsylvania Avenue FBI Headquarters.

The signage outside Intelligence Headquarters in the two capitals demonstrates differing approaches to openness and secrecy, with Britain seemingly favouring the latter when compared to her American counterpart. This suggests that there may in fact be a unique British way of intelligence, something Mike Goodman has discussed. He states that to fully understand British Intelligence, it is important to examine how intelligence is organised in the UK, and the underlying rationales for the structure and how it fits within wider Government due to the unique historical culture. By doing this, Goodman argues, British Intelligence breaks down into two central component parts, the committee style

²⁵ Photo taken by Abigail Blyth in Washington D.C, 16th September 2016
approach and the drive for consensus which date back to Maurice Hankey’s centralised cabinet system of Government introduced in 1916.26

These two themes are prevalent in exploring the role of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). Composed of heads of the Intelligence Services and senior figures within policy making departments, the JIC ‘discusses and sets the priorities and requirements for collection’ which are then arranged into Bands with Band 1 being the highest priority, down to Band 7 being collection when there is an opportunity to do so. However, MI5’s statutory basis resists such banding, and necessitates MI5 to focus on protecting the UK against threats.27 It is this committee style approach, Goodman argues, that creates the drive for consensus, in stark contrast to America where dissenting views are acknowledged within the National Intelligence Estimates. However, since the Iraq War, there is now the option to include dissent in British intelligence analysis.28

Goodman’s analysis demonstrates how Britain’s unique historical context continues to influence the structure and operations of British Intelligence in a contemporary context. Thus, it is apt to argue that there is a British way in Intelligence, an assertion which is prevalent throughout the thesis. Indeed, it was particularly noticeable when undertaking fieldwork in terms of the openness and willingness to engage with my research from American officials compared to their British counterparts. This allows for the thesis to build upon Goodman’s argument of the British way in Intelligence by comparing and contrasting the two countries and in particular, through their relationships with intelligence accountability mechanisms.

The different relationship which America and the UK have with openness and secrecy potentially emerges from how intelligence as an academic discipline emerged in America in the 1960s29 which Len Scott argues resulted in:

27 Goodman, M, ‘The British way in Intelligence’, p. 131–133
A degree of informed debate and a degree of openness that was in stark contrast to Britain, where lessons were considered entirely within the very narrow Whitehall confines. There was no public or parliamentary debate.\textsuperscript{30}

Scott’s analysis succinctly highlights key differences between the two countries in their approaches to openness and secrecy, thus furthering the assertion of a British way in intelligence. This occurs in how any discussions in the UK occur within the confines of Whitehall, thus preventing any public accountability. This is in contrast to America as well as parts of Eastern Europe and Latin America, where the creation of intelligence accountability occurred in response to revelation, allegation or moral panics.\textsuperscript{31} In the American context, intelligence accountability was created in 1976 following the revelations of the Watergate scandal which led to the establishment of the Church Committee.\textsuperscript{32} But for Britain, the ISC was created exogenously, and not in response to wrongdoing. Therefore, Phillip Davies highlights that Britain is an example of how intelligence accountability can be implemented when there has been no ‘fire alarm’

\textsuperscript{32} The Watergate scandal refers to the burglary of the Democratic National Committee Offices in the Watergate complex in Washington D.C in 1972 and the attempts by President Richard Nixon to cover up his involvement in allowing American intelligence agencies to undertake more domestic surveillance. This was after it was discovered that the 5 burglars were all part of the President’s re-election campaign. For more information, please see: CNN.com, Watergate scandal: A look back at the scandal that changed US politics, Faith Karimi, 17\textsuperscript{th} May 2017, Available From: https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/17/politics/watergate-scandal-look-back/index.html (Accessed 30\textsuperscript{th} October 2019)
United States Senate, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (The Church Committee), Available From: https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/ChurchCommittee.htm (Accessed 25\textsuperscript{th} February 2017)
moment. But, by not being forced into openness, the British intelligence accountability mechanisms remain shrouded in secrecy, something which should not be surprising due to the way in which secrecy has been a central component to the extent that any information was covered by the Official Secrets Act. But, it is problematic as it hampers public accountability of the British Intelligence Services, which in turn causes problems for their democratic legitimacy.

This demonstrates another way in which the unique historical context of British Intelligence continues to impact on the current mechanisms. Although Goodman’s analysis of how the British way in intelligence is centred upon the committee style approach and drive for consensus, the thesis builds on this and Davies assertions of the uniqueness of the UK context, as it argues that the pervasiveness of secrecy is another key characteristic of the British way in intelligence.

Literature Review

As the discussion above on the research puzzle of this thesis demonstrated, there is an acknowledgement within the intelligence studies literature of the importance of assessing what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services are in the public domain. By examining different facets of the intelligence studies literature, this section demonstrates how the sub-genres of intelligence accountability, cultural intelligence which includes the cultural cold war and popular culture literatures, intelligence failures, accounts

33 Davies, P, ‘Britain’s Machinery of Intelligence Accountability: Realistic oversight in the absence of moral panic’, p. 134, 40
34 BBC News, Whitehall’s Culture of Secrecy, Available From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/990242.stm (Accessed 8th December 2015);
Vincent, D, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain: 1832 – 1998;
Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 9/11’, p. 725, 728
Davies, P, ‘Britain’s Machinery of Intelligence Accountability: Realistic oversight in the absence of moral panic’, p. 155
BBC News, Whitehall’s Culture of Secrecy, Available From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/990242.stm (Accessed 8th December 2015);
Vincent, D, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain: 1832 – 1998
BBC News, Whitehall’s Culture of Secrecy, Available From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/990242.stm (Accessed 8th December 2015);
Vincent, D, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain: 1832 – 1998;
Gill, P, Policing Politics – Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State, p. 50, 80;
Scott, L, ‘British Strategic Intelligence in the Cold War’, p. 140
written by former practitioners, teaching intelligence, and media studies all explore themes central to this thesis.

**Intelligence Accountability Literature**

The intelligence accountability literature has been of most use due to the numerous themes central to the thesis which it explores. These include: limitations of legislation, the tensions between openness and secrecy, and the role of the public and news journalism as forms of intelligence accountability. In analysing the balance between openness and secrecy, Leigh explores the importance of Intelligence Services ensuring democratic legitimacy by adhering to ethical standards. He argues that this has been challenged by the relationship between oversight and international intelligence cooperation activities.\(^\text{37}\) Focusing on the implementation and activities of the ISC and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission,\(^\text{38}\) Leigh’s detailed examination explores limitations of legislation as the passage below demonstrates.

\textit{The legislation lacks detail. It is startling to find, for example, that the key term ‘national security’ is not defined with any precision. The legal implication is that the agencies are able to move flexibly into new areas of work without seeking explicit parliamentary approval.}\(^\text{39}\)


Leigh, I, ‘Intelligence and the Law in the United Kingdom’, p. 644–647

\(^{39}\) Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 95; This is a theme also explored on page 82 in relation to how the Intelligence Services Act which governs the actions of GCHQ, does not detail the arrangement for international cooperation, something which is central to the work of GCHQ as they share vast amounts of information with the American National Security Agency.
This is a theme repeated throughout Leigh’s numerous publications.\textsuperscript{40} The overall arguments have provided a clear base for the research puzzle in terms of how the democratic legitimacy which the British Intelligence Services are seeking to maintain can be affected by wider themes such as the limitations of legislation. This provides a starting point on which the thesis builds by assessing what portrayals are in the public domain, something which can impact upon the democratic legitimacy which the British Intelligence Services are striving for.

The tensions between openness and secrecy are discussed by Len Scott and Peter Jackson by highlighting the problems which emerge from the lack of an accepted definition of intelligence. They highlight that increasingly, there is ‘all source analysis’ which means that ‘intelligence estimates are almost always based on a combination of secret and open source information, very often drawn from government departments that have no direct involvement in secret intelligence’. Thus, it is difficult to judge what intelligence policymakers receive, a problem which they argue is exacerbated by secrecy.\textsuperscript{41} This intimates that the balance between openness and secrecy in the UK, is favouring the latter. Although there may be times when the Government does not want to expand on the use of intelligence, by discussing it more openly with the public would aid public comprehension of the intelligence realm and the relationship between intelligence and

\textsuperscript{40} Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 9/11’, p. 723

\textsuperscript{41} Scott, L, and Jackson P, ‘Intelligence’, in Palgrave Advances – International History, edited by Patrick Finney, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 164; This is a theme which Peter Gill and Mark Phythian also reference, highlighting how the relationship between intelligence and policy is not always explored in public statements. For more information, please see:

Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p.103

For more information, please see:

Leigh, I, ‘Intelligence and the Law in the United Kingdom’, p. 643;
Leigh, I, ‘National Courts and International Intelligence Cooperation’, p. 236;
Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 79, 80–83;
Leigh, I, ‘More Closely Watching the Spies: Three Decades of Experiences,’ p. 5;
Leigh, I ‘Accountability and Intelligence Cooperation – Framing the Issue’, p. 7;
Gill, P, ‘Theories of Intelligence’, p. 50
Gill, P, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the Challenge of Security Networks’, p. 939
Government. This is particularly prevalent in the UK context after the allegations of intelligence being politicised in the lead up to the Iraq War.

The Intelligence accountability literature increasingly acknowledges how the relationship between British Intelligence and the public is conducted by the media, and specifically news journalism.\textsuperscript{42} However, despite the centrality of this relationship, Richard Aldrich rightly argues it has received minimal analysis.\textsuperscript{43} This is slowly changing, as those specialising in intelligence accountability such as Claudia Hillebrand, Cris Matei, Karen Lund Petersen, Sir David Omand, Mike Goodman and Robert Dover examine the relationship between intelligence and the media,\textsuperscript{44} this thesis will contribute to the growing discussion due to the contemporary analysis undertaken. Hillebrand’s analysis of news journalists reporting of intelligence proved a useful starting point, as she explores how they are crucial to inform and educate the public in the realm of intelligence. However, news journalism’s scrutiny of intelligence matters remains indirect, informal and infrequent, arguably due to the media strategies adopted by the Intelligence Services and their Governments. Hillebrand argues that these actions include the use of excessive secrecy which acts as a blanket to conceal abuse, corruption, or incompetence, only providing sporadic information from insiders, and the Intelligence Services simply refusing to respond to stories which journalists are reporting on.\textsuperscript{45} All of these contribute to the limited coverage of intelligence issues by restricting the work of news journalists.

Examining the case of America, Denmark and the UK, Petersen explores why these Intelligence Services communicate with the public, arguing that it is either as a form of


\textsuperscript{43} Aldrich, R, ‘Regulation by Revelation? p. 13


\textsuperscript{45} Hillebrand, C, ‘The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight’, p. 701–704
awareness, advice or co-production. In particular, Petersen’s communication as awareness argument proves insightful as she states how it is:

A means to create accountability in the institution by creating a general democratic public awareness. Openness and secrecy are the defining counter-concepts, as the concept of communication relies on the classical dilemma between the need for security national interest against the need for democratic debate.

Using Petersen’s analysis, the thesis’ focuses upon portrayals of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain examines how the communication of these messages provides an awareness of the intelligence realm.

Both Petersen and Hillebrand (in her discussion of the role of news journalism), explore the importance of assessing what depictions of the intelligence realm are in the public domain. But, for both, this is a passing theme to their analysis which centres upon why the Intelligence Services engage with the public, and the role the media have in holding the Intelligence Services to account, respectively. Thus, the thesis will contribute to this literature via its originality in exploring the depictions.

The intelligence accountability literature has been incredibly useful due to its emphasis upon what information is placed in the public domain. This leads to a growing discussion pertaining to news journalism and its role in informing the public. But despite this, it fails to examine how the British Intelligence Services are portrayed via news journalism or any of the other avenues which this thesis explores.

Cultural Intelligence Literature
Cultural intelligence studies fall into two broad categories: one takes an anthropological approach to determine a specific intelligence culture, while the other studies media

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46 Petersen, K. L, ‘Three concepts of intelligence communication: awareness, advice or co-production’, pp. 317–328
47 Petersen, K. L, ‘Three concepts of intelligence communication: awareness, advice or co-production’, p. 319
representations of espionage which can include the study of spy fiction. The latter will be used in this thesis due to the way in which the four avenues identified above provide cultural narratives about the British Intelligence Services for the public domain. Trevor McCrisken and Christopher Moran argue that cultural products should be viewed as a legitimate source of study and research as they ‘contribute significantly to the production and reproduction of narratives about, and within, the political world’. As McCrisken and Moran state:

\[\text{The way in which the general public understand their [Intelligence Services] work, is to a significant extent, culturally constructed.}\]

This highlights that whilst cultural intelligence studies explore why such research is crucial, it occurs fleetingly, such as McCrisken and Moran’s article which examines the role James Bond has on public understandings of the intelligence realm, and the relationship between Bond and the real world of intelligence. They argue that it has ‘filled a public knowledge vacuum about intelligence agencies and security threats’. To illustrate this point, they highlight a feature that an Italian magazine ran in 1966, which saw readers send in questions about being a real-life spy. The most comment responses were whether you had to be a bachelor, did the job come with a fast car and how many people would you have to kill in a year. This demonstrates McCrisken and Moran’s assertion of how Bond has fulfilled public knowledge about the intelligence realm. Indeed, had the British Intelligence Services been more open about their actions, Bond would not have been in such an influential position. It is therefore important to fully comprehend what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are in the public domain, something this thesis seeks to ascertain.

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51 Willmetts, S, ‘The Cultural Turn in Intelligence Studies’, p. 810
The Cultural Cold War and James Bond literatures which encompass intelligence and media academics are key sub-genres which are the basis of the thesis’ analysis. They do examine themes salient to the thesis, such as; how historically the Intelligence Services engaged with the different avenues being discussed, what themes the early British spy novel explored, or specific themes in the Bond franchise.\textsuperscript{53} However, these literatures do not provide a cohesive, contemporary overview of the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services across various forms of popular culture. Thus, the originality of this thesis will contribute to these different literatures which address only one facet of the research puzzle.

\textit{Cultural Cold War, James Bond and Popular Culture Literatures}

The Cultural Cold War literature provided a useful starting point for understanding how important popular culture can be in providing a specific depiction to the public. It also served to highlight how the British as well as the American Intelligence Services cooperated with academics, authors and journalists,\textsuperscript{54} aiding the decision as to which avenues of dissemination to analyse in this thesis. In particular, it explores the role of popular culture at a time when the West was seeking to demonstrate their superiority within culture, socio-economic and political systems. Both Frances Stonor-Saunders and Hugh Wilford examine how the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in

\begin{itemize}
  \item Stafford, D, \textit{The Silent Game – The Real World of Imaginary Spies}, (Toronto, Lester & Opren Dennys Limited, 1988), p. 156;
  \item Schou, N, \textit{Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood}, p. 1-2, 20, 87;
\end{itemize}
conjunction with MI6, undertook cultural as opposed to political warfare by creating literary prizes, funded literary entities as well as opening art exhibitions and music festivals.55

Nicholas Schou explores similar themes as he highlights how the CIA used news journalism and popular culture in the Cold War, with a particular emphasis on the US activities in Vietnam and Nicaragua before examining how such actions continue.56 By interviewing news journalists and CIA officers, Schou seeks to provide both perspectives, although his writing does suggest he is scathing of the CIA for their willingness to engage with news journalism as he questions why Guantanamo Bay would need public affairs officers.57 But despite this, it is a starting point to understand the similarities and differences between the UK and US Intelligence Services engagement with the public domain, and how openness can occur without hampering ongoing intelligence activities.

The dedicated James Bond literature tends to have a narrow scope, focusing on a particular theme such as exploring geopolitics or the role of gender and sexuality within the James Bond franchise.58 Whilst these provide a useful starting point for the popular culture analysis, the Bond literature fails to address what depictions of intelligence are

56 One clear example of this which Schou explores is the policy of embedding journalists into specific military units, a policy the US first initiated during the Vietnam War. However, since 9/11, this has been continually used by the US Department of Defence based at the Pentagon and there have also been TV programmes about such activities such as the 2008 TV Mini Series Generation Kill about a Rolling Stone reporter embedded with the 1st Recon Marines in Baghdad in 2003.
57 Schou, N, Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood, p. 81
Another example of the narrow literature is evident in Joseph Oldham’s chapter: ‘The Man behind the Desk and Other Bureaucracies’ which focuses on intelligence leadership in popular culture
provided through the films and books. The popular culture analysis was further aided by the discussions from intelligence studies academics such as Robert Dover, Moran, Scott and Jackson and to a lesser extent, Omand examining this theme. They have all discussed the importance of assessing the relationship between intelligence and popular culture, and have undertaken some analysis of the relationship such as ethical considerations.\textsuperscript{59}

Dover’s examination of what depictions are provided within \textit{Spooks}, the Bond franchise and the American drama \textit{24}\textsuperscript{60} is the closest to what the thesis explores in Chapter 6 ‘A Fractious Relationship’. He argues that popular culture depictions of intelligence provide a distorted and fragmentary view of intelligence, leading the public to think they know what Intelligence Services do, which can create new realities within which policymakers begin to operate.\textsuperscript{61} This is a salient theme, as it was through popular culture that the Committee of Imperial Defence created the forerunners to MI5 and MI6 in 1909.\textsuperscript{62} But, by focusing on the British context, as well as placing popular culture depictions within a wider analysis, of how key avenues where popular culture is just one, this thesis builds on Dover’s analysis to fully comprehend the portrayals provided by the British Intelligence Services, British Government, academia, news journalism and popular culture.

Emanating from a communication studies perspective, Tricia Jenkins analyses the role of popular culture in conditioning the public on intelligence matters in the post-9/11 world.\textsuperscript{63} Although focusing on the American context, with no discussion of Britain or any other country, Jenkins provides an overarching understanding of how influential popular culture can be in educating the public, although she does not examine the substance of the depiction provided by popular culture. Therefore, the existing academic literature exhibits the importance of researching what depictions of the British

\begin{footnotes}
\item[59] Scott, L, and Jackson, P, ‘Journeys in Shadows’, p. 18
\item[61] Dover, R, ‘From Vauxhall Cross with Love’, p. 201–202
\item[63] Jenkins, T, and Alford, M, ‘Intelligence Activity in Hollywood: Remembering the “Agency” in CIA’, p. 7–8
\end{footnotes}
Intelligence Services are provided by the specific avenues, but how these come together to form an overarching portrayal.

This section has examined different facets of the intelligence studies, cultural cold war, media studies and James Bond literatures. All of these sub-genres have acknowledged the importance of assessing what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services are in the public domain, but have not undertaken this rigorous analysis, thus establishing the originality of this thesis.

Intelligence Failures Literature
The intelligence failures literature has proven useful due to its focus on the case study of the lead up to the Iraq War in 2002, when the British Intelligence Services were discussed extensively within the public domain. This was due to how the British Government published altered intelligence assessments stating that Saddam Hussein had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Since 2003 and the Iraq invasion, Michael Wesley argues that much has been written about intelligence failures and, in particular, the politicisation of intelligence. Examining both the US and UK context, Giovanni Coletta’s detailed analysis explores how the failure of the Iraq intelligence assessments in 2002 was due to structural and methodological flaws in intelligence analysis which were exacerbated and intensified by politicisation. Although something of an overview of both the US and UK contexts, Coletta’s analysis provides an understanding of how the politicisation occurred, such as policymakers encouraging the Intelligence Services to focus on particular themes, and its role in enhancing existing problems within intelligence analysis. Paul Pillar, a former US intelligence analyst, is scathing of the Bush

64 This was noticeably prevalent in the Cultural Intelligence Studies literature with Simon Willmetts in particular, highlighting the importance of the theme.
67 Coletta, G, ‘Politicising Intelligence: what went wrong with the UK and US assessments on Iraq WMD in 2002’, p. 73
administration who deviated from professional standards by ignoring intelligence assessments as they sought to make the case for war, and instead selected pieces of raw intelligence to bolster support for the war. He therefore makes recommendations of how to fix the intelligence-policy relationship, which includes having the legislative monitor the relationship, enhance the role of the ombudsman in the CIA, and have a stronger declaration that the Intelligence Services should not be part of policy advocacy. Combined with Pillar, this provides an insight into how the politicisation occurred in the lead up to the Iraq War, albeit without analysing what portrayals of the Intelligence Services the Governments were providing. Thus, the thesis will contribute to this understanding in the intelligence failures literature.

Geoffrey Treverton also explores the politicisation in the context of the Iraq War and the belief that Saddam Hussein had WMDs. He highlights the 5 key reasons why politicisation can occur namely: direct pressure from senior officials; cherry-picking; question-asking; taking a house line on a particular subject; and having a shared mindset. Treverton also analyses how all were evident in the build up to the Iraq War. In contrast, Leigh examines how the Intelligence Services can be politicised when their neutrality is affected, demonstrating the numerous ways in which politicisation of intelligence manifests. However, by simply focusing on the ways in which politicisation occurs, there remains an omission in detailing what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services were evident at the time of the intelligence failure, demonstrating originality and contribution to the thesis.

Peter Gill and Michael Wesley explore the politicisation of intelligence in the lead up to the Iraq War, with Gill focusing on the role of the media in the politicisation process. This is in the wider context of exploring the relationship between knowledge (intelligence) and power (policy) which Gill utilises to understand the intelligence failures and how the media were utilised by the Government, such as naming Dr David

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69 Treverton, G, *Intelligence for an age of Terror*, p. 174
70 Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 84
Kelly as the source behind Andrew Gilligan’s BBC Radio 4 Today Programme assertions that the Iraq dossier had been ‘sexed up’.\footnote{2}{BBC News, \textit{Full text: Gilligan’s Today reports}, 24\textsuperscript{th} July 2003, Available From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3090681.stm (Accessed 4\textsuperscript{th} May 2018); BBC News, \textit{Dr David Kelly: Controversial death examined}, 17\textsuperscript{th} December 2011, Available From: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13716127 (Accessed 4\textsuperscript{th} May 2018); Gill, P, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq,’ p. 24, 29}

This means Gills analysis does not explore what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services were evident in the media as a result of the politicisation. In contrast, Wesley criticises how close the heads of the Intelligence Services in the UK, America and Australia were to policymakers.\footnote{73}{Peter Gill also makes reference to the politicisation of intelligence in the lead up to the Iraq War}

Drawing the distinction between intelligence being policy relevant and intelligence being politicised, Wesley argues that intelligence analysis is about providing facts to policymakers on which policy must be based.\footnote{74}{Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’ p. 188} The analysis provides a clear understanding of how separate intelligence and policy should be in order to prevent politicisation. This is perhaps most eloquently highlighted when he argues that Intelligence Services ‘play a distinct role in the business of Government’.\footnote{75}{In the UK context, there were assertions of a closeness not between the heads of MI5 and MI6 with policymakers, but rather between Sir John Scarlett, the head of the JIC with policymakers For more information: Please see: Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’ p. 189–190; The Independent, \textit{WMD and the fatal war of misinformation}, Raymond Whitaker, 25\textsuperscript{th} January 2004, Available From: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/wmd-and-the-fatal-war-of-misinformation-75254.html (Accessed 23\textsuperscript{rd} September 2019)}


\section*{Literature written by Former Practitioners}

Former practitioners writing about the intelligence realm is another sub-genre which has proved useful as it provides a first-hand perspective on the intelligence realm. This was notable in Pillar’s exploration of the ways politicisation can occur.\footnote{77}{Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’ p. 190} These provide an unparalleled understanding of the issues the intelligence community faced in the disclosure of politicised intelligence assessments. However, with all former practitioners, there is the possibility of them simply wanting to portray former employers in a positive manner, as opposed to being critical of both Intelligence Services and their actions.
Whilst this must always be considered, they still prove a useful source of information which would otherwise not be in the public domain, a theme which Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ explores. Although it is far more common in the US context for former intelligence practitioners to turn to academia, it has occurred fleetingly in the UK, with Sir David Omand a contemporary example.

Omand’s work has been influential in this thesis as it explores how the public should be informed on intelligence matters, and argues that this is required due to the over-reliance upon news journalism to provide an informed understanding of intelligence to the public. This implies the necessity for the British Intelligence Services to further their own engagement with the public to prevent an over reliance on news journalism for an understanding of the British Intelligence Services. Like Omand, Treverton, a former practitioner, explores that public trust is crucial for the Intelligence Services in democratic countries to operate in secret. Although centred on the American case, Treverton’s overall arguments prove a useful starting point for assessing how important

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78 When attending the International Studies Association Annual Conferences in 2016 and 2018, this theme was incredibly noticeable. Several US academics précised their presentations by saying that they used to work in the US Intelligence Services. This information is often also highlighted on their academic staff profiles. See below for examples of this:


79 This is a theme which Chapter 5 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ explores in more detail but is worth highlighting how the academic writings of former practitioners although covering multiple themes, provide another insight into how the British Intelligence Services wish to engage with the public.

80 Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners,’ p. 43–44

81 Treverton, G, *Intelligence for an age of Terror*, p. 66, 235;

In 1975, Treverton served on The Church Committee which was the name given to the first Senate Intelligence Committee after its Chair, Senator Frank Church. It was created to look at the CIA domestic activities, as well as covert activity abroad which included the assassination of foreign leaders, alleged abuses by the Internal Revenue Service, FBI allegedly undertaking domestic spying by the military and the alleged interceptions of the conversations of US citizens by the NSA. For more information on this, please see:


82 Treverton, G, *Intelligence for an age of Terror*, p. 235;

This is one of many themes discussed by Treverton but considering the Central Research Question and research puzzle, is the most useful for this research. He also explores the role of technology on the intelligence cycle in th 21st Century, a theme which will be further explored in Chapter 2, as well as how in the post 9/11 context, there has been the ‘blurring distinctions between crime, terrorism and war’.

Treverton, G, *Intelligence for an age of Terror*, p. 134;


83 Treverton, G, *Intelligence for an age of Terror*, p. 84-5, 122
it is to balance secrecy and openness, as well as what portrayals of Intelligence Services are in the public domain.

Teaching Intelligence Literature
Teaching intelligence has continually been discussed in an American context\textsuperscript{84} since the creation of intelligence as an academic discipline in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{85} This has created an American centric discourse which fails to understand intelligence structures and practises in other countries. As the thesis centres on the British context, it will aid the existing American dominated teaching intelligence literature. Currently, there is a growing emphasis on the British approach to teaching intelligence,\textsuperscript{86} with many of these comparing it to the US. By providing an overview of the British approach to teaching intelligence at different universities, Goodman explores how post 9/11, the British academic study of intelligence was at the same point that American academia was in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{87} Helen Dexter, Mark Phythian and David Strachan-Morris further these themes when exploring the subtle differences between the UK and US intelligence academic discipline by exploring how they teach intelligence at Leicester University where they are all based.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{84} An example of this is how Loch Johnson has written about the links between the CIA and academia; Johnson, L. K, ‘Spies and scholars in the United States: winds of ambivalence in the groves of academe’, Intelligence and National Security, 34/1 (2019), p. 1–21


\textsuperscript{86} An example of this can be seen in an article written by Christopher Moran who although explores intelligence popular culture, has also written an article about the teaching of intelligence where he uses examples from the module he convened. In particular, he discusses how successful it proved to be to have former practitioners come and talk to the students and provides comments from the students to support this. For more information, please see: Moran, C, ‘Note on Teaching Intelligence’ Intelligence and National Security, 31/1, (2016) pp. 118–130


This emerging literature from established intelligence academics explores the ways in which intelligence is being taught in the UK. But, it also analyses the mechanisms through which cooperation between intelligence services and academia occurs, with a particular emphasis upon engagement with former practitioners. This proved useful for Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’; although its usefulness was limited as the literature does not discuss what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are portrayed by intelligence academia. This occurs due to the teaching intelligence literature being predominantly based on individuals’ experiences, as opposed to analysing what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are evident within academia. Thus, the thesis will contribute to this understanding of what portrayals are evident within academia and whether the type of publication, such as an official history, affects this.

Media Studies Literature
Media studies scholars (such as Brian McNair and Richard Keeble) examine the important role of news journalism in providing the public with information to make an informed political decision. Bernard Margueritte agrees with this to the extent that he describes journalists as a pillar of democracy. Henry Heald concurs, stating that journalism is a foundation of democracy, considering the centrality of journalists in informing the public. Schou furthers this theme, stating that an informed citizenry is an essential cornerstone in a democratic country. Therefore, it is clear that news journalism can be a key way in which the public are informed and educated on intelligence themes,

90 Moran, C, ‘Note on Teaching Intelligence’ pp. 118–130;
94 Schou, N, Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood, p. 5
and therefore important to assess what depictions of the British Intelligence Services it provides.

Chapman Pincher’s numerous books have also been utilised in order to provide a first-hand understanding of the historical relationship between news journalism and the British Intelligence Services. The overall arguments provide a clear starting point as he seeks to include the perspectives of the British Intelligence Services and does state when the information has been provided by them, something particularly evident in *Too Secret Too Long*\(^\text{95}\) which portrays the British Intelligence Services as seeking to act legally and ethically. In his autobiography *Dangerous To Know*, the excessive secrecy surrounding intelligence matters and thus the role of journalists in seeking to overcome this is continually highlighted.\(^\text{96}\)

In *The Truth About Dirty Tricks*, Pincher further discusses what he sees as the desire of the British Intelligence Services to always act legally and ethically, even in the face of difficult situations such as the troubles in Northern Ireland.\(^\text{97}\) This remained an overarching theme in *Their Trade is Treachery* which, based on disclosures from Peter Wright,\(^\text{98}\) examines how the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services was significantly affected by the Cambridge Five, and other moles such as Harry Houghton at the Underwater Weapons Establishment.\(^\text{99}\) This is combined with the continued suggestions that the former Director General (DG) of MI5 Sir Roger Hollis

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\(^{98}\) Pincher, C, *Dangerous to Know*, p. 221;


\(^{99}\) Pincher, C, ‘Reflections on a Lifetime of Reporting on Intelligence Affairs’, p. 162

The Cambridge Five refers to Five individuals, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt, Kim Philby and John Cairncross were Soviet moles within British Intelligence after they were recruited at Cambridge University during the 1930s.
was also a Soviet mole.\textsuperscript{100} Despite the book ostensibly describing events,\textsuperscript{101} it insinuates that British Intelligence was something of a leaky cauldron during the Cold War, due to the actions of individuals in providing information to the Soviet Union. Perhaps it is through his close cooperation with the British Intelligence Services that Pincher is able to imply where the issues emanated from.

Pincher’s overall arguments are useful for understanding the history of excessive secrecy surrounding the British Intelligence Services. This is combined with the first-hand accounts he includes from intelligence officers, although there is only Pincher’s account of the discussions. Yet, what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services were evident either within the wider media or other facets of the public domain is not explored.

The intelligence accountability literature explored themes central to the wider research puzzle such as the tension between openness and secrecy, how this can affect what information is placed in the public domain, and the ways in which public accountability can occur. Whilst all of the literatures surveyed have been incredibly useful, they tend to have applicability for one avenue discussed. This highlights how little scholarly attention has been focused upon examining what overarching depictions of intelligence are contained within popular culture, demonstrating the original contribution which can be made by this research. However, the intelligence accountability literature has been useful throughout due to its discussion of the overarching themes which are central to the research puzzle. Whilst the thesis contributes to all of the literatures assessed, it is intelligence accountability where the thesis situates itself.

\textsuperscript{100} Pincher, C, \textit{Their Trade Is Treachery}, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd, 1981), p. 3, 11-13, 38-41, 57-58, 67-68, 69-72, 76, 79-81, 158; Security Service, \textit{Who We Are, Former Director Generals – Sir Roger Hollis}, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/sir-roger-hollis (Accessed 12\textsuperscript{th} September 2019); Pincher goes on to argue that Hollis’s handling of the Profumo Affair could not have been more advantageous to the Soviets than if Moscow had been monitoring the situation daily. The Profumo Affair centred on the War Minister John Profumo having an affair with Christine Keeler who was friendly with the Soviet military attaché Eugene Ivanov and it was thought that Profumo was passing state secrets to the Soviets via Keeler after a KGB agent who was passing information to the FBI claimed that Ivanov had installed a microphone in Keeler’s bedroom and had been gathering valuable intelligence by listening to the pillow talk between Profumo and Keeler. For more information, please see: Pincher, C, \textit{Too Secret Too Long}, p. 317-332

\textsuperscript{101} Pincher, C, \textit{Too Secret Too Long}, p. 12-13, 16-21
Pincher, C, \textit{Their Trade Is Treachery}, p. 82-87
Methodology

The Case Studies
To analyse the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain, two case studies stood out as being obvious examples to analyse the depictions evident due to the substantial attention from all of the avenues namely British Government, academia, news journalism and popular culture that they received. The case studies are the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003 and the Snowden revelations in 2013. Not only was intelligence an important factor in both cases, but both cases also conveyed specific portrayals of intelligence to the public.

In the lead up to the Iraq War, the British Intelligence Services were placed at the centre of the political and public discourse when Blair’s Government sought to make the public case for war via intelligence assessments. These were made in a JIC report relating to Iraqi WMD that became known first as the September dossier and then the dodgy dossier. This report sought to further the Blair Government’s aims and objectives in justifying an invasion of Iraq by stating that Saddam had WMDs and was ready to use them, as well as drawing links between Saddam and Al Qaeda. Furthermore, and of most concern to the British public, the dossier implied that British military personnel stationed in Cyprus could be attacked by WMDs from Iraq at very short notice (within 45 minutes). The report acquired the nickname ‘dodgy dossier’ when it became known that the intelligence assessments it contained were altered by the Blair Government to make the case for war more persuasive.

The government’s willingness to amend intelligence reports reflects the high priority it placed upon Britain’s role in supporting the United States in this conflict, which was revealed in the finding of the Chilcot inquiry that Blair promised President Bush that he would ‘be with him whatever' as an ally against Iraq. British Intelligence continued to be in the spotlight after the 2003 invasion of Iraq due to their alleged involvement in the American rendition of terror suspects and the use of torture techniques in President

Bush’s Global War on Terror, with one Libyan citizen claiming that Britain was complicit in his rendition to a Gadaffi controlled Libya where he was tortured. However, due to the prominence of the British Intelligence Services in the decisions leading to the war, it is solely these portrayals which the research will seek to analyse.

Ten years later, the British Intelligence Services were in the news again. In June 2013, the former CIA contractor Edward Snowden leaked classified documents to investigative journalists about how America’s National Security Agency (NSA), had implemented the bulk collection of domestic telephone, internet and email records by collecting data from telephone companies. Along with the NSA, GCHQ was a key partner in the Prism surveillance programme where the NSA tapped directly into the servers of nine global internet firms, including Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo. These disclosures were published in *The Guardian*, The revelations demonstrated the role of the media in holding the Intelligence Services to account. This then resulted in Britain’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) who oversees the British Intelligence Services, seeking to examine the most serious claims made by Snowden pertaining to British Intelligence in

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The closeness of cooperation between the NSA and GCHQ has always been evident, with Ian Leigh highlighting this theme in 2005 and how legislation did not include matters of cooperation. Please see: Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 82.


the Privacy and Security Report.\textsuperscript{110} This demonstrates the role of the media within the accountability process as without the revelations purported in the media, the ISC would not have instigated such an inquiry, as Chapter 6 ‘A Complicated Relationship’ will examine further.

**Triangulation of Sources**
One of the first academic articles I read when undertaking this PhD was Phillip Davies’ ‘Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of the Elite Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Service’. In it, he discusses that to research intelligence; the ideal balance of sources is to combine interviews with memoirs, secondary sources and other available documents.\textsuperscript{111} This triangulation attempts to overcome the problems of one narrative from dominating the research, particularly if it is not reliable. It is particularly useful as Gill states that:

> Researching and writing about security intelligence matters is fraught with difficulties; doing so with respect to the UK is yet more so. Why? Researchers depend on information about their subject matter, and information on these matters is difficult to come by; therefore there may just be very little to go on.\textsuperscript{112}

Therefore, the triangulation approach allows for the inclusion of multiple sources to overcome the issues of secrecy surrounding the British Intelligence Services. One of the ways that the triangulation approach was applied in the research for this thesis was by undertaking elite interviews with British, European and American officials. Interviewing Britain’s international partners, who have become increasingly important as a result of the post-9/11 expansion in bilateral and multilateral cooperation,\textsuperscript{113} furthered the

\textsuperscript{110} Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and Security, p. 1

\textsuperscript{111} Davies, P, ‘Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of the Elite Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Service’, Politics, 21/1 (2001), p. 74

\textsuperscript{112} Gill, P, Policing Politics, p. 35

\textsuperscript{113} Following the Global War on Terror bilateral and multilateral cooperation has been central and thus interviewing those who Britain has worked with may provide more of an insight into the work undertaken by the British Intelligence Services. For more information, please see:
triangulation process. This continued when undertaking 6 weeks of fieldwork in America as it highlighted the different relationship between openness and secrecy. It demonstrated that there is in fact more openness that the British Intelligence Services could undertake without affecting intelligence operational security.

To comprehend how the British Intelligence Services depict themselves to the public, their websites and speeches made by their respective Heads are analysed in this thesis. Although the ‘ring of secrecy’\textsuperscript{114} surrounds the British Intelligence Services, there is undeniably more which could be placed in the public domain. For example, the British Intelligence Services could engage with museum exhibits such as the ‘Secret War’ at the Imperial War Museum, encourage university programmes which allow students to write policy recommendations,\textsuperscript{115} as well as enhance their use of social media to further public awareness. Although GCHQ does have a social media presence on Instagram and Twitter, no evidence was found of either MI5 or MI6 using similar techniques. On Instagram, they have just over 15,000 followers with the posts centring on their public engagement activities, such as the children’s TV show Blue Peter Enigma competition to mark the centenary of GCHQ.\textsuperscript{116} However, their Twitter profile has over 100,000 Twitter followers, and uses key hashtags on their posts as well as highlighting information from their history and how an individual can get involved.\textsuperscript{117}

But despite GCHQ utilising social media to some effectiveness, it remains something of a missed opportunity when comparing it to their American counterparts. On Instagram, the CIA have 261,000 followers and use it to highlight staff profiles whilst the FBI have 1.4 million and provide photos of their work in keeping America safe. Although the NSA

\textsuperscript{114}Glees, Anthony, Davies, H, John, The Open Side of Secrecy, Britain’s Intelligence and Security Committee, (London, Social Affairs Unit, 2006), p.19
\textsuperscript{115}This was a theme which was evident in the Diplomacy Labs programme run by the State Department and will be further discussed in Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’
\textsuperscript{116}Instagram, GCHQ, Available From: \url{https://www.instagram.com/gchq/?hl=en} (Accessed 19\textsuperscript{th} March 2019)
\textsuperscript{117}Twitter, GCHQ, Available From: \url{https://twitter.com/GCHQ} (Accessed 5\textsuperscript{th} December 2019)
does have an Instagram account, there is limited usage with only 10 posts and just under 3000 followers.\textsuperscript{118} Like GCHQ, the three main US Intelligence Services are more active on Twitter. The CIA has 2.7 million followers and combined with the use of hashtags, provides historical information of their work, declassified documents, and pictures from inside the headquarters.\textsuperscript{119} The FBI posts similar information to their 2.6 million followers, as well as highlighting the stories of FBI officers and requests for information about ongoing operations.\textsuperscript{120} Whilst the NSA does have a Twitter account with 625,000 followers, like Instagram, they do not use it as affectively as their counterparts and instead, provide details of how the NSA is engaging with policymakers at the Pentagon.\textsuperscript{121} Although there are questions as to why the NSA does not utilise social media to the same extent as the CIA and FBI, it demonstrates the increased openness in placing information into the public domain when compared to the British Intelligence Services. Thus, it is an activity which the British Intelligence Services could use to further enhance information directly placed in the public domain.

When exploring the websites, it became clear that the Big 3 all utilise them to publish speeches made by their respective Heads. These were therefore included within the analysis of how the British Intelligence Services seek to portray themselves in the public domain. It was staggering to realise just how many publicly available speeches there were, particularly from consecutive MI5 DGs post 9/11. By including all of these speeches on the websites, there is an attempt to ensure the public can access this information to thus have an informed understanding of the intelligence realm. But, it is questionable whether by simply making a speech available online, the public will be aware of its existence and read it to fully understand the work of the Intelligence Services.

\textsuperscript{118} Instagram, \textit{CIA}, Available From: \url{https://www.instagram.com/cia/?hl=en} (Accessed 5\textsuperscript{th} December 2019);
Instagram, \textit{FBI}, Available From: \url{https://www.instagram.com/fbi/?hl=en} (Accessed 5\textsuperscript{th} December 2019);
Instagram, \textit{NSA}, Available From: \url{https://www.instagram.com/nsausgov/} (Accessed 5\textsuperscript{th} December 2019)
\textsuperscript{119} Twitter, \textit{CIA}, Available From: \url{https://twitter.com/CIA} (Accessed 5\textsuperscript{th} December 2019)
\textsuperscript{120} Twitter, \textit{FBI}, Available From: \url{https://twitter.com/FBI} (Accessed 5\textsuperscript{th} December 2019)
\textsuperscript{121} Twitter, \textit{NSA}, Available From: \url{https://twitter.com/NSAGov} (Accessed 5\textsuperscript{th} December 2019)
Although not numerous, there are some memoirs published by former practitioners such as Dame Stella Rimington\textsuperscript{122} and Tom Marcus\textsuperscript{123} Any published memoirs from intelligence officials must have been vetted by the Intelligence Services before publication\textsuperscript{124} due to the nature of their work. Although the vetting process may restrict the nature of the information within the book, due to minimal available sources and the importance of triangulation, they will be used in a critical manner. Their usefulness emanates from discussions about life within the British Intelligence Services and the difficulties which can occur, such as not being able to discuss your work socially, a perspective which can be compared to that depicted within popular culture. In the case of Dame Stella Rimington, as the first publicly named DG,\textsuperscript{125} her autobiography discusses the emphasis MI5 placed on adhering to legal and ethical standards as they pushed to be placed on a legislative footing in the late 1980s.

Gaining approval for an autobiography is required, evident in how the first page of Marcus’s \textit{Soldier Spy} clearly states that ‘it has been vetted and cleared for publication by his former employer [MI5]’.\textsuperscript{126} This undoubtedly occurs due to the Government view that the publication of insider accounts of the Intelligence realm are damaging, there is no centralised process through which this occurs.\textsuperscript{127} However, it seems this will soon be changing as MI6 will be requiring entrants to sign their copyrights over to the service to prevent novels or memoirs from being published.\textsuperscript{128} It is unknown whether this will extend to MI5 and GCHQ as well. This is in stark contrast to America where the CIA have a centralised system allowing for the publication of memoirs and novels, namely a publication review board for former employees to seek approval.\textsuperscript{129} This suggests at the


\textsuperscript{124} Hansard, \textit{House of Lords Written Answers}, 5\textsuperscript{th} June 2000, Volume 613, Column 123


\textsuperscript{126} Marcus, T, \textit{Soldier Spy}

\textsuperscript{127} Gill, P, \textit{Policing Politics}, p. 9; This is something also intimated by Dame Stella Rimington in the acknowledgements to her autobiography as she refers to those within MI5 who were unsure about the publication of her book. For more information, please see: Rimington, S, Dame, \textit{Open Secret}, p. ix

\textsuperscript{128} Le Carré, ‘My plots are inspired by a true betrayal’ \textit{The Times} (London), 2\textsuperscript{nd} October 2019

\textsuperscript{129} Gill, P, \textit{Policing Politics}, p. 10;
differing approaches to former employees writing either fact or fiction about their time in the intelligence realm. The differing stances on this matter demonstrate the differing relationships between openness and secrecy in each country as the discussion on the British way in Intelligence revealed.

Chapter 5 ‘A Complicated Relationship’ scrutinises the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services in news journalism. Due to the large volume of reporting available for analysis, it was important to identify a clear focus that would allow the chapter to explore how the British Intelligence Services were portrayed by different types of media outlets with differing political affiliations. This would allow for a greater understanding of whether the portrayals differed based on political affiliation, type of media outlet, or whether there were different depictions being created. Therefore, three British media outlets that constitute the two most important news sources to the public as well as their role in scrutinising British Intelligence in the two case studies (the build up to the Iraq War and the Snowden revelations) were chosen for analysis.

It was equally important to discern which events to focus on. Chosen due to their role in the reporting of the assertions that the dodgy dossier was sexed up in the lead up to the Iraq War, the BBC a public service broadcaster, has a Royal Charter which stipulates the importance of impartiality. According to its 2016 / 2017 annual report and Ofcom’s 2018 News Consumption in the UK report, it is influential in providing news to the public. The British public also regard the BBC as reliable; over 83% of adult respondents to the Ofcom 2018 News Consumption survey said the BBC provides good analysis and high-

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130 This was also in part due to how there are numerous forms of news journalism as is intimated by Ofcom: Ofcom, News Consumption in the UK, Produced by Jigsaw Research, Summer 2018, Available From: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/116529/news-consumption-2018.pdf (Accessed 4th October 2018) p. 4


133 McNair, B, News and Journalism in the UK, p. 36; Broadcasting – Copy of Royal Charter for the continuance of the British Broadcasting Corporation, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2016), p. 5
quality commentary on current affairs. This was a theme the 12-15 year old respondents also agreed with. The BBC One television channel was the most used and most popular news source (62%), and had the highest proportion (27%) of respondents to the Ofcom 2018 News Consumption in the UK survey saying it was their most important news source, with 6% of respondents choosing the BBC website and/or app. The BBC News Channel was equally popular, with 9.9% of the population using it during 2015-2016, combined with the app having 7.5 million monthly unique browsers, making it the highest-ranking website or app in the Top 20 News Sources. Therefore, considering the role of BBC in reporting on the dodgy dossier and it being one of the most popular news sources across numerous platforms, it was a clear choice to analyse what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services it provides to the public.

The Guardian newspaper published the Snowden revelations in June 2013. As the statistics for the BBC indicated, news consumption is continually occurring online. In 2017, Ofcom statistics show that the left-leaning The Guardian had the second highest weekly readership, with the majority being online views as the excerpt (figure 4) from the 2018 News Consumption in the UK report shows.

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The Guardian, NSA Prism programme taps in to user date of Apple, Google and others, Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, 7th June 2013, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data (Accessed 20th March 2018);
139 Press Gazette, NRS: Daily Mail most popular UK newspaper in print and online, Dominic Ponsford, 26th February 2015, Available From: https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/nrs-daily-mail-most-popular-uk-newspaper-print-and-online-23m-readers-month/ (Accessed 9th October 2018)
Figure 4, is a table taken from the *Ofcom 2018 News Consumption in the UK* report showing the digital and print readership figures for British newspapers.\(^{141}\)

With so many views occurring online, the resulting effect is that its revenue largely emanates from online contributions and advertising as opposed to sales from print copies.\(^ {142}\) As the Snowden revelations are a case study the chapter explores, due to the centrality of the British Intelligence Services and the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) in the allegations, it would be remiss not to include *The Guardian* when assessing what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services are in the public

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To compare the depictions of British Intelligence, *The Daily Telegraph*, which has a political orientation to the right of centre, whilst having readership figures and demographics similar to those of *The Guardian* as Ofcom statistics above demonstrate, will be analysed. This combination of a differing political persuasion but similar readership figures and demographics between the two newspapers allows for conclusions to be drawn about whether the political leanings affect the depictions of the British Intelligence Services, whether the reporting is affected by wider factors, such as finances, and how British Intelligence is portrayed to a similar reader demographic.

Attending Edinburgh Spy Week in April 2017 was a turning point for the research for Chapter 6 ‘A Fractious Relationship’. The discussions highlighted the numerous facets to spy fiction, with one category of spy novels being insider spy fiction. By drawing this distinction, it suggests a way in which the British Intelligence Services can inadvertently engage directly with popular culture and provide a credible view of their work to the public. But this is not necessarily always the case. Joseph Oldham discussed how Ian Fleming and John Le Carré, both of whom worked for British Intelligence, characterise the romance and realism genres of spy fiction respectively. Therefore,

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144 In the two socio-economic groups, there is a 1% difference between the readership levels of the newspapers;
The socio-economic groups are ABC1 and C2DE as is stipulated by YouGov which draws the distinction between the two, using the phrases white-collar workers and blue-collar workers to explain the difference between the respective groups. For more information look at:

145 Although analysing the views of British Intelligence in tabloid newspapers would aid overall comprehension of how public perceptions of intelligence are influenced, particularly due to the role ‘The Sun’ played in the reporting of the dodgy dossier with the infamous headline ‘Brits 45 mins from doom’, the chapter would have become a thesis addressing how the media informs understandings of British Intelligence as opposed to a chapter examining how British Intelligence engages with the public.
The article referred to here is available from:

146 Monroe, A, ‘Spy Fiction in History’, Lecture at National Library of Scotland, 18th April 2017
147 This refers to novels written by former practitioners either during or at the end of their intelligence career. For more information, please see:
148 Oldham, J, ‘Spies, Conspiracies and the Secret State in British Television Drama’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 21st April 2017
their novels and adaptations were a key starting point when deciding upon which popular culture depictions of British Intelligence to assess. But it was important also to explore other popular culture portrayals of the British Intelligence Services, including the more recent Bond films, and the BBC drama *Spooks*. This allowed for three key forms of popular culture to be examined – films, books, and TV; thus providing a cohesive understanding of the depiction of the British Intelligence Services provided to the public.

To assess the Government responses to the two case studies, evident in ‘Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’, Hansard, the Parliamentary record of discussions in the House of Commons and Lords,\(^{149}\) was used. It proved a useful source to ascertain how the British Intelligence Services were portrayed in its verbatim transcripts of the debates. However, to ensure triangulation of information, this was combined with elite interview data which formed an integral part of the methodology.

**Undertaking Interviews**

Throughout the course of the PhD, a total of 23 interviews have been undertaken with academics, journalists, museum curators and policy practitioners. Two of these interviews were conducted off the record and thus could not be quoted from in the project. But, they nevertheless influenced my understanding and thinking on the topic. The inclusion of interviews within the project was always something I deemed important to ensure first-hand perspectives could be incorporated. With the exception of the former practitioners who turn to academia, the intelligence literature omits the perspective of the British Intelligence Services. To not include the perspective of those who you are writing about, does seem to be something of an omission. Whilst this could be due to the difficulties in getting members of the British Intelligence Services to willingly discuss these themes, this thesis overcame these problems by approaching those within the wider British intelligence realm.

Ideally, I would have liked to interview serving personnel from MI5, MI6 and GCHQ who work on public relation matters in order to fully understand what portrayals they seek to provide of themselves, as well as how they seek to engage with the public domain.

However, as the British Intelligence Services only name the heads of the organisation, directly reaching out to them proved difficult as the ‘contact us’ sections related either to press queries or providing information on a threat.\textsuperscript{150} To overcome this, research was done on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Home Office websites due to their roles in overseeing the British Intelligence Services,\textsuperscript{151} to discover who worked closely with the British Intelligence Services and would thus have an understanding of their work. This formed the bulk of the revised interview wish list. Not only are these names published, but so was the generic email formula for many civil service departments. One clear example of this was emailing the-then British Ambassador to the United States Sir Kim Darroch, who was approached due to his previous role as David Cameron’s National Security Adviser.\textsuperscript{152} Due to his experiences in this role, I had hoped that Sir Kim could have provided me with insights into the mechanisms of British Intelligence and an understanding of the relationship between the Intelligence Services and policymakers. Although this attempt to set up an interview with Sir Kim was not successful, it did result in an interview with someone equally knowledgeable (Private Interview 16),\textsuperscript{153} who contacted me directly after Sir Kim passed on my email to them. While the interview conducted was not with the individual originally intended, the ultimate interview subject nevertheless was a senior figure and provided useful insights, particularly about engagement with popular culture. A similar process happened several times in the course of the fieldwork, but they all resulted in useful interviews, even though they were not conducted with the person or postholder that I had originally hoped to meet.

Contacting those in a position of seniority was something I did when requesting interviews, based on advice from another PhD student. Those in more senior positions are not only knowledgeable about the specific topics that I wanted to discuss in interviews, but they also know whether this is a discussion they are authorised to have,

\textsuperscript{150} Secret Intelligence Service, Contact Us, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/contact-us.html (Accessed 28\textsuperscript{th} July 2015);
Security Service, Contact Us, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/contact-us (Accessed 20\textsuperscript{th} November 2018)


\textsuperscript{152} Gov.uk, Sir Kim Darroch – British Ambassador to the USA, Available From: https://www.gov.uk/government/people/kim-darroch (Accessed 19\textsuperscript{th} March 2019)

\textsuperscript{153} Private Interview 16: 19\textsuperscript{th} September 2016
and know who the best person is to talk about these themes if they themselves are not available. Interviews took place with serving civil servants (although one has since retired) to provide the British perspective of how they perceive who are the British Intelligence Services, and to understand how the British Intelligence Services seek to engage with the public, either directly or via the four avenues identified by this thesis. It was surprising just how open the interviewees were about the activities of the British Intelligence Services and the candid way they explored the impact of the Snowden revelations on the British Intelligence Services, and in particular, GCHQ. This was something of an overriding theme, that although none of these interviewees agreed with Snowden’s actions, they acknowledged that Snowden had aided public debates about what information the Intelligence Services place in the public domain.

Interviews were also conducted in other countries, furthering the triangulation of data. These occurred in two different contexts – European Union member states and America. This allowed for differing views of the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain, as well as whether the British Intelligence Services are engaging with the public domain in the same or different manners when compared to other countries. In May 2016, two former intelligence practitioners from European Union (EU) countries were interviewed and both provided useful understandings of who constitute the British Intelligence Services by those who have cooperated with them. Between August and September 2016, American fieldwork was undertaken where academics, museum curators and practitioners were interviewed due to the importance of UK – American cooperation.

This highlighted to me that there is far more which the British Intelligence Services can do to directly engage with the public whilst not causing operational difficulties. Examples include having academics in residence, dedicated public engagement activities and quite simply, just being more willing to engage with the public domain. Thus, the American context should not be seen as unique, but something which the British Intelligence Services should aspire to. Whilst this would

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154 Hillebrand, C, ‘With or Without You? The UK and information and intelligence sharing in the EU’, *Journal of Intelligence History*, (2017) p. 1–4
156 Phythian, M, ‘Cultures of National Intelligence’, p. 39
reduce the pervasiveness of secrecy and potentially encourage greater intelligence accountability, the British way in Intelligence would continue due to its unique historical context which has created a committee style approach and a drive for consensus in the setting of intelligence priorities and analysis.\textsuperscript{157} It is not disputed that secrecy is fundamental to the work of British Intelligence, but there is more information which the British Intelligence Services could publicise, particularly if the public are to continue to be an important form of intelligence accountability.

All interviews adhered to University ethical best practice and thus written permission to interview an individual was sought. However, there was one case where this proved problematic as although the individuals were happy to be interviewed, they could not sign the interview consent form without lawyers from their employer approving it. Therefore the interview did not occur as by the time overseas fieldwork finished, they still had not received approval to sign the interview release form. This proved frustrating, particularly as it was an overseas interview with the National Cryptologic Museum and would have been inherently useful about how public engagement can occur.

Consent was requested to record the interview on a Dictaphone; purely for the benefit of re-listening to it when writing up the PhD. Interviews had a semi-structured approach where I had a list of questions to begin with, but didn’t always strictly follow them based on the responses from the interviewee; allowed me to fully listen to the responses as opposed to be furiously writing notes and this method was found to be most effective. But, there were times when either electrical equipment was not permitted in a building or the interviewee preferred the interview to be off the record. However, for those interviews which were recorded, it was notable that the interviewee was more forthcoming once the recording finished. Despite this information, combined with some of the other interviews being off the record, they still provided useful detail which influenced my own thinking and analysis on the subject. All interviewee responses are stored securely, with Dictaphone recordings and written notes only given generic file names. Therefore, if the data was ever lost or stolen, the contents would look rather boring to anyone else. But, to identify the interviewees in the thesis, they are all given an identification number, in the chronological order in which the interviews are undertaken.

\textsuperscript{157} Goodman, M, ‘The British way in Intelligence’, p. 127–128, 135
and, where the name of the interviewee. However, anonymity was a recurring stipulation from many in return for the interview.

**Chapter Outline**

Chapter Two ‘A Direct Relationship’ begins by drawing a distinction between Britain’s Intelligence Services and Intelligence Community using what Treverton terms the ‘real intelligence cycle’.\(^{158}\) This allows for a clear understanding throughout the thesis of who constitutes the British Intelligence Services. The chapter then analyses what depictions the British Intelligence Services themselves are placing directly in the public domain by utilising their websites and speeches made by their respective heads. Unsurprisingly, they seek to portray themselves in a positive manner, especially considering that their websites are arguably designed as a recruitment tool. Whilst the Big 3 all explore the same themes such as their adherence to legal and ethical standards, they discuss these themes in varying manners, demonstrating that whilst they are all part of the wider British Intelligence Services, they each retain their individual organisational entity.\(^{159}\) However, there remain questions about how accessible the information is, with much of the information being hidden in plain sight as the individual still has to actively search for it, something certainly the case in relation to the speeches. Frustratingly, this is easily rectifiable by furthering direct engagement with the public such as aiding museum exhibits or simply making the information more user friendly. However, this is unlikely to change; as one interviewee succinctly stated, the British Intelligence Services view public engagement as a necessary evil.\(^{160}\) Until there is a mentality shift, this will continue to be the case.

Chapter Three ‘A Complementary Relationship’ analyses the Government rhetoric about the intelligence services during the two case studies. This allows for a comparison of how intelligence was depicted to the public over a decade, as well as under Governments of different political persuasions. In the Snowden case, there was overwhelmingly a


\(^{159}\) Possibly, this is why the British Intelligence Services are keen to highlight structural and organisational difficulties which they face, such as the creation of new organisations, can have on their work loads and who has overall control for a particular theme.

\(^{160}\) Private Interview 21; 12th September 2017
consistency in the portrayals between the Cameron Coalition Government and the British Intelligence Services. This centred on how the issues surrounding the legality of their actions emanated from the limitations of existing legislation, as opposed to the British Intelligence Services acting illegally and unethically, demonstrating a cross-Government message being provided to the public. Yet there remains the problem as to whether the content of Ministerial statements and debates in the House of Commons are effectively placed in the public domain. To access such information, the public are either reliant on accessing Hansard or on news journalism coverage. Whilst the latter does include live coverage of House of Commons and devolved Government debates, only a tiny proportion of society (0.6% of the population) accessed BBC Parliament each week during the periods covered by these cases.

Chapter Four ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ examines the portrayal of the British Intelligence Services in academia. Historically, there is evidence of this relationship as following the First World War, cabinet members debated the creation, content and authorship of official histories of the First World War. Although this discussion did not result in an officially-sanctioned published account of the war there is a clear suggestion from the archival information of the emphasis British Government placed on academia as a way of engaging with the public. Similar discussions occurred after the Second World War, resulting in the Cabinet Office sponsoring the writing of official histories of those organisations involved in the war, although these were designed for internal consumption to thus provide the Cabinet Office and British Intelligence with a greater understanding of wartime intelligence. One such example of was William Mackenzie’s history of the Special Operations Executive which did not become publicly available until 2000.

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161 Hansard, House of Commons, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 37
During the Cold War, academic also provided a way for Britain to further a particular rhetoric in order to aid public discourse. Although the British Government had had information departments in various guises since 1917, in January 1948, the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin established the Information Research Department (IRD) to coordinate a global response to hostile propaganda. As well as working overseas, the IRD also sought to influence British public opinion, utilising a wide variety of instruments, including: academia; the press; broadcast media (principally the BBC); books; visual media including films and posters. Similar activities also occurred in the American context with the CIA encouraging former practitioners and intellectuals to write for peer reviewed academic journals. This is not the only way in which the CIA utilised academia. Loch Johnson states how professors and campus administrators would aid the recruitment of overseas students so the CIA could focus on using these students as possible intelligence agents when returning to their native country.

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167 Defty, A, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945 − 1953 − The Information Research Department, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2004), p. 1–2, 26, 63
168 The majority of the IRD’s work occurred in areas which were deemed to be susceptible to communism, namely Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Far East, evident in how they conducted grey propaganda in India and Pakistan. For more information, please see: Wilford, H, ‘The Information Research Department: Britain’s Secret Cold War Weapon Revealed’, Review of International Studies, (1998), 24/3, p. 359;
169 This was in conjunction with the IRD using state private relationships which included an IRD publishing house, trade unions, the Church of England and freelance journalists. For more information, please see: Jenkins, J, British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War, (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2006), p. 8, 64, 65, 67, 80, 106–107;
Defty, A, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945 − 1953, p. 89;
In particular, it was the Irish University Review and the Partisan Review which the CIA encouraged them to publish in. For more information, please see: Edinburgh University Press, Journals – Irish University Review, Available From: http://www.euppublishing.com/loi/iur (Accessed 24th November 2017);
Stonor Saunders, F, Who Paid the Piper, p. 244
171 Seemingly, this is a policy which has continued through campus spotters. For more information, please see: Johnson, L. K, ‘Spies and scholars in the United States: winds of ambivalence in the groves of academe’, Intelligence and National Security, 34/1 (2019), p. 2, 6
Cooperation between the intelligence services and academia has continued in the post-Cold War period, and it is this which Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ will explore. Beginning by examining how the British Intelligence Services have engaged with university-approved courses and centres of excellence, the chapter explores that there is clear engagement between the British Intelligence Services and academia. This is something which is further prevalent in the analysis of the official histories of MI5, MI6, JIC and SOE; which allows comprehension as to how both current and former British Intelligence Services have been portrayed by academics. Although a consistent portrayal is apparent, it is weaker than was evident in Chapter Three ‘A Complementary Relationship’. The wider academic literature explored in this chapter highlights the amount of secrecy surrounding the British Intelligence Services. The thesis does not dispute that the British Intelligence Services require a degree of secrecy in order to function effectively, but it is the pervasiveness of secrecy, as discussed in the British way in Intelligence which becomes problematic. Perhaps if a policy of greater openness was pursued by the British Intelligence Services, this would ally public concern of information being shrouded in secrecy as it would be clear that only that information which needed to be protected, would not be in the public domain. Thus, if the British Intelligence Services undertook more forward-facing public engagement either by themselves or in conjunction with one of the avenues, when information is prevented from disclosure, know that this is for a very salient theme.

Due to the role of news journalism in informing and educating the public on intelligence matters, Chapter Five ‘A Complicated Relationship’ explores the depictions of the British Intelligence Services in news journalism, something which there is historical evidence of. The IRD used freelance journalists, or what Jenks refers to as ‘pliable’ journalists, was a policy adopted by that organisation from the outset, and is a theme that the academic literature extensively explores. It was seemingly so successful that:

172 Dover, R, and Goodman, M, ‘Introduction: Intelligence and the Information Age’, p. 9;
Hillebrand, C, ‘The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight’, p. 705
173 Jenks, J, British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War, 86
When it closed in 1977, the IRD had a list of more than 100 journalists on nearly every national newspaper who, wittingly or unwittingly, would use its material.\textsuperscript{174}

This demonstrates how extensively news journalism was used by the IRD, something Chapman Pincher also highlights.\textsuperscript{175} Jenks and Andrew Defty both explore this, focusing on the cases of Hugh Chevins, Elizabeth Monroe, Malcolm Muggeridge and Edward Crankshaw. They all worked for the IRD and utilised their material in articles published at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{176} Pincher also explores this practice in his autobiography, recounting the way that MI5 would routinely approach certain journalists at all the major newspapers, and that he himself, was asked to publish particular stories.\textsuperscript{177} Such cooperation also occurred in the American context, where the CIA have continually engaged with news journalism since their establishment. As was the case with British Intelligence, the CIA had hundreds of journalists acting as paid or unpaid assets, some of whom were deemed favourite journalists, as well as providing journalists with briefings at their Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.\textsuperscript{178} This is a theme which the first section of Chapter Five ‘A Complicated Relationship’ examines, using Steve Hewitt and Scott Lucas’s typology of whether there is an adversarial, dependent, manipulative, laudatory or supportive relationship between British Intelligence and news journalism.\textsuperscript{179}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
  \bibitem{TheIndependent} The Independent, \textit{Rear Window: Cold War: The British Ministry of Propaganda}, by Scott Lucas, 26\textsuperscript{th} February 1995, Available From: \url{http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/letters/rear-window-cold-war-the-british-ministry-of-propaganda-1574950.html} (Accessed 9\textsuperscript{th} October 2017)
  \bibitem{Jenks} Jenks, J, \textit{British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War}, p. 83–85;
  Defty, A, \textit{Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945 – 1953}, p. 85;
  \bibitem{Schou} Schou, N, \textit{Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood}, p. 1-2, 3, 19-20, 24, 33;
  \bibitem{Hewitt} Hewitt, S, and Lucas, S, ‘All the Secrets That Are Fit to Print? The Media and US Intelligence Agencies Before and After 9/11’, p. 106
\end{thebibliography}
In particular, the BBC has a long association of cooperating with the Government, as they were one of the main channels used for disseminating IRD propaganda.\textsuperscript{180} This allowed for the monitoring of foreign broadcasts and perhaps more interestingly, for BBC broadcasts to be used for intelligence purposes.\textsuperscript{181} Wilford’s analysis explains why this was the case: a combination of wartime cooperation between the BBC and Government departments; and the obscure wording of the Government’s white paper in 1946 about the importance of the BBC cooperating with Government departments to plan programmes in the national interest.\textsuperscript{182} However, such cooperation was problematic for the Home Services as the BBC was meant to have editorial independence.\textsuperscript{183} Undoubtedly, the extensive historical cooperation set a precedent of engagement between British Intelligence and news journalism, thus placing the latter in a unique and privileged position of providing the public with a depiction of the British Intelligence Services.

Centred on the two case studies, the chapter explores what portrayals the BBC, \textit{The Guardian} and \textit{The Telegraph} provided of British Intelligence. Irrespective of the media organisation, there was an overarching positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. By continually highlighting the politicisation of intelligence in the dodgy dossier in the Iraq War context, the British Intelligence Services were depicted as being capable and effective by contrast with policymakers, who were blamed for distorting and misusing the intelligence they were provided with. To some extent, this was a theme also evident in the Snowden case where although questions were raised about the ethical nature of GCHQ’s actions, these were in the wider context of the significant limitations of legislation governing those actions.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} Defty, A, \textit{Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945 – 1953}, p. 43, 73, 90; Jenks, J, \textit{British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War}, p. 92
\item \textsuperscript{183} Wilford, H, ‘The Information Research Department: Britain’s Secret Cold War Weapon Revealed’, p. 365
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
This resulted in a significant consistent portrayal to the themes evident in Chapter Three ‘A Complementary Relationship’ suggesting that there is a consistent portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. But, news journalism also provides a negative portrayal of British Intelligence illustrated in relation to the illegality and unethical nature of their actions in relation to the Snowden revelations. This intimates how there are often differing depictions provided by the British Intelligence Services themselves and by one of the avenues.

The final chapter ‘A Fractious Relationship’ scrutinises the depictions of the British Intelligence Services provided by popular culture. This is a key avenue to explore as:

Organisations and individuals, from the CIA to the FBI, from V I Lenin to Joseph Goebbels, have all expressed the view that cinema is the most important medium for transmitting political ideas.\(^{184}\)

This was certainly evident at the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) Century when during a time of considerable fear and uncertainty about British power and security, spy fiction rose in popularity.\(^{185}\) The chapter begins by furthering this historical overview of the way that popular culture has provided depictions of the British Intelligence Services dating back to the early 1900s. It then explores key themes highlighted in contemporary popular culture which include: surveillance; communications and code; science and technology; secret diplomacy; deception and secrecy; acting legally and ethically; threats and society; and finally the role of gender. These are central to the popular culture depictions and can provide a credible view of British Intelligence. At times, this leads to a consistent portrayal. However, it also explored themes not otherwise in the public domain such as the role of secret diplomacy. This demonstrates how each of the avenues identified in


this thesis can in fact aid the overall portrayal of the British Intelligence Services by highlighting themes not otherwise in the public domain. Indeed, popular culture can also influence the British Intelligence Services; it was Le Queux’s spy novels which had a direct impact on the creation of MI5 and MI6. Therefore, there can be a real-world impact to the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services placed in the public domain.

Conclusion
All four avenues identified in this thesis – the British Government, academia, news journalism and popular culture – all provide positive portrayals of the British Intelligence Services. Although there are differences in the details and types of the depictions they provide to the public, their overarching portrayals are remarkably consistent with each other, especially in the way that they present the British Intelligence Services as always striving to act legally and ethically. Any lapses in achieving the high standards that the intelligence services aspire to are almost always depicted as the results of limitations of legislation and therefore the fault of elected politicians. Equally, whilst information is in the public domain, it is not easily accessible, and the onus remains on the individual citizen to actively know where to find, and then access the information, something particularly prevalent in relation to the Intelligence Services’ websites. This results in this information being hidden in plain sight as opposed to being more easily accessible as the four avenues identified in this thesis tend to be. In turn, this places them in a more influential position of providing a depiction of the British Intelligence Services to the public. Thus, public accountability and the democratic legitimacy of the British Intelligence Services is based on the depictions ostensibly provided by the avenues.
Chapter 2: A Direct Relationship: The British Intelligence Services in the Public Sphere

Introduction
The British Intelligence Services seek to directly engage with the public domain themselves, something one interviewee stated was required as:

*You need a licence to operate in order to operate.*

Therefore, the section first assesses which organisations constitute the British Intelligence Services. Without a clear understanding of who they are, it is impossible to ascertain what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are evident in the public domain. Although the term British Intelligence Services is within the common vernacular, there is no consensus of which organisations it refers to. By utilising the

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1 Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017


Milne, S, Macaskill, E, *‘We thought we were doing something legitimate, then we were told it wasn’t’*, The Guardian, (London), 24th February 2015;


intelligence cycle, the chapter draws a distinction between the Intelligence Services and Intelligence Community. It argues that the ‘Big 3’ of the British Intelligence Services are; the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ). By assessing historical and organisational links, the chapter argues that Defence Intelligence (DI) are also part of the British Intelligence Services, all of whom seek to ensure Britain’s continued safety and security.

The chapter will then focus upon what portrayals the Big 3 provide to the public. To do this, it is their websites, which are the primary public face which communicates information to the public, which are analysed. However, DI are excluded from this analysis as they do not have their own website to directly engage with the public. Rather, information is available via Government websites, perhaps due to the fact that unlike their counterparts, their actions remain based on the Royal Prerogative as opposed to being legislated for. Whilst some of the websites include videos as well, the majority of information is available through written content. Although the British Intelligence Services are placing information in the public domain, the onus remains on the individual to access this or watch the videos. Therefore it is the written information which they are

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3 The websites of the Big 3 have become increasingly important as they have taken over some of the communication tasks which were previously the responsibility of the elected Government. An example of this is the threat assessments which now provided by the Intelligence Services and is available on the MI5 website. For more information, please see: Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’ in *Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services*, edited by Daniel Baldino, (Sydney, The Federation Press, 2010), p. 195;


more likely to consume, hence the emphasis on it within this chapter. This will be combined with the examination of information from public speeches made by the heads of these organisations, the reasoning for which was explored in the introduction’s methodology section. Although the websites may first and foremost function as a recruitment tool, they provide a key form of direct public engagement from Britain’s Intelligence Services.

In 2003, Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller, MI5’s Director General (DG) explained why she perceived such speeches to be required, arguing that with high public interest in their work, it is important that they should speak on the record. But despite this, public speeches remain a rarity, particularly from the heads of GCHQ and MI6. This demonstrates a salient theme the section will highlight, how the ‘Big 3’ all explore the same themes, such as: structural and organisational difficulties; acting legally and ethically; capability, effectiveness and cooperation; workforce and diversity; and the importance of secrecy, but they all place a different emphasis upon these themes. This allows for the analysis to compare and contrast what themes the individual services are emphasising on their websites. Overall, a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services individually and collectively, is prevalent throughout their websites and a theme to which the speeches allude.

The Intelligence Cycle

The academic literature identifies an intelligence cycle which, originally a British concept, was first utilised in the 1940s and 1950s, following the use of an intelligence chain to explain the concept. It has continued to be a useful mechanism for analysing how intelligence works, by linking the five key stages of: planning and direction, collection, processing, all source analysis and production, and finally dissemination. Although this cycle is predominantly used to analyse how intelligence failures occur, it

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has a much wider applicability. Peter Gill states how it can be used for heuristic value in explaining how the five stages interlink with one another, as opposed to a model of what happens in the intelligence realm due to its applicability for differing levels of intelligence; national, individual, organisational or transnational.\(^9\) But perhaps more crucially for this thesis, the intelligence cycle also helps us to understand exactly which actors should be included in a definition of the British Intelligence Services.

Due to the prominence of the intelligence cycle, first as a means to comprehend intelligence and later as an information tool;\(^10\) numerous diagrams explaining it in a plethora of ways are available. However, in recent years, their use has been questioned, and Sir David Omand has argued that it simply portrays intelligence in a sequential manner and that its applicability has dissipated following the end of the Cold War.\(^11\) Whilst this suggests that intelligence after the Cold War changed, which perhaps instigated the Intelligence Services portraying images of themselves to the public,\(^12\) it

\(^9\) An example of this highlighted by Gill is how intelligence has been used in sport. In 2003, the England Rugby Union team swept their dressing room for bugs ahead of the World Cup Final against Australia. This was following an incident in 2001 where surveillance equipment allowed the Australian Rugby Union team to crack the codes used at the scrum and lineout by the British and Irish Lions, thus giving the Australians dominance at the set piece plays. Another example of intelligence gathering in sport was also evident in rugby union when two men (who when questioned claimed to be Reuters journalists) were found covertly filming the New Zealand (All Black) rugby team during a training session in West London in 2005 before playing England at Twickenham. For more information, please see:

\(^10\) Omand, Sir, D, ‘The Cycle of Intelligence’, p. 59

\(^11\) Omand, Sir, D, ‘The Cycle of Intelligence’, p. 64

\(^12\) This occurs as following the end of the Cold War, the Intelligence Services were having to justify their existence and budgets to the public and demonstrate why they were required. Therefore, it would have been in their interest to be providing such information to the public domain. For more information, please see:
negates Gill’s assertion of how applicable the intelligence cycle is to all levels of intelligence. One diagram of the intelligence cycle is provided by Operational Security and demonstrates both the cyclical nature and how the different stages interlink. This diagram reproduced below (figure 5).

(Figure 5) 13

Geoffrey Treverton has argued that a different intelligence cycle should be utilised to fully understand intelligence due to the enhanced role of technology in modern life. Although it still has 5 integral stages, what Treverton has termed the Real Intelligence Cycle (figure 5) places a greater emphasis upon the relationship between collection, analysis and policymakers. He argues that such a model is required in the information age; as although more ‘raw’ intelligence is available via the internet, policymakers become increasingly reliant upon the analysis and processing stages to both comprehend the nature of the raw intelligence, and to place it into a wider context,14 something also intimated by Pillar.15

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The internal arrows demonstrate how technological changes have altered the cyclical nature of intelligence. Although Omand agrees with this theme, his discussion furthers the impact of technological advancements, stating how the 24 hour news cycle can provide mistaken impressions to the public on the excessive use of violence in police raids. By these being televised, there is often increased pressure exerted upon policymakers to provide instant responses and up-to-date analysis to evolving stories. In an intelligence context, this places analysts under increasing pressure to provide policymakers with the information required to address such stories, but this can be problematical as the raw intelligence may not have been collated or processed. Thus, Treverton’s arrow from raw intelligence to policymakers is accurate and demonstrates how the cyclical nature is not always followed. It also determines how intelligence collection and analysis are a separate part of the intelligence process.

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16 Treverton, G, *Reshaping National Intelligence*. 106
This occurs as the Intelligence Services undertake analysis to convert complex technical information into descriptions of real-world events,\textsuperscript{19} which can then be understood by policymakers. Therefore, it is clear to see a distinction here in how the Intelligence Services are responsible for collection and analysis of intelligence, with an intelligence community disseminating the analysis to policymakers. Gill and Phythian explore the role of the Intelligence Services and Intelligence Community, stating that the intelligence communities have suffered the most from the events of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.\textsuperscript{20} Using this analysis and applying it to the British case, it is possible to see the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) as part of the intelligence community due to their role in disseminating intelligence,\textsuperscript{21} something which was particularly prevalent in the lead up to the Iraq War.\textsuperscript{22} This suggests that Britain has a separate intelligence community which has the JIC at its core who formally connect the Intelligence Services with Government,\textsuperscript{23} a key step in the intelligence cycle.

An Intelligence Community which is capable of cross-Government analysis and dissemination overcomes vertical and horizontal barriers which exist for the Intelligence Services\textsuperscript{24} in seeking to share information. This would provide policymakers with timely all-source analysis on a particular issue. The Intelligence Community is central to this process as they are providing the intelligence assessments to the British Government, as opposed to undertaking intelligence collection.\textsuperscript{25} Using the intelligence cycle, this section has differentiated between Britain’s Intelligence Services and Intelligence Community

\textsuperscript{19} Omand, Sir, D, ‘The Cycle of Intelligence’, p. 60
\textsuperscript{20} Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 108
\textsuperscript{21} This is a theme which the Gov.uk website examines in relation to the JIC, arguing that they have a central role in assessing intelligence before disseminating this to policymakers. For examples of this, please see: Gov.uk, Joint Intelligence Committee, Available From: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-security/groups/joint-intelligence-committee (Accessed 21st October 2015);
\textsuperscript{24} Hansard, House of Commons, 24th September 2002, Volume 390, Column 3;
\textsuperscript{26} Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 108, 111
\textsuperscript{25} Gov.uk, Joint Intelligence Committee, Available From: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-security/groups/joint-intelligence-committee (Accessed 21st October 2015);
which is key to understanding what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services are in the public domain. The subsequent section will then address which organisations constitute the British Intelligence Services.

Writing in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the former US intelligence analyst Paul Pillar explores the relationship between intelligence gathering and policymakers. He highlights how policymakers influence which topics intelligence agencies address, but not the conclusions that they reach, with the intelligence community (who have a greater analytical role as opposed to intelligence collection), avoiding policy judgements. 26 Although specific to the US context, this provides a cohesive understanding of how the intelligence services, intelligence community and policymakers should work with one another in the context of seeking to prevent an intelligence failure. Mark Lowenthal draws a similar distinction, stating that:

*Intelligence exists to support policy, not to make policy.*

*In democracies, policy decisions are the sphere of the elected officials and their duly appointed subordinates.* 27

Both Pillar and Lowenthal draw a clear distinction between the work of the Intelligence Services and policymakers, a theme the intelligence cycle further exhibits. This demonstrates how useful it can be in seeking to ascertain who constitutes Britain’s Intelligence Services.

**Which organisations are the British Intelligence Services?**

As Gill’s analysis demonstrated, intelligence can occur at the transnational, organisational, individual or national level. 28 But for the purposes of the thesis, it is the national level of intelligence in Britain which is focused upon in seeking to ascertain what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are provided to the public by the different avenues. As identified in the intelligence cycle, it is those organisations that

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26 Pillar, P, ‘Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq’, p. 16–17;
Gill, P, ‘Theories of Intelligence’, p. 48

Page | 60
collect and undertake some analysis of intelligence before disseminating it to the intelligence community, which will be included within the understandings of who constitutes the British Intelligence Services.

In Britain, MI5, MI6 and GCHQ constitute Britain’s Intelligence Services and, in this thesis, are referred to as the ‘Big 3’. This is due to the fact that they all have a role in obtaining and monitoring intelligence, a theme which their websites and key pieces of legislation all determine. Indeed, their importance in gathering intelligence is not to be underestimated. In legislation which affects the ‘Big 3’ such as the Freedom of Information Act of 2000 (FoIA), the Justice and Security Act of 2013 (JSA) and the Single Intelligence Account, they are exempt from disclosing information on the grounds of national security. Yet despite this, there is no clear definition of national security in either UK or European law, something which provides the Government with the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances. But without such a definition, Peter Gill and Mark Phythian argue that the phrase is a trump card to prevent other investigations and highlight a specific example. They state that:

*Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, forced the Serious Fraud Office to stop their investigation of allegations of bribery and corruption between BAE systems and Saudi Arabia over deals involving the selling of fighter aircraft. Court action*

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Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 82
challenging the legality of Blair’s intervention has made it clear that he felt the UK government had no choice given that the Saudis had threatened to halt intelligence collaboration regarding terrorism.32

This demonstrates how the phrase ‘national security’ can be utilised for a plethora of purposes. In the British context, if the ‘Big 3’ act to ensure national security, such a definition should be evident and stipulate what actions they are eligible to undertake. In the interviews with British civil servants, this was a theme discussed with one interviewee talking candidly about this point. They stated that whilst they agreed from an academic stance of the importance of defining the term, from a practitioner perspective, it was clear what it referred to, although this wasn’t fully elaborated upon.33 Another, who was spoken to informally one evening, intimated that the lack of a definition was by design as it provides flexibility to move into new areas which is the reasoning for a lack of a concise definition. The former Chief (C) of MI6 intimates that this is the case, 34 something with which intelligence academics Ian Leigh and Gill and Phythian agree.35

However, the lack of a definition of national security can result in it being used as a means of preventing information being published.36 This has been a criticism made against the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that they often claim something is a matter of national security, merely because they do not want embarrassing information published.37 Whilst there is undoubtedly information which could be damaging to national security were it published using it in order to prevent any disclosures is damaging to both public accountability and the Intelligence Service’s

32 Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 194; This case was also discussed briefly in:
33 Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017
35 Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 95
36 Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 194
democratic legitimacy. This is a clear problem emanating from the lack of a clear definition as to what constitutes national security.

The research sought to provide the perspective of those working with, and in, British Intelligence to ensure that their views are included within the academic debate. One question which was asked to all British and overseas Government interviewees was ‘Who do you believe to constitute the British Intelligence Services’? The interview subjects all identified MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. One interviewee expanded this group to include components of the armed forces and the police in their understanding of the British Intelligence Services.\(^{38}\) Therefore, it seems apt to include these three Intelligence Services within the understanding of British Intelligence who can be viewed as the Big 3 within the intelligence realm.

In an academic context, Ian Leigh assumes a legal approach to assessing who constitutes the British Intelligence Services. He argues that the British Intelligence Services are those who have been legislated for, namely: MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. This is contrasted to Britain’s to other parts of the intelligence machinery such as Defence Intelligence (DI), the JIC and Intelligence Assessments Staff which remain based on a royal prerogative, something which further demonstrates the uniqueness of the British case.\(^{39}\) By contrasting this to Patrick Emek’s *British Intelligence Services – A Short Review* from 1984, it is possible to ascertain that whilst the ‘Big 3’ have always been deemed part of the British Intelligence Services, there is disagreement as to who else is included. Emek argues that the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) who undertake such covert activities.\(^{40}\) The inclusion of covert action military entities is interesting and demonstrates the problems Len Scott and Peter Jackson discuss that emerge from the

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\(^{38}\) Private Interview 5: 21\(^{st}\) January 2016;  
Private Interview 4: 21\(^{st}\) January 2016;  
Private Interview 10: 1\(^{st}\) June 2016;  
Private Interview 11: 1\(^{st}\) June 2016;  
Private Interview 12: 1\(^{st}\) June 2016;  
Private Interview 13: 2\(^{nd}\) June 2016. 

\(^{39}\) Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 79

\(^{40}\) Emek, P, *British Intelligence Services – A Short Review.* (London, Mandala 2 Projects, 1984), p. 3;  
difficultly in attempting to define intelligence and where covert action is situated within this.41

For the JIC, their functions are explored in the academic literature, with Phillip Davies highlighting how it provided executive level direction for the Intelligence Services as well as steering interagency coordination.42 Through Davies’ analysis, it is therefore possible to see how the JIC is an integral part of Britain’s analytical Intelligence Community.

In a post 9/11 world, intelligence collection has increasingly occurred via private companies. Following President George. W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq,43 there was an exponential rise in the number of private military and intelligence contractors who undertook mundane roles on behalf of the military.44 Blackwater, who received notoriety for their heavy-handed actions45 during the Iraq War, were just one company who received large contracts from the US State Department.46 Although the Iraq war media rhetoric centred upon the American use of such companies, Britain also utilised their services.47 Hakluyt is one such example who received notoriety following the death of an operative in China in what has been described as dubious circumstances.48 Ostensibly

47 Gill, P, ‘Theories of Intelligence’, p. 48, 51, 53
recruiting former practitioners from the British Intelligence Services, Hakluyt, which was created in 2011 by former MI6 operative, Christopher James, expanded in 2015 to include a cyber division continues to work closely with MI6. Considering that the thesis is exploring national intelligence gathering organisations, private military and intelligence companies are omitted from understandings of who the British Intelligence Services are within this thesis.

Combining legislation and academia, this section has demonstrated how the ‘Big 3’ have always been part of the British Intelligence Services, with the JIC at the heart of the Intelligence Community. Although private military and intelligence organisations have been excluded from understandings of who constitutes the British Intelligence Services, it is important to explore whether there are any other organisations within Britain’s complex intelligence machinery who are part of the Intelligence Services.

The Big 3, but who else?

The Big 3 are key members of Britain’s Intelligence Services and all seek to ensure Britain’s safety and security against complex and globalised threats by the continued collection and analysis of intelligence. However, they are not the only organisations with such aims and objectives, as DI and the Metropolitan Police also strive to ensure

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49 Sir Ian Lobban is an example of a former practitioner who then worked for Hakluyt after his retirement from GCHQ. For more information, please see:
Companies House, Welcome to the Companies House Service – Hakluyt, Available From: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/search/companies?q=hakluyt (Accessed 8th October 2015);
Hakluyt, Cyber, Available From: https://www.hakluytandco.com/cyber (Accessed 18th March 2019);


Sir Richard Dearlove, the former C of MI6 explores how due to the globalised nature of the world, nothing nowadays can maintain a regional issue, using the examples of how the reverberations of the Russian military action in Georgia or the Israeli intervention in Gaza resonate ‘loudly and rapidly’ through the wider international security system. For more information, please see:
Britain’s safety and security, something particularly evident following the Paris attacks in November 2015. This leads to questions as to whether either organisation also constitutes a member of the British Intelligence Services.

**Historical organisational links**

The existence of MI5 and MI6 dates back to the instigation of the Secret Service Bureau, an inherently secretive organisation established by a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. With the War Office and the Admiralty dominating the Committee, they exerted their beliefs, values and objectives onto both the Committee and organisations it established. As a result, MI5 and MI6 had militaristic characteristics which would enhance cooperation between the newly created intelligence organisations and the military. MI6 was particularly impacted by the close military relationship as they cooperated closely against the threat of German imperialism.

MI5 is perhaps best explained as an amalgamation of the Secret Service Bureau and MO3, a counter-espionage organisation created by the War Office in 1903 and which Andrew describes as the direct predecessor of MI5. The influence of the military is also apparent in the appointment of Major-General Sir Vernon Kell, a former British Army officer as the first Director General (DG). As the military was the only pre-existing

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52 Gov.uk, *Defence Intelligence*, Available From: https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/defence-intelligence (Accessed 8th October 2015);
53 Sir Bernard Hogan Howe, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner announced an increased number of armed response vehicles on the streets of London by a third, perhaps to allay fears of what would happen if a similar attack was seen in the UK. For more information see: BBC News, *Islamic State is plotting deadly cyber-attacks – George Osborne*, Available From: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34839800 (Accessed 18th November 2015)
54 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm, the Authorised History of MI5*, p. 20
Goodman, M, ‘The British way in Intelligence’, p. 130
58 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 5
organisation with intelligence capabilities, modelling MI5 and MI6 upon them was logical and aided a close working relationship.

The importance of code breaking has been recognised throughout history and in the early 1800s, Britain had a dedicated team of cryptoanalysts. However, they were disbanded following the illegal interception of personal correspondence.59 This highlights how scandal and intrigue has always been synonymous with intelligence organisations. It also exhibits the historical importance of cryptography, further evident as on the eve of the First World War, both the army and navy re-instated their cryptanalysts, MI1b and Room 40 respectively.60

Following their numerous successes during the First World War, the importance of cryptanalysts was corroborated. This created the forebearer to GCHQ, the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) in 1919 under the Admiralty’s influence,61 and it was governed by the same customer liaison architecture as MI6.62 This relationship continued during World War Two when GC&CS, stationed at Bletchley Park, were responsible for decryption of German military ciphers.63 This highlights the close relationship between the military and GCHQ, something which remains as Leigh highlights how GCHQ continue to provide technical advice and information technology security to both wider Government, but also to the armed forces.64

Throughout their history, there has been a clear military influence upon the Big 3, furthered through their continued cooperation as the Intelligence Services served alongside the military in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.65 Therefore, there may be

62 Davies, P, ‘Britain’s Machinery of Intelligence Accountability: Realistic oversight in the absence of moral panic’, p. 147
63 Aldrich, R, *GCHQ – The Uncensored story*, p. 27
64 Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 82
65 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 752;
merit in including facets of the military which engage with the ‘Big 3’ in the understanding of the British Intelligence Services. As the interviews intimated, this is most likely to be DI.\textsuperscript{66} An integral part of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), DI provides them with intelligence products and assessments\textsuperscript{67} determining that like the Big 3 it has responsibility for the collection and some analysis of intelligence. The intelligence cycle would therefore suggest that DI is another part of the British Intelligence Services.

Following the end of the Second World War, Britain sought to ensure their intelligence capabilities remained, albeit in a more cost-effective and centralised manner which created the Joint Intelligence Bureau.\textsuperscript{68} They had responsibility for a myriad of intelligence activities, including topographic, economic, industrial and scientific intelligence.\textsuperscript{69} These would not only have aided the military at a time of rising tensions with the Soviet Union, but also wider Government and in particular the Big 3 who were also seeking to counter the Soviet threat.\textsuperscript{70} Therefore, the forerunner to DI would have had close cooperation with the Big 3 due to the nature of the work undertaken, and this is something that undoubtedly continues.

The work of DI is predominantly military in nature, with offices at specific military bases, and the current chief is a serving 3-star military officer.\textsuperscript{71} This suggests that military intelligence is DI’s first priority. However, with economic and industrial intelligence also under their prerogative, cooperation with wider Government and the ‘Big 3’ is vital for

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\textsuperscript{66} Private Interview 11: 1\textsuperscript{st} June 2016
\textsuperscript{67} Gov.uk, \textit{Defence Intelligence}, Available From: https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/defence-intelligence (Accessed 8th October 2015)
\textsuperscript{68} Dylan, H, ‘Modern conditions demand integration and professionalism’: Joint Intelligence Bureau to Defence Intelligence Staff and the long march to centralisation in British military intelligence’, \textit{Public Policy and Administration}, 0/0 (2012), p. 2
\textsuperscript{71} Gov.uk, \textit{Defence Intelligence}, Available From: https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/defence-intelligence (Accessed 8th October 2015)
DI. By exploring historical organisational links of the Big 3, it is possible to determine that DI is another member of the British Intelligence Services.

Similarities in working environment
Similarities between the Big 3, the Police and the military are further evident in relation to their institutional culture. In the military context, Alastair Finlan states that:

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once through the barriers with the outside world, one
enters a different community, a place where smartly
attired, well-groomed people of both sexes wearing a
common-uniform move around with a purpose.73
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The London headquarters of both MI5 and MI6 are also surrounded by high levels of security, with the MI6 headquarters surrounded by high gates, with guards stationed at them. Although, unlike armed forces personnel, the staff of MI5 and MI6 do not wear uniforms, the latter are nevertheless clearly part of a professional community set apart from other civil servants. This is perhaps furthered by the amount of secrecy which governs their work, something the former DG Dame Stella Rimington has referred to. She stated that during her time in MI5, she was part of a separate and distinctive community, characterised in part by the prohibition on discussing work matters with outsiders. In practice this meant that MI5 staff socialised almost exclusively with one another, narrowing their social circle considerably, particularly evident in how the Big 3 all have clubs and societies for staff and their families to use.75

Phillip Knightley agrees, asserting that those working within the intelligence services tend to socialise

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73 Finlan, A, Contemporary Military Culture and Strategic Studies, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2013), p. 10
74 Rimington, S, Dame, Open Secret, p. 177
predominantly with one another, as they are able to relax in each other’s company, as opposed to being wary of anyone deemed an outsider.\textsuperscript{76}

No matter what professional field is being analysed, a degree of self-segregation is likely to be evident due to shared similarities between co-workers.\textsuperscript{77} This links back to Rimington’s discussion about the difficulties in attempting to socialise when your work is shrouded in secrecy and intimates how the Big 3 attempt to support their staff, a theme the subsequent section will explore.

Although difficult to ascertain the separate identity, the concept of entering a different world was evident several times when undertaking empirical fieldwork, with examples including needing to swipe ID cards to enter lifts and certain parts of the building. This was particularly noticeable when visiting the Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters in Washington D.C. They had their own police force monitoring the inside and outside of the building, as well as strict airport-style security when entering. This was also evident when attending the National Cryptologic Museum which is situated next to the National Security Agency in America. Despite being a public museum, proof of attendance and identity was required. This is despite there being street signs advertising the location of both organisations.\textsuperscript{78}

There is clearly a distinct culture and environment surrounding Britain’s Intelligence Services, something which is also evident in relation to the Police Force, as Nina Cope argues.\textsuperscript{79} Therefore, it is important to ascertain whether the Police, or any part of them, could constitute part of the British Intelligence Services, particularly considering the role of the Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch in counter-terrorism activities.

\textsuperscript{78} Private Interview with John F. Fox Jr – FBI Historian, \textit{J Edgar Hoover Building}, \textit{935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington D.C.} 20th September 2016; National Cryptology Archives, Annapolis, Maryland; Please see the photographs of the street signs for the FBI Headquarters which are in the introduction.
\textsuperscript{79} Cope, N, ‘Intelligence Led Policing or Policing Led Intelligence?’ \textit{British Journal of Criminology}, 44 (2004), p. 196
Policing and Intelligence

Special Branch was founded in 1883 to counter the threat posed by Irish Republican bombings, and is now an integral part of the Metropolitan Police force. They have substantial expertise in combating terrorism and due to the continued and serious threat it poses, cooperate closely with MI5 on domestic terrorism. However, the principal aim of the British Police remains the protection of life and property, and thus whilst they may support the Intelligence Services in the protection of national security, this is not their primary responsibility.

Following the 7/7 London attacks, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) was created and is an amalgamation of staff from MI5, the Police and other Government departments. This ensures that all knowledge in countering terrorism can be harnessed, demonstrating the continued cooperative relationship between the Police and the British Intelligence Services. Although JTAC is accountable to the DG of MI5, they are a stand-alone organisation deemed an integral part of Britain’s national intelligence machinery who have a crucial role in combating terrorism. Using the intelligence cycle, it is possible to determine that JTAC are part of the intelligence community due to the all source intelligence analysis they undertake on terrorism related matters. But if in future terrorism is no longer regarded as constituting a significant threat, JTAC’s role within British Intelligence may be questioned.

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80 Gill, P, and Phythian, M, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, p. 57
In Britain, Intelligence is forming an integral part of policing nowadays,\(^{86}\) evident in how both rural and urban police forces recruit intelligence analysts who utilise the intelligence cycle.\(^{87}\) This is perhaps unsurprising as Gill argues that the intelligence process is the same for domestic and criminal intelligence, it is the specific targets which differ.\(^{88}\) Police analysts are driven by crimes which have been perpetrated as opposed to priorities stipulated by the Government as is the case for the ‘Big 3’. Indeed, this has posed something of a dilemma for MI5 in particular when taking criminal justice approach to terrorism and seeking to ensure prosecutions, a theme consecutive DGs have examined.\(^{89}\)

But despite the significance it has, intelligence-led policing is still controversial. Based on primary interviews, Cope concludes that many front-line officers fail to see the significance of intelligence analysts\(^{90}\) and Gill and Phythian highlight the gender, age and education gap which often exists between analysts and detectives.\(^{91}\) Although there remains a close working relationship between the ‘Big 3’ and the Police,\(^{92}\) Britain’s police force does not constitute part of the British Intelligence Services.

**Conclusion**

This section has used the intelligence cycle to determine which organisations constitute the British Intelligence Services. Due to their role in intelligence gathering, it is

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\(^{86}\) Treverton, G, *Intelligence for an age of Terror*, (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009), p. 55; It is referred to as intelligence led policing. For more information, please see:
\(^{87}\) Gill, P, and Phythian, M, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, p. 56
\(^{88}\) Cope, N, ‘Intelligence Led Policing or Policing Led Intelligence?’, p. 189
\(^{89}\) Gill, P, *Policing Politics*, p. 6;
\(^{90}\) Gill, P, and Phythian, M, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, p. 12
\(^{96}\) Treverton, G, *Intelligence for an age of Terror*, p. 54-55
\(^{97}\) Cope, N, ‘Intelligence Led Policing or Policing Led Intelligence?’, p. 197
\(^{98}\) Gill, P, and Phythian, M, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, p. 107
indisputable that the British Intelligence Services refers to the Big 3. It is the Big 3 that are also most commonly associated with the term ‘intelligence services’, perhaps due to their prominence within popular culture which increases public awareness of them. Interview material obtained during fieldwork conducted for this thesis also revealed an overwhelming consensus that the Big 3 are the central actors of the British Intelligence Services.

However, difficulties arise when seeking to assess whether there are any other organisations that should be included in the British Intelligence Services. As was discussed, there are substantial similarities between DI and the ‘Big 3’, such as the origins of the services, and in particular, their aims and objectives. This is something which will undoubtedly continue, as will the importance of JTAC due to the continued threat posed international terrorism. But, it is DI which this thesis regards as constituting part of the British Intelligence Services due to their role in intelligence gathering on military, scientific and economic intelligence, amongst others. In contrast, JTAC along with the JIC are part of the wider intelligence community who do not actively collect and collate intelligence but rather analyse and disseminate all source assessments to wider Government.

The Intelligence Services Websites: What Portrayals are evident

**Acting lawfully and ethically**

Compare and contrast: Emphasis on adherence

The websites of the Big 3 all state how they seek to ensure that they are acting lawfully and ethically. For GCHQ, this included emphasising their adherence to legislation. In a ‘Message From The Director’ on the website it states that:

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93 Dylan, H, *Defence Intelligence and the Cold War*, p. 1
We work under one of the most stringent legal and oversight regimes in the world, including the new Investigatory Powers Act.  

In a speech centred upon the legacy of Alan Turing, Sir Iain Lobban explicitly states how GCHQ has always lawfully intercepted communications, furthering the positive portrayal that GCHQ always adhere to legislation and are therefore acting legally. Their website furthers this depiction with sections dedicated to oversight and ethics, with the latter demonstrating how GCHQ are aware of the ethical implications of their work, and the open environment in which staff can air any concerns. The importance of acting legally and ethically was also portrayed elsewhere on the website with the staff profiles, and in particular, Helen’s story emphasising the training provided to ensure staff are aware of the legislation underpinning their actions. This portrays adherence to legislation as central to GCHQ’s work.

These sections on the GCHQ website also demonstrate the open environment in which ethical concerns can be raised, the importance of which is discussed in an academic context by Ian Leigh. Through the existence of the staff counsellor, the Big 3 all depict, albeit to varying degrees, how staff can raise any legal or ethical concerns. Although no mention of the staff counsellor was apparent on the MI5 website, despite the post

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96 Government Communication Headquarters, Feature – GCHQ oversight, Available From: https://www.gchq.gov.uk/features/gchq-oversight (Accessed 29th November 2018);
99 In particular, he discusses the importance of having mechanisms where staff are able to raise any concerns about ethical abuses may be occurring. For more information, please see: Leigh, I, ‘More Closely Watching the Spies: Three Decades of Experiences,’ p. 6
originating in MI5 following the Peter Wright allegations,\textsuperscript{101} it likely remains an important aspect of ensuring legal and ethical standards. In contrast, MI6 does acknowledge the staff counsellor, saying you can ‘receive support relating to (their) Service from the staff counsellor.’\textsuperscript{102} This could be for numerous reasons, including the ability to raise any legal or ethical concerns.

Although this does demonstrate how the Big 3 are seeking to act in a legal and ethical manner by providing a mechanism for staff to raise complaints, Leigh argues it is a flawed system. He highlights the lack of a link between the administrative procedures and the legal jurisdiction of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC).\textsuperscript{103} Considering their responsibility for analysing the policy, administration, expenditure and operations of the Big 3,\textsuperscript{104} they would be the body to examine allegations of wrongdoing made by the staff. Leigh’s analysis agrees with Annie Machon’s assertion that although the staff counsellor exists, they have no ability to do anything.\textsuperscript{105} This suggests that whilst the British Intelligence Services attempt to provide mechanisms in which staff can raise problems, issues arise from the limitation of legislation governing the staff counsellor.

MI5 also seek to depict themselves as acting legally and ethically, and indeed petitioned to be placed on a statutory footing in the late 1980s, demonstrating how they have always wanted to act within the law, to the extent that they pushed Ministers to legislate for their powers.\textsuperscript{106} In the first ever public speech made by a serving head of the British Intelligence Services, MI5’s DG Dame Stella Rimington stated that:

\textsuperscript{103} Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 9/11’, \textit{Intelligence and National Security}, 27/5, (2012), p. 730
\textsuperscript{104} Justice and Security Act, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 2013), p. 2;
Following the Snowden revelations, the ISC explored the allegations of GCHQ’s role in the collection of bulk data: Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 2015)
\textsuperscript{105} Machon, A, ‘Using Our Intelligence’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 20\textsuperscript{th} April 2017
\textsuperscript{106} Security Service, Who We Are – Changes and Reforms, Available From: \url{https://www.mi5.gov.uk/changes-and-reforms} (Accessed 19\textsuperscript{th} November 2018);
Rimington, S, Dame, \textit{Open Secret}, p. 195
The security service must operate within a clear framework of the law. Its activities must be limited to countering genuine threats to national security…. With the proper legal authority, we may need to tap (their) telephones, open their letters or eavesdrop on their conservations to find out their intentions…. Applications to the Secretary of State for warrants to intercept letters or telephone conversations, or to interfere with property, are rigorously examined by the Service’s legal advisers and by the most senior levels of management, and again within the Home Office.107

By highlighting how MI5 are acting legally and ethically in the first speech of its kind, the emphasis of ensuring activities are legal and ethical is suggested. Indeed, in her autobiography Rimington alludes to this, when discussing how MI5 had to push to be placed on a statutory footing.108 Adhering to legal and ethical standards arguably remains a central aspect to MI5’s work as successive DGs Baroness Manningham-Buller, Jonathan Evans, and Andrew Parker all explicitly explore this theme in their speeches.109

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This is combined with the MI5 legal team having to review any operational plan to ensure its compliance with legal and procedural standards.\textsuperscript{110} Thus, MI5 depicts themselves as striving to continually ensure legal and ethical standards.

Another theme which MI5 portrays is how their actions must be necessary and proportionate, something also evident in Chapter 3 ‘A Complimentary Relationship’. In 1994, Dame Stella Rimington argued that the levels of investigation must be proportionate to the threat whilst respecting individual liberties. In turn, this means that the more intrusive the means of investigation, the higher the authorisation should be.\textsuperscript{111}

The importance of this assertion remains as consecutive DG’s have all highlighted the importance of proportionality, with Parker directly stating:

\textit{We take our legal and ethical duty to use these powers proportionately extremely seriously. We never use them for the sake of it and do not trawl at will through people’s private lives.}\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{110} Davies, P, ‘Britain’s Machinery of Intelligence Accountability: Realistic oversight in the absence of moral panic’, p. 146


This theme is further evident as MI5 explains the strict legal framework under which they work to ensure that all actions are necessary, proportionate and in accordance to the law.\textsuperscript{113} Taken from the MI5 website, the table on the following page (Figure 7) demonstrates what actions they can legally undertake, furthering the depiction of adhering to legislation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Authorisation required?</th>
<th>Warrant required?</th>
<th>Reviewed by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communications data</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Interception of Communications Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data about communications but not the content of the communication, such as the date, time and duration of a phone call.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interception of communications</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Interception of Communications Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to communications content, such as listening to a phone call or reading an email or letter.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directed surveillance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Intelligence Services Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covert monitoring of an individual’s movements, conversations and activities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrusive surveillance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (plus a property warrant in most cases)</td>
<td>Intelligence Services Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covert monitoring of an individual within their home or a private vehicle.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of covert human intelligence sources</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Intelligence Services Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasking an agent to obtain or provide access to information through their relationships with other people.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment interference</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Intelligence Services Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtaining access to the contents of stored communications or information on computers or other devices.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulk personal data</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence Services Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Datasets containing information about a large number of people which can be accessed in a targeted way to identify or find information about subjects of interest.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figure 7)\(^{114}\)

Whilst MI6 also demonstrates their adherence to a strict legal framework where they report to Ministers, including examining the legislation which provides the parameters in which they can operate, and ensuring their actions do not damage diplomatic relations,115 they do not provide as much detail as MI5. This is further evident as many of the other references to legal and ethical activities on their website are implicit,116 something which could have been made clearer. This is somewhat confusing as the speeches made by C do in fact further this depiction, evident as Alex Younger states:

\[
\text{In SIS, we have a service rooted in and inspired by the values of liberal democracy, determined to defend our country and the international rule of law, and carrying out remarkable and highly effective work in the face of potential threats.}^{117}
\]

This raises questions as to why their adherence to legislation could not have been more explicit on the website, as well as demonstrating a clear contrast between the MI5 and MI6 websites in highlighting this theme. For MI6, they are depicting how they seek to act legally and ethically within the limitations placed on them by the existing legislation which is not something they can control. This is something of a recurring theme on the Big 3 websites, and in the academic accountability literature.118 This leads to the implicit

\[\text{Davies, P, ‘Britain’s Machinery of Intelligence Accountability: Realistic oversight in the absence of moral panic’, p. 146}^{115}\]
\[\text{116 Secret Intelligence Service, Intelligence Explained – Part 3, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/intelligence-explained.html#section-03 (Accessed 26th November 2018)}^{115}\]
\[\text{This is a recurring theme in the speech at St Andrews as was also seen in the C speech in 2016 Inside the Modern Day MI6 and the speech given at the Women in Technology Awards. See: Secret Intelligence Service, News: 8 December 2016 – Inside the Modern Day MI6, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/news/inside-the-modern-day-mi6.html (Accessed 14th December 2018)}^{115}\]
\[\text{118 The limitation of legislation is something Ian Leigh and Peter Gill both explore in their academic discussions and the thesis explores in the literature review section of Chapter 1. For a selection of their work about the limitation of legislation, please see: Gill, P, Policing Politics, p. 3, 164–165;}^{115}\]
depiction that if there are issues with the actions undertaken by the British Intelligence Services as the Snowden revelations suggest, this is due to the legislation as the Big 3 are acting within this. In turn, this indirectly places the onus upon consecutive British Governments for not seeking to effectively legislate for the Intelligence Services. Gill explores the ramification of this as he states how:

*If the security intelligence agency does not conduct itself within a framework of law then it may well come to constitute the antithesis of liberal democracy.*

Therefore, it is crucial for the British Intelligence Services to act in a legal and ethical manner, as well as provide this portrayal to the public due to the importance of ensuring public confidence in a democratic society. Indeed, this is a theme which the speeches in particular have centred upon. In a speech at St Andrews University in December 2018, Alex Younger, C of MI6, acknowledges that the work of the Intelligence Services is done in the public’s name. He then implicitly portrayed how MI6 would never undermine this by acting in an illegal or unethical manner. The importance of such public trust is agreed upon, and previous DG speeches have all explored its importance. However, it was a speech in 2003 by the then DG Baroness Manningham-Buller which directly addressed the importance of ensuring public confidence. She states that:


119 Gill, P, Policing Politics, p. 64


We need to continue to tell them (the public) about the threat, explain the nature and extent of it, and be clear about what can be expected of us by the public. We need and rely on public cooperation and support for our work…. Informing the public increases their confidence that the authorities are addressing the problem and have the capability to respond appropriately to terrorist threats.\textsuperscript{122}

Her predecessors have built upon her argument with Evans acknowledging the importance of trust with the public.\textsuperscript{123} Parker furthers this as he highlights how engaging with the public is required as the public discourse about intelligence does not accurately provide a view of what is happening within the Intelligence Services.\textsuperscript{124} Therefore, it is in the interests of the British Intelligence Services to provide the public with an understanding of their work as they depend on the public trusting them to do their work.\textsuperscript{125}

Another way in which public confidence is explored by the Big 3 is in their acknowledging, and critiquing, illegal or unethical behaviour. This was particularly evident in the speeches made by MI5’s DGs following the Iraq War. In a speech from October 2003, Manningham-Buller scathingly remarked that:

\begin{quote}
there are unscrupulous individuals who will fabricate material, exploiting the laws of supply and demand.\textsuperscript{126}
\end{quote}
Although unclear which Intelligence Service, or even possibly a member of the Government, that she is referring to, Manningham-Buller’s assertions depict that there are those within the intelligence realm who would act unethically but they are in a minority, therefore creating a positive portrayal of MI5 within the public domain. As will become evident in Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’, this is something of a consistent portrayal, demonstrating that the understandings the British Intelligence Services seek to provide of themselves are at times, are also provided to the public via the different avenues.

_L legality and Ethicality in Intelligence Cooperation_

*Only through international cooperation will we be successful in reducing the threat from terrorism.*

International intelligence cooperation is both commonplace and crucial as the quote above from Baroness Manningham-Buller states, as it seeks to combat the threat from terrorism, a subtly referred to theme on the MI5 website. Indeed, the academic literature also explores the importance of this theme, demonstrating the agreement on the importance of international cooperation from both practitioners and academics alike. Successive DGs have highlighted this in their public speeches, with Evans stating cooperation:

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128 Security Service, _How We Work – Partnerships_, Available From: [https://www.mi5.gov.uk/partnerships](https://www.mi5.gov.uk/partnerships) (Accessed 19th November 2018);
Gill, P, and Phythian, M, _Intelligence in an Insecure World_, p. 194;
Has saved British lives. Many attacks have been stopped as a result of effective intelligence cooperation.

This depicts the importance of international cooperation, something which the Big 3 all emphasise to varying degrees on their websites. In particular, they explore how international cooperation can enhance their effectiveness, a portrayal which will be further explored. However, why this depiction is only implicit on the MI5 website whilst a central theme to the public speeches, raises questions as to what overall portrayal MI5 seeks to portray via the website.

But, this depiction of international cooperation fails to explore how states can have different understandings of what constitutes legal and ethical actions, something which could in fact be a major hurdle to overcome if there were to be international intelligence oversight. Alex Younger alludes to this, stating that those countries who do not share Britain’s laws, know where Britain’s red lines are. This portrays that whilst other nations who Britain cooperates with may act illegally or unethically, Britain has higher standards and does not undertake such activities, no matter the threat posed. This theme was particularly prevalent when Younger discussed the British response to the Salisbury Attack in March 2018 which involved exposing the perpetrators and the expulsion of

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131 Leigh, I ‘Accountability and Intelligence Cooperation – Framing the Issue’, p. 5–8;
Gill, P, ‘Theories of Intelligence’, p. 50–51

This is a theme alluded to by Sir Richard Dearlove when he highlights how the United States in the Global War on Terror have been forced to behave with more consideration based on the actions their counterparts are willing to undertake.
For more information, please see:
Russian diplomats following the poisoning of a former Russian spy now living in the UK.  

This was combined with how Britain’s ‘allies trusted our intelligence in the Salisbury attack. We felt this as an act of solidarity and it meant a huge amount to us.’ Younger depicts not only how well thought of British Intelligence is by its counterparts, suggesting their capability and effectiveness, but also that no matter the nature of the threat, Britain will always respond legally and ethically, furthering the positive portrayal of MI6 and the wider British Intelligence Services. This also demonstrates a contrasting depiction of legality and ethicality as these themes were not as prevalent on the MI5 or GCHQ websites. 

Evans does explore this theme in an explicit manner when he states:

I can say quite clearly that the Security Service does not torture people, nor do we collude in torture or solicit others to torture people on our behalf. That is a very clear and long-established principle.... I do not defend the abuses that have recently come to light within the US system since 9/11 ... We do not solicit or collude in torture. We do not practice torture. 

This portrays MI5 as a lawful and ethical organisation who does not, and has not, undertaken illegal or unethical activities, and will willingly condemn the actions of those who have. Throughout the DG speeches post 9/11, this is a recurring theme, creating the portrayal of MI5 acting legally and ethically to the extent that they are openly critical of those who do not.

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Perhaps such a depiction is promoted due to the difficulties international cooperation can pose for intelligence oversight, particularly due to the Control Principle (ORCON). This stipulates that whichever country gathered the intelligence retains operational control over which countries and organisations can access it. Increasingly, Leigh argues it is being used to demand total secrecy during court cases on the assertion that if the information was provided, it could hamper further intelligence cooperation and matters of national security.\footnote{Gill, P, and Phythian, M, \textit{Intelligence in an Insecure World}, p. 194; Leigh, I ‘Accountability and Intelligence Cooperation – Framing the Issue’, p. 5; An example of this is when the FBI had numerous files relating to the treachery of Anthony Blunt, one of the Cambridge 5 but the British did not want the information released and thus the FBI could not. For more information, please see: Pincher, C, \textit{Too Secret Too Long}, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd, 1984), p. 358-359; In examining the case of Katharine Gun and Derek Pasquaill, Leigh considers the balance between openness and secrecy when highlighting the ORCON principle. He highlights how there is both the desire to protect intelligence and the confidence of the partner country and the damage that a public prosecution would do in terms of putting cooperation under the glare of publicity. Katharine Gun leaked how the American National Security Agency (NSA) sought GCHQ’s assistance in bugging delegates to the United Nations (UN) Security Council. In 2008, Derek Pasquaill who worked for the Foreign Office, leaked documents concerning the UK’s policy of engagement towards Muslim groups and extraordinary rendition, with the proceedings against him subsequently dropped.} But assessing whether this is accurate or being used to prevent information being placed in the public domain remains difficult and highlights the ongoing tensions between openness and the need for secrecy, with international cooperation demanding the latter.

This section has been predominantly based upon information from MI5 and MI6 due to its availability, demonstrating a key contrast between the ‘Big 3’ websites. Although the GCHQ website does suggest the importance of acting legally and ethically, particularly in relation to adherence to legislation,\footnote{Government Communication Headquarters, \textit{Feature – Ethics}, Available From: https://www.gchq.gov.uk/features/ethics (Accessed 29\textsuperscript{th} November 2018); Greenwald, G, \textit{No Place To Hide – Edward Snowden, the NSA and the US Surveillance State}, p. 161 – 165; The Guardian, \textit{GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world’s communications}, Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davies and James Ball, 21\textsuperscript{st} June 2013, Available From: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa (Accessed 16\textsuperscript{th} November 2015); Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 2015)} this was not a central portrayal provided. This was somewhat surprising as it was GCHQ who were most affected by allegations of illegal and unethical activity in the Snowden revelations.\footnote{138}
Structural and organisational difficulties

Due to the nature and structure of the British civil service, there are numerous organisations which have an intelligence dimension to their work, as this chapter discussed in the context of the intelligence cycle. This results in the Big 3 cooperating with numerous other Government departments and institutions. Therefore, there has been the release of British Intelligence documents and papers in the files of other departments, released under the thirty-year rule. Whilst MI5’s former DG Sir Stephen Lander states that this was an accidental as opposed to systematic approach, it demonstrates the structural difficulties which can be posed by extensive Government cooperation. Indeed, it was through such archival disclosures that the former C’s secret slush fund for covert action in the Middle East was discovered. This demonstrates how cross-Government cooperation can cause structural difficulties, leading to the release of information relating to the British Intelligence Services. This certainly depicts wider structural issues being beyond the control of the British Intelligence Services. Therefore, information may be publicly available, even when the British Intelligence Services wish for it to remain secret.

Creation of Organisations and organisations, and organisations……

Over the past 15 years, the British Government has created numerous organisations with an intelligence role, arguably due to the Government’s desire to ensure a cohesive cross-Government approach to terrorism, as well as overcoming the problems surrounding the politicisation of intelligence following the Iraq War. The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) sought to develop coordinated arrangements for handling and disseminating intelligence in response to the international terrorist threat. Whilst being an organisation within MI5, it is staffed by 16 different Government departments and agencies.
suggesting that organisational difficulties could occur. This is also evident in the case of The Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) which is situated within the Cabinet Office and by working with Government and the private sector, aids protection of Britain’s critical national infrastructure. The newly established National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) also uses the expertise of staff from across Government and its website clearly states how it is part of GCHQ. This is in conjunction with the National Technical Assistance Centre (NTAC) which manages intercepted communications data to those entities who have requested it, also being located within GCHQ, despite their extensive cooperation with wider Government. This demonstrates how new organisations are continually created, with staffing coming directly from the Big 3 and other entities. Therefore, there are structural difficulties relating to ensuring the analysis and dissemination of intelligence in a timely manner.

This highlights how there are various structural and organisational difficulties affecting the British Intelligence Services, all of which have to be overcome. Although this theme is not discussed by the heads of GCHQ or MI6 who have not made as many public speeches, it is likely to be a theme which also affects them if new organisations are also struggling with the amount of information. This demonstrates a clear contrast in the

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themes the heads of the respective services discussed. Although the British Intelligence Services are alluding to the structural and organisational difficulties they face, they perhaps do not see this as a central theme to examine on their websites when compared to, arguably, the primary objectives of encouraging recruitment and ensuring public confidence in their work.

Following the end of the Cold War, MI5 placed an increasing emphasis upon organised crime, which led to the Security Services Act being amended in 1996 to allow MI5 to act in support of the Police in serious criminal investigations.\textsuperscript{146} This shifting emphasis may also have been due to the British Intelligence Services having to justify both their continued existence and budgets during the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and before the catastrophic events of 9/11.\textsuperscript{147} But, with the establishment of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) before it was replaced by the National Crime Agency (NCA), MI5’s focus shifted back towards counter-terrorism, something which was also affected by the events of 9/11.\textsuperscript{148} This demonstrates how the creation of new organisations can cause significant structural and organisational issues whilst also implicitly depicting MI5 as being ineffective if their role in the prevention of serious and organised crime was now the jurisdiction of a new organisation.

In comparison, in the case of GCHQ, it led to a rather different depiction. To combat sexual child exploitation, GCHQ and the NCA cooperate closely, even creating the Joint Operations Cell.\textsuperscript{149} Thus, GCHQ has a pivotal role in breaking paedophile rings. Following the Snowden revelations in June 2013, GCHQ was depicted as acting in an illegal and unethical manner.\textsuperscript{150} But by highlighting their involvement in anti-paedophilia operations, this is an attempt to redress this depiction as GCHQ as an organisation acting in the public interest in their endeavour to stop child sexual exploitation.

\textsuperscript{146} Andrew, C, \textit{Defence of the Realm}, p. 788; Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 81
\textsuperscript{147} Dearlove, Sir, R, ‘National Security and Public Anxiety: Our Changing Perceptions’, p. 34
\textsuperscript{150} Greenwald, G, \textit{No Place To Hide}, p. 161 – 165
**Territorial Battles**

Once MI5 and MI6 were created, the first heads made a conscious decision for MI5 to focus on domestic intelligence and MI6 to concentrate on foreign matters,\(^{151}\) a distinction which continues in a contemporary context.\(^{152}\) But despite this, the MI5 and MI6 websites suggest that this separation is not always adhered to. In 1994, MI5 was given ‘the main responsibility for intelligence investigations into all aspects of Irish terrorism activity anywhere in the world’;\(^{153}\) demonstrating how the separation was not adhered to, with MI5 operating overseas by examining Irish terrorism around the world. Arguably, this occurred due to the nature of the threat, as well as the peculiarity and complex historical relationship between Britain and Ireland.

Territorial battles also seem to have affected intelligence sharing between the services, with Chapman Pincher claiming that both services have tended to hoard as opposed to share information with one another. This occurred to the extent that for many years, MI5 were banned from accessing MI6 files. This meant a formal written request had to be submitted to access an MI6 file,\(^{154}\) something which was not conducive to intelligence cooperation. Neither was the tendency for both organisations to withhold information from one another due to the rivalry between them,\(^{155}\) and demonstrates the pervasiveness of secrecy if intelligence could not be shared. However, a similar criticism was also made about the American intelligence services not sharing intelligence prior to 9/11 due to deeply ingrained values and habits within the individual intelligence agencies.\(^{156}\)

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151 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 25
Although there is no evidence as to whether such issues continue to affect the British Intelligence Services, available information would suggest it is unlikely due to the emphasis upon a cooperative approach to countering terrorism, evident in MI6’s counter-terrorism section. It states that:

*Working closely with the Security Service (MI5), we also disrupt threats in the UK, where the threat has an international angle.*

Whilst this could simply refer to intelligence-sharing due to the international nature of threat, the obscure language depicts MI6 as operating on the streets of Britain. This could suggest to the public that Bond’s activities taking place on the street of Britain. But despite this connotation, MI6 are highlighting an organisational difficulty posed; how the nature of the threat requires the domestic and overseas separation to be challenged.

The British Intelligence Services all depict the structural and organisational difficulties they face, albeit to varying degrees. Whilst GCHQ emphasise the importance of cross-Government cooperation, MI6 implicitly alludes to the difficulties caused by the evolving nature of the threat. This highlights that whilst the Big 3 cooperate extensively, they remain separate organisations with their own identity and culture. However, there remains structural and organisational issues to be overcome, but these are not created by the British Intelligence Services having separate identities, but rather wider circumstances.

**Cooperation**

*Terrorism and Cooperation*

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Gill, P, ‘Theories of Intelligence’, p. 50


158 This is a theme also intimated by Ian Leigh. For more information, please see:
Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 81;
Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 9/11’, p. 722
In 1994, Dame Stella Rimington gave the first public speech by a serving DG. In it, she highlighted the importance of cooperation in combating terrorism,\(^{159}\) suggesting that cooperation has always been a central component to the work of the British Intelligence Services. In a contemporary context, all three of the websites, highlight the importance of it,\(^{160}\) with MI6 providing the most information. The ‘Intelligence Explained’ section has a counter-terrorist case study, depicting how cooperation occurs, thus portraying how important engagement with MI5 and GCHQ is as it ensures that the UK remains safe and secure’.\(^{161}\)

This portrays how cooperation between the Big 3 enhances their capability and effectiveness in maintaining Britain’s safety and security. However, the depiction could have been furthered had it explored how the information collected by the Big 3 engaged with the wider British Intelligence Community, a theme lacking discussion on all of the websites. Although a reason for this could be, as one interviewee stated, that the minute mechanics of engagement between the Intelligence Services and wider Government is something the public would not be interested in.\(^{162}\) But surely without giving the public the option of understanding this information, you cannot effectively argue that they are uninterested in the topic.

This depiction was also evident in speeches made by serving DGs,\(^{163}\) however, it is perhaps clearest in a speech made by Evans where he states that:

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\(^{161}\) Secret Intelligence Service, Intelligence Explained – Part 6, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/intelligence-explained.html#section-06 (Accessed 26th November 2018)

\(^{162}\) Private Interview 4: 21st January 2016

We work on an integrated basis with our sister agencies, GCHQ and SIS, so that the particular skills of each agency are focused on the same threat. Their assistance and the intelligence they have provided to us have been invaluable to our operations, giving us coverage beyond our traditional strengths.\textsuperscript{164}

In December 2018, Younger, Chief (C) of MI6 explores the same theme; namely how it is via cooperation that attacks by the so-called Islamic State or Daesh have been prevented.\textsuperscript{165} This creates a consistent positive portrayal of the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services in combatting terrorist threats via cooperation. But it also demonstrates more openness from MI5 and MI6 in discussing their actions thus providing greater understandings of their activities to the public. However, the onus remains on the public to access the websites and transcripts of speeches in order to have this understanding of the British Intelligence Services.


\textsuperscript{165} Secret Intelligence Service, \textit{News: 03 December 2018 – MI6 ‘C’ Delivers Rare Public Speech at St Andrews University}, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/news/alex-younger-st-andrews-speech.html (Accessed 10\textsuperscript{th} December 2018)
One interviewee argued that unless an individual is interested in a subject, they are not going to attempt to find the information.\(^{166}\) This furthers the point that the onus remains on the individual to access the information, as opposed to the British Intelligence Services directly engaging with the public sphere. Considering the existence of the Government Digital Service (GDS) which took over from the Government Communication Service, a disconnect remains in terms of engaging with the public on matters relating to security and intelligence. This was something one interviewee alluded to in terms of how the GDS has a limited understanding of secret and top secret information, which they suggested could be due to the GDS’s narrow experience in Government.\(^{167}\) First-hand experience of this theme was evident as an interview was sought with the GDS but the email chain refusing the interview said ‘not really my area’ even though the topic of the PhD had been clearly stated.

The importance of cooperation in ensuring the capability and effectiveness of British Intelligence has been a theme both of Younger’s speeches have discussed. His 2016 speech from inside MI6 highlighted that it is the fusing together of different expertise which not only makes British Intelligence successful in keeping the country safe, but also sets Britain’s intelligence community apart, being one of the most integrated in the world.\(^{168}\) However, as structural and organisational difficulties explored, this can cause issues at times, something omitted from Younger’s analysis. But the comments do further the over-arching positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services through the discussion of how their cooperation enhances their capability and effectiveness.

During the interviews with British civil servants, the topic of intelligence cooperation was discussed, primarily to allow for triangulation with what information the Big 3 placed into the public domain themselves. Following on from a question as to who constitutes the British Intelligence Services, one interviewee was asked whether this leads to close cooperation between them. But they refused to answer as it was deemed

\(^{166}\) Private Interview 4: 21\(^{st}\) January 2016

\(^{167}\) Private Interview 5: 21\(^{st}\) January 2016

operational.169 This was in stark contrast to another interviewee who said they could not think of an operation when the Big 3 have not cooperated closely and been in lock-step with one another.170 Whilst this response does intimate that the Big 3 cooperate closely, there is a clear juxta-position between what officials will say, and what information is publicly available on the websites. This also suggests at the continuing secrecy surrounding Whitehall discussions pertaining to intelligence, despite the Big 3 putting this information into the public domain themselves.

**Law Enforcement Cooperation**

The Big 3, and most notably GCHQ, explore cooperation with other British Government organisations, and in particular with law enforcement and the military.171 Former GCHQ Director Robert Hannigan suggests the importance of military cooperation when highlighting how GCHQ personnel served with the military in Iraq, Afghanistan and other conflicts which he does not name.172 Younger also discusses his organisation’s close relationship with the military, having been one of the many SIS officers who have served in Afghanistan,173 demonstrating a comparable rhetoric between the two. This also shows a degree of self-critique, as in highlighting military cooperation, Younger acknowledged the difficulties MI6 officers faced, as well as errors in rectifying these problems.174 This depicts MI6 as an organisation aware of their own failings and willing to overcome these. Therefore, they are not solely attempting to provide the public with a ‘squeaky-clean’ portrayal, but rather one that is honest about issues they have faced.

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169 Private Interview 4: 21st January 2016
170 Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017
Although acknowledging their failings could create a portrayal of wrongdoing, the awareness of these issues implicitly depicts MI6 in a positive manner as they are seeking to overcome these problems.

In discussing MI5’s counter terrorism approach, Manningham-Buller, Evans and Parker all allude to their service’s engagement with the military. However, this is in a more implicit manner than MI6’s and GCHQ’s discussion of military cooperation, undoubtedly due to the domestic focus of MI5 not necessitating as much military cooperation. Therefore, successive DG speeches simply suggest at cooperation with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq.\[^{175}\] This depicts a close relationship existing between British Intelligence and the military as it is a comparable theme across the websites. It also highlights how although there is a comparison in the themes the Big 3 explore on their websites and in speeches, there are contrasting manners in how this information is provided.

As well military cooperation, GCHQ highlights their ongoing work with law enforcement. This is due to the all-pervasive nature of cyber threats and security, and their emphasis upon countering serious and organised crime, something the website continually highlights.\[^{176}\] To those who access and actively digest the information, this depicts how law enforcement cooperation is a central component to GCHQ’s activities.

MI5 also explore the importance of law enforcement, focusing on their cooperation with the Police. Such an emphasis is placed upon this that the second ever public speech made by a serving DG was the annual James Smart Lecture to the City of London Police, a


lecture which Manningham-Buller also gave in 2003.\textsuperscript{177} Since the first speech in 1994, police cooperation was continually referred to in speeches with Evans arguing it aided their ability to combat the threat from Al Qaeda,\textsuperscript{178} something Andrew Parker has also suggested.\textsuperscript{179} This depicts how closely MI5 and the Police work with one another. Therefore, it is unsurprising that MI5 have been taking a more criminal justice approach to terrorism, a theme the following section will explore.

\textit{Criminal Justice Approach}

Since the 1990s, MI5 has undertaken a criminal justice approach.\textsuperscript{180} However, this has caused issues for MI5 in seeking to ensure that intelligence can be admitted as evidence in criminal proceedings. This is due to the high levels of evidence courts require or evidence to commit a crime, a theme both DG speeches and the website portray.\textsuperscript{181} This approach is unsurprising considering MI5’s counter-terrorism and organised crime emphasis at different points during the 1990s and 2000s as the previous section about territorial battles discussed. By highlighting issues pertaining to the criminal justice approach, it intimates that MI5 have been constrained in terms of securing convictions, as opposed to an inability in catching suspects. Therefore, they depict themselves as


\textsuperscript{178} Security Service, \textit{News and Speeches} – \textit{Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism and Trust: Jonathan Evans}, 5\textsuperscript{th} November 2007, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/intelligence-counter-terrorism-and-trust (Accessed 17\textsuperscript{th} December 2018);


Security Service, \textit{How We Work – Evidence and Disclosure}, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/evidence-and-disclosure (Accessed 19\textsuperscript{th} November 2018);


capable and effective whilst being constrained by a criminal justice approach. An example of this is highlighted by Gill as he explores how the mandate of the Intelligence Services cannot be fully applied to criminal law, arguing that:

_The prime concern of security intelligence agencies is information-gathering, not prosecution, and therefore its targeting of people and groups will be based on the perceived need for information, not whether there is likely to be some immediate 'result', as is more likely to be a priority for the police._  

This demonstrates a difficulty which MI5 have been grappling with, something Evans discusses in terms of the difficulties in not being able to wait until after an atrocity has happened to bring an individual to justice. This implicitly highlights the difficulties of not wanting to allow a terrorist attack to occur in order to gather evidence to be used in criminal proceedings, thus portraying the difficulties MI5 have of demonstrating their capability and effectiveness within a criminal justice approach. This is explicitly depicted when in 2010 Evans discusses MI5’s involvement in the disruption of an Al Qaeda cell in North West England. But due to their early intervention, they could not sustain criminal proceedings against the individuals. This furthers the depiction of the frustrations MI5 face in preventing atrocities whilst still collecting enough evidence, a portrayal evident in Manningham-Buller’s 2005 speech. In it, she succinctly highlights the dilemma MI5 face between protecting citizens within the rule of law when the intelligence does not amount to clear cut evidence. Implicitly, this also portrays MI5’s desire to act legally and ethically in seeking to gather evidence to ensure a conviction

182 Gill, P, _Policing Politics_ p. 64
within the rule of law, something of paramount importance as they seek to ensure their democratic legitimacy.

However, the difficulties Manningham-Buller discussed have been overcome as in a rare speech about their successes in 2013, Parker stated that there had been four major trials related to terrorist plots. This included plans for a 7/7 style attack with a rucksack bomb, two plots to kill members of the Armed Forces and a failed attack on an English Defence League march using an array of weapons.¹⁸⁶ Discussion of such successes have continued with Parker stating that in the first 6 months of 2017, there were 379 terrorism related arrests.¹⁸⁷ This provides two clear depictions. Firstly, that MI5 has been inherently capable and effective in the prevention of these attacks and secondly, that they have come to understand what evidence can be utilised to gain convictions and have been successful in this.

But perhaps more importantly, they are slowly becoming more open as MI5 are more willing to discuss their successes. Since 2012, DG speeches have discussed attacks that have been prevented or guilty convictions secured via the possibility of accessing a defendant’s communications data, something explicitly stated in Parker’s 2015 speech.¹⁸⁸ Overall, by being more open, there is a positive portrayal created that the British Intelligence Services are capable and effective, in their legal activities to secure convictions whilst implicitly portraying how access to communications data is something required to prevent attacks. This contrasts to the lack of statistical information from MI6 or GCHQ, although this is arguably due to the different emphasis that they all have.

International Cooperation

Today nearly all our investigations... have an international dimension, and simple enquiries are rendered complex by the need to liaise with several different countries. My service has links to services in over 100 countries.\(^{189}\)

Here, Manningham-Buller highlights how the nature of the threat requires international cooperation, depicting an organisation willing to cooperate with others in order to ensure Britain’s safety and security. Indeed, it is seemingly a crucial theme to MI5 as successive DGs and academics alike explore its importance, whilst also highlighting the issues it can cause, something particularly expressed in Evans’ speeches.\(^{190}\) This is combined with how Manningham-Buller and Parker both gave public speeches to Dutch and German

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Intelligence Services respectively. But, providing such assistance had been ongoing since the Cold War when MI5 officers were invited to give lectures to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police security branch on themes such as interviewing suspects and surveillance techniques. The current DG Parker furthers this portrayal when he discusses how due to the terrorist threat, MI5 are increasingly needing to operate across international boundaries.

This suggests the continuing importance MI5 places upon international cooperation, something also depicted on their website, although to a limited extent. Why such an understanding could not be included on the website is unknown when the information is publicly available elsewhere, suggesting that whilst the MI5 website is informative, there is more information which could be included. In turn, this would increase awareness of their actions as opposed to hiding the information in plain sight.

For MI6, international cooperation is one of the many facets of their overseas work. The ‘Our History’ section explores this theme by focusing on US and Allied cooperation during the Second World War, and MI6’s role in the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947. Implicitly, this depicts an intelligence service who remain shrouded in secrecy. In contrast, GCHQ does highlight the importance of international cooperation in cyber security and the extent to which they cooperate with America, something also indirectly portrayed via the picture of the American President’s residence, the White House, at the top of this page on the website. Yet despite this, it remains a theme under-explored in speeches by the Directors of GCHQ which instead focuses on

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192 Pincher, C, Too Secret Too Long, p. 410
cooperation within British Government. This is somewhat surprising as the Snowden revelations centred upon the amount of cooperation there was between GCHQ and their American counterpart the National Security Agency (NSA).\textsuperscript{197} Perhaps omitting this from any speeches is a subtle attempt to divert attention away from the Snowden revelations and move the rhetoric forwards.

Each service has placed a different emphasis upon the types of cooperation. This demonstrates that despite all being central members of the British Intelligence Services, they remain distinct from one another. Yet, this did not prevent a central positive portrayal from being evident throughout, that by cooperating extensively with one another, the military, law enforcement and their overseas partners, their capability and effectiveness is increased.

**Diversity and the Workplace**

*Historically been diverse*

In conjunction with highlighting the diverse workforce in a contemporary context, the Big 3 all provide the depiction that they have always been inclusive and diverse workplaces, a theme particularly emphasised by MI6 The ‘Our History’ section of their website explores how during the First World War, women played a central role in La Dame Blanche, a network of mainly female spies in German-occupied Belgium who provided detailed information to British Intelligence by watching German train movements.\textsuperscript{198} This highlights how MI6 realised the important role women could play, something Keith Jeffrey acknowledges in the MI6 official history which put MI6 in sharp contrast to the rest of the civil service in terms of women’s employment at this time.\textsuperscript{199} After the First World War, MI6 continued to have an inclusive workforce, as they offered jobs to injured military personnel, and women, no matter their marital status, as secretaries, clerks, typists and drivers, and Cumming often sent women to work


\textsuperscript{199} Jeffrey, K, *MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909 – 1949*, p. 57
This depicts how MI6 not only realised the role women could play in intelligence, but actively sought to utilise them in their work, something which continues with C highlighting the importance of women within MI6’s contemporary workforce. This attempts to dispel the portrayal of MI6 being a club for the boys, by highlighting the continual inclusivity and diversity, of the workforce.

In comparison, it seems that this is something MI5 also realised, albeit to a lesser extent, as during the First World War, members of the Girl-Guides were used as messengers within the MI5 Headquarters, after being deemed more reliable than their male counterparts. In the interwar period, perhaps seeing the success MI6 had in using female officers, Sir Maxwell Knight actively employed female agents which was inherently successful as the case of Olga Grey intimates. Having infiltrated the communist party in Britain, she gave evidence at the Old Bailey, against what was termed the Woolwich Arsenal Spy Ring, a Soviet spy cell who were copying details of British weaponry and passing them to Moscow.

GCHQ highlights its historical diversity, although not by exploring the role of women, demonstrating a contrasting approach to the subject amongst the Big 3. In a speech celebrating the role of Alan Turing, Iain Lobban states that GCHQ:

> Was at the most tolerant end of the cultural spectrum. In an organisation which valued the skills and characteristics that differences can bring, Turing’s

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205 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 220 – 221, 401
206 Hemming, H, *Maxwell Knight. MI5’s Greatest Spymaster*, p. 191, 206 - 211
homosexuality was less of a talking point than his insights into the complex crypt problems of the day. 205

This provides the depiction that GCHQ has always been a tolerant place to work, something which is in sharp contrast to comments made by Hannigan. He acknowledges that during the 1960s and 1970s, some staff, who were openly gay, were failed by GCHQ in not providing the support required. This meant that staff could be interrogated if suspected of being gay, and could be dismissed from the service, with no support. Hannigan goes on to say how sorry he was that so many were treated in this manner ‘right up until the 1990s when the policy was rightly changed’. 206

Here, Hannigan critiques past actions undertaken by GCHQ and seeks to apologise for them. Whilst this self-critique is pleasing to see, it contradicts the depiction provided by Lobban in terms of how GCHQ has always been a tolerant workplace. 207 It also stands in stark contrast to the portrayals of inclusivity painted by MI5 and MI6. Therefore, when analysing all the available information, the portrayal is that there are undeniably aspects of GCHQ’s history which were similar to the opinions in wider society at the time, but this does not prevent GCHQ, as well as MI5 and MI6, always striving to be diverse and inclusive.

Staff diversity in numbers

Due to the self-serving interest of promoting recruitment, the Big 3’s websites all emphasise how diversity manifests in terms of the activities they undertake, including

possible career trajectories, and the nature of the workforce.\textsuperscript{208} For MI5, they utilise statistics to enhance this depiction, as the website states that of the 4,000 staff, 40\% are women, 8\% from Black and Ethnic Minorities and 3\% have disabilities.\textsuperscript{209} Ensuring a diverse workforce as the service continually expanded, has been a continual policy for MI5, something which is evident when analysing the history of the service. In 1941, there was a dramatic expansion in staff numbers, due to the Second World War,\textsuperscript{210} and by 1994 half the 2,000 staff were women.\textsuperscript{211} In the early 2000s, there was another staff expansion, and by 2006 the staff had increased to 2,800, with 6\% from Black and Ethnic Minorities.\textsuperscript{212} This is perhaps due to the increase in counter-terrorism work in recent years which Leigh states took 80\% of their efforts and resources.\textsuperscript{213} This depicts the increase in the diversity of MI5, demonstrating how they represent a microcosm of British society.\textsuperscript{214}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{208} Government Communication Headquarters, \textit{GCHQ Careers, Early Careers, Graduates and Future Leaders}, Available From: \url{https://www.gchq-careers.co.uk/early-careers/graduates-and-future-leaders.html} (Accessed 3\textsuperscript{rd} December 2018);
\item Secret Intelligence Service, \textit{Explore Careers at SIS}, Available From: \url{https://www.sis.gov.uk/explore-careers.html} (Accessed 5\textsuperscript{th} June 2017);
\item Security Service, \textit{Careers – Working at MI5}, Available From: \url{https://www.mi5.gov.uk/careers/working-at-mi5} (Accessed 6\textsuperscript{th} June 2017)
\item Security Service, \textit{Who We Are – People and Organisation}, Available From: \url{https://www.mi5.gov.uk/people-and-organisation} (Accessed 16\textsuperscript{th} October 2018)
\item Security Service, \textit{News Service – The International Terrorist Threat and the Dilemmas in Countering it: Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller, 1\textsuperscript{st} September 2005}, Available From: \url{https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/the-international-terrorist-threat-and-the-dilemmas-in-countering-it} (Accessed 15\textsuperscript{th} December 2018); Ian Leigh highlights the exponential staff increase post 9/11. For more information, please see:
\item Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 9/11’, p. 722–723;
\item Leigh, I, ‘Intelligence and the Law in the United Kingdom’, p. 642
\item Security Service, \textit{News and Speeches – A Modern MI5: Andrew Parker, 28\textsuperscript{th} October 2015}, Available From: \url{https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/a-modern-mi5} (Accessed 21\textsuperscript{st} December 2018);
\item Leigh, I, ‘Intelligence and the Law in the United Kingdom’, p. 642, 653
\end{itemize}
In contrast, statistics are not available for GCHQ, and they simply highlight that their 6,000 staff\(^\text{215}\) comes from a diverse range of backgrounds. The nature of the diversity is subtly referred to, as the webpage lists support groups available for staff, including those to support women, ethnic minorities, LGBT individuals, and those with disabilities.\(^\text{216}\) Unlike MI5, GCHQ explores neurodiversity, highlighting how some employees are on the autistic spectrum,\(^\text{217}\) depicting GCHQ as an inherently inclusive organisation. Equally, it intimates how diversity is not solely referring to ethnicity. This depicts how GCHQ are attempting to ensure that preconceptions do not prevent innovation,\(^\text{218}\) something both MI5 and MI6 state in different manners, such as nowadays seeking to recruit those with technological expertise.\(^\text{219}\)

In the case of MI6, the website explicitly highlights diversity amongst its staff, as well as the support organisations available.\(^\text{220}\) In contrast, speeches by C only imply this theme, with the 2016 speech stating how MI6 officers are representative of wider society.\(^\text{221}\) This intimates that MI6 is a microcosm of wider British society, thus depicting a diverse and inclusive workforce, something Younger states offers divergent approaches.


to a problem, thus providing a more cohesive solution.\textsuperscript{222} Perhaps more interestingly, this portrays a desire to move beyond the criticisms pertaining to group-think mentality made by the Butler Inquiry following the Iraq War.\textsuperscript{223} By depicting MI6 as a microcosm of society, indirectly, it is seeking to move beyond the stereotypical MI6 officer as being an Oxbridge graduate and Bond-esque and further promoting MI6 as a possible career to those who may not have considered it.\textsuperscript{224} This demonstrates how the websites are attempting to promote recruitment by highlighting that they want individuals from all backgrounds.

**Workplace Support**

As the previous section alluded to, the Big 3 all seek to provide support for their employees. In MI6, this includes ensuring staff have ‘the support they need to stay safe and the guidance and training required to navigate the complex and ethically hazardous environment.’\textsuperscript{225} Two years later in 2018, C states how this has been strengthened in lieu of an ISC report.\textsuperscript{226} This provides the depiction of how MI6 seeks to support staff as much as possible, a portrayal also evident on the MI6 website as the Working Here page has a section dedicated to staff wellbeing and benefits available.\textsuperscript{227} This is something which GCHQ and MI5 also depict, with the staff profiles portraying what training available, particularly relating to acting legally and ethically, as this chapter has


\textsuperscript{223} Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2004), p. 16, 110


highlighted. By exploring such themes, it portrays the British Intelligence Services as seeking to provide support for staff, particularly in ensuring their work remains legal and ethical.

The support available to staff extends to their wellbeing, a theme all of them emphasise, with support structures including flexible working hours, mental health support and counselling services. This provides a cohesive depiction of how the British Intelligence Services as a whole, strive to ensure that staff are well supported throughout their careers. But MI6 takes this depiction further, by explicitly highlighting the provision of clubs and societies, an onsite restaurant, gym and occupational health services which serving or former staff and their families are able to access. This depicts MI6 as an organisation who takes the welfare of its staff seriously and strives to ensure they have all the support required, something particularly important due to the nature of the work and secrecy surrounding it. Whilst MI5 and GCHQ may also have such provisions, it is not explicitly alluded to, with the MI5 website simply stating there are clubs and societies, and no reference to whether families are able to access them, exhibiting

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228 Government Communication Headquarters, How We Work – Feature; The Threat from Terrorism, Available From: https://www.gchq.gov.uk/features/threat-terrorism (Accessed 28th November 2018);

Government Communication Headquarters, GCHQ Careers – Life at GCHQ, Available From: https://www.gchq-careers.co.uk/life-at-gchq.html (Accessed 29th November 2018);


231 Although a former MI5 officer, this is a theme explored in Tom Marcus’s autobiography Soldier Spy. He discusses that after being diagnosed with PTSD, the help he was offered came from with the British Intelligence Services although he was sceptical of things, he discussed in confidence being reported back to his bosses.


contrasting portrayals amongst the Big 3. But DG speeches allude to the support DGs themselves seek to provide to both serving and former personnel. For GCHQ, the references are far subtler with the careers section highlighting the ‘exceptional welfare and support on offer’ and a press release intimating the existence of clubs and societies.

It is not doubted that GCHQ are concerned with staff welfare, why they do not refer to it in the same manner as MI6 is somewhat strange and demonstrates a theme which they could explore on the website and would not have any operational consequences. Arguably, this would enhance GCHQ’s website as a recruitment tool by highlighting to prospective employees the support offered, as well as furthering the positive portrayal available to those who access the website that they are concerned about the welfare of their staff.

By discussing the workplace in such a candid and open manner, the Big 3 via increased openness, are portraying how they are career options to everyone as they represent a microcosm of society. This demonstrates how increased openness can be beneficial to ensuring continued public confidence of their work, as there are themes which do not require excessive secrecy.

Importance of Secrecy
Secrecy has always surrounded the British Intelligence Services and when they were founded, Sir Mansfield Cumming had a fake address for MI6 to protect their work,
something which continued. By 1919, he would send people to this fake address, to maintain the secrecy surrounding their activities. Although there is no evidence of MI5 undertaking such actions when they were founded, Evans does highlight that during the 1980s, they had a discreet cover as an opaque Government department, which he argues demonstrates the pervasiveness of secrecy at this time. Indeed, even when they were publicly acknowledged, Rimington discussed why MI5 required secrecy, a theme which her predecessors have all explored. This demonstrates how:

Secrecy is essential if we are to avoid our opponents knowing whether they are on our radar and learning how we go about our work, and if sensitive sources are not to be put at risk.

Parker’s 2015 speech ‘A Modern MI5’ explored the importance of this, using an historical example. In the 1920s, a public disclosure of intercepted Soviet telegrams resulted in the Soviet regime moving to a more secure means of communication, thus preventing Britain accessing them. In a contemporary context, at a roundtable at George Washington University where Younger was a panellist, this theme was prevalent in discussions pertaining to the damage of the Snowden revelations in the ability of the

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American and British Intelligence Services’ capability to operate. This provides clear comparison from MI5 and MI6 about why secrecy is required by the British Intelligence Services, and how it remains central to their work. Indeed, it also intimates how over time, MI5 are becoming more open by providing such details as opposed to the previous speeches which merely intimate the importance of secrecy.

Younger implicitly highlights the importance of balancing openness with secrecy. In his first ever public speech, he highlights why speeches are such a rarity; namely due to the secrecy surrounding their actions which limits the scope of his speech, whilst acknowledging that everything MI6 does is in the public’s name. Whilst depicting the importance of secrecy, Younger’s comments do portray the awareness of the contrast between ensuring public confidence and maintaining secrecy, something of a juxtaposition for a democratic intelligence service. But despite this, MI6 maintains a depiction of secrecy, in both public speeches and on the website. In his December 2018 speech, the importance of secrecy is a central theme as Younger states that:

The ability to create relationships of trust between our officers and people inside the organisations we need to understand. We call these brace people agents, and they put their livelihoods, and sometimes even their lives, at risk on behalf of the UK. That is why our people, our methods and our operations must always remain a secret.

243 YouTube, CIA-GW Intelligence Conference: Panel on The View from Foreign Intelligence Chiefs, Available From: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yefBv7Q3sv0 (Accessed 24th January 2018);
This depicts not only an understanding of the work of agents, but also provides a clear argument for the necessity of secrecy to their work. On the website, this depiction is furthered on both the ‘Our History’ and surprisingly, the ‘Contact Us’ section. From their instigation until the end of the Second World War, there is a concise depiction of key moments from MI6’s history. This is in contrast to MI5 who explore their entire 110-year history. But from 1949 onwards, the only information pertains to the appointment of Sir Dick White as C in 1956, having been DG of MI5, and the creation of the Intelligence Services Act in 1994 as ‘the secret nature of our work means we cannot give much information on our operations since then.’

The ‘Contact Us’ section stresses the importance of any individual who contacts MI6, ensures their own personal safety and gives suggestions of how to do this. This further the portrayal of how MI6 are concerned about the ongoing safety of all those who work, or engage with them as well as justifying the amount of secrecy. The necessity of the British Intelligence Services having a degree of secrecy has not been doubted, but the emphasis placed on it depicts that it is used as a cover screen to prevent further questioning. This places a greater emphasis on the avenues providing an understanding of the British Intelligence Services to the public, something which could be easily overcome if the British Intelligence Services furthered their direct engagement with the public, combined with making information more easily accessible. This could be easily overcome by seeking to ensure as much information which does not damage methods or operations is publicly available.

Andrew Parkers argues how successive Governments have:

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This is the same time frame that the MI6 Official History by Keith Jeffrey goes up to and provides the same argument as to why this time frame is evident.


wrestled with the inherent tension between the necessary of our operations, and the legitimate desire for greater transparency about the nature of our powers.\textsuperscript{247}

This intimates the tensions secrecy can cause, particularly in relation to engaging with the public, a theme which both Rimington and Manningham-Buller explored in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Thus depicting how the tensions of secrecy have been ever present, with the former giving a recommendation of how the accountability process could fill this knowledge gap.\textsuperscript{248} In a more contemporary context, Evans alluded to this theme in terms of the difficulty for the public to comprehend the full extent of information relating to intelligence which ends up in the public domain.\textsuperscript{249} However, this is undeniably something which could be overcome if British Intelligence themselves furthered their own engagement with the public, something Rimington suggested in 1994.

**Conclusion**

This chapter began by examining who constitutes the British Intelligence Services before analysing what portrayals they placed of themselves in the public domain. Using the intelligence cycle, the chapter first made a distinction between the Intelligence Services and Intelligence Community and concluded that it is the Big 3 namely MI5, MI6 and GCHQ as well as DI who constitute Britain’s Intelligence Services. Due to the availability of information, the chapter then compared and contrasted what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services were provided by the websites of the Big 3 and rare public speeches by their heads. These portrayed numerous themes which the chapter has

\textsuperscript{247} Security Service, News and Speeches – A Modern MI5: Andrew Parker, 28\textsuperscript{th} October 2015, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/a-modern-mi5 (Accessed 21\textsuperscript{st} December 2018)

\textsuperscript{248} Security Service, News And Speeches – Security and Democracy: Is There A Conflict: Dame Stella Rimington, 12\textsuperscript{th} June 1994, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/security-and-democracy-is-there-a-conflict (Accessed 11\textsuperscript{th} December 2018);

Security Service, News and Speeches – Global Terrorism: Are We Meeting The Challenge?: Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller, 16\textsuperscript{th} October 2003, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/global-terrorism-are-we-meeting-the-challenge (Accessed 13\textsuperscript{th} December 2018);


explored, including acting legally and ethically, cooperation, structural and organisational difficulties, workplace and diversity, and finally the importance of secrecy. Whilst the Big 3 all highlight these themes to varying degrees, there is consensus about their importance. Therefore, the websites are comparable in terms of the themes they explore but contrasting in how they examine these topics. This is most evident in the case of GCHQ who do not explore workplace diversity or the importance of secrecy to the same extent that MI5 and MI6 do.

The public speeches utilised have ostensibly been from MI5 DGs. In comparison, there are only three available by a serving Director of GCHQ, and two from C. However the latter’s are far more informative as the GCHQ speeches tend to be discussing wider themes such as promoting the work of Alan Turing. But it would be remiss not to utilise the speeches from as they not only enhance the depictions evident on the website but provide a telling mechanism for analysing how the content has changed over time. Whilst these speeches were all publicly available on the MI5, MI6 and GCHQ websites, these are not always easily accessible. Equally, this relies on the public accessing the websites, searching for the speeches, and then reading them, or on news journalism to report on such matters. Therefore, it seems apt to argue that these speeches are somewhat hidden in plain sight.

The first public speech given by Dame Stella Rimington in 1994, merely sought to provide an insight into the intelligence world, whereas her predecessor Sir Stephen Lander, simply gave a factual talk about the release of information to what is now the National Archives. By 2003, there was a shift in emphasis with Manningham-Buller focusing upon terrorism and how MI5 as well as wider British Intelligence sought to combat it, including giving statistics of the number of foiled attacks and emphasising the


importance of international cooperation. Perhaps it was due to the changing threats in the post 9/11 context, which required MI5 to become more engaged with the public, something particularly evident in the number of public speeches given by Manningham-Buller. Evans also sought to provide more information to the public, such as highlighting the continued threat posed by Al Qaeda. Thus, over time, there has been a gradual openness in the themes MI5 are willing to publicly discuss, although there is arguably more that could occur in this respect.

For the current DG, there is a continued attempt to further provide an understanding of the British Intelligence Services, something his counterpart, C has also undertaken, giving the first speech from within the iconic Vauxhall Cross Headquarters to news journalists. This intimates how news journalism is perceived to be an important way in which the public are informed about intelligence matters, demonstrating the validity of its inclusion as an avenue of information analysed in this thesis. Another theme both highlight is the successes the British Intelligence Services have had, something earlier speeches only ever subtly referred to. Whilst the early 2000s marked a turning point in terms of DGs giving statistics on the number of attacks prevented, Parker not only provides such statistics, but also what these constituted, a recurring theme in his many speeches. Implicitly, this portrays how capable and effective MI5 have been in

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preventing a terrorist attack and bringing the perpetrators to justice. This depiction is also evident from MI6 although more explicitly as Younger also provides such information by highlighting how via cooperation, Daesh attempted attacks have been prevented.258 This portrayal is also evident twice on the MI6 website in relation to their involvement in stopping the AQ Khan network from selling nuclear weapons to third parties.259

It was pleasing to see particularly in the speeches, that the British Intelligence Services do acknowledge their failings which depict them not only as human, but willing to move forward whilst highlighting issues they have faced. This allows for a clear depiction of how nowadays, the British Intelligence Services strive to act legally and ethically, as well as the emphasis placed on ensuring staff are aware of this and can discuss any concerns they have. This is perhaps one of the overarching portrayals all of the websites provide. Discussing their failings also prevents assertions that the websites are portraying a ‘squeaky-clean’ version of themselves in the public sphere in order to encourage recruitment, but are rather seeking to ensure that there is an understanding of their actions as they understand the importance of maintaining their democratic legitimacy via public trust and confidence in them.

Whilst the Big 3 all highlight the overarching themes of acting legally and ethically, cooperation, structure and organisation, diversity, and the importance of secrecy, there are nuances in how they emphasise them, demonstrating how they remain separate organisations, despite their close cooperation. Overall, there is a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services in their adherence to legislation; capability and effectiveness of ensuring Britain’s safety and security; the structural and organisational difficulties they have to overcome; the nature of the workforce and the importance of secrecy to the work of the British Intelligence Services.

259 AQ Khan is discussed on the counter-proliferation drop down section at the bottom of the ‘Our Mission’ page which provides some information about the threats MI6 are seeking to prevent. Please see: Secret Intelligence Service, Our Mission, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-mission.html (Accessed 3rd November 2015);
Whilst it has been pleasing to see the British Intelligence Services seeking to provide a depiction of themselves directly to the public, there are still questions about how accessible the information is. They all have websites which seek to actively engage with the public, with GCHQ launching a new one in 2016, which coincides with one interviewee’s assertions that the Snowden revelations demonstrated the necessity of engaging with the public and restoring public trust. Therefore, it is unsurprising to see an emphasis across the Big 3 that they are always acting in a legal and ethical manner. But much of the information is somewhat hidden in plain sight, making the depictions of the British Intelligence Services something that needs to be actively searched for as opposed to being easily accessible. This could be easily rectified and would portray British Intelligence as an entity willing to engage with the public in a user-friendly manner.

Interviews with British civil servants provided the assertion that the public are happy with what is going on, and will only delve into the details if they have a specific interest, but, and perhaps more telling, public engagement from the Big 3 is deemed a ‘necessary evil’. Although interviews demonstrated the realisation that the Big 3 can be better at telling their own story, there remains significantly more which they could do for this to occur. In particular, finding a balance between openness and secrecy would be an obvious starting point, combined with the possibility engaging with museums and exhibits. At the Imperial War Museum, the ‘Secret War’ exhibit is dedicated to the intelligence realm, and includes information relating to the contemporary context, with a specific emphasis upon the role of the British Intelligence Services in countering terrorism, and the 7/7 attacks in London in 2005. However, all the information is based on publicly available sources, and there is no engagement from the British Intelligence

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261 Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017;
Private Interview 5: 21st January 2016;
Private Interview 4: 21st January 2016;
Private Interview 2: 8th January 2016;
262 Private Interview 4: 21st January 2016;
Private Interview 2: 8th January 2016
263 Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017
264 Imperial War Museum, Secret War Exhibit, London, United Kingdom, 16th September 2015
Therefore, they utilised the same sources to create the display as are being analysed in this chapter, namely the Big 3 websites and public speeches.

This is in stark contrast to the International Spy Museum in Washington D.C which does have direct input from former intelligence practitioners, something which they highlight. In an interview with the museum’s curator, Dr Vince Houghton explored this theme stating that they have ‘always had close collaboration’ with the Intelligence Services, evident as since their founding, there have been 3 former Central Intelligence Agency employees and a deputy NSA director on the board, and MI5’s former DG Dame Stella Rimington was also a board member when the interview was undertaken in 2016. This demonstrates that Britain is somewhat behind their American counterpart in terms of engaging with the public, and demonstrates that there is far more which they could do to enhance the understandings they seek to provide of themselves to the public. This would prevent the avenues from being in such an influential position in providing an understanding of intelligence in the public domain. As the next chapter will explore, this can mean that by not directly engaging, the British Intelligence Services rely at times, on their political master’s to provide the public with information relating to their actions.

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265 Private Interview 1: With Amanda Mason – 7th October 2015
267 Private Interview 18: With Dr Vincent Houghton – 20th September 2016
Chapter 3: A Complementary Relationship – British Intelligence Services and the Government

Introduction

Intelligence plays a crucial role in informing and executing the policies of British Governments,¹ resulting in the successive British Governments having a clear understanding of the actions of the British Intelligence Services, who require Government approval for their continued activities.² Therefore, the elected Government, via Parliament, are in a clear position to provide a depiction of British Intelligence to the public, something which results in an inherently positive depiction.

To assess what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services are disseminated from the political as opposed to bureaucratic Government of the time, the chapter will explore the Parliamentary statements and debates surrounding the two case studies, both of which provide a positive depiction of the British Intelligence Services. The first, the lead up to the Iraq War, results in the superlative nature of British Intelligence, particularly in relation to their capability and effectiveness being highlighted by Ministerial statements. This portrayal is something the long-awaited Chilcot inquiry questioned, particularly raising concerns about the limitations of intelligence not being evident in the Government’s use of intelligence.³ But, this is not something the chapter focuses upon due to the emphasis consecutive Governments place on their independence from official reports and inquiries, a central theme evident in the creation of the Chilcot Inquiry.⁴ The second case study, the Snowden revelations, advances the positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services.

Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’ in Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services, edited by Daniel Baldino, (Sydney, The Federation Press, 2010), p. 188;


⁴ Hansard, House of Commons, 15th June 2009, Volume 494, Column 23
Intelligence Services, by not only furthering the depiction of their capability and effectiveness, but also the legality and ethical nature of their actions.

**Methodology**

As the relationship between Government and Intelligence Services varies between countries, this chapter arguably has the least applicability to the wider intelligence literature due to its inherent British focus. However, it still aids understanding of political institutions and the role of intelligence within them. Through researching the Government responses to the case studies, the potential of each theme becoming its own chapter was evident. Therefore, a tight focus on both case studies, as well as which Government statements are examined is paramount. Thus, Government statements at key points from the Iraq War controversy and the Snowden revelations will be analysed. For the Iraq case study, these include: when the September dossier was made public; when the allegations of sexing-up the dossier were made; and when the Butler Inquiry reported its findings. For the second case study, the speeches analysed are directly following the Snowden revelations and after the David Anderson Report was published.

Hansard has been used extensively to access speeches and written statements made by Government Members of Parliament (MPs) in the House of Commons. Although there are speeches made to news journalism by the Prime Minister, Foreign and Home Secretaries on these topics, these are analysed within the news journalism chapter and will therefore be omitted from the analysis in this chapter as news journalists invariably include their own analysis on the speeches, as opposed to repeating the speech or written statement word for word as they are in Hansard. Hansard allows for Government Ministers to place information directly in the public domain. In fact, the investigative journalist Chapman Pincher argues that Parliament can be deemed a medium in its own right through Hansard. Using it allows to clearly compare and contrast between the portrayals the Intelligence Services themselves are seeking to put directly into the public domain and the Government depiction of the Intelligence Services.

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Ministerial Statements

In this section, only statements made by key Government Ministers, namely the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary will be scrutinised, due to their role in overseeing British Intelligence.\(^7\) As the Foreign Secretary William Hague succinctly explained:

\[
I \text{ am responsible for the work of GCHQ and the Secret Intelligence Service, SIS, under the overall authority of the Prime Minister. My Rt. Honourable Friend the Home Secretary is responsible for the work of the Security Service.}^8
\]

As Hague alluded to, the Prime Minister also has a role in overseeing British Intelligence, something Ian Leigh argues results in the Prime Minister acting as a Government mouthpiece on intelligence matters, despite the secretaries of state having overall responsibility for the British Intelligence Services.\(^9\) Therefore, this section will examine Parliamentary statements made by the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Home Secretaries which are available via Hansard on both the reasons for the Iraq War and the Snowden disclosures.\(^10\) These suggest that over time, there is more willingness to discuss intelligence matters explicitly, as opposed to subtle references which are seemingly based on existing understandings of British Intelligence. Thus, over time, there is seemingly a move towards more openness to discuss intelligence in the public domain.

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\(^7\) Security Service, MI5 Video Transcripts – Director General MI5, Andrew Parker – Speech – 17/10/2017, Available From: [https://www.mi5.gov.uk/who-we-are-video-transcript](https://www.mi5.gov.uk/who-we-are-video-transcript) (Accessed 21\(^{st}\) December 2018);
Government Communication Headquarters, Feature – GCHQ oversight, Available From: [https://www.gchq.gov.uk/features/gchq-oversight](https://www.gchq.gov.uk/features/gchq-oversight) (Accessed 29\(^{th}\) November 2018);

This theme is also explored and highlighted by Chapman Pincher. For more information, please see: Pincher, C, *Too Secret Too Long*, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd, 1984), p. 531


In 2002, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair decided:

> to share with the public the intelligence being presented to the Government which showed that Iraq was in serious breach of several United Nations Security Council Resolutions’ (UNSCR).\(^\text{11}\)

This results in assessments made by British Intelligence placed directly into the public domain, as they attempted to enlist public and political support for the invasion of Iraq by providing ‘intelligence-related material concerning the attempts of the Iraqi regime to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD).\(^\text{12}\) Paul Pillar argues that this approach of publicising the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessments in order to bolster public support for the Iraq invasion, was clearly the politicisation of intelligence.\(^\text{13}\)

However, the publication of the intelligence assessments, Michael Wesley argues, was an effect of the new security environment and meant that law enforcement and intelligence agencies were involved in the communication tasks of Government.\(^\text{14}\) Indeed, at the time, even the Prime Minister Tony Blair acknowledged that this was a unique event.\(^\text{15}\) occurring


\(^{12}\) Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 85


\(^{14}\) Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’, p. 195;

This was something witnessed again under the Cameron Coalition Government when they published a JIC assessment about the Syrian use of chemical weapons against the domestic population. For more information, please see:

Hansard, House of Commons, 29\(^{th}\) August 2013, Volume 566, Column 1425, 1432;

BBC News, UK intelligence assessment on Syria under analysis, Gordon Corera, 29\(^{th}\) August 2013, Available From: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23883617 (Accessed 3\(^{rd}\) October 2019);


\(^{15}\) Hansard, House of Commons, 14\(^{th}\) July 2004, Volume 423, Column 1436
Because it is important that we explain our concerns about Saddam to the British people, we have decided to disclose its (the Joint Intelligence Committee) assessments.\textsuperscript{16}

The following section analyses what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services were provided when direct references were made to them, before assessing the more indirect and subsidiary references evident. This creates a portrayal of intelligence based on subtle insinuations which arguably played upon current beliefs pertaining to the British Intelligence Services already in the public domain. Perhaps this emerges from how in Pillar’s analysis, Government ‘public statements ostensibly reflect intelligence, but they do not reflect intelligence analysis, which is an essential part of determining what the pieces of raw reporting mean’.\textsuperscript{17}

**Direct References to British Intelligence**

Considering that the Government sought to publish the September dossier to present the public with the same information that they had been provided with in relation to the threat posed by Saddam,\textsuperscript{18} it would have been strange had they not directly discussed intelligence. In the 24\textsuperscript{th} September 2002 House of Commons debate, Tony Blair stated:

\begin{quote}
I am aware, of course, that people will have to take elements of this on the good faith of our intelligence services, but this is what they are telling me, the British Prime Minister, and my senior colleagues. The intelligence picture that they paint is one accumulated over the last four years. It is extensive, detailed and authoritative. It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16} Hansard, *House of Commons*, 24\textsuperscript{th} September 2002, Volume 390, Column 3
\textsuperscript{17} Pillar, P, ‘Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq’, *Foreign Affairs*, 85/2 (2006) p. 20
\textsuperscript{18} Hansard, *House of Commons*, 24\textsuperscript{th} September 2002, Volume 390, Column 3
which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population, and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability.\textsuperscript{19}

Blair’s comments directly portray the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services in providing the Government with key information relating to Saddam’s WMD capabilities. This included the ability to launch them in 45 minutes and the attempted acquisition of nuclear weapons. Whilst highlighting the role of intelligence in Blair’s policy-making in relation to Iraq, it also portrays British Intelligence positively by directly demonstrating what information they had provided the Government with to allow such an assessment of Saddam’s WMD capabilities. This correlates to Wesley’s assertion that both the US and UK Governments had speeches vetted for accuracy and publicised this fact,\textsuperscript{20} something evident in the excerpt from Blair’s speech above.

Following the Gilligan assertions on the BBC Radio 4 \textit{Today Programme} that the September dossier had been sexed-up,\textsuperscript{21} this was a theme Blair furthered during Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs). By not only emphasising how his decision-making was based on JIC assessments, which are of course, centred on collated intelligence assessments, Blair stated how the British Intelligence Services had discovered hidden documentation about Saddam’s missile capabilities.\textsuperscript{22} This rhetoric expands on the suggestion that the decision to go to war was based on the role of intelligence and the JIC assessments in informing Government decision-making. In turn, these direct references to the work of the British Intelligence Services could encourage public sentiment that if the Blair Government were influenced by the intelligence, any issues pertaining to why the war occurred was due to information policy-makers received. Although inherently subtle, this suggestion seemingly places the onus for any issues which may occur, on the

\textsuperscript{19} Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 24\textsuperscript{th} September 2002, Volume 390, Column 3
\textsuperscript{20} Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’ p. 195
\textsuperscript{21} BBC News, \textit{Full text: Gilligan’s Today reports}, 24\textsuperscript{th} July 2003, Available From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3090681.stm (Accessed 4\textsuperscript{th} May 2018)
\textsuperscript{22} Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 4\textsuperscript{th} June 2003, Volume 406, Column 154–155; The continued and threatening existence of the WMDs in Iraq is a theme which Peter Gill argues was a recurring one throughout Blair’s public statements in the lead up to the Iraq War. For more information, please see: Gill, P, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq,’ in \textit{Who’s Watching the Spies?}, edited by Hans Born, Loch K Johnson and Ian Leigh, (Dulles, Potomac Books, 2005), p. 20
British Intelligence Services as opposed to the Government, perhaps due to a self-serving interest.

Indeed, the depiction of the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services remains evident in the Government response to the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) report. Here, they welcome the ISC finding that ‘there was convincing intelligence that Iraq had active chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.’23 This furthered the portrayal of the British Intelligence Services being capable and effective, as if they are able to collect such coveted information from inside a hostile regime, which another organisation has deemed as convincing intelligence.

In the September dossier debate, the depiction of the capability of the British Intelligence Services is directly alluded to as Blair stated:

Wei have well founded intelligence to tell us that Saddam
sees his WMD programme as vital to his survival and as
a demonstration of his power and influence.24

This depicted the British Intelligence Services as capable and effective for being able to provide the Blair Government with information about how Saddam views his WMD programme. Undoubtedly, such an awareness would provide greater clarity to the policy-makers as to how Saddam perceives his position and ambitions in relation to WMD capabilities, thus exhibiting the importance of such intelligence. Indeed, Blair seemingly puts such an emphasis on the information he has received from British Intelligence, arguing after Saddam claimed to destroy his WMDs;

We are asked now seriously to accept that in the last few
years – contrary to all history, contrary to all intelligence
– Saddam decided unilaterally to destroy those
weapons... Iraq continues to deny that it has any WMD,

24 Hansard, House of Commons, 24th September 2002, Volume 390, Column 4
Although serious Intelligence Service anywhere in the world believes it.\textsuperscript{25} 

Whilst suggesting Britain has evidence showing Saddam was not serious in his offers, Blair further demonstrated the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services in gathering this information. This is in conjunction to questioning the credibility of those who refuted the assertions that Saddam posed a threat due to his WMD capabilities. This rhetoric of implying an implicit understanding of Saddam’s intentions was also evident in the 24\textsuperscript{th} September 2002 debate where Blair states: ‘We know from experience that it [Iraq] will try to avoid weapon inspections. We know from current intelligence that that is its intention.’\textsuperscript{26} By continually repeating ‘We or I know’ in his statements, Blair is again referring to information provided by British Intelligence, advancing the direct references to how the Government policy is inherently centred upon intelligence from services who are incredibly capable and effective in their provision of reliable information. The latter is something which was slowly expanded upon throughout the Government rhetoric, advancing the superlative nature of the British Intelligence Services.

This was something of a continual theme, in the 24\textsuperscript{th} September 2002 debate where Blair reiterated how information pertaining to Iraq’s WMD programme came from JIC assessments.\textsuperscript{27} Indeed, when Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary replaces the Prime Minister in answering questions, he furthered this rhetoric, as he argued that the dossier states that Saddam is prepared to use WMD.\textsuperscript{28} Although inherently implicit, this suggested that intelligence has provided information about the intentions of the Saddam regime, reiterating the rhetoric of how capable and effective British Intelligence has been in providing such information.

By the Government furthering this view of British Intelligence, it perhaps ousts concerns about unethical and immoral activity suggested by whistle-blowers in the late 1990s. Having been made redundant unexpectedly, Richard Tomlinson publicised what he

\textsuperscript{25} Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 18\textsuperscript{th} March 2003, Volume 401, Column 761, 762–763 
\textsuperscript{26} Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 24\textsuperscript{th} September 2002, Volume 390, Column 16 
\textsuperscript{27} Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 24\textsuperscript{th} September 2002, Volume 390, Column 11 
\textsuperscript{28} Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 24\textsuperscript{th} September 2002, Volume 390, Column 30
termed a ‘bad management style’ within MI6, before being imprisoned for breaching the Official Secrets Act. David Shayler and Annie Machon claimed that MI5 could have prevented the 1993 Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) bombing in Bishopsgate, London, as well as most controversially, that MI6 had been involved in a plot to assassinate the Libyan leader Colonel Gadaffi. However, if these revelations were to be fully quashed, then surely the Government rhetoric would have explored the probity of the British Intelligence Services, a theme absent from the discussions.

By highlighting the credibility of the intelligence on which the dossier is based, the portrayal of the effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services is expanded upon. Although slightly less prevalent, this depiction remains evident when Blair sought to abrogate the Government of any wrongdoing by stressing how the Butler and Hutton inquiries had reached the same conclusions. These pertained to the good faith of the Intelligence Services in compiling the dossier, as well as how any issues emanate from how the intelligence should have been presented, as opposed to the collected intelligence. They also acknowledge that caveats about the intelligence could have been clearer. Thus, the British Intelligence Services are portrayed as effective by providing

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31 Hansard, House of Commons, 24th September 2002, Volume 390, Column 14
32 Hansard, House of Commons, 14th July 2004, Volume 423, Column 1431, 1444
33 Hansard, House of Commons, 14th July 2004, Volume 423, Column 1435
accurate and credible intelligence as the issues surrounding the dossier did not emanate from them, but arguably from the process of disclosing a Government intelligence report to the public without amending it for public consumption.

In announcing the creation of the Butler Inquiry, Jack Straw stated:

*Let me take this opportunity to pay tribute to the outstanding work of the British intelligence agencies around the world, often in difficult and hostile conditions. This inquiry is emphatically not a challenge to that vital work, nor to the dedication and professionalism of the people who work in those agencies; but what the inquiry should do is to help the Government better to evaluate and assess the information that they provide.*

This direct reference to the work of the British Intelligence Services furthers the depiction of their capability and effectiveness in gathering information in difficult and hostile places, a portrayal which was also evident in the Government response to the ISC report. This is a theme Straw later expanded upon when he stated that the assessment of Iraq made by the British Intelligence Services was the same as that made by their counterparts around the world, thus expanding upon the portrayal of effectiveness if they are reaching the same conclusions as their counterparts around the world. Most notably, this is perhaps referring to American Intelligence who were central in the provision of information evident in Colin Powell’s now infamous United Nations (UN) speech which made the US intelligence community ‘highly visible’.

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38 Pillar, P, ‘Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq’, p. 20
The Blair quotation also explores the professionalism of the British Intelligence Services, a theme which the Government explicitly commended in their responses to the ISC report.⁴⁹ Such a portrayal may be the desired effect in leading the public to the suggestion that the British Intelligence Services provided accurate and credible intelligence, which others agreed with and therefore there were no problems with the intelligence which provided the premise for the Iraq War. In turn, this intimated the effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services, thus leading to the positive portrayal of them in the context of the Iraq War.

Although occurring in a different context, the professionalism of British Intelligence was directly referred to in the Ministerial responses to the ISC report when the dissenting views within Defence Intelligence (DI) about the validity of the intelligence in the dossier was examined. By stressing that such concerns emanated from two individuals and the concerns were dealt with internally,⁴⁰ the professionalism of the British Intelligence Services in handling concerns from staff who disagree with the majority view is inferred. The British Intelligence Services are portrayed positively here due to the clever wording which also implicitly criticises those who disagree with the intelligence by implying that these were not widely held beliefs and thus the intelligence of the threat Saddam posed remained credible. This also links into the British way in Intelligence as it demonstrates the extent to which there is a drive for consensus in intelligence analysis, something which Mike Goodman highlighted as being a key characteristic of the British way in Intelligence.⁴¹

Positive depictions of the British Intelligence Services continue when Jack Straw praised their activities for maintaining world peace.

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In the intervening period since the Iraq War began, events elsewhere have greatly increased anxieties about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of the need for reliable intelligence and effective international action. According to reports over the weekend, an individual has sold nuclear secrets to North Korea.\(^{42}\)

This exhibited the brilliance of the British Intelligence Services for discovering such information, a continual theme in the arguments of WMD proliferation. In highlighting Libya’s desire to have WMD capabilities, the ability of the British Intelligence Services to gather such information is highlighted, furthering the capable and effective portrayal.\(^{43}\) Cooperation with America and Pakistan to shut down the AQ Khan network which sought to sell nuclear information to what MI6 terms ‘countries of concern’\(^{44}\) also portrays the effectiveness and excellent work of British Intelligence. Seemingly, this is deemed something of an intelligence success that not only do MI6 refer to it on ‘Our History’ page of the website which includes minimal information post 1994,\(^{45}\) it also influenced the interactive role-playing game at the International Spy Museum,\(^{46}\) alluding to how much information about it is publicly available if it can influence such an exhibit.

Thus far, direct references to the British Intelligence Services by the Blair Government have all resulted in a positive depiction. However, there are portrayals of the British Intelligence Services being ineffective and providing the Government with dubious intelligence. This was certainly evident in the Government response to the Butler Inquiry. It raised doubts about the accuracy of the intelligence relating to the assertion that Saddam could launch WMD in 45 minutes, and resulted in Blair’s acknowledgment of Butler’s finding that not all the intelligence can be relied upon.\(^{47}\) Ministers are seemingly

\(^{42}\) Hansard, *House of Commons*, 3\(^{rd}\) February 2004, Volume 417, Column 626–627
\(^{43}\) Hansard, *House of Commons*, 14\(^{th}\) July 2004, Volume 423, Column 1432
\(^{45}\) Secret Intelligence Service, *Our History*, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-history.html (Accessed 20\(^{th}\) November 2017);
\(^{47}\) Hansard, *House of Commons*, 14\(^{th}\) July 2004, Volume 423, Column 1431, 1447
beginning to acknowledge that there are limitations to intelligence, thus suggesting that problems surrounding the inaccuracy of intelligence stemmed from the British Intelligence Services not providing the Blair Government with accurate information.

Significant parts of the intelligence have now been found by the SIS to be in doubt. The chief of SIS, Sir Richard Dearlove, has told me that it accepts all the conclusions and recommendations of Lord Butler’s report that concern the service. The SIS will fully address the recommendations that Lord Butler has made about its procedures and about the need for the service properly to resource them.  

Although the criticism is levied solely at MI6, it suggests there were issues with the intelligence in the lead up to the Iraq War, raising questions about the reliability and credibility of the intelligence in the dossier and by extension, the decision to go to war. This undeniably portrays both MI6 and arguably British Intelligence as an entity in a negative manner. But the wording utilised prevents this theme from becoming the overall portrayal of MI6. Rather, by emphasising the willingness of MI6 to change working mechanisms suggests a desire to ensure they are once again providing the Government with credible intelligence.

A recurring theme noticed is the Government emphasis on the access to information provided to the various inquiries, which for the ISC report, included access to classified material used in the September dossier, briefings from officials including the Prime Minister, Chair of the JIC and the heads of the Intelligence Services. This suggested to the public that the Government are doing as much as possible to cooperate with inquiries, perhaps a way of pre-empting assertions of the various reports being a cover-up of the Government’s activities. In the creation of the Butler Inquiry, Jack Straw highlighted that

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48 Hansard, *House of Commons*, 14th July 2004, Volume 423, Column 1435
some of the recommendations will be classified, a decision he alluded to, was not solely taken by the Government. These direct references sought to further the view that the Blair Government was placing as much information in the public domain, suggesting they had nothing to hide from public scrutiny.

The direct references to British Intelligence are frequent throughout the Government statements on the lead up to the Iraq War, and at key points following the invasion. Whilst some direct comments provided a negative view of the British Intelligence Services, this was over-shadowed by the overriding positive portrayal of British Intelligence which centred on their capability and effectiveness.

Indirect and Implicit Views of Intelligence
On 24th September 2002, Blair made a speech in the House of Commons to accompany the publication of the September (later to be known as the dodgy) dossier. As the previous section examined, this speech included numerous direct references to the British Intelligence Services, but there were also indirect and implicit references which sought to further the portrayals the speech already created. When emphasising the weaponry Saddam had access to, Blair began by highlighting what information the UN weapon inspectors in Iraq had gathered, before going on to discuss the dossier’s conclusions, and how these emanated from JIC who had a central role in providing intelligence assessments for consecutive Governments.  

It [the dossier] concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population, and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability.  

51 Hansard, House of Commons, 3rd February 2004, Volume 417, Column 625  
52 Hansard, House of Commons, 24th September 2002, Volume 390, Column 1 – 3  
53 Hansard, House of Commons, 24th September 2002, Volume 390, Column 3
By alluding to the role of intelligence within the dossier as the quote above demonstrates, it is implied that the British Intelligence Services provided the information pertaining to Saddam’s ability to launch WMD in 45 minutes. This is perhaps the key phraseology which caused concern amongst the British public about a WMD attack in such a short space of time. The same day, the *London Evening Standard* published the headline ‘45 Minutes from Attack’ and the following morning, *The Sun* had the headline ‘Brits 45 minutes from doom’. This demonstrates how crucial the wording can be in creating a certain viewpoint in the public domain. Indeed, the authoritative rhetoric suggests agreement from UN inspectors and British Intelligence to the extent to which WMD exist in Iraq, thus seeking to prevent any disagreement or questioning.

This theme was ever present when Blair explored the nature of Saddam’s weaponry, particularly focusing on the ballistic and long-range missile capabilities. Although Blair does not refer to British Intelligence having provided this information, he claimed that it was detailed in the dossier. Equally, in a response to a question, Blair stated there was evidence to show that if a war in the Middle East occurred, Britain would not be able to stand apart. The wording in both examples alluded to the Blair Government having intelligence relating to the use of missiles in Saddam’s desire to launch WMD, something implied as:

*In the past four or five years the issue of Iraq, weapon inspections and what we do about that regime has come over my desk pretty much week after week.*

As with the direct references, this advanced the portrayal that British Intelligence were capable and effective in their ability to provide the British Government with such important information from inside a hostile regime. Whilst subtly referring to the role of intelligence in policy formation, it also depicts the threat Saddam has continually posed to Britain, and how the information emanates from British Intelligence, although this is not directly specified. This is furthered due to the certainty in which this information is

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portrayed, almost in a manner which is saying to the public, if you disbelieve what we are saying, you are disbelieving the continual work of the British Intelligence Services who are inherently capable and effective. Therefore, the rhetoric encouraged the public to reach the same conclusion as the Government due to the threat perceived to emanate from the Saddam regime.

The capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services in gathering information about the threat posed by Saddam was implied on several occasions. When discussing the brutality of the security apparatus of the Saddam regime against Iraqi citizens, something the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw stated was included in the dossier, the effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services is once again suggested due to the amount of information they have collected from inside a hostile regime. There is an overriding implication through the Government statements that due to the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services, the wealth of information collected about the threat from Saddam, results in action being an imperative.

When discussing Iraqi opposition groups, the capability and effectiveness of British Intelligence is further alluded to when Blair states that: ‘I have not personally seen the opposition Iraqi groups but I know that the Government are in touch with them’. This phraseology implied the role of British Intelligence either in the instigation or continual contact with opposition groups, furthering the view of the hard work undertaken by the British Intelligence Services to gather as much information as possible about the threat of Saddam. Indeed, this arguably plays into the public understanding of the role of British Intelligence in providing such information as during the troubles in Northern Ireland, MI6 initiated contact with the IRA.

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Although we did not deal with this in the dossier, there is no doubt, for example, that certain forms of terrorism in the Middle East are supported by Iraq.\textsuperscript{61}

By suggesting that the Iraqi regime’s support for terrorist organisations could have been discussed in the dossier, knowledge of links between terrorism and the Saddam regime are implied to be based on information from the British Intelligence Services. In the response to the Butler Inquiry, Blair acknowledged that it was intelligence which suggested the link between WMD and terrorism as well as how this influenced his thinking on the threat Saddam posed.\textsuperscript{62} Thus in this instance, intelligence undoubtedly had a direct impact upon Government decision and policy making.

The link between Saddam and terrorism is seemingly another way in which the Government are purporting that the British Intelligence Services have provided a wealth of information and therefore, the action in Iraq would be a positive in the prevention of terrorism. This theme was particularly prevalent on the 18\textsuperscript{th} March 2003 debate before the vote on going to war where a direct link is made between the invasion of Iraq and preventing Al Qaeda recruitment.\textsuperscript{63} Undoubtedly, this played into public concerns about terrorism, considering the recent history of the IRA attacks in the UK, and 9/11 some 18 months previously. Highlighting such themes sought to encourage, and reinforce the suggestion that the war in Iraq was the right action due to the support the Saddam regime gave to terrorism.

The 18\textsuperscript{th} March 2003 debate also saw the Government rhetoric place an implicit emphasis upon intelligence by depicting Saddam as a tyrant with the capability of using WMD who had continually flouted United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs).\textsuperscript{64} This subtly alludes to the role of intelligence by stating what capacity Saddam had in which to utilise WMD, thus alluding to the continued capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services in gathering such information. Indeed, this depiction was furthered when Blair discussed how Saddam’s son-in-law had defected. Blair stated that:

\textsuperscript{61} Hansard, House of Commons, 24\textsuperscript{th} September 2002, Volume 390, Column 19
\textsuperscript{62} Hansard, House of Commons, 14\textsuperscript{th} July 2004, Volume 423, Column 1433, 1443
\textsuperscript{63} Hansard, House of Commons, 18\textsuperscript{th} March 2003, Volume 401, Column 767 – 769
\textsuperscript{64} Hansard, House of Commons, 18\textsuperscript{th} March 2003, Volume 401, Column 760
He disclosed a far more extensive biological weapons programme, and, for the first time, said that Iraq had, weaponised the programme – something that Saddam had always strenuously denied. All this had been happening while the inspectors were in Iraq.\textsuperscript{65}

By stating how these activities were still occurring when UN weapon inspectors were in Iraq, the reliability of intelligence provided by the inspectors is questioned subliminally, thus putting an increased emphasis upon the role on the information collected by the British Intelligence Services.\textsuperscript{66}

In response to the ISC report, the Government stressed the ISC conclusions that the JIC was free of any political pressure or interference, although issues of uncertainty could have been made clearer by the JIC.\textsuperscript{67} Emphasising this theme could be for the self-serving purpose of abrogating the Government of blame following the assertions made by the BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan about the sexing-up of intelligence in the dodgy dossier.\textsuperscript{68} But, in doing so, British Intelligence is portrayed both positively and effectively as the rhetoric of the Government response implies that as there was no interference in the JIC’s assessments, these were therefore accurately based on the intelligence they received from the individual British Intelligence Services.

These examples which mostly relate to information of WMD and their capabilities, demonstrated how the Government although not directly referring to the British Intelligence Services, has portrayed them in a positive manner by suggesting how capable and effective they are. Implicitly, this creates the perception of how accurate the

\textsuperscript{65} Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 18\textsuperscript{th} March 2003, Volume 401, Column 761
\textsuperscript{66} Although not directly referred to here, by detailing the information provided by Saddam’s son in law, the role of British Intelligence is subliminally suggested to the public conscious due to the Mitrokhin Archive and the role of British Intelligence in Mitrokhin’s defection and analysis of the information he provided. For more information about the role of British Intelligence in the Mitrokhin case, please see: Andrew, C, ‘The Mitrokhin Archive’, \textit{The RUSI Journal}, 145/1, (2000), pp. 52 – 53
\textsuperscript{68} BBC News, \textit{Full text: Gilligan’s Today reports}, 24\textsuperscript{th} July 2003, Available From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3090681.stm (Accessed 4\textsuperscript{th} May 2018)
intelligence must have been at the time, therefore justifying the Government’s case for war, which is arguably what the Government would have been seeking to achieve through this rhetoric. However, as the following section exhibits, intelligence was at times a subsidiary theme in the desire to further the depiction of the threat Saddam posed.

**Intelligence as a subsidiary theme**

Intelligence was something of a subsidiary theme when the Government were seeking to highlight why the Iraq intervention would be positive, a rhetoric which was ostensibly based upon humanitarian arguments.\(^69\) This depiction leads to the assertion that both Iraq and the Middle East would be better off without Saddam in power, a theme the Government explored in both Blair’s statement to the House of Commons with the publication of the September dossier, but also in numerous responses to questions.\(^70\) Indeed, the rhetoric also intimated that the UK and wider international system had tried numerous times to find a solution, but as Saddam had not acknowledged the actions of the UN, details of the UNSCRs, or allowed the UN weapon inspectors into the country to assess WMD capabilities, this was the last available option.\(^71\) This builds to the final argument of the brutality of the Saddam regime against Iraqi citizens, thus furthering the humanitarian and responsibility to protect arguments, whilst suggesting that such knowledge emanates from the British Intelligence Services.\(^72\) One clear example of this is when Blair stated that:

*The brutality of the repression – the death and torture camps, the barbaric prisons for political opponents, the routine beatings for anyone or their families suspected of disloyalty – is well documented.*\(^73\)

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\(^{69}\) Hansard, *House of Commons*, 18\(^{th}\) March 2003, Volume 401, Column 761, 772–773
\(^{72}\) Hansard, *House of Commons*, 18\(^{th}\) March 2003, Volume 401, Column 761, 772–774, 902
\(^{73}\) Hansard, *House of Commons*, 18\(^{th}\) March 2003, Volume 401, Column 772
When the Foreign Secretary announced the creation of the Butler Inquiry, he also explored this theme as a reason for the Iraq War, claiming it was the right decision to go to war in Iraq as Saddam had continually flouted international law.\(^{74}\) This demonstrates the continued rhetoric both before and after the invasion of Iraq by the Blair Government that overthrowing Saddam was the right decision, irrespective of intelligence of WMD due to the brutality of the regime. This subsidiary theme was also evident in PMQs following the Gilligan allegations of sexing up the dodgy dossier. Blair’s responses focused on what a tyrant Saddam was, and therefore the Iraq War was necessary,\(^{75}\) portraying an unwillingness from the Government to discuss these assertions, which included questions about the reliability of the intelligence provided. But, despite the desire to focus on why the war was a positive action, intelligence as a subsidiary theme is evident, thus creating the portrayal of how hard the British Intelligence Services had worked to gather information on horrific actions inside a hostile regime. This was something of a continuing portrayal throughout the direct and indirect references made to the British Intelligence Services.

Following the publication of the Butler Inquiry in 2004, the Blair Government acknowledged that ‘evidence of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction was indeed less certain and less well founded than was stated at the time’.\(^{76}\) This demonstrated how intelligence was a subsidiary theme to the Government response, despite the centrality of intelligence to these WMD assertions before the invasion, showing a shifting focus away from discussing intelligence. Arguably, this would still have been within the public consciousness, and thus although Blair simply refers to evidence of WMD being less certain, to many, they would assume this to relate to the British Intelligence Services. However, what is perhaps most telling in the Government rhetoric is that whilst they acknowledge there may have been limitations to the intelligence, they still believe the war in Iraq to have been the right course of action. This argument was centred on the humanitarian rhetoric that Iraq would be a better place without Saddam.\(^{77}\) But, by failing to acknowledge the limitations of intelligence provided, the rhetoric subtly implies that the intelligence was not overly important to Blair. Whether this was the desired impact

\(^{74}\) Hansard, House of Commons, 3\(^{rd}\) February 2004, Volume 417, Column 634, 637–638

\(^{75}\) Hansard, House of Commons, 4\(^{th}\) June 2003, Volume 406, Column 156, 527

\(^{76}\) Hansard, House of Commons, 14\(^{th}\) July 2004, Volume 423, Column 1432

\(^{77}\) Hansard, House of Commons, 14\(^{th}\) July 2004, Volume 423, Column 1436, 1441–1442, 1448
of the Government response is unknown, but it would further public belief of the war in Iraq not being solely based on available intelligence, but a wider desire from the Blair Government to oust Saddam.

The desire not to discuss intelligence was also evident in a statement made by the Coalition Government in the debate to mark the 10th anniversary of the Iraq War, furthering the view of the changing sentiment of the rhetoric. Mark Simmonds, the Parliamentary Under Secretary for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who provided the Government’s position is keen not to discuss events leading up to the war, until after the publication of the much anticipated Chilcot Inquiry. Instead, he seeks to discuss the ongoing situation in Iraq. But, this does lead to intelligence being a subsidiary theme as Simmonds highlights cooperation ventures between the UK and Iraqi Government designed to aid the ongoing security situation which he acknowledges is somewhat volatile with terrorist attacks still occurring in some parts of the country. Implicitly, this alludes that there is British Intelligence Services’ involvement to aid the security situation as following 9/11 and 7/7, much was in the public domain about the role of the British Intelligence Services in the prevention of terrorist attacks.

It is possible that the changing rhetoric was due to the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition Government seeking to demonstrate their own achievements in Iraq, but it may signify a change in the willingness to discuss intelligence-related themes, suggesting at the pervasiveness of secrecy. This is somewhat surprising considering the amount of information in the media about the role of intelligence in the lead up to the Iraq War to

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78 Hansard, House of Commons, 13th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 536, 539
79 Hansard, House of Commons, 13th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 539, 541
This was a theme also evident within popular culture depictions of intelligence at the time. Examples include: BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 5, Episode 10; BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 3, Episode 10; BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 7, Episode 1; The World Is Not Enough, Eon Productions, Danjaq, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, United Artists, Directed by Michael Apted, 1999; Quantum of Solace, Eon Productions, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios and Colombia Pictures, Directed by Marc Forster, 2008
mark the anniversary. It will be interesting to compare this to the Coalition Government statements about the Snowden revelations to determine whether this view of intelligence as a subsidiary theme is part of a wider rhetoric or a one-off, perhaps in an attempt not to be drawn into party political arguments.

Throughout this section, how intelligence is often a subsidiary theme in the House of Commons debates has been highlighted, something which seems particularly prevalent when the Blair Government sought to emphasise both the humanitarian and responsibility to protect arguments, but also how Saddam brought upon the intervention himself by continually flouting international law. However, these themes still allow for subtle inferences to be made about the British Intelligence Services, and their ability to gather information. Overall, this results in an incredibly subtle, but positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain.

Whilst the majority of the references to the British Intelligence Services are implicit, these still portray them as being capable and effective as they have collected intelligence from a hostile country which is credible and reliable. Such a depiction was also prevalent in the direct references although this saw dedication of British Intelligence explored too, thus aiding the positive portrayal. This was combined with the implicit suggestion that issues surrounding the dodgy dossier emanated from the JIC assessment being placed in the public domain. This overarching depiction furthered the positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. Equally, over time, there was reluctance to discuss intelligence. Whether this was due to changing attitudes towards the British Intelligence Services or a desire for the Government rhetoric to evolve is hard to assess but will perhaps become more evident when compared to Government statements about the Snowden revelations.

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81 This is a theme which the news journalism chapter analyses. One example of the news journalism focusing on the intelligence to mark the 10th anniversary of the invasion is: YouTube, The Spies Who Fooled the World – BBC Panorama, Available From: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UOsHLAQCMPI (Accessed 21st June 2018)

82 Hansard, House of Commons, 14th July 2004, Volume 423, Column 1435
Snowden: The Government Perspective through the House of Commons

Although the same criteria have been utilised to assess the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services in both case studies, the Snowden revelations demonstrated how the actions of the British Intelligence Services was discussed more explicitly than in the Iraq context. This meant that there was a clearer emphasis upon the British Intelligence Services, with intelligence as a subsidiary theme not being evident when analysing the rhetoric. Instead, there were numerous direct references to the British Intelligence Services as well as it being subliminally referred to. In the Snowden context, the British Intelligence Services are portrayed in a positive manner, with an emphasis upon how they are always striving to act. legally and ethically.

Direct References to British Intelligence

Throughout Hague’s 10th June 2013 statement, there are numerous direct references to how the British Intelligence Services act in a legal and ethical manner.

_This combination of needing a warrant from one of the most senior members of the Government, decided on the basis of detailed legal advice, with such decisions reviewed by independent Commissioners and implemented by Agencies with strong legal and ethical frameworks, with the addition of Parliamentary scrutiny by the Intelligence and Security Committee whose powers are being increased, provides one of the strongest systems of checks and balances and democratic accountability for Secret Intelligence anywhere in the world._

83 Hansard, _House of Commons_, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 32

84 Hansard, _House of Commons_, 30th October 2013, Volume 569, Column 919

The comments highlight the emphasis the Government places upon the British Intelligence Services acting legally and ethically by exploring the numerous mechanisms in place to ensure this. Other statements also explored this theme, with Prime Minister David Cameron stating in PMQs that they have structures which are ‘ensuring that they [British Intelligence] act under a proper legal basis’. 84 One week later, Cameron
reiterated this point again in PMQs, and it was discussed again in FCO topical questions in January 2014. This repetition continually repeats the argument of how strong and robust the legal structure is, and the role of warrants for the interception of content communications, thus depicting that the British Intelligence Services always act legally and ethically. This is a consistent portrayal when compared to the information the Big 3 place in the public domain via their websites and speeches.

Indeed, how the British Intelligence Services act legally and ethically was also discussed in the National Security Westminster Hall debate which examined how the legal framework governing British Intelligence is fully compatible with the European Union convention on human rights. This was followed by Theresa May stating in response to David Anderson that ‘it is absolutely the case that our agencies have been and are working lawfully and ethically in everything they do.’ The comments all provide a direct portrayal of how the British Intelligence Services act in a legal and ethical manner, thus adhering to European stipulated standards on these issues. Arguably, this is a theme which the Government is seeking to continually suggest to the public by its repetition. There is such an importance on acting legally and ethically that Hague highlighted it in responses to questions that GCHQ has internal structures where staff can raise ethical and legal concerns, themes also explored on their website, demonstrating a consistency in the information placed in the public domain by the British Intelligence Services themselves and one of the avenues.

Hague’s statement is continually refuting claims that GCHQ used the American National Security Agency (NSA) for information which they cannot legally obtain in the UK, claiming that: ‘I wish to be absolutely clear that this accusation is baseless’ and ‘the idea of GCHQ setting out to circumvent UK law by cooperation with other countries is

85 Hansard, House of Commons, 6th November 2013, Volume 570, Column 247
86 Hansard, House of Commons, 6th November 2013, Volume 570, Column 151
87 Hansard, Westminster Hall, 22nd October 2013, Volume 569, Column 75WH; Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 80
88 Hansard, House of Commons, 11th June 2015, Volume 596, Column 1358
89 Hansard, House of Commons, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 47
This leads to emphasising how British laws are always upheld, even when the information emanates from another country.\textsuperscript{92} Indeed, Hague furthers this rhetoric when assuring other MPs that their communications would not be accessed and that warrants are not signed off on political grounds as mechanisms in place would prevent it.\textsuperscript{93} This clearly depicts close cooperation between British Intelligence and the Government when seeking to provide a particular image of the former to the public. It also portrays that acting in a legal and ethical manner is not just central to British Intelligence, but an ingrained principle to all their work, thus, they always act in a legal and ethical manner, no matter what the circumstances, a theme which the Intelligence Services themselves have been keen to emphasise.\textsuperscript{94}

This theme was explored in greater detail in the Westminster Hall Security and Intelligence Services debate where James Brokenshire, the Parliamentary Under Secretary for the Home Department stated that the work of British Intelligence:

\textit{is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework that ensures that activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate... The work of the security and intelligence agencies is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework, which ensures that their activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate, including from Secretaries of State, from the interception of communications commissioner and the intelligence services commissioner as well as from the Intelligence and Security Committee itself.}\textsuperscript{95}

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\textsuperscript{91}Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 10\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Volume 564, Column 33, 47
\textsuperscript{92}Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 10\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Volume 564, Column 37, 39, 43
\textsuperscript{93}Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 10\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Volume 564, Column 41–44
\textsuperscript{94}YouTube, CIA-GW Intelligence Conference: Panel on The View from Foreign Intelligence Chiefs, Available From: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yefBv7Q3sv0 (Accessed 24\textsuperscript{th} January 2018);
\textsuperscript{95}Hansard, \textit{Westminster Hall}, 31\textsuperscript{st} October 2013, Volume 569 Column 380WH–381WH
\end{flushleft}
By repeating this point within two sentences, it furthers the rhetoric of how there are mechanisms in place to ensure that the British Intelligence Services act legally and ethically. Equally, it also portrays how their actions are necessary and proportionate, evident when Brokenshire highlighted how the commissioners analyse the codes of practice GCHQ has to ensure that they adhere to Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000. The necessity and proportionality of their actions is furthered as Brokenshire stated that the interception commissioner ‘must be satisfied that such measures are legal, necessary, proportionate and carefully targeted’. By highlighting the necessity and proportionality of GCHQs actions, the Government seek to highlight how the British Intelligence Services are adhering to legal and ethical standards, a theme furthered in the response to the ISC report.

The Government welcomes the Intelligence and Security Committee’s clarification that GCHQ does not have ‘blanket coverage’ of all internet communications, and that it only examines those communications that relate to its statutory purpose... The Government welcomes the Intelligence and Security Committee’s conclusion that only the communications of suspected criminals or national security targets are deliberately selected by GCHQ.

This depicts how GCHQ ensure their actions are necessary and proportionate, and therefore demonstrates that they are acting legally and ethically, something furthered when it is stated how:

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96 Hansard, Westminster Hall, 31st October 2013, Volume 569 Column 381WH
97 Hansard, Westminster Hall, 31st October 2013, Volume 569 Column 382WH
the principles set out in the Human Rights Act 1998 underpin and act as an appropriate constraint on all the Security and Intelligence Agencies.\(^99\)

British Intelligence are therefore portrayed as always seeking to ensure actions are necessary and proportionate, and in turn that their actions are legal and ethical, furthering the positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. This was also evident in the Westminster Hall Security and Intelligence Services debate where:

> the agencies’ recruitment and training procedures are all designed to ensure that those operating within the right of secrecy can be trusted to do so lawfully and ethically.\(^{100}\)

Not only does this further the depiction of how the British Intelligence Services always strive to ensure that they act legally and ethically, but also creates a consistent portrayal to the depictions the British Intelligence Services provide on their websites. In particular, GCHQ emphasises staff training to ensure all are aware of the legal and ethical framework of their actions, and how staff can raise any concerns they have about illegal or unethical behaviour.\(^{101}\) The clear similarities in the depictions the British Intelligence Service and Government suggests a clear ‘cross-Government’ awareness of what themes should be purported to the public. This creates consistency in the depictions of the British Intelligence Services placed in the public domain. This was something not evident in the Iraq case, intimating that how the British Intelligence Services and Government engagement with the public has evolved, perhaps due to more openness in the discussions of intelligence.

In the first statement following the Snowden revelations, Hague explained that:

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\(^{100}\) Hansard, Westminster Hall, 31\(^{st}\) October 2013, Volume 569 Column 383WH

I receive hundreds of operational proposals from SIS and GCHQ every year. The proposals are detailed. They set out planned operations, the potential risks and the intended benefits of the intelligence. They include comprehensive legal advice describing the basis for the operations and comments from senior Foreign Office officials and lawyers.¹⁰²

This depicts the mechanisms which ensure that the British Intelligence Services act legally and ethically, thus furthering how the adherence to legal standards is central to MI6 and GCHQ, and undoubtedly to MI5. However, this can lead to difficult ethical and legal decisions, something Hague stressed, whilst also highlighting how he does not approve all the warrants which MI6 and GCHQ request.¹⁰³ This leads Hague to explain the nature of warrants stating how they ‘are legally required to be necessary, proportionate and carefully targets, and we judge them on that basis.’¹⁰⁴ This portrays the British Intelligence Services as not only acting legally and ethically by ensuring Ministerial approval for their actions, but also how they are not simply receiving approval for all actions they seek to undertake, suggesting at the importance of Ministerial scrutiny of their actions. This also subtly infers that if any issues surrounding warrants are incorrect, it emanates from the Minister as opposed to the British Intelligence Services seeking to act illegally or unethically.¹⁰⁵

To ensure that secret intelligence remains secret... secrecy is essential to safeguard sensitive methods and sources, and to protect the lives of those who work for us on the basis of confidentiality and anonymity.¹⁰⁶

This demonstrated a salient theme, namely, the role of secrecy within Intelligence with Brokenshire’s comments from the Security and Intelligence Services Westminster Hall debate depicting its importance. Indeed, how crucial it is was also evident in the National Security debate where using an American example, Brokenshire discusses how publicly stating that the US had the ability to read Bin Laden’s communications in the 1990s, suddenly stopped and ‘we did not hear from him again until September 2001.’

This highlighted not only the importance of secrecy to intelligence operations, but provided a direct reference to how it is crucial for the continued capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services. This theme was also evident in the Westminster Hall National Security debate which supported the MI5 Director General in his comments on the issues which can emanate from revealing British Intelligence’s capabilities. This rhetoric is another example of the cross-Government; consistent portrayal of British Intelligence provided in the Snowden context.

In the Government response to the ISC report, they stated how it is only the most sensitive information which has been redacted, and have sought to put as much information into the public domain as possible, something which does come across in the ISC report. This demonstrates a desire for there to be more information in in the public domain which can lead to a greater comprehension of British Intelligence, something Hague deemed was crucial, even before the Snowden disclosures. Arguably, the necessity of this emanated from the coalition’s desire not to repeat issues of a lack of public understanding and confidence in the intelligence presented in the lead up to the Iraq War.

When the Government rhetoric sought to encourage cross-party support for the actions of the British Intelligence Services, they were portrayed in an incredibly positive manner. A clear example of this is how they were portrayed as having a crucial role in protecting the UK, something evident in a remark from Brokenshire who stated:

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107 Hansard, Westminster Hall, 31st October 2013, Volume 569 Column 73WH
109 Hansard, House of Commons, 12th March 2015, Volume 594, Column 45WS–46WS
I am sure we all agree on how essential is the work that our intelligence agencies do for us day in, day out to keep this country safe.\textsuperscript{112}

The direct reference portrays the crucial role British Intelligence has in protecting the country,\textsuperscript{113} something everyone in the House of Commons would wish to ensure. Successive Governments have all utilised British Intelligence, something Hague is keen to stress by remarking on how many of the mechanisms of intelligence, and particularly those for intelligence sharing with the US, used by the Coalition Government have not changed since the Blair and Brown Governments.\textsuperscript{114} Whilst this demonstrated how the British Intelligence Services have always been subject to the same robust mechanisms ensuring their actions are legal and ethical, it reads as if providing a subtle warning to the Labour Party of how actions in relation to overseeing and sharing intelligence are the same, perhaps to prevent any questions on this theme. This is further suggested when Hague highlights that the Coalition Government has sought to improve how intelligence is used by Ministers, stating:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Intelligence is weighed and assessed alongside all other sources of information available to use as a Government, including diplomatic reporting and the insights of other government departments, and that all this information is judged carefully in deciding the Government’s overall strategy and objectives.}\textsuperscript{115}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{112} Hansard, \textit{Westminster Hall}, 31\textsuperscript{st} October 2013, Volume 569 Column 380WH
\textsuperscript{113} The role of protecting the country against threats is something which the Big 3 all explicitly state on their websites. For more information, please see:
\textsuperscript{114} Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 10\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Volume 564, Column 33, 43–45
\textsuperscript{115} Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 10\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Volume 564, Column 33
\end{footnotesize}
These are comments which seem inherently directed towards the Labour leadership following the issues of the politicisation of intelligence by policymakers in the lead up to the Iraq War.\textsuperscript{116} The clearest example of this Government rhetoric was in responses to questions where Hague states that after how intelligence was used in Iraq, the Coalition Government sought to ensure that such issues did not happen again.\textsuperscript{117} These direct references portray the British Intelligence Services as being inherently capable and effective, something of a consistent portrayal when compared to the first case study explored in this chapter. In concluding his speech, Hague furthered this rhetoric when paying tribute to the integrity, professionalism and dedication of the staff of British Intelligence. He argued that in the House of Commons:

\begin{quote}
\textit{could witness the integrity and professionalism of the men and women of the intelligence agencies, who are among the very finest public servants our nation has, then I believe that they would be reassured by how we go about this essential work...The British people can be confident in the way our Agencies work to keep them safe. But would-be terrorists, those seeking to spy against this country or those who are the centre of organised crime should be aware that this country has the capability and partnerships to protect its citizens against the full range of threats in the 21st century, and that we will always do so in accordance with our laws and values but with constant resolve and determination.}\textsuperscript{118}
\end{quote}

This furthered the depiction of the British Intelligence Services acting in an inherently positive manner by highlighting not only how they act legally and ethically, but the dedication and professionalism of the staff in seeking to protect the British public. This is something which Hague alludes to aiding the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services. Hague furthered this theme when responding to questions where he acknowledged the difficult circumstances in which British Intelligence work.\textsuperscript{119} This

\textsuperscript{116} Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 10\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Volume 564, Column 33  
\textsuperscript{117} Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 10\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Volume 564, Column 47  
\textsuperscript{118} Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 10\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Volume 564, Column 34  
\textsuperscript{119} Hansard, \textit{House of Commons}, 10\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Volume 564, Column 36, 38
serves as a clear similarity between the portrayals of British Intelligence provided in both case studies. There is a passion in Hague’s words, leading to the depiction that he is attempting to provide this message on behalf of the British Intelligence Services. This was also prevalent in Theresa May’s comments following the Anderson report which also provided the view of the dedication and professionalism of British Intelligence as she states:

\[
I \text{ would like to finish by paying tribute to the vital work of the men and women of those intelligence and law enforcement community, whose work is not always known, whose successes often go unrecognised and whose efforts day in and day out are fundamental to keeping everyone in this country safe.}\]

With the majority of the Ministerial Statements being provided by junior FCO and Home Office Ministers, it was perhaps an attempt by the Coalition Government to move the debate onwards as they do not want to provide the Snowden revelations with discussion time from senior Ministers in the House of Commons as this could suggest the validity of the assertions. Although there are only a few comments made by the Prime Minister on either the subject of the British Intelligence Services, or the Snowden revelations, the times Cameron does discuss it, he too pays tribute to the staff. Although relating to GCHQ, Cameron states:

\[
It \text{ comprises very, very, dedicated, hard-working crown servants who do incredibly valuable work to protect our safety and security every day of the week, and they deserve solid support from right across the Chamber and from both the Front Benches.}\]

Clearly, this directly portrays the dedication and professionalism of GCHQ, and arguably wider British Intelligence, furthering their positive depiction. This is another theme

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120 Hansard, House of Commons, 11th June 2015, Volume 596, Column 1354
121 Hansard, House of Commons, 23rd October 2013, Volume 569, Column 300
122 Hansard, House of Commons, 23rd October 2013, Volume 569, Column 905
which should arguably unite the House of Commons, something which Cameron does allude to in his comments, highlighting that although there may be disagreements in how intelligence is used, or how they should be governed, the underlying principle that the British Intelligence Services are capable and effective in no small part to their dedication and professionalism, should be recognised. This is arguably the case as it is a theme which both case studies have analysed as being evident in both Blair’s Labour and Cameron’s Coalition Governments rhetoric.

The over-riding portrayal of the British Intelligence Services in the Snowden context is a positive one, with their capability, effectiveness, dedication, professionalism and legality of their actions all being key themes the Government rhetoric explores. Whilst acting legally and ethically was perhaps the overarching depiction, all of the themes explored further the positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain.

**Indirect References to British Intelligence**

One theme which created numerous implicit references to the British Intelligence Services was the continuing rhetoric of The Guardian damaging national security by publishing the Snowden revelations. In the first Government statement made following the publication, the Foreign Secretary William Hague never directly refers to either Snowden or his allegations. However, the language used made it clear that this is what Hague’s statement directly relates to as:

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Mr Speaker, with permission I will make a statement on the work of the Government Communications Headquarters, GCHQ, its legal framework and recent publicity about it.123
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Indeed, throughout both the Coalition and Cameron Conservative Majority Government, the language used in their statements is crucial in the creation of subliminal references to

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123 Hansard, *House of Commons*, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 31
the British Intelligence Services. This is evident in how Hague referred to the damage the revelations will have on British Intelligence, stating how maintaining the security of the UK and her allies now becomes more difficult. Therefore, the onus is placed on Snowden being in the wrong for publishing information which could have severe consequences, despite not naming him. In turn, this provided the implicit suggestion that the British Intelligence Services and her allies, will have to work far harder to ensure Britain’s safety and security, implying that their capability and effectiveness could be somewhat limited.

This theme was further evident during PMQs when David Cameron stated:

*I think the plain fact is that what has happened has damaged national security, and in many ways The Guardian itself admitted that.*

This was in the context of *The Guardian* destroying the files it had, which although Cameron implied was the newspaper’s own choice, is something *The Guardian* have claimed was undertaken by GCHQ who, combined with the cabinet secretary and Government deputy national security adviser, placed significant pressure on them to destroy the documents. This continues the indirect suggestion that it was those who published the information that were in the wrong, and caused difficulties for the British Intelligence Services to remain capable and effective in the collection of intelligence.

In October 2013, this theme was evident in a Westminster Hall debate initiated by backbenchers who were scathing of *The Guardian* for publishing the Snowden revelations, believing that the lives of staff could be affected. Julian Smith who initiated the debate stated:

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124 Hansard, *House of Commons*, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 31
125 Hansard, *House of Commons*, 16th October 2013, Volume 568, Column 731
This debate, however, focuses on a narrower and darker issue: the responsibility of the editors of The Guardian for stepping beyond any reasonable definition of journalism into copying, trafficking and distributing files on British Intelligence and GCHQ. That information not only endangers our national security but may identify personnel working in our intelligence services, risking their lives and those of their families.\textsuperscript{127}

Whilst the Government response to this debate also places the onus of culpability on The Guardian, this occurs in a far more muted manner. Brokenshire provides the Government stance in the debate and questions The Guardian’s decision to publish the Snowden allegations stating that:

\begin{quote}
I appreciate and respect the fact that journalists may spend significant time weighing up whether an issue is damaging to national security, and genuinely believe that they are doing the right thing. However, I respectfully suggest that they are simply not in a position to make national security assessments.\textsuperscript{128}
\end{quote}

This questions the assertion made by Glenn Greenwald, one of the journalists involved that himself, Snowden and Laura Poitras only sought to publish information ‘that the public should see and that can be revealed without harm to any innocent people’.\textsuperscript{129} Therefore, the Government are subtly criticising not only the journalists, but the wider editorial organisation at The Guardian for the publishing of this information. This theme continues when the rhetoric once again centres upon how the Snowden revelations can cause issues for the British Intelligence Services ensuring Britain’s safety and security, stating that those who released the information:

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\\textsuperscript{127}Hansard, Westminster Hall, 22\textsuperscript{nd} October 2013, Volume 569, Column 67WH
\textsuperscript{128}Hansard, Westminster Hall, 22\textsuperscript{nd} October 2013, Volume 569, Column 74WH
\end{flushleft}
would do well to understand that the types of capability they are writing about are those we have relied on in recent years to stop terrorist plots, disrupt organised crime and put cyber-criminals, including those exploiting children or illegally proliferating arms.130

By highlighting how the prevention of criminal activities could be affected following the Snowden revelations, there is perhaps a desire to gain cross party support that the amount of information published has hampered the ability of the British Intelligence Services to ensure the countries’ safety and security. In turn, this allows for the implicit depiction of how the British Intelligence Services continually strive to be capable and effective. Indeed, this portrayal continues when the Government also highlighted how national security had been further affected by The Guardian providing this information to other newspapers around the world.131 Most notably, the Snowden allegations were also published in the German newspaper Der Spiegel and The New York Times,132 thus spreading sensitive information about British Intelligence to a wider audience.

The damage caused by the Snowden revelations has been a theme of continual discussion, with claims that British spies had to be moved,133 and Sir David Omand comparing the damage to national security caused by Snowden akin to that of the actions of the Cambridge 5.134 This arguably intimates the validity of Smith’s assertions that the lives of British Intelligence officers are being put at risk due to the revelations. Also, the head of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service stated in a roundtable at George Washington University that ‘Snowden damaged your [American and British] national security in very

130 Hansard, Westminster Hall, 22nd October 2013, Volume 569, Column 73WH
131 Hansard, Westminster Hall, 22nd October 2013, Volume 569, Column 72WH, 74WH
significant ways’. Combined with the Government rhetoric in the Westminster Hall debate about national security, this leads to the depiction of how the Snowden revelations have created a difficult working situation for British Intelligence, most notably due to their methods being leaked to their adversaries. It also alluded the role that British Intelligence has, not only in protecting national security, but also in the prevention of child exploitation, something GCHQ in particular is involved with and is highlighted on their website. This demonstrated how the British Intelligence Services undertake vital work not only in aiding national security, but the prevention of wrongdoing, furthering the positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services due to the scope of their work.

In the 10th June 2013 statement Hague asserts that ‘it has been the policy of successive British Governments not to comment on the detail of intelligence operations’. This is relating to the successive Government policy of Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND) which the Investigatory Powers Tribunal states is a lawful response, relating to ‘the operational activities if the Intelligence Services, including their intelligence–gathering capabilities and techniques’. However, it is somewhat surprising to see it used in the Snowden context, when all the information Hague is referring to is already in the public domain. This demonstrates how at times of crisis, the Government seemingly revert back to excessive secrecy which is in fact more damming as by not discussing the nature of the Snowden revelations, it is as if the Government are covering up allegations of wrongdoing. This is evident as following a question asking Hague to comment on the nature of the revelations, he stated:

It is not possible for any Government to do that while respecting the need to maintain the secrecy of our intelligence work.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{135} YouTube, CIA-GW Intelligence Conference: Panel on The View from Foreign Intelligence Chiefs, Available From: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yefBv7Q3sv0 (Accessed 24th January 2018)
\textsuperscript{137} Hansard, House of Commons, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 31
\textsuperscript{139} Hansard, House of Commons, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 42
It is not disputed that the British Intelligence Services require a degree of secrecy for their work, but if this becomes too pervasive to the extent that it prevents discussion in the public domain, it suggests that there is something which the British Intelligence Services are attempting to keep out of the public sphere. In turn, this limited discussion can imply that the British Intelligence Services may undertake illegal and immoral actions. At fire alarm moments, there needs to be more openness and discussion in order for the public to fully comprehend what has happened. The tensions between openness and secrecy is a wider theme addressed in the research puzzle which undoubtedly affects public understanding of the British Intelligence Services. When there is arguably too much secrecy surrounding them, something the use of the NCND principle seemingly implies in this context.

Perhaps it is due to this realisation that Hague goes on to intimate how the British Intelligence Services always act in legal and ethical ways, highlighting the key role Ministers have in approving warrants, as well as what information these require,\(^\text{140}\) a theme further explored in responses to questions when he stated that:

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\text{we go beyond those requirements in assessing the impact on the privacy of individuals in order to try and make sure that it is only when absolutely necessary that we invade that privacy.}^{141}
\]

This depicted the importance placed on the British Intelligence Services to ensure that they act in a legal and ethical manner, something further suggested when Hague states that ensuring the proportionality, necessity and legality of targeted intelligence has always been a basic principle\(^\text{142}\) governing the British Intelligence Services. Such a portrayal was also evident in the Government response to the David Anderson Report ‘A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review’ in which the Home Secretary Theresa May alludes to the close scrutiny of the British Intelligence Services undertaken by Ministers.\(^\text{143}\) Implicitly, this suggests that the actions of British
Intelligence are always under the careful attention of the relevant Ministers, thus they are always acting in a legal and ethical manner.

By alluding to the strong legal framework and the checks and balances placed on British Intelligence, Hague further purported the rhetoric of how acting in a legal and ethical manner is an ingrained principle of British Intelligence. This leads to the implicit assumption that because of the strength of the mechanisms in place, British Intelligence will always act legally and ethically, with any misdemeanours highlighted by the strong internal and external mechanisms. This is a continual theme throughout the Government response to the Snowden revelations which also exhibited how the Government viewed a legal framework being the same as an ethical one, demonstrating how the British Intelligence Services always acting in a legal and ethical manner according to the Government.

However, issues emanate as to whether the public would have the same understanding of acting in a legal and ethical manner. Although the Government rhetoric highlighted how the British Intelligence Services are acting in adherence to frameworks and legislation, due to the limits of legislation governing the British Intelligence Services, a theme which will be subsequently discussed, the public may have a diverse view of what constitutes legal and ethical behaviour. Therefore, the perpetuating view from the British public could be that British Intelligence are acting in an illegal and unethical manner. But, assessing whether this is the case would require significant up to date fieldwork gathering public understandings of British Intelligence. Graeme Davies and Robert Johns have sought to assess public confidence in MI6 following the Iraq War, using data collected from 2010. Whilst useful, their analysis fails to explore whether there is public confidence that MI6 act legally and ethically. Instead, they explore levels of social trust, finding that those with a higher disposition to social trust, have higher levels of trust in MI6, and the Government use of intelligence.

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144 Hansard, *House of Commons*, 13th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 537 – 538
145 Hansard, *House of Commons*, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 41, 47
Another theme which provides an implicit portrayal of the British Intelligence Services is the discussion of the American (US) and UK relationship. Hugo Swire, The Minister of State, for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office discussed the importance of US–UK intelligence sharing arguing that:

Through our unique and indispensable relationship in the fields of intelligence, cyber and counter-terrorism, we work together to protect the people of our countries and their prosperity. The counter-terrorism relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States is vital to the protection of UK interests at home and overseas from the threats posed by Al-Qaeda and allied terrorist groups. The United States remains our most important partner in that field.  

This provided the implicit view of the importance of US intelligence cooperation for Britain, which is deemed crucial to ensuring Britain’s national security and prosperity. Indeed, the US-UK intelligence relationship has received substantial academic attention, from exploring the origins of what has been termed the special relationship between the two countries, to how this has evolved. The intelligence relationship was so crucial that Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE) played an influential role in the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) forebearer the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) who once created, established a close working relationship on counter-intelligence matters with both MI5 and MI6. Professor Keith Jeffrey explores the importance of US cooperation in the MI6 official history, explaining that:

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147 Hansard, Westminster Hall, 8th October 2013, Volume 568, Column 19WH
148 Hansard, Westminster Hall, 8th October 2013, Volume 568, Column 17WH
150 Smith, B, ‘The American Road to Central Intelligence’ Intelligence and National Security, 12/1, (1997), p. 11, 15 – 17;
Pincher, C, Too Secret Too Long, p. 95, 457-459
Pincher, C, Too Secret Too Long, p. 95
The closest and most mutually productive relations of all were with the United States and they drew on the extensive (if not entirely untroubled) wartime relationships which had been established between OSS, SIS, SOE and signals intelligence organisations on both sides.\(^{152}\)

The importance of this relationship continues, evident through the combined role of the US and UK in stopping the AQ Khan network of weapons proliferation.\(^{153}\) Although the US-UK bilateral relations debate did not explore the Snowden revelations directly, by highlighting the importance of US–UK intelligence cooperation, it provides a subliminal suggestion that there may be some validity of the assertions of the close cooperation between the NSA and GCHQ. However, this does not automatically correlate to the allegations of illegal activity which were made, a theme which the subsequent section will explore.

Following the Snowden revelations, one theme evident throughout the Government rhetoric were the problems emanating from the existing legislation, something particularly prevalent in the Government response to the ISC report. In the first statement following the allegations, Hague stated:

*There will always be ways of improving procedures… and there are always new situations that arise in intelligence gathering that require additions to the refinement of the legal basis of what we do and practices and procedures by which we do that work.*\(^{154}\)

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Other examples of this theme within *MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909 – 1949* can be found on pages: 449–450, 498, 586

\(^{153}\) Hansard, *House of Commons*, 14\(^{th}\) July 2004, Volume 423, Column 1433;


\(^{154}\) Hansard, *House of Commons*, 10\(^{th}\) June 2013, Volume 564, Column 37
Here, Hague alluded to the necessity of altering existing legislation, a theme he later explored in more detail, arguing that ‘We sometimes need to change aspects of the legal framework and where we are able to get information from’, due to the continual evolution in how people communicate.\textsuperscript{155} This intimates how, if there are questions surrounding the legality of GCHQ’s actions, these are due to the limitations of existing legislation, as opposed to GCHQ or the other British Intelligence Services setting out to act illegally or unethically.\textsuperscript{156} Such a depiction was furthered in the Westminster Hall National Security debate when Brokenshire argued:

\begin{quote}
There is a pressing need to ensure that the capability of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies keep pace with ever-changing technology if they are to maintain their ability to tackle terrorism and serious crime.\textsuperscript{157}
\end{quote}

This provided the indirect portrayal that if there are issues with the British Intelligence Services acting illegally or immorally, it is due to the limitations of the legislation as opposed to British Intelligence unilaterally deciding to act outside of the law. Indeed, this was alluded to in responses to questions in the 10\textsuperscript{th} June 2013 debate, where Hague acknowledged that changes were necessary, and reminded the House of Commons that this was a theme which there was cross party support for in the context of the Communications Data Bill.\textsuperscript{158}

In repose to the Snowden revelations, the David Anderson report was initiated to assess whether ‘the legislative framework we have is the right one’.\textsuperscript{159} In the Government response, there was the implicit suggestion that the British Intelligence Services had always acted legally and ethically as they acknowledged the limitation of legislation, as

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{155} Hansard, House of Commons, 10\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Volume 564, Column 41–42

Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 95
\textsuperscript{157} Hansard, Westminster Hall, 22\textsuperscript{nd} October 2013, Volume 569, Column 74WH

\textsuperscript{158} Hansard, House of Commons, 10\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Volume 564, Column 39, 44
\textsuperscript{159} Hansard, House of Commons, 11\textsuperscript{th} June 2015, Volume 596, Column 1356;

\end{footnotes}
it was ‘spread over several different Acts, and it is necessary to bring it together in one law’. Implicitly, this provides the depiction that the British Intelligence Services have always sought to act within the law, but there are significant problems with the legislation, and this is where issues emanate from. Indeed, this is another example of where the Government understanding of the legality of the actions undertaken by the British Intelligence Services may vary drastically to the public view who would not, on the whole, have a clear understanding of the limits to the legislation. If this was made clearer, then such confusion may have been prevented.

This is evident in the Security and Intelligence Services Westminster Hall debate where although the Government states that ‘GCHQ and our intelligence agencies act within the law’, this is questioned in relation to the Tempora programme Snowden revealed which related to GCHQ’s ability to gather and store mass amounts of data from fibre optic cables for up to 30 days. In the debate, Brokenshire stated that GCHQ’s involvement in Tempora was legal, before intimating that perhaps this demonstrates the necessity of updating legislation. Whilst this indirectly implied that Tempora was a legal activity undertaken by GCHQ, it also alludes to the necessity of altering existing legislation, perhaps due to the public concern as to GCHQ’s actions.

But, in the discussions of the communications bill and investigatory powers (IP) bill, the Government are keen to highlight that it is in fact law enforcement organisations pushing for these powers. This is perhaps most evident when communications data is raised as a question to the Home Department on 15th July 2013. Brokenshire asserted:

There is an understanding across government on the challenges and issues involved in protecting the police’s

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160 Hansard, House of Commons, 11th June 2015, Volume 596, Column 1356, 1358
161 Hansard, Westminster Hall, 31st October 2013, Volume 569 Column 382WH
163 Hansard, Westminster Hall, 31st October 2013, Volume 569 Column 382WH–384WH
164 Hansard, Westminster Hall, 31st October 2013, Volume 569 Column 382WH
What is interesting in this context is the limited emphasis placed on British Intelligence in the responses, despite it only being a month after the Snowden revelations. But this omission may be an implicit attempt at demonstrating how the communications data bill more controversial techniques, such as stipulating what types of data internet service providers must retain,\textsuperscript{166} were going to be used by the Police in their pursuit of paedophiles, terrorists and organised crime organisations.\textsuperscript{167} The role of law enforcement in utilising these techniques was explored in the Government response to the Anderson report,\textsuperscript{168} as well as highlighting that local authorities would also be able to use the collected internet data.\textsuperscript{169} Indeed, elite interviews undertaken also explored how it was law enforcement that was pushing for the legislation, as opposed to the British Intelligence Services, and that this was a theme the public were perhaps unaware of.\textsuperscript{170} Combining elite interview data with the Ministerial statements provides a cohesive understanding of the views on this theme across Government, something inherently lacking from the academic debate surrounding the Snowden revelations, thus demonstrating the contribution made by this thesis in understanding what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services are provided by successive Governments.

Although the Communications Data Bill was initiated before the Snowden revelations,\textsuperscript{171} by highlighting its use for the prevention of what everyone can agree are heinous crimes, there is perhaps an attempt to encourage cross-party support for the proposed legislation. In turn, it leads to the implicit portrayal that British Intelligence would not be the only entities to use such powers, and in fact the legislation is not an attempt to provide them

\textsuperscript{165} Hansard, House of Commons, 15\textsuperscript{th} July 2013, Volume 566, Column 761
\textsuperscript{166} BBC News, UK’s data communication bill faces tough criticism, 14\textsuperscript{th} June 2012, Available From: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-18439226 (Accessed 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2019);
\textsuperscript{167} Hansard, House of Commons, 11\textsuperscript{th} June 2015, Volume 596, Column 1334, 1363, 1365, 1366
\textsuperscript{168} Hansard, House of Commons, 11\textsuperscript{th} June 2015, Volume 596, Column 1335, 1363, 1365
\textsuperscript{169} Hansard, House of Commons, 11\textsuperscript{th} June 2015, Volume 596, Column 1339, 1365
\textsuperscript{170} Private Interview 4: 21\textsuperscript{st} January 2016
\textsuperscript{171} Parliament.uk, Draft Communications Data Bill Joint Committee – First Report, Available From: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201213/jtselect/jtdraftcomuni/79/7902.htm (Accessed 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2019)
with more powers, thus intimating although in an inherently subtle manner, that the British Intelligence Services act legally and ethically.

In response to the ISC Privacy and Security Report, the limitations of legislation are inherently prevalent,\textsuperscript{172} with the then Home Secretary Theresa May stating that ‘the draft Investigatory Powers Bill should be considered as the formal Government response to that [ISC] report.’\textsuperscript{173} This demonstrates the Government’s acknowledgement of the ISC finding that having a clear framework that sets out the intrusive capabilities available to the British Intelligence Services is necessary.\textsuperscript{174} This led to the creation of the IP Bill designed to provide a:

\textit{comprehensive and comprehensible framework governing the acquisition of communications, data about communications and equipment interference.}\textsuperscript{175}

This suggests the necessity for information about which actions the British Intelligence Services are able to lawfully undertake to be more transparent, a theme intimated in the Government response, suggesting the awareness of increasing public comprehension of these topics. Indeed, had this been as prevalent before the Snowden revelations, there may have been an increased understanding that their actions were not illegal or unethical, but allowed under legislation which did not consider evolving communications technology. This demonstrates how increased openness would have been beneficial for ensuring public understanding of the British Intelligence Services.

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\textsuperscript{173}Home Office, \textit{Letter from Theresa May to the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee}, 8\textsuperscript{th} December 2015, (Home Office, Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF)
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The Government response to the ISC report stated what types of communications could be accessed and how these will be defined in the IP Bill.\textsuperscript{176} This was a theme another elite interview also explored by discussing what data the IP Bill sought to collect.\textsuperscript{177} What was interesting in this civil service interview was the clear way in which the data the IP Bill sought to collect was explained, which raised questions as to why the public rhetoric was not explaining the theme in the same concise manner. The Government response implicitly depicted that the British Intelligence Services have always acted legally and ethically under the existing legislation which was not designed with modern communication methods in mind.\textsuperscript{178} This is combined with the use of warrants being explored and how these have always been utilised but, they will now be combined with enhanced safeguards.\textsuperscript{179} Therefore, there will be the strengthening, or improving of the existing situation by enhancing the safeguards.\textsuperscript{180}

Another theme intimated is that whilst the British Intelligence Services may have always acted legally, their actions may not have been entirely ethical as one service could gain access to a subject of interest’s property via the authority of another organisation’s warrant; something the Government is keen to stress is still legal entry as a warrant is in place.\textsuperscript{181} Arguably, this has some correlation to the central claims made by Peter Wright in the 1980s in relation to how the British Intelligence Services would access property.\textsuperscript{182}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{PrivateInterview} Private Interview 2: 8\textsuperscript{th} January 2016; Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 9/11’, \textit{Intelligence and National Security}, 27/5, (2012), pp. 722 – 738;
\bibitem{PublicInterview} Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, \textit{Special Reports – The Government Response to the ISC Privacy and Security Report}, Available From: PDF of Government Response Accessed via ISC website (Accessed 1\textsuperscript{st} March 2019), p. 5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 16, 18, 21
\end{thebibliography}
actions, thus portraying implicitly that whilst the British Intelligence Services do seek to act legally, they may at times act unethically due to issues outside of their direct control. But these issues all emanate from the limitations of legislation and therefore, under British law, their actions were in fact legal, thus attempting to provide a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services.

This is furthered when the Government response draws attention to MI6 stating that they:

*have launched a review of their use of class authorisations to strengthen existing arrangements and to enhance their ability to demonstrate compliance in a more systematic way.*

Linking back to the discussion of the use of language, this is another example of how it can create a particular portrayal. In the case of MI6, the language highlights how they have always had internal mechanisms to ensure their actions are legal and ethical, and that these are simply being made stronger. This creates the depiction of MI6 being an organisation who are continually seeking to ensure that their actions are both legal and ethical, a portrayal furthered when the Government response states that the British Intelligence Services are:

*properly authorised and subject to high ethical standards... activities of agents are properly authorised and currently subject to oversight by the Intelligence Services Commissioner.*

This furthered the depiction evident throughout the Government response to the ISC report that British Intelligence are always acting legally and ethically, and indeed, are keen to ensure that this continues. Although referring solely to GCHQ, the Government

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rhetoric has a tough stance towards anyone attempting illegality, such as the misuse of an agency capability, something the Government state can lead to criminal proceedings.\textsuperscript{185} Not only does this imply the strong safeguards the Government places on British Intelligence, but that if any illegal or unethical behaviour is undertaken, this emanates from individuals, as opposed to the British Intelligence Services.

Throughout the Government responses analysed, there are numerous implicit references to the British Intelligence Services. Whilst at times these intimate wrongdoing, such as the use of NCND in the first Government statement following the Snowden revelations, there is an overall positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services being capable and effective, although Snowden has affected this. This is combined with how in the Government understanding, the British Intelligence Services have always acted legally and ethically, with issues emanating from the limitations of legislation. However, problems arise as to whether the public are aware of this information which questions the extent to which such information is easily accessible to the public.

**Conclusion**

Despite the Blair Government publishing the JIC assessment on Iraqi WMDs in order to provide the public with an understanding of the information which the Government received,\textsuperscript{186} references to intelligence were implicit or as a subsidiary theme in the accompanying House of Commons debates. These still provided a depiction of the British Intelligence Services to the public, and overwhelmingly they were portrayed positively. This is in stark contrast to the Coalition Government who sought to avoid discussing intelligence on the 10\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Iraq war, as well as immediately following the Snowden revelations where they used the NCND principle. But, in contrast to the Iraq case study, intelligence was not portrayed as a subsidiary theme after the Snowden revelations, demonstrating that overall, there was increased openness in discussing

intelligence. This theme continued after the Snowden revelations,¹⁸⁷ and as this chapter has demonstrated, was accompanied by an overwhelmingly positive depiction of how British Intelligence are capable and effective and also ensure adherence to legislation.

This is perhaps the key difference between the depictions of British Intelligence in the two case studies, that the Iraq context did not see an emphasis placed upon British Intelligence acting legally and ethically. Perhaps this was not something which was questioned in the Iraq case as it was by the Snowden allegations. Equally, this also demonstrates how portrayals evolve over time as there was undoubtedly more information about the actions of the British Intelligence Services released in Government statements in the Snowden context, although this could also emanate from a desire to prevent issues of politicisation occurring again.¹⁸⁸ But perhaps more crucially, this demonstrates increased openness on behalf of the Government in openly discussing the British Intelligence Services which resulted in more information being available in the public domain. This is a stark difference between the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services provided by the two Governments.

But with more openness after the Snowden revelations, there was a consistent portrayal between what depictions the Government as an avenue of information, and the British Intelligence Services were both placing in the public domain. Whilst this was not evident in the Iraq context, this is undoubtedly because in 2003, public engagement was still something of a new phenomenon, particularly for MI6. Indeed, it was not until October 2005 that MI6 launched their own website in English, French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese and Arabic.¹⁸⁹ This has seemingly been a continual trend with two separate elite interviews acknowledging that Snowden revelations did encourage the wider debate of putting more information into the public domain,¹⁹⁰ thus allowing for consistent portrayals to become evident.

¹⁸⁷ Hansard, *House of Commons*, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 31, 46
¹⁸⁸ Hansard, *House of Commons*, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 47
¹⁹⁰ Private Interview 2: 8th January 2016;
Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017
Another reasoning for this could be that whilst the Government rhetoric provides a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, issues emanate from the limitations of the legislation, something which perhaps the wider public are not aware of. The lack of understanding could occur from the fact that for the public to be aware of Ministerial statements, they are either reliant accessing Hansard or, on news journalism coverage. Whilst the latter does include live coverage of House of Commons and devolved Government debates, for 2015 – 2016 and 2016 – 2017, only 0.6% of the population accessed BBC Parliament each week.\textsuperscript{191} This may in fact be another reason for the Intelligence Services themselves to undertake more of their own public facing activities.

Overall, there are similarities between the two case studies in their depiction of the British Intelligence Services as being a capable, effective, dedicated and professional entity, with the Snowden case furthering this depiction by focusing on their adherence to legal and ethical standards. Combined, this provides an overwhelming positive portrayal of British Intelligence from consecutive British Governments.

Chapter 4: A Symbiotic Relationship: The British Intelligence Services and Academia

Introduction
This chapter examines the constantly evolving relationship between the British Intelligence Services and academia. In a contemporary context the ‘culture of openness has led to greater engagement between Britain’s intelligence community and its universities’. However, this is merely the newest way in which the relationship manifests, and still remains far behind the engagement witnessed by their American counterparts which dates back to the emergence of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when they actively engaged with university campuses across the country. As the contextualisation section explored, there is a long history of British Intelligence and academia cooperating with one another, perhaps due to the symbiotic nature of the relationship, demonstrating how interlinked these fields are and thus require significant exploration.

To fully assess how intelligence and academia engage with one another, the chapter examines how the British Intelligence Services and academia cooperate, a section where the symbiotic nature of the relationship will be highlighted. This is due to the existence of approved university courses and centres of excellence, Governmental contracts for the teaching of intelligence personnel, and how former intelligence practitioners such as Michael Herman and Sir David Omand are now well-respected academics. Len Scott and Gerry Hughes are right in their assertion that this continues as following the Global War on Terror, there is a heightened interest in intelligence by both scholars and

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practitioners,\(^4\) a theme which the chapter will discuss. Based upon empirical research, the chapter will demonstrate not only the validity of Scott and Hughes’ assertion, but also the ways in which the relationship is apparent. Whilst some of them are merely an evolution of previous collaboration, such as academics writing official histories, there are new mechanisms such as approved university courses and centres, and the teaching of intelligence practitioners by academics. This demonstrates the symbiotic nature of the relationship as not only do current practitioners gain an academic understanding of the topic,\(^5\) but also academics gain a more detailed understanding of intelligence.

The chapter then analyses what views of British Intelligence are evident within the intelligence studies literature. By focusing on the official histories of the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Special Operations Executive (SOE), how British Intelligence is portrayed positively to the public will become evident. In the case of MI5 and MI6, the official histories were approved to mark their centenaries, and thus they provided unprecedented access to Professors Christopher Andrew and Keith Jeffrey respectively. In contrast, GCHQ have approved Professor John Ferris to write their official history to mark their centenary in 2019.\(^6\) This could in fact aid GCHQ in their attempts to tell their own story, a theme one interviewee said that they were attempting to achieve.\(^7\) This is something which has undoubtedly been the case for MI5 and MI6 in the publishing of the official histories.

The chapter will then explore the wider intelligence studies literature to ascertain whether this is a portrayal evident throughout. This will allow for an effective comparison analysis of what view academia is depicting of British Intelligence. However, due to the vastness of the literature, it is impossible to include it all within this analysis. Therefore, it will centre upon examining the view provided by former practitioners, and two sub-genres which have been central to this research due to their emphasis upon the necessity of the

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\(^5\) Private Interview 20: 12\(^{th}\) September 2017


At the time of writing, this had yet to be published and is therefore why it has been excluded from the discussions about the portrayals depicted within the official histories.

\(^7\) Private Interview 21: 12\(^{th}\) September 2017
public having an informed understanding of the intelligence realm; namely the Aberystwyth School and the Intelligence Accountability literature. Within these categories, some similarities were evident, particularly in relation to the depiction of how capable British Intelligence are in increasingly difficult circumstances. Therefore, academia provides a positive portrayal of British Intelligence and thus can provide the public with a greater awareness of the actions of the British Intelligence Services.

**Mechanisms of the Intelligence – Academic Relationship**

Empirical research undertaken for thesis uncovered numerous ways in which intelligence and academia cooperate, particularly in the American context. This wealth of information is perhaps due to the fact that a 2008 survey discovered how there were over 840 non-government courses in intelligence at over 100 civilian serving higher education institutions in America.\(^8\) This is combined with the National Intelligence University, the senior academic institution of the US intelligence community, receiving top level supervision and guidance from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.\(^9\) But, particularly post 9/11, there has been an increase in the number of intelligence courses in the UK,\(^10\) (something also enhanced following the 7/7 attacks in London).\(^11\) This growth of the subject is also evident in the other ‘Five Eyes’ countries Canada, Australia and New Zealand,\(^12\) and there are developing number of intelligence courses at higher education institutions in Israel, some South American countries and Asia,\(^13\) in part due

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\(^10\) Moran, C, ‘Note on Teaching Intelligence’ *Intelligence and National Security*, 31/1, (2016) p. 119

\(^11\) 9/11 also had a huge impact on intelligence courses in the US and in particular what is now known as the National Intelligence University as Spracher notes there was more money for both Department of Defence and civilian college and university intelligence programmes. Please see: Spracher, W. C, ‘National Intelligence University: a half century educating the next generation of US Intelligence Community Leaders’, p. 233–234


to increased student interest in the subject. This section will only focus upon three keys ways in which the relationship manifests itself, both due to the collected information, as well as to ensure the chapter remains of a manageable size. Therefore, this section addresses how there are now approved university centres and courses, Government contracts for the teaching of intelligence practitioners, and finally former practitioners turning to academia. By assessing these, the symbiotic nature of the cooperation will be evident.

Approved University Courses and Centres

University Courses

When undertaking overseas fieldwork, this theme was first discovered through the existence of the American Diplomacy Labs and the National Security Agency’s (NSA) centres of excellence in cyber defence. Empirical research was undertaken to further explore both of these projects and a lecture for the Diplomacy Labs project was observed at the Stevens Institute of Technology. The observed lecture provided students with a background awareness of American politics, and in particular, an understanding of the American Constitution at the beginning of the module, in order for them to fully appreciate how their projects could aid policymakers. When discussing the module with its convenor Dr Lindsey Cormack, she discussed how this background benefitted the students as many came to the programme from more science and technological backgrounds. This fieldwork allowed for an understanding of how intelligence and indeed wider Government was furthering engagement with academia; as well as a desire to assess whether such schemes were also prevalent in the British context.

18 Private Interview 15: with Lindsey Cormack – 7th September 2016
In the UK, there are a total of 18 approved courses do exist, predominantly at master’s level. Approved by the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), part of GCHQ, the courses tend to focus upon cyber and technical matters. This suggests how these are the attributes GCHQ is wanting to see in future recruits, and is therefore encouraging academia to focus on these subjects. This is similar to Diplomacy Labs which highlights future jobs to those within science and technology. The existence of such courses in the US and UK should perhaps not be surprising considering that ‘since 9/11 and across the ‘Five Eyes’ countries, an ever-increasing number of university bachelor and postgraduate courses are seeking accreditation’. However, when further examining these courses, there is no information on the NCSC website stating what criteria a course must reach. This suggests it is based on an ad-hoc process and could be due to staff research. This is implied in the case of the University of South Wales’ press release and staff profiles, which highlight previous engagement with the British Intelligence Services. This seems to be inherently likely as in his article about teaching intelligence in the twenty-first century, Patrick Walsh, highlighting the Australian context, states that government sponsored accredited university courses ‘rely on assumptions that the course submitted to government from the university has been peer reviewed by subject matter experts’. This is seemingly similar to the US context where there is incredible flexibility in terms of how universities become involved in

Diplomacy Labs. In the two interviews undertaken on the topic, how they became involved differed dramatically, with the University of Virginia being directly approached by the State Department, and the Stevens Institute of Technology applying.\(^\text{26}\) Equally, it is unclear whether there are nationality requirements to undertake such courses although this was not an issue for Diplomacy Labs with one interviewee saying ‘no, to my knowledge there is no restriction [on nationality]’.\(^\text{27}\) Perhaps in the UK context, it is due to the university in question utilising their own discretion, but even seeking primary research into these themes may not provide the desired information to further comprehend how the university courses function in practice.

**University Centres of Excellence**

As well as the specific courses already examined, GCHQ has in partnership with the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, approved university centres of excellence.\(^\text{28}\) Indeed, just the fact that these two organisations are cooperating demonstrates another way in which intelligence and academia cooperate. Unlike the university courses, the Academic Centres of Excellence in Cyber Research website highlights the strict criteria which all universities must adhere to,\(^\text{29}\) and are reviewed every five years.\(^\text{30}\) This led to 14 universities being approved in 2017, with the majority located in the south of England.\(^\text{31}\) This certainly intimates closeness between British Intelligence and the centres of excellence due to their geographical locations.

Throughout this section about university courses and centres, there is a substantial emphasis upon GCHQ’s engagement with academia. This highlights the emphasis the

\(^{26}\) Private Interview 19: 22\(^{\text{nd}}\) September 2016

\(^{27}\) Private Interview 15: with Lindsey Cormack – 7\(^{\text{th}}\) September 2016;
Private Interview 19: 22\(^{\text{nd}}\) September 2016


British Intelligence Services are placing on science and technology, further evident as one interviewee explained that the academic outreach undertaken by the British Intelligence Services does tend to centre around science and technology courses. But, there is academic engagement outside of this field. Alex Younger, the current Chief (C) of MI6, partook in a roundtable about foreign intelligence and cooperation at George Washington University in 2016. This was the first time Younger had spoken publicly in the US, and was an extraordinary event as four intelligence heads from America, Afghanistan, Australia and the UK talked, in front of an audience, about the challenges they were facing. Whilst excellent to see such engagement, it highlights the American willingness to engage with academia which perhaps emanates from the culture of openness which surrounds American Intelligence Services in a manner other countries should strive to emulate. In December 2018, Younger’s second ever public speech in the UK was at St Andrews University, further intimating at intelligence – academia cooperation, although this may have been a recruitment opportunity.

In contrast, MI5’s website highlights the apprenticeships offered by the Intelligence Services, which involving a two-year course at GCHQ, before another two years based at another British Intelligence Service. However, there is no information as to the nature of the work, and whether security clearances will be required. There are only eligibility requirements which state:

You’ll need three A levels (or equivalent) at grades A – C, including at least two in science, technology or maths.

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32 Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017
Science and Technology are also fields which the CIA is interested in with Loch Johnson stating that: ‘one finds a plethora of research links between the CIA and academe, all focused on the latest technological developments’. In: Johnson, L. K, ‘Spies and scholars in the United States: winds of ambivalence in the groves of academe’, p. 5
34 YouTube, CIA-GW Intelligence Conference: Panel on The View from Foreign Intelligence Chiefs, Available From: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yejBv7Q3sv0 (Accessed 24th January 2018)
related subjects. In return, we will offer you a range of exciting challenges, excellent training and development, and a competitive salary.\textsuperscript{37}

This implies that technology-related fields are where the British Intelligence Services are seeking to further their engagement with this academia, but is this to the detriment of others such as languages?

Teaching Practitioners
The United States has a history of academics teaching intelligence practitioners, which is particularly evident in the existence of the National Intelligence University, with many of its staff being former practitioners.\textsuperscript{38} This is the American Intelligence Community’s sole accredited federal degree granting institution, with academic centres around the world.\textsuperscript{39} From examining the intelligence literature, the realisation of the necessity to provide practitioners with an academic understanding of the discipline was first evident from the 1960s onwards with Dorondo exploring the theme in the CIA’s ‘Studies in Intelligence’ journal\textsuperscript{40} This led to the emergence of Intelligence Studies being taught in American higher education establishments,\textsuperscript{41} and implies that the realisation that an academic understanding of intelligence was necessary, emerged from within the intelligence realm itself.

However in Britain, although engagement between intelligence and academia has always been evident,\textsuperscript{42} the realisation that intelligence practitioners could benefit from academia emanated some 95 years after MI5 and MI6 were created. Following the Iraq invasion,
the Butler inquiry was created to review the intelligence regarding Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction.43 The report concluded that there should be the specialisation of intelligence
analysis and its advancement through the British Intelligence Community,44 and thus
‘tentative steps were taken to engage with academics working on intelligence’.45 This led
to the creation of an academic course, run by King’s College London, for civil servants
about the nature of intelligence.46 Mike Goodman describes this as akin to what the CIA
was considering in the 1960s.47 Despite the time lag between the creation of the British
and American programmes, both cases demonstrate how the intelligence services and
wider Government benefit from their engagement with academia, something with which
interviewed academics agree. It seems somewhat surprising that in the British context,
such engagement only began after the Butler Report, particularly as consecutive
Governments have brought in outside academics, such as allowing William Mackenzie
to write the history of SOE.48 Thus there may well have been informal arrangements in
which Government and the British Intelligence Services benefitted from academic
expertise.

Primary research has suggested that the Government has commissioned several courses
for intelligence practitioners, with one London university in particular, described as the
leader in this field.49 This further exhibits public engagement on intelligence matters as
information about how analysts are being trained is published by the academics
responsible who explain the nature of the courses. Omand and Goodman (who are
responsible for the Kings College London course), highlight that by providing a
multidisciplinary understanding of the concepts and issues surrounding intelligence,

43 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office,
2004), p. 1
44 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office,
2004), p. 114 - 115
45 Dexter, H, Phyhtian, M, Strachan-Morris, D, ‘The what, why, who and how of teaching intelligence: the
Leicester approach’, p. 921
46 Omand, Sir, D, and Goodman, M, ‘What Analysts Need to Understand: The King’s Intelligence Studies
Program’, Studies in Intelligence, 52/4, (2008), p. 2
47 Central Intelligence Agency, Library – Studies in Intelligence – Studying and Teaching Intelligence:
The Approach in the United Kingdom, Intelligence Education by Michael Goodman, Available From:
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
49 Private Interview 20: 12th September 2017
analysts from across Government share a sense of being part of a single intelligence analysis community, and are more aware of the:

*Meaning, value, nature and proper use of intelligence, and more confident in their own discussions of these topics.*

Equally, it highlights the emphasis placed on the teaching of practitioners, demonstrating the symbiotic nature of the relationship between intelligence and academia. At Leicester University, the Master’s in Intelligence and Security delivered via a distance learning approach, has a number of students who are intelligence practitioners, law enforcement and military officers, despite the course not having any nationality or clearance restrictions. Indeed, this is further evident with the academic education provided to the military who insist their personnel have a valuable education to allow them to undertake their work as effectively as possible. King’s College London has the contract to provide teaching at the Joint Services Command and Staff Colleges. Therefore, there is a clear awareness throughout British Government of the benefit of engaging with academia.

Practitioners turned Academics
Another mechanism of cooperation is when former practitioners turn to academia. From personal experience, this is perhaps more prominent in America, to the extent that Helen Dexter, Mark Phythian and David Strachan-Morris argue that the practitioner-scholar is one of the defining features of the American approach to Intelligence Studies. This was evident to me when attending the International Studies Association 2016 and 2018 conferences, it was astonishing how many academics began their presentation or

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50 Omand, Sir, D, and Goodman, M, ‘What Analysts Need to Understand’, p. 3
52 Defence Academy, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Available From: https://www.da.mod.uk/colleges-schools/joint-services-command-and-staff-college (Accessed 29th December 2017)
questions by highlighting their former careers. A possible reasoning for this openness in the American context could be as Loch Johnson states, that it is when links between practitioners and academics are secret that they become inappropriate, although cynically, this may also be a way of gaining credibility from the audience. Such openness about previous intelligence careers is not evident within the British context, with one interviewee believing that this is due to the secrecy surrounding British Intelligence, an assertion in which there is likely to be some merit. This demonstrates how other countries such as the US have overcome some of the issues surrounding the secrecy of intelligence which Britain continues to grapple with. But, it is clearly something which should be further explored due to the benefits practitioners turned academics can bring to the teaching and understanding of intelligence in the public domain. Walsh succinctly surmises this as he states:

_Bridges have been built between some Intelligence Community agencies and the academy by former practitioners, who have moved to academia (such as myself). This has helped universities build content and tradecraft skills, while also providing the higher education sector with a greater understanding of what specialised knowledge is needed by the Intelligence Community and should be built into the programme._

In the UK, one of the clearest and indeed earliest examples is Sir Harry Hinsley. Having worked at Bletchley Park during the Second World War, he became a distinguished academic at St John’s College, Cambridge despite not having a first-class degree or doctorate. He then went on to write the landmark _British Intelligence in the Second World_

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56 Private Interview 20: 12th September 2017
57 Walsh, P, ‘Teaching Intelligence in the twenty-first century: towards an evidence-based approach for curriculum design’, p. 1012
War over five volumes. Although this had the full cooperation of the authorities, Hinsley’s use of the archives was restricted as ‘secrecy about intelligence techniques and regarding individuals remained essential’.

This demonstrates how former practitioners turn to academia and write on the topic they have an implicit understanding of, something also evident in the case of Michael Herman. After a career which included national service in Egypt, Herman was recruited to GCHQ before being seconded to the Cabinet Office and then the Defence Intelligence Staff before returning as Director of GCHQ. After his retirement, Herman became a fellow at Oxford University where he not only wrote Intelligence Power in Peace and War, but also created the Oxford Intelligence Group. This serves to further the academic study of intelligence, with a particular emphasis placed upon understanding intelligence in the modern world, by hearing from both practitioners and academics.

In the British context, the most prominent example of a former practitioner turning to academia is Sir David Omand. Before his retirement from British Government, Omand was a named public official due to his role as both Director of GCHQ and becoming the first Security and Intelligence Coordinator. As a published academic, Omand explores both the nature of intelligence and the relationship between British Intelligence and the public. Throughout my PhD research project, Omand’s arguments have perhaps been

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60 Gill, P, Policing Politics, p. 12
62 Oxford Intelligence Group, About The Oxford Intelligence Group, Available From: http://oig.nuff.ox.ac.uk/index.php/about.html (Accessed 24th January 2018);
64 Kings College London, Visiting Staff – Professor Sir David Omand, Available From: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/people/visiting/omand.aspx (Accessed 7th December 2015)
Omand, Sir, D, Securing the State, (London, C Hurst & Co, 2010);
the most useful and persuasive. This demonstrates a way in which British Intelligence is furthering its engagement with academia. Former practitioners are in a unique position of being able to utilise their own expertise within academic writing, further allowing academia to depict British Intelligence; a theme which the following section will examine to assess what views former practitioners provide of British Intelligence through their work.

Although these are only three examples of practitioner turned academic, one interviewee said that there are British academics who have previously worked in the intelligence realm, joining academia mid-career. This serves as an interesting contrast between the US and UK contexts and demonstrates a clear difference which arguably emanates from the culture of secrecy in the UK context.

Becoming an academic is not the only way in which former practitioners can engage with students as Christopher Moran explains. When providing his first-hand experience of teaching intelligence to Undergraduates, he highlights the benefits of having former intelligence practitioners talk to the students. After asking all students to fill in questionnaires at the end of the module, Moran states that:

By putting a real face on the profession, they help to remove some of the mystique of spying, which can lead students to think that all spies resemble James Bond. Visual learners – students who learn by best by what they see – find it particularly valuable to see an intelligence officer in the flesh.

Thus, former practitioners can aid student’s understandings of the intelligence realm, by talking to students and providing ‘inside stories’, they further humanise the subject. This can prevent certain channels from dominating the depiction of the British Intelligence Services which is most synonymous with the public. This is surmised by a comment provided by one of Moran’s students who said: ‘It’s very difficult to conceive of a spy as

66 Private Interview 20: 12th September 2017
67 Moran, C, ‘Note on Teaching Intelligence’ p. 121
anything but a dashing, muscular, alpha-male when you’ve grown up watching super spies like James Bond, Ethan Hunt and Jason Bourne."\textsuperscript{68} Crucially, this highlights not only how dominant some portrayals of the British Intelligence Services can be, but how this can be overcome via engagement from the Intelligence realm, in this case via retired professionals. Although it is not feasible for serving intelligence personnel to undertake such activities, for those who are retired, it provides a continued way the public and specifically students, can fully comprehend the intelligence realm.

Conclusion
This section has explored three unique ways in which the intelligence – academia relationship manifests. With references made to the American context, the British way in Intelligence is evident due to the pervasiveness of secrecy seemingly preventing further engagement as is evident in America. Yet in both countries, the symbiotic nature of the intelligence – academic relationship is clear. Whether this has any impact upon the views provided by the literature will now be explored.

Views within the literature

Introduction
This section explores what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are evident within the intelligence studies literature. Due to the vastness of the field, the focus will be on certain sub-categories. The views of British Intelligence evident within the official histories of MI5, MI6, JIC and SOE will be scrutinised before examining sub-genres of the literature. The first differentiation is between those academics that are known to have previously worked within British Intelligence. Although primary research implied that there are several British intelligence academics who fall within this category, having left British Intelligence mid-career,\textsuperscript{69} their previous employment is not common knowledge. Therefore, within this chapter, when exploring former practitioners who have turned to academia, Michael Herman and Sir David Omand will be focused upon. The chapter then explores the Aberystwyth Academics namely, Professor Len Scott, Professor Martin Alexander, Dr Peter Jackson and Dr Gerry Hughes. Although not all are based in

\textsuperscript{68} Moran, C, ‘Note on Teaching Intelligence’ p. 123
\textsuperscript{69} Private Interview 20: 12\textsuperscript{th} September 2017
Aberystwyth anymore, they co-authored several chapters and books whilst working in Aberystwyth which explore the necessity of intelligence and provide a view of British Intelligence based on a difficult working environment. Finally, the accountability literature is analysed due to their emphasis upon secrecy surrounding British Intelligence, a theme the official histories emphasise. By splitting it into sub-genres, it allows for a clearer analysis of the themes explored and what depictions of British Intelligence are portrayed.

Official Histories
To mark their centenaries, MI5 and MI6 allowed established academics, Professors Christopher Andrew and Keith Jeffrey respectively, unprecedented access to their archives to write comprehensive histories of the services. Such activity was another example of the services undertaking public engagement as the histories provided the public with a clearer understanding of the services, something both were striving to achieve. This demonstrates how the relationship between British Intelligence and academia has continually evolved, as previous academic explorations of their activities were only for official consumption. This is evident in comparison to the official history of the Special Operations Executive by William Mackenzie which was commissioned by the Cabinet Office following the end of the Second World War. Although the service itself had been officially disbanded in 1946, it had a restricted circulation and until its publication in 2000, it was an in-house history.

Although SOE no longer exists, by undertaking extensive analysis of its official history within this chapter, it allows for a clearer comprehension of the over-riding themes

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official histories were providing to the public. Indeed, this was also the case in relation to the reading of *Spying on the World – The Declassified Documents of the Joint Intelligence Committee 1936 – 2013* written by academics Richard Aldrich, Rory Cormac and Mike Goodman. Unlike the other official histories, Aldrich, Cormac and Goodman reproduce many JIC documents, thus providing primary evidence of the themes they examine. But, when compiled with analysis from the other official histories, a comprehensive view of British Intelligence in five over-arching categories becomes evident. These are: British Intelligence’s capability and effectiveness; structure and purpose of British Intelligence, whether they are ethical or unethical; the human dimension of intelligence and secrecy surrounding British Intelligence. Each of these will be explored in turn to establish how British Intelligence is depicted before seeking to examine whether these are themes also evident within the wider intelligence studies literature.

**Capable and Effective**

All the official histories depict British Intelligence as inherently capable and effective, although the examples demonstrating this vary between the services. For MI5, their effectiveness is demonstrated through the discussion of their involvement in the highly successful Second World War Double Cross (XX) system which provided disinformation via agents to the Germans. This is evident in a quote Andrew includes in his analysis from Masterman, Chairman of the Twenty Committee which was responsible for Double Cross. He stated that:

> *we actively ran and controlled the German espionage system in this country.*

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78 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 845
Perhaps such an assertion is based on how one XX agent GARBO persuaded the Germans that the main target for the D-Day landings was Calais, not Normandy, demonstrating the importance the XX within the war effort, and MI5’s crucial involvement.

Although MI6 were involved with the XX system, their capability and effectiveness is perhaps best demonstrated by the nature of the information which they were collecting, such as commercial, economic and military intelligence. This allowed for more cohesive decision-making as MI6 was collecting a variety of information, something only possible if they were capable at recognising what was, and what was not, important. Although MI5 would arguably also have been capable of such intelligence collection, this is not a theme which Andrew explores in his analysis. This suggests that for MI6, it was an integral aspect of their work and due to Sir Mansfield Cumming’s forward thinking. As C of MI6, he encouraged the collection of economic and commercial intelligence during the First World War, thus aiding their ability to undertake all source analysis, thus demonstrating their capability and effectiveness from the outset. Whilst this may seem a subtle difference to what Andrew and Jeffrey deem important, it provides a view that all organisations within British Intelligence have differing remits which they all seek to undertake to the best of their ability.

One theme evident through all the official histories is the pre-emptive nature of British Intelligence, namely they are trying to provide information about something before it happens. But this is inherently difficult to achieve as the Intelligence Services are not able to predict the future, something which the former C Sir John Sawyers reminded MPs in the first public evidence session to the Intelligence and Security Committee when he said ‘we are not crystal-ball gazers’. Rather, the British Intelligence Services make projections based on the availability of information. Therefore, the ability to make such predictions requires capable and effective intelligence collection and analysis. This

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80 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 396
81 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 97, 456, 542
82 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 97
83 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 653;
Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 18;
Aldrich, R, Cormac, R, and Goodman, M, Spying on the World, p. 1
84 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Uncorrected Transcript of Evidence, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2013), p. 3
demonstrates the saliency of the argument, namely that the capability and effectiveness of British Intelligence can be evident through their ability to assess the collected intelligence. The discussion of how capable and effective MI5 and MI6 are in the official histories is a consistent portrayal to that seen on their websites, demonstrating how the positive portrayal is also evident via the avenues of information.

However, in contrast to the websites, the official histories acknowledge that there have been times when they have been incapable or ineffective. During the Cold War, MI5 and indeed wider British Intelligence, was penetrated by Soviet moles, the clearest example of which was the Cambridge Five, a theme upon which Andrew places a significant emphasis. By analysing the case of Melita Norwood who remained undiscovered until 1999, Andrew exemplifies MI5’s inability to fully analyse information which had already been collected as they had prior warnings of Norwood’s treachery which included an un-canny description of Norwood from one of Maxwell Knight’s agents. Indeed, even when witch hunts for Soviet moles gripped the service, Norwood’s activities remained undiscovered, it was only due to the Mitrokhin Archives that she was uncovered. Thus, MI5 are portrayed as being incapable to realise the extent of Soviet penetration.

Although MI6 were similarly affected by Soviet penetration, it is not explored by Jeffrey due to the time-span of his book, which only covered the period up to 1949. However, it does highlight the difficulties in processing collected information, thus producing ineffective analysis. Indeed, the JIC history also alludes to this theme as they have been criticised repeatedly for not analysing all information correctly, something particularly prevalent after the publication of the dodgy dossier. Whilst the analysis of intelligence

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86 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 182
87 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 510
89 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 61, 334
leading up to the Iraq War\textsuperscript{91} is perhaps the clearest example of this, it is not a new phenomenon as the limited awareness of the North Korean intention of invading the South demonstrates.\textsuperscript{92} Thus, the JIC history demonstrates their ineffectiveness at times to analyse information in as much detail as is required, as well as bowing to suggested wordings to further the Government rhetoric.

This limits the ability for policymakers to make informed decisions if the intelligence collection or analysis has been incapable or ineffective. Thus, it is important for such information to be included within the official histories to demonstrate where problems have occurred and demonstrate to the public that the official histories do not merely depict British Intelligence as faultless. This serves to demonstrate the issues British Intelligence grapple with but, there is undoubtedly an over-arching depiction of their capability and effectiveness, something of a consistent portrayal to Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and Chapter 3 ‘A Complimentary Relationship’.

Structure and Purpose
Although the structure of British Intelligence is not a theme explicitly depicted within the official histories, it is implicit such as through discussions pertaining to the relationships between MI5, MI6 and the JIC.\textsuperscript{93}

As was evident in Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’, there is an over-riding depiction within the official histories of the organisational and structural difficulties facing the British Intelligence Services. Jeffrey and Andrew both demonstrate how such problems have been evident since the creation of MI6 and MI5 in 1909.\textsuperscript{94} Such difficulties continued during the First World War which saw tense relations between MI6 and the

\textsuperscript{91} BBC News, \emph{Iraq: The spies who fooled the world}, Available From: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21786506 (Accessed 30\textsuperscript{th} November 2017)

\textsuperscript{92} Aldrich, R, Cormac, R, and Goodman, M, \emph{Spying on the World}, p. 168

\textsuperscript{93} Andrew, C, \emph{Defence of the Realm}, p. 29, 31, 235, 253, 286, 332, 409, 430, 500, 510, 528, 619, 675, 684, 686, 708, 710, 790, 808, 824, 852, 858;
Jeffrey, K, \emph{MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service}, p. 70, 142, 144, 164, 487, 489, 491, 634, 689, 744;
Aldrich, R, Cormac, R, and Goodman, M, \emph{Spying on the World}, p. 61, 71, 74, 98-99, 352, 409

\textsuperscript{94} Jeffrey, K, \emph{MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service}, p. 13;
Andrew, C, \emph{Defence of the Realm}, p. 25
War Office,\textsuperscript{95} and MI5 and the Police due to their responsibilities overlapping.\textsuperscript{96} Although the Secret Service Committee distinguished between domestic and foreign intelligence practices,\textsuperscript{97} organisational difficulties remained during the Second World War as to which organisation was responsible for the XX agents. This implies that whilst the Secret Service Committee in practice was combatting such problems, its effectiveness was limited, if not, non-existent.

Created during the Second World War, SOE were also affected by organisational difficulties as there was disagreement within Whitehall about which department should oversee them.\textsuperscript{98} Although analysis would suggest that such difficulties demonstrate wider problems within British Government, Jeffrey has a rather different opinion. He argues that it is due to the services seeking to ensure their independence, as MI6 was reluctant to be integrated into the central intelligence machinery during the Second World War,\textsuperscript{99} that such problems existed. This was not a theme which had previously been considered, but is certainly crucial, particularly in terms of MI6 ensuring their existence after the end of the Second World War.

Aldrich, Cormac and Goodman highlight how the JIC have been similarly affected, particularly in a contemporary context. Under Gordon Brown’s Government, the JIC remit to ensure the day-to-day coordination of the Intelligence Community, and the Permanent Secretary Committee on the Intelligence Services were abolished, and their work amalgamated into the national intelligence machinery.\textsuperscript{100} Thus, British Intelligence continued to be affected by organisational structural difficulties and it is no surprise that as Jeffrey assesses, the individual intelligence services seek to ensure their independence (including their own culture and identity) if such vast changes are implemented. This provides a depiction of the difficult circumstances in which the British Services Intelligence are seeking to operate. However, perhaps more recent organisational and structural changes, such as those introduced by Brown, Cameron and May, are due to the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{95} Jeffrey, K, \textit{MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service}, p. 17
\textsuperscript{96} Andrew, C, \textit{Defence of the Realm}, p. 82
\textsuperscript{97} Jeffrey, K, \textit{MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service}, p. 214
\textsuperscript{98} Mackenzie, W, \textit{The Secret History of S.O.E}, p. 340
\textsuperscript{99} Jeffrey, K, \textit{MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service}, p. 348
\textsuperscript{100} Aldrich, R, Cormac, R, and Goodman, M, \textit{Spying on the World}, p. 410}
increasingly cooperative enterprise intelligence has become, which would arguably be aided by a strong organisational structure. However, without agreement on how to implement this, organisational and structural difficulties will continue to affect the British Intelligence Services.

It seems that each administration believes they can affect the organisation of the British Intelligence Services. As Prime Minister, Theresa May undertook sweeping changes to the entire civil service and the Intelligence Services were not exempt. She sought to instigate the Investigatory Powers Act and create the position of a Senior Security Adviser, believed to deliver a more efficient service due to the creation of a Security Profession within Government. By exhibiting the structural issues affecting British Intelligence, the official histories present a consistent portrayal with the websites of the Big 3 in terms of how the wider structure and organisational difficulties they face being out of their control. Implicitly, this enhances the positive portrayal of how the British Intelligence Services work in difficult circumstances.

**Acting in a legal and ethical manner**

Owing to the importance of the Intelligence Services ensuring democratic legitimacy via public support, perhaps the most significant depiction of the British Intelligence Services is that they are adhering to strict legal and ethical standards, which furthers the positive portrayal. This is necessary as the British Intelligence Services, as well as their counterparts around the world, increasingly rely on the public to provide information. It is estimated that 90 – 95% of classified intelligence reports are based on open source

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101 Omand, Sir, D, ‘The Cycle of Intelligence’, p. 68
102 One example of this is how the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills was amalgamated to include energy and climate change. For more information, please see: Gov.uk, *Department for Business, Innovation and Skills*, Available From: [https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-business-innovation-skills](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-business-innovation-skills) (Accessed 3rd January 2019)
105 Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners,’ p. 44
intelligence;\textsuperscript{107} – a category which the public fall into, demonstrating the importance of the public as a source of information.\textsuperscript{108} Geoffrey Treverton highlights how the American Intelligence Services are using the public to gather a pool of translators from sectors of society they would not otherwise have talked to.\textsuperscript{109} But, if the public are going to provide such information to the British Intelligence Services, or indeed work for an Intelligence Service, they must have faith that the intelligence will be used in a legal and ethical manner, hence the importance of this depiction. Following allegations of illegal and unethical behaviour by Peter Wright, Phillip Davies argued that:

\begin{quote}
Popular perceptions of MI5, amongst legislators as much as the electorate, have long been influenced by Peter Wright’s evocative image of how Security Service officers in the 1950s and 1960s ‘bugged and burgled our way across London at the state’s behest.’\textsuperscript{110}
\end{quote}

One impact of the illegal and unethical portrayal provided by Wright was the reduced recruitment into MI5.\textsuperscript{111} This is perhaps why it is something of a consistent portrayal throughout all the official histories analysed although they explore it in various ways. MI5 portrays how they adhere to legislation in both a historical and contemporary context;\textsuperscript{112} MI6 follows ministerial instruction;\textsuperscript{113} there is a charter governing the JIC’s actions\textsuperscript{114} and SOE consulted with Whitehall.\textsuperscript{115} Undoubtedly, this depicts a desire within British Intelligence to act legally and ethically, a consistent portrayal to that provided directly by the Big 3, as well as by the Government following the Snowden revelations in 2013.

\textsuperscript{107} Johnson, L. K, ‘Spies and scholars in the United States: winds of ambivalence in the groves of academe’, p. 5
\textsuperscript{108} Petersen, K. L, ‘Three concepts of intelligence communication: awareness, advice or co-production’, p. 320
\textsuperscript{109} Treverton, G, Intelligence for an age of Terror, (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009), p. 191
\textsuperscript{110} Davies, P, ‘Britain’s Machinery of Intelligence Accountability: Realistic oversight in the absence of moral panic’, in Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services, edited by Daniel Baldino, (Sydney, The Federation Press, 2010), p. 147
\textsuperscript{112} Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 36 – 37, 222, 382, 422, 677, 758, 761, 767
\textsuperscript{113} Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 599, 620, 677
\textsuperscript{114} Aldrich, R, Cormac, R, and Goodman, M, Spying on the World, p. 236 – 238
\textsuperscript{115} Mackenzie, W, The Secret History of S.O.E, p. 428
Jeffrey highlights how MI6 would not act in a foreign country without Whitehall approval; first evident in the lead up to the First World War when Cumming sought to place agents in Belgium. However this adherence may not always have been prevalent as documents uncovered at the National Archives disputes this due to the emphasis MI6 placed on covert activities during the Cold War. Like Cumming, Kell was similarly focused upon legal and ethical standards and instigated the practice from the First World War onwards, of MI5 having their own legal advisers. Undoubtedly, this demonstrates how both Cumming and Kell were forward thinking and determined for their services to act legally and ethically. This creates a positive portrayal that from their creation, MI5 and MI6 have always adhered to legal and ethical standards imposed by both the Government and themselves, demonstrating the importance they have continually placed on acting legally and ethically.

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) led to allegations of British involvement in the American practices of extraordinary rendition and torture, actions Andrew argues, MI5 were fiercely opposed to. The strength of feeling on this subject within MI5 was palpable when Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller spoke publicly about her time as MI5’s Director General (DG), where the condemnation MI5 had for such actions was evident in their strained relationship with MI6. Andrew’s analysis of the archival material has depicted MI5 as an organisation that will not undertake anything they perceive as illegal or unethical, evident in how they have continually refused to utilise torture as a form of interrogation, even during the Second World War when they were responsible for the questioning of captured German agents. This creates the over-

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116 Jeffrey, K, *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service*, p. 27, 57, 568, 676, 708
118 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 56
119 BBC News, *UK pays £2m over Libyan rendition claim*, Available From: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20718675 (Accessed 18th March 2015);
120 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 811, 825
121 Manningham-Buller, E, ‘Leadership Under Pressure,’ Lecture at Aberystwyth University, 7th November 2012;
122 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 252, 824, 825
arching positive portrayal of MI5 ensuring that they act in a legal and ethical manner, something of a consistent portrayal to what they highlight on their website, as well as the depiction provided by the Government in the Iraq and Snowden contexts. Therefore, the public are receiving similar overarching depictions no matter the avenue of information.

Jeffrey explores how MI6 have continually sought ministerial instruction and adhered to legislation, demonstrating their desire to ensure they act legally and ethically. By exploring how MI6 abide by legislation, there is the implicit suggestion that if any of their actions are deemed illegal or unethical, it is due to the limitation of legislation, as opposed to MI6 unilaterally acting illegally or unethically. Although Jeffrey does not explore this theme due to the timeframe of his book, a clear example of this has been uncovered at the National Archives. Documents suggest that MI6 were involved in covert activities in the Middle East, even after the Suez crisis, when ministerial approval was given. Therefore, MI6 were arguably adhering to the legal and ethical standards placed on them by Ministers. Highlighting this theme results in a consistent portrayal with Chapter 2 ‘A Complimentary Relationship’ which analysed how the limitation of legislation was a key theme after the Snowden revelations. This allows for the depiction that the British Intelligence Services do seek to act legally and ethically.

Indeed, the limitations of legislation are also exhibited in Andrew’s analysis. He highlights how MI5 seek to adhere to legislation, problems arise when this legislation is inadequate, something Peter Gill is vocal about. In Andrew’s analysis, the limitations of legislation are apparent in relation to Home Office warrants governing the interception of communication as ‘the precise origin of the power to conduct telephone intercepts was a little hazy.’ Therefore, whilst MI5 believed they were acting ethically and legally, there was a clear limitation to the legislation. Indeed, this is further evident in relation to

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123 Jeffrey, K, *MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service*, p. 49, 144, 150, 568, 599, 620, 677
124 BBC Radio 4, *Document – MI6’s Secret Slush Fund*, Available From: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b09fyv1qm](http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b09fyv1qm) (Accessed 5th December 2017);
125 Gill, P, *Policing Politics*, p. 3
126 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 320 – 321
one of the more sensationalist claims by the former MI5 officer Peter Wright in his autobiography *Spycatcher*. He claims that MI5:

* Bugged and burgled their way across London at the state’s behest, while pompous bowler-hatted civil servants in Whitehall pretended to look the other way.*

Andrew does not shy away from exploring the ramifications of Wright’s allegations, and argues that the concept of bugging and burgling across the capital was broadly true as although intercepting communications was legislated for, entering property to install interception devices was not. Again, although this demonstrates MI5 acting in an unethical manner, it is due to the limitation of the legislation, as opposed to staff wanting to undertake actions they knew to be unethical, and furthers the consistent portrayal. This demonstrates the validity of Ian Leigh’s assertion that much of the legislation governing the British Intelligence Services emerged due to a lack of a legal basis for their actions.

This further intimates issues occurring due to the limitations of legislation.

Chapman Pincher also explores Wright’s assertions where he intimates any desire to act unethically may in fact have emanated from Wright himself, as opposed to an MI5 wide desire. In the book Pincher wrote with Wright’s assistance, the subtle inference is that if wrongdoing occurred, it was due to an individual, as opposed to the entirety of MI5 seeking to act illegally and unethically. There seemed to be lessons learnt from this due to Sir Anthony Duff’s push for MI5 to be placed on a statutory footing, as well as

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128 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 336
133 Pincher, C, *The Truth About Dirty Tricks*, p. 201, 328

Pincher claims here that the new Official Secrets Act, combined with the changes and new legislative footing were part of Wright’s legacy. This is arguably one of the few times Pincher is supportive of Wright as his writing is broadly scathing of Wright, in particular for fabricating themes such as the Wilson plot.
the creation of a staff counsellor for individuals to go to with any concerns about wrongdoing, furthering the depiction that the actions Wright alludes to occurred ostensibly because of the limitation of existing legislation. Indeed, Leigh concurs with this, as he highlights that it was due to the limitation of the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive which was governing the actions of MI5 which meant they would have been found in breach of the European Union Convention on Human Rights, and thus acting illegally, something which the Security Services Act rectified. Leigh’s analysis intimates that it was this, as opposed to the Wright allegations that was the catalyst for MI5 being placed on a statutory footing. The creation of legislation following a landmark moment is a consistent portrayal to that seen in ‘A Complementary Relationship’ following the Snowden revelations.

Although Andrew focuses upon MI5, when applicable, there are references to other British Intelligence organisations, and particularly MI6. But despite this, there is no reference to MI6’s covert activities in the Middle East during the Cold War, and the only references to the Suez crisis are fleeting suggestions at how this embarrassed Britain. This is somewhat surprising due to MI5’s involvement in the Middle East as Chikara Hashimoto examines. By closely analysing archival material, he highlights how MI5 were operating in Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, both in aiding the establishment of

This is combined with an increased emphasis on undertaking background checks on individuals who will work within British Intelligence, a ramification of the Cambridge Five. This included documentary films, some of them records of actual operations taken clandestinely, others made for the purpose, which were used to demonstrate how MI5 officers can be suborned by the KGB. In conjunction, the control of documents was tightened with the use of electronic and other technological advancements in an attempt to prevent unauthorised removal or copying of them.
For more information on this theme, please see:
Pincher, C, Their Trade Is Treachery, p. 172
134 This is a theme which was also discussed by Peter Gill in how it was being in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights which started the process of British Intelligence being legislated for and an oversight process. For more information, please see:
Gill, P, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the Challenge of Security Networks’, p. 929–930
136 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 203
137 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 445, 473
intelligence services but also in the collection of information.\(^{138}\) This theme demonstrates that there are certainly limitations to the official histories as it would be impossible for them to cover every minute detail, but also the necessity of MI6 further engaging with the public to provide a more cohesive understanding of their actions. With secrecy the explanation as to why the official history only covers the first 40 years of the service,\(^{139}\) it is staggering if this is the case, particularly as the ‘Our History’ section of the website does explore more contemporary events such as uncovering the AQ Khan network.\(^{140}\) This is undoubtedly a case where there is too much secrecy and it is preventing further awareness of MI6.

**Illegal and Unethical Activity**

The official histories provide the over-arching positive portrayal of how the British Intelligence Services seek to act legally and ethically. But, there are specific examples which demonstrate how at times, this has not been the case.

Both MI5 and MI6 had preconceived notions of who they could and could not employ. In the post-war period, MI5 ‘refused to recruit Jews on the grounds that their dual loyalty to both Britain and Israel might create an unacceptable conflict of interest’.\(^{141}\) Andrew’s analysis highlights how this was an inexcusable policy but despite this, it was not until 1974 that MI5 lifted this ban, yet some prejudices still existed within the organisation towards very orthodox Jews or those who had a distinct Jewish appearance.\(^{142}\) Andrew’s analysis of this theme demonstrates how the official history seeks to provide an accurate account of British Intelligence, and thus includes aspects of wrongdoing when this occurs. This also stands in stark contrast to the depiction in Chapter 2 ‘A Direct

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\(^{139}\) Jeffrey, K, *MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service*, p. vi


\(^{141}\) Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 363

\(^{142}\) Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 363
Relationship’ of the British Intelligence Services always having an inclusive and diverse workforce.

Due to the time frame of the MI6 official history, it is impossible to ascertain whether this prejudice towards Jews was evident across British Intelligence or service specific. However, it does explore preconceptions of those capable of undertaking intelligence work. During the Second World War, there was the extraordinary preconception that those from the Outer Hebrides or Faroe Islands were only capable of undertaking stay-behind communications. Unlike Andrew’s analysis, there is no discussion as to why this preconception was evident or critique of MI6 for this policy. This theme further manifests itself in the SOE history which suggests that there was an emphasis on recruiting males as opposed to females. Although a subsequent section will further assess the role of women, this demonstrates how British Intelligence as an entity, seems to have acted unethically due to the preconceived notions of those who could be employed. In the case of SOE, this was the only theme highlighted by Mackenzie demonstrating that they acted in an unethical manner, suggesting that the service predominantly acted ethically, a theme also suggested by the JIC official history as no evidence was ascertained to suggest they had acted unethically.

In both the MI5 and MI6 official histories, unethical actions are further depicted due to the actions of Rear Admiral Hugh Sinclair. After Cumming’s death in 1923, Rear Admiral Hugh Sinclair was appointed C of MI6, a position he held until his own death in 1939. As C, Andrew states that Sinclair went above and beyond what was expected to try and influence Government policy, particularly in relation to the Sudetenland to continue the British policy of appeasement. Jeffrey provides some contextualisation to this assertion, stating that unusually, MI6 had been asked to provide policy advice to Whitehall, leading to the production of a paper entitled ‘What Should We Do’ in which MI6 provided a number of proposals. However, Andrew fails to acknowledge this,
merely stating that the policy paper suggested a view which was prevalent throughout MI6 and varied dramatically to MI5’s own assessment which Kell provided to the Foreign Secretary.148

Whilst this suggests that MI6 perhaps acted in an unethical manner by providing policy recommendations, something the newly created JIC should have taken responsibility for, this was as Jeffrey demonstrates, information they were asked to produce. Sinclair’s role merely seems to have been in providing the information to policymakers which they asked for, a theme overlooked by Andrew, exhibiting how the services can have divergent views on the same event. But MI5’s belief that Sinclair was acting unethically is perhaps well-founded as in the early 1930s, Sinclair was running agents within the UK, something which MI5 was responsible for and understandably, caused tensions between the two services.149 This demonstrates how crucial the role of personalities can be in the activities of British Intelligence. This is further evident in the case of MI6 acting unethically as Major Ernest Dalton, the MI6 head of the Dutch station in the 1930s, was embezzling money after finding himself in financial difficulties.150 Although this example does not affect the entirety of MI6 or British Intelligence, it does question how Dalton was able to undertake such activities unbeknown to MI6. It also demonstrates the detrimental impact one individual can have on how the service, something particularly evident in the case of Kim Philby151 is perceived both by other Intelligence Services and the wider public.

Whilst the official histories do acknowledge that the British Intelligence Services acted illegally and unethically; it is due to wider issues, namely the limitations of legislation, a theme Chapter 3 ‘A Complimentary Relationship’ also portrays; or the actions of individuals as opposed to the British Intelligence Services as an entity seeking to act

148 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 203 – 204
149 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 737
150 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 277
151 Philby was a member of the Cambridge 5, and worked for MI6 as their liaison officer to America, spending a vast amount of time stationed in Washington D.C. Following his defection, it confirmed to Washington their long-standing suspicion that British Intelligence had allowed the KGB access to some of the most sensitive information the American Intelligence Services had. However, it was the actions of Philby which provided this information to the KGB, not a desire from the heads of MI5 and MI6 to pass on all the information to the KGB, thus highlighting the role of the individual. For more information, please see: Pincher, C, Too Secret Too Long, p. 301
illegally or unethically. This furthers the overall depiction throughout the official histories of a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. However, it will be interesting to ascertain whether this remains the case when archival material relating to GWOT is released, due to the allegations surrounding not only the Government politicisation of intelligence, but also the actions of the British Intelligence Services relating to interrogation and torture of terrorist suspects. Andrew does explore this to an extent but is limited owing to the availability of sources. Perhaps it is only when the services are marking their 200th or even 250th anniversaries that this will be fully answered.

Human Dimension
This section analyses what is arguably one of the more over-looked aspects of intelligence, namely the importance of individuals, a theme the official histories all explore. The section highlights the emphasis placed upon agent welfare and vulnerability, the importance of training, how recruitment has evolved, the role of women and finally the role of personalities.

MI5, MI6 and SOE all stress the importance of agent welfare,152 demonstrating the emphasis the British Intelligence Services place on it, evident in the numerous page numbers in the reference exhibiting just how often this theme is depicted within the official histories. By alluding to these themes, there is a consistent portrayal (within the official histories and compared with the Big 3 websites) of how the British Intelligence Services are genuinely ensuring the welfare of their staff, as opposed to it being for self-serving purposes of maintaining intelligence collection. Jeffrey further explores this theme by assessing how MI6 would scrutinise the private lives of its agents to ensure that there was nothing which would adversely affect their work.153 Perhaps this emphasis on agent welfare should be unsurprising due to the vital importance of agents, particularly for SOE and MI6, in the collection of intelligence.154 Indeed, such a policy of scrutinising the private lives of employees continues in a contemporary context for all those within

152 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 56, 244, 422, 543, 786; Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. xii, xiv, 20, 29, 62, 63, 177, 624, 649, 652;
153 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 275
154 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 569 – 570
British Intelligence, either via a Security Clearance or Developed Vetting. Both of these are described as an inherently personal and intrusive process.

This depicts British Intelligence as an organisation concerned with ensuring the welfare of its agents, evident in the emphasis placed on protecting the identity of agents, something Andrew and Jeffrey both highlight. This creates a consistent portrayal as the MI5, MI6, and GCHQ websites all state the importance of staff welfare and support, thus enhancing the overall positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services.

The official histories depict the vulnerability of agents and analysts, something which can occur in a variety of ways, such as being captured in possession of sensitive information, or not fully analysing collected intelligence. Both of these have a significant impact on the capability and effectiveness of British Intelligence. In 1939, MI6 agents were captured at Venlo on the Dutch-German frontier after being enticed there to attend a meeting with whom they thought were German Army opposition to Hitler. Jeffrey explores both the events leading up to the capture as well as the ramifications, and criticises the captured British agents as:

Their tradecraft that day was deplorable. Stevens was carrying some coding material, and Best had a list of agents’ names and addresses with him.

Jeffrey’s analysis suggests that their vulnerability emanated from their lack of training, resulting in ineffective tradecraft. Therefore, they were captured with information in their possession which would undoubtedly affect wider intelligence work. Indeed, the

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156 Aiken, A, ‘Inside UK Government Communications’, Lecture at Aberystwyth University, 24th March 2017

157 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. xii

158 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 589

159 Mackenzie, W, The Secret History of S.O.E, p. 536 - 537

160 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 182

161 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 332

162 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 382 - 386
seriousness of the Venlo Debacle is clear as even though MI5 were not involved, Andrew explores how it adversely affected MI6.\textsuperscript{163} This is triangulated with Jeffrey’s analysis which highlights how concerned Menzies was that the Venlo Debacle would mean the end of MI6.\textsuperscript{164} Perhaps Menzies concerns also emanated from the detailed knowledge the German officers had of the British Intelligence Services and key individuals according to the captured MI6 officers on their return to the UK.\textsuperscript{165}

This was not the only example of agent vulnerability explored by Jeffrey, who highlights how MI6 Burmese agents were captured after boasting of their successes to the Japanese military.\textsuperscript{166} Although there is the potential of mitigating such risks had MI6 provided effective training to its agents, the case of SOE explores that this does not wholly prevent the agents from being vulnerable as SOE officers struggled to undertake sabotage operations abroad.\textsuperscript{167}

These cases highlight that the British Intelligence Services can be ineffective and incapable due to an individual’s actions, a theme which was also prevalent following the Snowden revelations. One of the major criticisms levied at Snowden and explored in Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’ and Chapter 5 ‘A Complicated Relationship’ is the damage to ongoing operations, which included British spies having to be moved.\textsuperscript{168} However, the fact that one individual can act in such a manner does raise questions about internal staffing mechanisms if staff are able to act in such an ineffective manner.

Vulnerabilities also exist for intelligence analysts, a theme highlighted in the structure and purpose section. An analyst’s ability to make an informed decision is inherently based on the intelligence collected. Thus, if this has been affected in any way, there is a direct impact upon the intelligence analysis provided to policymakers. The intelligence cycle, discussed in Chapter 2, demonstrates this theme, as an error at any one stage can

\textsuperscript{163} Andrew, C, \textit{Defence of the Realm}, p. 244
\textsuperscript{164} Jeffrey, K, \textit{MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service}, p. 341
\textsuperscript{165} Pincher, C, \textit{Their Trade Is Treachery}, p. 136
\textsuperscript{166} Jeffrey, K, \textit{MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service}, p. 589
\textsuperscript{167} Mackenzie, W, \textit{The Secret History of S.O.E}, p. 534 – 537
\textsuperscript{168} BBC News, \textit{British spies ‘moved after Snowden files read’}, 14th June 2015, Available From: \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33125068} (Accessed 15th June 2015);
Hansard, Westminster Hall, 22nd October 2013, Volume 569, Column 67WH – 76WH
have knock-on implications to the wider intelligence analysis and advice provided to policymakers. Rather surprisingly however, this is not explored in the official histories, despite there being clear examples of this, such as the over-reliance on the intelligence provided agent Curveball in the lead up to the Iraq War, a theme Chapter 5 ‘A Complicated Relationship’ will further explore. The only reference to this within the JIC history, is that they were not the only organisation to get their assessment wrong, so did intelligence communities in Australia, Denmark, France, Germany and Israel. However, its inclusion would demonstrate that the official histories are seeking to explore all facets of British Intelligence.

Training

During the Second World War, SOE trained all their agents for the work they would undertake in hostile countries. This resulted in SOE establishing training programmes, a system which became institutionalised in 1942 although there is no evidence of MI5 or MI6 providing such training. In MI6, any training was ad-hoc, as Jeffrey highlights how Graham Greene’s training before going to South Africa was somewhat tailormade. But this does demonstrate a degree of training being provided to its agents, which is in stark contrast to MI5. Andrew states that it was not until 1976 when a four-week training programme was introduced, a theme also highlighted by Chapman Pincher in his discussions about the DG Sir Roger Hollis, stating that when he joined MI5, there was no professional training, with Hollis learning on the job. This demonstrates how MI5, MI6 and SOE all had a degree of autonomy as they dictated their own training methods. But, considering the wartime context, it is somewhat strange that there was no centralised decision relating to the necessity of training. As the official histories fail to fully examine this theme, it is impossible to assess why there was such unilateral decision-making about the training provided.

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172 Mackenzie, W, The Secret History of S.O.E, p. 52, 403
173 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 479
174 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 549
175 Pincher, C, Too Secret Too Long, p. 45
Unlike MI5 and MI6, SOE realised the importance of staff training, and what this should include, something which MI5 and MI6 could have benefitted from. Although containing no illustrations which would arguably have improved its usefulness, SOE produced a handbook for the guidance of the use of explosives and handy tips about guerrilla warfare, further demonstrating the effectiveness with which SOE sought to train all its agents. Rather interestingly, the JIC history does not provide any information about intelligence analysis training. Although this could be due to archival availability, it certainly creates the impression that this was not something the JIC believed to be required. However, if such training were in existence, perhaps it would have aided the quality of intelligence, a theme the Butler Inquiry highlighted. As Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ examined, GCHQ highlights the staff training they provide, particularly in relation to ensuring actions adhere to legal and ethical standards. This suggests that there has been a learning curve within the British Intelligence Services in the provision of staff training.

Role of women
Although the MI5 and MI6 official histories directly address the role of women in intelligence, Mackenzie’s SOE history does this in a rather inadvertent manner. All references related to recruitment discuss male agents; there is no discussion pertaining to the role of women at all. This is despite the role of women in SOE being increasingly in the public domain, evident in the Herefordshire museum dedicated to the SOE agent Violette Szabo. Thus there is a significant limitation to Mackenzie’s analysis by omitting a crucial element. Indeed, this theme is lacking from exploration within the JIC history. MI6 predominantly discusses women in a wartime context, as an example from a medal citation demonstrates. Although the woman remains unnamed, it is stated that she was:

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177 Private Interview 20: 12th September 2017
Engaged on the clerical side of intelligence work in a Balkan country on the outbreak of war. This secretary began to take on direct intelligence work.... In an atmosphere of accumulated strain as the Nazi’s strengthened their hold on the country, she performed most of the tasks of an intelligence officer, including the delicate work of contacting agents, which bore no slight risk in that Balkan war atmosphere.¹⁸¹

This is a clear example of not only how capable women are of intelligence work, but their importance during the Second World War. Perhaps this explains the decision taken in the aftermath of World War Two that within MI6, women would be recruited on the same grounds as their male counterparts, which would mean they could be sent to work in foreign stations.¹⁸² This is a consistent portrayal to that provided by the MI6 website about the involvement of women during the First World War.¹⁸³ In this respect, MI6 were ahead of the time, as even into the 1970s, women in MI5 had to fight for equal working conditions,¹⁸⁴ and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were unhappy about MI6’s use of women that they refused a cover identity for a female going to work in the Middle East.¹⁸⁵ Jeffrey’s analysis not only depicts how forward thinking MI6 was, but also how unusual it was for women to be seen as equals within British Government. Despite this, MI5 were the first to appoint a female DG,¹⁸⁶ with MI6 and GCHQ still yet to appointed a female head. Although it is plausible that there are women in senior positions, as it is only the head who is publicly named, this remains unknown.

Andrew explores how MI5 recruited women directly from universities during the First World War,¹⁸⁷ although there is no discussion about the work these women undertook. It

¹⁸¹ Jeffrey, K, *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service*, p. 420
¹⁸⁴ Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 550
¹⁸⁷ Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 60
is not until the latter stages of the Cold War when MI5’s female staff discussed creating a petition relating to career discriminations that Andrew analyses the role of women.\textsuperscript{188} Whilst it is clear that women did work for the service in the intervening 60 years, their role is not examined, even in relation to the Second World War, which is when they were seen as central to MI6 as this section has highlighted.

The British Intelligence Services seem to have all had divergent views on the role of women, although it is clear that MI6 were the most forward-thinking in their realisation that recruitment should be equal for both men and women. Perhaps this is due to the role of personalities within the MI6 management who saw the benefits of this. This links to the portrayal that the British Intelligence Services provide of themselves of the inclusive and diverse nature of the workforce, thus furthering the positive portrayal whilst further intimating how they remain their own independent organisations.

*Role of Personalities*

In particular, the MI5 and MI6 official histories explore the impact of personalities and they impact they can have. At a time when MI5 were under public scrutiny due to the court case surrounding the publication of Peter Wright’s memoir *Spycatcher*, Sir Anthony Duff had a large influence on MI5 staff morale and the future direction of the service\textsuperscript{189} as he sought to introduce numerous reforms and place the service on a statutory footing.\textsuperscript{190} Duff’s influential role is something which his successor Dame Stella Rimington acknowledges in her autobiography.\textsuperscript{191}

In the case of MI6, it was the first three C’s who were influential in the future direction of the service.\textsuperscript{192} Cumming was central in articulating the purpose of the organisation, whilst his successors Rear Admiral Hugh Sinclair and Stewart Menzies ensured their funding and good relations with Whitehall respectively.\textsuperscript{193} Future C’s seem to have been equally influential, and in particular Sir Dick White who was the only MI6 officer who

\textsuperscript{188} Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 550
\textsuperscript{189} Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 560
\textsuperscript{190} Pincher, C, *Their Trade Is Treachery*, p. 172; Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 560
\textsuperscript{191} Rimington, S, Dame, *Open Secret*, p. 194–195
\textsuperscript{192} Jeffrey, K, *MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service*, p. 725
\textsuperscript{193} Jeffrey, K, *MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service*, p. 150, 247, 350
did not view the MI5 suspicion of Kim Philby, perhaps the most famous member of the Cambridge Five being a Soviet mole as unjustified, perhaps because he moved to MI6 from MI5.\textsuperscript{194} The MI6 Official History does not analyse this theme due to the book’s time frame, but it does explore how the role of personalities was not just evident in MI5 and MI6, but further afield by exploring the role of William Donovan, the wartime chief of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS).\textsuperscript{195} OSS was the wartime espionage organisation central to American wartime operations. Donovan was described as a fearless leader, willing to give anything a try.\textsuperscript{196} Their counterpart, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also witnessed the role of personalities on the service. Between 1973 and 1976, the Director Clarence Kelly favoured an open management policy, something his predecessor overturned,\textsuperscript{197} highlighting how influential the role of an individual can be on the culture and openness of the service. Thus, the impact of personalities is not purely synonymous with British Intelligence but indeed intelligence around the world.

In contrast to analysing the heads of the Intelligence Services, Mackenzie examines the role of individual personalities in daily intelligence activities.\textsuperscript{198} Indeed, Andrew and Jeffrey do explore this theme, although in relation to specific individuals, such as Kim Philby and Peter Wright. In the case of Philby, he manipulated events for his own benefit, evident following Igor Gouzenko’s defection to the West. Philby prevented Jane Archer, the foremost Soviet expert British Intelligence had, from interrogating Gouzenko,\textsuperscript{199} due to Philby’s fear that he would be revealed as a double agent. Although Archer’s move from MI5 to MI6 demonstrates the organisational issues still affecting British Intelligence, it allowed for Philby to make such a decision, one which arguably allowed

\textsuperscript{194} Pincher, C, \textit{Their Trade Is Treachery}, p. 158; Pincher, C, \textit{Too Secret Too Long}, p. 224
\textsuperscript{195} Jeffrey, K, \textit{MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service}, p. 441
\textsuperscript{197} Gill, P, \textit{Policing Politics}, p. 53
\textsuperscript{198} Mackenzie, W, \textit{The Secret History of S.O.E.}, p. xvii, 165, 173, 180, 182, 373, 403, 509
\textsuperscript{199} Andrew, C, \textit{Defence of the Realm}, p. 341; As GCHQ came under control of MI6 at this time, Philby was also able to prevent GCHQ from looking at communications about the Soviet penetration due to his fears of being identified. For more information, please see: Pincher, C, \textit{Too Secret Too Long}, p. 298
him, and the other Soviet moles to continue undetected. In the case of Wright, Andrew explores how he was obsessed with uncovering the identity of the fifth member of the Cambridge spy ring, and thus became the service’s lead conspiracy theorist. But Andrew takes his analysis further, stating that Wright’s ‘conspiracy theories arguably did as much damage to the Service as Blunt’s treachery.’ Although there is no supporting evidence for such an assertion, it undoubtedly exhibits the role personalities can have upon the British Intelligence Services.

Sparse reference has been made within this section to the JIC history as the human dimension of intelligence is not a theme overtly depicted. Although the JIC are not concerned about running intelligence agents in the same way as MI6 and SOE, intelligence analysis is central to their work and there was ostensibly a human dimension to this. Fleeting reference is made to the importance of the assessment staff, which does to an extent, highlight the importance of human analysis. But what about their working conditions, did the JIC place the same emphasis on ensuring their welfare as the British Intelligence Services? This omission is perhaps unsurprising as the re-producing of declassified documents does not lend itself to a discussion on these themes. But the human dimension and the importance of individuals remains an over-arching depiction within the official histories, demonstrating how important the theme is.

Secrecy
Due to the nature of the British Intelligence Services, all the official histories explore how important it is to ensure nothing is released which could affect their ongoing work, something particularly prevalent within the foreword written by Sir Jonathan Evans in the MI5 history. He states that information was only omitted if:

> It’s disclosure would damage national security or, in a small number of cases, if its publication would be inappropriate for wider public interest reasons.

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200 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 510
201 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 439
203 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. xvi
As Andrew’s analysis spans the whole of MI5’s existence, this theme predominantly affects discussions pertaining to the 21st Century. It is understandable that MI5 would want to ensure operational security, something the British Government and Intelligence Services have been critical of Snowden for damaging, with one interviewee saying that overnight, some people lost 10 years’ worth of work. But it is in the SOE official history where the phrase ‘passage deleted on the grounds of national security’ is repeated numerous times. Considering that Mackenzie’s history was originally designed for in-house consumption and SOE was disbanded following the end of the Second World War, it seems bizarre that such vast amounts of information were omitted on the grounds of national security. This is in contrast to Mackenzie’s introduction where he states that ‘the work as it now stands has not been subject to any official censorship on the grounds of security or of policy’. Perhaps this introduction was not updated when the book was published in 2000 and his assertion was based on the in-house history.

Despite MI6’s history only pertaining to the first 40 years of the service, there remains a degree of secrecy surrounding the identity of those who worked for MI6, a theme depicted throughout its history, suggesting the emphasis MI6 have placed on ensuring the safety and security of its staff. Although there is no evidence to suggest that such secrecy is merely due to the desire for information to remain obscured from public view, the impact of secrecy upon the portrayals evident in the official histories could be further explored. In turn, this would provide readers with a greater comprehension of not only how the official histories were written, but also one of the central issues affecting the British Intelligence Services. As interviewees discussed, assessing how much information to place in the public domain is difficult, but shying away from such decisions only seeks to further the depiction that the British Intelligence Services are hiding behind secrecy.

204 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. xvi
208 Jeffrey, K, *MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service*, p. xii
209 Private Interview 4: 21st January 2016
Close readings of all of the official histories provide the depiction that the British Intelligence Services seeks to ensure the safety and welfare of its employees, something which requires a degree of secrecy. But this must be measured against the necessity of engaging with the public, something particularly important if the Intelligence Services are to maintain their democratic legitimacy. Perhaps if a policy of greater openness was pursued by the British Intelligence Services, this would allay public concern about information being shrouded in secrecy as it would be clear that only information that was central to ensuring national security was not in the public domain. There is surely a happy medium between openness and secrecy which can be achieved as the American context intimates.

All of the official histories are based upon archival material, but it is Mackenzie who assesses the limitation of sources in detail, thus providing the reader with a greater comprehension of the difficulties encountered when researching and writing the book. It would be interesting, although difficult, to explore whether the original version, created for internal consumption also discussed the limitation of sources. Undoubtedly, Andrew and Jeffrey had similar problems, and highlight this in the introductions, whereas Mackenzie highlights this throughout, aiding the analysis. Jeffrey does acknowledge in his analysis that the concept of keeping records for historical purposes was not central to the fledgling MI6. This is not a critique of MI6, but rather demonstrates the emphasis upon secrecy which governed the fledgling organisation which has impacted upon the sources available for the official history and examines where the limitations of these official histories are. Aldrich, Cormac and Goodman explore similar themes in their conclusion, examining how our understanding of the JIC is shaped by which archives are available. This gives the public a distorted view of the JIC, as it does not explore the role of the Joint Intelligence Organisation and Current Groups who are in fact, integral to the JIC analytical capabilities.

210 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. xv; Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. vii
212 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909 – 1949, p. x
"Back-channel communications"

Andrew and Mackenzie both explore how the British Intelligence Services have utilised back channel communications to instigate diplomatic relations without public scrutiny of the on-going discussions. Mackenzie explores how SOE agents created back-channel communications with resistance groups, whilst in a contemporary context, it proved effective during the troubles in Northern Ireland where British Intelligence established communications with the IRA. Andrew’s analysis examines how MI6 also played a vital role in the establishment of this communication method with the IRA. However, as the MI6 official history only pertains to the first 40 years of the service, this is not referred to in Jeffrey’s analysis. This suggests that when required, different branches of British Intelligence can cooperate effectively, despite the organisational and structural difficulties they face. Indeed, this is a consistent portrayal as the role of the British Intelligence Services was referred to by Blair when he told the House of Commons that the Government was in contact with Iraqi opposition groups. This furthers the overall positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services by highlighting their capability and effectiveness.

Although Andrew does not explore it, it is highly possible that the back-channel communications were not just due to the cooperation of MI5 and MI6, but also military intelligence units. The British military had a significant involvement in Northern Ireland during the troubles, known as Operation Banner and saw 27,000 military personnel stationed in Northern Ireland at the height of the troubles in 1972. Although the activities of the Provisional IRA in mainland Britain are explored, there is no discussion as to the activities of MI5, wider British Intelligence or military intelligence units undertaken in Northern Ireland. One example would be the Four Square Laundry

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217 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 625
218 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 625
221 Andrew, C, *Defence of the Realm*, p. 651 - 653
which saw Army Intelligence testing clothes for explosive residue before washing them.\textsuperscript{222}

The official histories demonstrate that there is a degree of secrecy which shrouds British Intelligence, as the introductions to the MI5 and MI6 histories highlight the archival limitations of sources.\textsuperscript{223} Although the analysis would be strengthened if there was discussion pertaining to the reasoning behind such secrecy in the official histories, they imply that this secrecy is due to the importance of protecting both the individuals and the methods used by the British Intelligence Services. Whilst it is not disputed that these are themes which require a degree of secrecy, it is whether there is too much secrecy, such as passages of the SOE history still being redacted, which is where problems emanate.

### Conclusion
Analysis of the official histories highlighted how they explore a multitude of themes, which this section has sought to examine. Beginning by highlighting how capable and effective British Intelligence can be, a consistent portrayal to the depictions provided by the Big 3 and the Government was evident. By addressing structure and purpose, there is a clear view that the British Intelligence Services continues to struggle with organisational difficulties which can affect what intelligence is gathered and how it is analysed, something of a consistent portrayal with Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’. Although specific examples of illegal and unethical activity were highlighted in the MI5 and MI6 official histories, there remained the over-arching portrayal that British Intelligence adheres to legal and ethical standards. When illegality occurs, it seems to be due to the actions of an individual as the human dimension explored. This demonstrates just how crucial individuals are to the intelligence process, something which the subsequent section about the wider academic literature fails to fully explore. Finally, the depiction of secrecy was assessed, something which affected all the official histories although this theme more than the others, demonstrated different approaches to writing an official history.

The official histories provide a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services as organisations which adhere to legal and ethical standards, whilst maintaining their capability and effectiveness to ensure Britain’s safety and security, and provide staff welfare and support. Although there are examples where humans act inappropriately such as Sinclair trying to influence decision-making, these do not take away from the positive depictions. If such errors were not there, it would provide an inaccurate depiction of the British Intelligence Services by negating the human side of intelligence. This section highlighted the consistent portrayals between the official histories and Chapter 2 ‘The direct relationship’, thus demonstrating that respected academics with substantial access to archival material, have come to the same conclusions of the British Intelligence Services resulting in a positive portrayal.

**Wider Intelligence Literature**

**Former Practitioners**

By focusing on Michael Herman and Sir David Omand, this section will explore the depictions of the British Intelligence Services by former practitioners. Herman was a trailblazer when after his retirement, he turned to academia, although this required Cabinet Office approval and all written work needed to be approved before publication. Indeed, in the preface to *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, these are acknowledged as ‘security limitations’. But despite these obstacles, Herman succeeded in his desire to ‘promote greater public understanding of intelligence’, by bringing intelligence and academia closer together. This demonstrates the difficulties encountered by former practitioners when moving to academia, although one interviewee suggested that these obstacles have somewhat diminished.

Herman explores intelligence as a system and a set of processes as well as assessing its purposes, thus providing a more conceptual understanding of the intelligence process.

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224 Phythian, M, ‘Profiles in intelligence: an interview with Michael Herman’, p. 2
226 Scott, L, and Jackson, P, ‘Journeys in Shadows’, p. 10
227 Phythian, M, ‘Profiles in intelligence: an interview with Michael Herman’), p. 1
228 Private Interview 20; 12th September 2017
229 Herman, Sir, M, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, p. 3
and resulting in it being described as a ‘key reference for all those seeking to study the nature, roles, and impact of intelligence as a state function’.230 Although reference is made to British Intelligence, this is to substantiate a theme he is analysing such as how to organise and structure intelligence.231 Thus, although a view of British Intelligence is evident, this is somewhat fleeting and arguably, not the intended purpose of the book. Herman’s historical context allows the reader to realise how organisational problems have always existed as he explored the difficulties British Intelligence had in the inter-war years.232 This is a consistent portrayal to that explored in the MI5 and MI6 official histories, demonstrating how the same depictions of the British Intelligence Services are evident within different academic literatures.

In an interview with Professor Mark Phythian, Herman acknowledges the limitations of the book, stating that with hindsight, one major omission was any debate about the accountability and oversight of the British Intelligence Services. But he explains why this was a conscious decision, namely seeking to ensure Cabinet Office approval for its publication.233 This demonstrates the difficulties former practitioners have encountered and perhaps explains why there is a limited depiction of British Intelligence throughout his writing. Indeed, this is something which American academics have also struggled with, despite having a publication review board.234 But by such an entity existing, it suggests that it is more commonplace for practitioners to turn to academia, and thus structures have been instigated to aid this process, intimating higher levels of openness than are evident in the UK.

Sir David Omand joined King’s College London235 after his retirement and has written extensively about British Intelligence. He depicts them as inherently ethical and capable, evident due to the importance of ensuring public and legislative support for the continued

230 Phythian, M, ‘Profiles in intelligence: an interview with Michael Herman’, p. 1
231 Herman, Sir, M, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, p. 30–31
232 Herman, Sir, M, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, p. 20
233 Phythian, M, ‘Profiles in intelligence: an interview with Michael Herman’, p. 3
collection of secret intelligence.\textsuperscript{236} If they were not adhering to high ethical standards, then ensuring this public and legislative support would not be paramount to their actions. Indeed, this portrayal of British Intelligence is further evident through Omand’s critique of popular culture depictions of intelligence. He argues that the BBC Drama \textit{Spooks} provides an incorrect view of MI5 as they are shown to be amoral spin merchants with no qualms about beating up suspects in the basement of Thames House.\textsuperscript{237} Whilst this critique is directed at the depiction of intelligence in popular culture, a theme explored in Chapter 6 ‘A Fractious Relationship’, Omand’s criticism creates the implicit portrayal that the British Intelligence Services act legally and ethically if the \textit{Spooks} depiction is so flawed. Indeed, this is a continual depiction throughout Omand’s work. In the \textit{Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies}, Omand explores the importance of the Intelligence Services having authorisation for their actions from the policymakers,\textsuperscript{238} revealing the importance of adherence to legislation. This is not only a consistent portrayal to the official histories, but also with Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and Chapter 3 ‘A Complimentary Relationship’. This furthers the overall positive portrayal which is being placed in the public domain.

In \textit{Securing the State}, Omand highlights how intelligence can be exploited when it is misused by policymakers,\textsuperscript{239} providing the depiction that it is not the British Intelligence Services who are responsible for the abuse and misuse of intelligence. He further highlights this when exploring the importance of analysts cooperating with one another,\textsuperscript{240} depicting wider structural problems as something which causes difficulties, as opposed to the British Intelligence Services being incapable. This depiction is further evident when Omand explores intelligence failures. Although he does not criticise any Intelligence Service directly, Omand suggests in a comparable manner to the JIC history that failures can occur due to an inability to assess how actions will be interpreted by another regime.\textsuperscript{241}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{236} Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners,’ p. 44
\item\textsuperscript{237} Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners,’ p. 47
\item\textsuperscript{238} Omand, Sir, D, ‘The Cycle of Intelligence’, p. 68
\item\textsuperscript{239} Omand, Sir, D, \textit{Securing the State} p. 214 – 215
\item\textsuperscript{240} Omand, Sir, D, ‘The Cycle of Intelligence’, p. 70
\item\textsuperscript{241} Omand, Sir, D, \textit{Securing the State}, p. 214
\end{itemize}
The strength to which Omand explores this theme suggests his own personal experience is central to the argument, demonstrating how former practitioners can provide a first-hand depiction of British Intelligence. Omand depicts a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services which is consistent with not only the official histories, but also Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’. This emanates through Omand’s overall depiction of the British Intelligence Services being inherently capable and adhering to legal and ethical standards. There is no discussion that the British Intelligence Services have undertaken dubious actions, such as the refusal to recruit certain ethnic groups as the official histories explored. But he does criticise the amount of secrecy still surrounding the British Intelligence Services as this affects what information is publicly available. If a former practitioner is scathing of the amount of secrecy surrounding British Intelligence, there is surely a pervasiveness of secrecy which is damaging understandings in the public domain. By increasing openness, the British Intelligence Services would be able to encourage public and legislative support for their actions. Therefore, it is their interest to further engagement with the public.

Aberystwyth School
Professor Len Scott, Professor Martin Alexander, Dr Peter Jackson and Dr Gerry Hughes all co-authored numerous books when working at Aberystwyth University, the overarching factor in creating this sub-grouping. Another reason for this grouping is the role Aberystwyth University had in being at the forefront of intelligence teaching. It was the first university in the UK to offer an Undergraduate Degree in Intelligence and International Politics, and although it was one of five offering such degree specialisation at the Master’s level, offered a research training Master’s in Intelligence Studies which was approved by the Government funded Economic and Social Research Council (a

243 Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners,’ p. 51
degree which I did at Aberystwyth having secured ESRC funding for this project). This meant that Aberystwyth was something of a trailblazer in the teaching of intelligence.245

Unlike Omand, the Aberystwyth academics explore how although there are times when an intelligence failure will occur as these are deemed inevitable;246 this is not due to the ineffectiveness of the British Intelligence Services, but rather due to the nature of intelligence. This triangulates not only with the official histories, but also with public statements made by intelligence practitioners,247 demonstrating the saliency of the depiction. By highlighting how intelligence failures can occur, an implicit message is portrayed that when a failure happens, this is not necessarily due to the incompetence of the British Intelligence Services, but rather due to the nature of intelligence.

Like the JIC history, the Aberystwyth academics explore the availability of information, and how this is affected by excessive secrecy. In Journeys in Shadows, Scott and Jackson contrast the secrecy surrounding British Intelligence to the situation in America. They highlight how both the CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) have scholars in residence,248 combined with the CIA actively encouraging the academic study of their work.249 Indeed, when undertaking fieldwork, one interview was within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Headquarters250 and another was sought with the curators of the NSA Cryptology Museum. However, this interview failed to occur as the NSA employees were not allowed to sign the interview release form without NSA lawyer’s approval. This undoubtedly provides the academic with unprecedented access due to the higher levels of openness evident in the US and raises questions as to why the British Intelligence Services could not further their openness with academia in the same way.

249 Scott, L, and Jackson P, ‘Intelligence’, p. 177
However, it demonstrates not only an ongoing desire for academic engagement, but also the ways in which secrecy surrounding the intelligence realm can be reduced while continuing to ensure operational security remains, something which would also enhance public accountability of the British Intelligence Services. Whilst the American case is unique in relation to their openness according to Phythian, it demonstrates a way in which secrecy can be reduced and further promote academic engagement with intelligence, seeing it as unique does not mean that it should not be aspired to. The writing of the official histories and heads of MI5 and MI6 attending academic meetings and conferences, does depict that British Intelligence are attempting to overcome the secrecy surrounding them, there remains far more which could occur to reduce the pervasiveness of secrecy. We can merely hope for a similar model to America’s to be adopted in the UK.

Although there are now more archival disclosures, evident in the discovery of Sir Stuart Menzies’ secret 1950s slush fund, there remains, Scott and Jackson argue, a degree of Governmental control exerted upon the archives. This is similar to the argument Aldrich, Cormac and Goodman explore in relation to how archival disclosures provide a specific view of British Intelligence, and therefore, there must be some caution about viewing official records as the complete reality. Indeed, this also overlaps with Omand’s discussion pertaining to the amount of secrecy surrounding British Intelligence, suggesting the saliency of the argument. By examining these themes, the Aberystwyth academics have depicted how the British Intelligence Services remains shrouded in secrecy, a mirrored portrayal to the official histories. But it will be interesting to ascertain whether this is con-current throughout the accountability literature.

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Scott, L, and Jackson P, ‘Intelligence’, p. 177
253 Scott, L, and Jackson, P, ‘Journeys in Shadows’, p. 2
Cormac, R, “C” and Covert Action”, pp. 227 – 248
255 Scott, L, and Jackson P, ‘Intelligence’, p. 176
256 Scott, L, and Jackson, P, ‘Journeys in Shadows’, p. 6;
Accountability Academics
The intelligence accountability literature has been useful throughout this thesis as it explores the difficulties of the public having an informed understanding of the British Intelligence Services. Key academics in this field include; Ian Leigh, Professor Mark Phythian, Phillip Davies, Michael Wesley and Claudia Hillebrand. All depict the British Intelligence Services as struggling with organisational and structural difficulties as well as the issues of secrecy.

The over-riding portrayal of the British Intelligence Services within the accountability literature pertains to the organisational and structural problems affecting British Intelligence, something which manifests in numerous ways. Leigh highlights how the British Intelligence Services are all on a different statutory footing, the reasoning for the legislation being introduced also differed, and perhaps most crucially, what the limitations of the legislation are.257 This is something which is exacerbated when administrative changes are introduced. After 9/11, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre258 (JTAC) was established. More recently, Gordon Brown abolished the Permanent Secretary Committee on the Intelligence Services and the JIC’s remit to ensure the day-to-day coordination of the Intelligence Community,259 a theme explored in the JIC official history. Under the coalition Government, David Cameron created the National Security Council,260 designed to allow collective discussion about the Government’s national security objectives via four ministerial sub-committees.261

Thus, Leigh’s analysis highlights the organisational and structural problems such as the creation of new organisations affecting British Intelligence, something compounded by

the limitations of legislation. In the co-authored *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, Phythian and Gill explored these issues in relation to the coordination of intelligence assessments, highlighting how JTAC is staffed by those seconded from other organisations and departments.\(^{262}\) Although such a discussion pertaining to structural and organisational difficulties may seem mundane, it is important to assess due to the impact these can have upon intelligence analysis,\(^{263}\) which in turn can affect policy decisions and future intelligence collection. Thus there is merit in the over-arching depiction of how the British Intelligence Services are affected by structural and organisational problems.

This is surmised by Michael Wesley who argues that British Intelligence is in a difficult position due to the structures of Government and the interplay between the services, their political masters and political bureaucracy.\(^{264}\) This provides the view that although the British Intelligence Services are plagued by organisational and structural difficulties, it is due to the wider nature of British Government, a theme the official histories and the British way in Intelligence section of the introduction sought to highlight.\(^{265}\) The accountability literature highlights the vast expectations placed on the British Intelligence Services, not only from policymakers, but also from the public.\(^{266}\) Through Wesley’s analysis, the framing portrays the numerous roles undertaken by the British Intelligence Services, which implies how overworked they are. This intimates that structural and organisational difficulties can impact upon the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services.

Leigh draws an interesting connection between the organisational and structural problems and politicisation of intelligence. He highlights that many of the structural issues are perhaps there by design, such as the Heads of the services being responsible

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266 Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’, p. 188
for the day to day control of the Intelligence Services as opposed to either the Home or Foreign Secretary to prevent the political manipulation of intelligence, or the lack of a clear definition of national security within legislation to allow for a flexible approach.\textsuperscript{267}

This provides the suggestion that although there are numerous organisational and structural issues affecting the British Intelligence Services which all sub-genres of the intelligence literature have explored as well as being evident in Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ these may in fact be created by design. Indeed, there is arguably some merit in Leigh’s assertion as following the Coalition’s election in 2010, they undertook substantial changes to the wider intelligence machinery, arguing it was to prevent politicisation of intelligence.\textsuperscript{268} Therefore, a degree of structural and organisational difficulties can be a positive.

Another recurring theme in Leigh’s analysis is the limitation of legislation governing the British Intelligence Services, something which affects numerous themes such as international cooperation, accountability of the Intelligence Services and what actions they are able to undertake.\textsuperscript{269} By examining the various limitations, Leigh intimates that issues of illegality or unethical behaviour emanate from the legislation governing the Intelligence Services, as opposed to a desire from the British Intelligence Services to act illegally or unethically. This is a theme Gill concurs with as he highlights how:

\textit{One of the major reasons why domestic security intelligence agencies have been found to have abused their power is that their tasks have been extremely ill-defined, or not defined at all.}\textsuperscript{270}

\textsuperscript{267} Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 84, 95


Leigh, I, ‘More Closely Watching the Spies: Three Decades of Experiences,’ p. 5;

Leigh, I ‘Accountability and Intelligence Cooperation – Framing the Issue’, p. 7

\textsuperscript{270} Gill, P, \textit{Policing Politics}, p. 3, 164–165
Although Gill focuses upon MI5, this demonstrates how the limitation of legislation is a central problem affecting the entirety of the British Intelligence Services highlighted by accountability academics. This provides the portrayal that whilst illegal and unethical activity may occur, it is ostensibly due to the existing legislation failing to account for key actions of the Intelligence Services, such as GCHQ intelligence sharing, or failing to fully define what actions the British Intelligence Services are able to undertake.

Leigh also explores how the secrecy which continues to shroud the British Intelligence Services, highlighting how:

*Secrecy restrictions placed on the process make it impossible for a complainant to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal to distinguish between an unsuccessful application based on justifiable use of legal powers and one based on lack of evidence of the services involvement.*

The Investigatory Powers Tribunal is an independent judicial forum which provides the right of redress to anyone who believes they have been victim of unlawful action by a public body, and in particular, they examine complaints including alleged human rights abuses about the conduct (as well as on behalf) of the Big 3, who are legally obliged to provide information to the Tribunal. Whilst this arrangement may satisfy the European Convention on Human Rights, both Leigh and Gill are sceptical of its effectiveness as an instrument of accountability due to the lack of cooperation with the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), and its inability to instil public confidence, highlighting the lack of publicly recorded tribunal findings against the Intelligence Services. Arguably, this is the impact of the secrecy surrounding the tribunal.

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271 Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 9/11’, p. 728
272 Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Welcome, Available From: https://www.ipt-uk.com/ (Accessed 1st October 2019);
Investigatory Powers Tribunal, What We Do – Complaints the Tribunal can consider, Available From: https://www.ipt-uk.com/content.asp?id=12 (Accessed 1st October 2019);
Gill, P, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the Challenge of Security Networks’, p. 936;
Gill, P, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the Challenge of Security Networks’, p. 930–931
273 Gill, P, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the Challenge of Security Networks’, p. 938;
Wesley examines how politicisation of intelligence occurs. One way in which this could happen is due to the necessity for the Intelligence Services to justify their existence, which can occur by them seeking to be policy relevant, demonstrating another factor affecting how the Intelligence Services operate. However, this has been an ongoing theme since their creation as the official histories acknowledge, with the case of Sinclair providing policy suggestions for the Sudetenland. Thus, there is a consistent portrayal in the official histories and wider intelligence literature.

This section has highlighted how the accountability literature depicts how the British Intelligence Services undertake numerous roles, a theme not fully analysed in the official histories, demonstrating how the literature provides a slightly different view of British Intelligence. However, as with all the other sub-genres which the chapter has analysed, the role of secrecy is central to the arguments explored. Phillip Davies argues that it is perhaps due to this secrecy, that we only hear about intelligence when something goes wrong. Whilst there is certainly some merit to this argument due to the nature of intelligence, it can create a problematical portrayal of the British Intelligence Services as it suggests that failures occur due to the ineffectiveness of the British Intelligence Services. Although discussions about intelligence failures may be more prevalent in the public domain, there is a great deal suggesting just how capable and effective they are as this chapter has demonstrated. However, until the British Intelligence Services are more engaged with the public, the depiction of failures will arguably continue to dominate public consciousness due to the accessibility of information.

Davies’ assertion fails to explore what information the British Intelligence Services are now placing in the public domain. Although instigated 11 years after they were publicly acknowledged, MI6 launched their website in 2005 which contained information about their history and how to apply to work for the organisation. Whilst this demonstrates

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Leigh, I, ‘Intelligence and the Law in the United Kingdom,’ p. 648
Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’, p. 190 – 192
Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 203 – 204;
Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, p. 305
Davies, P, ‘Britain’s Machinery of Intelligence Accountability: Realistic oversight in the absence of moral panic’, p. 137
Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 63
an attempt to engage with the public, there remains a vast amount of secrecy surrounding
the British Intelligence Services. Phythian also explores this theme, suggesting that this
in fact could be in part due to Britain’s culture of secrecy evident in the ‘need to know’
principle which prevented Intelligence Services from sharing valuable information.278
Davies furthers this argument, suggesting that it is not just British Intelligence who are
affected by such secrecy, as it is a wider issue within British Government.279 Whilst there
is certainly some merit in this, evident by what has been referred to as the Whitehall
culture of secrecy,280 there are perhaps times when it is utilised to prevent further
discussion or investigation into a certain matter.281 The thesis is not disputing that the
British Intelligence Services require a degree of secrecy in order to function effectively,
but, as is suggested by the wider intelligence literature, that there is arguably more
secrecy than is required. If this were replaced by greater openness, public accountability
would be far stronger, something which would in-fact benefit the British Intelligence
Services in ensuring their democratic legitimacy.282

Discussing intelligence post-Brexit, Hillebrand argues that the British Intelligence
Services will remain well-respected by other nations,283 furthering the positive portrayal
of the capabilities and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services. Somewhat
surprisingly, this is the first reference outside the official histories to Britain’s capable
and effective intelligence. However, in her other publications, Hillebrand demonstrates
how the British Intelligence Services have at times acted illegally. Focusing more upon
intelligence oversight and accountability, she explores how the former Foreign Secretary
and some MI6 personnel are facing legal action for the alleged extraordinary rendition of
the Libyan dissident Abdel Belhadj despite MI6’s actions having received ministerial

278 Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 107
279 Davies, P, ‘Britain’s Machinery of Intelligence Accountability’, p. 155;
Gill, P, Policing Politics, p. 50
280 BBC News, Whitehall’s Culture of Secrecy, Available From:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/990242.stm (Accessed 8th December 2015)
281 Phythian, M, ‘Cultures of National Intelligence’, p. 40
between the ‘real’ and the imagined’, Intelligence and National Security, 33/6 (2018), p. 808
283 Hillebrand, C, ‘With or Without You? The UK and information and intelligence sharing in the EU’,
Journal of Intelligence History, (2017) p. 3
approval. However this is in contrast to Robert Dover and Mike Goodman’s depiction of the British Intelligence Services as inherently legal and ethical organisations who are seeking to counter rogue spooks. This intimates that if there is any wrongdoing, it is an individual who is responsible, as opposed to the entirety of the organisation seeking to act in an illegal or unethical manner.

Conclusion
The different sub-genres of the intelligence studies literature all highlight how the British Intelligence Services adhere to legal and ethical standards, and the excessive secrecy which still shrouds the British Intelligence Services. A degree of secrecy is required for intelligence; what is debatable is the amount of secrecy. However, there were contrasting views in the literature, perhaps this occurred due to the framing of themes and the vast difference in the length of the publications. Whilst all explore the structural and organisational difficulties, it is only the accountability literature which analyses why these problems are evident, concluding that it can prevent the politicisation of intelligence. But throughout the academic literature explored, it is clear that there is an overarching positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, thus creating a consistent portrayal throughout the literature, irrespective of whether the academic has had first-hand knowledge or access to information. But there are key moments when this is questioned.

Conclusion
The British Intelligence Services and academia have always had ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’. Following the First World War, Prime Minister David Lloyd George questioned the possibility of an official academic history to mark the end of the conflict.

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286 Hillebrand, C, ‘Intelligence oversight and accountability’, p. 306
287 The MI5 and MI6 official histories are both over 700 pages long; allowing them to explore themes in vast detail, something other academic publications cannot do simply as they are not this long in length.
Although this did not happen,\textsuperscript{288} it demonstrates how even 100 years ago, the British Government realised how academia could purport a particular understanding to the wider public. Inherently based on primary research including archival material, undertaking elite interviews, and attending lectures at an American University, this chapter has examined how this relationship occurs in a contemporary context.

The primary research highlighted the emphasis the British Intelligence Services places on the relationship as one interviewee explained,\textsuperscript{289} something evident in the numerous university courses and centres of excellence. However, as the American context demonstrates, there is more which could occur, particularly in relation to Undergraduate student engagement. The chapter then undertook an in-depth analysis of the varying subgenres of the intelligence studies literature, all of which had an overarching positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services as being inherently capable and effective, adhering to legal and ethical standards and providing support and training for employees, although there were differences in how these themes were explored.

Throughout the literature the adherence to legal and ethical standards was a recurring theme, and although there were criticisms of actions at times, particularly from the official histories, these were due to the limitations of legislation, as opposed to the British Intelligence Services unilaterally deciding to act in an illegal or unethical manner, something the accountability academic Leigh also explored.\textsuperscript{290} By examining this theme, there was a consistent portrayal to Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’ which explored legislation limitations in the Snowden context. This places a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain by the implicit reference being on the legislation surrounding them not being fit for purpose.

One theme which received minimal attention was that of modern technologies, with only the Aberystwyth Academics, Phythian and Dover assessing this theme.\textsuperscript{291} Considering

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\textsuperscript{288} Parliamentary Archives, Houses of Parliament, London, David Lloyd George Papers LG/F/26/1 ‘Lloyd George Papers’, 1922
\textsuperscript{289} Private Interview 21:12\textsuperscript{th} September 2017
\textsuperscript{290} Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ pp. 79–99
\textsuperscript{291} Scott, L, and Jackson P, ‘Intelligence’, p. 175; Gill, P, and Phythian, M, \textit{Intelligence in an Insecure World}, p. 110;
\end{footnotesize}
the emphasis now placed upon the British Intelligence Services acting legally and ethically, evident through the public discourse of the Investigatory Powers Act,\textsuperscript{292} the limited emphasis upon the links between technology and the Intelligence Services acting ethically is somewhat surprising, particularly considering the centrality of technology in the Snowden revelations. Although Dover rightly asserts that there have always been technological matters for British Intelligence to counter, it is the fact that these are continually evolving and changing that causes difficulties.\textsuperscript{293} This has affected how British Intelligence work,\textsuperscript{294} with the impact of the 24 hour news cycle just one technological advancement caused difficulties.\textsuperscript{295}

It has also served to demonstrate that there are also themes assessed in the official histories not explored in the other sub-sections of the intelligence literature, such as the decision not to employ certain ethnic groups, although this is perhaps due to word constraints on the wider literature. However, this also demonstrates that the official histories are not simply providing a ‘squeaky-clean’ depiction that the British Intelligence Services have always been perfect, they do highlight wrongdoing and are critical of this. Although there are times when this could have been further evident, such as in the discussion of MI5’s involvement in Northern Ireland during the troubles, this returns to the central argument of the amount of secrecy which still shrouds the British Intelligence Services. It is not disputed that their actions require a degree of secrecy, but too much can raise suspicion and thus the public can become critical or scathing of the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain.

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\textsuperscript{293} Dover, R, ‘Communication, Privacy and Identity’, p. 298
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\textsuperscript{294} Scott, L, and Jackson P, ‘Intelligence’, p. 175, 182
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\textsuperscript{295} Dover, R, and Goodman, M, ‘Introduction: Intelligence and the Information Age’, p. 9
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Chapter 5: A Complicated Relationship: The British Intelligence Services and News Journalism

Introduction

Government need public support and understanding for their security policies. There is therefore a very strong case to be made for government to reveal sufficient of the real nature of its security and intelligence world to enable the media and the public to retain a sense of perspective.1

This quotation from Sir David Omand demonstrates how influential news journalism can be in providing the public with a particular depiction of the British Intelligence Services, something Peter Gill also acknowledges.2 Therefore there is a clear significance in assessing news journalism portrayals to comprehend what understandings of the British Intelligence Services are in the public domain. These are themes central to the chapter which has two sub research question that shape it, and these are: what views of the British Intelligence Services are portrayed via news journalism; and what is the nature of the relationship between the British Intelligence Services and news journalism and to what extent does that relationship affect the views portrayed? To analyse what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services are evident, the Iraq War and Snowden case studies will be focused on.3 Coverage of the case studies often provides a positive image of the British Intelligence Services, despite some differences amongst themes different news journalists examine, with intelligence often being a subsidiary theme.

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The chapter begins by addressing the first research question by exploring a typology for Intelligence – news journalism engagement which Steve Hewitt and Scott Lucas explore as they argue that the relationship can be adversarial, dependent, manipulative, laudatory or supportive. This discussion examines how at different times, all of these relationships have been evident, although some are more prevalent than others. How these impact upon the views of the British Intelligence Services provided to the public will be explored in the subsequent section which analyses ‘What views of the British Intelligence Services are evident within news journalism?’ As Omand highlights, this question is of crucial importance due to the way news journalism directly impacts upon the view of British Intelligence held by the public. However, if the British Intelligence Services furthered their own direct public engagement, something which has increased following the Snowden revelations, news journalism, as an avenue of information, would not continue to be as influential in providing a depiction of the intelligence realm in the public domain.

Centred upon news articles, newspaper opinion pieces and BBC news documentaries, the final part highlights how the British Intelligence Services are depicted. This section argues that the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services in news journalism are often implicit rather than being the central focus of a news item, and that these portrayals can be grouped into several key themes. Namely: the effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services, which includes assessing whether this is affected by structural and organisational difficulties; whether their activities are legal and ethical; how the human dimension comes into play in shaping intelligence decisions and operations and finally, the role of secrecy.

The case studies demonstrate that there is overwhelmingly a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, although there are variations to the extent to which this is evident, particularly due to the themes that different news journalists examine. But

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despite this, there is an overall agreement about the politicisation of the dodgy dossier in the lead up to the Iraq War and the limits of British legislation surrounding the Snowden revelations.

There is academic agreement that news journalism provides a form of intelligence accountability, something which ostensibly occurs when there are apparent failures in traditional intelligence oversight mechanisms. But, it also impacts upon public accountability due to the influential role news journalism can have upon public understandings of the intelligence realm. Whilst news journalism is undoubtedly a central way of allowing public accountability to occur, if the British Intelligence Services furthered their direct public engagement something which could occur via their websites being more informative or collaborating with museum exhibits, news journalism would not be in such an influential position.

As the introduction (Chapter 1) stated, elite interviews have been utilised throughout this project to gain a more informed understanding of the topics explored. Elite interviews were sought with journalists reporting on relevant stories for the BBC, The Guardian, and The Daily Telegraph. Success in gaining interviews with these subjects was mixed, with the journalists interviewed agreeing to speak to the author of this thesis on the condition that the interviews were conducted off the record. But whilst this means that the interviews cannot be quoted nor can the interview subjects be named, the material acquired as a result of the interviews nevertheless provides valuable insights into the relationship between news journalists and British Intelligence and have shaped the analysis in this chapter. The combination of academic literature and news reporting provides a triangulated methodology that enables a comprehensive analysis to assess the chapter’s two research sub-questions.

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The nature of the relationship
Hewitt and Lucas argue that the relationship between Intelligence and news journalism manifests variously as: an adversarial relationship; a dependent relationship; a manipulative relationship; a laudatory relationship; or a supportive relationship. They state that:

From the onset of the Cold War to the era after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these relationships have shifted, overlapped, and varied in the United States and Britain, yet they still await examination and critique by scholars.\(^\text{10}\)

They are right that the relationships need analysing, which is why it is surprising that they omit this from their own critique, instead exploring how informal links between the American intelligence community and news journalism have shaped the relationship.\(^\text{11}\) This demonstrates how this research provides an original contribution to the existing literature. But despite this omission, Hewitt and Lucas’s typology provides a clear structure to analyse the first sub-research question: ‘What is the nature of the relationship between the British Intelligence Services and news journalism’? The different relationships between British Intelligence and news journalism are all evident, with some more prominent at times. Establishing how the relationship changes depends on wider circumstances, which the second research question will examine.

Adversarial relationship
There is agreement amongst intelligence scholars of the importance of news journalism.\(^\text{12}\) As Richard Aldrich writes:

With formalised national systems of accountability looking weaker, informal accountability through

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\(^{10}\) Hewitt, S, and Lucas, S, ‘All the Secrets That Are Fit to Print? The Media and US Intelligence Agencies Before and After 9/11’, p. 106

\(^{11}\) Hewitt, S, and Lucas, S, ‘All the Secrets That Are Fit to Print?’, p. 106


Hillebrand, C, ‘The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight’, p. 691 – 693
revelations by a globalised media in tandem with activists and whistle-blowers, may become more important.\textsuperscript{13}

This can result in an adversarial relationship between the British Intelligence Services and news journalism as the latter are seeking to publish information that the former seeks to keep secret, something particularly evident with investigative journalism. Thus, tension is caused due to the secrecy surrounding the British Intelligence Services. This has been abundantly clear through the research for both case studies. But the adversarial relationship has a long history, first evident in the aftermath of the Second World War.

In 1946, Chapman Pincher started working as an investigative journalist for the \textit{Daily Express} after his demobilisation from the military and in his autobiography, highlights the daily challenges faced in securing classified information without facing the risk of prosecution.\textsuperscript{14} The adversarial relationship continued to be evident, and in 1967, Pincher reported that private overseas cables were being collected at the Post Office for examination by the security authorities which is now known to be the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ). Despite having sought the advice of the D-Notice Committee who stated that the story did not contravene any guidelines, they still sought to suppress it under Foreign Office advice. But, in consultation with his editor and the \textit{Daily Express} legal adviser, Pincher published the story arguing it was in the public interest.\textsuperscript{15}

The adversarial relationship continued in the 1970s when \textit{The New York Times} published the Pentagon Papers, about American involvement in the Vietnam War. The documents were provided to the paper by Daniel Ellsberg after his attempts to get law makers to publish the report proved futile. This example highlights how news journalism provided a form of accountability lacking within the American Government at the time, although

the Nixon administration did try and sue the New York Times for its disclosures, demonstrating an adversarial relationship.

The adversarial relationship continued to be evident in 1970s and 1980s America where Geoffrey Treverton argues that the media had more people asking difficult questions of the Government of the time and fewer people were prepared to take the Government at its word. During this time period, the adversarial relationship was also prevalent in the UK. Prior to the closure of the Information Research Department (IRD) in 1977, John Jenks states that they had become nervous when independent and investigative journalists became interested in their work, one of the reasons Hugh Wilford argues that the IRD was closed. Indeed, it was investigative journalism which provided the first accounts of the IRD when they were dissolved, highlighting another historical example of an adversarial relationship.

In a more contemporary context, the adversarial relationship has continued via investigative journalism. During the Global War on Terror (GWoT), it proved central in uncovering initiatives designed to encourage information sharing both in and out of a legislative framework. In turn, this was pieced together by investigative journalists who in turn provided a degree of accountability and oversight about these otherwise unknown activities. Thus, investigative journalism not only provided a degree of intelligence

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20 The Congress of Cultural Freedoms was the American equivalent to the IRD, and they too were closed due to the adversarial relationship, with Wilford arguing that investigative journalists effectively wrecked the CCF as an organisation. For more information, please see: Wilford, H, ‘“The Permanent Revolution”? The New York Intellectuals, the CIA and the Cultural Cold War’, in The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War – The State Private Network, edited by Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford, (Oxon, Routledge, 2006), p. 206
oversight, but also granted a degree of openness about the actions of the Intelligence Services.

In the American context, there is evidence which demonstrates that an adversarial relationship can be overcome as journalists are invited to Fort Meade, a military establishment, to understand what information in a story is sensitive,\textsuperscript{22} thus addressing the problems of releasing too much information into the public domain. This is in conjunction with the continual policy of the American military embedding journalists within their units to further their understanding of being in a combat zone.\textsuperscript{23} Although this began during the Vietnam War, it is a policy which has continued, with Schou stating that post 9/11, embedding of journalists happened again to the extent that the press acted as the Pentagon’s unpaid publicist.\textsuperscript{24} Whilst the embedding of journalists into intelligence operations would not be possible, the military’s experience with journalists suggests that an adversarial relationship can be overcome by the Intelligence Services providing a more informed understanding to the news media which would aid journalists’ coverage of intelligence matters. In the American context, there is seemingly a formal process to engaging with news journalism as the CIA public affairs officers provide frequent background briefings to journalists, often pertaining to overseas hot spots.\textsuperscript{25} With the pervasiveness of secrecy, an adversarial relationship is more likely due to the desire to gather any information relating to the intelligence realm. But, via increased openness, an adversarial relationship can be overcome as it provides news journalists with a greater understanding of the intelligence realm, and what information it would be detrimental to publish, such as names of officers.

Another way in which the adversarial relationship can manifest itself is when news journalism fails to cooperate with the Intelligence Services as Peter Gill explores. In October 1991, Channel 4 broadcast a programme centring on allegations of collusion

\textsuperscript{22} Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners,’ p. 55
\textsuperscript{24} Schou, N, Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood, p. 69
\textsuperscript{25} Schou, N, Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood, p. 3
between the Intelligence and security forces and Northern Irish Loyalist paramilitaries in a campaign of political assassinations. The result of this was that:

The Royal Ulster Constabulary obtained a court order under the Prevention of Terrorism Act requiring Channel 4 to disclose its evidence but, when this did not include the identity of its main source, Channel 4 was charges with contempt of court and eventually fined.\(^{26}\)

This was the first time the Prevention of Terrorism Act had been used against news journalism to discover a source, with Channel 4 arguing that providing the information would put the life of the informant and others at risk.\(^{27}\) It demonstrates how the adversarial relationship can also occur in relation to news journalism seeking to protect their sources.

Whilst investigative journalistic endeavours can be one of the reasons for this adversarial relationship, if the British Intelligence Services themselves placed more information in the public domain and oversight structures were improved, news journalism would not be in such a privileged position of not only holding the British Intelligence Services to account, but also in aiding public accountability of the intelligence realm. As the American case demonstrates, there are ways to prevent an adversarial relationship. Although cultural differences exist between the two countries, the US context highlights both the uniqueness of how the British Intelligence Services seeks to transmit portrayals of themselves, but also how via increased openness, this can become a more formalised arrangement whilst not detracting from the actions of the Intelligence Services.

\textbf{Dependent relationship}

The IRD and the British Intelligence Services were dependent on one another for access to information in their attempts to further the anti-communist rhetoric. This is the central


\(^{27}\) The Independent, \textit{Channel 4 faced ruin for protecting sources: Sequestration of television company’s assets may be the only way to ensure that the law is enforced, the High Court was told}, Michael Durham, 29th July 1992. Available From: \url{https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/channel-4-faces-ruin-for-protecting-sources-sequestration-of-television-companys-assets-may-be-the-1536142.html} (Accessed 7th October 2019)
characteristic which differentiates the dependent relationship from the manipulative one, that both entities are reliant upon one another. Nevertheless, there can be aspects of a manipulative relationship within a dependent one. However, discovering evidence to support this is difficult. The academic literature does suggest examples of the dependent relationship, with Mike Goodman stating that the British Intelligence Services can use news journalism to distribute information or gain intelligence about a particular country that they could not access. This is a theme Carl Bernstein explored in relation to the way that the CIA used journalists to gather intelligence in specific countries, demonstrating the extent to which the Intelligence Services were dependent on news journalism for information during the Cold War. In return, news journalists can gain information from their contacts within the Intelligence Services. Len Scott and Peter Jackson point out that news journalists often write well-informed and authoritative pieces on intelligence, which are often based on extensive links with officialdom.

The life of Chapman Pincher succinctly demonstrates this as throughout his career, he made links with both the military and the British Intelligence Services which provided him with vast amounts of information, something which he subtly refers to in his books. For example, in *The Truth About Dirty Tricks*, he merely states ‘I have been assured that in recent times similar British operations [dirty tricks] have been quietly achieved’ and how Peter Wright is held up to new Security Service (MI5) recruits as everything an officer should not be. Pincher’s engagement with the British Intelligence Services also manifested with him being asked to write articles which would benefit the Intelligence Services. One of the most high profile examples of this was following the defection of

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31 Pincher, C, *Dangerous to Know*, p. 31–37
32 Pincher, C, *The Truth About Dirty Tricks*, p. 2 and 200
33 Another example of this is on page 32–33 when discussing the assassination of the Pakistani Dictator Zia ul-Haq where Pincher discusses his conversations with British and American intelligence officers who attribute the actions to the Soviet military intelligence organisation, the GRU
34 Another example of the Intelligence Services ‘using’ Chapman Pincher was in 1964 when in order to ensure a prisoner swap with the Soviet Union occurred, they leaked the details of it to Pincher so it was in
two of the Cambridge 5, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess to the Soviet Union (USSR). This led to a meeting between Pincher and the MI5 chief legal adviser, organised by the D Notice Committee Secretary 2 months before Khrushchev the Soviet leader was due to visit London34 where MI5 asked Pincher ‘to publish a prominent article warning the public that whatever the defectors might say in future would be KGB lies’, an article which MI5 were delighted by.35 Another example was when Pincher was asked to highlight how Burgess was in breach of the Official Secrets Act (OSA) and thus could be prosecuted if he returned to Britain.36

In Too Secret Too Long, Pincher intimates that this is something which occurred on several occasions as when MI5 or the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) officers did provide him with information, it was a deliberate attempt to ensure publicity for their own purposes37 and were thus dependent on news journalists to publish the information in question. Perhaps this is why Pincher has been described as a public urinal where Ministers (as well as civil servants) queued up to leak!38 This provides a first-hand account of how the dependent relationship which was mutually beneficial manifested itself during the Cold War. Indeed, this was a tactic also used in America with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) thought to have 400 journalists who had carried out ‘assignments’ on behalf of the Agency.39

Intelligence Services have continued to be dependent on news journalism for live coverage of events such as 9/11 and 7/7. During the Gulf War, the American Intelligence

35 Gill, P, Policing Politics, p. 15;
Pincher, C, Dangerous to Know, p. 65;
Pincher, C, ‘Reflections on a Lifetime of Reporting on Intelligence Affairs’, p. 157;
Such actions was also undertaken by the CIA as is discussed in:
36 Pincher, C, The Truth About Dirty Tricks, p. 111;
Pincher, C, Too Secret Too Long, p. 228-229;
Pincher, C, Their Trade Is Treachery, p. 203
37 Pincher, C, Too Secret Too Long, p. 534
38 Pincher, C, ‘Reflections on a Lifetime of Reporting on Intelligence Affairs’, p. 152, 156
Services were dependent on news coverage to communicate with opposition forces in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{40} This demonstrates how the dependent relationship continues to be evident at times. Although the dependent relationship could cause issues with a free press in terms of news journalists simply regurgitating information that the British Intelligence Services provide, it can aid the understanding of intelligence in the public domain. As Scott and Jackson intimate, the dependent relationship between officialdom and news journalists aids the media’s comprehension of intelligence due to the provision of information by the intelligence services, however as Pincher highlights, this can at times include the provision of disinformation.\textsuperscript{41} This perhaps occurs as:

\begin{quote}
There is always tensions in the routine relations between journalists and intelligence officials because of the secrecy that envelops the field.\textsuperscript{42}
\end{quote}

Potentially, it is due to the pervasiveness of secrecy which can lead to a more manipulative relationship.

**Manipulative relationship**

In the build up to the First World War, Lord Northcliffe exacerbated fears within society of a German invasion through the stories published in his newspapers.\textsuperscript{43} In doing so, Northcliffe manipulated fears to increase the revenues of his media organisations. The link between sensational or exaggerated news coverage of events and profitability continue to be relevant due to the continued decrease in circulation.\textsuperscript{44} Fairfax examines one way in which this occurs, with a newspaper owner dictating the paper’s policy,\textsuperscript{45} which McNair also explores, stating that this can happen by editors influencing editorial appointments, thus allowing for a particular political viewpoint to be prevalent.\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}[40\textsuperscript{\textnormal{th}}}]
\item Pincher, C, *The Truth About Dirty Tricks*, p. 163
\item Gill, P, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq,’ p. 28
\item McNair, B, *News and Journalism in the UK*, p. 57
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Following the creation of the CIA, the American journalist Hanson Baldwin was one of the first journalists to devote significant time and attention to the new agency, with his article ‘myopia on intelligence’. In it, he argues for the necessity of a joint committee to provide continuing legislative supervision and protection for what he describes as:

One of the most vital, most secret and most important agencies of Government... Intelligence Services cannot work except in secrecy. Yet this very secrecy, unless somehow scrutinised can breed inefficiency or danger to a democracy.47

Following this, CIA Director Allen Dulles who personally knew Baldwin, ‘was careful to cultivate the view that the CIA was a decisive, capable agency and cited specific objections to the article.48 Thus, Dulles manipulated the view of the CIA portrayed in the newspaper articles by using his relationship with Baldwin as Dulles managed to change ‘a potentially damaging estimate of how much the CIA cost the American taxpayer while retaining that budget’s official secrecy.’49

Another way in which the manipulative relationship manifests is by news journalism only highlighting certain aspects of Government reports a theme Hillebrand examines in the case of the treatment of Iraqi prisoners. She argues that whilst the media were excellent in drawing public attention to the issue;

an investigation by the US Army Criminal Investigation Command had also passed almost undetected by the news media.50

49 Hadley, D. P, 'A Constructive Quality: The Press, the CIA, and Covert Intervention in the 1950s’, p. 248
50 Hillebrand, C, ‘The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight’, p. 693
Therefore news journalism sought to manipulate the view of intelligence to portray that American military personnel had acted unprofessionally. But, this is not the first time there has been such emphasis by news journalism on specific aspects. When discussing the Peter Wright *Spycatcher* Affair, Pincher highlights how a BBC *Panorama* interview with Wright discussed the allegation of leaking information about the Prime Minister Harold Wilson which had generated public outrage. But, the interview was virtually ignored by all other media outlets, resulting in a surprising number of people being unaware of the interview and this discussion. This further exhibits how at times, news journalism is guilty of only highlighting certain facets of a story pertaining to the intelligence realm. This becomes even more pronounced in the American case where the CIA sought to publish an internal Inspector General report into the dark alliance where they apologised for their actions publicly.

*And yet, while the CIA might have been prepared to confess its sins, the press establishment was not. The agency’s mea culpa went almost completely ignored by a national news media that was obsessed at the time with the sordid details of the just breaking Bill Clinton – Monica Lewinsky sex scandal.*

This highlights the crucial role news journalism had in not fully reporting on the wrong-doing and arguably illegal and unethical activities of the CIA which had been put in the public domain. Considering the importance nowadays of the Intelligence Services ensuring public support, manipulating the view of intelligence is inherently problematic. However, this manipulative portrayal of intelligence could be due to how media coverage of intelligence tends to focus on ‘fire alarm’ moments according to Mary

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51 Pincher, C, *The Truth About Dirty Tricks*, p. 182
52 Schou, N, *Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood*, p. 53; The Dark Alliance was the relationship between the CIA and the Nicaraguan Contras. The Inspector General report acknowledged that for over a decade, Langley allowed Nicaraguan contras and their funding partners to smuggle drugs into the US, information which the CIA never shared with law enforcement agencies
53 Schou, N, *Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood*, p. 53
54 Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners,’ p. 44; Omand, Sir, D, *Securing the State*, p. 251
Manjikian’s analysis, an argument which is also made about parliamentary oversight.\textsuperscript{55} Phillip Davies accurately surmises how secrecy can be a reason for this to occur as he states:

\textit{Another consequence of the secrecy is that it intensifies the difficulty faced by any individual or institution in dealing with the press – that is, the allegations get the most play in the media. Detailed follow up reporting is usually more muted, and any eventual unpacking of what happened is often too little too late.}\textsuperscript{56}

This is arguably something which affects Britain’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) who although ‘produced interesting and informative reports, that added to public knowledge, despite redactions,’\textsuperscript{57} they are still reliant on news journalism for the public to become aware of the reports. Therefore, by the British Intelligence Services, as well as the ISC having a continued presence in the public domain, when fire alarm moments do happen such as the Snowden revelations, a knee-jerk public engagement campaign does not need to be initiated as it already exists.

Although pertaining to the British military, Pincher highlights how during the troubles in Northern Ireland, an army information officer provided unattributable briefings to the press as a way of providing disinformation which the British media cannot be ordered to print. Yet managed briefings which included tip-offs often contained disinformation, such as how static electricity from women’s nylon underwear could prematurely detonate


Ian Leigh argues that often parliamentary and judicial inquiries can be described as ‘fire-fighting’ measures as they are focused on allegations which have become public and thus there needs to be a perceived attempt at overcoming the issue. Sometimes it is via the adversarial relationship between intelligence and news journalism that such fire-fighting moments are required in the oversight process. For more information, please see:

Leigh, I ‘Accountability and Intelligence Cooperation – Framing the Issue’, p. 8


Davies intimates this theme as well on p. 133 but is more explicit in the quotation used

bombs. This highlights the attempt to manipulate the media reporting on the troubles, which is perhaps unsurprising as much of the British – Irish Republican Army (IRA) intelligence war was played out through the media. This is perhaps unsurprising as Gill states how the Intelligence Services have a ‘professional interest in the manipulation of information and use it as a tool in their trade’.

The British Intelligence Services also sought to manipulate the view of the USSR by utilising its own publishing house and magazines. This also happened post 9/11 when Schou argues how in the American context, the floodgates opened on official misinformation, resulting in the US media becoming a willing participant in disinformation propaganda. Although there is no evidence that British Intelligence or the wider British Government continues to engage in such activities, Aldrich has been vocal in his critique of the British Government for manipulating the view of intelligence via archival disclosures. This demonstrates how the manipulative relationship occurs from both entities, although it seems to occur when there are wider influences affecting the British Intelligence Services – news journalism relationship, such as a media organisation’s financial considerations. It is also inherently problematic for the understanding of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain due to these external influences affecting the portrayals.

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58 Pincher, C, *The Truth About Dirty Tricks*, p. 163, 266
However it is worth noting that the British media cannot be ordered to print disinformation.
60 Gill, P, *Policing Politics*, p. 35
Jenks, J, *British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War*, p. 65, 80, 106 – 107;
62 Schou, N, *Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood*, p. 57
Laudatory relationship

The IRD cooperated with journalists from nearly all of the national newspapers, with Omand stating that:

*The Intelligence Agencies, for their part drew tame journalists into their orbit as unwitting channels for information operations or simply in the hope of having their work portrayed in a better light.*

Although Omand fails to examine how this occurred, utilising key journalists exhibits the benefits of cooperation as it allowed for the British Intelligence Services to be portrayed in an inherently positive manner, potentially laudatory, something Goodman also examines. Indeed, the MI5 use of this was something Pincher explored when discussing his dealings with the MI5 whistle-blower Wright as he states:

*Wright told me that MI5 had a paid informer inside every Fleet Street newspaper. When I asked him why MI5 had never tried to recruit me, he replied “We considered it but decided that you would be uncontrollable.” He was right.*

However, this laudatory relationship could be the result of a manipulative relationship, suggesting the interlinked nature of the categories which Hewitt and Lucas acknowledge. However it seems that having laudatory portrayals of their actions is not always something that the British Intelligence Services want. Although in the Cold War

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65 Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners,’ p. 38

66 Goodman, M, ‘British Intelligence and the British Broadcasting Corporation: A Snapshot of a Happy Marriage’, p. 120

67 Pincher, C, *Dangerous to Know*, p. 307

68 Hewitt, S, and Lucas, S, ‘All the Secrets That Are Fit to Print? The Media and US Intelligence Agencies Before and After 9/11’, p. 106
context, Pincher highlights how for MI5’s Director General (DG) Sir Roger Hollis, secrecy was of paramount concern to the extent that Hollis:

Deplored any publicity about his department so much that he vetoed even laudatory accounts of its war-time work by distinguished colleagues such as the late Sir John Masterman.  

This demonstrates how even during the Cold War, the British Intelligence Services were affected by the pervasiveness of secrecy which thus prevented how much could be placed in the public domain. In this situation however, it seems that MI5 were overly concerned about secrecy if wartime laudatory accounts were prevented from publication. This is a clear example of excessive secrecy as it is hard to see why such information should not have been in the public domain. Whilst it would be pleasing to hope that such tensions have dissipated, this is unlikely as secrecy remains a key feature of the British way in Intelligence as Chapter 1 discussed. But, as the American case demonstrates, there is a balance to be found between openness and secrecy which still allows the Intelligence Services to operate, something Britain should be focusing on discovering as they seek to ensure their democratic legitimacy.

But in a contemporary context, whilst it is impossible to ascertain whether there is a laudatory or manipulative relationship between the British Intelligence Services and news journalism, interviews did suggest that the British Intelligence Services do still directly engage with news journalism as the Big 3. have specific media officers. Therefore there is cooperation with specific news journalists, although who these were was not revealed. However, another interview highlighted that this is something which occurs across Government departments and is simply because they know some news journalists better than others.

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69 Pincher, C, Their Trade Is Treachery, p. 79  
71 Private Interview 16: 19th September 2016
A laudatory relationship can occur via what Lord Leveson describes as:

Cross fertilisation of employment with retired senior police officer being engaged as newspaper columnists and journalists being employed in PR departments or as advisers by police services.\(^\text{72}\)

This is perhaps unsurprising due to the available career options for those having previously worked for the British Intelligence Services, something the historical examples of Tom Braden, Lieutenant General Sir Ian Jacob, Hugh Greene and Guy Burgess (one of the Cambridge Five) demonstrate.\(^\text{73}\) Undoubtedly, this cross-fertilisation can aid news journalism’s understanding of the intelligence realm, but there is the potential of this leading to a laudatory relationship. Former practitioners may be keen to portray the British Intelligence Services in a positive manner due to their understanding of themes not in the public domain, as well as the potential of identifying with former colleagues as opposed to ensuring balanced reporting. However, this could be seen as a manipulative relationship too.

**Supportive relationship**

In a contemporary context, the importance of open source information has been highlighted,\(^\text{74}\) suggesting the continued importance of news journalists in supporting the work of the British Intelligence Services, whether intentionally or not. This demonstrates

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\(^{73}\) Wilford, H, ‘“The Permanent Revolution”? The New York Intellectuals, the CIA and the Cultural Cold War’, p. 200;
Goodman, M, ‘British Intelligence and the British Broadcasting Corporation: A Snapshot of a Happy Marriage’, p. 121;
Pincher, C, *Too Secret Too Long*, p. 177

Guy Burgess was one of the Cambridge 5 but before working at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, he worked for the BBC. Although this may have been a calculated decision by the KGB, it demonstrates the cross-fertilisation of those working as security and intelligence journalists and those working within the Intelligence Services.

However, as ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ examined, academia is another career path taken by former practitioners once they retire from the intelligence realm, something particularly evident in the US context.

\(^{74}\) Omand, Sir, D, *Securing the State*, p. 32
the support British Intelligence and news journalism can provide to each another, as opposed to being dependent on one another.

Another way in which the supportive relationship manifests is through the Defence and Security Media Advisory Notice System, more commonly known as the D Notice Committee. Unique to the UK, the committee has no statutory basis and is an independent organisation, with no affiliation to other Government Departments. It consists of representatives from the Government and the media in an attempt to:

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To \text{ prevent inadvertent public disclosure of information that would compromise UK military and intelligence operations and methods or put at risk the safety of those involved in such operations or lead to attacks that would damage the critical national infrastructure and/or endanger lives.}
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Thus the British Intelligence Services and news journalism support one another to make decisions about disclosures, confirming the existence of a supportive relationship. Pincher surmises this theme when he states how the D-Notice Secretary:

\[
Believed it his duty to secure publication if possible without real damage to the national interest. In return, editors trusted him to be telling the truth when he assured them or their reporters that publication would damage national security.
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76 Pincher, C, *The Truth About Dirty Tricks*, p. 90
This allowed for information to be assessed on merit prior to publication. Pincher was complimentary about this practice, for example discussing how he always gained D-Notice approval for his articles, often reading them over the phone to the D-Notice Secretary to find suitable wording which would allow publication. In an interview with Richard Norton Taylor, he discussed how the D Notice Committee had prevented the publication of stories, although he did not provide examples.

Andrew explores the role of the D Notice Committee in the MI5 official history. In 1967, the Daily Express published information saying that Harold Wilson demanded copies of all cables and overseas telegrams for inspection, something Wilson was convinced should have been prevented from publication under a D-Notice. However, the committee subsequently created to examine the circumstances of the article concluded that Pincher’s ‘account of the cable-vetting had not been inaccurate and had not breached any D-Notice.’ Indeed, following the media interest into the affair between the War Minister John Profumo and Christine Keeler who had links to the Soviet defence attaché, Profumo requested a D-Notice to prevent the articles being published, something which was denied. This example demonstrates how D-Notices do consider whether the information is important to national security, or an attempt to keep information out of the public domain, something which does occur by claiming national security as the thesis has explored. Although a historical example, it exhibits the supportive relationship allowing decisions to be made in the public interest, whilst revealing a clear way in which the British Intelligence Services and news journalism can cooperate.

Indeed, although the way the supportive relationship manifests is unique to the UK, the concept of it is not. Although not referring to it as a supportive relationship, Schou examines how many national security news journalists in the US will give the CIA’s public affairs office at least one day’s notice of an impending story, a courtesy which is

82 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 531
83 Pincher, C, Dangerous to Know, p. 232
often extended to America’s allies, including Britain.\textsuperscript{85} Indeed, this was evident when *The Washington Post* sought to publish the name of ‘Jihadi John’ – Mohammed Emwazi, a British national working with the so-called Islamic State who was involved in the murder of several western journalists and aid workers.\textsuperscript{86} After telling the British Intelligence Services of the article, they were asked to wait 24 hours before publishing. It transpires, this was so the Emwazi family could be relocated (they had dual nationality) for their own safety once the story broke.\textsuperscript{87} Thus, news journalists are able to support the work of the American and British Intelligence Services.

**Conclusion**

To assess ‘What is the nature of the relationship between the British Intelligence Services and news journalism’, Hewitt and Lucas’s typology of how the relationship manifests was explored. Whilst there is substantial evidence of all the relationships occurring at different times, it is the adversarial and dependent relationships which are seemingly most prevalent, with the laudatory relationship occurring fleetingly. These findings may be due to the emphasis of investigative journalism in reporting upon intelligence matters, something which would be limited if the British Intelligence Services were more open about their activities where possible. How these relationships impact upon the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services is something the subsequent section will seek to examine.

**Views of British Intelligence**

**Introduction**

In both the build-up to the Iraq War in 2003 and the 2013 Snowden revelations, British Intelligence received substantial media coverage, allowing for a clear comparison of how

\textsuperscript{85} Schou, N, *Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood*, p. 12

\textsuperscript{86} BBC News, *Islamic State: Profile of Mohammed Emwazi aka ‘Jihadi John’* Dominick Casciani, 13\textsuperscript{th} November 2015, Available From: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31641569 (Accessed 9\textsuperscript{th} September 2019);


\textsuperscript{87} Schou, N, *Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood*, p. 12
British Intelligence was depicted in two separate cases, as well as how reporting of intelligence matters may have evolved over the course of a decade. The section explores the key themes evident in news and opinion articles. These are: Capable and Effective which includes the organisational structure, Ethical Activities, Human Dimension and Secrecy. Although the portrayal of British Intelligence within news journalism is often a subsidiary topic, overall a positive portrayal of British Intelligence is provided to the public, despite depictions of British Intelligence being affected by wider themes such as the nature of the relationship and political bias of the media organisation. This results in the public receiving multiple depictions of intelligence, something which could be overcome if the British Intelligence Services were undertook more direct public facing engagement.

Whilst the 2003 Iraq invasion is not the first time countries have gone to war in controversial circumstances, the academic debate pertaining to the politicisation of intelligence following the Iraq War was unprecedented. But what remains under-explored is how the British Intelligence Services were portrayed in the media discussions pertaining to both the British invasion, and the dodgy dossier, thus providing a significant contribution to the literature. This is also the case for the Snowden revelations. News journalists played a key role in highlighting the existence of such mass data collection which predominantly led to an adversarial relationship with the British Intelligence Services, yet the depictions this created has yet to be examined. By analysing media stories relating to both case studies, this section will analyse the depictions that media outlets provided of British Intelligence.

**Capable and Effective**

In May 2003, the BBC correspondent Andrew Gilligan told BBC Radio 4’s *Today Programme* that the September dossier had been sexed-up at the request of Downing Street, and that the Prime Minister’s office had known that the 45-minute claim was

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89 Gill, P, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq,’ p. 12 – 33;
misleading. Gilligan’s source was the eminent Ministry of Defence (MOD) scientist Dr David Kelly who specialised in discovering weapons of mass destruction.\(^{90}\) He told Gilligan that British Intelligence were unhappy about the published version of the dossier as it did not reflect their considered view.\(^{91}\) Based on a dependent relationship, it was via Gilligan’s report that assertions of sexing-up the dodgy dossier were first revealed after Kelly spoke to Gilligan about his concerns.\(^{92}\) Gilligan’s coverage of the dodgy dossier suggests implicitly that the British Intelligence Services are capable and effective due to the emphasis placed upon the role of the Government in politicising intelligence. As Gilligan reported:

\[\text{Downing Street, our source says, ordered a week before publication, ordered it (the dossier) to be “sexed up”, to be made more exciting.}^{93}\]

It was the dependent relationship which resulted in Gilligan being able to report on these claims, as without Kelly’s information, the story would not have existed. This demonstrates how crucial the nature of the relationship can be in the portrayal of the British Intelligence Services as it fundamentally shifted the onus away from the details of the dossier, to how it had been politicised by policymakers and Alastair Campbell in particular. This leads to an implicit view of the British Intelligence Services as being capable and effective as alterations to the intelligence occurred at the political level rather than the original intelligence reports. This was a consistent portrayal to that evident in the US at the time.


\(^{91}\) The Guardian, *Dr David Kelly: 10 years on, death of scientist remains unsolved for some*, Vikram Dodd, 16\(^{th}\) July 2013, Available From: [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jul/16/david-kelly-death-10-years-on](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jul/16/david-kelly-death-10-years-on) (Accessed 24\(^{th}\) March 2019);


Some of the most accurate reporting about Iraq came from leaks within the CIA, where there was widespread resentment against the Bush administration – and particularly vice President Cheney’s office – over its manipulation of intelligence to justify the war... Cheney’s staff had cherry-picked CIA intelligence that suited their purposes, passing along reports that seemed to bolster the notion Saddam had WMDs, while ignoring other intelligence that undercut the administration’s case for war.94

However in Britain, the report led to significant confrontations between the BBC and the Blair Government95 with Alastair Campbell demanding that the BBC apologise.96 When appearing on Channel 4 News, Campbell once again commanded the BBC to apologise, whilst showing his confrontational nature when he told Jon Snow to ‘get your facts right before making serious allegations’ and to ‘correct yourself’.97 This demonstrates an adversarial, and almost confrontational relationship between the Blair Government and news journalism, although Campbell’s anger was predominantly directed at the BBC.

To mark the 10th anniversary of the Iraq War, Panorama produced a programme ‘Spies who fooled the world’ that explored how flawed intelligence was cherry picked by US and UK policy-makers to make the case for war. This was based on what Michael Fitzgerald and Richard Ned Lebow refer to as ‘the most notorious example of fabricated evidence’98 namely the assertions made by Agent Curveball and others, including an Iraqi general, about Saddam Hussein’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities.

94 Schou, N, Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood, p. 64
97 YouTube, Alastair Campbell interviewed by Jon Snow – Channel 4 News 2003, 27th June 2003 Available From: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8a5uImq5X4I (Accessed 13th October 2018);
These informants claimed that Saddam had mobile biological laboratories and these assertions were a key facet in Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations, to the extent that diagrams were shown. This is despite the fact the assertions had been dismissed by the Defence Intelligence Agency and the CIA had never interviewed Agent Curveball.

Indeed, this selected use of intelligence is an assessment shared by Paul Pillar in his discussion of how the Bush Administration used policy to drive intelligence by cherry-picking intelligence rather than using the intelligence community’s analytical judgements. Both the Panorama documentary and related news articles portray the British Intelligence Services, and specifically MI6 as a capable and effective organisation who sought to corroborate available information and analyse it to the best of their ability. This furthers the positive portrayal of both MI6 and the British Intelligence Services.

This positive portrayal was further evident when Peter Taylor undertook a number of high-profile interviews for the Panorama documentary, including with Agent Curveball, those within the CIA, the Head of German Intelligence August Hanning and the head of Defence Intelligence (DI) at the time, Dr Brian Jones. Gaining such high profile interviews should be unsurprising as Panorama previously interviewed Peter Wright where they uncovered Wright’s fabrication of the Wilson plot as well as interviewing the KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky. This would suggest a dependent relationship as DI sought to provide their account of the lead-up to the Iraq War, but were dependent on Peter Taylor to provide this to the public. All these interviews further the positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services by alluding to the problems emanating from the politicisation of intelligence. However, the associated article on the BBC news

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100 C-Span, Colin Powell’s Speech at the UN, 5th February 2003, Available From: https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4716794/colin-powells-speech (Accessed 22nd June 2018)
105 Pincher, C, The Truth About Dirty Tricks, p. 182, 242
website did not explore this theme in as much detail,\textsuperscript{106} perhaps due to editorial issues such as ensuring news articles are concise.

*The Guardian* articles in the lead up to the Iraq War also depict the British Intelligence Services as capable and effective, albeit in a more implicit manner as they explore Alistair Campbell’s role in changing the September dossier.\textsuperscript{107} Based on information gained via a Freedom of Information (FoIA) request, the 2010 article portrays Campbell as responsible for ordering the changes to the pre-invasion dossier to mirror claims made by the Bush administration, resulting in extensive comparisons being made to the claims made by the CIA.\textsuperscript{108} Thus, it implies that the British Intelligence Services had analysed all the intelligence effectively and the problems occurred via politicisation of intelligence. Although Gilligan argued in 2003 that Alistair Campbell had a central role in the dodgy dossier,\textsuperscript{109} the 2010 article uses a more authoritative tone in criticising Campbell’s involvement, perhaps due to the clear evidence the paper gained via the FoIA request. This raises questions as to whether without investigatory journalism the extent of Campbell’s involvement with the dodgy dossier would have been known and highlights the role of news journalism of providing this information to the public which in turn creates the positive portrayal as the problems were due to politicisation.

Indeed, this theme was also evident in *The Telegraph*’s ‘The Iraq War Files’, a series of articles published to mark the beginning of the Chilcot Inquiry in 2009. These articles suggest that no matter what intelligence was provided to the Blair Government, the decision to go to war was already made.\textsuperscript{110} This portrays the politicisation of intelligence to support their policy, a theme *The Telegraph* opinion articles also depict. In ‘Iraq War:

\textsuperscript{106} BBC News, *Iraq: The spies who fooled the world*, Peter Taylor, 18\textsuperscript{th} March 2013, Available From: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21786506 (Accessed 30\textsuperscript{th} November 2017)
\textsuperscript{109} BBC News, *Full text: Gilligan’s Today reports*, 24\textsuperscript{th} July 2003, Available From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3090681.stm (Accessed 4\textsuperscript{th} May 2018)
\textsuperscript{110} The Telegraph, *The Iraq War Files*, 22\textsuperscript{nd} November 2009, Available From: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/6628792/The-Iraq-war-files.html (Accessed 4\textsuperscript{th} May 2018)
Major New Questions for Tony Blair’ the American influence on Britain’s decision to go to war is examined.\(^{111}\) Although intelligence is a subsidiary theme of the article, it implies that Blair had already decided that Britain would participate in the invasion of Iraq even before the British Intelligence Services provided their views about Iraq and WMDs. *The Telegraph* article therefore demonstrates that the British Intelligence Services was capable and effective as the politicisation was due to pressure exerted by Blair and his aides. In turn, this creates a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services as the issues which occurred were ostensibly out of their control.

In comparison to *The Guardian* news articles, the opinion articles written in the build up to the Iraq War provide an explicit view of the British Intelligence Services being professional, capable and effective as the problems emanated from the politicisation of intelligence by Government officials. ‘Tell Us the Truth About The Dossier’ makes this abundantly clear as it states that ‘the government for months applied pressure on the intelligence agencies to come up with a dossier on Iraq’s banned weapons’.\(^{112}\) By examining the politicisation of intelligence, there is a positive portrayal provided via concise understanding of the difficulties the British Intelligence Services were seeking to overcome when the Government had a clear policy they were seeking to follow, something also evident in ‘Use and Abuse of intelligence’ as:

> The security and intelligence agencies, along with most among the senior ranks of Whitehall, opposed the invasion of Iraq on the grounds that it could not be justified... Officials who expressed concern about the claims were slapped down by the Foreign Office diplomats – though they also, privately, opposed the war – because of the damage such honesty might do to US-UK special relations.\(^{113}\)

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The opinion articles analysed provide clear analysis of the difficulties posed by politicisation, thus portraying the Intelligence Services as being capable and effective in their professionalism. Interestingly, this also places the onus for the situation on the Blair Government as opposed to the wider Labour Party.114 This is an interesting theme as it demonstrates not only that Blair was acting inherently unilaterally, something Sir John Chilcot has highlighted,115 but how The Guardian critiqued the leader of the party that they normally supports.116 The ease with which the newspaper criticised the Blair Government undoubtedly resulted from The Guardian’s opposition to the Iraq War, a recurring theme throughout the opinion articles from the time.117 This demonstrates that despite the political affiliation of a newspaper, they can still be critical of a particular policy of that Government. In The Guardian’s news and opinion articles, the British Intelligence Services are characterised by their professionalism and effectiveness, thus providing their readers with a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services.

Opinion articles demonstrate this as Richard Norton-Taylor states:

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I am told that a member of the JIC realised immediately the 45-minute claim referred only to short-range battlefield weapons.\textsuperscript{118}

This reveals that the British Intelligence Services were capable and effective in analysing intelligence pertaining to the 45-minute claim and that the assertions about it in the dodgy dossier were due to the politicisation of intelligence, thus furthering the positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. But the phraseology also highlights another salient theme, namely how Norton-Taylor had engaged with British Intelligence to receive such information. One of the first interviews undertaken for this research was with Norton-Taylor who did suggest that he had cooperated with MI6 as he was approached for advice when they were creating their website.\textsuperscript{119} It was also seen in an article entitled ‘The evidence against Blair which Hutton cannot ignore’, albeit in a subtler manner. Here, Norton-Taylor states how:

\begin{quote}
Intelligence officials, who are also in the frame, are now distancing themselves further from the dossier they were provided by their political masters to draw up.\textsuperscript{120}
\end{quote}

Other articles by Norton-Taylor suggest this relationship was due to his excellent awareness of British Intelligence. His article titled ‘An Insult to British Intelligence’ highlights the imprecise nature and limits of intelligence,\textsuperscript{121} an assertion explored within the academic literature.\textsuperscript{122} This provides the public with an analytical view of some of the difficulties the British Intelligence Services may encounter but this does not mean they are ineffective, rather Norton-Taylor highlights how supportive the former Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, is of the British Intelligence Services, furthering the depiction of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{119} Private Interview 3: With Richard Norton-Taylor – 19\textsuperscript{th} January 2016
\textsuperscript{120} The Guardian, \textit{The evidence against Blair that Hutton cannot ignore}, Richard Norton – Taylor, 5\textsuperscript{th} January 2004, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/jan/05/media.davidkelly (Accessed 8\textsuperscript{th} August 2018)
\textsuperscript{121} The Guardian, \textit{An insult to British intelligence}, Richard Norton-Taylor, 30\textsuperscript{th} April 2003, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/apr/30/iraq.iraq (Accessed 19\textsuperscript{th} July 2018)
\textsuperscript{122} Omand, Sir, D, \textit{Securing the State}, p. 49 – 50
\end{flushleft}
how effective and capable they are.\textsuperscript{123} This provides a consistent portrayal between news journalism and the Government in their portrayals of the British Intelligence Services in the lead up to the Iraq War.

It is clear that news journalism depicts the British Intelligence Services in an inherently effective light, particularly in the Iraq War case, therefore providing a positive portrayal. All the media outlets analysed, firmly place the onus upon the politicisation of intelligence from policy-makers as being responsible for the issues within the dodgy dossier. Utilising data collected in 2010, Graeme Davies and Robert Johns analysed public attitudes towards MI6 and discovered that there were high levels of confidence from the public in the intelligence which MI6 produces. This is contrasted with the distinct lack of public confidence in the Government’s ability to use intelligence, as the graph below (figure 8) from their article depicting public perception of MI6 and British Government presentation of intelligence demonstrates.

(Figure 8)\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{123} The Guardian. \textit{An insult to British intelligence}. Richard Norton-Taylor, 30\textsuperscript{th} April 2003, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/apr/30/iraq.iraq (Accessed 19\textsuperscript{th} July 2018)

Davies and Johns’ analysis suggests that the public can draw the distinction between whether the intelligence practitioners or policymakers were responsible for the intelligence assessments in the public domain, something which news journalism implicitly suggested due to the emphasis placed upon the politicisation of intelligence.

**Structure**

In the BBC *Panorama* programme ‘Spies Who Fooled The World’, the structural difficulties affecting the Iraq dossier are alluded to. This results in DI not receiving all the intelligence MI6 had, as well as DI’s warnings not being listened to, according to Dr Brian Jones.¹²⁵ This points to a theme referred to in Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’, namely the organisational and structural difficulties affecting the British Intelligence Services. This is evident as the programme emphasises the role of MI6 in the analysis of agents Curveball and Red River; two key Iraqi defectors, whilst only making passing reference to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and ‘other agencies’ who were refuting the claims made by the two agents in question.¹²⁶ Considering the key role the JIC has in intelligence analysis, a structural or organisational difficulty is suggested if they were unable to undertake the analysis of the information provided by Curveball and Red River.

This depicts the British Intelligence Services as being affected by the wider structural and organisational difficulties which impacted upon the quality of intelligence assessment, creating a consistent portrayal to Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’. It also raises questions about why there is simply a reference to other agencies, particularly considering the role of DI in questioning the validity of the intelligence included in the dodgy dossier.¹²⁷ The omission of DI and the role of the JIC suggests that MI6 was solely responsible for the intelligence in the dodgy dossier, rather than a recognition that MI6 was the actor responsible for intelligence

collection whereas the analysis was conducted by the JIC which provided ‘a national assessment of what is gathered’.  

*The Guardian* also highlights the structure of British Intelligence, especially through articles exploring the JIC that were written by the newspaper’s Westminster correspondent David Hancke. He states that the JIC is comprised of:

> Representatives from SIS, MI5, MI6, the Foreign Office, the Cabinet Office, the Treasury and Customs and Excise.  

Crucially, this omits several organisations that are permanent members of the JIC: the MOD; Home Office; Department of International Development and most crucially, GCHQ. However, the inclusion of both SIS and MI6 is problematic as these are in fact names for the same organisation. Despite attempting to provide an understanding of the structure of British Intelligence, there is a flawed understanding of who constitutes the British Intelligence Services being depicted to the public. This becomes inherently problematic due to the important role of news journalism in informing and educating the public. Whilst the structure of intelligence may require such cooperation with both the Treasury and Customs and Excise, this is arguably not their main objective, something implied by Hencke’s writing. If there was more openness surrounding the JIC, such misunderstandings could be overcome, something a supportive relationship could also aid. Information pertaining to the JIC structure is publicly available, albeit in a simplistic manner on the Gov.uk website, raising questions as to why such a limited view of British Intelligence is evident within the article. Two possible reasons are the journalists’

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limited awareness of British Intelligence or errors within the editing process. One off-the-record interview did highlight the rigorous nature of the editorial process, leading to further questions as to how such a flawed comprehension of the JIC was allowed to be printed.

In *The Telegraph*'s article ‘British Intelligence provided main source for dossier’, there is a clear comprehension of the JIC’s role in combining intelligence assessments from the individual organisations, from the defence correspondent Michael Smith.\(^{133}\) This clearly depicts the structures of analysis within British Intelligence, thus allowing the public to have a clearer understanding of these themes. Indeed, examining the structure of British Intelligence is evident in another article written by Smith and Johnston. In ‘Dossier will draw on MI6 and CIA files,’ Smith explores the role of the MOD in providing intelligence for the September dossier, as well as the difficulties posed for British Intelligence by the Government seeking to publish the report.\(^{134}\) This further creates a consistent portrayal within the public domain about the wider organisational and structural issues affecting the working environment of the British Intelligence Services.

Articles in *The Guardian* by Norton-Taylor, the newspaper's defence and security correspondent,\(^{135}\) also elicit a clear awareness of the British Intelligence Services as this chapter has intimated. ‘Threat of War: Dossier: Secrets of Saddam’s hidden arsenal’ refers to how the intelligence community has responsibility for analysis.\(^{136}\) Although a subtle theme to highlight, Norton-Taylor demonstrates the complex structure of British

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Intelligence,\textsuperscript{137} as well as the importance of intelligence analysis, exhibiting an excellent awareness of the existence of a wider intelligence community. This portrays the intricacies of the structure of British Intelligence to the public.

Tom Utley implicitly explores the structure of British Intelligence when examining the politicisation of the dodgy dossier where he argues that Alastair Campbell:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Did everything in his power to strengthen the wording of the document, so that it gave the impression of a much more immediate threat from Saddam than actually existed. But the inconvenient fact remains that every word of the dossier was approved by the head of the JIC. The JIC’s Chairman, John Scarlett, was misguided to accept so many of Mr Campbell’s suggested amendments to the dossier.}\textsuperscript{138}
\end{quote}

Unlike the other articles exploring the politicisation of the dodgy dossier, Utley argues it was Sir John Scarlett who let the politicisation happen by approving the wording of the dodgy dossier, perhaps due to political pressure exerted upon him as the quote above highlights. This demonstrates that the structure of the British Intelligence Services meant it was the JIC that was responsible for the intelligence provided to policymakers, implicitly portraying the Big 3 as capable and effective; the dodgy dossier was something which occurred out of their control, thus creating a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. Although this was an opinion piece, Utley provided a clear and concise understanding of the role of the JIC, something lacking in other news and opinion articles. This raises the question of whether there was a supportive relationship between Utley and British Intelligence for this view to be provided to the public.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{137} Gov.uk, Joint Intelligence Organisation, Available From: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-security/groups/joint-intelligence-organisation (Accessed 27\textsuperscript{th} November 2015)

\textsuperscript{138} The Telegraph, Hutton has distracted attention from the week’s really big story, Tom Utley, 31\textsuperscript{st} January 2004, Available From: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3602085/Hutton-has-distracted-attention-from-the-weeks-really-big-story.html (Accessed 13\textsuperscript{th} August 2018)
\end{footnotesize}
Whilst some of the articles in this section have explored the structure of British Intelligence in a more concise and analytical manner, all of them seek to highlight to some extent the organisational difficulties that are posed by the structure of British Intelligence. This allows the public to have a clearer and more concise understanding of how intelligence was politicised in the lead up to the Iraq War, as well as placing information in the public domain about the mechanics of British Intelligence. Although one interviewee believed that this is not a subject the public are interested in, this can never be fully assessed unless the public are given the possibility of understanding such themes. But the central issues remains that although this information is being discussed by news journalism, the onus remains on the individual to access, read and digest this information.

Although the news journalism articles examined thus far was portrayed the British Intelligence Services as being portrayed as capable and effective, this was not always the case. When interviewing Sir John Chilcott, Laura Kuensseberg implied that the British Intelligence Services were, in fact, incapable. In a confusingly worded question, she asks:

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\text{So, you believe the report should in theory, could stop another rush to war where, not enough was being done either in the legal process, or the intelligence process to be sure, that it was the right thing.}^{140}
\]

Kuensseberg, the BBC’s political editor, implies that the British Intelligence Services were incapable in the lead up to the Iraq War by not ensuring that the invasion was the right course of action. This suggests to the audience that the British Intelligence Services had the ability to tell policymakers what to do with the intelligence provided, despite the British Intelligence Services not having a role in assessing whether a policy decision was right or wrong. This contrasts with the clear understanding and analysis of intelligence in both a contemporary and historical context demonstrated by Gordon Corera, the

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139 Private Interview 4: 21st January 2016
140 YouTube, BBC News – Tony Blair ‘not straight’ with UK over Iraq, says Chilcot, 6th July 2017
Available From: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tPygSfzEBg (Accessed 3rd July 2018)
BBC’s security correspondent,\(^\text{141}\) suggesting the importance of the role of the individual news journalist in the depiction provided to the public. But despite this, there does seem to be an overarching understanding of the organisational and structural issues affecting the British Intelligence Services, something of a consistent portrayal.

Legal and Ethical Activity
Discussing the Cold War context and the troubles in Northern Ireland, Pincher highlights how the British Intelligence Services sought to act in a legal and ethical manner, even in difficult circumstances by contrasting their actions with others such as the Soviet Intelligence agency the KGB as he states:

> When the fanatical pro-Iranian Hezbollah terrorists extended their kidnapping campaign in the Lebanon by seizing four Soviet diplomats and killing one of them, the KGB responded in the only way barbaric murderers would be likely to understand. They grabbed a close relative of one of the Hezbollah leaders, shot him and returned his body, with his testicles in his mouth, along with a message that this was only the start if the diplomats were not released... By contrast, the British Army in Northern Ireland is allowed to hold a captured terrorist or suspect for only half an hour before having to hand him over to the Police.\(^\text{142}\)

By using this example, Pincher explores how the British Intelligence Services maintained legal and ethical standards when compared to their adversaries, perhaps due to the standards expected of intelligence services in democratic countries. This is a theme he further highlights when exploring how the British Army wanted to doctor sten gun


\(^{142}\) Pincher, C, *The Truth About Dirty Tricks*, p. 25
ammunition\textsuperscript{143} in order for it to explode when the IRA used it, but such a tactic was deemed ‘too dirty’ by Whitehall civil servants.\textsuperscript{144} Thus, it is implied that the British had a legal and ethical response to the troubles in Northern Ireland through Pincher’s assertions. This is a continuing theme throughout \textit{The Truth About Dirty Tricks}. Pincher furthers such a portrayal in \textit{The Trade is Treachery} as:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Having no powers of arrest or legal authority of its own, MI5 cannot require suspects to undergo interrogation. They can only be invited to do so.}\textsuperscript{145}
\end{quote}

This highlights the limitations placed upon MI5 to ensure that they act in a legal and ethical manner, unlike their KGB counterparts. Indeed, in the conclusion, Pincher highlights how MI5’s powers to carry out routine procedures such as tapping a telephone\textsuperscript{146} have been greatly reduced and controlled, with the Post Office refusing to undertake surveillance work for GCHQ unless there was a warrant.\textsuperscript{147} This further highlighting the overall assertion of the book that wrongdoing emanated from individuals, not the service.

When discussing the \textit{Spycatcher Affair}, Pincher intimates that it is the actions of individual officers as opposed to the service as a whole who is in the wrong, thus intimating that the British Intelligence Services acted in a legal and ethical manner, an overarching theme in \textit{Their Trade is Treachery}. This provides a consistent portrayal to ‘Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ as the official histories not only portrayed the Intelligence Services as acting legally and ethically, but how the role of individuals can cause problems.

\textsuperscript{143} A sten gun is a type of submachine gun which was used by the British and Commonwealth Forces during the Second World War.
\textsuperscript{144} Pincher, C, \textit{The Truth About Dirty Tricks}, p. 273
\textsuperscript{145} Pincher, C, \textit{Their Trade Is Treachery}, p. 142
\textsuperscript{146} This refers to undertaking surveillance on an individual’s telephone calls.
Based on comments from the former DG of MI5 in 2010, *The Guardian* article ‘UK complained to US about terror suspect torture, says ex-MI5 boss’ portrays the British Intelligence Services, and specifically MI5 as acting legally and ethically as they ‘did lodge a protest’ about the US use of torture. But, Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller does acknowledge that they were slow to realise the US use of torture.\(^{148}\) Whilst this article does explicitly acknowledge how MI5 were seeking to act in a legal and ethical way, it could have further explored the ramifications of such a complaint by assessing structural and working difficulties with the Americans following these concerns. This view is centred upon the comments of the former DG and demonstrates a form of engagement between the British Intelligence Services and news journalism. Therefore, engagement between the British Intelligence Services and news journalism can still result in critical reporting of their actions, whilst also providing a cohesive understanding of British Intelligence to the public.

Whilst the overriding portrayal of the British Intelligence Services provided by this article is that they act legally and ethically, the article also implies that MI5 were somewhat incapable due to the length of time that it took for them to discover the Americans’ use of torture, although why this was the case is unclear. However, this does not detract from the central view being that MI5 acted legally and ethically in their attempts to stop the use of torture. Not only does this result in a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, but demonstrates another example of a consistent portrayal from the previous chapters, and most notably Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’. This demonstrates that the avenues of information are providing the same over-arching depictions that the British Intelligence Services themselves seek to provide to the public.

*The Guardian*’s article ‘Blair Government rendition policy led to rift between UK spy agencies’ also explores ethical activity, although framing it in a solely British context as

it discusses the tensions between MI5 and MI6 caused by the latter’s involvement in the American practice of extraordinary rendition. This created:

... A serious and prolonged breakdown of trust between
Britain's domestic and foreign spy agencies provoked by
the Blair government’s support for rendition.¹⁴⁹

By drawing the distinction between MI5 and MI6, it portrays that illegal and unethical activity were not commonplace throughout the British Intelligence Services as they were just undertaken by MI6. In highlighting MI5’s role in seeking to prevent such behaviour, it further intimates how they did seek to act legally and ethically. This is evident as the article goes on to explore how MI6’s illegal and unethical behaviour adversely affected their cooperation, although a greater emphasis could have been placed upon this theme to fully allow the public to understand the issues affecting the British Intelligence Services. However, perhaps this was impossible as it would have required engagement from the British Intelligence Services in a supportive or dependent relationship and this was lacking at the time.

The BBC’s coverage of the technological aspects of the Snowden revelations portrayed an implicit view of the British Intelligence Services acting both ethically and professionally. In the Panorama episode, ‘Edward Snowden: Spies and the Law’, Peter Taylor draws the distinction between GCHQ having the capability to remotely access a smartphone and actively using it.¹⁵⁰ This was further evident as news articles examined the amount of personal data technology companies gathered and their relationship with the British Government.¹⁵¹ This demonstrates the implicit portrayal of GCHQ seeking to act in a proportional manner; just because such capabilities exist, does not mean they are utilised. This is something that even Snowden himself highlighted,¹⁵² and is also a

consistent portrayal to Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and Chapter 3 ‘A Complimentary Relationship’.

‘Edward Snowden: Spies and the Law’ had a clear focus on GCHQ, signifying how the Snowden disclosures solely involved GCHQ rather than the British Intelligence Services as a whole. This implies that MI5 and MI6 had not been acting in the same manner as GCHQ, something which undoubtedly aids public understanding of intelligence. This is in stark contrast to the discussions of Snowden in Chapter 3 ‘A Complimentary Relationship’ which focused upon the British Intelligence Services as an entity. It also demonstrates ethical adherence, examining the number of interception warrants approved in 2014, although erroneously it states it was the Home Secretary who approved these, despite the Foreign Secretary having day-to-day ministerial responsibility for GCHQ. Although the details of the approval process are presented in a somewhat confusing way, the article does indicate that GCHQ follows a process of applying for interception warrants and thus that it adheres to legal and ethical guidelines, creating another consistent portrayal to both Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and Chapter 3 ‘A Complimentary Relationship’. This determines that whilst the avenues of information highlight the same overall themes, there are subtle differences in the way in which these depictions are provided.

*The Telegraph* article ‘GCHQ is a greater problem than American spies’, claims intelligence whistle-blower*155* explores the issues surrounding the legislation governing GCHQ, a theme also analysed in the academic literature.*156* The article portrays how GCHQ are always striving to ensure the safety and security of British citizens by acting in a legal and ethical manner by adhering to legislation, a consistent portrayal to that

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156 Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 82, 95
GCHQ themselves have on their website and the argument made by Leigh.157 This is a theme which was explored in BBC’s Panorama ‘Edward Snowden: Spies and the Law’, exhibiting how different news journalists can provide a similar depiction of the British Intelligence Services to their audiences, it is the way in which this occurs which differs. But this undeniably leads to questions about how effective news journalism can be in providing the public with an understanding of the British Intelligence Services if there are such different ways that the same theme can be depicted. To an extent, this can be due to the political affiliation of the news outlet, but could be easily overcome if there was more openness from British Intelligence Services themselves. This would prevent news journalism being in such a privileged position in terms of providing understandings of the British Intelligence Services to the public.

**Being in the wrong**

As more information became publicly available, it seems that The Telegraph changed its stance on Blair’s decision to go to war. Written to mark the 10th anniversary of the conflict, ‘Iraq War: Major new questions for Tony Blair’ explores how Blair misled the public over the threat posed by Saddam and WMDs due to his desire to support Bush’s invasion.158 This is in sharp contrast to ‘Dossier will draw on MI6 and CIA files’ written in 2002 which implies that the dodgy dossier was solely based on intelligence.159 However, this may also be due to the timing of events. Following the 2010 General Election, the Conservatives, whom The Telegraph supports,160 were in a coalition Government with the Liberal Democrats. Potentially, this explains the impetus of the newspaper changing their stance on the dodgy dossier and placing the onus on Blair for the politicisation of the dodgy dossier; namely wanting to continue to support the Conservative Government.

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157 Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 82, 95
Indeed, providing support to the Cameron Government was also implicitly suggested in the reporting of the Snowden revelations and the framing of article titles. The title ‘Edward Snowden is a traitor to the United States: he must be brought to justice’ strongly asserts that Snowden was wrong for disclosing classified material, a consistent portrayal to that in Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’. The article then argued that he had endangered intelligence personnel and should be brought to justice as a result.\textsuperscript{161} This is a view which has been highlighted by intelligence officers from around the world,\textsuperscript{162} and is the major critique of Snowden’s decision to place such vast amounts of sensitive material in the public domain, a central theme explored in Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’. The article ends by stating:

\begin{quote}
It is the dedicated and professional staff in these agencies, and at GCHQ in Cheltenham, that provide vital and timely insights into immediate and future threats to the UK national interest.\textsuperscript{163}
\end{quote}

This furthers the depiction of the British Intelligence Services being inherently capable and Snowden being in the wrong with his revelations, leading to a more positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services.

Indeed, such framing was also evident in \textit{The Telegraph}’s obituaries for Melita Norwood and Peter Wright. Norwood was a double agent for the Russians but was not uncovered

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{161} The Telegraph, \textit{Edward Snowden is a traitor to the United States: he must be brought to justice}, Mark Pritchard, MP, 18\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Available From: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10127864/Edward-Snowden-is-a-traitor-to-the-United-States-he-must-be-brought-to-justice.html (Accessed 13\textsuperscript{th} March 2018)
\item \textsuperscript{162} YouTube, \textit{CIA-GW Intelligence Conference: Panel on The View from Foreign Intelligence Chiefs}, Available From: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yeBv7Q3sv0 (Accessed 24\textsuperscript{th} January 2018)
\item \textsuperscript{163} The Telegraph, \textit{Edward Snowden is a traitor to the United States: he must be brought to justice}, Mark Pritchard, MP, 18\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Available From: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10127864/Edward-Snowden-is-a-traitor-to-the-United-States-he-must-be-brought-to-justice.html (Accessed 13\textsuperscript{th} March 2018)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotes}
until 1999,\textsuperscript{164} despite evidence of her treachery as early as the 1930s.\textsuperscript{165} Wright, a whistle-blower in the 1980s, took the British Government to court in his attempt to publish his memoir \textit{Spycatcher}.\textsuperscript{166} Although there were some positive outcomes from Wright’s assertions,\textsuperscript{167} \textit{The Telegraph}’s discussion of Wright frames him as a whistle-blower who, along with Norwood, sought to damage Britain’s security by placing more information in the public domain.\textsuperscript{168} This demonstrates how the framing of Snowden as someone who has damaged national security is another example of \textit{The Telegraph} portraying as traitors those whose actions it does not approve of, suggesting a bias towards national security, in whatever form it occurs. Indirectly, this depicts British Intelligence as always seeking to act in the public interest.

Many of \textit{The Guardian} articles about Iraq WMD capabilities explore the British Government decision during the 1980s to help build the Iraqi chemical warfare plant, Falluja,\textsuperscript{169} at a time when Saddam was thought to be gassing Iranian troops during the


Hemming, H, ‘M: Maxwell Knight, MI5’s greatest spymaster’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 20\textsuperscript{th} April 2017


\textsuperscript{167} In her autobiography, Dame Stella Rimington highlights that Wright’s allegations were on the factors which led to the service being placed on a statutory footing in 1994. See: Rimington, S, Dame, \textit{Open Secret}, (London, Arrow Books, 2001), p. 195;

Andrew, C, \textit{Defence of the Realm}, p. 564


The Telegraph, \textit{Obituary – Peter Wright}, Available From: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/7547558/Peter-Wright.html (Accessed 13\textsuperscript{th} February 2017)

\textsuperscript{169} The Guardian, \textit{Threat of war: Dismay at chemical plant link to Britain}, Available From Nexis: https://www.nexis.com/results/emhdocview.do?docLinkInd=true&ersKey=23_T27660800358&format=G NBFI&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=0_T27660800370&backKey=20_T27660800371&csi=138620&docNo=1 (Accessed 25\textsuperscript{th} June 2018);

The Guardian, \textit{Britain’s dirty secret}, David Leigh and John Hooper, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2003, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/06/uk.iraq (Accessed 25\textsuperscript{th} June 2018);

The Guardian, \textit{The strange case of Falluja 2}, David Leigh, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2003, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/06/uk.iraq2 (Accessed 25\textsuperscript{th} June 2018)
Iran-Iraq war.\textsuperscript{170} Here, \textit{The Guardian}'s articles are implicitly suggesting that the Thatcher Government had questionable ethical considerations because it was unconcerned about providing Saddam with the capability to produce and use chemical weapons. The articles are based upon Government documents, portraying the Thatcher Government as being in the wrong for supporting Falluja 2. This resulted in the UK taxpayer giving £300,000 in compensation to the Iraqi Government after the final checks on the plant were interrupted by the first Gulf War,\textsuperscript{171} something which furthers the article’s argument of Thatcher being in the wrong. In the Iraq War context, the article depicts the JIC assessment for being wrong in not highlighting the British involvement in Falluja 2, however the articles do not state how the assessments would have been aided by its inclusion.

This clearly exhibits \textit{The Guardian}'s political stance as a left-wing newspaper with a readership of predominantly Labour and Liberal Democrats supporters.\textsuperscript{172} Undoubtedly, this limits the analysis provided as it portrays the Conservative Government as wrong for their approval of Falluja 2. But, despite this, \textit{The Guardian} were opposed to the Iraq War, but place the blame for such actions firmly on Blair as opposed to the Labour Party,\textsuperscript{173} demonstrating how although a newspaper may have a clear political stance, this does not prevent them from criticising party policies. Therefore, it is somewhat surprising for the

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\textsuperscript{170} The Guardian, \textit{Britain's dirty secret}, David Leigh and John Hooper, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2003, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/06/uk.iraq (Accessed 25\textsuperscript{th} June 2018)
\textsuperscript{171} The Guardian, \textit{Britain's dirty secret}, David Leigh and John Hooper, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2003, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/06/uk.iraq (Accessed 25\textsuperscript{th} June 2018)
\textsuperscript{172} BBC News, \textit{The politics of UK newspapers}, Available From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8282189.stm (15\textsuperscript{th} March 2018)
\textsuperscript{173} The Guardian, \textit{Blame the masters, not the servants}, Richard Norton – Taylor, 3\textsuperscript{rd} February 2004, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/feb/03/davidkelly_media (Accessed 7\textsuperscript{th} August 2018);
The Guardian, \textit{The evidence against Blair that Hutton cannot ignore}, Richard Norton – Taylor, 5\textsuperscript{th} January 2004, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/jan/05/media.davidkelly (Accessed 8\textsuperscript{th} August 2018);
The Guardian, \textit{45 minutes from a major scandal}, Richard Norton – Taylor, 18\textsuperscript{th} February 2004, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/feb/18/iraq.iraq (Accessed 7\textsuperscript{th} August 2018);
The Guardian, \textit{Straw explores Cook’s legacy}, Ewen MacAskill, 11\textsuperscript{th} June 2001, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/jun/11/whitehall.jackstraw (Accessed 9\textsuperscript{th} August 2018);
The Guardian, \textit{Blair stole my birthday}, Richard Norton – Taylor, 5\textsuperscript{th} June 2004, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jun/05/secondworldwar.iraq (Accessed 7\textsuperscript{th} August 2018);
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articles to have a limited focus upon the Iraq War context and rather seek to place the onus for the current situation upon the actions of the Thatcher Government.

Although impartiality has been a guiding principle of the BBC since the 1920s, there are times when this has been questioned. Peter Taylor interviewed numerous high-profile individuals for the Panorama programme ‘Edward Snowden, Spies and the Law’, including: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Deputy Director Mark Giuliano; Metropolitan Police (Met) Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley; General Mike Hayden; David Anderson; Sir Malcolm Rifkind and Edward Snowden. This exhibits the possibility of a supportive relationship being evident for such individuals to talk candidly about surveillance and related themes. But the interviewee selection leads to the programme providing the view that Snowden is a traitor, a view particularly promoted by the FBI Deputy Director Mark Giuliano. Whilst it is admirable that Taylor interviewed Snowden, providing a balanced view of Snowden’s actions could have been furthered by interviewing those who have praised Snowden’s actions, perhaps even Glen Greenwald who was responsible for publishing the information. This results in the portrayal of Snowden as being wrong for revealing classified information, a consistent portrayal to that evident in Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’. Perhaps this is best evident when Taylor puts to Snowden the charges the US Government has brought against him and states how each one is accurate, although Snowden disputes this.

**Unethical Activity**

*The history of intelligence agencies over the last 50 years in the US and UK – with the targeting of trade unionists, left-wingers, peace campaigners, civil rights activists and others, as well as the dodgy dossier – shows the need for*

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174 McNair, B, *News and Journalism in the UK*, p. 36
175 YouTube, BBC Panorama – Edward Snowden Spies and the Law BBC Documentary 2015, 6th October 2015, Available From: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ozf7ZqFqFkA](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ozf7ZqFqFkA) (Accessed 29th June 2018)
176 YouTube, BBC Panorama – Edward Snowden Spies and the Law BBC Documentary 2015, 6th October 2015, Available From: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ozf7ZqFqFkA](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ozf7ZqFqFkA) (Accessed 29th June 2018)
177 YouTube, BBC Panorama – Edward Snowden Spies and the Law BBC Documentary 2015, Available From: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ozf7ZqFqFkA](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ozf7ZqFqFkA) (Accessed 29th June 2018)
strong oversight by parliament and the judiciary, neither of which exists. 178

Written after the Snowden disclosures, this passage from an opinion article by Ewen MacAskill portrays how the British Intelligence Services are acting in the shadows due to a lack of oversight, suggesting that the British Intelligence Services were not under the control of the Ministers who are meant to oversee them. 179 This creates a negative portrayal of the British Intelligence Services for not acting legally and ethically. The wording implies British Intelligence had been acting unethically in their targeting of certain groups, a theme which Christopher Andrew explores in the MI5 official history. 180 Thus, Ewen MacAskill’s assertion of such unethical activity seems apt in the MI5 context, providing the view that the British Intelligence Services have at times undertaken illegal and unethical actions.

The Guardian’s coverage of the Snowden revelations portrays him as a hero who has done the right thing in providing information about Intelligence capabilities to the public. In turn, this creates the implied portrayal that the British and American Intelligence Services have acted illegally and unethically:

The existence of the programme has been disclosed in documents shown to the Guardian by the NSA whistle-blower Edward Snowden as part of his attempt to expose what he has called “the largest programme of suspicionless surveillance in human history”. “It’s not just a US problem. The UK has a huge dog in this fight”,

180 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 534 – 535
Snowden told the Guardian. “They [GCHQ] are worse than the US”.  

This is further evident in how defensive The Guardian reporting is about anyone who has criticised Snowden. Following allegations in The Sunday Times about David Miranda’s involvement with the Snowden documents and the access Russia have had to the classified documents, The Guardian was highly scathing of the reporting, claiming it was factually inaccurate that David Miranda had met Snowden in Moscow and was in possession of classified documents when he was detained at Heathrow Airport. If the assertions of Miranda’s detention were accurate, something The Guardian reporting suggests, it would further the portrayal of the British Intelligence Services acting in an unethical manner due to their perceived role in the detention of Miranda at Heathrow. This raises questions about whether those involved are almost too close to the story to provide an un-biased, analytical view of the subject matter. But it also serves to demonstrate the adversarial relationship between the British Government and The Guardian, something which continually manifested itself during the course of the Snowden revelations.

Glenn Greenwald, the investigative journalist responsible for publishing the Snowden revelations in 2013 provides his account of the time leading up to, and after the Snowden documents were published in his book No Place To Hide. In it, he states how he, Snowden and Laura Poitras – another investigative journalist involved, vetted all the material before publication, to ensure nothing which would harm anyone was released. Implicitly, this suggests that whilst British and American intelligence organisations had acted unethically, Snowden, Greenwald and Poitras were seeking to act ethically in their


decision as to what information to publish. However, considering the vast scope of the Snowden disclosures, it seems impossible for Snowden, let alone the investigative journalists Greenwald and Poitras to have the in-depth knowledge to assess what information should be redacted. But had Britain had more openness akin to America’s and a system of teaching journalists what information could be detrimental to national security, the journalists involved would arguably have had a better awareness of what to omit from the Snowden revelations.

The failure to fully ‘vet’ the Snowden revelations is one of the major critiques of Snowden and the journalists levied by intelligence officials as is discussed in Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’. It demonstrates the adversarial nature of the relationship following the Snowden revelations which increased when GCHQ employees entered The Guardian offices and ordered computer hard drives to be destroyed.

The portrayal of unethical actions following the Snowden revelations was further demonstrated in an opinion article for The Guardian. Following the terrorist attack in Paris in 2015, Trevor Timm argues that:

*Politicians in the UK, which already has the most expansive surveillance laws in the western-world, are using the tragedy to attempt to rush through their even more invasive new mass-spying bill.*

Referring to the Investigatory Powers Bill, Timm suggests that the British Intelligence Services already undertake in mass surveillance, and is therefore acting unethically. As Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’ and Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’

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explored, this is not the British Intelligence Services acting illegally and unethically, but rather a significant limitation of the legislation, a subtle difference which is not fully explored by Timm. If it were, it would depict that the British Intelligence Services were acting lawfully, but issues arose due to the obscure language, and lack of legislation directly relating to the collection of information online.

Indeed, MacAskill highlights a similar theme, albeit in a more muted manner. He argues that:

*The intelligence services, after decades left to their own devices, have been exposed to publicity. The idea that their activities can be left free from at least some degree of transparency and oversight is no longer tenable.*

This suggests that new legislation was required if the current system was untenable. What this means for the actions the British Intelligence Services can undertake, could have been further explored, thus highlighting the limitations of the legislation. In turn, this could have provided greater analysis for the Investigatory Powers Bill which sought to provide legislation of gathering information from the internet, and was incredibly controversial.

In 2015, BBC *Panorama* explored the Snowden revelations as part of their coverage of the Investigatory Powers Bill, where Taylor examined the necessity of the new legislation. This implied the limitations of the existing legislation and that issues emanated from this as opposed to the activities undertaken by the British Intelligence Services. By interviewing the Met Assistant Commissioner and discussing the use of

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189 Private Interview 4: 21st January 2016


social media information,\textsuperscript{192} suggestions were made as to how law enforcement would also use the newly-legislated capabilities. One interviewee also highlighted this theme, stating that British Intelligence and Law Enforcement realised the necessity of the legislation, as it would put all powers together in a more transparent way, with the only new power being internet connection records, and it was Law Enforcement who were pushing for the new power.\textsuperscript{193} If the Police’s use of the new legislation was made clearer throughout the programme, it would have highlighted to the audience that it was not British Intelligence who were keen to have further powers of surveillance and would have furthered the depiction that British Intelligence were not acting unethically.

The Snowden revelations highlighted the cooperation between social media companies and Governments,\textsuperscript{194} a theme which Panorama also explored. Taylor interviewed Simon Milner, the Director of Facebook in the UK and Ireland who repeatedly stated how Facebook rely on users to report terrorist content and also requests from law enforcement, suggesting that this was ample to prevent terrorist content.\textsuperscript{195} However, the ISC report into the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby suggested that this was not adequate, after the subsequent discovery of a Facebook chat between one of the killers and an Al Qaeda affiliate about wanting to kill a British soldier with a knife.\textsuperscript{196} This implies how crucial the new legislation would be to law enforcement if social media companies are relying on requests for information, as opposed to providing them with any suspicious online activity. It also alludes to a manipulative relationship; if this part of the ISC report received substantial media attention, public attitudes towards the IP legislation could have been very different.

‘Torture: British role suppressed’ implicitly argues that British Intelligence acted illegally, unethically and crucially without Government approval as:

\textsuperscript{192} YouTube, BBC Panorama – Edward Snowden Spies and the Law BBC Documentary 2015, 6\textsuperscript{th} October 2015, Available From: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ofz7ZqFqFkA (Accessed 29\textsuperscript{th} June 2018)
\textsuperscript{193} Private Interview 4: 21\textsuperscript{st} January 2016
\textsuperscript{195} YouTube, BBC Panorama – Edward Snowden Spies and the Law BBC Documentary 2015, 6\textsuperscript{th} October 2015, Available From: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ofz7ZqFqFkA (Accessed 29\textsuperscript{th} June 2018)
MI5 and MI6... have been very keen that British MPs and the public did not discover how they were complicit in CIA operations, including that involving Binyam Mohamed... subsequently tortured and sent to Guantanamo Bay.\textsuperscript{197}

This portrays that the British Intelligence Services were acting unethically by engaging with CIA operations and without the approval of Ministers if they were seeking to prevent MPs becoming aware of their actions. Indeed, this theme is further implied by discussing how the controversial Closed Court Proceedings are preventing the disclosure of information which supports the allegations of British involvement in torture,\textsuperscript{198} perhaps an impact of how following the Binyam Mohammed case there was a more sceptical judicial mood according to both Gill and Leigh’s analysis.\textsuperscript{199}

In the BBC’s ‘Q&A: The Iraq Weapons Row’ it asserts that the JIC oversee security services reports,\textsuperscript{200} something which is in fact the ISC’s responsibility.\textsuperscript{201} By permeating such a counterfactual view of intelligence, it implies that there are James Bond-like characters on the streets of the UK, something which does not happen as MI6 is the foreign intelligence service. But the portrayal suggests that MI6 are acting within the UK and possibly in an unethical way. In the biography of a former MI5 officer – the domestic intelligence service – the adherence of observing a suspect before their arrest is paramount,\textsuperscript{202} refuting the assertion within news journalism.

Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 9/11’, p. 723
Borelli, S, ‘Rendition, Torture and Intelligence Cooperation’, p. 110–111;
\textsuperscript{199} Gill, P, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the Challenge of Security Networks’, p. 934;
\textsuperscript{200} BBC News, \textit{Q&A: The Iraq Weapons Row}, 19\textsuperscript{th} July 2003, Available From: \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3051298.stm} (Accessed 2\textsuperscript{nd} December 2015)
\textsuperscript{201} BBC News, \textit{Q&A: The Iraq Weapons Row}, 19\textsuperscript{th} July 2003, Available From: \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3051298.stm} (Accessed 2\textsuperscript{nd} December 2015)
Although this is an attempt by a retired intelligence officer to engage with the public domain, news journalism arguably reaches a bigger audience, and thus it is the unethical depiction of MI6 acting unilaterally that the majority of the public will consume. But despite this, it still requires the public to actively access, read and digest the information. If the British Intelligence Services themselves were more willing to engage publicly, news journalism as an avenue of information, would not continue to be such a prominent way in which the public are informed of intelligence matters.

Human Dimension
In a consistent portrayal to that evident in Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic relationship’, news journalism explores the human dimension of intelligence, and in particular, the role of personalities. The role of the individual is examined in ‘Iraq War: major new questions for Tony Blair’ as the article stipulates:

Mr Blair has been accused by critics of being a ‘war criminal’ for his role in the conflict which ultimately cost the lives of 179 British soldiers and an estimated 100,000 civilians.203

This places the onus for the politicisation of intelligence and the Iraq invasion firmly on Blair and his closeness to the Bush administration, demonstrating how influential Blair was within the British Government’s decision-making process. Indeed, many of the articles which have examined the politicisation of intelligence do suggest this theme, although many, including Gilligan, place the onus on Alastair Campbell204 as opposed to Blair, although many of these resulted in an adversarial relationship. ‘Downing Street told spy chiefs to rewrite dossier six times’205 creates the impression that the British Intelligence Services did what was asked of them by their Ministerial bosses, and

therefore it was the Cabinet Ministers who caused the problems with the dodgy dossier. This provides the implicit assumption that the British Intelligence Services have acted legally and ethically throughout and have done the right thing by not bowing to political pressure, as the title suggests. In turn, this creates the positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services.

The human dimension was seen in an article Gilligan wrote for *The Telegraph* to mark the 10th anniversary of the conflict. Here, Gilligan firmly demonstrates the human dimension, placing the onus not only for the invasion, but also the military conflict including the number of British personnel who died, on Blair and his successor Gordon Brown, arguing that the Labour Government failed to support troops when stationed in Iraq.  

This goes against the newspapers support for the invasion at the time, suggesting the difference between an individual journalist’s view and the editorial position.

> When Mr Campbell saw their (British Intelligence) latest offering, which was distinctly lacking in the kind of hard evidence that Mr Powell presented to the Security Council last Wednesday, he could not resist the temptation to spice it up with an obscure PhD thesis.

This excerpt from a *Telegraph* opinion article explicitly states that issues of sexing-up intelligence emanated from Campbell, with British Intelligence only referred to in terms of not providing the hard evidence which had been evident in Colin Powell’s UN speech. This suggests that the British Intelligence Services had failed in providing policy-makers with the information they required, suggesting that the role of the

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207 *The Telegraph, In Our Name, Telegraph View 15th February 2003, Available From: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/3587643/In-Our-Name.html* (Accessed 23rd August 2018)


Intelligence Services was to support Government policies. However, as the intelligence literature examines, this was not the case. Gill and Phythian argue that British Intelligence are responsible for assessing collected information and disseminating this to policy-makers, as the intelligence cycle demonstrates.\textsuperscript{210} Thus in an inherently implicit manner, there is a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services as Con Coughlin places the onus of the politicisation of intelligence on Campbell,\textsuperscript{211} exhibiting how influential the human dimension can be.

Therefore, the human dimension is depicted as being the cause of the politicisation of intelligence. In turn, this portrays British Intelligence as not doing as their political masters required, and therefore, they acted legally and ethically which furthers the positive portrayal. If there were more active engagement from the British Intelligence Services, such a view could have been clearer, such as highlighting that it is not the role of British Intelligence to provide policy-makers with the information they want, but rather with analysis of the available information.

*The Guardian* implicitly examines the human dimension in the Iraq War which saw some MPs resign in protest to Blair’s actions, something evident in ‘Our Prime Minister has been ill served by the US’ which centres upon John Denham’s resignation from Parliament.\textsuperscript{212} Indeed, this continued to be prevalent in ‘Sixth aide resigns over Iraq’ which described what David Kidney had said, combined with his personal background.\textsuperscript{213} Considering these junior Government Ministers had resigned over Blair’s decision to invade Iraq, there is limited analysis about the reasoning for the resignations, such as the assertions of the intelligence being sexed up, or the ramifications of the resignations. Equally, this highlights how intelligence was a subsidiary theme to the article when arguably, considering the resignations related to the Iraq invasion and the dodgy dossier,

\textsuperscript{211} The Telegraph, *A distinct lack of intelligence*, Con Coughlin, 9\textsuperscript{th} February 2003, Available From: [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3587299/A-distinct-lack-of-intelligence.html](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3587299/A-distinct-lack-of-intelligence.html) (Accessed 23\textsuperscript{rd} August 2018)
\textsuperscript{212} The Guardian, *Our prime minister has been ill served by the US*, Nicholas Watt, 19\textsuperscript{th} March 2003, Available From: [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/19/houseofcommons.iraq](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/19/houseofcommons.iraq) (Accessed 25\textsuperscript{th} June 2018)
\textsuperscript{213} The Guardian, *Sixth aide resigns over Iraq*, Staff and Agencies, 19\textsuperscript{th} March 2003, Available From: [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/19/iraq.iraq](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/19/iraq.iraq) (Accessed 25\textsuperscript{th} June 2018)
intelligence should have been far more prominent in the discussion. This limits the view of the British Intelligence Services provided to the public.

*The Telegraph* supported the Iraq invasion and the opinion article ‘In Our Name’ questioned why people were going on the anti-war demonstrations:

> They intend to protect the world, and themselves, against the threat of chemical, biological and nuclear attacks by Saddam Hussein; to liberate the people of Iraq, who have suffered more under Saddam than anybody else; to overthrow the most dangerous of the regimes that sponsor international terrorism; and to uphold the authority of the UN by enforcing the disarmament of Iraq. How many of the marchers disagree with these aims?214

By placing the onus on the individual, the article seemingly sought to encourage *The Telegraph* readers to believe that the Iraq invasion was the right decision, by focusing on the ousting of Saddam as being a good thing, a theme also explored in Chapter 3 ‘A Complimentary Relationship’. This omits any discussion of the British Intelligence Services, despite how central the dodgy dossier was to the Iraq invasion and demonstrates how British Intelligence was a subsidiary theme in the article. This results in an article demonstrating its support for the Iraq War, believing that it was the right decision, irrespective of intelligence. Arguably, this is seeking to manipulate the readers into supporting the Iraq invasion. This goes against the newspaper’s party affiliation and demonstrates their desire to support actions deemed to encourage national security, something highlighted in the case of the framing of the paper’s titles in the Snowden case.

‘British spies moved after Snowden files read’ examines the assertions that Snowden had put the lives of British Intelligence personnel in danger after his documents had been read

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214 The Telegraph, *In Our Name*, Telegraph View 15th February 2003, Available From: [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/3587643/In-Our-Name.html](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/3587643/In-Our-Name.html) (Accessed 23rd August 2018)
by China and Russia. The BBC intelligence correspondent, Gordon Corera provides clear contextualisation of these themes based on interviews with Sir David Omand, Professor Anthony Glees and Shami Chakrabarti. The article provides a greater comprehension of intelligence such as the emphasis placed upon ensuring the safety and security of British Intelligence personnel, thus providing a consistent portrayal to the information the British Intelligence Services themselves place in the public domain. Throughout the article, the depiction of the British Intelligence Services is inherently subtle as it focuses more upon the assertions of Snowden damaging national security and the assumption that hostile states may have accessed the Snowden documents.

Such an in-depth awareness of the impact upon British Intelligence of the Snowden revelations suggests the article benefitted from a supportive relationship with British Intelligence. By highlighting their sentiments towards Snowden as being a ‘traitor’, the BBC article received information from a ‘senior Government source’. This demonstrates a form of engagement from British Intelligence which has undoubtedly aided the portrayal of British Intelligence as being concerned about their personnel, a view not always prevalent within news journalism depictions but was evident within Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’.

Secrecy
As with Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ secrecy is a theme news journalism emphasises. In The Telegraph’s ‘Gordon Brown admits Iraq War was not “justified”’, secrecy surrounding the British Intelligence Services is implicitly highlighted. It states that Brown only became aware of top-secret American intelligence held by the Department of Defence once he left office which challenged the official US view about Saddam’s WMD. Throughout the article, British Intelligence is a subsidiary theme but,

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there remains some very interesting implicit depictions of them. What is perhaps most
telling is the amount of secrecy surrounding intelligence on Iraq if Brown only became
aware of the report in question once he left office, raising questions about why the
intelligence had not been shared with Britain, thus providing an implicit message of
British Intelligence being capable and effective based on the information they had. In
turn, this furthers the positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. This
highlights the levels of secrecy surrounding intelligence, even amongst allies in the
intelligence realm.

Secrecy surrounding intelligence is highlighted by Norton-Taylor in ‘UK spies fooled by
scale of raid on US’ where he discusses findings from the latest ISC report.

In a report sprinkled with asterisks denoting censored
information, the parliamentary intelligence and security
committee revealed that the agencies reported “an acute
awareness in the period before September 11 that [Bin
Laden] and his associates represented a very serious
threat”.

Although it may seem trivial, by highlighting the asterisks throughout the report, Norton-
Taylor portrays just how much secrecy there is surrounding intelligence, even in a
parliamentary report. This is a theme which Glees, Davies and Morrison examine in The
Open Side of Secrecy, one of the few academic studies of the ISC. Although they
acknowledge the necessity of the Intelligence Services operating in secrecy, they
highlight how ‘the ISC agree to the exclusion of sensitive material before the report’s
publication’. This highlights how Norton-Taylor’s discussion has provided a view to
the public of one of the major difficulties faced when holding the British Intelligence
Services to account. This suggests why news journalism remains such a crucial avenue
of information, that the pervasiveness of secrecy surrounding the British Intelligence
Services even reduces what information accountability mechanisms are able to publicly

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221 Glees, Anthony, Davies, H, J, Phillip, Morrison, N, L, John, The Open Side of Secrecy, Britain’s Intelligence and Security Committee, (London, Social Affairs Unit, 2006), p. 19
discuss. This therefore puts a greater emphasis on the role of news journalism being a form of public accountability if there are issues surrounding the existing accountability structures.

**Conclusion**

References to the British Intelligence Services were something of a secondary theme within many of the articles analysed, which is somewhat surprising considering how central British Intelligence was in relation to the dodgy dossier and the Snowden revelations. This resulted in many of the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services being implicit, as opposed to explicit, although this was less evident in articles written by intelligence, security and defence correspondents. Perhaps this is due to a supportive or dependent relationship being evident. This demonstrates how the nature of the relationship seems to have a direct correlation with the portrayal of the British Intelligence Services as these articles sought to highlight how capable and effective British Intelligence were, and their emphasis upon the safety and security of intelligence personnel.  

There also seems to be an overall positive portrayal of British Intelligence being capable and effective, with issues of politicisation and the nature of the legislation being highlighted as the cause of the British Intelligence Services being in the public domain in both case studies. This therefore depicts that there are wider issues affecting the British Intelligence Services which are beyond their control.

**Conclusion**

The chapter has explored two inter-related questions in order to assess what views of the British Intelligence Services are portrayed to the public via news journalism. It began by examining ‘What is the nature of the relationship between the British Intelligence Services and news journalism’ by analysing the typology suggested by Hewitt and Lucas. This analysis demonstrated that although all of the relationships are prevalent at different times, the adversarial and dependent relationships were most evident, with

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the laudatory relationship arguably occurring least often due to the availability of information. Perhaps it was unsurprising for these relationships to be most common due to the case study selection as it was the dependent relationship which arguably led to the allegations of the sexing-up of the September dossier,224 and the adversarial relationship being evident with the Snowden revelations.

The chapter then examined the second research sub-question; ‘What views of British Intelligence are evident within news journalism’ by analysing the coverage of the dodgy dossier and the Snowden revelations in the BBC, *The Guardian*, and *The Telegraph*. Rather surprisingly, this highlighted that a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services is depicted to the public via all media organisations and that engagement with British Intelligence can still result in critical reporting of the actions of the British Intelligence Services. This refutes arguments that cooperating with Intelligence Services results in a laudatory relationship being prevalent.

In the Iraq War context, this occurred by articles centring upon the politicisation of intelligence, which they highlight occurred at the political level, with Blair and Campbell both being deemed responsible for the sexing-up of the dossier. Indeed, had it not been for the dependent relationship, such assertions would not have been published in 2003. This clearly highlights how the nature of the relationship impacts directly upon the view of the British Intelligence Services provided to the public, as well as how they overlap as the dependent relationship soon turned into an adversarial one. In the Snowden context, this continued to be prevalent with the adversarial relationship displayed when *The Guardian* first published the stories.225 The overriding portrayal is of the issues affecting the legislation governing the British Intelligence Services, thus leading to a consistent portrayal with Chapter 4 ‘A Complementary Relationship’.

However, the analysis has demonstrated how British Intelligence is not always a central theme explored within news journalism, and instead is a subsidiary theme. It is also

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inherently dependent on the individual journalist, perhaps due to the cooperative relationship which exists between some and British Intelligence. This demonstrates how engagement from British Intelligence themselves, aids understanding of the intelligence realm and gives a more informed view to the public.

Throughout this chapter, it has been clear that the tensions between openness and secrecy in Britain continue to affect the Intelligence Services – news journalism relationship. By being so secretive, investigative journalism fills the void of public knowledge, however this often results in an adversarial relationship, as well as the British Intelligence Services having to react to a fire alarm moment when they are forced to be in the public domain. If there was more openness, as is evident in America, news journalism as an avenue of information would not continue to be so important in creating public understandings of the intelligence realm, and would arguably also reduce the adversarial relationship. In turn, this could also prevent as much damaging information being placed in the public domain by investigative journalists. Thus, it is hard to see in this context, how increased openness is anything but a positive.
Chapter 6: A Fractious Relationship: British Intelligence and Popular Culture

Introduction

They [portrayals of intelligence] are not just fictitious fluff and nonsense; they have a real-world impact in respect of how they help to condition the public to think about intelligence, the use of state sanctioned violence and counter-terrorism.¹

As Robert Dover demonstrates, popular culture is an influential way in which the public are conditioned upon intelligence matters, something which has emanated from how ‘popular culture found itself in a unique and privileged position’² before Intelligence Services around the world were publicly acknowledged. Although the British Intelligence Services are publicly acknowledged and do place some information in the public domain as Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ examined, popular culture remains a key avenue through which the public domain consumes an understanding of the British Intelligence Services.

Dover’s assertion demonstrates not only the continued role of popular culture in informing the public, but also why assessing this is of paramount importance, a theme Len Scott and Peter Jackson concur with as they argue that:

fictional representations of intelligence form the basis of much public understanding.³

This theme is also explored by Christopher Moran who succinctly argues that:

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\text{in an ideal world, popular attitudes towards intelligence services should not be conditioned by popular culture but sadly the world is not ideal.}^4
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This is furthered in Moran’s co-authored article with Trevor McCrisken where they state that the Bond franchise in particular:

\[
\text{Has filled a public knowledge vacuum about intelligence agencies and security threats. With the intelligence services historically unable and unwilling to open up about their operations, we would argue that Bond – unclassified and accessible – has functioned as an important site through which the public has come to perceive intelligence, plus the threats faced by intelligence communities.}^5
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This is best demonstrated by the introduction to the Imperial War Museum’s exhibit ‘Secret War’. It begins by highlighting popular culture portrayals of the British Intelligence Services, as the picture below (Figure 9) demonstrate.

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Figure 9 shows the entrance to the secret war exhibit where at the centre there is a poster from the Bond film *Casino Royale* with the phrase ‘It is easy to mistake spy fiction for reality….’ above it.⁶

According to Amanda Mason the exhibit’s curator, beginning with Bond was a conscious decision as the public often think of spies through fiction.⁷ This demonstrates the validity of the academic arguments explored, and in particular Dover’s assertion of the real world impact popular culture portrayals of the British Intelligence Services can have. But if the British Intelligence Services furthered their own engagement with the public domain, popular culture would not continue to be such an influential avenue of information about the intelligence realm. This exhibits the clear importance of scrutinising what depictions of the British intelligence Services are portrayed through popular culture, something which this chapter strives to achieve in order to comprehend what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are in the public domain and thus impacting upon public accountability of the British Intelligence Services.

However, it is possible that the British Intelligence Services are using popular culture to their advantage by directly engaging with it. Although no concrete evidence of this was

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⁶ Imperial War Museum, *Secret War Exhibit*, London, United Kingdom, 16th September 2015
⁷ Private Interview 1: With Amanda Mason – 7th October 2015
found, interviewees did intimate how MI6 acknowledge that there are some positives from the Bond franchise as it increases recruitment and have permitted filming outside its Headquarters, something Chapman Pincher also acknowledged. This demonstrates how the elite interviews allow for the perspective of the British Intelligence Services to be evident within this thesis, thus furthering the contribution to the literature.

To fully comprehend what understandings of the British Intelligence Services popular culture provides to the public, the chapter first provides a brief contextualisation which examines what popular culture constitutes, a key term for this chapter. Secondly, this section explores the evolution of popular culture portrayals of the British Intelligence Services as it has always been a keyway in which to promote specific ideas and concepts, evident as:

*Organisations and individuals, from the CIA to the FBI, from V I Lenin to Joseph Goebbels, have all expressed the view that cinema is the most important medium for transmitting political ideas.*

The chapter will then analyse what themes are evident in the Bond franchise, John Le Carré’s *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, and the BBC drama *Spooks*. This selection allows for the three main forms of popular culture namely, film, TV and books to be compared and contrasted. In all of them, the themes explored include: communications and code, surveillance, science and technology, secret diplomacy, deception and secrecy, acting legally and ethically, threats and society, and finally the role of gender. The chapter then examines under-explored themes in popular culture which include the monotonous nature of intelligence, support mechanisms and financial difficulties. Due to the real world impact popular culture can have on the intelligence realm, it is crucial to examine what portrayals this avenue provides and whether like the other avenues, there is an overarching positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services.

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8 Private Interview 2: 8th January 2016; Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017
Contextualisation

What is popular culture?

As the literature review examined, there is an academic literature which explores popular culture depictions of intelligence, although these tend to focus on a particular theme such as the role of gender and feminism, leadership or the geopolitics of the Bond films. This, combined with the Cultural Cold War literature, has provided a rich source of information about intelligence and popular culture by demonstrating how its uses have continually been evident, thus suggesting the importance of popular culture in putting information into the public domain. Indeed, it would be strange if something which was continually used throughout the Cold War was dismantled in the post-Cold War era. However, one consistent theme across these literatures was the lack of a concise definition as to what constitutes popular culture.

Work which focuses solely upon popular culture such as Buhle’s chapter, fails to provide a definition of what popular culture is. Perhaps this is due to the problematical nature of seeking to define what culture constitutes. Rotter believes that such difficulties arise from how interlinked it is with the nation state, language, identity and values. Whilst there is certainly merit to Rotter’s argument, it fails to consider the increasingly globalised and inter-connected nature of the world nowadays which arguably allows for the existence of transnational culture. However this does not necessarily aid defining culture. In 1990, Joseph Nye argued that power in world politics was inherently changing...

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to a softer style, centring upon resources such as cultural and ideological attraction combined with rules and institutions of international regimes. This is a logical theme which continues to be prevalent within the academic literature and primary sources. Gienow-Hecht provides the closest to what could be considered a definition when highlighting cultural diplomacy and what this constitutes as she argues it is:

The creation and communication of memory, ideology, emotions, lifestyles, scholarly and artistic works and other symbols.

Gienow-Hecht’s definition provides a useful starting point in considering what popular culture may constitute. Although not an academic source, the most cohesive definition of popular culture is found in The Oxford English Dictionary. It states that it is ‘culture based on the tastes of ordinary people rather than educated elite.’ This suggests that it is predominantly based upon the preferences of the public. This highlighted that whilst culture can take many forms, for the purposes of this chapter, popular culture is centring upon forms of culture that are widely accessible in the public domain. This is a theme prevalent within Storey’s analysis where he continually suggests that popular culture is based on the non-elite urban masses, thus allowing for a clear distinction between popular culture and high culture which refers to opera, renaissance art and classical music. Therefore this chapter will be assessing popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence Services which are ubiquitous in the public domain. Thus the chapter will focus upon spy novels as well as films and TV programmes due to their influence and

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16 Nye, J, ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Policy, 80, (1990), p. 168
17 Rotter, A, J, ‘Culture’, p. 279 - 280
19 Gienow-Hecht, J, C, E, ‘On the Division of Knowledge and the Community of Thought’, p. 6
popularity. This is particularly salient due to the overlap between these types of popular culture, something which the chapter will seek to explore in greater detail.

Although the academic literature does seek to explore whether popular culture depicts a romanticised or credible view of the British Intelligence Services, this tends to occur in a historical context.\(^{23}\) This is unsurprising as, due to the nature of their work, Intelligence Services are shrouded in secrecy, evident by the exemption of the British Intelligence Services from the Freedom of Information Act.\(^{24}\) This raises the question of whether it is even possible to discern whether popular culture provides a realistic depiction of intelligence work in a contemporary context. Therefore, the chapter analyses which themes popular culture depicts to the public, thus allowing for a clear comprehension of whether this provides a positive or negative portrayal, or indeed is consistent with the depictions provided by the other avenues of information.

**Popular Culture Portrayals of the British Intelligence Services: An Evolution**

Popular culture has capitalised upon matters of public intrigue since the Victorian era.\(^{25}\) In the 1840s, the dime novel in America popularised stories about both detectives and cowboys\(^{26}\) whereas it was not until the 1870s when the spy novel came into existence with the publication of *The Battle of Dorking*, which provided a vivid account of a German invasion in the UK.\(^{27}\) However, it was in France where spy fiction initially gripped the popular imagination, arguably due to the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war\(^ {28}\) but such interest subsided over time, intimating how intrigue into the spy genre linked to the public having an experience of war, conflict or espionage. This was

evident as spy fiction did not enjoy popularity in Britain until the turn of the century, a time of considerable fear and uncertainty about British power and security.

These were concerns which William Le Queux exacerbated, due to his conviction of Britain’s inability to retaliate against a German invasion. Due to the success of Le Queux’s novels, Spies for the Kaiser was serialised in the Weekly News at a time when newspapers were further permeating the fears of German espionage. This was evident as Lord Northcliffe’s the Daily Mail exacerbated concerns of a German espionage ring in Britain stating that every German was a potential spy, albeit with slight adaptations to ensure continued newspaper sales. In Edwardian society, serialising books in newspapers allowed for more people to access them, demonstrating the ongoing desire to adapt novels into other forms of popular culture in order to appeal to a wider audience. This was in conjunction with other authors such as Robert Childers and E Phillips Oppenheim permeating fears of a German invasion. Although these novels did not directly depict an image of the British Intelligence Services, they did have a significant impact upon British Intelligence.

With continuing concerns furthered by popular culture surrounding a potential German invasion and the balance of power in Europe in question, there was, as Stafford wrote:

\[
\text{the need for drastic measures to protect British society in the new century.}\]

This manifested itself in the creation of the sub-committee of Imperial Defence in 1903, to whom Le Queux provided considerable evidence. In 1909, they recommended the establishment of the British Intelligence Services, and thus MI5 and MI6 came into

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31 Trotter, D, ‘The Politics of Adventure in the Early British Spy Novel’, p. 31
33 Stafford, D, The Silent Game, p. 48
35 Stafford, D, The Silent Game, p. 33 – 35, 41
36 Stafford, D, The Silent Game, p. 9
37 Cobain, I, The History Thieves, p. 16 – 19
existence. This intimates how influential spy fiction could be on public understanding of intelligence and on the Intelligence Services themselves, a theme Trotter explores. This was further evident by numerous claims of espionage cases that inundated MI5 during the first four months of the First World War.

Popular culture depictions of the intelligence realm continued, perhaps owing to returning First World War veterans wanting to write about their experiences. A.E.W Mason, Somerset Maugham and Compton Mackenzie all published books based upon their personal wartime intelligence work. As archival material collected on overseas fieldwork suggests, it is these examples which are the likely origins of insider spy fiction as those who had served during the First World War had a desire to engage with the public and provide their account of events. Like Oppenheim, who explored the impact of war upon human combatants, these authors were inspired by the events around them, in stark contrast to Le Queux’s earlier portrayals of the intelligence realm, which Stafford argues were highly romanticised. This is somewhat unsurprising as until 1909, the British Intelligence Services did not exist, and it was in part due to the evidence Le Queux provided to the sub-committee of Imperial Defence that the British Intelligence Services were created.

_The Thirty-Nine Steps, a best seller as soon as it appeared, is often described as the first British spy novel, and its hero, Richard Hannay, as the prototype of the fictional secret agent._

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38 Andrew, C, _Defence of the Realm_, p. 19 - 20
40 Andrew, C, _Defence of the Realm_, p. 13 – 14;
41 National Cryptology Archives, Annapolis, Maryland, History Today DK 38-29, ‘Forum: Christopher Andrew questions official policy towards the history of British Intelligence and Happy New Year from MI5’, January 1983, p. 5
42 Stafford, D, _The Silent Game_, p. 72 – 73
44 Stafford, D, _The Silent Game_, p. 51
45 Stafford, D, _The Silent Game_, p. 78
46 Stafford, D, _The Silent Game_, p. 57
Written by John Buchan in 1915, *The Thirty Nine Steps* is about a British officer who after being framed for the murder of a British spy, clears his name by exposing German officers who have infiltrated British Intelligence. It was instantly popular resulting in its adaptation to film in 1935, before being re-made several times as well as becoming a TV series and a West End theatre performance. During the 1920s and 1930s, Herman Cyril McNeile’s *The Adventures of Bulldog Drummond* (written under the pseudonym Sapper) was adapted for both newspaper serialisations in Lord Northcliffe’s publications and for films. This allowed a wider audience to engage with the storyline and gain a further understanding of British Intelligence, something evident in both novels. Although the extent to which it occurred is disputed, Buchan is thought to have worked for British Intelligence following a career in the military, a path it seems McNeile also followed. Unsurprisingly, these events influenced their writing, and therefore both are examples of insider spy fiction.

Without the success of Buchan’s hero, a capable individual who can save the entirety of British Intelligence single-handedly, and his writing style, McNeile and other novelists such as Ian Fleming, would not have followed the ‘formula’ first evident in Buchan’s writing. Namely; a fictional agent acting alone to counter the threats Britain was facing, which for Buchan’s hero Richard Hannay, was German espionage. This suggests Stafford’s assertion of *The Thirty Nine Steps* being the first British spy novel may have some saliency as it created a formula for future authors to follow. This is certainly evident in *The Adventures of Bulldog Drummond*, as it mirrors the adventures of Richard Hannay, albeit with a different hero. Indeed, reference was made to *Bulldog Drummond* in John Le Carré’s *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy*, demonstrating how fiction can feed fiction. This

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49 Stafford, D, *The Silent Game*, p. 106

50 Stafford, D, *The Silent Game*, p. 64 – 65


52 Stafford, D, *The Silent Game*, p. 57


is still something which occurs in contemporary spy fiction and programmes such as *Spooks* which had dedicated researchers to find aspects of intelligence tradecraft in spy fiction.\(^{55}\) As the chapter will further explore, this can aid the positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services provided to the public. This suggests just how popular the spy novel had become and demonstrates how popular culture was providing the public with a particular view of intelligence.

Indeed, spy fiction was so popular that under the leadership of J Edgar Hoover, the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) engaged with popular culture during the 1930s.\(^ {56}\) Their counterpart, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which was created in 1947 continued to cooperate with popular culture and they covertly worked with producers, with the 1951 version of George Orwell’s *Animal Farm* one such example.\(^ {57}\) For the FBI, their public engagement took the form of radio programmes, news reels in the cinema\(^ {58}\) and the creation of FBI toys that were sold in shops across America.\(^ {59}\) The photograph below (figure 10) was taken at the International Spy Museum and shows a selection of the toy cars, guns and magazines that the FBI created during this time.

\(^{55}\) Harris, Z, ‘Spies on TV’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 21\(^{st}\) April 2017

\(^{56}\) Private Interview 17: With John F. Fox Jr –20\(^{th}\) September 2016


Spy fiction continued to be popular with the British reading public throughout both the Second World War and Cold War, with insider spy fiction occupying a central position. Graham Greene and Geoffrey Household, both of whom had been stationed abroad, published espionage novels on their wartime escapades. With both being in a privileged position of having a first-hand view of intelligence, they were examples of insider spy fiction, namely a former practitioners using their experiences to write fiction. This genre is certainly influential not only in providing the public with an understanding of the intelligence realm, but also in influencing other authors such as Eric Ambler who built upon the foundations created by Somerset Maugham. Ambler therefore made mundane and boring aspects of intelligence fascinating and brought it into mainstream fiction. This contradicts what one interviewee said in relation to the public not being interested

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in the minute mechanics of how the British Intelligence Services operate. Not only does this demonstrate Ambler’s importance to the creation of the modern spy novel, but also in providing a view of intelligence to the public.

Spy fiction and other depictions of the British Intelligence Services continued to be produced and rose in popularity dramatically during the Cold War. This is evident in the response to John Le Carré’s The Spy Who Came in from the Cold which outsold all other works of fiction in America in 1964, selling 230,000 copies and a further 2 million copies the following year when published in paperback. Bond’s escapades were equally popular and were not only serialised in the Daily Mail, but were also turned into a comic strip. This highlights how Bond:

Functional first and foremost, although not exclusively, as a Cold War hero, an exemplary representative of the virtues of Western capitalism triumphing over the evils of Eastern communism.

Thus, popular culture had a significant role in showing the West’s political and ideological superiority.

Although John Le Carré acknowledges his time working for the British Intelligence Services, he states that:

I am a writer who, when I was very young, spent a few intellectual but extremely formative years in British Intelligence…. Some of you may wonder why I am reluctant to submit interviews on television and radio in

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63 Private Interview 4; 21st January 2016
the press. The answer is that nothing that I write is authentic. It is the stuff of dreams not reality.\textsuperscript{67}

Despite his argument, Le Carré’s depictions of intelligence undeniably constitute insider spy fiction, particularly due to the implication of how important and informative his time was within the British Intelligence Services. However, there is no discussion either in the information available on the website, or in an interview Le Carré gave in 1965 to Malcolm Muggeridge as to what work he undertook.\textsuperscript{68} In his rare 2017 public appearance, to coincide with the publication of his most recent book, A Legacy of Spies, Le Carré did discuss his time working for both MI5 and MI6, whilst stating that Smiley was based upon the author John Bingham.\textsuperscript{69} Coinciding with this PhD research, this provided another perspective on this topic and was a rare glimpse into the creation of George Smiley (the main hero in many Le Carré novels).

During the Second World War, at Churchill’s request, Ian Fleming worked at the British Security Corporation in New York following America’s entry into the war, to spread propaganda to ensure victory in Europe.\textsuperscript{70} Therefore, like Le Carré, Fleming is another example of an author of insider spy fiction. But unlike Le Carré, Fleming utilises his experiences of the British Intelligence Services with the use of gadgets,\textsuperscript{71} a central component of the Bond franchise.

Both Le Carré and Fleming demonstrate the continued emphasis upon adapting novels to other forms of popular culture, a substantial history of which has been highlighted within this section. This demonstrates the continued importance of popular culture in providing a depiction of intelligence to the public. If such portrayals were not well received by the public, then surely adaptations would not be continually evident. Perhaps such intrigue

\textsuperscript{68} BBC Intimations, John Le Carré, Available From: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00nw1tb (Accessed 28th April 2017)
\textsuperscript{69} Le Carré J, ‘An Evening with George Smiley’, Lecture at The Royal Festival Hall, London, 7\textsuperscript{th} September 2017
\textsuperscript{71} Oldham, J, ‘Spies, Conspiracies and the Secret State in British Television Drama’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 21\textsuperscript{st} April 2017
was in part due to the case of the Five Soviet moles within the British Intelligence Services who were known as the Cambridge Five, who Denning believes created such public intrigue into espionage.\textsuperscript{72}

Therefore, there was a public appetite for intelligence, which was utilised and perhaps fuelled by the products of popular culture, and which arguably still occurs today. The former Director General (DG) of MI5, Dame Stella Rimington took the unusual step of publishing her autobiography in 2001\textsuperscript{73} which created some concerns for MI5,\textsuperscript{74} despite the fact that large sections of the book focus on her formative years and family rather than on her career. Rimington subsequently published a series of fictional books featuring Liz Carlyle, a female operative in MI5,\textsuperscript{75} a contemporary example of insider spy fiction. In 2016, a film adaptation of Le Carré’s \textit{Our Kind of Traitor} was released,\textsuperscript{76} as well as \textit{The Night Manager}. First published in 1993, \textit{The Night Manager} was adapted into a six-part BBC TV series and became instantly popular before receiving critical acclaim.\textsuperscript{77} Due to its success, there are now discussions to adapt Le Carré’s \textit{The Spy Who Came in From The Cold} into a modern TV series.\textsuperscript{78} If there was not a public fascination with the intelligence realm and particularly with the British Intelligence Services, then such adaptations would not have been created, or well received. This demonstrates that popular culture continues to be a central avenue through which portrayals of the British Intelligence Services are placed in the public domain.

\textsuperscript{72} Denning, M, ‘Licensed to look; James Bond and the heroism of consumption’, \textit{A Critical Reader}, edited by Christoph Lindner, (Manchester, Manchester University Publishing, 2003), p. 56
Themes in popular culture
This section explores what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are prevalent in popular culture by focussing on the following themes: communications and code; secret diplomacy; surveillance and information gathering; science and technology; deception and secrecy; acting in a legal and ethical manner; and finally, threats and society. Whilst these are not themes directly examined in the other chapters, they still, on occasion, create both a consistent and positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services.

Communications and code
In both historical and contemporary contexts, one of the most common aspects of the work undertaken by the British Intelligence Services depicted in popular culture is communication and the encryption of information, namely cryptography. By exploring the emphasis on ensuring information remains secure and cannot be unduly accessed, there is the implicit suggestion that the British Intelligence Services are capable and effective, furthering the positive portrayal of them in the public domain. Somerset Maugham’s Ashenden scrutinises the difficulties encountered when both coding and deciphering a message as the code used must be committed to memory, preventing the possibility of the adversary gaining a clear advantage of deciphering the coded messages.79 Whilst technology may have created other ways in which communications can remain secure without having to commit the code to memory,80 the importance of communication remains.

In Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy the importance of communication and code is an overarching theme, thus depicting the importance of it to the public. There is a discussion of the communication techniques used by Soviet spies which consists of ‘secret writing, microdots, stuck all over full stops on innocent looking letters, and dead letter boxes in Western capitals’.81 This is undoubtedly an example of fiction feeding fiction as

80 Chapman, R, D, ‘Save the Last Meringue for Me’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 29/2 (2016), p. 372
microdots are also explored in Spooks.\textsuperscript{82} Although unknown whether microdots are still used by the British Intelligence Services, by exploring how important communications and code are, the British Intelligence Services are depicted as being capable and effective in ensuring all information remains secure. This leads to an overarching positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. Seemingly, this is an inherently subtle consistent portrayal to Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’ and Chapter 5 ‘A Complicated Relationship’ which examined how Snowden had damaged the capabilities of the British Intelligence Services, a theme one interviewee also discussed.\textsuperscript{83}

Set in Russia at the time of the Bolshevik revolution, Maugham’s main character Ashenden requires instructions as to what his next actions should be as the original plan was no longer viable. Whilst he deems sending the message to be rather boring and cumbersome, he acknowledges the importance of it.\textsuperscript{84} The necessity of receiving instruction was also something Tarr required in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy when Irina, the Russian spy, wanted to defect.\textsuperscript{85} By awaiting for instructions, there is an implicit suggestion that the British Intelligence Services are seeking to act legally and ethically as opposed to just undertaking what actions an individual perceives as necessary. Indeed, even former practitioners highlight the important role of communications and code in finding out what their actions should be. In the Dominican Republic in the 1970s, Robert Chapman, a CIA officer was desperate for instructions from superiors as to what actions he should undertake.\textsuperscript{86}

Numerous popular culture depictions including Spooks, Ashenden, and Washington Shadow (by Aly Monroe about the fictitious British Intelligence officer Peter Cotton), highlight the use of a code book for ensuring encrypted information. In a monologue by a former MI6 officer, believed to be a traitor, the trade craft of a code book is discussed in Spooks. The rogue officer states that a code book is:

\textsuperscript{82} BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 5, Episode 9
\textsuperscript{83} Private Interview21: 12\textsuperscript{th} September 2017
\textsuperscript{84} Maugham, S, Ashenden, p. 301
\textsuperscript{85} Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 57
\textsuperscript{86} Chapman, R, D, ‘Save the Last Meringue for Me’, p. 372
A robust form of transmission as long as you are working from identical books. Modify the code with a basic shift pattern, and it’s all but unbreakable... It can’t be decoded without the right shift pattern and the exact source text.
Not just the right book.... The exact edition.\(^{87}\)

The analysis of how a code book functions is also evident in *Ashenden, Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy and Washington Shadow*. Its usefulness is explored as the code book tends to be an ordinary novel which would not arouse suspicion. For Peter Cotton in *Washington Shadow*, it was *The Ambassadors*\(^ {88}\) whereas in *Spooks* it was *Two Cheers for Democracy*,\(^ {89}\) perhaps a subtle reference to the wider themes explored in both that episode and the entire series. In an interview at Edinburgh Spy Week, Zinnie Harris, a former scriptwriter for *Spooks* discussed that for aspects relating to tradecraft, researchers would look to other spy fiction novels for examples of it.\(^ {90}\) Indeed, this highlights how key themes could in-fact emanate from earlier popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence Services. Before attending the 2017 Edinburgh Spy Week where this theme was discussed, it had not been previously considered but is undoubtedly central. One clear example of fiction feeding fiction sprang to mind during a talk about Victorian popular culture. Professor Penny Fielding discussed *The Dynamite Ship* whose central plot was to blow up the Houses of Parliament from The Thames,\(^ {91}\) a concept directly repeated in *Spooks* when a terrorist threatens to blow up the House of Commons by boat in series 4 episode 4.\(^ {92}\) However, Harris did not discuss which novels were utilised or give an example of the trade craft portrayed after such research, something which would further comprehension of whether *Spooks* was in fact simply repeating themes depicted in other popular culture depictions, an assertion her comments certainly seem to suggest. But this does serve to highlight how fiction feeding fiction remains a prevalent aspect within popular culture, even in a contemporary context.

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\(^{87}\) BBC DVD, *Spooks*, Series 5, Episode 9
\(^{89}\) BBC DVD, *Spooks*, Series 5, Episode 9
\(^{90}\) Harris, Z, ‘Spies on TV’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 21\(^{st}\) April 2017
\(^{91}\) Whelehan, N, and Fielding, P, ‘Spies, Dynamite and Victorian Terrorism’, Lecture at National Library of Scotland, 19\(^{th}\) April 2017
\(^{92}\) BBC DVD, *Spooks*, Series 4, Episode 4
Another form of communication explored within popular culture is the signalling of whether a meeting between intelligence officers is safe and is a theme particularly prevalent within *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy*. Perhaps one of the clearest examples of this are the instructions Prideaux has when going to meet a presumed Czech general to find out who the mole is. Prideaux is warned that he should only proceed with the meeting if there is no sign of anyone being at the cabin in the woods, no lights or a bicycle outside, for example.\(^\text{93}\) Such consideration of safety is also taken when Haydon meets with his Russian contact at a safe house, with milk bottles on the door step being the sign of the meeting.\(^\text{94}\) Whilst the ways in which messages are portrayed may have become more sophisticated as communication methods have evolved, this demonstrates the overarching importance of communication and code to the British Intelligence Services.

By depicting how important communication is, through the portrayal of the encryption and cryptography, popular culture depicts that the British Intelligence Services are seeking to ensure the safety and security of both the information and by extension, the staff by preventing information such as their locations being available to the enemy. This creates a mirrored portrayal to that in Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship; and Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’. This is also evident through the existence of certain key organisations within Britain. GCHQ, one of the main British Intelligence Services, focuses upon communication and the encryption of information\(^\text{95}\) as they support the British Intelligence Services, military, law enforcement and wider Government.\(^\text{96}\) themes Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ discussed. Whilst the way in which communications and code are depicted may use artistic licence, it places a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain.

**Surveillance**

Another theme portrayed within popular culture is the role of surveillance, and how this can lead to the gathering of previously unknown information.\(^\text{97}\) The techniques utilised

\(^{93}\) Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 330

\(^{94}\) Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 370


\(^{97}\) Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 42 - 44
in pursuit of this aim are explored in depth within *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy*. Although not actively gathering intelligence in the field, Smiley and his colleagues in London all undertake routine surveillance as part of their daily lives. When arriving at the Circus by taxi, (the name Le Carré gives to the MI6 Headquarters), the name of a nearby shop or restaurant is given before walking the short distance to the office, as opposed to asking to be dropped at the front door. 98 Smiley takes such surveillance further as he counts the number of parked cars where he lives and whether there any which are unfamiliar. 99 This demonstrates how crucial surveillance is within intelligence work if even those intelligence officers undertaking desk jobs or who have retired, are utilising such surveillance techniques in their daily lives to ensure that they are not being followed.

Indeed, in the novel, such an emphasis is placed upon surveillance that the Circus has a dedicated section to it – the Scalphunters. Whilst this certainly indicates the importance of surveillance to the work of an intelligence organisation, 100 it also illustrates class and educational structures. The Scalphunters, under the leadership of Toby Esterhase, are not based at the Circus, but rather in Brixton, suggesting they are not necessarily seen as an integral part of the Circus. This is combined with the actions that the Scalphunters undertake. Whilst surveillance is certainly a central aspect to their work, they are also utilised for actions including kidnapping, burglary, blackmail and assassination. 101 Although none of these actions are undertaken by the Circus in the novel, it serves to demonstrate that the Scalphunters are used to undertake the riskier aspects of intelligence.

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98 Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 379
99 Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 30
100 The importance of surveillance is highlighted in Chapman Pincher’s book *The Trade Is Treachery* where he highlights the surveillance undertaken by MI5 against Soviet targets. The MI5 surveillance team, known as ‘watchers’ would tail Soviet cars around London to see what was happening and were also used in the case of Harry Houghton and Gordon Lonsdale. Houghton worked for the British Government’s Underwater Weapons Establishment and was passing documents to Lonsdale. The ‘watchers’ were tailing Lonsdale and had even photographed his apartment, something the KGB then became aware of. They also kept knowing what frequency the ‘watchers’ were using on the radios to communicate with each other. The ‘watchers’ were also used to keep Donald Maclean under surveillance once he was suspected of being a Soviet mole in British Intelligence. Indeed, when reading Pincher’s discussion of the watchers it reads as something you would find in a Le Carré novel in terms of this separate entity undertaking the monotonous nature of intelligence.

For more information on this, please see:
work. Implicitly, this can also suggest to the reader that actions which are legally and ethically dubious are not part of the central MI6 structure due to the geographical distance between the Circus (MI6 Headquarters) and the Scalphputers in Brixton. Equally, when compared to analysing intelligence, the skill sets required are fundamentally different. For those undertaking surveillance activities, there is the necessity of not standing out in a crowd and convincingly doing nothing, something highlighted several times within the novel. Despite Le Carré not fully articulating this, it serves to highlight how distinct aspects of the intelligence cycle need to be undertaken by different people due to the expertise required.

Another and perhaps more subtle form of surveillance is the honey trap. Rather interestingly, honey traps within popular culture all manifest themselves in very different ways, with Spooks arguably demonstrating the more ‘classic’ honey trap approach, where someone in a position of power is befriended, either to gain valuable information or influence their decision-making by blackmailing them. In series 4, episode 4, the honey trap is used in conjunction with surveillance where the technical gurus place microphones and cameras into a hotel room to gain firm evidence of the honey trap to thus blackmail the Crown Prince of Baja (a fictional country) into giving the information MI5 require about a terrorist plot. The bugging of hotel rooms is something Pincher claims MI5 did when the Soviet leadership visited London in an attempt to gather valuable information. In contrast, Ashenden utilises an on-going affair between Lazzari and Chandra Lal to gain more information about his actions by turning Lazzari into an agent. It is also referred to in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy when obtaining information about a Soviet intelligence officer.

This serves as another example of where the overarching theme, in this case surveillance, provides a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. In this avenue of

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102 Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 327
103 Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 354
104 BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 4, Episode 4; BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 6, Episode 1
105 BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 4, Episode 4
107 Maugham, S, Ashenden, p. 128
108 Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 51
information, popular culture depicts how surveillance can occur by using techniques such as bugging hotel rooms and the honeytrap which may lead to an implicit view of the British Intelligence Services acting illegally or unethically due to the way they are portrayed in gathering the information. But, the detailed depictions of surveillance occurring in this manner may be due to the commercial considerations placed upon popular culture. 109 But this becomes problematic if it continually leads to a negative portrayal of the British Intelligence Services acting illegally and unethically simply to ensure viewing figures.

However, what is lacking from the depictions of surveillance is the political decision-making to initiate or discontinue it. *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy* briefly highlights this theme when Smiley is asking Connie about her work on Polyakov who she believed constituted a threat, but she was over-ruled.110 Implicitly, this leads to a portrayal of the British Intelligence Services acting legally by adhering to what their political masters request, a consistent portrayal to that evident in all of the previous chapters. But this is also subtly suggesting how decisions can be made without assessing all available information. Considering this is something of a controversial matter in the UK following the lead up to the Iraq War as Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’ and Chapter 5 ‘A Complicated Relationship’ explore, popular culture could in fact aid the continuing debate, and thus aid the understandings of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain.

Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the British Intelligence Services deem surveillance to be an important tool of information gathering. The whistle-blower Annie Machon discussed the role of social media for the Intelligence Services, describing Facebook as ‘a spy’s wet dream’111 as it allows for an understanding of a target and who they associate with. There have been numerous debates in the UK about social media

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109 This is due to the vast expense of producing a film of this manner, as has been discussed in why there is such an emphasis on the use of the honeytrap to demonstrate surveillance techniques. Producers are seeking to ensure the viability of their films. In 2007, Alford estimated that it cost of creating a film like Bond over $100 million, demonstrating how important that the film appeals to a global audience due to the number of box office ticket sales this will create. For more information, please see: Alford, M, *Reel Power*, p. 5 - 6


111 Machon, A, ‘Using Our Intelligence’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 20th April 2017
being utilised to collect personal data following the creation of new legislation (the Investigatory Powers Bill), something explored in Chapter 5 ‘A Complicated Relationship’. In one of the interviews undertaken for this thesis, the interviewee discussed this topic in detail, and how it would aid the work of law enforcement and the British Intelligence Services. But one crucial aspect seems to be lacking from this rhetoric, the realisation that surveillance has always been undertaken, dating back to the 1700s, and it is merely the way in which this is undertaken which is evolving due to technological advancements. Thus, the British Intelligence Services are merely seeking to adhere to legal and ethical standards in their continuing desire to ensure Britain’s safety and security.

### Science and Technology

Whilst science and technology may sound like an obscure theme, it is perhaps one of the more prevalent themes depicted within popular culture due to the emphasis, rightly or wrongly, placed upon gadgetry within portrayals of intelligence. The James Bond films are famous for their use of gadgets however, gadgetry is also explored within Le Carré depictions although they have not received the same condemnation. This does seem to be something of a double standard, but perhaps this is due to the type of gadgetry which is explored. Written in the Cold War context, a theme prevalent throughout Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy, Tarr describes the gadgetry being utilised by Soviet intelligence which included: ‘a recessed fountain pen with a signal plan folded up inside, (and) concealed camera,’ whilst the gadgetry created by those in ‘nuts and bolts’ – the Circus’s technology department - included a lamp with an embedded camera. In contrast, the gadgetry evident within the Bond films is perhaps somewhat more glamorous, evident as Goldfinger, released in 1964, has an ejector seat in Bond’s infamous Aston Martin.

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113 Private Interview 4: 21st January 2016
115 Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 54
116 Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 187
117 Goldfinger, Eon Productions, United Artists, Directed by Guy Hamilton, 1964
Such glamorous gadgetry has continued to be evident, to the extent that it has arguably become synonymous with the Bond franchise.\textsuperscript{118} For example, the 2015 Bond film \textit{Spectre} included: an Aston Martin accessorised with an ejector seat and rear-firing missiles, as well as a watch with an explosive charge, a reference to the gadgetry evident in the earlier films.\textsuperscript{119} This provides another example of fiction feeding fiction, albeit within the same franchise, as both \textit{Skyfall} and \textit{Spectre} have sought to pay homage to the earlier Bond depictions. But surely however gadgetry is explored within popular culture, it provides the portrayal of the British Intelligence Services seeking to ensure their capability and effectiveness by the ways in which they are attempting to gather information. This is evident at the International Spy Museum which explores the use of gadgets within intelligence, particularly within a historical context, and displays tools used by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) during the Second World War such as a rectal tool kit and a pipe pistol, seen in the photographs (figures 11 and 12) below.

![Rectal Tool Kit and Tobacco Pipe Pistol](figures.png)

Figure 11 (left) is of a rectal tool kit which was used by SOE. It was made up of escape tools which could be stashed in the body where they would not be found during a search. Figure 12 (right) is a tobacco pipe pistol which could fire a projectile that could kill someone at close range.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{118} McCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary between the ‘real’ and the imagined”, p. 816–817

\textsuperscript{119} Spectre, Eon Productions, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios and Colombia Pictures, Directed by Sam Mendes, 2015

\textsuperscript{120} Copyright: Abigail Blyth: Photo Taken At: International Spy Museum, \textit{School for Spies Exhibit}, Washington D.C, United States, 12\textsuperscript{th} September 2016
By highlighting the use of gadgetry, there is a consistent portrayal with Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ of how important gadgetry can be. Indeed, Chapman Pincher also highlighted this theme in *Their Trade Is Treachery* where he discussed how MI5 created a cavity microphone for their Australian counterparts to place in a wall in the Soviet embassy.¹²¹ This was a theme also highlighted in *Too Secret Too Long* when Pincher highlights how the Canadians also placed microphones in the Soviet consulate with MI5’s assistance when it was rebuilt following a fire, and how MI5 and MI6 placed microphone in a Claridge’s hotel room when the Soviet leadership came to London.¹²² Thus, technology has always been something the British Intelligence Services have used to gather information. This is combined with how MI6 have acknowledged the existence of Q – the quartermaster who is responsible for all the technology evident,¹²³ a role which has been continually depicted within Bond films.

**Secret Diplomacy**

Rather interestingly, the role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and their Embassies is a theme depicted within intelligence novels but omitted from the film and television adaptations of those books, although there does not seem to be any apparent reason for this omission. From the British perspective, highlighting the FCO within the intelligence realm is understandable as they oversee both MI6 and GCHQ,¹²⁴ suggesting that its inclusion within popular culture provides an understanding of the British Intelligence Services which is not apparent on the Big 3 websites. When interviewing the American intelligence academic Professor Loch Johnson, he discussed that when he wanted to write about the use of embassies for intelligence activities, he struggled to gain approval to discuss this theme, battling to prove it was already in the public domain.¹²⁵ However, following the Salisbury attack in 2018, embassies as diplomatic covers for intelligence officers has been clear in the news journalism coverage.¹²⁶

¹²¹ Pincher, C, *Their Trade Is Treachery*, p. 52
¹²³ Stanford, P, ‘As the real-life Q is revealed to be female – do women really make better spies?’, *The Telegraph*, (London), 27th January 2017
¹²⁴ National Intelligence Machinery, (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 2010), p. 10
¹²⁵ Private Interview 8: With Loch Johnson – 18th March 2016
Ashenden explores the importance of the British Foreign Office for intelligence officers working abroad. When he arrives in Vladivostok, the British Consulate provides assistance including the provision of a travel companion on the long train journey across Russia,\textsuperscript{127} themes also prevalent within the former CIA officer Robert Chapman’s writing.\textsuperscript{128} Washington Shadow also depicts the role of the Foreign Office as Peter Cotton is sent to the British Embassy in Washington D.C despite being an intelligence officer,\textsuperscript{129} as opposed to a diplomat.

Embassies and Foreign Offices are mentioned numerous times within Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy but always in a fleeting manner. However this still manages to provide the reader with a clear comprehension of the link between intelligence and the Foreign Office. For those intelligence officers stationed abroad, the Embassy can provide a cover identity for their work, explored in relation to Soviet intelligence in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy. In the novel, set at the height of the Cold War, there were numerous Soviet intelligence officers stationed in London under the guise of a driver, an assistant coding clerk and a cultural attaché.\textsuperscript{130} This is in conjunction with Mackelvore who was introduced as being a Circus elder (senior leadership) who has spent his career working in embassies.\textsuperscript{131} However, such actions were commonplace as Martha Peterson, a former CIA officer, was stationed in the American Embassy in Moscow issuing visas.\textsuperscript{132} Perhaps this is based on how consulates and embassies can provide legal and diplomatic cover for intelligence officers, a theme Le Carré highlights.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{127} Maugham, S, Ashenden, p. 251  
\textsuperscript{128} Chapman, R, D, ‘Save the Last Meringue for Me’, p. 369  
\textsuperscript{129} Monroe, A, Washington Shadow, p. 3  
\textsuperscript{130} Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 68 - 70  
\textsuperscript{131} Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 375  
\textsuperscript{132} Peterson, M, ‘The Widow Spy’, Lecture at Aberystwyth University, 16\textsuperscript{th} May 2017  
\textsuperscript{133} Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 95

Indeed, the role of embassies in providing diplomatic cover for Intelligence Officers was evident in programmes which did not directly link to Intelligence. For example, Auf Wiedersehen Pet, a programme about a group of British builders who travel abroad to find work also highlighted this theme. In series 4, the group work as a Government contractor and are sent to Cuba to build the Ambassador’s residence. Whilst there, two embassy staff are working for MI6 and recruit one of the builders to gather intelligence for them about a pharmaceutical deal between the Cubans and Chinese. Considering that Auf Wiedersehen Pet was not a programme related to intelligence, it highlights the public interest in the subject for this to be one of the main story lines throughout the series which explores the toll spying but on the individual as he had a cover identity and was lying to his friends about where he was going in the evenings. For more information, please see:
When asked about engagement with popular culture, one interviewee discussed how the FCO had engaged with the BBC drama *Ambassadors* in relation to highlighting the role of the diplomatic bag,\(^{134}\) something Le Carré demonstrates can be used for intelligence work,\(^{135}\) a theme the interviewee did not highlight. Whilst the nature of the work undertaken by an intelligence official stationed at an embassy is unknown, the highlighting of the theme demonstrates a depiction of the work of the British Intelligence Services which is lacking from Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’.

**Deception and secrecy**

Popular culture depicts deception and secrecy by examining the necessity to lie when required. This is known as having a cover story or legend, and allows an intelligence officer to work undercover to gain valuable intelligence.\(^{136}\) In *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy*, the necessity of having a cover legend is discussed in relation to Tarr, Peter Guillam and Jim Prideaux. When discussing Operation Testify, Control asks Prideaux if he has a legend and cover story he can use when going to meet the Czech general.\(^ {137}\) Tom Marcus, the former MI5 officer who published his autobiography in 2016 also explored this theme. Undertaking surveillance on numerous targets, Marcus examines the importance of living your cover so as not to raise suspicion.\(^ {138}\) When Smiley remembers his previous attempts at getting Karla to defect, this theme is explored. Rather interestingly however, this comes in the form of how difficult maintaining a cover story can be as Smiley tells Karla about his personal life in an inadvertent manner.\(^ {139}\) Whilst depicting the importance of secrecy, Le Carré also highlights how difficult this can be for an individual to maintain. This was the over-riding theme of the first and third series of *Spooks*, thus providing a more human view on intelligence matters by assessing the impact of this upon those

\(^{134}\) Private Interview 16: 19th September 2016

\(^{135}\) Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 187


\(^{137}\) Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 319

\(^{138}\) Marcus, T, *Soldier Spy*, p. 67

\(^{139}\) Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 237
within the intelligence realm. In turn, this provides the consistent portrayal of the British Intelligence Services seeking to ensure the safety and security of their employees by ensuring their real identities and families by extension are kept safe, themes explored in Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’.

David Shayler, the MI5 whistle-blower, discussed the impact that constantly lying can have on an individual in a 2002 newspaper interview, suggesting that the popular culture depictions of this theme provides the public with an understanding of the actions of the British Intelligence Services not explored by the other avenues analysed in this thesis. This is further triangulated by the fact that a former Spy Master at MI5, Maxwell Knight, focused his recruitment primarily on whether an individual had the ability to lie daily, perhaps demonstrating his realisation even in the 1930s of how this could affect an individual.

Although Spooks highlights the use of legends for an intelligence officer to work undercover, and the stress this places on the individual, it fails to explore the element of deception as it allows intelligence officers to reinvent themselves when going to a different country or, if they feel their life could be in danger. This is evident in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy when Tarr evolves from the Australian Thomas in Hong Kong, to the British citizen Poole in Malaysia, due to the belief that Soviet officials would be following him. Deception and secrecy not only allows intelligence officers to gain valuable intelligence, but also ensure their own safety. Such an emphasis is placed upon this theme that Le Carré highlights the importance of maintaining secrecy. Perhaps one of the clearest examples of this is when Smiley visits the woman Haydon has been living with. Instead of stating Haydon is a traitor, Smiley lies, telling her that Haydon is abroad on a secret job, to the extent he could not tell anyone, and may be away for years.

140 BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 1, Episode 1; BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 1, Episode 6; BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 3, Episode 6
142 Hemming, H, ‘M: Maxwell Knight, MI5’s greatest spymaster’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 20th April 2017
143 BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 4, Episode 4
144 Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 75
145 Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 409
demonstrates the importance of secrecy to the British Intelligence Services as despite Haydon’s treachery, they do not want it to become common knowledge.

Indeed, this portrayal is further evident in the Minister’s concerns over Haydon publicly stating what he has done when he arrives in Moscow.\textsuperscript{146} This does lead to ethical questions in relation to the actions undertaken to ensure secrecy is maintained. Perhaps it is these such suggestions of how self-preservation is so crucial which angered those within the British Intelligence Services, combined with the clear links between Haydon, the Cambridge Five and Snowden, both of which were scandals which deeply affected the British Intelligence Services. The depiction of the importance of secrecy to the ongoing work of the British Intelligence Services provides a consistent portrayal to Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’, Chapter 3 ‘A Complimentary Relationship’ and Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’. However, unlike these other avenues, popular culture does not emphasise how there can be the pervasiveness of secrecy and the problems which this can create.

**Acting legally and ethically**

Len Scott and Peter Jackson argue that acting legally and ethically is one of the overarching themes depicted within popular culture,\textsuperscript{147} which is perhaps unsurprising due to the centrality of legal and ethical considerations to decisions about intelligence. Indeed, McCrisken and Moran highlight that this is one of the key messages throughout the Bond films, the professionalism of British Intelligence who are a morally upright organisation.\textsuperscript{148} This theme is arguably of interest to the British Intelligence Services as it can show them either positively or negatively in relation to the actions they undertake which in turn, can have an impact upon public support for their continued democratic legitimacy. What has become evident within the analysis is how adherence to legal and ethical standards is portrayed very differently in the various depictions of intelligence.

\textsuperscript{146} Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 415
\textsuperscript{147} Scott, L, and Jackson, P, ‘Journeys in Shadows’, p. 18
\textsuperscript{148} McCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary between the ‘real’ and the imagined’, p. 810
Within *Ashenden*, the intelligence services are depicted as a very ethical organisation. When discussing whether a munitions factory should be blown up, there is a clear emphasis upon how this should be very much a last resort due to the number of people who would be killed as a result.\textsuperscript{149} This suggests that the methods utilised are continually discussed to ensure that nothing illegal or unethical is undertaken. But such an assertion is refuted by the whistle-blower Annie Machon whose analysis suggests MI5 is an illegal and unethical organisation where nothing is ever questioned, and decisions are simply adhered to.\textsuperscript{150} Yet, popular culture provides a very differing view of intelligence, particularly evident within *Spooks*. After an operation goes wrong, Zoe, a junior intelligence officer stands trial in the Old Bailey, accused of conspiracy to murder after the death of an undercover police officer on Operation Aladdin which sought to infiltrate the Turkish mafia who were bringing weapons and drugs into the UK.\textsuperscript{151} Whilst this leads to interesting discussions about what standards intelligence officers are held to, it is a monologue that takes place outside the court room which is most telling, with a senior intelligence officer stating:

\begin{quote}
*If we creep around in the dark it is because we have to, because there are people out there who also move in the dark. Look at the old man selling the newspaper, that woman scratching her back as she talks. The couple whose fingers are just touching, who are obviously having an affair. They know they should go to the gym, give up smoking, consolidate their debts. We do our best to try and protect them from people who would happily blow them to pieces. You can question our methods, we do that all the time – but don’t question our motives.*\textsuperscript{152}
\end{quote}

By continually questioning whether they are using the right methods, this monologue portrays MI5 as an organisation who have legal and ethical considerations at the centre of all their decision-making; something which is depicted as Spooks’ overarching

\begin{footnotes}
\item[149] Maugham, S., *Ashenden*, p. 243
\item[150] Machon, A., ‘Using Our Intelligence’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 20\textsuperscript{th} April 2017
\item[151] BBC DVD, *Spooks*, Series 3, Episode 6
\item[152] BBC DVD, *Spooks*, Series 3, Episode 6
\end{footnotes}
concern in numerous episodes. An example of this is evident in series 4 where senior MI5 officials threaten to resign over the American extraordinary rendition of a potential terrorist suspects as they state the Americans are acting illegally and unethically. As Chapter 5 ‘A Complicated Relationship’ explored, this was a theme which caused substantial tensions between MI5 and MI6 as MI5 were horrified by MI6’s involvement in extraordinary rendition. Indeed, this is a theme Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller has alluded to in public comments, furthering the positive portrayal of MI5 in the public domain, as well as highlighting a substantive consistent portrayal between MI5 and the avenues of information.

However, Spooks has not always depicted the British Intelligence Services in such a positive manner. When a mercenary reveals that a missile attack on London is imminent, he is questioned and tortured by MI5 operatives. Sir David Omand is highly critical of this depiction, arguing that it shows how MI5 ‘has no compunction about beating up terrorist suspects in the basement of Thames House’. Whilst Omand’s anger at this portrayal is somewhat understandable given his previous role within British Intelligence, this is not the only depiction which portrays the British Intelligence Services acting illegally and unethically. Le Carré’s The Spy Who Came In From The Cold sees the West using the same dubious ethics as those in the East. Whilst such a depiction may perhaps originate from Le Carré’s own disillusionment with the Cold War after being based in Germany, those within the British Intelligence Services were angered by this portrayal.

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153 BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 4, Episode 1; BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 10, Episode 5
154 BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 4, Episode 9
156 Manningham-Buller, E, ‘Leadership Under Pressure,’ Lecture at Aberystwyth University, 7th November 2012
157 BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 3, Episode 9
of the service as though it were staffed by those who lacked trust or loyalty and would sacrifice officers without a second thought.161

It is understandable why those within the British Intelligence Services were angered by these portrayals, particularly as Dover argues that:

the politics of state intelligence are every bit as political as those of the terrorist or dissidents they seek to contain and defeat.162

This demonstrates how at times, popular culture provides a negative understanding of the actions the British Intelligence Services are willing to undertake, something which could arguably affect public accountability due to the perception that the British Intelligence Services would undertake unethical activity. However, if they were more open and engaged more with the public, then the portrayals provided by popular culture could be countered.

Popular culture also addressed the British Intelligence Services acting legally and ethically by examining an individuals’ motivation to work for the intelligence realm. Maxwell Knight, an MI5 spy-master in the 1930s,163 joined MI5 due to a sense of duty and patriotism, a characteristic he looked for in those he recruited.164 Although why this was a trait Knight believed to be of importance is unclear, perhaps it emerged through a belief that this was a more ethical and moral reason for working within intelligence. However, as Ashenden explores, this is not the only motivating factor. For the individual only referred to as ‘the Hairless Mexican’, money was the overriding factor behind his involvement with British Intelligence due to a desire to return to Mexico.165 Whereas in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy, Tarr’s decision to join British Intelligence was due to his anger

164 Hemming, H, ‘M: Maxwell Knight, MI5’s greatest spymaster’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 20th April 2017
165 Maugham, S, Ashenden, p. 55
at gunrunning and disillusionment, having worked for the Belgians.\textsuperscript{166} Therefore, whilst Tarr’s engagement with British Intelligence was based on a legal and ethical decision, this was not the case for the Hairless Mexican.

Motivations are further explored in relation to becoming a traitor – one of a plethora of words which could be used to describe someone who works for an opposing intelligence organisation or non-state actor, a theme explored in \textit{Ashenden}. There is a long discussion of Caypor’s motivations to become a traitor; a decision it is stated is based:

\begin{quote}
\textit{not from hatred of the country… not even from love of his wife, but from a desire to score off the big wigs who never knew of his existence.}\textsuperscript{167}
\end{quote}

Whilst this highlights Caypor’s motivations, whether ethics was a factor in the decision is unclear. Indeed, there is no indication in \textit{Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy} of Haydon’s reasons for working for Soviet intelligence. But it is clear he was disillusioned with Britain and the Empire\textsuperscript{168} but, whether it was an ethical or moral decision is not articulated, providing a reference to the Cambridge Five. This is something \textit{Spooks} also refers to in an even more veiled manner.

In a rather convoluted plot in series 5 of \textit{Spooks}, a seconded MI6 officer seeks revenge for the death of his Israeli wife and child by cooperating with Israeli intelligence who are acting under the guise of a terrorist organisation.\textsuperscript{169} Whilst exploring the more human side of intelligence, this provides evidence of how popular culture is seeking to highlight a plethora of themes salient to intelligence, with motivations and ethics just one aspect to this. Indeed, with the exception of the Bond film \textit{Spectre}, all of these popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence Services which have been analysed, pre-date the Snowden revelations. However, they provide an overarching portrayal that those who are seeking to adversely affect the British Intelligence Services are in the wrong. Therefore, for anyone reading or watching these post Snowden, there is the implicit assumption that

\textsuperscript{166} Le Carré, \textit{Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy}, p. 39
\textsuperscript{167} Maugham, S, \textit{Ashenden}, p. 186-187
\textsuperscript{168} Le Carré, \textit{Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy}, p. 411
\textsuperscript{169} BBC DVD, \textit{Spooks}, Series 5, Episode 7
Snowden damaged the capabilities of the British Intelligence Services, creating a consistent portrayal to Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’.

Corruption is another facet of acting legally and ethically which is explored within popular culture and in particular, is a story line throughout series three of *Spooks*. In this, Oliver Mace, chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee, is seeking to politicise intelligence by interpreting the information collected to suit the current Government policy.\(^{170}\) This demonstrates the saliency of Zinnie Harris’s (the former *Spooks* writer who spoke at Edinburgh Spy Week 2017) argument that the producers of *Spooks* always wanted to try and make the events seem plausible,\(^ {171}\) in this case by including a story line reminiscent of the Blair Government’s politicisation of the dodgy dossier in the lead up to the Iraq War. Dover argues that the existence of such a story line demonstrates how the producers have been conscious about portraying the inter-play between politics and intelligence,\(^ {172}\) but his analysis falls short by failing to explore what understanding this inter-play provides to the public. Omand is also critical of this portrayal in *Spooks*, stating that it is merely depicting those at the top of the intelligence community as amoral spin merchants.\(^ {173}\) Whilst the argument that power can corrupt those in a position of power is applicable to numerous fields, Omand’s comments merely seem to criticise *Spooks*, despite his arguing that the public need to be informed on intelligence matters. Whether he likes it or not, surely *Spooks* is doing this. If popular culture as an avenue of information is to have less of an impact upon public understandings of the intelligence realm, then there needs to be more openness from the British Intelligence Services. But, until they stop seeing public engagement as a ‘necessary evil’\(^ {174}\) as one interviewee stated, popular culture will continue as a crucial avenue of information.

This theme was also explored, although in a more nuanced way, within *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy*. When gathering information about what happened when Prideaux was shot, the off-duty officer is not only scathing of the Minister in his comments to Smiley, but

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\(^{170}\) BBC DVD, *Spooks*, Series 3, Episode 2

\(^{171}\) Harris, Z, ‘Spies on TV’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 21st April 2017

\(^{172}\) Dover, R, ‘From Vauxhall Cross with Love’, p. 204

\(^{173}\) Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners,’ p. 47

\(^{174}\) Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017
also makes a passing comment of how power corrupts.\textsuperscript{175} This, along with the story line in \textit{Spooks} provides a depiction of how it is those politicians who cause problems within the intelligence realm. It is the intelligence officers who are seeking to overcome this, once again depicting good versus bad in the overarching theme of legally and ethically, thus aiding the overall positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. Indeed, this also furthers the consistent portrayal in both Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and the other avenues of how the British Intelligence Services do seek to act in a legal and ethical manner. However as with Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ there are times when popular culture depicts the British Intelligence Services acting in an illegal or unethical manner.

\textbf{Threats and Society}

\textit{The Bond franchise has been adept at keeping abreast of the perceived changes in security fears from the Cold War threat of nuclear annihilation through to so-called ‘new’ globalised security threats, many of which such as terrorism, bio-threats or transnational crime, Bond stories anticipated before they became commonplace on political or academic agendas.}\textsuperscript{176}

This argument was succinctly surmised at the International Spy Museum’s ongoing exhibition \textit{Exquisitely Evil: 50 Years of Bond Villains} which said:

\textit{Each Bond villain embodies the fears we face in society.}\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{175} Le Carré, \textit{Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy}, p. 261
\textsuperscript{176} McCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary between the ‘real’ and the imagined’, p. 817
\textsuperscript{177} International Spy Museum, \textit{Exquisitely Evil: 50 Years of Bond Villains}, Washington D.C, United States, 12\textsuperscript{th} September 2016
Jeremy Black argues that this is due to the way that the franchise ‘drew on current fears in order to reduce the implausibility of the villains and their villainy’. Lindner’s analysis is in agreement with this position, as he argues that Bond has adapted to major developments in world politics. Wesley Wark furthers this by highlighting how ‘the details of the plot, character and setting (are) designed to simulate the real world’. This is evident as the 1980s Bond films depicted the impact of Thatcherism and Reaganism on politics, which can be seen with a sharper political edge to Bond. McCrisken and Moran also explore this theme in relation to Casino Royale, stating that Bond’s use of whatever force necessary tallies with contemporary counterterrorism actions in the UK. The more recent Bond films explore threats posed by non-state actors, something also evident within Spooks. In Skyfall, non-state actors was a central theme where Dame Judi Dench, as M when giving evidence to the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee states in response to the continuing necessity of ‘00’agents:

\[I\text{ suppose I see a different world than you do. And the trust is that what I see frightens me. I’m frightened because our enemies are no longer known to us. They do not exist on a map. They’re not nations, they are individuals. And look around you – who do you fear? Can you see a face, a uniform, a flag? No. Our world is not more transparent now, it’s more opaque. It’s in the shadows – that’s where we must do battle.}\]

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179 Lindner, C, ‘Introduction,’ p. 1
182 McCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary between the “real” and the imagined”, p. 812
184 BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 5, Episode 1
185 Skyfall, Eon Productions, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Directed by Sam Mendes, 2012
McCraken and Moran argue that M’s speech is ‘one of the most pivotal and reflective speeches to be delivered in a Bond film’, an assertion which seems rather accurate. Not only does it succinctly demonstrate the evolution of the Bond franchise, tallies with the threats MI6 are countering, and also portrays the importance of intelligence accountability to the public and how serious MI6 take the process.

The role of real world events inspiring what is seen on screen is one Dover also explores in relation to Spooks, as he argues that they replicate issues evident in the news media such as mass protests. This links to the assertion that the producers of Spooks wanted it to emulate themes which could be evident on the BBC news which always directly followed the show. Therefore, popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence Services, and Spooks in particular, provide a consistent portrayal to Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ in terms of the threats which the British Intelligence Services are countering, as well as how these have evolved over time. Equally, by the threats depicted in Bond evolving, there is an increased global appeal, something of an undoubted importance due to the vast expense of making and producing a film. In 2007, it was estimated that the cost of producing a film was $106.6 million, a figure which has likely increased, and thus ensuring commercial success of the film becomes integral. Therefore, if the themes exhibited within the film appeal to a global audience, there is a greater possibility of the box office sales recouping this money.

In 1954, Casino Royale was adapted into an hour-long American TV programme about Jimmy Bond, followed by the creation of a Bond comic strip which was distributed in Yugoslavia, perhaps an activity associated with the Cultural Cold War. Since then, the Bond franchise has become a worldwide phenomenon, evident in the photographs taken of Bond posters (figures 13, 14 and 15) in multiple languages at the International Spy Museum.

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188 Dover, R, ‘From Vauxhall Cross with Love’, p. 205
189 BBC DVD, Spooks, Series 5, Episode 1
190 Harris, Z, ‘Spies on TV’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 21st April 2017
191 Alford, M, Reel Power, p. 5 - 6
Figures 13 (top left), 14 (top right) and 15 (bottom) are a selection of the posters on display at the International Spy Museum which demonstrate how Bond has become a global franchise.194

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194 Copyright: Abigail Blyth; Photo Taken At: International Spy Museum, Exquisitely Evil: 50 Years of Bond Villains, Washington D.C, United States, 12th September 2016
As this section has explored, the overarching theme portraying the threats the British Intelligence Services are seeking to counter, leads to a consistent portrayal to Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’. This highlights the role popular culture has as an avenue of information about the intelligence realm. Although the British Intelligence Services have websites where they highlight the threats that they seek to counter, as Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ explored, an individual must know the websites exist before actively accessing them. Thus, the onus remains on the public to access them if they wish to further understand the work of the British Intelligence Services. Although popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence Services still require an individual to watch or read them, the depictions arguably permeate the public consciousness in a manner unseen by the British Intelligence Services engaging directly with the public. However, if there were more openness from the Intelligence Services themselves, they could perhaps undertake more public engagement than simply placing information on the difficult to navigate websites, thus reducing the impact of popular culture as an avenue of information. In fact, this is in the interest of the British Intelligence Services as they seek to maintain their democratic legitimacy, which is dependent on public support, making more openness crucial for their future.

In providing the public with an understanding of the threats which the British Intelligence Services seek to counter, there is a consistent portrayal to Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship, but not with any of the other avenues of information. One possible reason for the consistent portrayal is engagement directly between the British Intelligence Services and popular culture, although Dover’s analysis of this fails to consider the way in which this occurs. This is arguably because, as Tricia Jenkins argues, when there is cooperation, it is a very informal process and therefore difficult to trace. Although the CIA created an Entertainment Liaison Officer position in the mid-1990s, suggesting

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197 Dover, R, ‘From Vauxhall Cross with Love’, p. 208
a formalised system of engagement, the way in which the engagement occurs remains rather informal and unique to the US due to the revolving door between Government and private business.\textsuperscript{199} However, merely the existence of an Entertainment Liaison Officer not only suggests at increased openness, but demonstrates a willingness to engage with these avenues of information in a manner not evident in the UK due to the pervasiveness of secrecy.

Role of Gender

One theme explored by the academic literature, is the role of women and gender in popular culture depictions of intelligence.\textsuperscript{200} In the early Bond films, women are only evident as a sexual encounter for Bond,\textsuperscript{201} a depiction which many people nowadays are horrified by. But Dover rightly points out that such a portrayal must be seen in the cultural setting of the time in which the film was released, and explores this using the example homosexuality. At a time when homosexuality was still illegal, it was depicted within the Bond films through many of the villains and their associates being gay,\textsuperscript{202} which provided a subtle suggestion that homosexuality is wrong, something also evident within \textit{Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy} as it is revealed that the traitor Bill Haydon is gay.\textsuperscript{203} However, more recent depictions of intelligence within popular culture do not portray such themes, demonstrating the validity of Dover’s argument.

Indeed, not only are changing attitudes towards women in society explored, but also the role of women within the British Intelligence Services. In \textit{Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy}, there are women within the Circus, however, they tend to have somewhat menial jobs. While Connie undertakes research, Mollie McCraig runs a safehouse,\textsuperscript{204} despite both seeming to be inherently capable of undertaking other intelligence roles. When working at the Circus, Connie was convinced that Karla was attempting to build an army of moles, having undertaken meticulous research in conjunction with the military which led to the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{199} Schou, N, \textit{Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood}, p. 87, 91, 93, 98, 102-103
\bibitem{200} Scott, L, and Jackson, P, ‘Journeys in Shadows’, p. 6
\bibitem{201} Denning, M, ‘Licensed to look; James Bond and the heroism of consumption’, p. 69
\bibitem{202} Dover, R, ‘From Vauxhall Cross with Love’, p. 212
\bibitem{203} Le Carré, \textit{Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy}, p. 414
\bibitem{204} Le Carré, \textit{Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy}, p. 119 and 383
\end{thebibliography}
identification of three new Karla trainees. Despite this evidence and convinced of Polyakov’s involvement, which later turned out to be the case, Connie could not get anyone to listen to her hypothesis. Although not explicit, there is the assumption within Le Carré’s writing that this is due to her being a woman and is not seen as an equal by those she works with, despite her clear job capability.

The case of Mollie McCraig further emphasises this point, particularly as Le Carré is more implicit in his highlighting of the role of women within intelligence. Described as the housekeeper for the safe house where Haydon met Polyakov, Mollie is described as a professional eavesdropper, demonstrating her capabilities within the intelligence realm. But despite this, she is not involved in a job which would utilise her clearly impressive skill set. When Smiley is setting up the meeting to discover who the mole is, there is one interesting sentence from Le Carré which surmises how women were viewed. Namely:

\[ \text{She remained downstairs, she said, as if that were a woman's place.} \]

This demonstrates how Le Carré portrays the role of women within society as being subservient to men, further exhibited as Mollie McCraig sees herself as being there to help her male colleagues, as opposed to seeing herself as their equal. The women highlighted within both *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy* as well as in some of the earlier Bond films, fall into two categories. There are those like Connie and Mollie, who are unmarried and capable of doing their jobs, but have a maternal instinct over the males they work with, and others who are young and there as a sexual encounter. By only highlighting these roles for women, it further permeates the suggestion of how women were not deemed to be as capable as men. However, more contemporary depictions have portrayed women as being equally capable within the intelligence realm, demonstrating changing attitudes towards the role of women. This is particularly evident in *Skyfall* as M – the head of MI6 in the Bond films – is portrayed by Judi Dench who, in this film, has a male

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205 Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 116 and 119
206 Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 124
207 Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 383
208 Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 384
secretary.\textsuperscript{209} This flips the gender stereotype evident in the previous Bond films, of a male M helped by a female secretary known as Miss Moneypenny who is infatuated with Bond.

This section has explored what themes are evident within popular culture portrayals of the British Intelligence Services. Whilst these have predominantly resulted in a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, and provide consistent portrayals to themes explored by the other avenues of information such as acting legally and ethically, there are some themes omitted from popular culture and rather interestingly, these are aspects which the British Intelligence Services emphasise.

**Under-explored themes**

Whilst the analysis has examined key themes explored in popular culture depictions of intelligence, there are also ones which have been overlooked. This section will seek to explore these disregarded themes whilst also assessing why popular culture depictions have not sought to address them. The topics scrutinised include: the monotonous nature of intelligence and research; the supportive mechanisms in place and finally, the financial difficulties intelligence officers can face.

**Monotonous nature of intelligence**

Former practitioners such as Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller and the whistle-blowers Annie Machon and David Shayler have been scathing of the depiction of MI5 in popular culture. Baroness Manningham-Buller, MI5’s former DG has publicly criticised \textit{Spooks}, arguing that the only similarity was entering through the pods,\textsuperscript{210} a criticism also made by Shayler and Machon.\textsuperscript{211} The academic (and former practitioner) Mark Lowenthal has made similar criticisms about popular culture, arguing that analysis is the mainstay of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{209} \textit{Skyfall}, Eon Productions, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Directed by Sam Mendes, 2012
\textsuperscript{210} Manningham-Buller, E, ‘Leadership Under Pressure,’ Lecture at Aberystwyth University, 7\textsuperscript{th} November 2012
\textsuperscript{211} The Guardian, \textit{Must Spy Harder}, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2002/may/15/bbc.davidshayler (Accessed 1st May 2017); Machon, A, ‘Using Our Intelligence’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 20\textsuperscript{th} April 2017
\end{flushleft}
intelligence work, yet this is not portrayed. But popular culture will remain in this privileged position unless the British Intelligence Services further their own engagement with the public. Such criticisms arise from the minimal emphasis placed upon the monotonous nature of intelligence work, something which Shayler’s newspaper article highlights as integral to the work of an Intelligence Officer. This is supported by McCrisken and Moran who highlight in their analysis of Bond that:

*Intelligence is usually a painstakingly slow business, where it can take months, even years, for threats to be identified, monitored and stopped.*

Yet despite this, it is a theme rarely explored within popular culture depictions. However, as Joseph Oldham highlights, this is not the only theme lacking discussion within popular culture portrayals of intelligence. When exploring intelligence leadership depictions in popular culture, he argues that whilst intelligence bureaucracy had a key role in the overall narrative, it was rarely a direct focal point in itself. There is saliency to Oldham’s argument as even within Le Carre’s *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy* there is only one veiled passing reference to it when Mackelvore is introduced to the story. This implicitly demonstrates that even when stationed abroad, intelligence is not glamorous, or romantic. However, in the earlier popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence Services, this was an overriding theme, demonstrating how popular culture portrayals of the British Intelligence Services have evolved.

In *Ashenden* and *Extremes Meet* by Maugham and Mackenzie respectively, the monotonous and repetitive nature of intelligence gathering are central. This highlights

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215 Oldham, J, ‘The Main Behind the Desk and Other Bureaucracies’, p. 284
216 Le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 374
217 Maugham, S, *Ashenden*, 101
how popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence Services have evolved over time as there are now numerous commercial factors affecting popular culture, and in particular film and TV depictions meaning that ‘drama has to be more exciting than real life’\textsuperscript{218} to entice the audience. Perhaps the emphasis on the monotonous nature of intelligence was the reasoning for both to become core reading for recruits to MI6 and the American Office of Strategic Services respectively.\textsuperscript{219} In Ashenden, the nature of intelligence is succinctly summarised as:

\begin{quote}
Ashenden’s official existence was as orderly and monotonous as a city clerk’s... The work he was doing was evidently necessary, but it could not be called anything but monotonous.\textsuperscript{220}
\end{quote}

Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy also explores the role of research, albeit in an indirect manner as it is more of a passing comment to aid the ongoing story, as opposed to an integral aspect. This is despite how Smiley’s meticulous research leads to the realisation of the interplay between Source Merlin and the mole, Gerald.\textsuperscript{221} Thus, a high paced view of intelligence is portrayed, in relation to the operational nature of intelligence, and further demonstrates the validity of Shayler’s argument. Perhaps this over glamorised view of the British Intelligence Services is why popular culture depictions are often disliked by British Intelligence Services personnel. But despite this, for those wanting to join the intelligence realm, popular culture can in fact be their first insight into this secretive world, as was the case for the 1930s MI5 officer Olga Grey. The role of popular culture in informing the public continues, with one of the interviews undertaken stating how Bond is a great recruiter for MI6 and they were happy to see Bond play a key role in the London 2012 Olympics Opening Ceremony!\textsuperscript{222} This is a continuing perspective from the British Intelligence Services as McCrisken and Moran discuss how many intelligence professionals, including the former C Sir Colin McColll see Bond as one of the best

\textsuperscript{218} The Guardian, Must Spy Harder, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2002/may/15/bbc.davidshayler (Accessed 1st May 2017)
\textsuperscript{219} Stafford, D, The Silent Game, p. 4 and 83
\textsuperscript{220} Maugham, S, Ashenden, p. 101
\textsuperscript{221} Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 119 and p. 249
\textsuperscript{222} Private Interview 2: 8\textsuperscript{th} January 2016
recruiting tools they have. \footnote{McCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary between the ‘real’ and the imagined’, p. 807} Rory Cormac agreed with this assertion; speaking at the 2019 Hay Festival, he stated that MI6 like the image which Bond creates, and also aids intelligence diplomacy around the world. \footnote{The Guardian, James Bond still a strong ‘recruitment sergeant’ for MI6 says expert, Sian Cain, 30th May 2019, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/may/30/james-bond-still-a-strong-recruitment-sergeant-for-mi6-says-expert (Accessed 22nd August 2019)} But it is somewhat telling that in a time when the British Intelligence Services all have websites and GCHQ use other social media platforms, a popular culture depiction of their work remains such an active recruiter, thus intimating the permeation of popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence Services versus the limited information due to the pervasiveness of secrecy actively provided by them.

Support mechanisms

The British Intelligence Services demonstrate that they are organisations with supportive mechanisms in place for employees as Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ demonstrated and was consistent in Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’. Considering the secretive nature of their work, it is unsurprising that the British Intelligence Services seek to provide all facilities that an individual would need ‘in house’ as it were. Such services are highlighted to a limited extent on the MI6 career web page, showing potential recruits the range of services available, if required. \footnote{Secret Intelligence Service, Explore Careers at SIS, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/explore-careers.html (Accessed 5th June 2017)} Research suggests that the importance of providing a support mechanism was realised in the 1930s. Whilst also being the head of the first agent-running section in MI5, Maxwell Knight acknowledged the importance of supporting his agents and thus acted as a counsellor to many of them, something which Olga Grey benefitted from immensely. \footnote{Hemming, H, ‘M: Maxwell Knight, MI5’s greatest spymaster’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 20th April 2017} Yet this supportive mechanism is lacking clear references within popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence Services.

Nowadays, the British Intelligence Services have a staff counsellor, a post created in 1987 allowing anyone who works in, or closely associated with British Intelligence, the opportunity to discuss ethical matters, personal grievance or anything else which arises.
from their work.\textsuperscript{227} However, whether this is effective remains unclear. Annie Machon was somewhat scathing about the effectiveness of this position and suggested that there is a lack of confidentiality,\textsuperscript{228} raising questions about the effectiveness of everything occurring ‘in house’. This can lead to concerns from those accessing the services that their bosses could become aware of their difficulties, a theme Tom Marcus states was a central concern before asking for help with his Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.\textsuperscript{229} How the support mechanisms function and the effect of these is something of an overlooked aspect within popular culture, this is despite there being some depictions of intelligence officers struggling with the demands of their job.\textsuperscript{230}

By demonstrating an awareness of this theme, popular culture depictions would create more of a consistent portrayal in the public domain as to how the British Intelligence Services seek to support their employees. In turn, this would allow for a greater comprehension of British Intelligence, something still lacking within public awareness of intelligence matters.

Financial Difficulties

Another theme popular culture, as well as the other avenues fails to explore, is the limited salaries of those within the British Intelligence Services, one which former practitioners seek to analyse, suggesting what a critical issue it is. David Shayler states that:

\begin{quote}
It is never explained in Spooks how officers living in central London can afford such lavish designer labels and cosmopolitan lifestyles on a salary of 10% higher than a civil servant of equivalent grade.\textsuperscript{231}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{228} Machon, A, ‘Using Our Intelligence’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 20\textsuperscript{th} April 2017
\textsuperscript{229} Marcus, T, \textit{Soldier Spy}, p. 274 – 280
\textsuperscript{230} BBC DVD, \textit{Spooks}, Series 4, Episode 8
Yet there is no comprehension of this either within Spooks or any other popular culture depiction of intelligence. Although the Spooks characters wearing designer clothes may be due to commercial product placement, this does not explain how young professionals can afford such luxuries and live in central London. Whilst the MI5 website seeks to promote how attractive working at MI5 can be, the section on their website pertaining to salaries and benefits fails to stipulate the starting salary of an intelligence officer. However former intelligence officers allude to it being minimal, as Tom Marcus highlights – despite ensuring the safety of the country daily, he was drowning in debt. Although this would have been an interesting theme to explore in the interviews undertaken, this was not deemed appropriate. However, this remains a theme overlooked within popular culture which seems somewhat surprising, particularly when there are depictions of what motivates individuals to become involved with intelligence.

Why popular culture fails to highlight certain facets of the intelligence realm is unclear, but it seems strange that these factors which former practitioners have addressed, and there is some information about in the public domain, remain under-explored. But these could be described as the more mundane aspects of intelligence, one which popular culture predominantly fails to address. Perhaps if such themes were included within popular culture, the British Intelligence Services themselves may have a better view of popular culture as it is not something always appreciated by the Intelligence Services, despite how crucial it can be for them as the following section will explore.

**Impact of these themes**

The chapter has analysed depictions of intelligence evident within popular culture. However, it is important now to examine the impact of these as often films and television programmes provide the only information the viewer has about the intelligence services. By the portrayal of science, technology and gadgetry within the Bond franchise, the Soviet politburo believed that such technology was being used by British

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232 Alford, M, *Reel Power*, p. 5 - 6
234 Marcus, T, *Soldier Spy*, p. 150
235 Dover, R, ‘From Vauxhall Cross with Love’, p. 217
Intelligence, and thus demanded the Soviet Intelligence organisation (the KGB) to acquire the same gadgetry.\textsuperscript{236} This demonstrates that whilst popular culture depictions may be light hearted and fun, there is a clear real-world impact which these portrayals can have. Indeed, the impact of gadgetry was further demonstrated after a dinner party where President J.F. Kennedy asked Fleming for his advice on the situation with Fidel Castro in Cuba. The suggestions made by Fleming included dropping pamphlets over Havana explaining that beards were a natural repository for radiation from US atomic radiation testing. As radiation caused impotency, Cuban men would be forced to shave their beards, thus severing a symbolic link to both Castro and the revolution.\textsuperscript{237} These suggestions then manifested themselves in Operation Mongoose.\textsuperscript{238}

The CIA Director Allen Dulles was also a Bond aficionado, which Moran argues was in part because Bond was an ‘unashamed celebration of the spy business’ and Dulles was ostensibly involved in selling the spy business to the public. But perhaps more crucially, this was due to the close friendship Dulles and Fleming shared, with the CIA Director feeling he could turn to Fleming for inspiration.\textsuperscript{239} This is perhaps most evident in the fact that Dulles requested the CIA to replicate as many of Bond’s devices as possible,\textsuperscript{240} and was thrilled when a spring-loaded knife embedded in the sole of a shoe went from being a fictional weapon to something which worked!\textsuperscript{241} This success was arguably one of the reasons that the CIA continued to create Bond like gadgets under Dulles successor, Casey.\textsuperscript{242} Apart from liking the message provided by Bond, Dulles was suitably impressed by Fleming’s wartime experiences with espionage and covert action\textsuperscript{243} and thus thought Fleming was in an opportune position to provide advice and

\textsuperscript{236} Scott, L, and Jackson, P, ‘Journeys in Shadows’, p. 18
\textsuperscript{239} Moran, C, ‘Ian Fleming and the CIA Director Allen Dulles’, p. 209–210
\textsuperscript{240} McCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary between the ‘real’ and the imagined’’, p. 815–816
\textsuperscript{241} Moran, C, ‘Ian Fleming and the CIA Director Allen Dulles’, p. 211
\textsuperscript{242} McCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary between the ‘real’ and the imagined’’, p. 815–816
support to the formative CIA, perhaps a reason why the CIA were willing to use Fleming’s suggestions in Operation Mongoose. Thus, the portrayals of intelligence within popular culture can be utilised by other Intelligence Services as they believe popular culture to be an accurate representation, demonstrating its real-world impact.

Trotter argues that the British spy novel in the Edwardian era was a response to the erosion of British power and prestige. As the historical section exhibited, it was the influence of the spy novel and the themes they permeated which led to the creation of the Secret Service Bureau in 1909. This demonstrates the impact popular culture can have upon society by instigating new organisations and changing attitudes. Indeed, such themes were also depicted within Bond. Following the Suez crisis Britain was in a period of decline; and Bond highlighted that Britain could be great again. This was combined with demonstrating to civil society, that despite the realities of the Cold War, society could enjoy themselves and travel, thus impacting upon the behaviour of the British public.

Another impact popular culture can have is on recruitment to the British Intelligence Services, particularly now that an individual applies directly to them. This is something one interviewee highlighted when asked about the role of popular culture saying that Bond can be positive for recruitment, although it is important to remember that Bond is fictional. Despite the British Intelligence Services attempting to directly engage with the public, popular culture remains a key avenue through which an understanding of what they do permeates public consciousness. Indeed, those who have worked within British Intelligence have been somewhat influenced by the popular culture depictions. Maxwell Knight became keen on an intelligence career after reading 1920s spy fiction and in


Trotter, D, ‘The Politics of Adventure in the Early British Spy Novel’, p. 31

Bennett, T, and Woollacott, J, ‘The Moments of Bond’, p. 19

Wark W, ‘Introduction: Fictions of History’, p. 6


Private Interview 2: 8th January 2016
This influenced his time in MI5 and would run meetings with his agents in the manner he believed would be seen in one of his favourite spy novels. But unless there is more openness from the British Intelligence Services, the depictions of intelligence promoted by the avenues of information will continue to be in a unique position of providing a view of intelligence to potential recruits.

**Conclusion**

The chapter examined what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are evident in popular culture by analysing novels, films and TV programmes. Beginning by defining popular culture, the evolution of popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence Services were then explored by charting a history of British popular culture depictions of the intelligence realm. As the threats and fears in society changed over time, so too did the overarching depictions provided by popular culture. This exhibits how popular culture as an avenue of information has always sought to provide the public with an understanding of the intelligence realm.

The chapter then focused on the Bond franchise, Le Carré’s *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy*, and the BBC drama *Spooks*, to analyse what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are evident in these three forms of popular culture. By triangulating the interviews undertaken, archival research at the American Film Institute and National Cryptography Museum in America, museum visits to the Imperial War Museum and the International Spy Museum with the popular culture depictions, there was a clear understanding of what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services popular culture places in the public domain. The overarching themes such as surveillance, communications and code and acting legally and ethically demonstrate how the British Intelligence Services are capable and effective in their collection of intelligence, an important facet to their work. Combined, not only did these create an overall positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, but also a consistent portrayal to the depictions provided by the other avenues of information. In particular, it was adhering to legal and ethical standards which was a central theme explored by all avenues of

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249 Hemming, H, *Maxwell Knight, MI5’s Greatest Spymaster*, p. 16
250 Hemming, H, ‘M: Maxwell Knight, MI5’s greatest spymaster’, Lecture at Edinburgh University, 20th April 2017
information. However, popular culture does omit discussions pertaining to the monotonous nature of intelligence, support mechanisms and financial difficulties, perhaps due to the commercial considerations which result in popular culture needing to be more exciting than real life to ensure commercial viability, a theme the other avenues of information do not have to contemplate.

Despite the overall positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, former practitioners remain somewhat scathing of popular culture depictions as the chapter highlighted. But, unless the British Intelligence Services undertake more openness and place more information in the public domain in an accessible manner, portrayals of the British Intelligence Services via the avenues of information which frustrate former practitioners will continue to inform the public about the intelligence realm. Therefore, increased openness benefits the British Intelligence Services as there would be a more informed understanding of intelligence in the public domain. This is crucial as Dover rightly argues that popular culture depictions are:

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\text{Merely diversions from reality, showing fragments of intelligence activity – as a result we should enjoy them, but guard against their seductive but counter-productive charm.}^{251}
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Yet despite Dover’s words of caution, popular culture continues to have a real world impact on the intelligence realm.\(^{252}\) This demonstrates what an influential position popular culture as an avenue of information is in. If the pervasiveness of secrecy

\[251\] Dover, R, ‘From Vauxhall Cross with Love’, p. 219
\[252\] As the chapter explored, this was evident after due to the fears of a German invasion exacerbated by Le Queux and Lord Northcliffe, the sub-committee of the Imperial Defence was established and Le Queux provided them with substantial evidence of the German threat. This resulted in the creation of the forebears to MI5 and MI6. Another example of the impact of popular culture depictions of intelligence is how Allen Dulles, as CIA Director utilised weaponry and techniques evident in the Bond films, although part of this may have been due to Dulles’ close friendship with Fleming. For more information, please see: Cobain, I, The History Thieves, p. 16 – 19;
Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 19 – 20;
continues to shroud the British Intelligence Services to such an extent, popular culture as an avenue of information will continue to be the view of the secret world many consume.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

As Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ highlighted, there is an attempt from the British Intelligence Services, namely the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) to engage directly with the public domain. This ostensibly occurs via their websites and through rare public speeches made by the respective heads, with the websites providing transcripts of these.\(^1\) Despite this direct engagement, the websites are not publicised effectively, if at all; and it is only if an individual is interested enough that they will search for this information. Therefore, the onus remains on the public to be aware of these public engagement activities, access the information and interpret what is included on the difficult-to-navigate websites. But this results in the British Intelligence Services being able to state that information has been placed in the public domain, although it is often hidden in plain sight.

Although the existence of the official websites\(^2\) is a good starting point for the British Intelligence Services to portray themselves to the public, the onus remains on the individual to access them, and presumes that everyone has the ability to access the internet. Only 41% of the population aged over 75 was an internet user in 2017,\(^3\) highlighting a wider socio-economic problem due to the continued emphasis placed upon the internet as a means of engaging with the public. By contrast, it is much easier for ordinary members of society to be reached by the information about the British intelligence services provided by the avenues of information, namely wider Government,

\(^1\) Security Service, News and Speeches, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news-and-speeches (Accessed 14th December 2019);
Secret Intelligence Service, News, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/news.html (Accessed 14th December 2019);

\(^2\) Security Service, Home, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/ (Accessed 15th June 2016);


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academia, news journalism and popular culture. This results in the avenues of information being in a privileged position due to their role in informing the public domain about the British Intelligence Services.

It is surprising to see that despite the different avenues of information analysed, there is a consistent positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services evident through all of them. Whilst they all emphasise different themes to reach this overall conclusion, this is unsurprising due to the diversity of the avenues. An example of this is how the British Government explore the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services, whereas news journalism emphasises the limitations of legislation, particularly in the post Snowden context. But, there are some themes all the avenues agree on, such as how the British Intelligence Services seek to act legally and ethically, which enhances the overall positive view of the British Intelligence Services.

The introduction’s research puzzle addressed the tensions between openness and secrecy, something which has been a recurring theme throughout the thesis. It is not disputed that the British Intelligence Services require a degree of secrecy for their work, what is questioned is the amount of secrecy which acts as a barrier between the British Intelligence Services and the public domain. Ultimately, this can result in a disconnect between the intelligence realm and the public domain, with the avenues of information filling this void. This becomes problematic for the British Intelligence Services as to ensure their continued democratic legitimacy, they require public and legislative support, thus increased openness can in fact be beneficial for the British Intelligence Services. This exhibits the necessity of a delicate balance between openness and secrecy.

In ascertaining this, there are lessons Britain can take from America. America has a very different historical culture to secrecy and openness as the latter was forced upon the American Intelligence Community following the Watergate Scandal in 1975 where it transpired that the Intelligence Services had undertaken constitutionally dubious

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domestic intelligence activities. This resulted in the creation of oversight mechanisms which increased openness about the intelligence realm, as well as the instigation of what Geoffrey Treverton refers to as the social contract. It meant that the American public allowed the Intelligence Services, who they realised they could not know everything about, to operate in their name, even to undertake illegal or unsavoury actions, but to understand the limits imposed by American values. However, it was damaged in the mid-2000s following allegations that US military personnel were torturing terrorist suspects under instructions of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay. However, it highlights a salient theme in how increased

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5 Examples of the constitutionally questionable operations undertaken include how President Nixon approved individuals to break in, and install eavesdropping equipment in the Democratic National Campaign headquarters as Nixon prepared for his election. Another example is how the CIA was spying on anti-war protestors for over a decade. For more information, please see:

- United States Senate, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (The Church Committee), Available From: https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/ChurchCommittee.htm (Accessed 25th February 2017);


Gill, P, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the Challenge of Security Networks’, Review of International Studies, 35/4 (2009), p. 933; Originally, the American news broadcaster CBS broke the story of the inhumane treatment of Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad on the 60 Minutes programme, before photos of the abuse appeared in an article written by Seymour Hersh for The New Yorker. These photos, including a hooded individual stood on a box and naked prisoners forming a human pyramid with American service personnel stood behind them, received worldwide coverage and were synonymous with allegations of the US use of torture. For other articles please see:

- The New Yorker, Torture at Abu Ghraib, Seymour Hersh, 10th May 2004, Available From: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib (Accessed 13th March 2018);

Researching this topic did highlight how it was also covered in the non-English speaking media as well such as Germany’s Der Spiegel. However as I am not a native speaker, I have not included these in the list of references.
openness from the Intelligence Services, can result in an increased public understanding of the intelligence realm and that certain actions do require secrecy. If the British Intelligence Services became more open with the public, not only would their democratic legitimacy continue, but they would not have to undertake a knee jerk public response when they received public scrutiny.

One example of this would be the Snowden revelations in 2013 which claimed that the American National Security Agency (NSA), in partnership with GCHQ, had implemented the bulk collection of telephone, internet and email records by collecting data from technology companies, including Facebook, Google, Verizon, Microsoft, Apple, and Yahoo.\textsuperscript{8} One interviewee spoke candidly about the Snowden revelations, and the debate it has initiated, with GCHQ increasing their public engagement.\textsuperscript{9} But had they already been doing this, perhaps the public would not have been so keen to believe the Snowden revelations which claimed that GCHQ were acting illegally and unethically, as opposed to acting within the existing legislation. What was interesting in Chapter 5 ‘A Complicated Relationship’ analysis was that news articles published at the time of the Snowden revelations portrayed GCHQ acting illegally and unethically, whilst those written subsequently, were more critical of the existing legislation. This demonstrates how a negative depiction of the British Intelligence Services was first evident, but this soon changed after the initial debate surrounding the revelations. However, had there been more openness to begin with, the negative portrayal may have been prevented.

There are other lessons which Britain could take from their American counterparts who have seemingly found the balance between openness and secrecy such as engagement

\textsuperscript{8} The Guardian, \textit{NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily}, Glenn Greenwald, 6\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Available From: \url{https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order} (Accessed 12\textsuperscript{th} March 2018);

\textsuperscript{9} Private Interview 21: 12\textsuperscript{th} September 2017
with museum exhibits. The NSA engages with the public via the National Cryptologic Museum, and perceive the museum, which is located next to their Headquarters, to be their principle gateway to the public. This was one example of the increased levels of openness which I witnessed when undertaking fieldwork in America and highlighted how the American balance between openness and secrecy is something which Britain should aspire to. But for this to occur, the pervasiveness of secrecy which is a key characteristic of the British way in Intelligence will have to change.

The introduction explored the British way in Intelligence which Mike Goodman argues, due to the unique historical cultural context of British Government, means there are two defining characteristics in approaching intelligence. These are, a committee style approach to decision making, which is evident through the role of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) within the wider intelligence community, and the drive for consensus in decision making, something also witnessed through the JIC seeking to provide one cohesive view of intelligence to policymakers. The thesis builds on this, arguing that the pervasiveness of secrecy also characterises the British way in Intelligence due to the historical emphasis there has been on complete secrecy shrouding the British Intelligence Services to the extent that the Whitehall view was that any information was an official secret until officially released. But, this does not need to be a defining characteristic of the British way in Intelligence.

There have been attempts at increased openness such as the Waldegrave Initiative which Richard Aldrich argued was nothing short of a major revolution as it changed the default setting of Whitehall to releasing as opposed to withholding information, something which coincided with John Major placing MI6 and GCHQ on a statutory footing in 1994. But despite this, there remains a culture of secrecy surrounding the British Intelligence Services, in part due to the engrained need to know principle which

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prevented discussions of the intelligence realm.\textsuperscript{15} However, as the American case demonstrates, further openness of the British Intelligence Services is possible without having an adverse effect on operations or collecting information. By locating this balance, the British Intelligence Services can continue to ensure Britain’s safety and security whilst reassuring the public that they are acting in their best interest, adhering to legal and ethical standards, as opposed to skulking around in the shadows and undertaking dubious activities. Providing this understanding to the British public is crucial as the British Intelligence Services seek to ensure their continued democratic legitimacy. Although successive Intelligence heads have explored this theme in their speeches,\textsuperscript{16} it was Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller who highlights its importance in a clear and succinct manner as she states:

\begin{quote}
We need to continue to tell them (the public) about the threat, explain the nature and extent of it, and be clear about what can be expected of us by the public. We need and rely on public cooperation and support for our work…. Informing the public increases their confidence that the authorities are addressing the problem and have
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Secret Intelligence Service, \textit{News: 03 December 2018 – MI6 ‘C’ Delivers Rare Public Speech at St Andrews University}, Available From: \url{https://www.sis.gov.uk/news/alex-younger-st-andrews-speech.html} (Accessed 10\textsuperscript{th} December 2018);
\item Security Service, \textit{News and Speeches – The Enduring Terrorist Threat and Accelerating Technological Change: Andrew Parker, 8\textsuperscript{th} October 2013}, Available From: \url{https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/the-enduring-terrorist-threat-and-accelerating-technological-change} (Accessed 20\textsuperscript{th} December 2018);
\item Security Service, \textit{News and Speeches – Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism and Trust: Jonathan Evans, 5\textsuperscript{th} November 2007}, Available From: \url{https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/intelligence-counter-terrorism-and-trust} (Accessed 17\textsuperscript{th} December 2018);
\item \textsuperscript{16} Security Service, \textit{News and Speeches – Global Terrorism: Are We Meeting The Challenge?: Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller, 16\textsuperscript{th} October 2003}, Available From: \url{https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/global-terrorism-are-we-meeting-the-challenge} (Accessed 13\textsuperscript{th} December 2018)
\end{itemize}
the capability to respond appropriately to terrorist threats. 17

Although she said this in 2003, it remains the case 16 years later and further highlights the importance of the public having an informed understanding of the British Intelligence Services. However, although the British Intelligence Services have increased their openness since Manningham-Buller’s comments in 2003, 18 there remains far more they could do such as engage with museum exhibits, or use social media platforms to promote their websites. 19 Due to this secrecy, the four key avenues are placed in the unique position of providing the public with an understanding of the British Intelligence Services. All provide a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services and rather surprisingly, the same overarching themes such as acting legally and ethically are explored by the British Intelligence Services themselves, and is discussed in Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’, as well as by the four key avenues of information. This creates a consistently positive portrayal of how the British Intelligence Services act legally and ethically.

The thesis’s originality and contribution to the literature emerges from the extensive analysis of the portrayals provided by each of the avenues of information. As the introduction discussed, there is an awareness, particularly from the intelligence accountability literature of the importance of assessing what information is placed in the public domain. In particular, Sir David Omand explores this, as he discusses the importance for the British Intelligence Services to ensure legislative and public support.20

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18 This is evident in how MI6 launched their website in 2005 in several different languages, some 11 years after they were placed on a statutory footing. For more information, please see: Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, Second Edition, p. 63
19 Currently, it is only GCHQ who utilises the social media platforms on Twitter and Instagram, although not to the same extent as the CIA and FBI. This was a theme explored in Chapter 1 ‘Introduction’ and provides the statistics of how many followers GCHQ, CIA and FBI have on each platform. Please see pages 34–35 for more information.
When examining how news journalism can act as a form of intelligence accountability, Claudia Hillebrand discusses the roles of the media in transmitting information, scrutinising decisions, act as a substitute watchdog, or as a legitimising institution. However, this does not account for what portrayals are provided of the British Intelligence Services. In relation to popular culture, Simon Willmetts, Trevor McCrisken and Christopher Moran, and Robert Dover, also explore the importance of assessing what themes are portrayed in popular culture due to the role this avenue of information has on public understandings, evident as:

*They [portrayals of intelligence] are not just fictitious fluff and nonsense; they have a real-world impact in respect of how they help to condition the public to think about intelligence, the use of state sanctioned violence and counter-terrorism.*

MCCrisken and Moran agree with this theme. Focusing on the Bond franchise, they argue that it has ‘played a vital role in constructing the meaning of secret intelligence and framing the discourse used to understand it.’ Thus, there is a clear importance in assessing what portrayals popular culture provide, as was discussed in Chapter 6 ‘A Fractious Relationship’. Although this did utilise Dover’s analysis, he compares British and American popular culture depictions. By having a British centric approach, the thesis aids the ongoing debates by undertaking this important analysis and being able to compare and contrast the portrayals provided by the different avenues of information, something the conclusion has referred to.

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This is a theme also highlighted by Willmetts in his article:


Overall, all of the avenues of information have provided a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, with their adherence to legal and ethical practices and overarching theme the avenues explored. In the first case study, the lead up to the Iraq War, this is implied as the debates centre around the politicisation of intelligence, a theme particularly evident through academia and news journalism avenues of information. Unsurprisingly, the British Government did not explore this theme, but rather sought to highlight the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services due to their ability to gather extensive intelligence about Saddam Hussein’s nuclear desires and capabilities. Implicitly, this is almost suggesting that if there are issues with the intelligence, then it was due to the information provided by the British Intelligence Services. This was a key contrast in how the avenues of information portrayed the lead up to the Iraq War, with the others emphasising the politicisation of intelligence by policymakers which in turn created a positive depiction of the British Intelligence Services.

In the Snowden case, although there was a negative portrayal of the British Intelligence Services immediately following the revelations, over time the avenues of information intimated that the British Intelligence Services adhered to legal and ethical standards by critiquing the limitations of existing legislation. Thus, while news journalism provided the same overarching positive portrayals of the British Intelligence Services as the British Government, they reached the conclusions in very differing ways. Thus there are competing depictions of the actions undertaken by the British Intelligence Services in the British public domain, although there are significant areas of agreement on key points in those portrayals. This will continue to be the overarching depiction in the public domain unless there is increased openness from the British Intelligence Services in a meaningful way. If the British Intelligence Services stopped hiding information in plain sight, the avenues of information would not be in such an influential position.

To achieve this, Britain should strive to emulate the American balance between openness and secrecy. Whilst this would alter the pervasiveness of secrecy which the thesis has argued is a characteristic of the British way in Intelligence, this would be a positive change. But, there also needs to be a realisation from the British Intelligence Services that increased openness can not only increase recruitment, but their democratic
legitimacy, as opposed to viewing public engagement as a necessary evil. Only then will the avenues of information through which the public are informed about the intelligence realm stop being in such an influential position to inform and educate the public.

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23 Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017
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Private Interview 11: 1st June 2016

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Private Interview 13: 2nd June 2016

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