Security Governmentality in Turkey

by

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Submitted in part fulfillment of the Degree of Ph.D. in International Politics
DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed ................................................
Date \(09/12/2005\)


STATEMENT 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

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STATEMENT 2

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The thesis asks a central question: what is the nature of the relationship between state security and domestic politics in contemporary Turkey? It aims to show that although the pendulum of Turkish politics has swung back and forth between democratic elections and military interventions, in the last decade a new set of historically conditioned discourses and practices of state security have fused the political and military realms to produce a peculiar regime which I call *security governmentality*. Understanding the traits of Turkish security governmentality is the task of the thesis. It adopts a genealogical approach. The subject-matter analyzes both the historical-political conditions within which security governmentality emerged as a dominant practice of rule and the prospects of its dissolution. Indeed, the dissolution of security governmentality gained an air of expectancy particularly after 1999 when Turkey was granted an 'official candidacy' and started to adapt the EU democratic membership conditionality. Within this framework, the thesis explores the peculiar entanglement between security and politics in Turkey, which has produced an uneven distribution of power between the military and the society, and examines the challenges of the EU membership reform process to Turkey's security governmentality.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>Critical Security Studies</td>
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<td>DSP</td>
<td>Democratic Left Party</td>
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<td>DYP</td>
<td>True Path Party</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>FP</td>
<td>Fazilet Party</td>
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<td>Nationalist Action Party</td>
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<td>MSP</td>
<td>National Salvation Party</td>
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<td>MUSIAD</td>
<td>Association of Independent Businessmen</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Policy Document</td>
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<td>ROS</td>
<td>Reason of State</td>
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<td>RP</td>
<td>Refah Party</td>
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<td>TSS</td>
<td>Traditional Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUSIAD</td>
<td>Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association</td>
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<td>WWG</td>
<td>Western Working Group</td>
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<td>YAS</td>
<td>Supreme Military Council</td>
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<td>YOK</td>
<td>Higher Education Council</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The thesis asks a central question: what is the nature of the relationship between state security and domestic politics in contemporary Turkey? It arises from the author’s observation that in the last decade the Turkish state has employed a specific set of security discourses and practices that have, in considerable measure, shaped and molded political and personal conduct. The state security discourses and practices have framed the scope of political conduct and informed a range of responses to domestic political dissent. Significantly, these discourses and practices have been accompanied by certain institutional, legal and conceptual instruments utilized by the state elites. As such, Turkey represents a paradigmatic example of the cases where the discourses and practices of state security are interior to and in some part constitutive of domestic political conduct. State security and its attendant regimes, programs and strategies have become extensively enshrined in the constitution and political practice to the extent that at times the concern over ‘the security of the state’ is imposed on the workings of democratic politics. State security is systematically internalized by the ruling elites through a set of rational and institutional mechanisms. Such a configuration of security produces significant practical ramifications for the government of the people. As a result, power and authority is unevenly distributed in the polity, that is, the discourses and practices of security in Turkey help maintain and reproduce the power of the state elites in domestic politics.

Security governmentality comprises two kinds of juxtaposed actors: state elites and political elites (Heper, 1992b: 146-7). State elites can be identified as acting in a ‘bureaucratic ruling tradition’ and a considerable number of them believe that they both know and protect the national interest better than the citizens (Turan, 1984: 116). The state elites see themselves as the modernizing agents, guardians and ‘true servants’ of the state; its Kemalist ideology and public-national interest (Yavuz, 2000a). They believe that they are free to act in order to protect ‘vital matters’, and if necessary do it at the expense of any other (democratic) political procedure (Heper, 1984: 93). Within the state elites, the thesis identifies the Turkish military as the main agent. Its unprecedented political power has derived from the relevant institutional and legal capacities conferred to it to define and respond to ‘domestic threats’, especially that of political Islam. The thesis also identifies a second category of elites. These are termed ‘political elites’, and involve the elected representatives of the political parties, which are normally inclined to protect the socio-economic rights and needs of their constituencies. The distinction can be seen as follows: the state elites can be considered as
representing the ‘vertical’ dimension, whereas the political elites represent ‘horizontal’ dimension of Turkish politics life (Heper, 1991). It is partly this juxtaposition that engenders a conflictual dynamic in democratic politics between appointed state elites and elected political elites (Karpat, 1988).

Another significant ramification of security governmentality is that state security infringements on the governmental functions and powers have blurred the liberal demarcation between the civilian and the military. This produces an undemocratic and complex politico-military rule. For instance, the influential discourses and practices of state security make crucial inroads into the individual and societal conduct by embodying novel channels of intervention of the state (security) forces into the collective and personal conduct. Within this context, it is possible to argue that national security has been the passion of the day for the ruling state elites since 1996, when an Islamic government took office for the first time in the history of secularist-modern Turkey. As a result, the age-old Ottoman Young Turk question of ‘how can the state be saved?’ against the external (European) powers (Koker, 1990: 69; Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004: 3) has been turned into a question of how the state can be saved from the internal ‘Islamist threat’. The state, we are often told by the military, has to be saved from these ‘internal threats’ posed by an assortment of social or cultural categories: be it people with Islamic sensitivities or people with ethno-political Kurdish identity (Yavuz, 2000a: 25). In the words of Turkey’s former Chief Public Prosecutor, the demands of such people for wider visibility and recognition in society represent unequivocal ‘security threats’ for the ‘survival of the state’ (Savas, 2001a: 7). Accordingly, state security has been resourcefully employed to function as a discourse, mentality, method and identity at the service of the non-democratic agents of the state (e.g. the military) for intervening into political and personal conduct.

AIMS

The thesis therefore explores the research question: how can we understand the nature of the relationship between state security and domestic politics in contemporary Turkey? More specifically: How have the military elites activated state authority and (non-democratic) state power in the name of the security of the secular state? To answer these questions, the thesis explains the ideology of Kemalist secularism and its role in the related justifications, discourses, practices, processes and strategies of the non-democratic state elites such as the
military for undertaking a related range of political actions without any routine and institutionalized negotiation with other societal actors. Because this type of relationship is not fully addressed by the mainstream International Relations and its sister traditional Security Studies, the thesis seeks to develop a new theoretical perspective. By gleaning insights from Critical Security Studies and Michel Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ approach, the thesis will explain the relationship between security and politics in Turkey as ‘security governmentality’. The analytical framework of security governmentality allows one to account for the increasingly overt political presence and intervention of Turkish national security institutions in the country’s social and political space. It also helps address the degree to which Turkey’s security politics is able to produce an unequal distribution of power between the military and the civilians. It is to this aim that the thesis addresses itself and explores the political impact of security discourses and practices through which the state elites have deployed their forces against the demands of active socio-political forces such as the Islamist Refah Party government (1996-1997) and the Justice and Development Party government (2002-present). The thesis hopes to contribute both to the literature on Security Studies in general and to the politics of Turkish security in particular, by showing the political and practical consequences of national security politics under military tutelage.

WHY SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY?

The politics of the Turkish state security can hardly be grasped within the parameters of traditional approaches and the contribution of the present project is to explore it through a novel perspective. As Chapter 1 argues, security in mainstream International Relations tends to focus on problem areas and questions about military strategy, external state defence and state-to-state war (Walt, 1991: 212). Traditional Security Studies rarely questions the status quo and investigate how states may cause insecurities for their own people (Wyn Jones, 1999: 112-7; Wheeler, 1996). As a result, there emerges a supposedly apolitical conceptualization of security upheld at the expense of other substantive issues such as the security of the very people within states (Booth, 1991: 318; Williams, 1998b). Secondly, there is little awareness in TSS as to how certain conceptions of security can actually relate to domestic politics or how the military dimension of security can foul normal politics and interfere into political conduct in the name of state security (Kemal Pasha, 1996: 287; Khattak, 1996; Andreas and Price, 2002: 32-6). Some security issues are either ignored or go unnoticed in the traditional approaches to security, and Chapter 1 will explore the reasons for this neglect.
To decode the complexities of Turkish state security it is necessary therefore to begin by asking alternative questions about the theory and practice of security. Most of the existing answers within TSS are not particularly helpful for they decline to engage with complex dilemmas, histories and struggles of 'real lives in real places' (Booth, 1995: 123). Whether ignored or taken as given, TSS leaves aside such significantly related questions about the institutional and organizational aspects of security issues, power, authority and 'states as a source of threat rather than as a source of security' (Booth, 1997: 99).

Hence, this thesis engages the following important but often neglected questions as: What is security? What constitutes a security problem? How should one study security? Who or what can help provide security? And whose security are we talking about? (Williams, 2001: 21-30, 38-53; Bilgin, 2000: 50). It is because of these questions that the thesis has as its starting point the Critical Security Studies perspective. CSS argues that states' supposedly apolitical security policies are not merely by-products of immutable or objective threats to the states and their physical environment (territory) but rather products of tangible and moral historical configurations of expertise, knowledge, authority and specific institutional settings (Williams, 1997: 297-8). Unlike TSS, which is status quo oriented (Bilgin, et al., 1998: 141) CSS offers an academic orientation to differentiate the analysis at hand from problem-solving approaches by calling into question 'prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action' and by investigating 'the process of change' (Cox, 1981: 128-9). Hence, the insights of CSS into security offer an innovative lens through which to critically analyze Turkey's politics of security and its potential transformation after the EU membership official candidacy. An obvious advantage of adopting a CSS (and governmentality) angle in this investigation is that it enables an analysis of 'the politics of security' (Williams, 1997; 1998). CSS also foresees that security discourses and practices of states are constitutive of politics rather than its epiphenomenon of politics (Booth, 1997: 106; Krause, 1998: 305-16). This is a crucial argument in this project.

Besides the contributions CSS brings to the discussion, a critical approach to state security allows a better grasp of the state power. In particular, it surpasses the one-dimensional liberal-democratic view of legitimacy and consent and the relevant contractual theories of sovereignty evident in the mainstream IR, which does not explicitly spell out its theory of state (Kelstrup and Williams, 2000: 7). An alternative grasp of the state power is needed to
enhance our understanding of the institutional and political sources of such unconventional security discourses and practices of states. Such an approach can highlight social and political effects of state security in Turkey. It is to this aim that the thesis introduces Foucault's concept of governmentality.

The works of Michel Foucault are relevant for understanding state-society relations in Turkey because his analysis of state power helpfully invokes the realm of the familiar and the immediate. There has been a relative absence of governmentality studies on the Turkish state, which indicates a lack of engagement with Foucault's later works possibly because the governmentality approach was not available to scholars until the summary on his lectures was published by Colin Gordon in 1991 (Lemke, 2001: 191). Foucault's work in general is appealing because it emphasizes the daily and immediate aspects of state practices. As sociologist Ayse Oncu writes in Turkey:

[n]ewspapers are filled with incidents of police brutality, 'suspicious' deaths in prisons, or 'unexplained' disappearances. Foucault's analysis of the 'modern' penal system can be read to understand the nonmodernity of Turkish prisons. But also, notions of 'disciplining' and 'disciplined' bodies-in schools, in the army and in the bureaucracy-have immediate and very concrete resonances in the Turkish context (1997: 269).

The concept of 'governmentality' as originally coined by Foucault (1991), involved the idea of the state in terms of a triangle of 'sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security' (Foucault, 2000: 219). Foucault's theory of governmentality expands the liberal-functionalist view of modern state authority as stemming from a 'general will' or 'core values and normative consensus' and instead locates exercise of state authority within 'apparatuses of security' (Foucault, 2000: 220). The inclusion of governmentality as a component of the present analysis is vital to understand the configuration of state power around the discourses and practices of security. This approach can also help constitute, in the Turkish case at least, an answer to the question about 'the nature of the power possessed by states and state elites' (Mann, 1988: 4). But more crucially it also helps us capture the essence of certain specific processes of activating this very state power (Foucault, 2000: 221). In other words, it enables us to attain 'the means, techniques, rationalities, forms of knowledge and expertise that are to be used to accomplish the enfolding of authority' (Dean, 1996: 222-3).
Combining the insights from CSS and governmentality literatures, the thesis introduces the term *security governmentality* to refer to the *politics* of state security and to analyze its rational, conceptual and institutional components. Here, security governmentality enables the investigation of security as a discursive and political method through which the ruling state elites frame and regulate the exercise of authority and power at the expense of normal (democratic) politics. Although not undertaken in this project, it is also possible to also consider security governmentality as an ‘articulation’ that strives to ‘arrest the flow of difference, to construct a centre’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 112). In this view, security governmentality is a centre of acquaintance for the military protagonists who wield it as a political weapon to advance their national-international agenda and position. In addition, this approach posits the individual and societal elements (i.e. the governed) firmly into the problematic and identifies miscellaneous tensions between state security and individual/societal freedom.

Military interventions into Turkish politics have been studied in the past literature (for instance, Brown, 1989; Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997; Cizre, 2003; 2004; Karabelias, 1999; Narli, 2000; Demirel, 2003; Insel and Bayramoglu et al, 2004). However, there are some shortcomings that hinder studying the contemporary (post-1997) nature of Turkish military behavior. Firstly, the study of the Turkish military is a thorny issue and in some cases dangerous in that it can cost the academic position of the researcher in the country (Jacoby, 2004a: 150). Secondly, the classified nature of the information pertaining to the military’s recent actions and legal-political considerations considerably fetter access to primary sources and give rise to rather a limited number of study. Consequently, there has overall been rather a limited scholarly interest due to the restricted access to jealously guarded military sources. (Bayramoglu et. al., 2004: 8). Thirdly and most importantly, particularly since mid-1990s the prevailing attitudes of the military have come to signify unconventional patterns of political intervention against certain out-groups such as Kurdish insurgents and Islamists. That is, rather than using the perpetual threat of direct military intervention, the military legitimizes its guardianship role of protecting ‘the territorial and ideological integrity’ by using newfound techniques of intervention under the relevant legal-constitutional shelter and cloaked effectively in the state security discourses and practices (Jacoby, 2004a: 151). Therefore, the nature of the contemporary military-democracy relationship, as Umit Cizre argues, can hardly be fully captured by the existing theoretical literature on civil-military relations (2003: 215-6).
There are certainly other reasons for studying the relationship between security and state in Turkey. An obvious one is that the discourses and practices of state security often degenerate into non-democratic state practices. That is, the discourses and practices of state security open up a valuable strategic and socio-political maneuvering space for the non-democratic state elites (i.e. the military) to invest and deploy institutional and ideological powers against the active socio-political forces demanding political transformation in state-society relations. Despite the existence of this vital interplay between security and politics in Turkey, such a relationship has been scarcely studied so far. The thesis thus fills a gap in the literature by investigating how security can become a key political method and justification at the hands of the non-democratic or unelected state actors such as the military to interfere into, and at times take up, certain governmental activities.

WHY TURKEY?

Many analysts are ‘perplexed’ by Turkey and its people (Mango, 2003: 206), a country ordinarily described as one of ‘fertile complexity’ (Pope and Pope, 2004: x). Part of the puzzlement is attached both to its ‘unique’ geographical location ‘as the gateway from Europe to Asia’ and to its social identity, that is, ‘the way the country combines being Western oriented though Turkish and Muslim at the same time’ (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 1). Indeed, Turkey’s social identity, domestic problems, the political autonomy of its military, and its involvement with the hotspots of world politics (e.g., Cyprus and Aegean problems with Greece, military incursions into the Northern Iraq, to name but a few) and its relentless bid for EU membership have often generated widespread debates inside and outside of the country (Mango, 2002: 179-80; Kalypso, 2004: 1-9). Turkey’s ‘alternative experience of modernity’, its future directions, its handling of domestic challenges (i.e., Kurdish problem, the rise of Islamic identity) and its relations with the Eastern and Western civilizations are all issues that capture domestic and external academic and public attention (Kaya, 2004: 1-15). More often than not, the complexities of the country accompany the complexity of its analyses that at times lead to some pungent conclusions. Robert Kaplan, for one, intriguingly asserts that Turkey ‘has the potential to dominate the Middle East once again’ and that it and its culture ‘can harbor extensive slum life without decomposing [it] will be, relatively speaking, the future’s winners’ (quoted in Kasaba, 1997: 33).
More specifically, the dissertation's investigation on the Turkish state security was provoked by an experience of the ongoing confrontation in the last decade between the secularist state forces (most notably the military) and contemporary socio-political manifestations of Islamic resurgence (most notably by the Islamist parties). This confrontation has been heightened by the two 'eye-opening' general elections of 1995 and 2002 which saw the 'Islamist' parties forming governments, respectively. As a result, the nature of political life has been marked by a proliferation of antagonisms and instability of socio-political identities (Celik, 1996: 235). The social and political spaces have been once again open to violent solutions as evinced in the Kurdish question and the persistent rise of political Islam (Celik, 1996: 235). Most significantly, the Turkish military has been more openly taking a political side in this confrontation in the name of state security. In other words, the Turkish state in this while aims to remove 'all manifestations of religion from the public sphere and put it under strict control of the state...This struggle against the traditional "forces of darkness" uses a militant secularism to justify an authoritarian military-bureaucratic establishment' (Yavuz, 2000b: 33). Not only did this kind of undemocratic resolution of the socio-political conflicts reaffirm the historical role of the Turkish Armed Forces as the 'arbitrator' or 'guarantor' of the polity (Abromowitz, 2000: 8); but also the Islamist political rise in the 1990s has led the military to take an overt political positioning (Cizre, 2003; Yavuz, 2000a).

Crucially, the Turkish case was chosen here also because the language of its domestic political confrontations is primarily articulated in the discourse of state security. In this respect, the ensuing politicization of religion and security (endorsed by the Islamist political parties and the military, respectively) has dominated 'many facets of Turkish life, from political power to education, and complicate Turkey's relations with the United States and the EU' (Abromowitz, 2000: 8). The over-dramatization of the relevant events pertaining to these domestic political confrontations is further fuelled by the mainstream media, slanted in favor of the secularist camp (Finkel, 2000: 147-67). The mainstream media thus hype up the confrontation by bringing 'security threats' into the living rooms of the population. Consequently, this puzzling confrontation between the secularist state and the religious society continue to grip the attention of the national and international public to such an extent that the confrontation is sometimes referred to as a 'culture war' (Pak, 2004: 337).

The present project does not aim at formulating possible policy options that could help us resolving the Turkish puzzle of state-society relations. Its goal instead is to point out that the
recent confrontations between the ruling state elites and the active societal and political actors in Turkey can be better understood by investigating Turkey's state security discourses and practices. Such practices serve as a context for exploring the relationship between state and society in general and security (e.g. the military) and politics (e.g. democracy) in particular. These topics are important and demand exploration for a number of reasons. Firstly, the far-fetched security discourses are still largely under-examined (for two exceptions, Cizre, 2003; Bilgin, 2005). This is despite the fact that security in Turkey has embedded an extraordinary range of administrative and policy issues (Economist, 31 January 1998; Jenkins, Sunday Times/Home, 20 March 2005, p.38). Indeed, the discursive and practical reach of state security is so extensive that security often provides a legitimate gambit for the state elites for securitizing and criminalizing normal political activities and public debate beyond the confines of anti-terrorism laws or other familiar internal security arrangements (Jenkins, 2001; Sozen and Shaw, 2003; Cizre, 2003, 2004).

Secondly, security has generally been studied in Turkey typically by emphasizing the related geo-strategic policy analysis. As a result, little attention is paid to the question of how the discourse and policy of state security can produce domestic political effects. Examining state security in Turkey presents a valuable empirical case study that enables us to explore how the discourse and practice of security can contribute to the annulment of normal democratic politics by a country's formal structures of power. In other words, national security generates material and immaterial obstacles that derails or distorts the democratic resolution of political conflicts between social forces (Cizre, 2003; 2004). Here, securitization¹ is used by the state elites as a counter-measure to cope with a burning domestic political agenda such as the Kurdish ethno-cultural demands for recognition and the pressing issue of political Islam (Yavuz, 2003a: 239-265). These latter issues are left out from the traditional security studies which explore external, state-centered and military security issues. Apart from a small number of researchers or investigative journalists (e.g. Kinzer, 2001; Akpinar, 2001; Pope and Pope, 2004), such immediate political issues are rarely addressed in academia.

Thirdly, although unconventional activities of the state have informed the historical and sociological analyses of Turkish politics (see, for example, Yavuz, 2003a; Kaya, 2004; 2004).

¹ Securitization is a political act of classifying an issue as one of 'security', implying an existential threat and emergency measures that call for and justify 'actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure' (Buzan, et al., 1998: 23-4)
Jacoby, 2004a), these have rarely acknowledged the role of the security discourse and practices on domestic politics in their own right. This, for instance, can be observed in the case of the military interventions into normal politics in the name of state security. As stressed by the former US Ambassador Abramowitz, the military's role goes beyond defense and includes a political posture of 'the dedicated guardians of Turkish territorial integrity, public order, and the secular state' (Abromowitz, 2000: 8). Indeed, state security figures predominantly as the 'cause' and 'justification' of the military interventions. For instance, the former Chief of General Staff and President of the National Security Council Kenan Evren said that the military had to undertake the September 1980 coup 'in order to secure the Turkish nation the prosperity and happiness which she rightfully deserves, to give a new strength and impetus to Ataturk's principles that are being eroded... and to reinstate the vanishing authority of the state' (Evren quoted in Karpat, 1982: 395). Despite this relevance, the importance of state security for the military has often been understudied and scarce attention is paid to such justifications of the military coups.

Turkey furthermore represents a case enabling the researcher to explore how the coercive apparatus of the state, such as the military, state security courts and National Security Council can be deployed for domestic political missions. Turkey's experience exemplifies the links between politics on the one hand, and national security institutions, rationalities, identities, missions and techniques, on the other. The Turkish case allows the researcher to explore how an outward expansion of the portfolio of national security issues from previous traditional military security into domestic political operations is made possible. It is also possible to consider the consequences of these changes for the traditional agenda of Security Studies, reflecting both a militarization of politics and politicization of military.

To recapitulate, Turkey represents a major case for analyzing the antagonistic relations between the military and Islamists, secularism and Islamism, the National Security Council and the governmental cabinet, security of the state and human rights, securitization and democratization. These have become conspicuous elements of government in Turkey. It is through studying the social and political effects of these dichotomies and antagonisms that it is possible to better grasp the political role of state security discourses and practices. Such an investigation also enables the security analysts to better understand how the state elites increase their hold over the body politic and manage to precipitate domestic control mechanisms by the use of techniques as political agenda control through national security.
concept, the National Security Council, media manipulation and securitization. In brief, the Turkish case provides an excellent case study for understanding how security and politics cross-fertilize each other.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

The thesis explores the politics of security in Turkey since the mid-1990s to clarify the relationship between state and security. Part I articulates the theoretical framework derived from the CSS and governmentality literatures, whereas Part II offers a genealogy of socio-historical conditions of security governmentality as a three-dimensional construction. Part III explores change, and specifically, how the EU membership process affects the different components of security governmentality. It relies both on primary and secondary sources attesting the relevant actors' cognitive affiliation with regard to the EU membership, in general, and the changes in democratic political rationality, secularist and Islamic identities, in particular.

Admittedly, political Islam and secularism are not the only pressing issues in the country. Indeed, there are other significant socio-political issues that have been expressed in state security language and logic such as the Kurdish problem. However, the thesis almost exclusively focuses on the domestic political conflict revolving around the secularist-Islamist divide. Although some relevant aspects of the Kurdish problem have been included into analysis, overall the author was forced to take a conscious decision to separate it based on the fact that the complexity of the Kurdish problem would have required an in-depth analysis that was simply impossible to develop here.

Specifically, a genealogical study of Turkish state security discourses and practices is employed to understand the relationship between the country's discordant social and political phenomena such as secularism, political Islam and state security. Genealogical method is used as to investigate the contemporary experience of security governmentality 'so that it can be seen as put together contingently out of heterogeneous elements each having their own conditions of possibility' (Barry et al, 1996: 5). In general, this genealogy uses 'a contextualized line of inquiry determined by the socio-historical specificity of the subject matter' (Jacoby, 2004b: 413). As such, the genealogy of security governmentality encloses 'a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize
ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking and saying' (Foucault, 1984a: 46). The genealogical method tracks down a history of the conditions of security governmentality in which the ideal of the secularist-nationalist state has eventually become a problem. What is at stake here is an inquiry not in search of 'origins' for finding out how the present (i.e., security governmentality) has emerged (Foucault, 1991b: 58-9). Rather, it is about using 'history as a way of diagnosing the present' (Kendall and Wickham, 1999: 4). Furthermore, the aim is also to attest the role of the 'events' that play significant roles for their 'unique' characteristics (Foucault, 1984b: 80). This is a method also called 'eventualization' by Foucault (2000: 226-9). It holds that through the analyses of events (such as the military's 'post-modern coup in 1997' or the 'headscarf crisis') we can find the 'reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a feeble domination that poisons itself as it grows lax, the entry of a masked “other”...responding to haphazard conflicts' (Foucault, 1984b: 88; Dean 1994).

Theoretically, the present project aims to examine how the discourse and practice of state security can be approached in order to bring out its wider social and political significance. It is necessary here to point that state security discourses are not taken as merely linguistic but also 'real and material' in that they have their 'conditions of possibility' and as such they are not simple effects of 'ideas or consciousness' or mere fictions, distortions or delusions (Kendall and Wickham, 1999: 37). Neither is the concept of discourse taken here as an overarching category or 'articulation' that can explain the cohesion and unity of social and political practices (for such a view, see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 107). Discourse is rather understood as 'an ordering of terms, meanings and practices that forms the background presuppositions and taken-for-granted understandings that enable people's actions and interpretations' (Milliken, 1999: 12).

The thesis will analyze security discourses of various state actors 'in order to show how they seek to render proper certain policies while marginalizing alternative courses of action' (Bilgin, 2005: 117). Hence, the emphasis is on both discourses and practices of state security. Discourses of state security can be better seen as 'economies' that have 'their own intrinsic technology, tactics effects of power which in turn they transmit...Power is inscribed within the discourses not outside them' (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 488). State security discourse in this formulation becomes 'the medium through which human beings are situated in social reality' (Yegen, 1994: 49). In other words, discourses in this sense function like 'the framework of
meanings and values within which people exist and conduct their social lives' (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 479).

The emphasis on discourse notwithstanding, the present analysis is genealogical rather than archaeological. The genealogical approach views the 'empirical work as necessary to question and reformulate presumed continuities and discontinuities so that it is possible to offer diagnosis of the limits and possibilities of the present' (Dean, 1999: 46). Key for the analysis here are both the discursive visibility and historical contexts of security governmentality, including the related power relations, claims, identities, and techniques. Hence, rather than focusing merely on the 'rules of formation' of security statements of the state as 'a snapshot or a slice through web of discourse' (Foucault, 1989: 34-78), attention is paid to the historical 'processual aspects of the web of discourse' and material practices that is to their genealogy (Kendall and Wickham, 1998: 30-1). Therefore, the subject matter is not reduced to the discursive unity of the state security but incorporates diverse, fragmented practical aspects (Joseph, 2004: 147). Genealogical method is more or less similar to the historical analysis but it alerts the researcher to the particularities rather than general aspects of the present problematic while using the historical research.

The point of analyzing the prospect of a change in and other forms of resistance to security governmentality (i.e. the EU and Islamist political parties) is in keeping with the place of ethics in both CSS and Foucault's thought. As to the former, CSS gives priority to considering the difficulties of 'those men and women and communities [e.g., the plight of the headscarf wearing university students and female politicians] for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security' (Wyn Jones, 1995: 309). In regard to Foucault's thought, for instance, investigating the 'Islamist' political movements within security governmentality is due to investigating their functions in bringing out change, rather than endorsing their actions as ethically right or proper. In other words, they are explored with a view to 'allow[ing] a space for the work of freedom' or opening up 'the received fixedness and inevitability of the present' and 'letting in a little glimpse of freedom-as a practice of difference-through its fractures' (Barry et. al., 1996: 5).

Therefore, the thesis might at times sound moralizing. It does not adopt the problematic 'detached observer status' (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 10), for it remains committed to the paradigm of a pluralist democracy (see Mouffe, 1992). It is usually from this ethical point of
view that the ideological components of security governmentality are compared and contrasted. Here again, this line of thought is also a result of the theoretical presumptions made use of in the thesis. CSS, in this regard, rejects the conventional definition of politics that views the state, its sovereignty, its moral authority and its status as 'the key guardian of people's security' (Booth, 1997: 106; Bilgin, 2000: 54). Likewise, engaging with Foucault's approach requires being alert in research, since the ethos of his genealogy is a 'militant criticism' of political reason or 'a permanent and pragmatic activism without apocalyptic or messianic ends' (Dean, 1999: 44; Visker, 1995: 54). In other words, Foucault's approach is 'a skeptical attitude towards many forms of expertise and claims to authority, and suggests that we should not assume that the good intentions of particular institutions [be it the military or the AKP] will guarantee good outcomes' (Cooper, 2001: 7). Furthermore, Foucault suggests that such investigations are necessary 'to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable and to determine the precise form this change should take' (Foucault, 1984a: 46).

The thesis uses both primary and secondary sources. Its primary sources include newspaper research, interviews, and a questionnaire. The method employed is one of 'data triangulation' that gathers empirical information by checking and juxtaposing multiple sources (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 23). The material was obtained from the Marmara University Centre of Turkey-EU Relations, Bilkent University Library and the Turkish National Library in Ankara, the Jean Monnet Centre for European Studies and Hugh Owen Library at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, the National Library of Wales, and the European Research Institute at the University of Birmingham.

Part III of the thesis relies on newspaper research, recent pamphlets and books by representatives of the state and 'Islamist' party elites. It also includes personal interviews conducted with the military officials and the 'moderate Islamist' AKP members (the ruling 'Justice and Development Party') in Izmir, Kayseri, Ankara and Istanbul in January, April and August 2004. Here, the aim was to supplement the available interviews with the party leadership with the personal interviews and questionnaire conducted by the author. The interviewee involved 'rank and file' and other intermediary party officials serving in the capacity of local district heads and/or active party youth divisions, whose acts abridge the party's democratic discourse (especially EU political conditionality) with the respective local electoral base. Attached in the appendix is the questionnaire submitted to the party's youth divisions. The questionnaire aimed to explore whether the changed democratic-EU
membership discourse can only be evinced at the party leadership level or can as well be obtained within the party official levels\(^2\). Trying to arrest such a change is important for evaluating the future identity orientations of security governmentality and the Islamic movement. The questions asked included: what are the implications of the EU membership democratic conditionality for Turkey’s national security? Will the EU membership threaten Turkey’s cultural and religious identities?

To test how the electorate responded to the new ‘moderate Islamist’ party discourse tuned into the EU democratic discourse, the interviews took place before and after the local elections of March 2004. The interviews used a semi-structured format, lasted around one hour and were carried out in Turkish in the interviewees’ respective party buildings in eight of Istanbul’s 31 districts: four selected in the Anatolian part (Anadolu Yakasi) and four in the European part (Avrupa Yakasi) in January, April and August 2004. Istanbul was chosen because it constitutes one fifth of the whole national electorate and because it is a locus of diverse social, ethnic, economic, and cultural groups.

Interviewing elites or ‘special populations’ on topics related to security constitutes ‘socially sensitive research’ (Lee and Renzetti, 1993: 5; Arksey and Knight, 1999: 122-5). In this respect, the ethical issues of privacy and confidentiality are preferred whenever necessary to protect the identity of the participant military personnel and the ‘moderate Islamist’ party members. This pertains especially to the interviews with the military personnel. As for the latter, the lack of complete sampling frames, threats to career advancement associated with the research, the relative anonymity of the respondents, and sensitivity of the questions asked made random sampling quite difficult. Instead, sampling was selective, mostly ‘because potential participants have [had] greater need to hide their involvement’ (Lee and Renzetti, 1993: 30). The major strategy used for gaining access to these ‘special’ ‘research populations’ of the military personnel or the party members with Islamic persuasion was twofold. The first involved attending general social sites within which potential participants could be reached. Second ‘cultural sensitivity approach’ was utilized so as to increase familiarity and rapport by trying ‘to learn about their actual life styles (beliefs, needs, habits, fears, risks) and to communicate in ways that the individuals understand, believe, regard as relevant to themselves, and are likely to act upon’ (Sieber, 1993: 19; Arksey and Knight, 1999: 115-122).

\(^2\) This questionnaire has been conducted with the 120 members of AKP’s ‘rank and file’ in different districts of Istanbul in April 2004.
THESIS STRUCTURE

The thesis has a three-fold structure. Part I introduces the theoretical approach and empirical study. Part II examines the constitution of security governmentality by focusing on its central dimensions: rationality, identity and technique. And Part III explores the impending dissolution of security governmentality in Turkey associated with the EU membership reform process. More specifically, Part I, ‘The Politics of Security,’ develops a theoretical framework informed by Critical Security Studies and the governmentality literature to explore how security discourses and practices shape domestic political conduct. Part II, ‘The Construction of Security Governmentality in Turkey’, analyzes the relationship between security and politics, a relationship which involves ideology, institutions and socio-political processes. Part III ‘EU Membership and Change in Security Governmentality’ investigates how security governmentality has been impacted by the ongoing European Union membership process from 1999 when Turkey gained an official EU candidacy status to the end of 2004.

In Part I Chapter 1, ‘The Politics of Security: CSS and Governmentality’ combines the CSS approach with Foucault’s’ governmentality to present a ‘security governmentality’ perspective. The CSS approach enables one to investigate state security processes through which ‘security threats’ and ‘appropriate responses’ have been constructed by the Turkish state, whereas governmentality thesis explores discourses and practices in four dimensions: visibility, rationality, identity and technique. The chapter, by combining the two, offers a theoretical framework for understanding the politics of state security discourses and practices in Turkey as security governmentality.

Chapter 2, ‘Security Governmentality and its Visibilities’ identifies the different facets of security governmentality by mapping out the prevailing historical, institutional and socio-political discourses and practices of Turkish military and state institutions. It also shows how state security has been enmeshed with politics through a state-induced legally binding shift from external to internal threat construction. Specifically, it notes how security discourses have been employed as a counter-measure particularly against the rise to prominence of the Islamic social and political forces since the mid-1990s. It analyzes how the most visible agent of security governmentality, namely the Turkish military has played an active role in democratic politics.
Part II focuses on the constitution of security governmentality. It defines the constitutive elements of security governmentality as rationality, identity and technique. Chapter 3, ‘Rationality of Security Governmentality’ discusses the ‘rationality’ of security governmentality, that is, a particular knowledge that at the thought level constitutes state security discourses and practices. The chapter shows that the Turkish state (particularly the military) has produced knowledge of the ‘reality’ of the governed subjects under the rubric of official state ideology of Kemalism. More significantly, in the 1990s and early 2000s the rationality in security governmentality has been constituted and constrained by two principles: ‘secularism’ and ‘reason of state’. These have been deployed to preserve the ideological character of the state against internal and external dissenters or ‘threats’.

Chapter 4, ‘Techniques of Security Governmentality’ is devoted to methods of state intrusion into the public and private spheres. It distinguishes between two security-related techniques used by the state elites: macro and micro techniques. These interventions in particular empower the military over the political class by enabling the former to define the ‘domestic threats to the state security’. Macro techniques signify constitutional, institutional and other formal sources of state intervention into the domestic political conduct, such as National Security Council and the military. The micro techniques stand for a means of intervention such as securitization and the media representations that interconnect the macro techniques with the social/individual conduct. It is through these two methods that the state elites find institutional and constitutional channels of intervention into the public and private sphere, including religious choices. The chapter introduces a relatively understudied case: the military intervention in February 1997 (the so-called ‘post-modern coup’) that illustrates the deployment of macro and micro-techniques.

Chapter 5 investigates the identity dimensions of security governmentality. The chapter argues that the identity dimension in Turkey’s security governmentality is crystallized around the two identity expressions: the secularist identity of state elites (the military and civilian bureaucracy) and the political Islamist parties (the Refah Party in the 1990s and the AK Party since 2002). The security confrontations between secular and Islamic identity produce a playground of antagonisms through which security governmentality has been justified, articulated and executed. Such antagonisms are also couched and expressed in dichotomies such as normal/virtuous, abnormal/criminal and so on. Categorization and normalization of
this kind paves the way for the state actors to employ the relevant techniques so as to make inroads into the private and public conducts.

Part III investigates the issue of change in security governmentality. It argues that since 1999, Turkey’s politics of security has undergone a period of change with the effect that Turkey’s EU membership bid appears to be eroding some of traditionally well-established aspects of security governmentality. The EU membership conditionality and membership reform process forces the state to remedy the ailing civil-military relations by striving to wield institutional balances in favor of civilians and empowering them with democratic institutions.

Chapter 6, ‘Change in the Rationality Dimensions of Security Governmentality’ investigates how the EU membership reforms in Turkey have attempted to inculcate a democratic rationality as an alternative replacing the reason of state rationality of security governmentality. The first section also provides an historical account of the EU-Turkish relations. It charts the changes in both Turkey’s membership bid and the changing EU membership conditionality that culminates in the ‘Copenhagen Political Criteria’. The latter obliges Turkey to conform to a democratic reform package which galvanizes the issue of EU membership in Turkish politics.

Chapter 7, ‘Change in the Techniques of Security Governmentality’ investigates how techniques of security governmentality changed in response to reforms passed to meet EU accession criteria. The EU-induced reforms have managed to redress the political autonomy of the military and some of its techniques in security governmentality by curtailing the power of the institutions such as the National Security Council.

Chapter 8 assesses the changes in identity dimensions. It examines the prospect of change in the secularist identity of the military-led state elites and the religious identity of the relevant political parties. It concludes that although the secularist identity of the military-led state elites has mainly remained unaltered, that of the Islamist political identity has changed significantly. The chapter concludes that a key constitutive (identity) aspect of security governmentality is likely to decompose in the post-EU official candidacy era thanks to the change in Islamist identity.
The Conclusion aims to provide an overall assessment of the themes developed out of the conceptualization of security governmentality. Reconsidering the relationship between the military and democratic politics in Turkey since 1999, the main questions the conclusion addresses are: What are the consequences of security governmentality? What are the prospects for a more democratic mentality and practice of politics in Turkey, which could accommodate the demands of socio-political actors such as people of Islamic persuasion and Kurdish citizens for a wider social and political recognition and participation? In other words, the thesis begins to answer the question: how can a genuine transformation in security governmentality in Turkey be possible?
PART I: THE POLITICS OF SECURITY
CHAPTER 1

CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND THE CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENTALITY

This chapter discusses the theory of state security. It explores the role state security plays in the production of socio-political conditions which perpetuate security governmentality. The chapter begins by surveying the central claims and assumptions of the Traditional Security Studies (TSS) and Critical Security Studies (CSS). It goes on to explore Foucault's theory of governmentality which provides the basis for the subsequent discussion of state power. Instead of seeing state security as a militarily static concept—an approach followed in TSS—the chapter adopts the perspective of CSS and governmentality. Its goal is to explain how Turkish state security discourses and practices encroach upon and distort the normal workings of domestic politics and generate a particular political regime type, that is, security governmentality. The aim is to show that CSS and governmentality approaches are better than TSS in supplying a theoretical reference point for the study of the Turkish state security. Hence, the approach proposed here combines CSS and governmentality studies and lays the conceptual foundations for the chapters in Part II, which study how state security functions as a category of rationality, identity and technique of governing.

1.1. SECURITY AND POLITICS IN TRADITIONAL SECURITY STUDIES

With the advent of the Cold War international structure, the IR sub-field of TSS3 came to occupy a prominent place on the academic and intellectual agenda of the era (Williams, 2001: 21-2). In this scholarship, a nation was typically identified with the state and considered to be 'secure' insofar as it was 'not in danger of having to sacrifice its core values... and [be] able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in war' (Lipmann quoted in Wolfers, 1962: 150; 147-65). TSS tended to define 'national security' as the military defense of the state defined mainly in territorial terms and the strategic calculation of military stability (Waever, 2002: 43-8). For TSS, the main object of security is the state; the mission is to safeguard the modern state and the buzzword is 'state survival' (Krause, 1998: 301). As Buzan argues, security is viewed as a primary value not only in itself but also a precept condition for other values such

3 Admittedly TSS here is taken as a general category for analysis with the possible omissions of important differences within its rubric. Also, TSS should be understood as referring primarily to the neo-realist shcool, which is dominant in IR discipline.
as health, welfare, and economy (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al., 1998: 141-62). The study of security thus focused on a particular practice within a context of external interstate relations. In so doing, this scholarship mostly relied on microeconomic individualism, materialism and objectivist theorizing about the behavior of its primary unit of analysis—the state (Williams, 1998a: 438; McSweeney, 1999: 32-44).

According to TSS, the behavior of the state depends largely on the anarchical structure of the international system, where each state rationally and competitively pursues its own self-interest expressed in terms of security (Waltz, 1979). As a result, a ‘natural’ perpetual security competition and a relentless cycle of violence follow as ‘tragic’ outcomes of the anarchical structure of the international system, which does not (need to) look at the regime type or ‘domestic political considerations’ (Mearsheimer, 2001: 10-1). Once defined in these terms, security becomes ‘tragedy’, namely, a natural disaster or a constant exterior of politics (Schmidt, 2004: 431). ‘State interests’ refer to the pre-given state preferences or goals (Rose, 1998: 152) that are orientated either towards seeking a ‘scarce’ commodity like security, or alternatively, towards influence (Gilpin, 1986: 308-9; Zakaria, 1998: 19).

For TSS, national security is the prime objective of the states and, as Barry Buzan argues, ‘the fact that no other agency exists for this task [of security provision] is what justifies the primacy of national security’ (1991: 329). Having taken such an understanding of the state as the dominant wielder of power in the international system, TSS bifurcates the state and by implication, world politics, into an ‘inside’ against an ‘outside’ (Walker, 1993: 12-3). As such, security has significant normative implications, despite TSS claims to conceptual neutrality and objectivity (Williams, 2001: 28-30). That is, security in the TSS formulation appears to be an exclusively state-related task where security expertise lies in the hands of the relevant state actors. Here, ‘military force is legitimized, state sovereignty is seen as a superior value and consequently, all non-state groups which threaten a state are delegitimized’ (Eriksson, 1999: 313). Rarely in the TSS understanding can one find an interest into the question of how the security forces of a state can be expropriated as a tool of intervention into the social construction of rationalities, subjectivities and rules of engagement in politics.

Within TSS, the characterization of the role of military power is externally constructed. As Andreas and Price point, in TSS the use of military power mostly corresponds to the external defense of the state which supposedly has little to do with the domestic political process.
In this formulation, militaries are responsible only for 'national security' and for the external defense of states from external threats (Walt, 1991). Given the anarchic structure of the international system, security is the driving force of an internationally interactive environment. The central focus lies on military force and its study reflects 'the threat, use, and control of military force' (Walt, 1991: 212). Security practice has its key determinants located in a potentially conflictual anarchical structure, inhabited and coordinated by the unitary/sovereign self-helping states (Art, 1992: 141; Grieco, 1993: 315, Elman, 1997). Such an understanding of security suggests that the military force is the primary arbitrator during conflict which is the dominant, if not ubiquitous, condition of world politics (Mearsheimer, 1994/5; 2001: 5). In this context, war becomes a prime mover since there is no higher authority to curb it (Waltz, 1959: 205).

Unsurprisingly, the TSS approach renders the security of the state synonymous with the accumulation of military power and the use of military force (Sweeney, 1999: 219). It is possible to further argue that TSS exhibits what is called a Lockean 'military morality' on the proper use of the armed forces which assumes that 'the armed forces can only be used [externally] by the authority of the civilian state, whose authority derives from the people' (Cresswell, 2004: 640). This Lockean take on state-society relations in turn becomes an unproblematic explanation of state authority and citizen political duty. The contractual nature of the sovereign nation state-either actual or hypothetical-then safely places the focus of analysis on external state security (Krause and Williams, 1997: 39-40). Thus, TSS simply likens the state’s military power to preserving existing national and international orders and to ‘ensuring continuity and maintaining the status quo’ rather than changing them (Williams, 2001: 27).

TSS assumes that states have responsibility for the security of their subjects (Thompson, 1994: 22). This view implies a state system in which ‘the core function of states’ or ‘the baseline function of the states has been to provide security to its citizens’ (Stein, 2002: 21). While state security is made synonymous to an ‘aggregate individual security’; individual security is in turn reduced to an external security, that is, to the state’s protection of the individual from other states (Reus-Smit, 1992: 17). State security in TSS formulation does not consider the security of the individuals or domestic society (Waever, 1993: 42; Krause and Williams, 1996: 232; Krause and Williams, 1997: 43-9). This is so because in the TSS characterization of security, the contractual obligations ‘underwritten by the authority of the
state' means that ‘the security of “citizens” is identified with (and guaranteed by) that of the state; and, by definition, those who stand outside it represent potential or actual threats’ (Krause and Williams, 1996: 232; Reus-Smith, 1992: 17).

Indeed, the TSS conception of security makes a critical reference to the ‘rational subjectivity’ of the citizens. This conception in particular refers to the theoretical-pragmatic construction of individual human beings as both ‘self-contained and instrumentally rational’ subjects (Williams, 1998b). This portrays rational individuals as pursuing their interests egoistically within a perilous insecure environment whose content can be only secured by the existence of the state (Krause and Williams, 1997: 40). That the state emerges as the primary security provider grants it legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. The state assumes the unique banner of security for the internal constituencies and demands the consumers of security—that is, the citizens—to provide three most valuable political batons: legitimacy, authority and obligation. These are three important political categories which TSS takes for granted (Krause and Williams, 1997: 48).

The ‘statism’ characteristic of TSS goes back to the nineteenth-century idea that ‘all loyalty and decision making power should be concentrated on states’ (Booth and Vale, 1997: 349, Booth, 1999). TSS’s idea of ‘the state as the exclusive security referent’ is, however, endorsed without a requisite theory of the state (Krause and Williams, 1996: 232). Instead, states are assumed to be autonomous, instrumentally rational and self-contained units, whose domestic societal influences are territorially limited by a claim over the monopoly of the means of violence (Weber, 1968: 64; Tilly, 1975: 27; Barnett, 2002: 117).

It follows that under the conditions of international anarchy states are merely seen as functionally undifferentiated units whose task is to provide security to their inhabitants (Waltz, 1979). The TSS approach thus not only glosses over domestic politics but the main category of analysis, the state, is conceived within a monist theory of the state. The idea of the indelible unity of the state in relation to other political entities at the national and international levels is one of the key theoretical underpinnings of neorealism. An implication of the neorealist theory which creates difficulties is that states are burdened to cope with the ultimate problem (survival) on their own (military) terms (Waltz, 1979:100-1). The sovereign state is to emphasise the internal unitary role states play in regulating various interaction processes of their individual/subgroups at the internal-domestic level. Having denied any significance to
the space inside and outside the state, the analytical focus is on the question as to how an internally secure state participates in international politics by ensuring its external security against other states.

According to TSS, the role of politics is one of 'pure technique' or 'mere calculation of instruments of control' and becomes operational at the hands of (dominant) power elites. In essence, politics purports to reflect no more than an 'instrumental coaction among dumb, unreflective, technical-rational unities' (Ashley, 1986: 292-3). If one follows the TSS approach, security has to be taken as merely exterior to politics meaning that various state interests would be collapsed into a uniform category of external-security seeking. This, in turn, translates into a biased perspective, namely, one of a satisfied and status quo oriented state power (Schweller, 1996: 91). TSS accepts that there might be states that allocate resources for goals or activities other than survival-motive but these are nevertheless only a 'prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have' (Waltz, 1979: 91). That the survival may not be the only motive for some states is moreover another factor that buttresses the argument for security policy. This is so since if there exist some states for whom 'survival does not exhaust their political ambitions; others are forced, logically, to look to their defences' (Waltz, 1959: 204). Once again, the opportunity to explore the domestic nature of state behavior is missed.

TSS has a special take on the (liberal) contractual/constitutional aspect of domestic politics. Significantly, it assumes away rather than argues for the peaceful domestic workings of the military/civilian bureaucracy or the 'offices and organs making up the state' (Poggi, 1990: 30). In TSS understanding, the ultimate decision power within a state is vested in the state's non-bureaucratic organs or in 'the very seat of sovereignty', be it the Crown, Parliament or the ruling party (Poggi, 1990: 31). Domestic politics is construed as a hierarchically ordered and constitutionally constrained domain. The units within domestic political structures are thus 'formally differentiated according to the degrees of their authorities' and possess the 'specified distinct functions' (Waltz, 1979: 81). In that domain, the relevant political units and portfolio for their actions are forecasted in predefined and institutionally hierarchical substructures. It is the similarity/difference in the structure that should be studied and that '[E]verything else is omitted. Concern for tradition and culture, analysis of the character and personality of political actors, consideration of the conflictive and accommodative processes of politics, description of the making and execution of policy-all such matters are left
aside... despite cultural and other differences, similar structures produce similar effects' (Waltz, 1979: 82, 88, emphasis added). Then, surely there is also an alleged need for a successful theory to separate politics from other categories such as economics, culture and social dimensions (Waltz, 1979: 79).

The TSS view of the state is accompanied with a standard perspective on the domestic decision-making process. It is a perspective of 'expected utility' which emphasizes that state actors (understood as political elites) 'weigh the utilities of different outcomes by their probabilities, calculate costs and benefits of all alternative policies, and choose the option with the highest utility' (Brooks, 1997: 454). The neorealist view, for example, grants that states seek to advance their security and/or power over other nations, and that there is 'essentially no need to look at domestic-level processes because actors are understood to have minimal discretion regarding the strategies they adopt' (Brooks, 1997: 471). Drawing on political realism and state sovereignty literatures, TSS privileges the state as the pre-eminent actor and ontological unit of analysis in security studies (Buzan, 1996: 51). Bound by geography, human nature and a (strategic/instrumental) rationality, the focus of the inquiry is placed on the state as a unified actor (Keohane and Stein, 1993: 32).

It can be argued that TSS's bracketing of the domestic politics generates a blind spot in the discourse of security understood within a broader tradition of modernity, one that copes with questions of violence, history and normativity (Williams, 1998b). For TSS, the very security and nature of domestic political community is related to the practices associated with the modern conceptions of an individual 'empty' self 'freed from claims about its personal identity and united with others through the structures of contractual sovereignty' (Williams, 1998a: 438). State security is, therefore, premised upon an idea of domestic society comprised of aggregate, atomistic and material individual persons stripped of their personal or collective identities (Williams, 1998a: 438).

TSS by implication takes domestic society to be relatively homogeneous (Waltz, 1979). Inside the state, a space of relative order and peace exists and change is expected in the form of development and progress (Buzan, 1996: 53). To be sure, domestic politics in TSS formulation is fractious and competitive too, that is, TSS does 'not expect all states to have identical domestic structures' (Desh, 1998: 159). However, domestic conflict over power is often assumed to be irrelevant to 'functional similarity' of state behavior (Desh, 1998: 159).
Or alternatively, it is understood to be ‘pacific’ and ‘constrained by institutional procedures’ that ‘regulate the struggle for the control of the state’ (Terriff et al, 1999: 41-2). This is so since there is the reference to ‘specification of the functions’ and the ‘hierarchically ordered’ nature of the domestic political system in which, according to Waltz, a

broad agreement prevails on the tasks that various parts of a government are to undertake and on the extent of the power they legitimately wield. *Thus Congress supplies the military forces; the President commands them. Congress makes the laws; the executive branch enforces them; agencies administer laws; judges interpret them.* Such specification of roles and differentiation of function is found in any state, *the more fully so as the state is more highly developed* (Waltz, 1979: 81-2, emphasis added).

Another source of this vision of domestic political order, central to TSS, is the idea of a ‘tradeoff’ faced by citizens. This idea implies that security is juxtaposed with individual/group liberty such that ‘the most profound of all the choices relating national security is...the tradeoff with liberty, for at conflict are two distinct values’ (Ullman, 1983: 131). These views on instrumental rationality and the homogeneity of political society, however, conceal such state security practices that expose domestic socio-political divides. One explanation of this is that TSS does not analytically separate security from politics. As a result, security is often subsumed under various variables such as survivability, conflict and war which in turn mean that the TSS approach underestimates the political agency of states (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001).

There are other approaches that do not underestimate the political agency of states. On the contrary, they do establish the important parallel between state security and domestic politics. Indeed, such approaches understand security as a ‘political condition’ in such a way that a ‘positive correlation’ is set out between security and the degree of stateness, that is, security as dependent upon the fragility or comparative infancy of statehood (Ayoob, 1995: 22; 1997). While offering some insights into a more critical analysis of security, this perspective provides a contentious account of the relationship between security and politics. That is to say, this understanding of ‘security as stateness’ privileges rather than problematizes the *existing* political authority (Krause, 1998). It also uncritically consigns a positive trust and authenticity to the state elites in finding solutions to the problems stemming from ‘state-building’ activities (Ayoob, 1995: 21-42). Besides, this perspective leads to an elitist outlook which equates security ‘to the security of those who profess to represent the state territorially
and institutionally' (Ayoob, 1995: 9). The resultant frame of analysis entails an ethical commitment that favors 'regime security' rather than security of the people and tends to safeguard 'the elite’s grip on power' (Ball, 1988: 95; Terriff et al, 1999: 19). In other words, the 'state makers' are expected to have abundant time and opportunity since they need 'lots of time and relatively free hand' in order 'to persuade and coerce the disparate populations' (Ayoob, 1995: 29).

These important shortcomings notwithstanding, analytically the present case of Turkey does not conform to this formulation both because it has a solid 'degree of stateness' a 'strong state tradition' (Heper, 1991; 2000; Sozen and Shaw, 2003) and also because state security continues to be a recurring concern for the state elites (Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004: 3; Koker, 1990; Aydinli, 2003). In addition, the view of 'security as [a] political condition' differs from the position defended in this chapter which makes security a political practice and asset that serves the state elites against other rival societal forces. Furthermore, this view of security would not help to chart detailed analytical framework appropriate for exploring a complex case such as the Turkish politics of security. The approach adopted here therefore explicitly focuses on the connection between security and politics.

To recapitulate, the discussion so far shows that the important interplay between state security and domestic politics is left out in the conventional TSS approaches. TSS therefore fails to provide a solid theoretical ground for studying Turkish state security discourses and practices, since it cannot explain how and why elites appropriate state security for their own primarily domestic political purposes. Two critical aspects thus deserve mentioning with regard to the specificity of the Turkish case study. First, studying the dynamics of Turkish state security require a sound theoretical awareness of state security as internally rather than externally orientated state action. Secondly, a proper analytical framework would also have to account for the military’s enduring clash with political Islamists in the name of state security in the period between 1995 and 2004. As shown above, TSS is too rigid to accommodate such an analysis. The approach advanced here embraces the alternative CSS approach and bridges it with Foucault’s governmentality approach. This combined perspective allows one to better investigate complex state security discourses and practices.

1.2. SECURITY AND POLITICS IN CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES
Unlike the TSS’s state and status quo oriented premises, CSS provides innovative lens through which one can critically view Turkey’s state security discourses and practices and their potential transformation. CSS—quite usefully for the present study of Turkish state security discourses and practices—sees security discourses and practices of a state as constitutive rather than an epiphenomenon of its domestic politics (Booth, 1997: 106; Krause, 1998: 305-16; Waever, 1999: 337).

Before discussing CSS, it is necessary to clarify the use of the very term ‘critical’, often ascribed to the Frankfurt School, or, alternatively, to post-structuralism. Although CSS seems divided between the Frankfurt School-cum-Critical Theory and poststructuralist critical theory (Booth, 1997: 109; Wyn Jones, 1999: 165-6), there is no unanimity over what a ‘critical’ approach to security studies means (Williams, 1999: 341). Perhaps this is why the editors of the first collection of a CSS work did not impose a precise meaning of ‘critical’ in either a methodological or political sense (Williams and Krause, 1997: viii; Williams, 2001: 31). Notwithstanding much of the differences, it is pertinent to stress that the term critical challenges the atomistic, unitary, discrete, disengaged (Cartesian) and apolitical academic subject who unproblematically exist antecedent to the discourses that it constitutes and empowers (Dillon, 1995: 324; Huysmans, 1998). CSS is sympathetic to the view—that ‘knowing and acting subjects are social and embodied beings, and products of their thought and action bear ineradicable traces of their situations and interests’ (McCarthy, 2004: 193). In other words, when academics study their subject matters; ‘they do not leave their lives on the coat-hook outside’ (Booth, 1995: 110). ‘Critical’ in CSS is then, amongst other things, an academic orientation to differentiate the analysis at hand from problem-solving approaches by calling into question the ‘prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action’ and by investigating ‘the process of change’ (Cox, 1981: 128-9). It can be said that CSS takes as its foundation the question of change in both an explanatory and an evaluative sense (Williams and Krause, 1997: xii).

For the present study, the term ‘critical’ utilizes all those approaches that criticize the orthodox metatheoretical assumptions of much of Security Studies (Booth, 1997: 104). The term ‘is meant to imply an orientation toward the discipline [rather] than a precise theoretical label’ (Williams and Krause, 1997: x-xi). The term ‘critical’ is an umbrella concept to include all studies that fall outside the mainstream rationalist or traditional neoliberal-neorealist
scholarship (Krause, 1998: 299). The perspective adopted in this thesis reflects a similar and broadly 'critical' perspective and takes CSS as a typological device by making use of all the approaches that are critical of TSS (Wyn Jones, 1999: 165-6).

CSS rejects views of security portraying it as 'derived from a top-down, masculinized Anglo-American conception of security and politics' (Booth and Vale, 1997: 332; Buzan, 1991; 1995; Booth, 1991; 1997; 2005; Lipschutz, 1995; Krause and Williams, 1996; 1997; Williams, 1999). It runs counter to the perspectives which define 'security' in state - military terms and render state-military security into something of a 'higher value' (Bilgin, et al., 1998: 141; Williams, 2001: 24-30). As argued above, the TSS logic of security stipulated that what needed to be secured was (the modern conceptions of) sovereignty and 'the state' (Buzan, 1991: 22-3; Walker, 1997: 66-72; Williams, 2001: 38). This a priori claim to state security has been challenged by the emergence of unprecedented problems such as threats stemming from terrorism, environmental problems, fragmentation of states, third world insecurity, globalization, identity-based conflicts, and the division of sovereignty among a number of agencies at the transnational, international, sub-national levels (UNDP Report 1999: 344-6; Held, 1992: 16; Bush and Keyman, 1997: 319-25; Dalby, 1997: 4; Acharya, 1997: 301-2; Strange, 2000: 153-4; Yearley, 2000: 375-381). What CSS challenges is not simply the normative inadequacy of state or state sovereignty-the referent objects of traditional security studies. This means that although CSS does not ignore or challenge the material manifestations of the state and the military; it challenges their moral and practical status (Booth, 1997: 107). Furthermore, whereas TSS presents an unrealistic and partial (externally oriented) analysis of security practices, CSS aims to provide 'a fuller analysis of security practices and a (realistic) assessment of their dynamics and possible reorientation' (Williams, 1999: 342). Central claims of CSS can be summarized in six maxims (Krause, 1998: 316-7):

1. The principle actors in world politics--whether these are states or not--are social constructs, and products of complex historical processes that include social, political, material and ideational dimensions.

2. These subjects are constituted (and reconstituted) through political practices that create shared social understandings; the process of constitution endows the subjects with identities and interests that are not given or unchanging but contingent.
3. World politics is not static and unchanging, and its structures are not determining, since they are also ultimately social constructs.

4. Our knowledge of the subjects, structures and practices of world politics is not objective, since the organization and explanation of the ‘facts’ of the world is a collective and social process involving observers and/or social actors.

5. The appropriate methodology for the social sciences is not that of the natural sciences. Interpretive methods that examine actors’ understandings of the organization of their social world, as well as the relationship between these understandings and the social structures and practices, in which they are embedded, are the central focus of research.

6. The purpose of theory is not explanation and prediction, within a framework of transhistorical and generalizable casual claims but rather contextual understanding and practical knowledge.

**What is a Security Issue? Developing the Theme of Security as Politics**

The goal behind investigating Turkish state security discourses and policies from a CSS perspective is ‘to lay bare the political work of the signifier security, [and, critically, to ask questions such as]..., what it does, how it determines social relations’ and in this regard further probe such questions as to ‘how does a security story order social relations? What are the implications of politicizing an issue as a security problem?’ (Huysmans, 1998: 232-3). Consequently, the object of security and the corresponding concept of political order become keys for the present investigation. Such an inquiry seeks to render problematic and political what is mostly taken for granted, apolitical and static about state security.

What is ‘security’ from a CSS perspective? First of all, security is a derivative concept or in other words ‘security is what we make it’ (Booth, 1997: 106; Bilgin et al., 1998: 140). Security is a concept that forms part of deeper assumptions about the nature of politics and the role of conflict in political life (Wyn Jones, 1999: 166). The major problematic of CSS is that security in itself is a less notion, which, to have any meaning ‘necessarily presupposes something to be secured; as a realm of study it cannot be self-referential’ (Williams and Krause, 1997: ix). This is why CSS first investigates the political process through which
‘threats’ and ‘appropriate responses’ are constructed, and then searches for possibilities for overcoming ‘security dilemmas’ (Krause, 1998: 318; Williams, 2001: 34). Security discourses and policies do not come from a void but result from and represent the related historical processes, social and institutional power structures (Williams, 1997: 296-302; also see Foucault, 1989: 44-54).

Security discourses and policies are clearly associated with the state and its institutions and CSS aims to engage in ‘analytical and ethical debate about the state, a debate which has been remarkably absent from traditional discussions within security studies’ (Williams, 1999: 342; Booth, 1997; Ayoob, 1997). However, the point is not simply to bring forward the historical centrality of the state and/or institutions of sovereignty in security discourses and practices (Lipschutz, 1995: 8; Buzan, 1995). What is at stake is an understanding of how the state resolves the problem of political order through security discourses and practices (Williams and Krause, 1997: x; Dalby, 1997: 9-12; Williams, 1998b; Williams and Neuman, 2001: 372-74). CSS holds that security discourses and practices order social life in a particular way that is embedded in a technological/instrumental take on knowledge as power and a modern conception of politics (Dillon, 1996: 15).

What makes something a ‘security problem’? The securitization approach associated with the Copenhagen School claims that in naming a certain development a security problem, ‘the state’ can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites. Consequently, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so (Waever, 1995: 54). Because of this very powerful ability power-holders can always utilize the instrument of securitization of an issue in order simply to have control over it. This way securitization can be a technique of intervention into politics as it becomes a device to ‘decide’ on ‘friends and enemy’ (Williams, 2003). The ones occupying administrative positions can effectively use this method for their own (political) purposes. In this context, security is seen as a ‘speech act’. As Waever says;

In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering ‘security,’ a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it (Waever, 1995: 55).
Following these CSS premises, one can argue that the concept and practice of state security function as 'a specific principle of political method and practice directed explicitly to “the ensemble of population”' (Campbell, 1998: 201). It is within these parameters that certain security discourses and policies become able to frame normal politics by elevating certain policies to the level of ‘extraordinary’ or a ‘prepolitical immediacy’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). Such a political use of security offers tactical-political attractions for the state elites in that it helps render otherwise inappropriate state discourses and policies both acceptable and inexorable, while effectively discarding other democratic options (Waever, 1995). Furthermore, in so far as discourses are in part sources of subject positions (Foucault, 1989: 44-54); security discourses can be seen as constitutive of political agents, practices and order (Dalby, 1990; 1997: 10; Dillon, 1996: 12-35). At issue then is ‘the overall discursive fact that security is spoken about at all, the way in which it is put into political discourse and how it circulates throughout politics and other discourses’ (Dillon, 1996: 14).

According to this view of security, how an issue becomes a security threat is not necessarily an objective venture unproblematically undertaken by the state elites (Weaver, 1995). The reason for this is that an overemphasis upon ‘urgency’ and ‘survivability’ of the state security simply excludes the political notion of ‘we’ from that of the enemy or ‘others’ and generally does away with other processes in (democratic) politics (Waever, 1995: 51). State security generally provokes an image of ‘survivability’ and ‘urgency’ providing the state with the historical and legitimate right to resort if necessary to ‘extraordinary means’ for fighting against the threats to its sovereignty. As it is argued;

If states acquire their identities qua security-seeking-provider agents, this would then mean to a large extent that it would potentially bypass the political order or procedures since it sees itself as dealing with a problem of utmost importance: the issue of ‘survival’ of the state as state (sovereign, independent) (Buzan et al 1998: 57-58).

In this regard, it is useful to recall that within TSS understanding, state security was related to a perception of survivability and the threats to security were deemed relevant only when they affect the survival of the basic political unit: the sovereign state (Waltz, 1979). The justification of this view was that if those threats to the state as the overarching political/sovereign unit are not dealt with, the state will disappear and with the possibility of addressing other political problems too (Buzan, 1991: 117). Contrary to this understanding, CSS argues that the concept of security is not lacking pre-assumptions, images, specific
meanings, connotations. In other words, 'security is neither objective (threats in themselves) nor subjective (a matter of perception), but intersubjective and political: who can securitize what with what effects' (Laustsen and Waever, 2000: 708).

Therefore, it might be a better strategy to address the concept of security as a discursive political practice (Laustsen and Waever, 2000: 708). As opposed to its daily usage, the word 'security' connotes a special effect of evoking the images of military threat-defense, state and international/national security. In this regard 'the exact definition and criteria of securitization is the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects' (Laustsen and Waever, 2000: 708). Because the state and states system are defined as the current dominant forms of political organization concerned with security and violence (Deudney, 1995: 87), security contrary to its 'daily' image is not a neutral concept, devoid of any pre-given meanings, images and connotations. Consequently, an abstract notion of security is hardly available. As Waever puts it:

The problem is that, as concepts, neither individual security nor international security exists. National security, that is, the security of the state, is the name of an ongoing debate, a tradition, an established set of practices and, as such, the concept has a rather formalized referent; conversely, the 'security' of whomever/whatever is a very unclear idea. There is no literature, no philosophy, no tradition of 'security' in non-state terms; it is only as a critical idea, played out against the concept and practices of state security, that other threats and referents have any meaning (Waever, 1995: 48, emphasis original).

In short, labeling a particular issue a security issue renders it ultra-valid and urgent. It also activates a political reaction which makes the state actors mobilize 'extraordinary measures' to eradicate the challenging political tendencies (Waever, 1995: 48). In essence, securitization increases the intractability of the problems since it invokes an image of urgent threat-response dichotomy and militarizes mind-sets, hence 'allocating to the state an important role in addressing it' (Waever, 1995: 45). Consequently, security can be better understood both as inter-subjective, dependent and derivative concept. The conventional character of security is that it refers to a 'field of practice' where states threaten other states, disturb or challenge each others' sovereignty; impose their will on others and so on. In this context, military and state-centered security understandings might well lead to militarism and militarization of the politics, where the notion of survivability rather than negotiation, compromise, civil society, and meaningful social action prevails. Security may also refer to a specific practice that
constitutes a social reality (security field) via a set of codes, rules, norms and common understandings and a specific discourse, which constructs a field or realm, having its own laws and agenda (Weaver, 1995). Indeed, as Gul Khattak argues

References to national security suggest a broad and very powerful repertoire of meanings through which to convince a population both that its being and unity are threatened and that collective protection can be ensured (1996: 341, italics original).

Since security is articulated within particular institutional spaces (Williams, 1997), the power-holders in a political system become eligible for elevating a particular political issue to the security level or realm. This way, they have the 'legitimate' right to mobilize all necessary means to handle the 'security problem' and prevent the 'negative' repercussions from the audience and thus protect their own privileged positions out of securitization process. This tactic can be best countered with a process of ‘less security and more politics.’ As Waever argues, it is equally vital to grasp that;

The language game of security is, in other words, a jus necessitates for threatened elites, and this it must remain... The problematique itself locks people into talking in terms of 'security,' and this reinforces the hold of security on our thinking, even if our approach is a critical one (1995: 56-57).

In regard to the case of Turkey’s security governmentality, and within the general parameters of CSS, security hence will be viewed in an alternative way, that is, as an effective means of political intervention at the disposal of the 'despotic power' of state elites. The 'despotic power' designates 'the range of actions which the [state] elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups' (Mann, 1988: 5). It is precisely the political power of state security that helps the Turkish state elites to by-pass the routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society (Savvides, 2000). Specifically, for instance the primary institutional authority in Turkey that securitizes political issues is the National Security Council. As Chapter 2 will argue, the most notable securitizing actor in Turkey is the military.

In order to better delineate the role of the state in generating security discourses and practices that have significant domestic political resonance, the CSS understanding of security should - at least in the Turkish case-be supplemented by a theory that can conceptualize the many layers behind the concept of ‘the state’. As argued, TSS employs an unhelpful view of ‘the
state', which considers the state to be simply a reflection of sovereign authority (i.e. the office of Prime Minister or President) and hence risks marginalizing the active roles played by other non-democratic actors, processes, programs and strategies of power (such as the role of national security concept or securitization) that seek to regulate particular domains of individual and collective behavior (Miller and Rose, 1995: 592). In addition to CSS’s more fruitful approach to security, Foucault’s concept of governmentality can allow the students of state security to better understand unconventional security discourses and practices of the states.

1.3. FOUCAULT’S CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENTALITY

As mentioned earlier, Foucault coined the term ‘governmentality’ in his later works (1991, 2000), when he defined the state in terms of a triangle of ‘sovereignty-discipline-government which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism as the apparatuses of security’ (2000: 219). He characterized governmentality as ‘the conduct of conduct’ meaning the activity to affect, modify, shape or direct the space of (human) conduct which embraces the practices of individuals and other socio-political entities particularly concerning the relationship between those practices and government of political domain (Foucault, 2000: 218; Gordon, 1991: 2-3). The historical forms of government of human conduct are conceived as a changing phenomenon or more correctly as appearing in a process (Barry et al, 1996). The emergence in history of the problematic of government is traced back to the idea that government is ‘the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end’ (La Perriere, quoted in Foucault, 1991: 93). Foucault draws one’s attention towards a shift in the objectification of government from that of territory/men to ‘things’. Indeed, this shift marks a turning point for the characterization of the subject of power in that the initial focus on the territory and its inhabitants (Machiavellian principality) and juridical understanding of sovereignty seems to be replaced by a concern with governing ‘things’ (Foucault, 2000: 220). That ‘things’ surely involve human beings or ‘men’, but government, as Foucault argues, is more about

[a] sort of complex composed of men and things...but men in their relations, their links, their imbrications with those things that are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking...property and territory are merely one of its variables’ (1991: 92-3).
Basically, the governmentality approach tries to conceive the problem of state power from the perspective of diverse mechanisms and configurations of political rule (such as the Turkish National Security Council and national security concept) which cannot be easily categorized into philosophical and ideological compartmentalization (Hindess, 1996: 96-136; Barry et. al., 1996). Foucault's work enables the analyst to delve into multiple and more complex operations and mechanisms of power between the rulers and the ruled than the discourses of right and obligation or 'legitimate consent' (Hindess, 1996: 106). His conception is helpful in distinguishing and analyzing different mentalities, practices and government rather than an understanding of modern states dominated solely by the discourses of right-obligation or 'legitimate consent' (Hindess, 1997: 259).

The governmentality approach does not accept uncritical descriptions of the state that as an authority that governs simply through the legitimacy of consensual agreement. Instead of viewing the modern state as a unified apparatus, governmentality takes up a view of the state as a network of different institutions and practices. State power thus does not operate from a single source but from variegated procedures and techniques. For Foucault, 'The state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth' (2001: 123). Governmentality hence is introduced to address 'the “how” of power and microphysics of society' (Marsden, 1999: 26).

More specifically, Foucault's conception of government throws into question the traditional liberal, functionalist or Marxist views on the state (see Mann, 1988: 1-32). Instead of picturing government 'as the work of a sovereign power that is founded upon, and operates through, the consent of its subjects', Foucault describes it as something 'far more intimately involved in moulding the public and private behaviour-and even the personalities-of individuals than any conception of those individuals as citizens would allow' (Hindess, 1996: 131). The issue of government thus concerns the state and its activities not simply as the operations of making and enforcing laws by a sovereign power based on 'right and obligation' but in the context of specific rationalities of government (Barry et al., 1996).

Governmentality moves beyond conventional accounts of the state and politics which take for granted the unproblematic internal organization of the political apparatus and the legitimacy of sovereignty discourse. The government of society has its agencies which extend beyond the
state and its institutions to incorporate non-state contexts such as family and school and find expression in ‘the pedagogical state’ (Hunter, 1996: 149). Here, Foucault’s vision enables one to extend the scope of the Weberian argument of the distinctive skills and specialized knowledge of the bureaucracy by making it possible for power to include non-bureaucratic forms of expertise such as accountancy and psychiatry (Hindess, 1996: 135-6). Such an understanding of governmental power also widen the scope of state activities beyond the classical legislature-executive model of government that reduces the finalities of political power to ‘the maintenance of law and order within the collectivity and the securing of its boundaries against external encroachments’ through ‘binding-rule making’ functions of states (Poggi, 1990: 14-5; Mann, 1988: 13). In addition, governmentality broadens the activities referred to as politics in relation to the state in a way that goes beyond the confines of orthodox Marxist or Leninist discourses of politics (Hunt, 1980: 11-6; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 83-4) based upon ‘hermetically sealed, wholly autonomous, pure economic phenomena’ of a class-divided society most famously expressed in the metaphor of ‘base and superstructure’ (Hobson, 1997: 289; Mercer, 1980: 108).

Instead of an exclusive concern with who possesses power in the state, the point is to see how the exercise, application and effects of state power in relation to people can account for ‘how [this state power] circulates through the social body’ (Joseph, 2004: 155). The operations of what is called ‘bio-power’ render health, sexuality, sumptuary laws and other regulatory mechanisms of life and the body as subjects of administration and management of populations. The task to analyze how the subjects within the states are governed today is not so much to dispense with the idea of ‘the cold monster’ of the state that strives to dominate or colonize the society but rather to consider ‘the broader strategies of government within which the instrumentalities of the state are incorporated and deployed’ (Hindess, 1996: 109). From this standpoint, it is not the state (considered as a distinctive institutional structure) that determines what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private and so on’ (Foucault, 1991: 91). Rather, the range of state actions is by specific rationalities of government (Hindess, 1996: 112). In other words, what is at issue is:

How and in what ways, and to what extent the rationales, devices and authorities for the government of conduct in the multitude of bedrooms, factories, shopping malls, children’s homes, kitchens, cinemas, operating theatres, classrooms and so on have become linked up to a ‘political’ apparatus?...How did different political forces seek to programme these new domains? (Rose, 1996: 38)
Quite relevant for the case of Turkish state security is Foucault’s discussion of the *apparatuses of security* within governmentality (2000: 221). At a basic level, the *apparatuses of security* ‘include the use of standing armies’ and their practices are neither understood as ‘instrumental’ in terms of the functionalist tradition of state theory nor as being at the service of the executive authority, which simply heads and coordinates it (Mann, 1988: 2). Instead, the governmentality approach understands the *apparatuses of security* as trying to foster, optimize or discard ‘the forces and capacities of living individuals’ (Dean, 1999: 20). According to the governmentality approach, state power is activated not simply through the legal and political instruments of the sovereign-disciplinary state but also through the *apparatuses of security* in the context of attendant rationalities, identities and technologies of governing (Hindess, 1996: 12-3; Dean, 1999: 23). In other words, governmentality characterizes state power in such a way that governmental rationalities, identities and technologies together with *apparatuses of security* make possible ‘the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state’ (Foucault, 2000: 221).

**Analytics of Governmentality**

An analytics of governmentality is about distinguishing ‘the particular mentalities, arts and regimes of government and administration’ (Dean, 1991: 2). An ‘analytics’ of governmentality is used for distinguishing and analyzing particular mentalities, practices and government such as those pertaining to security regimes, programs and strategies. It strives to answer ‘how we govern and are governed within different regimes’ (Dean, 1999: 23). Political rationalities of government, for instance, are cast as more than ideologies ‘constituting a part of the fabric of our ways of thinking about and acting upon one another and ourselves’ (Barry et. al., 1996: 7).

Instead of the uncritical renditions of the state provoked by the approaches such as that of TSS, the present project hence proposes an ‘analytics of security governmentality’. This latter adds value in research terms because it enables one to examine the emergence, stabilization and change of the Turkish state security regimes, programs and strategies. The analysis falls upon Foucault’s work on governmentality as well as the broader literature to explore the problem of the Turkish state security in the post-Cold War era. In developing this framework, Michel Dean’s four-dimensional ‘analytics of governmentality’ (visibility, rationality, technique, identity) provide a useful starting-point for exploring the relation between security...
and politics in the Turkish case. Because Dean’s four-dimensional model of governmentality (1991, ch.1) is used to organize structurally the present project, its four components-visibility, technique, rationality and identity-need to be articulated.

**a. Visibility of Governmentality**

The first component in Dean’s scheme is visibility. The visibility dimension denotes socio-historical contexts where state conduct and targets of state conduct are identified. This dimension strives to lay bare the matrix of relationship between state and society that appears to be problematic. An example of this would be the legal, political and institutional aspects of the Turkish state and military. The concept of visibility presupposes that the processes of governmentality is understood as regimes of practices, namely, organized ways in which we do such things as cure, care, relieve, punish, educate, and train (Foucault, 1991b). Visibility addresses different ways of doing (governing) in different times and places.

**b. Rationality of Governmentality**

The second component in the proposed analytical framework adopted from Dean is rationality. Rationality denotes the intelligibility of regimes of government and uncovers its intrinsic logic operating in specific programs or policies (such as Kemalist secularism and strong state rationality of reason of state). Rationality in other words is about purposive attempts to regulate, re/organize, institutional and personal spaces with a view to generating routines, rituals, and procedures which construct objects of selfhood and institutional-professional authorities. As Gordon argues, the ‘rationality of government will thus mean a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed)’ (1991: 3). The analysis of rationality of government aims not to track down ‘institutions’, ‘theories’, ‘ideology’, but *practices* [which] possess up to a point their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence and ‘reason’ (Foucault, 1991b: 75).

The governmental rationality or *episteme* stands for various forms of knowledge that ‘arise from and inform the activity of governing’ (Foucault, 2000: 201-222; Dean, 1999: 31). Such knowledge denotes not an abstract form but a set of programs or ‘formulas of rule’ to objectify, know, regulate and organize populations, institutions, persons and their conducts (Foucault, 2000: 217-22; Dean, 1995: 566; 1999: 32). The rationality of government designates ‘a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government’
Rationalities and associated programs/formulas for governing populations might differ across time and place (Rabinow, 1984: 14-23). That is, there are processes of 'rationalization' which are 'open to investigation, without assuming any necessary overall coherence' (Hindess, 1996: 147). These rationalities might be culminating in a definite material form such as set of regulations or texts rather than simple ideological paradigms.

In other words, historically contingent and multiple forms of rationality of government are at issue. Indeed, the term govern-mentality incorporates the task of defining a field of action for the political authorities. In this sense the term has a discursive aspect in the sense of suggesting that the targeted objects and boundaries need to be specified before the exercise of power. This linking between governing and mentality (modes of thinking) indicates two things. First, there is a 'reciprocal constitution' of power techniques and forms of knowledge, and, second, because the exercise of power is rationalized; it is not possible to grasp technologies of power before analyzing political rationalities that underpin them (Lemke, 2001: 191). The rationality of the conduct of government is in the plural and refers to a multiplicity of rationalities, different ways of thinking and defining purposes and employing knowledge (Dean, 1999: 11, emphasis added). This means that what gets manifested is any form of rationality regarding how to govern which therefore cannot be reduced to a single universal standard or 'specific rationalism of the West' (Dean, 1994: 78-91).

In brief, such an intersection between governing and mentality entails the delineation of concepts, the specification of objects, borders and the provision of arguments and justification, on the one hand, and agencies, institutions, procedures and legal forms, on the other. In this manner, not only the objects and subjects of a political rationality are governed and but also the problems are addressed and certain strategies offered for solving/handling problems (Lemke, 2001: 191). The relevant questions of this dimension can be: What forms of knowledge, thought, expertise and rationality are employed for governing? How does thought envisage particular issues or problems as governable? How do the practices of government produce particular regimes of truth?

c. Identity of Governmentality

The relevance of identities, which are about the 'characteristic ways of forming subjects, selves, persons, actors or agents' emanates from the fact that the particular ways people live
become an object of governmental programmes and practices (Dean, 1999: 23). The practices of a state in this respect can take 'life-conduct of the ethically free subject' as 'the correlative object of its own suasive capacity' (Gordon, 1991: 5). This political interest in an otherwise private issue, namely 'life-conduct' is that individual life and its social environment are increasingly seen as conditions, instruments and components of state-strength particularly within the rationality of 'reason of state' (Foucault, 2000: 414-6). For the latter, the particular ways populations live might well become an object of the practices that can be put under the rubric of 'the political technology of individuals' (Foucault 2000: 415-7).

The practices or programmes of government often seek to form both individual and collective identities through which governing operate. Emphasis is both on the governing bodies and the governed. This is so because one needs to address the question as to how particular agents come identify themselves with their duties, rights, statuses, capacities, personage and selfhood by presuming to know 'what constitutes good, virtuous, appropriate, responsible conduct of individuals and collectivities', and this aspect of governmentality invites almost inevitably the questions of who/what one is or should be (Dean, 1999:12). Governmental practices attempt to shape or affect public and private identities. By implication, some important questions thus cannot be avoided: How can individuals and collectives identify and be identified with certain groups and categories? How are rights and duties attributed, articulated, reformed, endorsed, enforced or constrained? What sort of expectations arises from those identifications?

d. Techniques of Governmentality

The regimes of government are much surrounded by their technical dimension which has to rely on the resources and capabilities of the ruling regime to maintain, transform and regenerate its fields of existence. To realize their ends, governments employ certain technical and technological devices together with the related instruments, mechanisms and institutions. The key issue in the context of the present project is to address those security related techniques and examine their effects on security governmentality, that is, on domestic politics. The main question to be taken up in Chapter 4 thus would be: What are the instruments, procedures, tactics, technologies, mechanisms and vocabularies in the exercise of authority and rule for the conduct of government?

The relevance of the concept of governmentality for the present study is obvious for many reasons. Firstly, the scheme which outlines the four dimensions of governmentality will serve
as an analytical map that enables one to register how and what (through state discourses and practices) is done in the name of state security. Secondly, the governmentality approach places the people (governed) into the analysis and draws attention to specific processes through which some segments of society are cast out politically by the governing regime in power. In other words, questions of who governs and how and who are the governed and how they are influenced and participate—that is reproduce, resist and maintain—the practice and discourse of governmentality—are key. The issue is how dominant groups in society are positioned through legitimate or illegitimate means. In other words, the focus is to shed light on the distributions of power or the division between state and civil society and the mobile, changing and contingent assemblages of regimes of government (such as security governmentality). Thirdly, what is highlighted is the tension—the fluctuating and competitive venture-taking place between the state and society. These various dimensions allow one to examine specific, historically contingent state actions in relation to state elites as occurred in the socio-political crises in the period between the 1990s and 2000s. Lastly, the project addresses the question about the modes of participating and gaining access into the political arena and the ways into which different segments of society call the rulers to account.

More specifically, the framework of governmentality adopted here is helpful for understanding Turkey's security practices for at least three main reasons. It enables security conceptions and institutions to connect with the multiple 'sites of emergence of technologies of rule and forms they assume' (Miller and Rose, 1995: 591). Secondly, it deals with different regimes of authority (such as the Turkish military) under which 'the ways in which the lives of the individuals are acted upon' (Miller and Rose, 1995: 591). Thirdly, the governmentality perspective goes beyond the ideological components to take into consideration the historically changing ways of governing to account for the changes introduced after the EU official candidacy. The aim is to bring forward the historical significance of 'invention, contestation, operationalization, transformation of the rationalized schemes, programmes, techniques and devices' (Miller and Rose, 1995: 592). For instance and (as Chapter 5 argues) the thesis explores Turkish secularization as a state-enforced project taken by the elites rather than as a historical process (Kadioglu, 2005). Such a view enables the researcher to see pressing problems such as the 'political Islamic threat' not as manifestations of some 'inner' or 'hideous' 'Islamic threat' but rather as stemming in part from a specific political rationalities galvanized by state elites.
In brief, the study of Turkish state security is about discourses, political rationalities, identities, and institutions employed by the Turkish state elites (most notably the military) to sustain the *status quo* and eliminate or control certain political, religious, social, or even personal conducts. It is the socio-historical discourses/practices, rationalities, identities and techniques of state security that shape the ‘solutions’ proposed by the military-led state elites to such problems of contemporary political order as crisis of legitimacy, a yawning gap between the state and society marked by the increasing dominance of the public over private sphere and individual freedom. Hence, when seen from the lenses of CSS and governmentality, the discourses and practices of Turkish state security clearly appear to be functioning as a justification and political method of domestic control and repression by the historically salient assemblage of state elites. This is expected to be a valuable addition to both the governmentality literature as well as the critical security studies.

**SUMMARY**

This chapter argued that traditional theoretical approaches to the study of security do not clearly delineate the relationship between state security and domestic politics. This was an invitation to articulate an alternative framework through which to explore this relationship, and moreover, exploring it by reference to the Turkish security politics since the mid-1990s. Most TSS approaches considered the relations between security and politics as given—both conceptually and theoretically—and as something independent of domestic politics. Two reasons can be identified as to why the TSS account of state security cannot be deemed satisfactory. Firstly, mainstream IR often conflates the question of security with other issue-areas having to do with military strategy, especially, external state defense or state-to-state war. Because this results in an exclusive emphasis upon military strategy, *status quo* and the state, there emerges an *apolitical* conceptualization of security upheld at the expense of other substantive issues of domestic politics and security associated with the very people within states, especially with their daily practices and discourses. Secondly, TSS cannot address the question as to how certain conceptions of security relate to domestic politics or how the military dimension of security can foul democratic politics and interfere with the political and personal conduct of the individual in the name of state security. The main argument of this project is that the relationship between state security and domestic politics in Turkey can be better understood by an alternative, critical approach, which combines the CSS perspective with Foucault's concept of state power as governmentality.
Because of its complexity, the Turkish state security discourses and practices call for a different conceptualization of 'the state' and 'state power' than those offered by the TSS literature. State security - especially in the Turkish case - is not properly captured by the conventional understandings of 'the state'. The conventional understanding does not capture state security effectively because it either reduces the notion of state power to a simple quantitative capability (as was the case with Waltz) or portrays this power, in a similarly oversimplified fashion, as one that reflects legitimate political rights stemming from a consent-based model of the state power.

The chapter also argued that security should be understood as a derivative concept reflecting deeper assumptions about the nature of politics and the role of conflict in political life, a key assumption for CSS. CSS investigates political processes through which 'threats' and 'responses' are constructed. Secondly, security discourses originate in and represent historical processes as well as diverse power structures. Such an understanding allows the researcher to understand how the state in part resolves the problem of political order through security discourses and practices. State security thus becomes a political method and practice employed directly for the domestic government of the people. The securitization approach, which is a critical rather than a traditional one-plays a key role in supporting one of the main arguments of this project, namely, that state security is a political practice. By way of securitization, the state claims a special right of intervention into politics, and securitization becomes a device to 'decide' on 'friends and enemy' of the state. Within the parameters of security discourses and policies, state elites are able to circumvent the normal workings of politics by elevating certain policies to the level of 'extraordinary' or a 'prepolitical immediacy'. Such a use of state authority through securitization yields political means for the state elites by rendering undemocratic state discourses and policies acceptable, while discarding other democratic options. CSS argues that those supposedly apolitical security policies of states are not the by-products of immutable/objective threats to the state's physical survival but rather resulting from certain tangible/moral historical configurations of expertise, authority and specific institutional settings.

The domination of the defense-militarist concept of security can be overcome by locating the discussion within the parameters of CSS and governmentality. Here, state security would be understood as an effect of a wider and complex power relations formed by ideas, identity,
institutions, and techniques. Turkish state security in this configuration stands for the ability of state elites to try to engineer certain rationalities, identities and techniques of governing that are facilitated by the relevant institutions of military, bureaucracy and politics. Once located within these parameters, state security comes to serve as a political asset for the accredited state elites, especially the military. State security thus becomes part of structure of interaction among socio-political actors concerning state discourses and practices. The current project thus enables us to better understand how security discourses and policies are constructed, contested and employed as politically effective by the state and powerful elites in their relation vis-à-vis domestic society.
CHAPTER 2

THE VISIBILITY DIMENSIONS OF ‘SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY’

The present chapter analyzes the visibility dimensions by analyzing the main contours of the historical, institutional, socio-political and legal sources of security governmentality in Turkey. The chapter first introduces security governmentality with a view to charting its basic contours. Secondly, it analyzes the historical, institutional, political and legal conditions under which security governmentality has been able to flourish. The chapter also identifies the major features and actors in security governmentality by locating them into their relevant social and historical settings. Such an undertaking serves two aims. First it helps us delineate the relevant historical-political context within which the sweeping canvas of national security has come to absorb democratic politics. Second, such an investigation also helps wrench the complexities of socio-political forces (such as political Islam) out of the parochial dismissal of these forces by the state as ‘pre-modern’ and ‘irrational’ security threats.

Such an investigation constitutes the first aspect of an ‘analytics of government’ in so far as the ‘visibility’ of governmentality refers to ‘the intrinsic logic or strategy of a regime of practices’ (Dean, 1999: 22). In so doing, the chapter tries to understand the operational practices of governmentality or the ‘characteristic forms of visibility, ways of seeing and perceiving’ (Dean, 1999: 23). Overall, instead of reifying the perceived ahistorical and homogenous nature of societal dynamics as naturally and comfortably located out and against the Turkish state, the chapter examines ‘how different locales and agents are [historically] connected with one another, what problems are to be solved, and what objectives are to be sought’ (Dean, 1999: 30).

2.1. SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY AS A DOMESTIC POLITICAL REGIME IN TURKEY

Modern states often use security discourses for political purposes in order to convince their populations that the state is threatened by inter/national challengers to such an extent that ‘national security has very often been a conservative formulation equating the political status quo with desirable order’ (Dalby, 1997: 10). ‘State security’ is one such discourse that is
invested in a repertoire of meanings at the disposal of the accredited state authorities (Khattak, 1996). Aside from its role in constructing conventional distinctions of inside/outside, the discourses and practices of state security also produce advantageous rhetorical resources in political life (Kemal Pasha, 1996). One way of recognizing domestic political leverage of state security is to identify when security is rendered with protecting more than the narrow conception of external military defense of the territory so as to include protection of domestic 'political order' (Williams and Krause, 1997: x; Andreas and Price, 2001: 35). In this case, security is burdened with 'essentially normative' and 'radically idealist' visions of modern state that is 'preoccupied with containing change within territorial boundaries and legal codes' (Walker, 1997: 62).

In the Turkish case it is vital to note that the discourses and practices of security denote far more than conventional territorial/external defense and crucially include the protection of an idea and ideology of the state as the primary referent object of security (Muller, 1996: 177-8). Once designated as such, state security cannot but register certain segments of population as threatening such unconventional referent objects of security as 'secularism' (Cizre, 2003: 216). From the second half of the 1990s onwards, the salience of security discourses and policies have granted certain state security institutions and conceptions a wide autonomy in Turkish politics, which has given rise to a fusion between state security and policy making. The most significant outcome of this process has been an enlarged political domain and ascending political profile for the Turkish military, which has since then resorted to an overtly politicized discourse and legitimized its various political involvements in the name of state security (Cizre, 2003).

This increased political activism of the security institutions (i.e. the military) together with the attendant rationalities, identities and techniques have established a new style of governing or a regime of practice in Turkey, which is here called 'security governmentality'. Security governmentality can be defined as a regime of government and administration that is undertaken by the military-led state authorities and agencies, which employ certain forms of knowledge and an array of techniques that seek to shape political and private conduct through the identities, aspirations and beliefs of the citizenry. Specifically in the Turkish case, security governmentality refers to the techniques of the military, informed by the political rationalities of secularism and 'reason of state' for intervening in political and private
conduct. So construed, security governmentality is used here as a heuristic device to describe the de facto political regime that has been at work in the last decade, which has inhibited and sometimes cancelled out the workings of normal (democratic) politics.

In general, the ebb and flow of Turkish state security discourses and practices shows two significant characteristics perpetuating security governmentality. Firstly, they demonstrate that a persistent and semi-reflexive urge to save the state against 'domestic political threats' has been entrenched within the discourses and practices of the state elites, who are mainly composed of the secularist military, state bureaucracies, and the mainstream media (Lowry, 2000: 48). In this way and secondly, exerting such a non-democratic security-based control over certain political actors heralds relatively newer security functions of the state elites (as argued in Chapter 4 in relation to the military intervention in February 1997) (Cizre, 2003: 216). These military functions concern, inter alia, an unconventional interventionist attitude into macro and micro realms of polity and society in the name of Turkish state security. Therefore, in the last decade it has become usual for the state security institutions such as the military and the National Security Council (one of the most influential institutions of decision-making in the country) to take on the 'domestic threats' supposedly posed by the Islamists to the 'security of the secular state'. At the heart of the efforts of the military-led state elites is, as Yavuz argues,

[a quixotic quest to radically recast Turkish culture, history, and identity [that] has ensured a permanent kulturkampf against society, guaranteeing, ironically, Turkey's failure to make the transition to a Western-style liberal democracy (2000a: 34).

By examining the prevailing parameters of security governmentality it is possible to pin down a new pattern of military involvement into politics that has departed considerably from the old patterns in two significant ways. Firstly especially since 1997, the military interventions into politics have been carried out and justified with recourse to the discourse of security of the secular state defined as the need to protect the state against the ideological and political challenges posed by the religious forces in society (Insel, 1997; Yavuz, 2000a)\(^4\). Secondly, the military has taken up its guardian role in maintaining secularism to a point where it no longer served to protect secularism or 'the secular nature of the state' merely as part of the

\(^4\) One recalls that a rather similar discourse of 'threats' to secular order was also employed against the ruling parties in the 1960 and later 1980 military coups. At these times, however, there hardly was a robust Islamic political movement, nor were the accused governments such as the Democratic Party government Islamist or anti-secular (see Karpat, 1960; Demirel, 2003).
constitutional order but rather to reassert Kemalist secularism as a hegemonic political/ideological discourse against the challenges by the Islamic social periphery (Dagi, 2005: 24, 27). In this context, the state elites hold that the 'survival of the state' is in peril not because of external physical-military threat but rather because of an ideologically driven domestic socio-political movement acting under the rubric of political Islam that is allegedly bent on destroying 'the secular character of the Turkish state' (The NSC Decisions, 28 February 1997, see Appendix 1).

Indeed, since the mid-1990s the most visible socio-political 'domestic threat' in the state security discourse has been dubbed as the political Islamist movements (Insel, 1997; Yavuz, 2000a). The ensuing confrontation has generated a stringent security logic and dynamic platform of conflict between the dissenting socio-political (Islamist) elites and the secularist state elites (i.e. the military) in Turkish politics (Insel, 2001; Laciner, 2004). It is in this milieu that the secularist state forces (the military, but also the mainstream media and a certain segment of civilian bureaucracy) have come to confront head-on the Islamist political parties and their demands for visibility in the public sphere such as the Refah Party government (1996-1997) and the incumbent ruling AK Party government. This way, the military-led state elites often claim that there exists a Manichaean struggle against the onward march of a 'deluded' political Islam that is allegedly set to 'destroy' the secular nature of the state (Savas, 2001b: 33-4).

In all, security governmentality lays the groundwork for the range of military interventions into political and personal conduct quite extensively by manipulating state security discourses and practices. The military and other state elites have come to see their mission not simply as physical defense against foreign forces but ever more so against the domestic socio-political forces. Especially since the mid-1990s, the military has not failed to find channels for meddling into the 'ways of acting and living' of the individuals and collectivities (Salt, 1999; Yavuz, 2000b; Tank, 2002; Cizre, 2003). As argued in the subsequent chapters of the thesis, the military's newfound political activism can best be couched in the complex workings of security governmentality. As mentioned, governmentality can be understood through examining its dimensions of visibility, rationality, technique and identity (Dean, 1999: Ch. 1). The section below tries to establish the visibility dimension of security governmentality with a view to finding out its historical, institutional-political, social and legal aspects that have helped constitute security governmentality.
2.2. HISTORICAL ASPECTS

Especially since the mid-1990s, Turkey's exclusionary discourses and practices of state security rendered the ethno-cultural demands of the population as 'security threats'. The reasons for such securitizations can mainly be traced back to the process of development of modern Turkish state (Heper, 1992b; Sozen and Shaw, 2003; Jacoby, 2004). More often than not, Turkey's puzzling state-society relations are attributed to the brazen transformation process the country underwent from a largely multicultural, multilingual and non-secular imperial setting into a secularist, nationalist, republican and homogenizing socio-political setting (Ozdemir and Frank, 2000: 6). Indeed, the effects of this transformation figured prominently in the politics of the late Ottoman modernization and establishment of the Republic (Yegen, 1999a; Jung and Piccoli, 2001). In this process, the state and society confrontation bore the brunt of a persistent political tension between the need to liberalize the regime and to maintain the security of the state (Aydinli, 2003: 210-12). In other words, the historical attempts to open up to the masses or democratize the political regime were often curtailed and/or accompanied by a belligerent set of domestic and international security problems, which, in turn, aggravated the state concerns over regime security (Aydinli, 2003: 210-12; Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 83-106).

Here a particularly potent source of the historical tension between liberty and security can be traced back to the violent dismemberment of late Ottoman Empire at the hands of victorious European powers after the First World War. This particular tension finds its expression in the 'Sevres Syndrome' referring to the overzealous concerns over the idea of national unity and the territorial integrity of the state against internal and international conspirators (Jung and Piccoli, 2000: 94; Candar, 2000: 141-2). It is often argued that the 'Sevres Treaty' imposed by the Western powers with the 'goal to divide the country continues to weigh heavily in the common memories of the Turkish state and society' (Aydinli, 2003: 223). Indeed, between the French Revolution and the early twentieth century, the Ottoman-Turkish state faced threats to its security due to the developing, aggressive and divisive nationalisms and European imperial expansion (Zurcher, 1997: 23-32). Consequently, as the former advisor to the President Turgut Ozal and pre-eminent journalist Cengiz Candar argued:

The republic that replaced the Ottoman Empire after the World War I was 'security
oriented'. Founders of the republic were, after all, the top military brass and civil servants of the Ottoman state, which had experienced steady territorial losses for more than a century. The distrust for outsiders stemmed from that Ottoman experience and was deeply embedded in the ruling elite of the new state (2000: 123).

In addition to war against the European powers, following its independence the newly established Turkish Republic had to fight on another front for the rise and maintenance of the nation-state against the internal ethnic and Islamic oriented resistance groups (Tokluoglu and Hunt, 2002). Here an important example was that of the Kurdish-Islamist Sheikh Said Rebellion against the Kemalist regime in 1925. The latter proved to be a symbol of fanaticism that had to be suppressed by the state elites and a means for naming 'most serious subsequent opposition to government policies...[and]...the disaffected groups [as] traitors' (Olson, 1991: 158-60). Since the establishment of the Republic, this double security predicament eventually led to a persistent reactionary stance on the part of the state elites against the domestic and international critics of the state (Candar, 2000: 140-2). Although this antagonistic national international political environment did not lead the state elites to give up on their Europeanization reforms, the logic was still tied down to the security of the state. This double predicament notwithstanding, the survival of the state was believed to lie in a full-fledged modernization process, which was to radically transform an ailing traditional society. To save the state, the Ottoman-Turkish state attempted to reform its legal, educational, and economic structures from the 1830s to 1870s under the banner of Tanzimat (Shaw, 1997: 55-172; Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004: 3). In other words, the state's 'urge to modernize-that is, Westernize-was more a pragmatic effort to secure the survival of the state than an ideological posture' (Candar, 2000: 123). Hence, in the era between the Young Turk Revolution (1908) and the Democrat Party governments (1950-60) Turkey witnessed considerable efforts for secularization and nationalization of the state and society at least partly in the name of 'saving the state' (Karpat, 1982: 465-77; Berkes, 1998: 479-503; Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004: 3).

The ensuing insecurity perception has come to inform the activities of the state elites in the 1990s and 2000s (Drorian, 2004: 2). This ultimately gave way to a 'national security syndrome' that gripped the state elites, who were occupied with internal as well as external 'security threats' (for example see Savas, 2001a; Ilhan, 2002; Yucel, 2002; Yazicioglu, 2004). In their power struggle against domestic socio-political dissenters, it was this existential insecurity problem that fed into the activities of the military-led state elites and helped constitute their justifying discourses and practices (Candar, 2000: 140-2; Insel, 2001: 8-13;
Aydinli, 2003). From the 1960s until early 1990s (against the backdrop of entry into NATO, rapid industrial expansion, urban migration, application for a full membership into the EU and the Kurdish problem) Turkey endured three military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980 all in the name of security of the (Kemalist ideology and values of) the state (Tachau and Heper, 1983: 17-33; Heper, 1992b; Jacoby, 2004: 127-164). Consequently, from the late Ottoman modernization to the contemporary EU membership struggle; there has been a marked obsession on the part of the state elites with state security. The latter helped shape state action in its relations with domestic and international world (Aydinli, 2003: 209-212; Jenkins, 2001b: 272). Thus unsurprisingly, the pendulum between civil liberties and state security in Turkey has generally swung in favor of the latter (Mardin, 1969; Heper, 1991; Cizre 2003).

2. 3. INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS: THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL CULTURE

It seems possible to assume that certain institutions acquire 'pivotal positions in the society' and that 'power accrues to positions within institutions that had become dominant' such as the military and the executive (C. Wright Mills quoted in Seligman, 1973: 304). The military is a particularly pertinent institution, where 'the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society' (Lasswell, 1941: 455). As indicated earlier, the major agent and protagonist of security governmentality in Turkey is the military. The politically high-profile of the military is often attributed to its 'non-political' social and legal positioning in the system, which places the military as being 'above' the confines of daily politics (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997). Indeed, the military has long internalized a guardian and vanguard role to ward off any 'threat' to its Kemalist ideology such as its secularist rationality (Bayramoglu et al., 2004: 7-12). Yet as will be argued in Chapter 4, since 1997 the military has embarked upon a newfound route that has increased its involved in the daily politics of the state (Insel, 1997; 2001; Yavuz, 2000a; 2000b; Jenkins, 2001; Cizre, 2003; Jacoby, 2004). As shown below, through the legal and institutional capacity given by an all-encompassing national security concept and the NSC; the military has been able to define and respond upon the domestic security threats (Cizre, 2003). In short, the military has effectively called the shots in Turkish politics (Doxey, 1997: 12). How can this political activism of the military be understood?

Understanding the military's paramount influence and the fusion between democratic politics and state security necessitate charting the role of the military in society and polity. In general,
the nature of Turkey's contemporary civil-military relations exhibit two main features. First, the military's acceptance of civilian authority makes it necessary to disguise its political weight and/or legitimize its overt political interventions. To these aims, the military gradually expanded its institutional functions and acquired legal and constitutional powers to the point that some of its functions are even assumed as of 'social engineering' such as surveillance of the civil activities, dress codes, and belief orientations (Insel, 2001: 13). Second, the military as an institution became politically autonomous mainly because 'the ultimate justification for the military's political predominance rests on its [institutionalized and legalized] "guardianship of the national interest,"
(Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997: 154). As argued by Umit Cizre, a leading expert on civil-military relations in Turkey:

Since 1983 the military has used legal/constitutional, historical/cultural, and structural reasons and mechanisms to retain its privileged position in issuing demands, policy suggestions, and warnings on political matters. It has done so at the expense of nonmilitary groups, such as the left, youth, the retired, women, the unemployed, and intellectuals, whose views carry less weight (1997: 153).

What are the institutional-political cultural sources of the military's influence in contemporary Turkish politics?

Political Culture of a 'Rationalist Democracy'
The legal and political emphasis on Turkey's 'concentrated rather than diffused state values and norms' breeds two kinds of actors in the political drama: the state elites and political elites (Heper, 1992b: 148-150). In other words, the political elites represent the 'horizontal' dimension by comprising the elected representatives of the political parties who are inclined to protect the socio-economic rights and needs of their constituencies. The state elites in the military and civilian bureaucracy represent the 'vertical' dimension, meaning that the state elites are primarily responsible for 'the security of the state' against the 'misuses' of the particularistic interests of the 'intermediary structures' (Heper, 1992b: 147). These appointed state elites act in a 'bureaucratic ruling tradition' (Akyaz, 2002: 23). They are the modernizing agents, guardians and 'true servants' of the state, its ideology and public-national interest (Heper, 1984: 80; Sozen and Shaw, 2003: 108-20). They act to protect the 'vital matters' at the expense of any other (democratic) political and administrative procedure (Sozen and Shaw, 2003: 111). Modelled on the lines of French grandes ecoles and largely isolated from the social groups by way of exclusive education in institutions such as the
Military Academies and the School of Political Science, the state elites are exposed to Kemalist indoctrination which means that nationalism, republicanism and secularism become 'articles of faith' (Zurcher, 2004: 102-3).

The party political fragmentation and polarization contribute further to the negative impact of the military-led state elite's notion of democratic political regime. The latter for the military was not conceived as a specific political regime boldly demanded by the rising social groups (for instance, Moore, 1966) or as a system of rule through which various particularistic interests could be negotiated and reconciled (Heper, 1992b: 146). Instead, the state policy of westernization incorporated an understanding of democracy as 'adopted' by conscious decisions of the state elites (Tachau and Heper, 1983: 17-33; Cizre, 1999: 61). Therefore, for the Turkish military a 'viable democracy' does not denote 'a debilitating pluralist conception of democracy' but refers to 'a rationalist understanding of democracy' (Heper, 1992b: 147, emphasis added). Hence whenever the chronic political instability coincides with rising religious and/or ethnic awakenings in the society that challenges the basic principles of the Kemalist official ideology such as secularism, the discourses and practices of state security is employed by the military against the actions of the Islamist political elites. When such concerns over state security are voiced by the military in public or private then the ability of the incumbent governments to operate within a more liberal political order or security is plagued (Yavuz, 2000b; Yucel, 2002; Bilgin, 2005). One significant result of rationalist democracy has been the demarcation of state politics from formal electoral politics played out by political parties and political elites.

Demarcation of State Politics and Electoral Politics

A competitive politics operates in Turkey based upon a parliamentary democracy since 1950. Turkish politics has generally been characterized as 'party-directed' and 'network politics' (Carkoglu, 2004). The latter functions as a medium for transferring state resources to party supporters in a 'patron-client' pattern (Ayata, 1996; Sozen and Shaw, 2003). Although Turkey has been ordinarily described as a competitive 'electoral parliamentary democracy' or as an 'established democracy' (Heper, 1992b; Stepan and Anderson, 2004), in general when dissenting societal demands challenge the Kemalist state ideologies of secularism and nationalism, they are mainly not recognized as legitimate voices to be heard (Salt, 1999: 72-8; Yavuz, 2000a: 33). Historically, the rural populace considered the state elites and political class not necessarily as guarantors of their well-being and security; on the contrary, the very
word ‘siyaset’ (politics) retained a negative connotation for centuries. In the words Serif Mardin:

[...] he modern Turkish word siyaset still retained the grim connotation of its earlier meaning under Ottoman rule, where it was in official parlance also a synonym for a death sentence imposed for reasons of state (quoted in Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 26).

Specifically through the post-military coup constitutions of 1961, 1971 and 1982, the military was able to give rise to a ‘double-headed’ or ‘dual-track’ political system (see Shambayati, 2004). That is, certain state institutions such as the Constitutional Court, the Turkish Radio and Television, and the universities were created as ‘constitutional institutions’, which could autonomously engender ‘an enlightened public opinion’ against ‘irresponsible politicians’ and ‘the excesses of the majority’ (Heper, 1992b: 162). In other words, the above mentioned duality of roles by the state elites and political elites helped create a system of government in which ‘the civilian council of ministers coexisted with the national security council on the executive level’ (Cizre, 1997: 157). Later, following the 1980 military coup, a new system of criminal courts called ‘State Security Courts’ were introduced, which contained a military judge along with the civilian judges in its hearings. State Security Courts tried ‘the cases involving the security of the state’ by which ‘the military system of justice continued to operate independently alongside the civilian system’ (Cizre, 1997: 157).

To underline this demarcation institutionally and preserve ‘the matter of state’ against the ‘vulgar’ daily politics, other legal-constitutional instruments were also introduced. More specifically, after the 1960 military coup a new constitution delivered further legal powers and delineated overt institutional spaces for the de facto demarcation between daily politics and the state (affairs). The 1961 constitution brought in ‘the authorized agencies’ such as the NSC that were expected to exert supervision over the general political process and even the parliament itself. After the 1980 coup, the constitution was largely rewritten to establish this demarcation. According to the 1982 Constitution, another politically unaccountable state actor, the President joined in these ‘authorized agencies’ to supervise the political decisions by the sheer existence of his veto power on the governmental decisions. These non-political but constitutionally authorized ‘supervising’ institutions also included Higher Education Council (YOK) (Heper, 1992b: 162). The latter was particularly influential not only to scrutinize ‘the legal validity of administrative decisions and parliamentary acts’ but also
[t]o test the political and administrative desirability of the said [politically reached] decisions and acts. And these tribunals, on the whole sympathetic to the views of the bureaucratic elites, did not always make their decisions in an impartial manner' (Heper, 1990: 232).

Amongst the state elites, the most notable aspect in the visibility of security governmentality concerns the political and ideological position of the military. The role of the military in articulating a particular security discourse is more effectively cast than other relevant state institutions. The former is mainly because of the historical, institutional and legal implications of the political culture. The Turkish modernization project was launched by and through the military elites that foresaw the production of a new social identity (secular, western, national, modern) as a necessary step to be enforced. The military was involved in this enforcement process from its inception as the main 'vanguard' and 'guardian' of the 'modernization-project' and secular identity (Tachau and Heper, 1983; Heper and Aylin, 1996; Sen, 1997; Cizre, 2004). In fact, this was in line with many other modernizing militaries. As Krause argues;

\[\text{modernization was not only in the 'forms of civil-military relations, patterns and norms of military recruitment and education, claims on economic and social resources that had been under reconstruction but also in the very options between various aspects of concepts of security as to who or what constitutes the threat and how to handle it (Krause, 1998: 135).}\]

The Turkish military is the 'ultimate locus of the idea of the state' (Heper, 1992b: 147). It represents itself as 'the guardian of the republic' (Cizre, 1999: 67-79). It operates as a 'total institution' in seclusion from both social and political elites (Birand, 1986: 140). Despite its institutional and social seclusion, the military is closely associated with domestic politics and intervenes into politics on the grounds that it has the role to firmly defend the priority of the Kemalist state principles against any domestic socio-political dissenters (Tachau and Heper, 1983: 17-33; Lowry, 2000: 41; Kinzer, 2001: 165; Jenkins, 2001: 45).

Because of the military's formal commitment to parliamentary democracy and quick returns to the civilian rule after its interventions of 1960, 1971, and 1980; Turkish civil-military relations have generally been presented as relatively milder versions of the general typologies in the literature of civil-military relations (Finer, 1962/2003: 38; Nordlinger, 1977: 21-9; Tachau and Heper, 1983: 17-33; Interview with Prof. Metin Heper, University of Birmingham, 26 September 2003). Whatever their type, however, these coups together with
the post-modern coup in 1997 (see Chapter 4) clearly exemplify the overt influence of the military over normal politics (Yavuz, 2000a; 2000b; Cizre, 2003; 2004).

**Institutional Autonomy of Turkish Military**

In addition to its historical and social setting; the military has possessed a certain degree of political, administrative, judiciary, and financial autonomy in security governmentality (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1997). The status of the chief of the general staff in the hierarchy of state bureaucracy clearly shows the powerful positioning of the military: Article 117 of the 1982 constitution renders him responsible only to the prime minister rather than the defense minister as the latter would be the case in a liberal democratic political order (Dikmejian, 1982; Diamond and Plattner, 1996). Moreover, another sign of military's political weight can be found in the separation between the jurisdiction of civilian courts and jurisdiction of the military criminal courts (Military Court of Appeal and Supreme Military Council) to such an extent that 'military prosecutors can issue warrants for civilians involved in unlawful acts that concern the military' (Ozcan, 2002: 20). The military has jealously guarded its institutional autonomy. Whenever its high status was disputed by the politicians, the general staff expressed its disapproval of such criticisms (for instance, *Cumhuriyet*, 1 May 1992, 2).

As argued in greater detail in below section 2.5, the ‘guardianship’ role of the military in the state structure and its position in society as the ‘most trusted institution’ is also shored up by a formal legal basis. This includes Article 35 of the Internal Services Act of 1961, which establishes that ‘the duty of the armed forces is to safeguard and defend Turkish territory and the Republic of Turkey as designated by constitution’, whereas Article 85 of the Internal Service Regulations asserts that the ‘Turkish armed forces shall defend the country against internal as well as external threats, if necessary by force’. Despite the fact that constitutional and national laws change, the issue of ‘protection of the republic against both external and internal enemies remains the essential role of the armed forces’ (Tank, 2002: 220).

Therefore, the military as an institution plays a vital role in Turkish politics especially in matters that are deemed within the domain of state security. The ever-extensive definition of the latter has been the exclusive preserve of the military (Ozcan, 2002). The significant political role of the military also derives from the Turkish administrative and political culture (Sozen and Shaw, 2003). The latter represents the characteristics of a ‘strong state’ (Heper, 1992; 1993). Starting as earlier as the 1924 Constitution, the ‘strong state’ meant that the
‘state interests’ have always enjoyed priority over societal interests. Although the latter articulated that sovereignty belonged to the nation (Earle, 1925: 94) the military and the bureaucratic elites did not interpret sovereignty as ‘popular sovereignty’, which would put forward the sectional, individual or group interest of the people rather than the general, collective national interest of the state at the forefront of politics (Heper, 1992; 1993; 2000). As Heper argues (1990: 322)

This meant that in the view of the military and the bureaucratic elites a search for ‘what was best for the country’ was far more important than the reconciliation of interest groups... The ensuing conflict between the bureaucratic and the political elite was a consequence of, and in turn, contributed to the continuing salience of cultural rather than functional cleavages. The political elites were preoccupied in demarcation of their territory (‘politics’) as distinct from that of the bureaucratic elites (‘the matter of state’).

**Fragmented Political Party System**

The Turkish political culture, in particular its party system, also provided the military with a fertile ground to exert its influence over domestic and foreign policies. Having weak ties with their constituency over the years, the top-down oriented elitist and undemocratic internal parties mostly declined to pay heed to the demands of a more democratic and inclusive politics (Cizre, 1999: 15-28). This has bred a perception and practice of politics as an elite-driven bargain process of getting access to material rewards (Sozen and Shaw, 2003: 108-20). This view in turn implanted a narrow or procedural perception and conception of political process in that politics became a function of a patrimonial or patron-client structure of power (Keyman, 1999). This structure of political parties is largely reminiscent of a ‘cartel party’ that sides with the state as it swings away from the public demands (Cizre, 1999: 20). As Jenkins summarizes:

Political parties tend to resemble clans rather than institutionalized organizations and form around charismatic individuals rather than ideological conviction or common goals. Advancement within the party is invariably the reward for royalty to the leader rather than ability. Dissenters are faced with the choice between obscurity and resignation. Under the current political parties law, party leaders are able to appoint not only candidates for general elections but also the delegates to the party congresses which elect the party leaders. The result is a collection of self-perpetuating autocracies and oligarchies rather than democratic institutions (2001: 14-5).

Unable to carry the interests and opinions of the masses to the political stage, the political
class in Turkey have instead largely sided with and conformed to the state interests set almost exclusively by the military dominated state elites (Bayramoglu, 2001: 17). Turkish political elites have thus often appeared ‘legitimist’ vis-à-vis state elites, especially the military (Insel, 2003). This form of political culture has in turn helped the military to control politics. The role the military played in politics was also enabled in part because some political elites and civil society groups encouraged and even invited the military to reign in whenever cultural-ideological cleavages, extremist sectarianism, rightist and leftist movements terrorized the society and destabilized the political system, this is so, as Jenkins stresses, mainly because the

[v]ast majority of Turkey’s politicians are still products of a social and cultural environment which sees the military as embodying the highest virtues of the nation. In addition to any practical considerations, such as the possibility of a coup or a loss of public support, it is also very difficult psychologically for most Turkish politicians to challenge the authority of the military (Jenkins, 2001: 52).

The effect of this political culture is the daunting failure of the politicians to curtail the immense power hold of the military in the country’s political system. In other words, a supposedly non-political agent, namely the military has been able to take hold of the political decision-making process (Insel, 1997). However, after its 1980 intervention into politics, the military pursued an indirect rather than overt influence over Turkish politics (Insel, 2001). As argued in Chapter 4, the military exerted its influence over society and polity not through a military coup but by devising a new constitution (the 1982 Constitution) and by establishing related institutional arrangements such as the National Security Council and the National Security Policy Document (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997).

Consequently, the political system has been largely swamped by the institutionalized security-related anxieties and policies of the military dominated state elites, whose views could be summarized as ‘saving the state against the internal and external challengers’ (Jenkins, 2001: 57-83; Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004: 3). ‘Saving the state’ here meant preserving the ‘nature of the state’ referring to basic components of the Kemalist state ideology most notably secularism as explained in Chapter 3. This interest in saving the state did not always yield a crude military domination over the policy-making structure. That is, even the direct interventions of the military were not aimed at carving out a manifestly authoritarian-military regime or supporting a particular political leaning but rather at preserving the status quo with
a commitment to the parliamentary democracy and capitalist economy (Jacoby, 2003). As Heper stressed:

[removed]

Viewed within this context, then, the political weight, public mandate and high social status of the military should not come as a surprise. That is, when the military finds itself operating within such helping historical and social conditions, it is little wonder how it comes to inhabit such a prominent place in the political life of the country.

2.4. SOCIAL ASPECTS

One of the obstacles that prevents Turkish politics from fully adopting itself to a more inclusive pluralist democratic arena is related to the effects of the socio-political dynamics in the country. As mentioned, the latter carries a historical baggage of the strong state tradition and fragmented party politics to the extent that the most obvious characteristics of Turkish politics in the 1990s have been those of fragmentation and polarization (Tachau, 2000; Sozen and Shaw, 2003). The relevance and importance of these recurring political-cultural trends to the present study is noteworthy: the near total absence of a public and political outcry over the military’s interference into Turkish politics is a feature that helps perpetuate the real policy objectives of the state elites in security governmentality.

How can we make sense of this lack of public-political outcry over the military’s interference into politics? Despite all the rhetoric deployed to stress otherwise, it is possible to discern a marked continuity between the Ottoman and the Turkish state power structures and elite habitus (Heper, 2000; Jung and Piccoli, 2001; Jacoby, 2004). The Ottoman patrimonial/paternalistic state tradition was continued in shape by the new Republican Kemalist state elites (Mardin, 1973: 200; Ozbudun, 1994: 192; Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 30). That is, the absence of large landlords or economically powerful bourgeoisie, for instance, left first the Ottoman state bureaucracy and after 1923 the modern nationalist bureaucracy relatively independent of social pressure or challenges (Mardin, 1973: 199-200; Gulalp, 1997b). The social segments could not find necessary political mediums for pressurizing the
ruling nationalist and bureaucratic elites to recognize and materialize their civil and political rights (Heper, 1992b).

More specifically, at the state level the political weight of the Ulama (clergy) began to decline during the westernizing period of the Ottoman Empire, but it was the final dismemberment of this class from the state by the new Republican elite that made a substantial difference in the political regime and the power structure of the new Turkish state (Mardin, 1971; 1990 Hunt and Tokluoglu, 2002). Victorious finally over the Ulama, secularist forces and civil bureaucracy captured the state and filled its key institutions, in particular the military. The overwhelmingly authoritarian history of the single-party government (1923-1950) under the Republican Peoples' Party (RPP/CHP), which was almost exclusively established by the Republican state elite, is a clear testimony to this process (Zurcher, 2004).

When this socio-historical legacy overlapped with the Turkish top-down modernization process, a state security-oriented elitist outlook was bestowed on the political structure (Keyder, 1997: 86). Turkey's modernizing officials believed that they had a duty to instigate a top-down transformation of society (Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004). In this process, politics has come to be seen by the state elites not a process of meeting or accommodating diverse group demands but as a normative engagement in search of the 'right' for the entire 'egalitarian' society (Heper, 1984: 96; Keyman, 1999: 112). As mentioned, the RPP governments between 1923 and 1950 were exemplary in conforming to this 'rationalist' democracy and the politics of modernization. Since then, multi-party democracy has both curtailed down the heavy-hand of authoritarian modernization and broadened political participation; but military coups were periodically undertaken to correct perceived deviations from the logic of 'rationalist democracy'.

According to the state elites, political elites tend to overlook the lofty and sacred interests of the Republican state as against the petty interests of their groupings and their diverse demands to attract more votes and guarantee political office. This generated a yawning gap with general societal elements, which hindered social demands to be incorporated by the political centre and thus largely emptied the existing political space from civic involvement (Yavuz, 2000a: 33). The state elites have become largely unresponsive to the changing social demands. Consequently, as Yishoi succinctly argued:
A tradition which assumes the existence, primacy, autonomy and sovereignty of the state has evolved militating against liberal democracy. The Turkish state was able to frustrate the development of civil society by placing an emphasis on the long-term interests of the community at the expense of sectional interests. The upshot was a monist polity, where the bureaucratic elites dominated the polity (1998: 158).

As argued in Chapter 3, one pertinent dimension of rationality in security governmentality has been the ‘reason of state’ a by-product of an ‘extremely strong state tradition’ in the Turkish political system (Heper, 1992a; 2000; Sozen and Shaw, 2003). The latter embodies respect for authority and other social conformity patterns that have been closely observed in modern Turkey, something which ‘makes the task of the government in Turkey much easier’ (Frye, 1957: 186). Historically, social segments suffer from lack of autonomous intermediary political mediums (interest groups and/or civil society) for pressurizing the ruling nationalist and bureaucratic elites to recognize and materialize their civil and political rights (Mardin, 1969: 265). Such a view of the state is perpetuated by the near absence of powerful or autonomous civil society or interest groups (Mardin, 1990: 33-4). This is not to suggest that the state has been omnipotent vis-à-vis the civil society or that the societal forces have been historically non-existent or powerless all the way down (see Ozdek, 2005). It is rather to point out that civil society could not develop in line with its western counterparts, that is, powerful enough so as to struggle to secure its interests from the state and/or to represent a real alternative to the state policies (Mardin, 1990: 21-34). As Jenkins emphasizes,

Turkish society tends to be hierarchical, patriarchal and authoritarian, with an emphasis on collective rather than individual rights and values. The result is a society which is both more cohesive and more restrictive than those in Western democracies. But both the cohesion and the restrictions owe more to traditional values and social pressure than to legislation ... Pluralism, whether personal or political, is often viewed with suspicion as posing a potential threat to social and national cohesion. Turkish children are taught that “one of the elements that makes the Turkish nation is the subordination of the individual’s own interest to those of the nation”...Schoolchildren are told: “Every Turkish citizen is a willing, fearless soldier in our army which protects the independence and integrity of the country...Our army is the symbol of our national unity and the guarantee of our future, which fulfils its duty to the letter” (2001: 11-3).

It has been argued that a chief reason for the relative weakness of the civil society is a historically attained detachment between the centre and periphery in the Ottoman and Turkish socio-political system (Mardin, 1990: 35-77). Ottoman-Turkish political development showed a particular trend that differed from the European ‘state societies’ where the state developed
alongside society with an often conflictual interaction pattern with such peripheral or alternative authority structures as landed interests or bourgeoisie (Heper, 1992b: 148-9; Mann, 1988). Ottoman-Turkish political rulers were conquerors rather than members of patrician, patrimonial, tribal or feudal families (Heper, 1992b: 148-9). Hence, since the Ottoman era the hierarchical, patrimonial and vertical social structure in Turkey lacked functional, differentiated and antagonistic socio-economic strata or classes, gathered around common goals for the promotion of conflicting interests (Sozen and Shaw, 2003).

In all, the composition of the domestic-political structure consisted of a weak civil society vis-à-vis the strong state (Heper, 1992b). While the 'strong state tradition' did not spell the doom of civil society, it rendered weak the influence of societal actors in effectively pressing their demands upon the decision-making process. Undoubtedly though, the 'strong state tradition' has on the whole bedeviled the development of a public outcry against the undemocratic security discourses and practices of the state elites.

The Challenge of Islamic Political Parties

Since the mid-1990s, the most significant social problematic of security governmentality concerned the role that political Islam has come to play in Turkish politics. Any investigation of the visibility of security governmentality should take into account the most troubling issue for the state, which is political Islam. In addition to the Kurdish ethno-cultural reawakening in the 1980s, political Islam with the emergence of two ruling Islamist governments has come to dominate the official agenda as the most pressing crisis facing state security in the 1990s and the 2000s (Carkoglu, 2004). Political Islam figured predominantly in the state security discourse as the existentially threatening vestiges (*mustehase*) of a past Turkey must have long left behind (Yegen, 1999a; Yavuz, 2000b).

Such hostility towards political Islam derives from the fact that the idea of the territorially delimited 'ideal society' (see Chapter 5) has largely denied much space to alternative identities and civil rights. This was basically because Turkish nationalism embraced unity, cohesion, solidarity and homogeneity and opposed all types of cosmopolitanism (Akural, 1984: 130). In other words, because the 'Turkish Nation' is held to denote all the citizens within the political boundaries of the state the outcome was an outright dismissal of the recognition of the ethnic and/or religious demands for recognition of the citizens (Yegen, 2004). However, the accelerated incorporation of Turkey in the global capitalist economic
order in the early 1980s brought in cultural diversification and emboldened political demands for representation (Onis, 1997; Gulalp, 1997a; 1997b).

The liberalization process of the 1980s involved import and export facilitations, a greater role for the private sector, debt management programs and so forth (Aricanli and Rodrik, 1990; Baysan and Blitzer, 1990). Thereafter and contrary to the official representations of the ‘Turkish Nation’ in the 1990s the state citizenship norms based upon secularist and nationalist ideology were increasingly challenged by political-Islamic and Kurdish-ethnic revivalism in society and polity (Yavuz, 2000a; 2000b). From this period onwards a struggle and confrontation between the Kemalist state identity of secularism-nationalism and Islamism-ethnic secessionism ensued (Taspinar, 2004; Tank, 2005). It is this resultant sociopolitical power contention that added new constitutive components into the state security discourse. Unlike the Cold-War based geo-strategic and inter-state threat discourse of the state (Erguvenc, 1998: 35), the 1990s saw certain domestic socio-political actors as ‘security threats’ (Jenkins, 2001: 48).

Of particular significance was the ‘Islamist threat’. The state elites seemed apprehensive and troubled with the rise of the Islamic social and religious orders and economic forces such as MUSIAD that made a dramatic re-entry into the Turkish political arena especially since the mid-1990s through the electoral successes of the Refah (Welfare) and later AKP (Justice and Development) party in the early 2000s (Bugra, 1998: 533-4; Cizre, 2003). This anxiety of the state was not simply related to the party’s alleged counter-revolutionary discourse since they have been acting in accordance with the constitutional boundaries of the political game. Their discourse was not ‘anti-systemic’ but rather related to their politically unprecedented successes in national elections (Yavuz, 1997a; 2003). They were legally legitimate political expressions of a broader social base, which was formed against the perils of urbanization and the secularist policies of the state (Gulalp, 1995: 54-6).

The successful cultural and political expression of these Islamic sensitivities in 1990s was made possible basically by ‘the popularization of knowledge through mass communication...by a new class of intellectuals based in the print and the electronic media, and of the party’s internal organizational flexibility and ideological presentation of the

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5 MUSIAD is an umbrella organization for Islamic-oriented business groups estimated to control ten percent of Turkey’s trade (Shankland, 1999: 172).
“just order” (Yavuz, 1997a: 66-7). The latter’s sustained, moderate and gradual inclusion of some of excluded groups such as Islamists (and some Kurds) by addressing their economic, social and cultural demands through political participation offered a new political community and a language of communication for voicing discontent (Yavuz, 1997a: 75). As Kamrava argued:

With a populist image, a vaguely Islamic platform, and an impressive organizational set-up actively trying to attract members and supporters, the party largely succeeded in distinguishing itself from the rest of the field (1998: 276).

When this Islamic language of discontent attracted masses and yielded the most dramatic electoral successes in the form of an Islamist-led coalition government in the summer of 1996 and later as a single party power in the Autumn 2002, the secularist alarm bells went off. Indeed, the obstinate policy of disallowing any kind of public discussion let alone representation has forced the state elites to address this question simply as ‘security problem’ (Yavuz, 2000b; Cizre, 2003). The military-dominated state elites denied the existence of cultural and religious dimension of political Islam (Yavuz, 2000a). However, despite this denial they never ceased to ‘think’, ‘speculate’, and ‘speak’ on these questions by generating their own distinct approach in which these groups appeared as ‘backwards bandits’ ‘sheikhs’ and ‘secessionists’ (van Bruinessen, 1988: 40; Yegen, 1999b: 555). This contradistinction was basically because the political role Islam plays in Turkey is at odds with the dearly held and strictly interpreted principle of secularism of the Turkish state. Within this context, secularism has increasingly found its place in the Turkish state discourse as a security issue in the 1990s and the 2000s (Cizre, 2003; Tank, 2005). The main reason for this was the re-emergence of Islam in public space as an unprecedented political force in the country, as Yavuz argued:

In spite of the state-led secularization policy, Islam has remained a depository for regulating day-to-day social life for the masses...the republican goal of secularization has met with opposition. Its advocates did not take into account that Islam is socially embedded in various forms of social life and is more conducive to mass mobilization than either nationalism or socialism because of its flexible networks system, norms and symbolic value (1997a: 64-5).

The security-driven anxiety of the state vis-à-vis the Refah phenomenon was related to the most distinguishing feature of the Refah politics, namely its ability to challenge the established status quo and norms of secularist and nationalist political platform (Gulalp, 1997). These challenges were quite alarming for the secularist-nationalist republican state
elites, who believed that the party’s ‘real’ intention was to topple the republican regime (Bugra, 1998: 534). Further alarming for the state was a new legal order proposed by the Refah’s intellectual circles that would be based on ‘multiple legal orders’ in order to grant every existing community the right to perform and implement their own laws and conventions within respective legal systems (Cinar and Kadioglu, 1999). This was adopted in the 1993 party convention and advocated a relaxation of the role and a reformulation of the state’s most valued principles, namely secularism (Yavuz, 1997a). To this end, the Refah proposed in parliament a constitutional amendment to the principle of secularism. In the fiery words allegedly of the party leader, Necmettin Erbakan later claimed ‘it should never be forgotten that democracy is a means, not an end. The real end is the creation of a felicitous order [Saadet Nizami]’ (quoted in Gulalp, 1995: 56).

Furthermore, in contradiction to the established western oriented foreign policy of the state, the Refah party leadership after coming to power paid its first critical international visits to two most notoriously ‘anti-systemic’ states in the region, namely Libya and Iran (Salt, 1999: 73). At the domestic level, these visits were interpreted by many secularist state elites as revealing the ‘real intention’ of the party to align itself with the Islamic world instead of the established state policy of western alignment. Many secularist state elites observed these two visits as open revelation and reception of Turkey’s political Islam at the national and international scene (Akpinar, 2001). These and other foreign policy initiatives of the Refah were ‘eye-opener’ to secular circles, which then refused to come to terms with this brand of politics and rather chose to frame it as a security problem.

With the crucial local and general elections in mid-1990s the Islamists demonstrated an ability to package their cultural, political and economic messages and party programs as constituting the single most eminent alternative position on the political arena fraught with corrupt mainstream parties (Carkoglu, 2004: 112). The Islamist social bases were represented by the elites with divisive and sharp dichotomies that gave the impression of an upcoming battle that reflected potentially explosive cleavages between Islamists and secularists (Carkoglu, 2004: 111). The dramatic political expression of these cleavages has been made particularly evident after two electoral successes of the Islamists in 1995 and 2002 by the Refah and AKP respectively (Sabah, 04 October 2002, p.1; Radikal, 04 October 2002, p.1; Yeni Safak, 04 October 2002, p.1). At issue in the confrontation between the Islamist political elites and the secularist state elites has been a wide gamut of social, economic and political matters, as
Carkoglu puts it:

The front line of this secularist vs. pro-Islamists confrontation is quite wide, ranging from a debate around the ban on turbans and headscarves in universities to religious education in the country, from Islamic principles in the economy to Turkish foreign policy towards Middle Eastern countries (2004: 111).

The success of the Islamist Refah and later of the more moderate AKP demonstrated that although the secular state identity remained as an organizing principle of the polity, it rather fell short of serving as a homogenizing normative force within Turkish society (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xxii-xxvi). Instead of secularist identity the Islamist socio-economic groups were able to establish themselves outside the public space at the expense of their political representation (Cakir, 1990: 148-217; Bugra, 1998: 533). They carved out an influential space first in the some societal establishments and then the political scene, through voicing the dissent and demands of their repressed Islamist identities under the secularist regime (Ayata, 1996).

To sum up: the social and political visibility of religious discourses and practices in security governmentality has been represented by the state not as occurrences of freedom of expression of individual pious citizens, nor as stemming from religious obligations or personal choice; on the contrary, they have been seen as devious assaults and political attempts to rewrite the 'imagined cerography' of the secularist public space (Gole, 2002: 180-4). For that reason, the state elites concerned with security governmentality have received alternative cultural and religious sensibilities as political rather than cultural-religious practices and most significantly as 'security threats' to the foundations of the Turkish state (Dewey, 1997: 12; Ayata, 2004). In brief, security governmentality has construed the religious sensibilities of the citizenry in security language and has denounced them as 'security threats' (Savas, 2001b: 257-74).

2.5. LEGAL ASPECTS: STATUS AND CAPABILITIES

The combination of the aforementioned historical, institutional, socio-political conditions has helped provide the backdrop of security governmentality. The latter, however, cannot be thought about without the legal texts that constituted the basis of the state security discourses and practices against the domestic dissent. There has been a palpable legal base to the
visibility dimensions of security governmentality, which is effectively wedded to the security discourses and practices of the state. In the recent past, the legal sources of security governmentality have come to construe the public visibilities of Islam as illegitimate political reactions and 'domestic threats' to the state security. The basic condition of possibility for such a threat construction has been a particular legal-constitutional security discourse. It is partly due to the latter that 'public Islam' appears an 'outcast element' in an otherwise 'ideal society', which supposedly has faced a 'political subversion' or even 'regime change' by the political Islamists (for such a state view see, Savas, 2001a; 2001b). Over the years these legal texts have served for the military led state elites as pretexts of denial of a more pluralist public space that could accommodate various ethnic, cultural or religious demands for recognition.

The political nature of security governmentality is thus based on the above-mentioned historical imbalance in state-society relations. This politics is vitally shored up by certain legal and institutional mechanisms that have enabled the military-the main protagonist and guardian of the state-to upset the variegated social demands staged on the political scene (Jacoby, 2004a: 127-54; Demirel, 2004b: 345-79). These texts have enabled the most decisive political power-base of the military in security governmentality: to shape and shove the decisions of elected governments in according with its own ideological persuasion-and without staging military coups d'état (Insel, 1997: 16; Sevinc, 2000: 64). What are the sources and means of these undemocratic political capacities of the military in expanding the concept of national security?

As explained above, the military acquired its moral and political power by representing itself as protecting the generic 'state values' against parochial and 'debilitating' political interests. The military's historically acclaimed 'role' of protecting the state from external and internal dissenters however led to an acute differentiation between state interest and political interests (Insel, 2004: 43-6). Significantly, this dual political reasoning (i.e. state interests vs. political interests) was conveniently equipped with the relevant legal and constitutional sources by invoking certain concepts, institutions and politics of security. Consequently, although the military remained 'notionally subordinate' to the political authorities and its decisions has not been immediately legislated and implemented by the civilian authorities; the military nonetheless could still intervene into daily politics (Bayramoglu, 2004: 113). This was done by either presenting the governments 'with detailed draft of measures' or by issuing guidelines/publicly expressed opinions in order to restrict and/or confine certain governmental

How Does the Military Influence Domestic Politics? Legal Status and Political Capacities of Security Governmentality

It is possible to describe the 1990s as the formative years of security governmentality. This was facilitated mainly by the initiatives of the military. The military in this period steadfastly and expansively defined domestic ‘security threats’ so as to include not only territorial defense or political and economic interests but also crucially the preservation of Kemalist legacy especially against perceived dangers to the secular character of the regime (Sarlak, 2004: 287-93; Kardas and Kucuk, 2004). So much so, that the military commanders have come to hold that the ‘importance of our army is increasing because of those who are against the republic, democracy and secularism’ (quoted in Cizre, 2003: 213). The justification for upholding counter-measures against such ‘security threats’ to the ‘secular nature’ of the state was given by one of the architects of ‘28 February Process’ (see Chapter 4), the hawkish Commander of Navy Admiral Guven Erkaya stated that:

- The 12 September military coup [makers] theorized on the assumption that [because as an enemy ideology of the state] communism rejected religion, [they should] encourage the public to reclaim their religious credentials [to dissuade the threat of communism]. This helped generate an imbalance [tilting towards increasing general religiosity] and inadvertently led to the establishment of an environment conducive to the efforts of those people to cunningly capitalize on the religious feelings of the public (quoted in Baytok, 2001: 226).

As further explained in Chapter 4, in order to thwart the ‘anti-secularist threats’ to the state the military has utilized its ‘moral authority’ and high public esteem when it needed to ensure that its securitization attempts (i.e., to galvanize public opinion to apply pressure on the governments on the basis of its perceived threats to the secular nature of the state) would get political authorization by the civilian counterparts. As explained in Chapter 4, the military shrewdly resorted to its media savvy techniques through which it publicized its expressions of security concerns in both public speeches and ‘carefully prepared on or off the record briefings to selected journalists’ (Jenkins, 2001: 49; Akpinar, 2001: 229-32; Cevizoglu, 2001: 15-18).
Crucially, it should be noted that in addition to its public prestige and 'moral authority' (origins of which are explained above), the military’s political weight and role in policy formulation also derived from its legal-statutory powers, responsibilities and obligations and formal institutional channels such as the NSC and other state bureaucracy (Bayramoglu, 2004: 82-97). In other words, the military has been able to utilize not only official security platforms such as the NSC to influence governmental policy making and impress its decisions over the political bodies, but also its legal-constitutional capacities in the name of state security (Cizre, 2003). Although the military is careful not to bypass at will the promulgation of legislation and intervene in such governmental policy areas as the economy, in other areas it has been able to discharge its capacity to influence politics either through formal channels such as its wide-ranging definition of ‘national security’ or informal channels such as the affirmative mainstream media coverage (see Chapter 4). As Jenkins’ (2001) and Bayramoglu’s (2004) comprehensive surveys demonstrated there have ordinarily been a set of main laws pertaining to the status and legal responsibilities of the military that have enhanced its political profile. Here it is pertinent to mention these basic sources:

The Turkish Constitution

It should be emphasized that the security discourses bear a deep imprint of the ‘basic goals and duties of the state’, which are expressed by Article 5 of the Constitution as ‘to protect the independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the republic and democracy, and to provide for the prosperity, peace and happiness of individuals and the society’. Additionally, Articles 2, 4 and 24 refer to the secular character of the state and posit it as an unchangeable component of the Constitution. Article 24 states:

No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental social, economic, political and legal order of the State on religious tenets (www.tbmm.gov.tr).

These legal bases are interpreted as ‘of great importance from the aspect of internal security’ and the emphasis on the prosperity of the state is affixed to ‘national interests’. The latter is defined as those interests pertaining to the ‘Eternal Existence of the State and the Prosperity of the Nation’ and expected to be achieved through national objectives as guaranteed by the

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6 The military however did enter the sphere of business and industry as exemplified in the experience of OYAK. The latter is an acronym for Army Mutual Assistance Association. OYAK was active especially in the automotive industry (see Jacoby, 2003; 2004).

Until various amendments on 17 October 2001 and 22 May 2004 due to the EU reform process (see the changes in www.tbmm.gov.tr) the Constitution of 1982-introduced by the NSC during a period of military rule-has served to ensure a Kemalist political worldview (see Chapter 3) protected by the military and other security forces in which the idea of a sanctified and militarized state, and an authoritarian mentality of rule were legitimized (Bayramoglu, 2004: 82-4). Article 13 restricted fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals because of the concerns over the security of the state (Bayramoglu, 2004: 83). Other areas such as education policy were also affected by the restrictive nature of the constitution, for instance, Article 131 of the constitution granted the Chief of Staff the right to nominate his own candidates for membership of the Higher Education Council (YOK). This military member of YOK was to ensure whether the curriculum of higher education (e.g., university education) conformed to Kemalist principles (Jenkins, 2001: 44).

*The National Security Concept*

An all-embracing definition of national security serves as the most effective technique of discourse control in security governmentality. It consists of the relevant legal source for the state intervention in politics, potentially criminalizing certain public and private conducts (Yavuz, 2000b). The concept of national security legitimizes, and provides content and direction for the influential National Security Council's decisions (Yucel, 2002: 11). The concept is so extensively defined in the constitution and other relevant formal texts that it is 'often difficult to find any issue that in one way or another does not fall within the National Security Council's prerogatives' (Ozcan, 2002: 25). Article 2a of the National Security Council Law of 1983 (No.2945) stands as testimony to this broad definition, it declares that

National security means the defense and protection of the state against every kind of external and internal threat to the constitutional order, national existence, unity, and to all interests and contractual rights in the international arena including in the political, social, cultural and economic spheres.

The other formal texts also underline similar definitions. For instance, national security is defined in another official text as 'the protection and maintenance of the state's constitutional order, national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests on an international level, and contractual law against any kind of internal and foreign threat' (*White
Here, it is significant to note that this definition is provided exclusively by the military and that it is also legally binding as in the Act on the 'National Security Council and National Security Council General Secretariat', which is dated 9 December 1983 (White Paper: Defense, 1998: 12). The National Security Policy is described in the same Act as 'a policy covering the principles of the internal, foreign and defense patterns of behavior determined by the Board of Ministers within the views set by the National Security Council with the aim of ensuring national security and achieving national objectives' (White Paper: Defense, 1998: 12-13).

There also exist additional constitutional sources that make provision for this broad understanding of security. For instance and in line with this wide-ranging scope of the national security concept, Article No. 5 of the 1982 Constitution declares that: 'The state’s main objectives and obligations are to protect and maintain the independence and integrity of the Turkish nation, the indivisibility of the country, the republic and the democracy to ensure the prosperity, peace and happiness of the individuals and society' (Turkish Constitution, www.mfa.gov.tr). Additionally, as another article that is often cited as the source of the main NSC decisions, Article No. 24 states: 'No one can exploit or misuse religion, religious feelings or things considered religious in whatever form or amount with the aim of making the basic social, economic, political or legal order of the state dependent on religious rules for political or personal interests or to exert influence' (Turkish Constitution, reached at www.mfa.gov.tr).

It is evident from the scope of the above definitions that the breadth of both the national security concept and policy is wide-ranging. This scope bears both external and internal dimensions. The external dimension of the traditional understanding of security such as the protection of the territorial integrity, non-interference into domestic affairs and indivisibility of the state are already ascertained in the legal discourse of security. Decisively, these traditional security concerns over external matters are rigorously accompanied by internal-domestic security concerns such as preserving the Turkish state’s ideological pillars of nationalism and secularism.

The National Security Policy Document

Turkey’s national security concept is formally called the ‘National Military and Security Concept’, which is contained in the National Security Policy Document (NSPD) (Cizre, 2003: 72).
221). The NSPD provides another influential formal instrument for state intervention into the public and private conduct of the citizenry (Bayramoglu, 2004: 89). The NSPD is ostensibly a 'classified' document that singles out the internal and external threats to the state security and is prepared by the NSC secretariat that reflects the evaluation of the policy goals by the military (Jenkins, 2001: 41). As Ozcan avers, the NSPD technically;

lists the [domestic and external] threats to national security, sets out priorities, lays down policy guidelines, and provides a detailed framework of foreign and security policies for governments and state institutions ...tells governments to formulate these policies in the [context of] views determined by the National Security Council...No government can pursue a policy that contradicts the document, which was concluded without any parliamentary debate, classified as top secret, and retained by the NSC secretariat. This authority has been underscored by other legal arrangements having the force of law, such as government decree No. 174-176, which stipulates that all ministries carry out their services in compliance with the national security policy documents (2002: 28).

Revealingly, after its preparation, the NSPD is not presented to the parliament for ratification but sent to the National Security Council for approval (Jenkins, 2001: 41). Once approved by the National Security Council, a ratifying decree without indicating its content is presented to the Council of Ministers for signature after which follows its publication in the Official Gazette (Jenkins, 2001: 47). The Turkish military is here as well actively involved in the preparation of the NSPD, because it is essentially tasked with and held responsible for not only defending the external boundaries of the country but also for the ideological nature of the regime basically defined in the constitutions as secularism and nationalism (Yucel, 2002: 12; Hale, 1994: 80).

To this aim and from 1963 onwards, the military has primarily determined the content of the NSPD, which is regularly updated every five years or sooner if necessary (Jenkins, 2001: 42). Initially, the security threats were defined chiefly in line with the international context of the Cold War targeting the Soviet Union. In 1992 and for the post-Cold War era, Greece and Middle East were instead named as the main security threats. Most significantly, the NSPD was amended in 1997 with a view to reordering the internal and external threats catalog under the light of the new developments such as the coming to the power of the Islamic coalition government of the Refah Party in June 1996 as discussed in Chapter 5. According to this new NSPD, which remains in effect, the military defined foreign threats as Greece and the southern flank (Syria and Iraq), whereas it named the domestic threats as Islamic
Fundamentalism, Kurdish Separatism and Organized Crime. The crucial change here was that unlike the 1992 NSPD, which named Kurdish separatism as the primary domestic threat, the military named the religious fundamentalism as the ‘primary threat’ (Sevinc, 2000: 67, ft. 16).

The NSPD has thus been one of the most resourceful and fervent techniques of political intervention in security governmentality. The NSPD provides direction and content to the foundation of Turkey’s security politics. The document is purportedly classified and is normally not open to public inspection to the effect that it is sometimes nicknamed as the ‘Red Booklet’ indicating its nub and significance through the red color (Ozcan, 2002: 28). Due to the secrecy and lack of democratic scrutiny surrounding its preparation, the NSPD is also called a ‘secret constitution’ of the state (Hurriyet, 29 August 2002, p.1).

**The Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law**

Another basic statutory regulation is provided by the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law of January 1961, which delineates the legal role and obligations of the military. The law holds the military responsible for protecting ‘the nature of the Turkish regime’, namely the most notable Kemalist principles of territorial integrity and secularism, Article 35 clearly states ‘The duty if the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect and preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as defined in the constitution’ (Jenkins, 2001: 45). As to the method of the acting on this responsibility, Article 85/1 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Directive declares that ‘It is the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces to protect the Turkish homeland and the republic, by arms when necessary, against internal and external threats’ (Tank, 2005: 4).

**The Prime Ministerial Crisis Management Bill of 1997**

On 9 January 1997, the Official Gazette issued a law that has increased the political autonomy of the military (Resmi Gazete, No. 22872). Although it was subjected to the signature of the PM (but not to the approval of the parliament) this law conferred the administrative and political government of the country to the military ‘at times of crises’ (Bayramoglu, 2004: 103-5). The issue at stake was that while nominally remaining under the authority of the PM’s office, the law shifted the role of coordinating and implementing of a ‘crisis situation’ from the Prime Minister to the NSC secretariat and enabled the NSC to govern other state and public institutions in the relevant cities and townships and ‘at times of crises’ (Insel, 1997: 15-8). Another issue was that the definition of a ‘crisis situation’ was crucially left vaguely so
that the military was able to interpret so as to name and target certain social movements as security threats to the state and cope with them in the name of crises management, Section 4/b read:

A crisis includes the existence of all or each of the following situations: malign attitudes and behaviors against the indivisibility of the state and the nation; national targets and interests; violent acts to destroy the constitutionally erected free democratic order or the related rights and freedoms; natural disasters; dangerous and contagious diseases; great fires; important chemical and technological events such as radiation and air pollution; great economic crises; asylum and great demographic movements.

It was this law that conferred extraordinary political powers to the military under the institutional umbrella of the NSC secretariat so that it could make its political strategy in a 'crisis situation' and shape the key 'National Security Policy Document' accordingly (Sevinc, 2000: 64). In a 'secret' internal memorandum sent to the NSC secretariat, the leader of the Islamist Refah Party and then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan has clearly revealed how this bill was equipped with extraordinary executive powers:

Based on the decisions of the NSC and the related decisions of the council of ministers and plans confirmed by the PM; in 1997 the NSC secretariat or the personnel it appoints are given capacity in the name of PM office to supervise, monitor, observe, orientate and coordinate the actions undertaken by the ministries, public institutions and city authorities (quoted in Insel, 1997: 17).

As investigated in greater detail in Chapter 4, the primary institutional channel through which the military expresses its voice has been the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was formed through the Article 111 of the 1961 constitution. It has been a constitutional institution since the 1961 Constitution (Heper, 1992b: 147). The promulgation of the NSC Law No. 129 on 11 December 1962 has formed the NSC and its General Secretariat. The NSC was held responsible for 'determining the internal, external and defense policies'. According to the article of 111 of the 1961 Constitution, the duty of the NSC is to ‘to recommend to the Council of Ministers the necessary basic guidelines regarding the co-ordination and the taking of decisions related to national security’.

As mentioned, the NSC law of 1983 gives a definition of 'national security' that hints at the army's broad policy-making capacity. Clearly, such a definition is immensely broad and can contain literally almost everything that gives the military such a huge power in designating
the threats it sees ‘real’.

20 years later, Article 118 in the 1982 Constitution has extended the power of the NSC in such a way that it has put the Council of Ministers to a position ‘to give priority consideration to the decision of the NSC concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of society’. This was the extraordinary Article 2a of NSC Law No. 2945, which had been ratified on 9 September 1983. It remained in force up until October 2001 and defined the scope of national security in such a way that has covered literally the entire policy perspective. It is in this definition that ‘the preservation and protection of the vitally important values of the state formed by the constitutional order... [are]...included in the definition of the concept of National Security against all kinds of internal and external threats directed to Turkey form the legal parameters of Turkey’s National Security Policy’ (White Paper, 2000: Part 3, emphasis added).

SUMMARY

Following Michel Dean’s four dimensional analysis of governmentality, the present chapter has attempted to understand ‘security governmentality’ and its visibility dimensions. Security governmentality is established through four dimensions: visibility, rationality, identity and techniques. It is in these dimensions that we can examine the political activism of the military and the establishment of a new style of rule or what is called here ‘security governmentality’. Chapter provided a definition of security governmentality as a regime of government and administration that is undertaken by the military-led state authorities and agencies, which employ an array of techniques and forms of knowledge that seek to shape political and private conduct through the identities, aspirations and beliefs of the citizenry. The most visible actor of security governmentality is identified as the military, whose unprecedented political activism helped establish a national security oriented, semi-military government particularly through the systematic process of domestic threat construction in the name of state security.

Secondly, the chapter charted the historical, institutional, socio-political and legal sources of the visibility dimension in security governmentality. These sources have formed and presented an extensive political space for the military-led state elites, who are unaccountable in the democratic political system. In addition, it is in part these sources that bore a tenuous
democratization process, which in turn endowed the state elites with a strong political posture. The chapter also highlighted that since the mid-1990s the state security discourses and practices engaged with the domestic social and political dissenters as ‘domestic threats’ to the state rather than as social and political protagonists. In particular, it is the political Islamic identities in the country that has been represented as ‘security threats’ to the secular nature of the state. From the second half of the 1990s onwards, the state security discourses and practices reflected the context within which the socio-political effects of security governmentality became pertinent.

Overall, the Chapter argued that state security here has charted a course well outside the conventional claims of security as ‘external defense’. For the foundation of security governmentality has basically been the Turkish military’s domestic defense of the official ideology of Kemalist secularism. Indeed since 1997, newfound ‘domestic threats’ to the secular nature of the state (i.e., political Islam) have gained primacy in the discourse of state security over the conventional external interstate security threats. Such a redefinition of state security now covers as many diverse sectors as education and political participation. Thus, the military has been able to assert its newfound clout in Turkish politics precisely through its successful shift of national security definition from external to domestic threats. The most salient ideological rationalization of security governmentality is achieved with the military’s recurrent discursive references to the ‘domestic threats’ to the unity and integrity of the secular character of the state. Consequently, the ‘praxis’ of this justification can be captured by studying the impact of state security discourses and practices on party politics, religious education and mainstream news media. It is the ensuing replacement of the normal democratic politics by security governmentality that should be analyzed in relation to the state security discourses and practices utilized by the military-bureaucratic elites. Accordingly, security governmentality will be analyzed by investigating its constitutive dimensions. The most significant of the latter are rationality, identity and technical dimensions. Part II begins this task with its rationality dimensions.
PART II: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SECURITY
GOVERNMENTALITY
CHAPTER 3

RATIONALITY OF SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY

Having outlined the concept of security governmentality and its historical, institutional, social and legal sources, Part II begins to explore the construction of security governmentality. The present chapter investigates the constitutive rationalities of security governmentality. Its goal is to delineate the broad episteme of security governmentality in Turkey under the two most prevailing aspects of rationality: secularism and the ‘reason of state’. These two rationalities have informed state security discourses and practices at least since the mid-1990s. Specifically, the chapter first outlines the umbrella ideology of Kemalism as an ideational-pragmatic program of the modern state since 1923. Then, it argues that the kernels of contemporary rationality have been Kemalist secularism and the ‘reason of state’. The chapter asks: what form of security-based thought, knowledge, and expertise were employed under the rubric of Kemalist secularism. How has the ‘reason of state’ rationality come to inform the state elites? In line with the governmentality perspective, the chapter aims to show that these two basic rationalities elucidate the underlying state security discourses/practices and related forms of knowledge, plans, visions, objectives, and specific ideals. All these together strive to ‘regulate, reform, organize and improve what occurs within regimes of practices in the name of a specific set of ends articulated with different degrees of explicitness and cogency’ (Dean, 1999: 31-32).

3.1 KEMALISM

It is possible to argue that ‘the ultimate representations of Turkey since its establishment centre around the predominant metaphor in the whole Turkish discourse: Kemalism’ (Stone, 1998: 21). Although much has been written on Kemalism (Landau, 1981), to understand its practical social and political ramifications one needs to stay away from its ideological foothold. In keeping with governmentality literature (Dean, 1999: 23), and instead of reiterating the ideological premises of Kemalism, it is pertinent to begin the discussion by pointing out that the prevalent Turkish state discourse of Kemalism appears less of a unified-coherent ideology than an elite-instigated socio-political project aiming to mould the society into a national-secular political community (Akural, 1984: 125; Stone, 1998: 5; Celik, 1996; Yegen, 1996; Yavuz, 2000a).
The founders of the Turkish Republic expressed their ideological program in the early 1930s in six principles: republicanism, etatism, populism, revolutionism, nationalism and secularism. Together these six represent the basic pillars of the official ideology of the Turkish state: Kemalism. Also known as the ‘Ataturkism’, Kemalism constitutes ‘the chief foundation of Turkish national statehood and appears as a predominantly political ideology’ (Karpat, 1982: 366). Kemalism has helped define the political rationality of the state. The Kemalist movement’s basic tenets essentially arose out of debates and reform currents in the nineteenth century that revolved around the ‘Westernization’ of the Ottoman Empire (Mardin, 1990; Kazancigil, 1981; Jung and Piccoli, 2001). After the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Kemalism went beyond reforming the Empire and took up an outright task of ‘radical transformation of Turkish society from Islamic to a Western setting’ (Toprak, 1993: 630). Thereafter, Kemalism was increasingly described as a programmatic set of ‘guiding ideas’ rather than a thorough ideological ‘system of ideas’ (Dumont, 1984: 25). It consists not only of the famous ‘six principles’ but also a more generic set of ideas, speeches, programs, laws, attitudes and opinions established by the state elites (Parla, 1992). As Zurcher argues, Kemalism is;

[a] flexible concept and people with widely differing world views have been able to call themselves Kemalist...Together they [the six principles] formed the state ideology of Kemalism, and the basis for indoctrination in schools, the media and the army...Nevertheless as an ideology it lacked coherence...This ideological void was filled to some extent by the personality cult which grew up around Mustafa Kemal during and even more after his lifetime. He was presented as the father of the nation, its saviour, its teacher...At the time of writing it is still very much part of the official culture of Turkey (1997: 189-90).

Kemalism is better understood as a top-down elite-instigated socio-political project (Akural, 1984: 125) which 'aims to change some basic structural aspects of the Ottoman Empire so as to form a [new] society in line with the Western civilization taken as the first step towards the world civilization' (Mardin, 1990: 181). Kemalistic principles have been effectively ‘indoctrinating’ the officers and civil servants of the state (i.e. military officers, governors, diplomats and administrators) especially at the ‘Military Academy and General Staff College’ and ‘Civil Service Academy’ (Mulkiye) that still serve to this aim under the new name

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7 Kemal Ataturk refers to the founding father of the Turkish Republic (1881-1938). Kemalist is someone, who devotedly follows the principles of Ataturk: Secularism, Nationalism, Etatism, Revolutionarism, Populism, and Republicanism.
As the historian Erik-Jan Zurcher stresses in regard to these two institutions;

In time both institutions also became the centres of Kemalist indoctrination, where republicanism, nationalism and secularism were articles of faith for staff and students alike—a situation that continues to this day (2004: 103, emphasis added).

The constitutional-legal arrangements provide the basic traits of Kemalism which is taken as sacrosanct sources with a special emphasis on nationalism and secularism (Karpat, 1982: 366). Initially, the defining six principles of Kemalism were singled out under the rule of Republican People’s Party (RPP/CHP) which spotted these principles as the state’s overarching roadmaps and included them both in the constitution and its party programs from 1931 onwards (Parla, 1992: 35-47). On 5 February 1937, these six principles were also included into the amended Article 2 of the Constitution (of 1924) which read: ‘The Turkish State is Republican, Nationalist, Populist, Statist, Secularist and Revolutionary-Reformist’ (Ahmad, 1993: 63).

3.2. SECULARISM

In its most common sociological sense ‘secularization’ refers to ‘the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols’ (Berger, 1973: 113). In this process, ‘a new vocabulary is acquired which provides a medium for asking and answering questions about the meaning of life’ (Lidtke, 1981: 22). These new vocabulary is about the marked transformation that modernization bears on the traditional-spiritual societies. That is, it is held that modern economic transactions by their nature (division of labour, instrumental, competitive, profit and market-oriented capitalist modes of production) lead to the de-theologisation of social and political relations of authority and domination largely by means of formal-instrumental rationality (Kadioglu, 1998a). As the latter develops in the world through a process, furthermore, full secularization is expected to be a universal development, a promise made by scientific thinking and economic growth (Bruce, 2000). For instance, a Marxist class analysis can be a point of reference in secularism debates. From an ideological point of view, Marxism predicts that religious beliefs will be abandoned in due time, simply because religion is dismissed as serving to the interest of ‘vampire property holding class’ (MacIntyre, 1967: 30). More specifically, in Marxist analysis industrialization and urbanization are expected to link secularization to the rise of
class divisions and the concomitant class differentiation in value systems, aspirations and legitimization, which is then expected to produce a non-religious platform for moral justification and meaning of life (MacIntyre, 1967: 30). The secularization thesis aims to shed light on changing state-religion-society relations in modernity. It suggests that with the arrival of formal rationality and modern nation-states, which gradually replace the local religious communities, the role religiosity plays in social and political structures diminishes and even eventually disappears. The religious-traditional order becomes increasingly discredited and instead modern social, economic, health and other sectoral alternative-effective arrangements are accompanied by the emergence of different classes and professionalism (Bruce, 2000). Hence, the relationship between the temporal and spiritual is recast—religiosity is pushed away from the public sphere and confined to private space (Wallis and Bruce, 1992: 8-30). While some political theorists mention the ‘religious bloodbaths’ of the past to view secularity as a precondition of non-violent civil society, others underlie the political advantages of secularizing time which de-links events from pre-set ‘metasocial values’ or meanings attached by ‘divine time’ and instead instills only temporal interactions of speaking/acting citizens, which is vital for democratic civil society (Keane, 2000).

Secularism is not exempt from criticism. Critics of secularism underline the relationship between Protestantism, individualism and secularization and highlight it as ‘a gift of Christianity’ while questioning its thesis in general and the transferability of secularism to other non-Western societies in particular (Madan, 1987: 754). They question the idea that secularism, itself an element of European modern life, is a requirement of modernization elsewhere (cf. Archer, 2001). In addition, other critics highlight the ‘self-contradictory’ nature of secularism in that in secularized modern civil societies ‘existential uncertainty’ replaces religiosity but also leads to personal crises and stress/confusion which in turn invites the return of the sacred (Keane, 2000: 12-3). Some also argue that liberalization and modernization could not erase the importance of the religion in society but might even accentuate a new ‘hunger for spirituality’ in non-organized, informal ways (Shiose, 2000: 324).

Secularism is another constitutive rationality of security governmentality. As regards to the Turkish experience, an investigation of the relationship between secularism and security matters because secularism has been an impending constitutive component of the discourse and practice of state security especially since the mid-1990s when the Islamist socio-political
forces began to occupy the governmental posts. Since then, the dispute about political Islam and Kemalist secularism continues to flare up in the polity in a struggle to shape the basic contours of political and personal conduct. In other words, the recent developments in Turkish politics are understood here partly with recourse to the symbiotic relationship between secularism and the concept (i.e. political security) and institution (i.e. military) of security. Exploring the connection between state security and Kemalist secularism is important also because there is a congruity of secularism with the role military plays in the Turkish politics, which happens to be one of the basic obstacles in Turkey’s bid for the EU membership as argued in Part III.

**The Rise of Kemalist Secularism**

This section explores Turkey's secularist doctrine in relation to state security. It does not provide a theory or ethic of secularism, nor does it seek to find a corrective for the 'dogmas and wrongdoings' of secularism. It also leaves aside vague official accounts of the Kemalist secularism. Its goal is to lay down the domestic political relevance of Kemalist secularism that since the mid-1990s has been a recurrent theme in the state security discourses and practices. This recurrence can be attributed to the fact that Kemalist secularism has been identified with the state itself and as such become the signifier of 'the political' for the modern republic that replaced the non-secular residues of the defeated theocratic-Ottoman regime (Celik, 1996). Here, state security almost automatically enters the equation because any challenge to Kemalist secularism is then constructed as a challenge to the Turkish state itself. Dissent concerning secularism is subsequently securitized by the state elites as a major threat to the state’s political survivability. In this sense, therefore, Kemalist secularism does not attest to an ideal-type Western secularism. Instead of serving as an 'ideal-type' emancipating political ideology, secularism is defined as a discourse and practice of state security.

Secularism (also referred as laicism) is arguably the most fundamental principle of the modern Turkish state (Tachua and Heper, 1983: 17; Steinbach, 1984: 78; Tank, 2005: 4-7). Before discussing its implications, a historical description of Turkey's experience with secularism is in order. Following the establishment of Turkish Republic, and starting with the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the Ankara government transformed a large portion of the Ottoman political-religious order by secularizing its administrative, juridical and educational institutions eventually finding a formal expression for secularism enshrined in the Constitution in 1937 (Dumont, 1984: 36). In this reform process, the Islamic Caliphate and
the Sultanate; the Islamic religious legal system (the Shari'ah laws), religious education including the Arabic script, were all abolished. The free exercise of the practices of Islamic faith were all forbidden in the public domain and only state sanctioned expressions of Islam were allowed (Berkes, 1998: 495-500).

At the time, the main stimulus for such unflinching secularism was to radically transform the political system towards an absolute secular polity and society and to obliterate the country’s Islamic heritage and its Ottoman past and instead implant a ‘top - down’ new socio-political conduct (Okyar, 1984: 49-53). Crucially, the maxim in this transformation was that the insecurity and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was facilitated by the reactions and resistance of the elements of ‘obscurantist’, ‘retrogressive’ or ‘reactionary’ Islam in society to the modernization efforts of the late Ottoman rulers (Heper and Aylin, 2003). As Stirling (1958: 399) highlights, for instance, one version of this view puts the blame on

[t]he failure of the Turks to remain the leaders of the human race in technology and political power on the “dead hand of Islam.” It was necessary only to get rid of Islam and Turkey would rise buoyantly again to world leadership.

Concerns over state security helped inflict a conception of public space where the plurality of societal differences should be restricted and antagonisms (or politics of difference) were to be minimized for the sake of state security (Savvides, 2000; Tank, 2005). This conviction that dictated that the political sphere should be exempt from religious motives or, rather, more strikingly, that religion at best must serve the aims of the state remains alive today (Houston, 1999: 83-98; Tank, 2005: 4). Because the republican state was formed in part by an uneasy exclusion of religion from the state discourse (Hunt and Tokluoglu, 2002), the political order was punctuated by a discourse of transition from a political community of ummet (unity of the Islamic community based on the doctrine of religious fraternity) to the secular nation-state (Celik, 1996: 12). The contradictory result was that this top-down move polarized the social space since secular politics displaced societal elements with Islamic persuasion from the public sphere (Yavuz, 2000a). Overall, this task of relegating Islam from the status of ‘an autonomous positive signifier of the public sphere’ to a negative and private matter was an uneasy and paradoxical process. As Celik argues:

[it]his negation imposed on the public authority a requirement of drawing thorough boundaries for religious practice. Strict state control was imposed on religious
practice. Any attempt to expand its boundaries beyond personal lives was violently suppressed. This, at the end of the day, made religion a subject of state affairs, and its organization a public matter, and blurred the dividing line between the public and private realms (1996: 13-4).

Thereafter, and by implication, (political) Islam (i.e. Islamic principles in law and policymaking) or even any of its variants or derivatives has become adverse for the new republic in order not to repeat the fatal termination of the Ottoman polity. Through this reasoning the survivability of the Turkish republican political establishment is held to be closely associated with the principle of secularism. It was in this spirit that the elites took up one of the first tasks of the modern Turkish state as the elimination of the religious institution of the Caliphate in 1924 as a sign of its commitment to secularism (Berkes, 1998: 467-73). Secularism was crucial for the state elites in so far as it designated the symbolic rejection and end of the Ottoman socio-political system (Tank, 2005: 5-6). Indeed, the Ottoman political and administrative structure was accustomed if not strictly dominated by the logic and practices of Islam, which allowed various ethnic and other group identities to identify themselves as ‘the Ottoman’ (Yegen, 1999a: 57-98). They had enjoyed a degree of social and political recognition of their ‘difference’ within the Ottoman state system because the Ottoman political structures provided a non-national political platform (Yegen, 1996: 216-26).

Towards the end of the Eighteenth century, however, the Ottoman political-administrative system was challenged and threatened by the Western powers. The power relations between the two were undergoing a radical change at the expense of the Ottoman political regime. The latter’s reaction to and remedy for this sweeping imbalance had mostly emerged from the conviction that saving and securing the Ottoman regime from the challenge of the ‘West’, necessitated the modernization of its state structure and adaptation to the Western state system (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 28-35). In this regard, the state’s economic backwardness was attributed to the country’s traditional heritage; progress was taken as a by-product of the westernized-secular state structure, and modernity at large was seen only possible by ridding the republic of its Ottoman-Islamic foundations (Mardin, 1990: 161-180).

The founders and intellectuals of the Turkish Republic were vehemently in agreement with this notion (Tank, 2005: 5-6). The founder of the republic Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) himself, for instance, ‘regarded the form of Islam as practised under the Ottomans as an obscurantist
obstacle to development' (Jenkins, 2003: 46). In their view, it was the religious foundations of the old regime that prevented the success of the Nineteenth century reformation movements (the so-called Tanzimat period) and eventual demise of the Ottoman political regime. In other words, they perceived a close relationship between the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the persistent opposition of religion to the modernization efforts of the late Eighteenth and early part of the Nineteenth centuries. These elites perceived secularism as the critical dimension of the republican ideology (Heper and Guney, 2000: 636).

Later, the discourse of secularism has started to occupy the centre stage in state security and political discussions, and thereby become one of the constitutive components of the state security practices. To this end, especially between 1920s and 1980, the republican government launched and implemented a policy of ‘de-Arabization and de-Islamization of society’ in domestic and international politics by restricting its ties with the Middle East (Yavuz, 1997b: 23). For instance, the Turkish state voted against the Algerian independence at the United Nations, while becoming the first Muslim country to establish relations with the Israeli state (Yavuz, 1992). As Zubaida argued (2000: 71); ‘If Turkey was to become a European state and nation, all “oriental” elements had to be jettisoned or suppressed. Religion was to be purified from its “backward” elements and Turkified’. This way, secularization of the socio-cultural life has occupied a central place in the transformation of society. The radical changes introduced through this state-led secularization policy in the 1930s were attempting to eliminate the reproduction of religious authority in the society by banning influential religious organizations with a view to expunging the Islamic influence from the social space (Berkes, 1998: 483-90). To this purpose, the reforms were an extensive range of various aspect of social life to the extent that it included dress codes. As Helvacioglu writes:

The staunch secularization policy undertaken also in this period aimed to distance both the state and public from the theocratic structure of the Ottoman Empire ... In brief, what is now provisionally regarded as the sign posts of “European Cultural heritage” was imported as a whole sale package by the nationalist forces during the cultural revolution of the 1930s. This wholesale package of European heritage consists of Greek philosophy, Roman Law, European nation - state formation, as well as aesthetic trends including the Renaissance art, “modern” art and literature, “Western” and European films, fashion, architecture and industrialisation (1999: 5).

When understood within this context of forced secularization, Turkey’s experience can hardly be considered as an implementation of secularism designed eventually for individual ‘liberty’
or ‘freedom’ as in the Western experience (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xvi). In other words, while in the Anglo-Saxon European experience secularism was a condition and a means for and a more contented life through assigning a private sphere to religion and its institution and by severing it from the public space, in Turkey it did not mean a Lockean separation of religion and state (Berkes, 1998; Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xv; Tank, 2005: 6) or even a ‘Jeffersonian compromise’. That is, secularism in Turkey can hardly be seen to comply with the Jefferson’s idea of a separation between church and state or Madison’s ‘strict separationism’ (Munoz, 2003a). Nor can it be viewed as identical with George Washington’s emphasis on the necessity of republican governmental support for a ‘pious citizenry’ while still maintaining church-state separation (Munoz, 2003b: 20-3).

In Turkey’s experience, on the other hand, secularism has come to enforce politics over religion in that it has utilized Islam for the political support of the state’s republican regime particularly since the 1980 military coup decided to cement society through allowing and authorizing Islamic educational and organizational outlets (Ayata, 1996; Yavuz, 1997a). This fact alone highlights how Turkey’s secularism has a different take on the relationship between state and religion (Kaplan, 2002). The ‘western experience’ about secularism has therefore limited relevance for our understanding of the practices of Kemalist secularism in Turkey (Tank, 2005). Consequently, the simple official adaptation by the elites of secularism as a political ideology for strengthening the state does not necessarily render a polity and society ‘secular’ (El-Affendi, 1997).

Strikingly, then, the normative ideal of secularism has been rather missing in the Turkish experience. Correspondingly, Secularism in Turkey has been more of an ideological and political authorization and strategy than a practical device at the service of the people. It has become an end in itself. This way, Turkey has become a secularist state rather than a secular polity. Turkey’s adaptation of secularism fitted more prolifically into August Comte’s sense of positivist progressivism coupled with ‘social engineering’ holding that (social) scientific reason will eventually depose religious belief and condemn it to private space (Kadioglu, 1998a: 27-9; Giddens, 2000: 152-61). Motivated by this Comptean reasoning, the secularist state elites (Turkey’s ‘social engineers’), seized the opportunity to transform the society (Gellner, 1997: 243). Hence, the secularization of society and politics was put into practice.

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8 Throughout the thesis, whenever the secularism of the state elites is invoked, they are not understood as a genuinely ‘secular’ but secularist elites.
through a ‘top-down’ process of exercising state power (Kadioglu, 1998a). A Turkish version of secularism tends to be seen not so much as the separation of religion and state but as anti-religious, the limitation-even suppression-by a military-led elite of the expression of Islamic piety (Jenkins, 2003: 45; Yavuz and Esposito, 2003).

Therein, the official state ideology of Kemalism allowed only a facile secularism construed as a creed for the elites, and not an instrument embraced by the people. Specifically, the state elites strove to reconcile religion with Kemalist-secularism as the most valued normative doctrine in the organization of society and polity so much so that they attempted to replace religion with the proto-religious credentials of Kemalism or what is sometimes called ‘Kemalist theology’ (Yavuz, 2000b: 33; Jenkins, 2003: 47). Indeed, the all-encompassing state ideology of Kemalism was attempted to be enshrined in almost every aspect of public life: in the Turkish constitution (Turkish Constitution, Article 2), in the architectural landscape (Bozdogan, 1997: 136-40), in the pre-school education (Kaplan, 1999: 348-68) and in various public rituals (Meeker, 1997: 168-75). In short, as Jenkins argued, Kemalism has acquired many of the trappings of a fully fledged religion...[This] has important repercussions for the definition of what it means to be secularist or Islamist and imbues what would otherwise appear to be relatively minor issues with a critical importance. Almost all secularists are Kemalists. Mere non-observance of the rites of Kemalism (for example, participation in commemorative ceremonies, displaying Atatürk’s portrait or visiting his mausoleum) by someone known to be a devout Muslim tends to be interpreted by Kemalists as an act of Islamic rebellion. Similarly, the issue of women covering their heads has taken on an iconic value (2003: 47).

It is vital to note that this dense representation and internalization of Kemalist secularism is most fervently upheld by the military (Jenkins, 2001: 33-5; 2003: 45-8; Cooper, 2002: 120). As mentioned, the military has often represented itself as the guardian of Kemalism (Tank, 2001: 218-20; Cizre, 1997; Demirel, 2003; 2004b). Especially in the post-1980 military intervention the military has been assertive. For instance, ‘we will insert Kemalism into everyone’s head’, averred Kenan Evren, the former President and the leader of the military junta that staged the 1980 coup (Hurriyet, 31 January 1985, p. 1).

Consequently, secularism has been more than an ideological instrument in Turkey because state secularization has not simply changed the worldview of state elites, but has transformed their political rationality. Secularism marked the end of the horizontal-theological or spiritual
view of the universe divided between Muslims and infidels, and instead opened up the possibility for a temporally and geographically construed, vertically divided world of nation-states. The basic reference was to that of French secularism sparing little or no space for religiosity (Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xvi; Tank, 2005: 6). Unlike many of the Western examples, however, secularism in Turkey did not in practice designate a church-state separation (Thomson, 1957: 37; Berkes, 1998). The outcome was rather that in Turkey ‘the State has been freed from religion, even if religion has by no means freed from the State’ (Stirling, 1958: 399).

While secularization in its theoretical characterization appears as a ‘natural process’ made possible through modernizing practices, the ruling elites of Turkey reversed this ‘causal’ chain and viewed and implemented secularization as a precondition of modernization and as a fully-fledged political rationality (Kadioglu, 1998b: 44; Tank, 2005: 5-7). In other words, the view that ‘secularization leads to modernization’ was taken up by the state elites who declined to see the secularist paradigm as a ‘natural’ outcome of the modern developments described above. In this formula, modernization required the dismissal of religiosity and secularization ceased to be a process and became a model or project along with westernization (Kadioglu, 1998b: 44).

Correspondingly, any characterization of the contemporary Turkish political system as ‘secular’ would therefore overlook inherently problematic variations that the term might bear in the Turkish context. The Turkish state aims to produce secularism and the notion of production highlights how such an affirmative ideological tenet would risk discounting the underlying rationale behind secular practices. A mere textual interpretation of secularism therefore would not easily reveal the intricacies of the Turkish case. In short, secularism in Turkey is not the same as it is defined in the context of largely Western political experiences. What replaced Ottoman theocratic politics has not been a cushy adaptation of the modern secular political structure. The latter can hardly be observed in the Turkish context because of the divergent state interventionist practices in the social and political domains and its reworking of religion in a wider political landscape. Moreover, the Turkish state has for the most part absorbed and used the sphere of religious piety for its political purposes (Kaplan, 2002; Tank, 2005). The state has politicized Islam whenever it saw fit to the extent that some even argued that ‘the lay Turkish state enjoyed greater authority in religious affairs than had the sultan-caliphs in their days’ (Dumont, 1984: 38). The Islamic religion itself became a
program of the Kemalist state which 'tried to devise a renovated and turkified Islam that could help the State to propagate new values' (Dumont, 1984: 38; Kaplan, 2002).

Security and Kemalist Secularity

How can we account for the processes leading to such an elusive and antithetical quest for Kemalist secularism then? After the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and its pertinent religious institutions such as the Caliphate, the Turkish republic has not turned into a secular state proper, as it was expected by reference to the Western examples. In the name of secular production of civility, to date, the Turkish State has continued to have a solid grip especially on how to arrange the space and representation of religion in public life. The main stimulus for this prolonging political patrol over religion and its institutional visage was always said to be necessitated by the security concerns of the political nature of the state. The continuation of this protectorate however was also related to other wider concerns such as the nation building and (non-political) legitimacy-seeking practices for the ruling military regime as particularly evinced after the 1980 military coup (Kaplan, 2002).

State secularity is largely maintained by an interventionist course of action, whenever the opportunity arises. The range of action might diverge according to the circumstances. In the relevant course of action, the state, for example, may limit or execute altogether the activities of 'dangerous' religious associations, foresee the closure of the legitimate but 'threatening' parties, illegalize certain freedoms of religious expression and constrain related human rights (Yavuz, 2000b). It controls these religious activities by institutionalizing and bureaucratizing Islam and strives to manufacture a 'regime-friendly' socio-religious environment by drawing upon educational and institutional techniques such as the introduction of a Directorate of Religious Affairs to preside over all the mosques and other sites of religious activity in the country (Kaplan, 2002; Tank, 2005). For instance, Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution reads that 'religious and moral education will be conducted under the supervision and control of the state'. To attempt to institutionalize religion in such a way shows that 'Religious foundations, education and worship were all subsumed under a state department, what was to become the Religious Affairs Directorate' (Zubaida, 2000: 71).

Although strict official implementation of these secularizing reforms was observed, these reforms did not yield a secular society overnight. Instead, organized religion had begun to lose its otherwise powerful political purchase and the religious affairs of the public were
supervised or put under surveillance from that moment on. The first Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Pasha (Inonu) accentuated this intention in his speech to the representatives of a Teachers’ Association Congress in 1925:

Ten years hence, the whole world, and those who are now hostile to us or who, in the name of religion, are anxious because of our policy, will observe that the cleanest, purest, and truest form of Islam will flourish in our midst (Quoted in Reed, 1954: 270, ft.3, emphasis added).

As a result, the state has exerted control and pressure over religious life to conform the latter to the needs and concerns of the state (Houston, 1999; Kaplan, 2002). Specifically in order to combat the ‘politically potent forces’ and prevent their potentially Islamic-oriented future generations from growing to pose ‘threats’, the state allocates responsibility in this regard to specific organizations as in the case of the Ministry of Education’s scrutiny over (religious) education. All these proceedings were

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\text{[t]}o \text{ direct and partially control national religious life and the certification and payment of prayer leaders, provincial muftis, mosque custodians, and similar persons. All imams and muftis are required to hold a government license, and virtually all of them, except in the villages, are state employees...[the state control] has also been criticized as illogical and hardly secular. Whatever the logic of these actions, they did have the effect of leaving an emotional, intellectual, and spiritual gap in Turkish life which is only now being filled by the upsurge of religious feeling and interest (Reed, 1954: 269).}
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In the 1990s, paradoxically, these strict control mechanisms over religious practice created an increased piety among some sections of the population (Ayata, 1996; Yavuz, 1997a). Meanwhile, the austere and superficial Europeanization not only failed to convey the message of the modern, but even sharpened the traditional-religious sensitivities. The ‘secularizing’ reforms had thus an unintended result of enabling religious dissent to reenter the political scene in the 1990s as in the case of the Refah Party (Cakir, 1994). Indeed, the sources of the dissent can be partially traced back to the reforms, which

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\text{[t]}ouched such vital elements of popular religion as dress, amulets, soothsayers, holy sheikhs, saints’ shrines, pilgrimages and festivals. The resentment caused by these measures, and the resistance put up against them was far greater than, for instance, in the case of the abolition of the caliphate, the position of Seyhulislam, or the medreses, which was only of importance to official “high” religion (Zurcher, 1997: 200).}
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The polarization between a secular culture associated largely with the state elites and a mass traditional and religious culture provoked politicians to capitalize on this differential of cultures that has been under way since the 1950s (Carkoglu, 2004). The resultant emerging political Islamic counter-discourse has then been seen as challenging the security of the form of the state, and, critically, its very foundation because it questions the constructed image if the Turkish state as a ‘civilized’ republican nation-state bearing a secular-Western character. The fact is that the number of such ‘threatening’ groups in the country is limited when compared to the vast majority of other peaceful associations, groups or people, who would simply ask for political representation and a more expanded public sphere for their civil rights to facilitate and exercise their right of religious expression (for surveys see Carkoglu, 2004; Kadioglu, 2005). However, from the perspective of the state even the smallest number of these ‘dangerous people or groups’ active within social and political strata appear as a serious ‘threats’ to the survivability of the state (at certain times prevailing over all other internal-external ‘threats’) (Yavuz, 2000a; Jenkins, 2003; see Chapter 4). Hence, in comparison to the ‘threat’ coming from Kurdish separatist organizations (e.g., the PKK) or Greece, Islamists are viewed as more ‘dangerous’ because, as Houston summarized, for the state the Islamist discourse ‘does not seek to emulate [the nation-state model] but to assimilate it. Its goal is not to carve out a territorially separate Islamistan but to desecularize and re-Islamify everything within the sovereign boundaries of Turkey’ (1999: 90).

To recapitulate, presenting merely the ideological underpinnings and related ideological state vision of secularism in Turkey conceals from view the practices and processes that aim to produce a secular civility in the country by state-imposed means. As mentioned, this analytical approach is, however, not to be seen as a corrective to the state version of a secular society and polity. Instead, it tries to spell out how the practices of secularism relate not necessarily to the Western standards but to a particular rationality that is employed by the Turkish state, and particularly, its military elites. The state in short seeks to control those seeking to ‘subvert’ its very foundations and who/which in the state discourse are often named as ‘destructive’, ‘retrogressive’, ‘obscurantist threats’ to the state’s integrity. In contrast to the traditional literature on secularism which refers to the political separation of religion from politics (Madan, 1987; Bruce, 1996; 2000; Keane, 2000), the Turkish secularism served as a political instrument of the state and a key constitutive category of rationality of security governmentality. Therefore, rather than being devoted to the ideal of human emancipation, Kemalist state secularism was flung into motion through state driven
meddle some social engineering with a view to banishing ‘dangerous’ religion from the political space that over time amounted to a secularist doctrine (Vergin, 1994: 13). Secularism in this capacity has strengthened the state over society and as such it has been the key rationality of government to the extent that Kemalist secularism as Yavuz and Esposito stressed (2003: xvi) ‘differentiated, marginalized and excluded large sectors of Turkish society’.

3.3. REASON OF STATE RATIONALITY

The ‘reason of state’ is the second critical rationality of security governmentality. This rationality refers to the idea of preserving the nature and the very idea of the state against internal and external threats. It is the source of the much-coveted insecurity concerns of the state and as such is a cross-fertilizing and operational thought component within security governmentality. Basically, the political tradition of ‘Reason of State’ (ROS) refers to ‘rationality specific to the art of governing states’ (Foucault, 2000: 314). It was a prevalent sixteenth-century secular political rationality which basically advised ‘the statesmen what he must do to preserve the health and strength of the State’ (Meinecke, 1998: 1). The ROS rationality-as opposed to alternative rationalities such religious and/or judiciary ones-concerns ‘what the state is; what its exigencies are’ (Foucault, 2000: 315). ROS aims to ‘reinforce the state itself, its own strength, greatness and well-being, by protecting itself from the competition of other states and its own internal weakness’ (Dean, 1999: 86). In short, in this rationality the state ‘exists to exist’ and ‘is its own finality’, or ‘something that exists per se’ and that becomes a ‘kind of natural object’ (Foucault, 2000: 408). Once the priority of the state is construed as such, in this context, the aims of the state would appear to be:

[n]ot only the conservation but also the permanent reinforcement and development of the state strengths, [and as such] it is clear that the governments don’t have to worry about individuals—or have to worry about them only insofar as they are somehow relevant for the reinforcement of the state’s strength (what they do, their life, their death, their activity, their individual behavior, their work, and so on) (Foucault, 2000: 409).

ROS indicates that a government’s task is to strengthen the state, which ‘holds out’ and becomes a ‘natural object’ for itself separate from the ruler (Skinner, 1998: 355). In trying to strengthen the state, the statesman is ‘constrained’ in the process by the ‘inescapable’ forces of power and environment. This process strengthening the state is driven by ‘necessity’ or
other power considerations (or 'Kratos'). However, ROS also entails a teleological process shaped by purposes and values (or 'Ethos') in that it serves as a bridge, providing 'the consideration of what is expedient, useful beneficial, of what the state must do in order to reach occasionally the highest point of its existence' (Meinecke, 1998: 5). The difficulty of ROS is that this function of bridging is devoid of easy solutions. As Meinecke wrote:

For it is precisely on this bridge that one sees particularly clearly the frightful and deeply disturbing difficulties which are concealed by the juxtaposition of what is and what ought to be, of Causality and Ideal, of Nature and Mind in human life. Raison d'etat is a principle of conduct of the highest duplicity and duality; it presents one aspect to physical nature and another to reason (Meinecke, 1998: 5).

The ROS has four layers. First and as already mentioned, it implicates a particular function of politics as increasing or decreasing the strength of the state. This function is in relation to both its internal forces and other states in a permanent competitive external environment dealing 'with an irreducible multiplicity of states struggling and competing in a limited history' (Foucault, 1991: 23; 1995: 408-9). Secondly, ROS is imbued with a particular understanding of the relationship between the individual and the state, which is called 'political marginalism'. The latter indicates that individuals are of relevance when they contribute (or not) to the force of state. Individuals here matter only in terms of their political utility. From the perspective of ROS 'the individual exists insofar as what he does is able to introduce even a minimal change in the strength of the state, either in a positive or a negative direction' (Foucault, 1995: 409). Thirdly, ROS implies and legitimizes a particular hierarchy in the political conduct at a state level. When necessary for its security, the state has the 'right' to overrule the existing code of ethics (Sancar, 2000: 25) or occasionally bypass the existing legal framework (Meinecke, 1998: 132). Fourthly, ROS necessitates a certain kind of 'expertise' whose exclusive attributes separate them from other knowledge structures.

The fourth layer is a cardinal aspect of ROS in that it calls for a particular kind of knowledge. An Italian Jurist from the sixteenth century, Giovanni Botero, likens ROS to: 'A perfect knowledge of the means through which states form, strengthen themselves, endure and grow' (cited in Foucault, 1995: 406). This knowledge has to be precise, concrete and measured such that it indicates a kind of 'political arithmetic', or political knowledge of both 'the state and the knowledge of different states'. For the attainment of such knowledge, 'the statesman should educate and form himself culturally for it' (Meinecke, 1998: 6).
It can be argued that the overriding concern exhibited here for the strength of the state and its 'holding out' against internal and external challenges suggests that 'reason of state is intrinsically founded on the problem of security' (Dean, 1999: 87). ROS concerns both relations between states and within a state. Overall, the ROS rationality enables one to understand the logic behind the numerous incursions of the state into the realm of social and personal conduct in the name of security and state strength leading to what is sometimes called 'colonization of the lifeworld' (Savvides, 2000; Bernstein, 2004: 160). In other words, while externally it is concerned with maintaining the strength of the state in relation to other states; domestically it is also about augmenting of the elements and the forces that constitute the strength of the state (Dean, 1999: 89). The existential security concerns preside over other 'essences' of the state such as justice or concern for the political rights of the ruled. The latter are either to be subordinated until 'the State has achieved its first rudimentary objective of becoming powerful' or suppressed altogether. Justice and political rights are not simply absorbed into the 'essence of the State' but have surrendered their 'own autonomy' (Meinecke, 1998: 398-9). Their 'autonomous powers' in turn would be utilized by the various techniques for the strength of the state (Insel, 2003: 135-8). As Dean argues:

What is demonic is the way 'fundamental experiences' of life and death, of health and suffering, of desires and needs, of individual and collective identity, of toil and labour, have become matters for extremely sophisticated regimes of government and complex forms of knowledge and expertise, and that all this is linked to the exercise of the sovereign power of the state (1999: 96).

**Reason of State in Turkey: Strong State Tradition**

In line with the reason of state rationality, the main tenet of security governmentality has been preserving the nature and the very idea of the state against internal and external threats. This rationality of security governmentality provides frames of reference and gives meaning structures to the state and people to grasp past, present and future. So construed, the idea of the Turkish state itself becomes a singular referent object of security. Specifically, 'the concentration of all loyalty' of the state elites has been ultimately on the sovereign (secular) state (Booth, 1998: 52). The nature and the very idea of the state can here be referred to as 'organizing ideologies' of a state, which, as Bužan argues takes;

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9 It can be pointed that many other states might just as well be concerned about the security of their states. Yet in the Turkish case, it is ultimately the concern over the (secular) nature of the state rather than national security that is often invoked.
the form of identification with some fairly general principle, like Islam, or democracy, or some more specific doctrine, like republicanism or communism...Since these ideologies address the bases of relations between government and society they define conditions for both harmony and conflict in domestic politics...In some cases, an organizing ideology will be so deeply ingrained into the state that change would have transformational or perhaps fatal, implications (1991: 79).

It should be noted here though that state security is not associated with 'inadequate statehood' or any lack of natural, evolutionary or teleological process of 'state-building', which should not ideally be distorted by externally 'imposed deadlines', as argued in the context of the 'Third World security predicament' (Ayoob, 1995: 28, 32). Rather, Turkey's security problematic is reflective of the very 'idea of the state' itself. The latter denotes an elusive category in security analysis which represents a rather different configuration from the physical and institutional bases of the state (Buzan, 1995; Williams, 1998). The 'idea of the state' is essential since it makes available meaning for the link between the 'territorial-society-polity' with different historical forms (Buzan, 1991: 85; Shaw, 1993). The latter delivers the ensuing readings of security. Hence for Buzan:

Tracing the essence of the state to the socio-political level gives us a major clue about how to approach the idea of national security. If the heart of the state resides in the idea of it held in the minds of the population, then that idea itself becomes a major object of national security (Buzan, 1991: 64).

As explained in Chapter 2, there is a strong state tradition in Turkey (Heper, 1992; Shaw and Sozen, 2003) and in this sense there has been continuity between the Ottoman and the Turkish state structure (Heper, 2000; Jung and Piccoli, 2001). Correspondingly, it is the unitary nature of the state its public order and national security that constitute the main political values and standard functions of the strong state rather than, say, providing welfare or social services (Tachau, 1984: 59). Any challenge to these values or functions is frustrated by such state institutions that incorporate a strong, centralized, bureaucratized political-administrative structure. This strong state tradition in turn helps deliver a persistent lack of individualism and yield communitarian allegiances shaping around ethnic (e.g. Kurdish or Turkish) and religious (cultural or Islamic) cleavages (Carkoglu, 2004: 111-2). As a result, group identities tend to obstruct more impersonal institutionalized, rational and legal political relations (Sozen and Shaw, 2003). Hence, contemporary Turkish political and social culture exhibits a tendency towards the 'strong state' tradition, which includes, as Tachau argues (1984: 66-7),
The notion that the state is a proper repository of legitimate authority, and that the legitimate wielders of that authority have a responsibility to preserve the public order and promote the general welfare. From that experience there also emerges the notion that the social order over which the state presides should be stable and unchanging, and that there is a natural division between the rulers and the ruled.

Particularly when it comes to matters of state security, the Turkish state and its bureaucratic apparatuses (e.g., the military) are not beholden to the society, a tendency that helps the state elites to by-pass the societal demands (Yavuz, 2000a: 33). The state (seen as 'Father State') is largely autonomous of societal or economic groups and this way it is seen as above 'ordinary' society and the 'mundane' polity (Heper, 1992b: 147). People serve the state rather than vice versa (Sozen and Shaw, 2003). For, the hierarchical, patrimonial and vertical social structure in Ottoman-Turkey for long lacked functional, differentiated and antagonistic socio-economic strata or classes which would rally people around common goals for the promotion of conflicting interests (Heper, 1992b: 148; cf. Jacoby, 2004). In other words, what is missing has been political mediums for pressurizing the ruling elites to recognize and materialize their civil and political rights against the power of the state (Heper, 1992b: 150). Consequently, the strong state tradition has rendered domestic politics not a process of meeting or accommodating diverse group demands but as an institution serving state interests 'like a Platonic government controlled by guardians who personify the essence of the public interest and the approved ideology, who are to be their devoted instruments' and who becomes a normative category in search of the 'right' for the entire nominally 'egalitarian' society (Heper, 1984: 93).

**Political Arithmetic of Reason of State Rationality**

In the context of security governmentality, the fourth layer of ROS namely the 'political arithmetic' of the state can help us to better clench the logic behind the pervasive ROS rationality. Arguably, the 'political arithmetic' of Turkey's security rationality has been best articulated in a book that has been influential in informing the Turkish official views on the practices of its security rule throughout the 1990s (Kivanc, 1997: 27-45; Sarlak, 2004: 288). The book is entitled as 'Devletin Kavram ve Kapsami' [The Concept and Content of the State],10 and published in Ankara by the Secretariat of Turkish National Security Council (NSC) in 1990. The book reveals the logic and mode of thinking by the military on the

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10 *Devlet'in Kavram ve Kapsami* (1990) Ankara: Milli Guvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterligi Yayinlari. The following translations used in this chapter are the author's.
Turkish state, nation, government of state and society and plainly discloses the ways of thinking derived from the tradition of ROS.

One of the book’s premises relating to the ROS rationality is about the teleological process shaped by the values (Ethos) of the Turkish state, it reads: ‘The reason of the existence of the Turkish Republic lies in the eternal qualities of the Turkish country, nation, and the holiness of the Turkish state’ (1990: 16, emphasis added). This commonplace ethereal vision is accompanied by other state attributes such as the administrative-technical virtuosity, sovereign virility, imagery of monolithic-homogeneous nation and its subsequent power. The book makes the relationship between the ‘Turkish nation’ and the ‘Turkish state’ clearer: ‘a real nation is aware of the fact that its existence and strength is dependent upon [its] state’s existence and strength’ (1990: 100).

In the book, the functioning logic of state elites is reduced to finding the equilibrium between ‘internal and external balances’. It holds that for a state to exploit external (international) conditions, it has to have an effective control of internal forces (i.e. society’s constituting elements). In its dealings with societal forces, the state should strive to supply the conditions of an ‘internal balance’; the manner of which reveals the structure of state-society relations. To ensure this precarious internal balance, the state ‘has to seek for and provide a common consciousness, shared attitude and behavioural patterns in line with the reason of state or its ‘national interest’ amongst real or corporate persons, all kinds of official or non-official institutions, associations, political actors, political parties, and the legislative, executive, judicial and representative organs of the state (1990: 47). Devletin Kavram ve Kapsami thus states:

Out of these state activities emerges the resultant ‘national power’. The latter is defined as ‘the total efficiency of the material, spiritual, quantitative and qualitative values, used to meet the national interests and national targets’ (1990: 95).

The book also hints at the relationship between the state elites and the political elites and between democracy and ‘national security system’. It reads:

[t]he research, assessment, decision-making and implementation and other similar activities pertaining to the preservation and maintainence of national security need to be carried out in the democratic and yet in a shorter system with a view to keeping
its secrecy and specialization. This is called national security system (1990: 43-4, emphasis added).

This book perpetuated the very idea of the Turkish state as an exclusive referent object of security reflecting the reason of state rationality since the mid-1990s. The implication of this is that whenever 'the idea and the nature' of the Turkish state is believed to be endangered because of new or threatening conditions, the state existence is protected under the light of the political arithmetic and other three logics of ROS briefly explained above.

The Consequences of Rationalities of Security Governmentality

There are mainly three consequences of the dimensions of rationality. The first is that the pressing issues of Islamic identity claims (such as public visibility) and Kurdish socio-cultural rights (such as the language and broadcasting rights) have been largely denied by the rationality of state security. The latter invalidated and disproved any public representation for the demands of the pious Islamic groups in Turkey. Since the political has been conditioned by a secularist strong state tradition, the frame of politics eventually appeared very limited for the governed population. This led to a more polarized cleavage, which led to the state intervention not only in politics, but also in the multi-ethnic and religious social space in the name of state security (see Chapter 4 and 5). In brief, the ruling elites saw ethnically and religiously informed political demands as simply 'security threats' that had to be de-politicized and dismantled. Denying, for the most part, any political and even social demands tended to galvanize and radicalize the political elite discourse against the state and provide the conditions through which authoritarian state security discourses and practices were reproduced.

Secondly, the secularization of the state alienated the religious sections of the population. In other words, the 'top-down' modernizing-transformation project lacked genuine 'bottom up' social support. The constitutionally established and implemented stern Kemalist secularism generated not an absolute or 'indivisible unity' of state and society but furthered the social and political fragmentations and also diminished the role of the state control over the symbolic reproduction of society (Gole, 2002). Instead of an 'indivisible unity' between the state and the nation as foreseen by the constitution(s), in time, there emerged a significant gap between the ruling centre and the ruled periphery because of the differences in their 'make-up' or 'social habitus' (Jung and Piccoli, 2001). The ruling centre failed to reach out to the
periphery which remained to a large extent uninfluenced by these sweeping changes, as Yavuz argued:

The resultant secular-national ‘high modern culture’ of Europe remains to be mostly embraced by the state-centric elites including state officials, artists, journalists and big city based businessmen. The ruling centre fails to reach the periphery, which remains rather uninfluenced by these sweeping changes. Instead, the republican elite and their supporters choose to cast their internal ‘Others’ by identifying and distinguishing themselves as secularists (laikler) while referring to the masses as ‘backward Muslims’ (gericiler) (1997a: 64).

The secularist policies were developed more amongst the state elites in urban centers and were not fully embraced in more traditional Anatolian social and economic bases whose fervent political opposition was felt more intensely after the mid-1980s (Onis, 1997; 2001). Accordingly and thirdly, the secularization (and nationalization) of public space led to certain confrontations on a wide range of policies between state elites and the general population, which produced an increasing alienation of most of Turkey’s Muslims and Kurdish citizens (Yavuz, 2000a; 2000b; Carkoglu, 2004).

SUMMARY

This chapter investigated the main constitutive rationalities of security governmentality with a view to delineating its broad episteme. It argued that two are most prevailing aspects of rationality of security governmentality: secularism and the ‘reason of state’. The chapter first outlined the official state ideology of Kemalism as an ideational-pragmatic program of the state. It then argued that Kemalist secularism has constituted and constrained the domestic political conduct especially since the mid-1990s. Secondly, the chapter explained the other component of rationality: the ‘reason of state’. It argued that the ‘reason of state’ rationality can be understood by the strong state tradition, which signified the idea of preserving the nature and the very idea of the state against internal and external dissenters and threats.

More specifically, the chapter identified Kemalist secularism as a rationality of governing society within security governmentality. Kemalist secularism served as a lever to banish the religious rationalities from the political space. Rather than being an ideal of human emancipation, the Kemalist secularism functioned as one of the powerful instruments of the state against domestic society. The chapter then went on to identify the ‘reason of state’ as
another constitutive rationality that shaped the concerns of the state and informed its activities. This section also argued that the ‘reason of state’ rationality in Turkey finds its most vivid expression in the strong state tradition. In Turkey’s strong state tradition, the unitary nature of the state, its public order constitute the main political values. Within this context, the strong state tradition endorses and even hypes state security discourses and practices. Any socio-political challenges to these values or functions are likely to be frustrated by the state institutions most notably the military and other bureaucratized political-administrative elites. This is basically because the Turkish state elites have confidence in the Kemalist ideology that preaches unity, cohesion, solidarity, ethnic homogeneity rather than ‘a debilitating pluralist conception of democracy’. This world-view upholds ‘a rationalist understanding of democracy’ that could be ‘induced’ and voiced by those founding revolutionary cadres or other bureaucratic elites rather than self-propelled social change.

Overall, Kemalist secularism and the ‘reason of state’ rationalities are two obstacles, which prevent the state elites from easily adopting a more liberal conception of security (a prerequisite of EU membership). It has been the reason of state and its sister (the ‘strong state tradition’) that has reacted to the re-fragmentation and re-polarization of society along with diverse ethno-cultural cleavages especially in the contexts of the politics of 1990s (Carkoglu, 2004). The relevance of these recurring rationalities within the parameters of security governmentality is noteworthy. For instance, the significance of fragmentation and polarization in polity is not welcome by the reason of state rationality in general and strong state tradition in particular. Because at these times state security becomes the prime concern of the state elites, and the ability of the governments to switch effectively to a more liberal rendition of security problematic is then plagued. In other words, whenever the chronic political instability threatens the principles of the Kemalist regime especially secularism; the discourses and practices of state security are evoked in the form of the techniques of security governmentality, which are investigated in the next chapter.
The techniques of security governmentality refer to the means through which security governmentality is practically implemented. This chapter argues that there are ordinarily two core techniques in use for the state elites. These are broadly named as macro- and micro-techniques. Macro-techniques signify legal-constitutional, institutional and other formal sources of state intervention into the domestic political sphere. Micro-techniques, on the other hand, refer to the means of intervention that interconnect the institutional techniques with state security. Macro-techniques stem from the relevant legal-constitutional texts with ‘binding rule-making function’, and are implicated in the formal institutional codes of conduct. Macro techniques bestow formal authority and practical-instrumental direction for state intervention. The most effective and powerful institutional source utilizing macro-techniques in security governmentality are identified as the National Security Council (NSC) and the military. In course of their interventions into political conduct; the NSC and the military harness the existing legal texts such as the national security concept and the National Security Policy Document. As described in Chapter 2, these serve for the military as a technique of discourse and agenda control in domestic politics. It is chiefly through these techniques that the military-led state elites find institutionally and legally authorized channels of intervention into Turkish politics. Then the chapter discusses micro-techniques that grant discursive passages of intervention between the state authority and individual conduct through a connecting discourse of security. Here, the chapter discusses two dimensions of micro-techniques: securitization as the main discursive articulation of state intervention and the mainstream Turkish media as the space for linking the discourse of state security with the individual life-styles, choices and other private conducts. In the last section, the chapter introduces a case study for illustrating the practical uses of the macro and micro techniques in security governmentality. The case investigates the military intervention in February 1997 or the so-called famous ‘post-modern coup’ with a view to showing how these techniques can be effectively implemented.

Technical Dimension of Governmentality
The technical dimension of security governmentality is of crucial significance since it is in part through these methods that the de facto politico-military regime has been perpetuated. In
relation to the technical aspects of governmentality, Foucault (1994: 71) notes the emergence of ‘the political problem of population’ starting from the second half of eighteenth century that renders the existence of populations as dependent upon multiple ‘artificially alterable’ factors rather than earlier divine laws. This reconfiguration of populations, in turn, generates a space for ‘biopolitics’ of state intervention in living conditions of populations ‘in order to alter them and impose standards on them...through laws, but also through changes of attitudes, of ways of acting and living that can be obtained through “campaigns”’ (Foucault, 2000: 71-2). The attempts to employ specific techniques of governmentality in specific contexts are predicated ‘on a claim to knowledge concerning the character of the human subject [which is] seen as...the focus of instrumental control’ (Hindess, 1996: 115).

In Turkey, the variegated state interventions into ‘ways of acting and living’ stretch well beyond the traditional exercise of state power. The conventional aspects of the latter are normally utilized for penetrating and coordinating social life through ‘centralized, institutionalized and territorialized regulations of many aspects of social relations’ (Mann, 1986: 26). The importance of this aspect of state power notwithstanding, the military-dominated Turkish state elites do not apply their rule over civil society classes and other elites simply by drawing upon such ‘infrastructural sources of state power’ such as literacy, coinage, measurement, transportation of communication and people, division of labor and so forth (Mann, 1988: 5). There exist an additional and more vindictive ‘heterogeneous array of techniques’, which can be defined as ‘ways or methods of intervening in the non-discursive world constructed by political rationalities that work across private and public boundaries to realize, or at least attempt to realize, governmental programmes’ (Sigley, 1996: 459). These techniques are vital components of the study of governmentality. To signify the political importance of such interventionist techniques, Foucault argued that ‘it is the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on’ (1991: 103).

Broadly put in the Turkish context, these tactics or means of intervention are referred to as the techniques of security governmentality. Hence, in line with the studies on governmentality, the Chapter tries to find out ‘by what means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies and vocabularies is authority constituted and rule established’ (Dean, 1999: 31).
4.1. MACRO TECHNIQUES OF INTERVENTION

National Security Council

The Turkish National Security Council (NSC) is the key security institution embedded in the political system. It was established on 11 December 1962 as a result of the 1961 constitution which was prepared under the auspices of the military following the 1960 coup (Jacoby, 2004: 135). The ideational source of the Turkish NSC is in large measure the ‘strong state tradition’ (see Chapter 2), which provides the rationale for creating such state institutions (Heper, 1991). Although its exercise of power reached its peaks in the 1990s, the NSC has a long institutional history dating back to the early years of the modern Turkish Republic, which is established in 1923 (Bayramoglu, 2004: 60). The first historical precedent of the NSC can be seen in the form of ‘the General Secretariat of the Supreme Defense Assembly’, which was formed by decree in 1933 for national security matters. Initially, this institution was formed for national mobilization issues. Later with an Act in 1949, the scope of its role was extended to include the preparation of national defense policy (Savci, 1961).

According to the 1961 constitution, the NSC was legally defined as a ‘consultative body’ advising on the government about national security issues. It was originally set up as the basic institutional channel through which the military and the civilian representatives of the government discuss ‘all matters touching on the security of the state’ (Brown, 1989: 389). The NSC is specifically composed of both political and military members under the chairmanship of the President of the Turkish Republic. Ex-officio members of the NSC are selected from the military and the government each having five chairs. These members are the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the Minister of National Defense, the Minister of Interior Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Commander of Land Forces, the Commander of Naval Forces, the Commander of Air Forces, the General Commander of Gendarmerie and the General Secretary, which is always a serving full general or admiral (White Paper: Defense, 1998: 9-10).

The main task of the NSC is to consult the government on the domestic, foreign and defense policies (Bayramoglu, 2004: 77-9). The internal functioning structure of the NSC is secret and except in rare cases, its decisions are not publicized. The decision-making process of the NSC remains vague (see below discussion) and it is largely through its decisions that the country’s
domestic internal and external policies is designed. Although the NSC was ostensibly set up to submit its 'advice' on national security to the cabinet of the day, it has been often seen functioning as 'the principal decision making body on foreign and security issues' (Ozcan, 2002: 24). Specifically, later under the law of 1983, the NSC was further empowered and turned out to be capable of influencing the political decisions of the country through interpreting almost everything at the table of discussion as a security issue (Jenkins, 2001: 46). The NSC was expected to 'preserve the existence and independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society' (Lowry, 2000: 41). The NSC has been the most powerful politico-military institution in Turkey designed to function as a forum for the exchange of views between the military generals and the civilian politicians largely about the country's security concerns (Jenkins, 2001: 45). State security is put under the responsibility of the NSC by Article 118 of the Constitution, whose tasks are identified as the following:

The national security council shall submit to the council of ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and implementation of the national security policy of the State. The council of ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the national security council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation the existence and independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society (quoted in Lowry, 2000: 45).

The interpretation of the matters pertaining to the 'national security policy of the State', however, was kept wide enough to include 'almost all issues which fall under the responsibility of government' (Jacoby, 2004: 145). Indeed, one factor that stretches the authority of the NSC over other governmental organs is its formal and informal capacity to decide upon a whole range of issues. Agendas of NSC meetings reveal how many otherwise clearly social and political issues are thought of, taken measure against and securitized. In the military-dominated NSC meetings the agendas might have such a far-reaching catalog that it may include:

[i]nspecting education system, stopping the activities of Sufi orders, controlling certain media reports on the military actions, preventing violations of the dress code and practices that portray Turkey as backward, making sure that hides from the Feast of Sacrifice are donated to designated organizations each year, allowing no leniency whatsoever for violations of the Law on Crimes Committed Against Ataturk of for displays of disrespect towards him (Shmuelevitz, 1999: 25-7).
The legally more powerful status of the NSC was later set up by the 1982 Constitution (Kinzer, 2001: 14). The political power of the NSC was furthered by the latter, which stipulated that the Council of Ministers had to give ‘top priority’ to the suggestions made by the NSC (Heper, 1990: 323, italics added). Article 118 of the 1982 constitution obliged the Council of Ministers to:

\[
give priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of the society.
\]

The NSC secretariat (associated with the military flank) has important functions such as: preparing all the agenda to be present at the table, coordinating the government to implement the NSC decisions, and checking whether the decisions are implemented on time (Ozcan, 2002: 25). The NSC secretariat has under its command approximately 350 permanent staff most of which are either serving or retired military personnel together with some civilian bureaucrats, who are used ‘to liaise with and collect information from their former institutions’ (Jenkins, 2001: 51). The NSC secretariat’s monopoly of gathering security related information is an important activity of its permanent staff. This monopoly was enabled by controlling other relevant political institutions and if necessary forcing them to provide the required information in order to take certain ‘financial, economic, social and other measures for meeting the National Security Policy services’ (Bayramoglu, 2004: 95). The NSC’s intelligence and knowledge production was to be aided by such wide ranging bureaucratic institutions as the TRT (state controlled television network), RTUK (the High Audio-Visual Board that serves as the state’s censoring institution over the media); DPT (the State Planning Institution); YOK (the Higher Education Board that supervises universities) and local governorships (Bayramoglu, 2004: 95-6). With all these power bases, the NSC has been the ‘supremo’ of Turkish politics (Cizre, 2003: 220).

This is not to suggest that the military cannot securitize an issue outside the institutional realm of the NSC. Rather, it is to pinpoint that the legal-constitutional framework provided by the NSC enhances the reach and impact of its decisions into the realm of administration and politics (Ayyay, 1978; Insel, 1997). Therefore, while the most notable securitizing actor is the Turkish military, the NSC is the authorized body for implementing and completing the securitizing moves of the military through existing legal and constitutional sources. The NSC
effectively fosters a disproportionate power base for the military over the civilians in security
governmentality mainly because the decisions of the NSC can neither be challenged through
democratic procedures nor can its decision-makers be held accountable to any public and
political scrutiny (Sozen and Shaw, 2003: 109). The elected politicians or the parliament
hardly ever present counterproposals to the decisions taken by the NSC (Ozcan, 2002: 25-6).

Information on the internal decision-making process of the NSC meetings is extremely
limited. Only the summary results of the NSC meetings are press-released. The most notable
sources detailing the meetings are the daily newspapers, which rarely report the details of the
discussions in the NSC meetings. From these sources we know that the governmental
authorities such as the mentioned ministries and the PM do take part in the decision making
process in the NSC meetings, however, it is also a well-known fact that these elected-civilian
members often retreat from disagreeing with the military members of the NSC in the meetings
held regularly every month.

It is a remote possibility that there exists a voting procedure taking place over each issue
(Jenkins, 2001: 51). It is more likely that the military members ‘convince’ the civilian
counterpart of their views. As then Chief of General Staff Dogan Gures once stated, ‘We do
not count fingers, we just convince each other’ (Sabah, 25 April 1993, emphasis added). The
membership structure and informal norms of conduct ensure that ‘the government virtually
never resists given the required “priority consideration” to NSC recommendations’ (Pope and
Pope, 2004: 150). Indeed, ‘governments have never directly tried to challenge the
recommendations emanating from their monthly meetings with the armed forces commanders
in the National Security Council decreed by the constitution’ (Pope and Pope, 2004: 341).
Furthermore, in the decision-making process of the NSC the military members are most likely
to form a ‘bloc’ view rather than having individual voices, which gives the military an ‘added
advantage’ over their civilian counterparts (Ozcan, 2002: 24). Overall, it is held that the NSC
has ‘a dominant place in the policy-making structure’ of the country and as Sozen and Shaw
argue ‘it is well known in Turkey that the views of the military normally dominate the
decisions of the NSC, whose recommendations have always become national policies (2003:
110).

The NSC has therefore been institutionalized as ‘the highest non-elected decision-making
body of the state’ (Karabelias, 1999: 135). It has long enjoyed broad yet astounding legal-
political powers. It has functioned as the dominant decision making body not only in foreign and security policy but also in many fields of domestic politics (Cizre-Sakallioğlu, 1997: 160). The NSC has been the primary institutional conduit which 'crystallized and spearheaded' the military's authority over areas of civilian control and consolidated 'its political hegemony more deeply' (Cizre-Sakallioğlu, 1997: 157). As such, it served as a significant channel of the military's intervention into the domestic politics. Through the enhanced political profile of the NSC, the military has been able to control the political scene and enforce its will whenever it deemed the security of the state was at peril. This way, the military exercised an 'independent political power particularly through the National Security Council' (Heper and Guney, 1996: 620). The principal significance of the NSC for the present discussion derives from the fact that the securitization of political and social issues by the military is mediated and legalized through the institutional structure provided by the NSC. The significance of the NSC lies in that fact that it functions 'as a platform from which the military can exercise its informal authority by presenting the civilian authorities with policy guidelines' (Jenkins, 2001: 43). The NSC gave the military a dual function as being armed forces and an executive at the same time: in other words, through the NSC the military monitored Turkish political life (Heper, 1992b: 163).

The role the NSC plays in security governmentality is, however, more extensive than its description warrants. Although the primary role of the NSC seems to be 'advisory', the military members of the NSC have come to propose, shape and oversee the implementation of policies they 'advice'. The fact that Article 118 urged the Council of Ministers to give 'priority consideration' in all matters that related to the national security policy of the state 'has come to be interpreted as putting even religious expression under the mantle of state security' (Lowry, 2000: 45).

To recapitulate, the NSC constitutes the main institutional facilitator for the interventionist practices of the military in politics. That is, the NSC serves as an authorized institution for calling an otherwise political issue a security issue. The NSC is a powerful instrument in the political system, because it is a constitutionally empowered site for the legitimization of the actions of the military. The constitutional and legal aspects of the NSC indicate that the military adheres to the formal democratic politics and does not prefer to interfere into politics directly in the form of a direct military coup. Yet, it is precisely here that such an NSC effectively substitutes for the crude coups d'états of the past. Partly through the NSC, the
military has been embroiled almost in the day-to-day machinations of civilian politics and acted as an alternative springboard institution to articulate, legalize and justify this overt political function.

**Military Interventions**

It should be noted that partly because of its 'permission' of civilian-democratic rule (Heper, 1992; Dagi, 1998), the military in the post-Cold War era has not pursued a direct coup d'etat to take over the political process (Heper and Aylin, 2000). In fact, even at times when it did stage direct military coups, 'the military did not stage coups to stay in power ad infinitum' (Heper, 1992b: 162-3). This, however, did not mean that the military bureaucrats lacked any aspiration to influence the decision making process (Heper, 1984: 81). On the contrary, as discussed below, the newfound means of intervention (such as securitization and public manipulation through the instruments of the mainstream media) equipped the military with a powerful repertoire and springboard to influence the decision making process (Lowry, 2000: 51-3). This kind of interventionist venture was evinced particularly when the political decisions of the elected civilians were thought of as detrimental to the highly valued rationalities of reason of state and Kemalist secularism (Yavuz, 2000a: 33; Kinzer, 2000: 151-162). Unsurprisingly, thereafter came a long tradition of clampdown on civil liberties mainly because of the military interference in Turkish politics by referring to the 'open threats and vague hint of military intervention' (Nye, 1977: 214).

Even after its political power peaked in the late 1990s, the military has not shied away from intervening into politics. The Turkish military has no longer resorted to an overt military coup established in the form of a classical coup d'etat as defined in the civil-military literature (Huntington, 1957; Finer, 1962; Nordlinger, 1977; Kolkowicz, 1982). However, instead of staging coups, the military has tried to influence the political process to 'counter' the effects of the 'anti-state' domestic forces in the name of protecting 'secularism and national unity' (Narli, 2000: 108-9). Over-concerned with saving the Kemalist state from the challenges of the internal Kurdish and Islamic 'threats', the military has put forward its sophisticated institutional instruments to upset the agendas of the political class whenever it collided with the military agenda of 'saving the state' (Peker, 2000: 80-1).

It is significant to note that despite this interventionist tendency, which mainly fell short of direct political rule, the Turkish military generally managed to stay away from the pulling and
the hauling of the ‘mundane’ political life. However, this observed political detachment has waned, particularly in the aftermath of the latest military intervention that is after the so-called ‘post modern coup’ of February, 28 1997. Particularly from then onwards, the military has been increasingly influential in exerting pressure over the elected governments on various domestic issues that are much diverse and wider than those falling within the general argot of ‘national security’ (Lowry, 2000: 41-50; Cizre, 2003). What are the mechanisms for this military influence?

As the relevant literature on civil-military relations stressed, the bond between the military and the public is enhanced by military service (Huntington, 1996: 11). This technique not only aims to shape a particular breed of political actors in the country but more crucially by finding ‘inroads into the society’ and trying to convince the average individual that the kind of ‘militarist thinking’ about the relevant political decision making item is both necessary and desirable (Mahcupyan, 2003: 56). In similar vein, the individual conformity to the military and its Kemalist rationalities is significantly enabled by the compulsory military service in Turkey (Altinay, 1999: 200-8; Cizre, 2003: 224). In addition to the compulsory military service, the process of molding individuals starts with the integration of militarist values into the definition of identity both by general social values and through state education (Kaplan, 2002; Mahcupyan, 2004; Demirel, 2004).

Another important component of this is related to what is sometimes called the ‘militarization of education’. At a more systematic level of education, the intense inculcation of such Kemalist state principles as secularism and nationalism is provided through a type of ‘Hobbesian political education’ according to which the sovereign needs to educate the subject about how to internalize and conform to the state authority in order to govern more effectively (Kaplan, 1999: 25-31; 347-82). That is, starting with the primary schools, the state controlled education system has enhanced Kemalism and military values by imprinting them into the hearts and minds of the pupils by molding their upbringing through the teachings of school textbooks (Kaplan, 2002; Altinay, 2004: 179-200). This way, the individual male citizen is subject to the various moldings attempts of the state elites, who strive to cajole them into granting their consent for the non-democratic moves of the military curbing civic consciousness about normal procedures of democratic politics (Mahcupyan, 2004: 129-33). Therefore, although these types of interventions overall do not neatly amount to ‘the disciplinary gaze’ for producing ‘docile bodies’ (Foucault, 1977: 135-70), they nonetheless
effectively make inroads into the ‘minds and hearts’ of the citizenry through symbolic and confirmatory education of nationalist-military values (Kaplan, 2002; Bora, 2004).

Particularly relevant here is the ‘National Security Knowledge Course’ that is given as a compulsory course along with mathematics, physics, and social sciences for educating the students about the military service and national security (Altinay, 1999; Altinay, 2004). Since 1926 this course has been a compulsory course to be taken by the pupils in primary and later in secondary schools (Altinay, 2004: 182). The aim is to educate pupils in general Kemalist political ideology (see Chapter 3). The content of the course book is designed and prepared by the Office of General Staff and the course is taught by the retired or acting military officers to educate and ‘internalize’ militaristic, nationalist values (Altinay, 2004: 182-95). If the officer is a retired officer, the attributes of would-be-teacher-officer are to include active participation in ‘military missions against terrorists’. The overall aim of the course is stated in the preface of the course book as follows:

> Because of its geopolitical position, the Turkish Republic is the target of the games staged by the outside [powers]. The Turkish youth has to be ready against these games. Being ready is conditional upon accepting that a secular and democratic structure is the most ideal system for Turkey and being knowledgeable about this. This condition can be attained by not only internalizing [Kemal] Ataturk’s principles on the thought level but also as a life-style... As long as the Turkish youth is aware of the games staged against Turkey and internalize Ataturk’s principles as a life-style, there will be no doubt that Turkey will reach the level of contemporary [Western] civilizations... Then the aim of the national security course is to make the Turkish youth go alongside these two important behaviors [that is, internalizing the principles both at the thought level and as a life-style]. By confirming to the latter two behaviors, the Turkish youth thus will not turn down Ataturks’ expectations from them (National Security Knowledge Course Book: 6, quoted in Altinay, 2004: 184-5, my translation, emphasis added).

In addition to these structural interventions, a more crucial element in the military’s new political attitude has been the particular channels for fusing civilian and military functions from the mid-1990s onwards. Especially since the mid-1990s, there has been a shift in the military functions from defense matters straight into the political realm that is facilitated by the military’s ‘own expanded intelligence networks, political espionage, and counterintelligence activities’ (Cizre, 2003: 218). Specifically and as argued further below, the Turkish military has effectively employed two novel means of intervention. The first was disguised in the form of a ‘public campaign’ mainly addressed to and echoed by ‘the
mainstream media, several leading business associations, labor unions, university presidents and senates, the majority of intelligentsia, and other members of Turkey’s ruling elite [which] created a climate of acceptance, not a negative reaction’ (Lowry, 2000: 42). The military’s ‘public campaigns’ was based on a politics of fear, which capitalized on the secularists’ fear that the political Islamists (i.e. Refah government) would take over the state (Akpinar, 2001: 229-32). The novelty of this style of military intervention was unmistakable in that instead of roaring its tanks in the streets of the capital the military garnered public support for a its vision of society and polity understood within the purview of reason of state rationality and Kemalist secularism as described in Chapter 3.

The Working Groups of the Military
The second novel technique of intervention by the military was the establishment of military units, or ‘working groups’ most famous of which was the Western Working Group (WWG). The working groups were semi-secret branches of the military and established without informing the Prime Minister. They employed officers from all the forces, who were tasked with monitoring, gathering relevant information and devising policy recommendations about the political orientations of institutions and public figures in the country (Lowry, 2000: 42). As regards to the internal workings of these ‘working groups’ in his interviews with journalists and former government ministers in Ankara, Heath W. Lowry finds that

Whenever a particular question arises, the relevant working group sets up a task force to produce a study. Recommendations are passed to the military wing of the NSC and fed to the elected officials for implementations. Whenever the elected politicians move outside the boundaries decreed by the military, they are quickly shown the folly of their errors (2000: 42-3).

More specifically, the military established working groups to acquire relevant information about the activities and outlooks (dress codes) of civilians including the state bureaucracy, business circles, financial institutions, teachers, civil society associations and so on with a view to naming dangers to the secular nature of the state (Bayramoglu, 2001: 297-8). As Cizre argues in relation to the WWG:

It is clear that BCG [WWG] was set up out of the realization that because the National Intelligence Agency (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati-MIT) was responsible to the Prime Minister and police intelligence to the Minister of Interior (in turn answerable to the Prime Minister), intelligence reporting on extreme Islamic activities was bound to be tempered by the more permissive attitude of the civilians. Therefore, the General Staff
felt that it would be safer to set up BCG [WWG] as its own intelligence department vis-à-vis Islamic activity (2003: 219).

One of the 'top secret' reports prepared by the WWG was leaked to the press on August 1, 1997 in regard the conditions of the 'religious awakening' in the country. The report clearly spelled out the military's mindset, which clearly was in line with security governmentality's rationalities of secularism and reason of state. The WWG reported that:

The power of religious organizations, due to years of government indifference, had grown to the point that the forces who seek a return of the Seriat system [an Islamic state] in Turkey had managed to take over key governmental agencies. Further, that if steps to the contrary were not taken, it is possible that the fundamentalists' political wing [Refah] could come to power by itself in the year 2000 (quoted in Lowry, 2000: 46).

Consequently, it can be argued that part of the infrastructure of the military-expertise in politics has been these flexible 'working groups' that are composed of the staff officers, who are able to conduct research aided by the information gleaned from different state institutions with a view to producing 'briefing documents, even policy drafts, on a wide variety of issues' (Jenkins, 2001: 50). These working groups were formed to especially 'monitor Irtica [regressive Islamism or fundamentalism] and devise policy recommendations for dealing with it' with the intention of 'playing upon the secularists' fear of an Islamic takeover of the state' (Lowry, 2000: 42; Hurriyet, 02 January 2002). In the 1990s, the WWG, the most famous military working group, was specifically established to combat Islamic Fundamentalism under the supervision the Naval High Command. Its duties included:

[monitoring not only violent extremist groups but also the Islamist media, organizations and educational establishments and identifying suspected Islamist sympathizers in the central and local government bureaucracies, trade unions and employers' organizations...the establishment of an Economics Working Group to investigate for instance links between Turkish banks, bureaucrats and the underworld (Jenkins, 2001: 50).

In one of the internal memorandums of the 'Western Working Group', the Commander of Navy General Guven Erkaya highlighted the extensive reach of the military into the private and personal conduct of the citizenry:

All the information pertaining to the biographical and political views of the following individuals and institutions in cities and townships are to be identified and recorded at
the headquarters of the Navy Command Office: each and every occupational and voluntary associations, civil society organizations, trade unions, institutions of higher education, governors, student dormitories; mayors, members of city councils and executive branches of political parties and other officials; and the information relating to the local TV stations, radios, newspapers and magazines, and other broadcasting agencies (Intelligence 3429-3, 97/IKK. S. 5 May 1997, Navy Commanders Headquarters quoted in Bayramoglu, 2004: 102).

There are also other branches operating under the auspicious of the NSC such as the ‘Special Politics Unit’, whose under-secretaries produce ‘expertise knowledge’ include ‘social politics, economy politics, education and cultural politics, science and technology politics’ (Bayramoglu, 2004: 96). Another institutionalized branch is the ‘Office of Public Relations’, whose under-secretaries include ‘Psychological Action and Education Secretariat, Print Media Secretariat, Visual and Audio Media Secretariat, Internet Secretariat, Civil Society Organizations Secretariat’ all of which show the monitoring, maneuvering and policy making capacities and activities of the NSC (Bayramoglu, 2004: 96). Thus whenever the military sees a particular security question arising in one of the above fields, it enables the relevant working group to set up ‘a task force to produce a study’ (Lowry, 2000: 42).

What can be said in relation to the institutional efficacy of the military working groups? The working groups’ briefing documents and reports are prepared by blending with other data collected by the state intelligence agencies (e.g., the National Intelligence Service and Police Intelligence Office). These then are provided to the NSC secretariat, which interprets the whole information in security logic, alluded to the present threats to the state (Yucel, 2002: 14-5; Bayramoglu, 2004: 95). The NSC secretariat then presents it to the governments and their political representatives in the NSC.

In light of this discussion, it can be argued that with the introduction of such sub-military units as the WWG, a sturdy structure of a *de facto* dual-track government at once revealed. The political government appeared as an outer ditch, behind which stood the military’s WWG-like units and sub-institutions ‘in which many of the nation’s real policy objectives are being generated by the TGS and its various working groups and task forces [such as] an Aegean working group, a media working group, and an economic working group’ (Lowry, 2000: 42). Without having to bear primary responsibility for running the government and by occupying a key institutional role in policy formulation for certain civilian issues, the military curtailed the civilian authority on the issues it saw as threatening ‘the security of the state'.
Therefore, security of the state was conceived as synonymous with public policy by letting the existing national security concept 'influence' the codification of laws, decrees, and regulations amounting to 'criminalizing certain political activities and constraining public debate' together which 'gives the Turkish military a wide latitude in policy making and law enforcement' (Cizre, 2003: 219).

In brief, it should be noted that the military has successfully adapted its strategies of intervention to the changing conditions of post-Cold War politics. Partly in response to the public outrage in the aftermath of the Susurluk incident that revealed the corruptions in the security forces most apparent in the members of 'gendarmerie intelligence' (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 11-8), the military further changed its overall methods of engagement. That is, in the history of the modern Turkish republic since 1923 the military no longer had to rely on the more crude techniques of intervention into the structures of power such as staging coups at the expense of the elected political parties in power, as it previously did in 1960, 1971 and 1980. Instead, the military transformed itself through the language and medium of the media into a center of institutional gravity, which 'voices' and 'shares' its concerns with the society over such internal political matters. The military through such techniques poses not so much like an opposition party, but rather an alternative government with an alternative political agenda enabled by the generous-affirmative coverage of the mainstream media.

4.2. MICRO TECHNIQUES

Turkish Mainstream Media

Turkey's vast communication space is one of the most media-saturated in the region. It has 10 national newspapers; 20 national, 35 regional and 350 local television stations; 41 national, 120 regional, and 1234 local radio stations (Yavuz, 2003b: 180-1). The political effects of the media skyrocketed especially in the late 1980s and 1990s with the proliferation of new technologies of communication ranging from the press and the broadcast media to audio and the videocassettes (Sonmez, 1996: 76-86). As a result, with the help of the interactive use of telephones, faxes and internet 'asymmetries between the senders and receivers' were reduced as more people participated into religious, civil and political discourse of anonymous public which is less policed (Eickelman and Dickenson, 2003: 3). This in turn helped generate two effects. The first was the emergence of alternative configuration of norms that has either challenged or transformed the existing hegemonic social imaginary and the ideal of public at
large (Warner, 1992: 378-9). Secondly and consequently, the boundaries between the private and public have been blurred. One effect of this developments has been that the open and increasingly accessible modes of communication helped give a lesser degree of state broadcast control and instead diffused 'the normative language of Islam' (Eickelman and Dickenson, 2003: 1).

These developments in media were helped by the era of 'media privatization' that referred to the opening of communication space 'for licensing to commercial broadcasting' by the state (Price, 2002: 93). As the relevant literature stressed, the impact of these competing narratives on the capacity of the state has clearly been a concerning issue for the authoritarian governments (Postman, 1984: 16-30; Corner, 1999: 21-3; Price, 2002: 197). For instance, as a result of and through these communication opportunities the 'Muslim public' in Turkey began to more openly 'challenge or limit state and conventional religious authorities and contribute to the creation of civil society' (Eickelman and Dickenson, 2003: 1; Yavuz, 2003a: 15; Yavuz, 2003b: 181-184; Cakir, 1990: 267-79).

In the Turkish context these developments, however, have not necessarily designated a system of an 'independent'-information circulation bent on capturing the democratic content of politics as opposed to state interests often cloaked as 'the national interest' (Kinzer, 2000). Put differently, what did not happen was a significant weakening of the hold of state security discourses and practices over the social and political agenda of civil society. In this context, what mattered was that the mainstream media often appeared as 'a mere surrogate or alter ego of the state-as was often the case in Russia, Malaysia, and Turkey' (Price, 2002: 95). Indeed, to make sure that the press would remain a 'surrogate of the state', press freedom was put under siege in Turkey throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (Kinzer, 2000: 147-66). As documented by the 'Committee to Protect Journalists'; dozens of journalists were imprisoned for their work under restrictive laws. As they predict:

Despite the recent improvements, Turkey has a long way to go to reach press freedom standards acceptable for a democracy. Turkish law, even under the reforms, still allows for journalists to be criminally prosecuted and imprisoned for their work (CPJ: Attacks on the Press Annual Report, 2004).

One particular reason for this dependent character of the media has been related to the fact that the journalists in Turkey have traditionally acted not as 'neutral brokers', but as
'Jacobinist journalists'. That is, the journalists perceived themselves 'as the guardians of public interest, as they themselves interpreted it' and 'as the holders of the ultimate truth' (Heper and Demirel, 1996: 120-1). These 'Jacobinist journalists' subscribed to the 'rationalist democracy' espoused by the military. According to Heper and Demirel, they

have tried to shape the political regime's policies and the course of events in polity and society by trying to mould public opinion. They looked on democracy as basically their freedom to engage in this type of activity...When that happened they tended to magnify the issue, sometimes to crisis proportions, which, of course, did not bode well for regime stability and for maintaining a delicate balance between political participation and prudent government, both of which are critical for the consolidation of democracy (1996: 121, emphasis original).

This Jacobinist identity orientation of journalists in turn has had practical policy stances in regard to the countries' pressing social and political problems. In addition to the limitations on the freedom of press introduced often after the military interventions, 'a culture of self-censorship' ensued in the press (Kinzer, 2000). This self-censorship put a curb on the 'objective' coverage of such sensitive topics as the religious liberties, the Armenian massacres, Kurdish identity, the cult of Ataturk and the role of the military, which have been deliberately avoided by the press (Alpay, 1993: 83; Kinzer, 2000: 151-5; Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 102).

In relation to the media's role in security governmentality, even a hasty glance at the headlines of the main Turkish mainstream media in the second half of the 1990s would reveal how often private (cultural-religious) choices of the individuals and groups had been presented by these journalists in a security language (Akpinar, 2001; Cevizoglu, 2001). Indeed, the 1990s were a period of the identity-based politics that subsumed 'all forms of class and ideological divisions in identity categories [and] political debate became dominated by the themes of Islam vs. secularism, Sunni vs. Alevi, and Kurd vs. Turk' (Yavuz, 2002: 202). In this process, the mainstream news media contributed to rather than helped redress the practice of identifying friends and enemies of the state (Heper and Demirel, 1996: 118-9). It is essential then to take into account such an alarmist-dramatized security articulation by the mainstream media of the private choices of the individuals/groups. For, the effects of confrontation between the individual/groups of Islamic persuasion and the secularist military/civilian circles are heightened by the media.
It has been argued that the role in memory of photographs/imagery and narratives of 'enemy and friend' is 'more important for their role in priming pre-existing interpretive schema, linking the viewer's memory to familiar news categories and scenarios than their referential or descriptive function' (Griffin, 2004: 384). In Turkey, especially the private TV channelles ‘informed’ the news audience by the seemingly unvarnished narrative and visual images regarding what constituted the ‘enemy’ or ‘danger’ to the secular nature of the state in the form of certain representations of the individual life-styles such as religious dress codes. As argued below, throughout its repeated and enduring representations of its enemy-producing images; the media played an important role in the military intervention of 28 February Process. In other words, the news media in Turkey helped establish enduring images that sustained a ‘dominant representational paradigm’ (Griffin, 2004: 383) with regard to the role of the military, enemies (i.e. Islamists) and friends (i.e. secularists) of the state.

The influence and sophistication attained by the military interventions can hardly be grasped without taking into account the role of the mainstream media. Indeed, the military polished its techniques of intervention over the body politic with the benediction of the mainstream media (Lowry, 2000; Kinzer, 2000). In the process the military and the media have particularly brought into the living rooms of the audience chimerical fears to haunt and circumvent public opinion on the relevant issue at hand in order to securitize an otherwise political problem (Yavuz, 2000b). The media-helped securitizations resulted in removing issues from the realm of politics and placing them instead into the supposedly apolitical security field, which requires the expertise and knowledge of the security actors such as the military. As Cizre argues:

During the 1990s, the secret behind the military’s strength lay not just in its traditionally control oriented discourse but also in the inroads the TSK [the Turkish military] has made on the fabric of Turkish society. In this regard, the military’s agenda has been supported by a media that, whilst formally independent and pluralistic in structure, has purveyed a monistic nationalistic image (2003: 217).

Within this context, it is possible to argue that especially since the mid-1990s the mainstream media in Turkey has helped the construction of ‘security threats’ particularly in its secularist contributions to the ensuing war of words and images between secularists and the Islamists (Heper and Demirel, 1996: 118). This was particularly so between June 1996 and June 1997 when the Islamist coalition government was in power (Yavuz, 2003a: 244). The mainstream
media's representations of the religious dress codes such as headscarf as 'security threats' has helped to 'symbolize generalities, providing transcending frames of cultural mythology or social narratives in which the viewer/reader is led to process and interpret other information on the page or screen' (Griffin, 2004: 384).

Such an approach to the mainstream media indicates that the springboard between discursive and institutional techniques of intervention in security governmentality is partly conferred by the visual and print media. Here, the Turkish media, that is the mainstream media, can be seen as a major crucial linkage between state intervention and individual conduct. To do so, the media literally and visually (e.g. selective photo-editing) singles out, names and shames certain (religious) individuals because of the 'security threat' associated with their otherwise private life-choices such as sending pupils to religious schools, religious dress codes and bodily expressions such as beard-shaving or accessories and so on (Akpinar, 2001: 160-4). Certain religious individuals are represented as 'deviants', who are held as potential criminals by the very virtue of their life-choices that could allegedly subvert the secular 'nature of the state'.

This way, the 'dangerous' private life-styles and spaces were skillfully publicized and carried onto the political sphere by representational strategies of the mainstream media in a particularly dramatized security language, which aggrandized the fears of the secularist ruling elites (Ahmed Ozcan, 2000: 56-7; Yavuz, 2003a: 248). In the process, the media acted not as neutral brokers but rather as an intermediary functional securitizing actor in the various securitization processes. It did so in two ways. Firstly, it carried the messages and images of the 'security threats' to the attention of the securitizing military elites. Secondly and after it diffused these 'security threats', the media circulated the securitizing message of the military for the attention of the general audience. In this while, the mainstream media acted as a 'functional securitizing actor' (Buzan et. al., 1998: 36). In other words, securitization of the individual life choices was assisted by the mainstream media. It provided both the referent object of securitization and the main venue for the securitizing message. The mainstream segments of the Turkish media served as a significant contributor to the securitizing act of the military along with the other relevant institutional actors.

In short, the mainstream news media in the 1990s and 2000s chose to voice a particularly elitist and alarmist-security language in reproducing certain secular, national and masculine
subjectivities. In this process, the related news are made functional for security politics by using an alarmist security discourse as the main medium to understand and color certain policies as security rather than purely political matters.

**Securitization**

Securitization as a technique in security governmentality basically functions as a political instrument for the state elites to intervene into the domestic political and private spaces by blocking or rearranging normal political process (Buzan et al., 1998: 28). This is done most visibly through naming ‘the secular-nature of the state’ as the most reverend and threatened referent object of security. The logic runs as follows. Because the secularity of the state is ‘being existentially threatened’, the survival of the state is at stake, which in turn forces the state elites to lift the related range of policies above ordinary politics and to assign ‘a special urgency and necessity’ or ‘a swiftness and drama high enough to make a point of no return credible’ (Laustsen and Waever, 2000: 708).

In the Turkish case, it can be argued that the securitizations in security governmentality provide and locate the military in both an ontological and strategic space in Turkish politics. First, securitization-moves grant an ontological space in that in these moves the military is represented as the secular and unifying agent of the state. A strategic space is also endowed by the securitizing discourse that declares the military as a means for ‘protecting and preserving’ the policy of ‘the indivisible entity of the Turkish state with its territory and nation’.

The construction process of state securitizations can be traced back to the Cold War period, when the communist ideology was taken as a ‘threat’ by Turkish state elites. Later with the disappearance of the ‘communist threat’, there came a widening distance between Turkey and the Western world in the early 1990s mainly because of the absence of a unifying ‘threat’ like that of the ‘communist menace’ (Kubicek, 1995; Muftuler-Bac, 1996). Short of the latter, the state elites rushed in to point to the new security ‘threats’ in order not to lose their powerful position as security providers in the political system (Cizre, 2003). Crucially, at that time these threats were increasingly found at the domestic level (Jenkins, 2001). These were named as ‘Islamist threat’ against the ‘secular nature of the state’ and in this regard, political Islam was named as the most perilous ‘threat’ (Kosebalaban, 2002). From the mid-1990s onwards, the state’s relations with any government or individual who happened to have any connections with this sort of threat were increasingly securitized.
Since the mid-1990s, the breeding context for securitizing private matters of the individual (e.g. the headscarf as a ‘security threat’, discussed in Chapter 5) is mostly related to relations between the secularist state and the Muslim society (Yavuz, 1997b). It is no secret that historically the relationship between the two was not established on grounds of mutual-identification (Mardin, 1971; Turkdogan, 2003). However, the political developments of the 1990s that saw an Islamist government in power further exacerbated this already ailing relationship and rendered it more problematic (Cakir, 1994; Yavuz, 2000b: 35; Ergil, 2000: 61; Carkoglu, 2004). Consequently and particularly from the second half of the 1990s onwards, the military elites (as the ‘vanguards and guardians’ of the Turkish Republic) increasingly resorted to a security discourse to increase the hold of the state over society and the political process (Cizre, 2003). This led to ‘state interests’ to come before societal or individual interests (Sozen and Shaw, 2003). It is in this context that the military employed the securitization of governmental policies and private lifestyles of individuals as a general rather than restricted method of political intervention in Turkey.

According to securitization theory it is not the case that anyone wishing to employ securitization for political purposes can do so and that there are certain conditions for a successful securitization (Buzan et al, 1998: 28). However, it is not very clear what factors facilitate the process of securitization (Huysmans, 2002; personal correspondence 2004). Ole Weaver asserts (2000: 252) that securitization is not decided by one single sovereign subject and that it is inter-subjective, he goes on to suggest that:

No condition (any number of tanks at the border) or underlying cause (motivation of leaders), not even a solid position of authority of the speaker of security, can make for a securitization-they can only influence a political interaction which ultimately takes place among actors in a realm of politics with the historical openness this entails.

Arguably because of his take on (liberal) politics and/or lack of clarification of what he means by ‘politics’ Ole Weaver’s formula does not help much at least in the Turkish case with identifying particularities of securitization (Johansen, 2001; Huysmans, 2004). The factors he downgrades can well be more than ‘influences’. Following Michael C. Williams (1997: 287-307) it can be pointed out that formal organizational and institutional sources of securitizations can well be seen as more than ‘influences’ such as the military in the Turkish case. As argued in Chapter 2, the military in security governmentality enjoys a considerable
legitimacy unquestioned by the larger society (Demirel, 2003), and consequently its security discourses enjoy a hegemonic status in the public.

Hence, it is worthwhile to note that some of these conditions of possibility for a ‘successful securitization’ exhibit rather different patterns in the Turkish case than foreseen by the proponents of securitization theory (see Buzan et al, 1998: 141; Weaver, 2000: 252-3). The degree of this difference makes a textbook adoption of securitization rather difficult. For the process of securitizing an issue does not merely take place at the political level. The securitizing agency is what makes the Turkish case rather unusual. The most accredited securitizing agent in the Turkish case is a democratically unaccountable security actor, namely the military (Yavuz, 2000b: 38). Furthermore, not only is the securitizing agent in most of the cases the military, but also it does so by quite independent of political process. Securitizing an issue in Turkey does not appear to be at the mercy of the political class or a particular political institution, say, PM office or defense ministry. In other words, securitization in Turkey does not necessarily spring from a political environment, which could ultimately be dependent upon to public and democratic scrutiny and democratic accountability.

This upper-hand in security field allowed the Turkish military to securitize some of the political matters almost at will (Cizre-Sakalligolu, 1997; Cizre, 2003; Insel, 1997; 2001). The issue area of state security for the military could involve not only the conventional themes of anti-terrorism laws, counter-insurgency or internal security arrangements, it also involves securitizing and criminalizing alternative lifestyles, identities and political activities for constraining the public debate (Yavuz, 2003a: 248; Insel, 2001; Cizre, 2003). In fact, it is not unusual to find the infusion of the military logic of security in other states. For instance, in the 2000s the security agenda of U.S. was broadened to the effect that the exercise of US federal government power was reconfigured from being ‘the old warfare state to the new crimefare state’ (Andreas and Price, 2001: 36). However, it is arguably in the Turkish case that we can find one of the most proficient and skillful articulations of securitization as a technique of government. Most significantly for security governmentality, the securitization technique is not simply employed as a last resort method by the political class for dealing with the political quandaries of Turkey. Instead, it seems that particularly from the second half of the 1990s onwards when identity politics subsumed political debate, securitization has been one of the
most competent and effective methods of state intervention into public policy and private matters. As Yavuz argues,

Securitization allows the military to deny autonomy to the civilian institutions that might recognize the identity claims of Kurds and Islamists. In accordance with its endowing ideology of Kemalism, the Turkish military regards ethnic or religious diversity as a cause of hatred and a precursor of disunity. This fear of ethnic and religious diversity guides the current state policy of depriving people of their ethnic and religious identities (2002: 201-2).

In addition, Turkey’s securitization process entertains other institutional mechanisms to become successful. The life-styles (dress codes) and private (religious) choices of the individuals or other societal groups have often been represented (by the military) in security language and put into circulation for the ‘approval’ not deliberation of the audience (citizens) through the mainstream media coverage. As argued above, the latter represent these private matters as ‘perilous and threatening’ practices by the dangerous men and women, who allegedly strive to destroy the ‘secular nature of the state’ (see Hurriyet, Milliyet and Sabah between June 1996 and June 1997). Another crucial issue of securitizing private images of certain religious practices is not analyzed in the theory, which, as Williams argues (2003: 525-31), places the conditions of a successful securitization exclusively to the linguistic-discursive realm and thus offers little help here.

Its important differences notwithstanding, securitizations in security governmentality can be understood as a successfully deployed, effective and major technique of political intervention at the service of the authorized military-led state elites. Particularly the ‘threats’ of political Islam and/or certain religious practices are cast as the newfound ‘existential threats’ to the secular state and help the power-holders to present and utilize securitization to protect their powerful positions in the political domain (for such an example see headscarf conundrum in Chapter 5).

4.3. A CASE STUDY OF TECHNIQUES IN SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY: THE 28 FEBRUARY 1997 ‘POST-MODERN COUP’

To provide a model of intervention by the techniques discussed above, an important example is elaborated below. This is an account of one of the least-studied military interventions in Turkish politics. It is ordinarily called as the ‘soft coup’ or ‘post-modern coup’ of 28 February
1997 (Doxey, 1997: 12). Because of its relevance to the micro and macro techniques explained in this chapter and its understudied nature this particular intervention is put under scrutiny below. The 'post-modern coup' is discussed as a microcosm of the practical application of the micro- and macro-techniques in security governmentality. This military intervention into domestic politics should not be grasped as an instant ousting activity, where an elected government would be simply forced to side-step (Ergin, 2001: 14). After a brief description, the socio-economic factors, techniques used and a general assessment of this 'coup' will be presented below.

The 1997 post-modern coup was unlike its predecessors in 1960, 1971, and 1980 (Candar, Sabah, 29 February 1997 p.18; Alkan, Radikal, 16 January 2001 p.15). It was ‘unique in style’ in that it ‘did not involve troops taking over the streets, the declaration of martial law, and the open assumption of civilian powers by the military’ (Lowry, 2000: 41). Indeed, this post-modern coup represents a newfound style of military intervention and evades easy categorizations for two main reasons. Firstly, the military’s extensive methods in the said intervention do not fall comfortably within the categories of a military coup found in civil-military relation literature (Cizre, 2003: 215-6). Secondly, this intervention is a peculiarly continuing intervention, one well-expressed in the term: the ‘28 February Process’ (Sevinc, 2000: 60-71). Indeed, instead of thinking it in terms of a classic coup d’etat, the post-modern coup of 1997 can be defined as an attempt at ‘social engineering’ by the military (Insel, 1997: 17; Cigdem, 2000: 26). As General Cevik Bir put it ‘the phenomenon of 28 February is the integration of the Turkish public and the Turkish Armed Forces through the phenomenon of social engineering. The 28 February has been conducted together [that is] with the Turkish military as the social engineer and the Turkish Republican Public’ (quoted in Insel, 2001: 13).

The 1997 post-modern coup was an unconventional military intervention into domestic politics in the name of state security that ended in toppling the elected pro-Islamist Refah (Welfare) coalition government in the summer of 1997 (Salt, 1999: 72-8). The coup and the subsequent ‘28 February process’ were rooted in the declaration of the ‘eighteen measures’ that were designed to thwart the perceived threat of Irtica (Islamic fundamentalism) to be implemented by the Islamist Refah-led coalition government (Gokmen, 2002: 347-50). On 28 February 1997, after an ‘eight-hour marathon’ meeting in the NSC with the generals, the PM Erbakan had to put his signature to the military’s demands, which risked confronting his
constituency and 'thereby seemingly endorsing the power of the NSC to mandate state policy on domestic issues' (Lowry, 2000: 41).

For a while, the Refah government shied away from implementing the 'eighteen measures' and other secularist ultimatums of the military fearing that it would alienate its religious constituency. However, under the sustained military-media 'public campaign', the Refah government was forced to resign on 18 June 1997 (Salt, 1999: 72-8; Carkoglu, 2004: 111). Later in January 1998, the Constitutional Court decided to close down the Refah party on the grounds that it posed a 'threat to the secular nature of the state' responding positively to the accusations of State Prosecutor Vural Savas, who claimed that the Islamist party ran foul of Article 69/6 and 68/4 of the Constitution by becoming 'a centre of anti-secular activities' (Savas, 2001a: 260).

Consequently, the military-led state and civilian elites spectacularly managed to pull off a coup in the name of securing the secular nature of the state from an elected and fully legitimate civilian government. The military 'justified' its undemocratic involvement by resorting to the discourse of security of the secular state (Doxey, 1997: 12-3). This was a media-simulated coup since the military's securitizing message was carried out in the live coverage. It was made possible not through the physical forces of the military but by utilizing 'civilian' methods and actors (i.e. the agitating mainstream news media and some civil society groups (Gokmen, 2002: 350, ft. 6). Therefore, throughout its 'secularist jihad' against the Islamists in power, the military put into use an audacious and effective securitization strategy with the help of a media campaign to outpost the elected 'Islamist government' (Aydintasbas 1998: 32). This intervention was later playfully named as a 'post-modern coup' by one of its Generals (Former Secretariat of Chief of Staff, General General Erol Ozkasnak Hurriyet, 15 January 2001, p.1, 17). Later, in a revealing passage this event was also described by another General as 'an ongoing reaction to a security problem' (Interview with the former Commander of the Naval Forces General Salim Dervisoglu, in Cevizoglu, 2001: 16-7, italics original).

The Socio-Economic Factors
Following the international systemic changes of the early 1990s, Turkey's social and political predicaments were exacerbated (Muftuler-Bac, 1996). The state elites could no longer easily reap the benefits of the Cold War global security and political structure, which had largely
allowed the state to bottle up the demands of different social and identity groups for wider recognition and representation in the political process (Muftuler-Bac, 2000; Bilgin, 2002). Domestically, the liberalization process of the 1980s in Turkey reflected itself as a booming economy and brought in a newly emerged economic class named as ‘Anatolian Tigers’, whose demands included the assertion of their religious identity and space for recognition and public visibility (Bugra, 1998; Onis, 1997; 2001). The so-called ‘Anatolian Tigers’ were comprised of rather traditional families forming small-medium size firms and coming from the communities preserving their Islamic culture and identity (Yavuz, 1997a; Bugra, 1998; Jacoby, 2004: 149). They utilized ‘opportunity spaces’ in civil society and then moved into the ‘political opportunity structure to make demands for making political, social and economic inclusion, in addition to justice’ (Yavuz, 2003a: 15). Drawing on developments of the international system in the 1990s to find a helping new discourse of human rights, multiculturalism and democratic governance that were seen as the new norms, challenging the state-centric international system; these groups used to using human rights and democratic rights as a legitimate basis for expressing their Islamic identity claims (Gulalp, 1997a; 1997b; Bayramoglu, 2001: 70; Dagi, 2005).

Contrary to the expectation of this economically powerful and politically ambitious emergent class and the globalization of democratization norms, the Turkish state apparatus shied away from such demands and responded by launching a secularist reaction (Gulalp, 1999; Yavuz, 2000a). Instead of accommodation and compromise, a thoroughgoing domestic conflict ensued between the self-styled secularist and Islamists (Yavuz, 2000b). The state together with the visual and rhetorical representational devices of the mainstream news media managed to present and painstakingly criminalize certain private religious conducts (e.g. headscarf ban) and demands of individuals (e.g. sending pupils religious schools) (Insel, 2003: 132-5). This way, certain segments of society were stigmatized for trying to express their private-religious preferences in the public sphere as ‘threats’ to the ‘secular nature of the state’ (Gole, 2002).

Indeed, after the second half of the 1990s Islamic religious life-styles of the individual citizens have been increasingly presented by the military-dominated state elites as ‘threatening’ to the secular nature and security of the state (Karaman, 1999). The individual private religious choices such as certain dress codes and bodily expressions were increasingly securitized (for a detailed chronicle of this and other events see Akpinar, 2001). The military
legitimized its interventions by taking a security perspective against such social and political Islamic groups and reduced ‘major social, political, and economic problems to security issues’ (Yavuz, 2002: 203). In this manner, not only the Islamists but also many citizens of Islamic persuasion were accused of trying to convert the secular Turkish state into a religious theocratic state (Kosebalaban, 2002; Cizre, 2003). As mentioned, in confronting such ‘domestic security threats’, however, the military set aside its previous methods of intervention such as staging coups d’etat, overthrowing and punishing the governments. Instead, the military was able to instigate a catalog of techniques, which included both the necessary legal-constitutional contexts and the effective institutional assistance from the NSC and the media to oust the civilian government from power (Yavuz, 2003a: 244).

Techniques of the 1997 Post-Modern Coup

In an attempt to grapple for the meaning of the post-modern coup of 1997, a leading student of Turkish politics Professor Metin Heper recently stressed that an adoption of Eric Nordlindger’s typology of military coups (1977) that concerns different styles of military interventions within ‘Ruler, Moderate and Guardian’ types could be of help in understanding this intervention and then named the 28 February intervention as an instance of the ‘guardian type’ (Interview with Metin Heper, Birmingham, 26 September 2003). Helpful though it seems, such characterizations of the 28 February 1997 intervention not only tend to gloss over the particular non-military methods used in this intervention such as securitization but also leave aside the crucial role played by other nominally ‘civilian’ agents such as the mainstream media in toppling the Islamist government. This was certainly a different military coup in the making. So much so, that when one of its central figures asked to define it, he grappled with it as follows:

This ‘post-modern coup’ is a very successful ongoing process, which was done like a piece of cake, was like no old military coups, was without bloodshed, without making anyone sad, was approved by the NSC with very democratic practices and staged by the kind of people from the person on top of the state [the president] to every related ministry and even with our nation through civil society institutions (Former Secretariat Chief of Staff, Erol Ozkasnak, quoted in Cevizoglu, 2001: 56-7).

The 1997 coup was no ordinary military coup in the sense that the military itself ruled out an old type coup with the military tanks rolling down the streets of the country on the grounds that such a crude military coup was ‘not suitable for the [democratic] conditions of the country’ (Interview with the former General Secretariat of the Chief of Staff Erol Ozkasnak,
The military’s main antagonist Islamist Refah government was brought down by the distinct techniques of security governmentality not by the crude show of the military force (Sevinc, 2000: 60-1). As explained below, in the main the peculiarity of the coup sprung from both the way it was conducted and the set of participants that took part in overthrowing the government from power.

Macro-Techniques of the 1997 Post-Modern Coup: the Military and the NSC

First, it should be noted that the NSPD was amended in 1997 by the military with a view to reordering the internal and external threat perception due mainly to new developments such as the increasing individual piety, religious activity, outward dress codes and coming to the power of the Islamic coalition government, as discussed in Chapter 5. In the new NSPD, the military defined ‘domestic threats’ as Islamic Fundamentalism, Kurdish Separatism and Organized Crime (Jenkins, 2001: 47). The crucial novelty here was that unlike the 1992 NSPD, which named the Kurdish separatism as the primary domestic threat (Sevinc, 2000: 68), the new NSPD instead placed Islamic fundamentalism as the primary threat and ‘warned that what it described as “political Islam”, namely the Turkish Islamist movement headed by the WP [Refah Party], continued to pose a threat to the country’s security’ (Jenkins, 2001: 48).

Secondly, the military was not alone as an institution in staging this coup. As a legally responsible and authorized security institution, the military took an active part in the process with the help of and through other state institutions against such social and political Islamic leaning ‘threats’. In this respect, an important institutional lever used by the military in the process was the Higher Educational Board (YOK), which is in control of the university administrations in Turkey. This was particularly pertinent in the military’s efforts to keep the universities under control through the latter institution (see Carkoglu, 2004: 112 and Chapter 8). To maintain the Kemalist doctrine in higher educational institutions and to cleanse ‘all forms of Kurdish or Islamic identity claims’ from educational settings, the military issued a new set of regulations to all the university administrations:

The new regulations empowered the university administration to fire those who “acted against the Republic and its values” and to strip professors of their academic titles. Violators also could “lose their social security rights and face a life ban in state service” (Yavuz, 2002: 204).
Thirdly, having realized that it could not initially enforce the Islamist Refah government to abide by the NSC decisions, the military launched a novel public-media campaign to securitize the religious practices of the certain segments of the society and blamed then the ruling Refah Party for inaction against such 'security threats' (Akpinar, 2001; Yavuz, 2003a: 244). Particularly, following the 31 March 1997 NSC meeting, the military resorted to a rarely seen technique of 'public briefings' in order to 'inform' the public about the 'security threats' posed by the Islamist religious activity (Akpinar, 2001: 229-32). In this 'campaign' against the Islamists, according to Yavuz, 'the military used the mass media, press briefings, conferences, and regular public announcements to inform public opinion about the threat to the existence of the state and homeland stemming from political Islam' (2002: 203).

In the period between 1996 and June 1997, the Refah government’s tenure and political agenda unfolded like football match frenzy covered live by the mainstream news-media ending with an enforced resignation of the government in June 1997. First, a media savvy inflation of fear and insecurity was created by the military's public campaign and press-briefings that securitized certain policies of the Islamist government by denouncing them as the ‘clear signs’ of an ‘Islamist counter-revolution’, which allegedly amounted to ‘an unprecedented anti - secularist, obscurantist and fundamentalist uprising against the secular Republic’ (Then Commander of the Naval Forces General Salim Dervisoglu, Milliyet, 16 January 2001, p.19). Further adding to the dramatic tension, the military regularly accused the government of harboring secretive and malign intention to subvert ‘the secular nature of the state’ (Former Secretariat of the Chief of Staff, General Erol Ozkasnak, Cumhuriyet, 16 January 2001, p.1, 19).

Micro-Techniques: Media and Securitization

All this while, a media army of nationwide newspapers and TV channels joined the securitizing chorus by dramatizing the unfolding details of the confrontation created by the military against the government (Cevizoglu, 2001). It was in front of the live coverage of the media channels that the military-dominated NSC intervened into politics by issuing its package of secularist measures (see Appendix 1) to be ‘immediately implemented’ against what the military called the ‘Islamist threat’ to the state survival (Shankland, 1999: 112). In order to thwart the ‘threat of Islamist government’ the military spearheaded a ‘concerted civilian pressure mechanism’ through organizing press-briefings between 1996 and 1997.
As to the architects of the intervention, the military was not the only significant actor to galvanize the 28 February Process against the ‘threat of Islamists’. In the process, the military-orchestrated a political initiative that gained momentum and peaked with a public campaign, which has been schemed by the mainstream media, the state-sponsored big business groups, and powerful civilian and bureaucratic circles including some university academicians (Shmuelevitz, 1999: 16-23; Laciner, 2000: 16; Cigdem, 2000: 22-6). In all, the military ‘encouraged’ the so-called ‘unarmed forces’ of central civil society actors to join the bid to topple the government (Akpinar, 2001: 329; Gokmen, 2002: 347-50). Such ‘civil’ society institutions as the media, universities, business circles, labor unions took active part in ousting the elected government (Milliyet, 16 January 2001, p.15). Hence, in order to push the elected government to accept its own downfall, the 1997 post-modern coup bore witness to the birth of the new military method that utilized legal, ideological and institutional sources such as the constitution, the NSC and the media rather than its tanks (Salt, 1999: 72-8).

The military’s public briefings were addressed to some civil society groups, the editors and columnists as a method of airing the securitizing message and were in turn abundantly covered by the media in a dramatized secularist and sneering-berating tones (Akpinar, 2001: 229-32). The military briefings represented secular concerns over the policies of the Islamist government. The mainstream media was of great help for the military in that it constructed spectacles out of seemingly spontaneous eventful stories that tended to be emblematic of such heated security themes as the danger posed by the Islamic dress codes (Lowry, 2000: 51-6). For instance, part of the frenzied media coverage in the early 28 February process was about the alleged attempts of the leaders of Turkey’s major religious orders at subverting the secularity of the state together with the Refah government (Akpinar, 2001: 161). The specific event took place on 12 January 1997, when the religious leaders gathered at the PM’s Office for a traditional fast-breaking in the holy month of Ramadan. The TV channels and later newspapers covered the event as a breaking-news. The entry into the PM Office as guests of the bearded leaders of religious orders dressed in religious robes visually and symbolically supported the verbal securitizing text. This event caused great controversy and was represented by other rival political parties, the press and the military as the ‘penultimate
threat’ and the manifestation of the challenge posed by the Islamist government to ‘the secular nature of the state’ (Akpinar, 2001: 160-4).

Through these effective media coverages and ‘public briefings’, the Islamist party in power was on various occasions accused by the military of being ‘costly’ inactive at the time against such ‘security threats’ that tried to convert the secular character of the constitution, which is a criminal offence (Ahmed Ozcan, 2000: 56; Akpinar, 2001: 229-32). In these briefings and after presenting such cases of ‘threatening’ religious practices, the military often speculated about the ‘coming of an Islamist political state’ in Turkey that would wreck ‘the secular nature of the state’ and against which the government was doing so little (Ahmed Ozcan, 2000).

In all, the mainstream news media served the established narrative themes depicted within the parameters of the official security discourse that represented forms of dress as ‘threats to the secular nature of the state’. The visual information provided by images and photographs of bearded and robed men or especially females with veils or headscarf were put into use for manifesting the ‘coming of the threat’ to the secular character of the state (for a discussion see Gole, 2002). Indeed, the role the media played in this intervention was significant in that its representations of some religious dress codes as intrinsically ‘dangerous’ to the secular character of the state overshadowed any fuller or more complex range of depiction of those forms of dress. It simply provided ammunition to the confrontation by providing such news coverage.

In this way, the securitizing discourse of the military against the religious activities of people and the Islamist party was put in full circulation for the public attention. The religious people in question and the Islamist Refah party in power used a democracy discourse claiming that these religious practices were private matters and as such they did not constitute any security threat to the state (Heper, 1997). Despite this counter-discourse, the military together the effective media coverage was successfully able to air its securitizing message for the population and express its political reactions against the government in such a way that would clearly be considered ‘as anomalous for a liberal democracy’, which is normally embraced by Turkey (Norton, 1995: 4; Demirel, 2004: 127).

An Assessment
Overall, the military-managed post-modern coup and the subsequent ‘28 February Process’ was a successful securitization that later resulted first in the overthrowing and then banning of the Islamist Refah party. It is true that the military’s intervention targeted the Islamists in power and eventually forced it to resign just after one year of its power (Shankland, 1999: 110-26). However, this was a different intervention in that it made use of distinct techniques of information-manipulation and securitization through a media savvy public campaign that led to the subsequent resignation of the Islamist PM. This is why the coup was shrewdly dubbed as a ‘post-modern’ military intervention by a veteran columnist (Candar, Sabah, 28 June 1997, p. 23; Yeni Safak, 16 January 2001, p.11). Indeed, then the secretary of the Chief of Staff and one of the influential generals of the time, who took an active part in the 28 February process, explained in an interview the logic of and reasons for the intervention and he also confirmed this post-modern nature of the intervention:

Of course, the ‘28 February Process’ can be considered as an activity of the Turkish Armed Forces. I am someone, who was given a role within that process. Prior to the 28 February, there had been no period in the history of the Republic in which the foundations of the secular Republic were strenuously shattered by a legitimate government [like that of the Islamist Refah Party]. There is no example of such an event or process [like the 28 February]. The leaders of the Sheri’at [groups] and obscurantist mentality in their religious caps and robes had never before been present in the Prime Minister Residence and posed on televisions. And the comments and images of the dribbling [like dogs] obscurantist people had never been aired that much on televisions of the country in the so-called 28 February process. Therefore, the efforts and struggles of such persons who played a role in this [intervention] Process were for preventing the country from falling into an obscurantist dark bog and from resembling the Iranian Mullah Republic. Some gave this [intervention] Process a very beautiful name: ‘post-modern coup’, a name given by cleverness. In fact, in my opinion the ‘post-modern coup’ is the best name given. This ‘post-modern coup’ is a very successful ongoing process, which was done like a piece of cake, was like no old military coups, without bloodshed, without making anyone sad, was approved by the NSC with very democratic practices and staged by the kind of people from the person on top the state [the president] to every related ministry and even with our nation through civil society institutions. The most active participants [of this intervention] were the Chief of the General Staff and other the commanders of the army. (Interview with Erol Ozkasnak in Cevizoglu, 2001: 56-7)

This ardently stage-managed military intervention led to the continuation of restrictions on the political rights of the new religious and ethnic communities and individuals (Salt, 1999: 74-7). In a press briefing for selected journalists on September 3, 1999 for addressing the problems arising out of the devastating earthquakes of August 1999; then Chief of General Staff Kivrikoglu strayed from his ‘prepared text’ and most revealingly declared that:
On the 28th of February [1997] an 18 article decision was adopted by the national security Council. To date only four of the 18 recommendations contained in this decision (including that concerning basic education) have been enacted by legislation. However, we see no sign that there are efforts to push ahead with implementation of the remaining articles. We are also face to face with an approach which says that "the 28th of February is over." The 28th of February is a process. It began in 1923 and from that date until the present it has continued in keeping with the threat of irtica [Islamic fundamentalism]. We accept our role as the defenders [against irtica]. If necessary, the 28th of February will continue for ten years. If necessary, one hundred years. If necessary, for a period of a thousand years. We are expecting parliament when it reconvenes on October 1st quickly to take up the matter of enacting legislation to implement the remainder of the February 28th decisions (Quoted in Lowry, 2000: 45).

Indeed, what makes this intervention most peculiar is that unlike its previous three military interventions, the army carried this intervention through macro and micro techniques discussed above. That is, the military did not carry this intervention alone, but via the National Security Council (NSC) and through other institutions such as the media (Kinzer, 2000). The specific discourse of the communiqué and the resultant 'post-modern coup' was finely tuned to the securitization of the life styles and cultural demands of the mentioned new Islamic groups (Yavuz, 2003a: 239-65). This negating powerful campaign against the Islamists in turn aroused the indignation of some Islamic communities, which reacted in a more aggressive and more critical tones by questioning the merits of such a stern secularist stance of the military (Akpinar, 2001: 166-72). The military elites then skillfully used this aggressive tone as a material 'proof' for their earlier accusations that these groups and their Islamist representation in government ran foul of the constitutional secular characteristic of the state and thus had to be ousted and punished (Akpinar, 2001: 240-1).

The representation of the Islamic demands as 'security threats' to the 'nature of the state' hit the headlines almost daily throughout the rule of the Islamist Party between June 1996 and June 1997. The media reported continuously about the allegedly 'real intentions' of the Islamist Refah party in power as attempting to change the secular 'the nature of the state' for an 'Islamic Republic' despite the numerous declarations of the party to the contrary (Yavuz, 1997a; Heper, 1997). Most crucially, this alarmist representational mode of the individual religious choices (dress codes, headscarf issue, attending the religious schools and other religious expressions) by the mainstream media in turn literally paved the way for the kind of securitization moves and subsequent 'extraordinary measures' taken up by the military (Shmuelevitz, 1999: 39-40). In general the military accused the party of trying cunningly to
'take over the state by stealth' through the media and on various public declarations (Akpinar, 2001: 240-1). Furthermore, the military capitalized on the media reports about the 'anti-secular' religious deeds of the party.

The publicized eighteenth points were in essence the detailed list of the military-vision of politics, demanding the Islamist government to 'rectify' its ongoing failings in relation to the secular principles of the state (Shankland, 1999: 204-8). These points were read immediately on the national TV channels, giving the full dramatic tone to the course of events (TRT1-News, 28 February 1997). The military utilized this media savvy security campaign in order to force the Islamist PM to ultimately accept the NSC Recommendations designated as '18-point ultimatum' (Shmulelvitz, 1999: 36-7). Later, the Islamist PM bowed to the military-media pressure and resigned form government after the daily news that reiterated and shored up the military's allegations against the party (Shmuelevitz, 1999: 34-8). In line with the discussion of the techniques of security governmentality, the mainstream media astutely helped securitize the demands for recognition of the Islamist party and its electorate. Throughout the period of the Islamist party government between June 1996 and June 1997, the agile and skillful representational rhetorical and visual devices of the mainstream media helped securitize the discourse and private practices of the religious individuals as 'threats'-to the secular 'nature of the state'. Hence securitization was achieved successfully.

The role the Turkish media played was of utmost importance, because in this incident it acted proficiently as the intermediary between the macro (the military and the NSC) and the micro (individual and society) sources of security governmentality. These 'intermediary actions' by the media helped lock the relations between the acting units into a security logic and enmity after which the road to the 'orthodox logic of military dialectics' opened up (Buzan et al., 1998: 57). It is also through this usage of the media that the military's 'actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure' were justified in the eyes of those individuals, who already laid an unconditional trust on these two institutions namely the military and the media (Heper, 1997).

In all, the 1997 post-modern coup was therefore a military intervention into politics made serviceable and operative through a catalog of techniques of intervention in security governmentality. The application of macro-interventionist techniques by the military and the NSC under a broadly defined security agenda (through the NSPD) is here combined with the
application of micro techniques such as the securitization of religious private conduct and the subsequent media coverage. Specifically, these techniques successfully represented the private cultural-religious choices of the pious citizens as 'security threats' to the secular state. The military was able to activate such an intervention mainly by linking the question of 'survivability of the secular state' with the 'subverting religious practices' of the Islamist Refah Party in power. The military was also able to exert such a pressure upon the political process by making inroads into the hearts and minds of the individual by launching the 'public campaigns' with and through the channels provided by the media. The end result was that instead of accommodating such political demands of the religious citizenry into modern politics, the anomaly of a military-media coalition reigned at the expense of more pluralist liberal democratic values.

SUMMARY

This chapter has discussed the techniques of the security governmentality in Turkey. It has argued that these techniques mainly contain two patterns that can be basically called as micro and macro strategies of intervention. The macro sources of intervention basically originate from two sources: the legal-institutional space of the NSC and the military interventions. The working mode of the macro techniques is such that the formal aspects of the prevalent security understanding are first implicated in the legal and constitutional texts (such as the highly extensive national security concept and the formal text of National Security Policy Document), and then these are utilized by the military as authorized means of intervention into politics primarily through the institutional space of the NSC.

Secondly, there are micro techniques of security governmentality. These relate to socially oriented and rather subtler strategies of intervention chiefly targeting the individual conduct. The micro sources include two main aspects. The first is the securitization of socio-political affairs, representing individual life styles such as religious choices as 'security threats' to the 'secular' nature of the state. The second method concerns the mainstream news media images and representations of the 'security threats' to the 'secular' nature of the state. In the last decade, beneath the platitudes of 'free press', the Turkish mainstream media has chosen to serve the state by representing these images for security-threat-production. Thereafter, it has become commonplace to represent outward expressions of religious garment of some citizenry as security threats to the state rather than as private religious choices mostly seen as
'normal' in liberal democracies. In so doing, the mainstream media employed a pro-state, striking alarmist-security language in reproducing and privileging secular, national and masculine identities over unvarnished news coverage or any other alternative political identities in the making. In this way, the print and visual media gained prominence and appeared as a powerful source of secularist opinion making and threat construction.

Overall, the macro- and micro-techniques of intervention have proved to be very functional for the inner workings of security governmentality in that these interventions helped the main actor of security governmentality namely the Turkish military to make inroads into the political and social spaces to establish the mould of the predefined (secularist) human subjectivity. It can be argued that the Turkish military systematically has used these micro and macro techniques of intervention not only to ascertain the competence of the state but also to reproduce the legitimacy for its own political interventions. In other words, the military's aim for using such techniques has been to protect its politics of security from the named domestic dissenters and reestablish itself as the prime protector of the state.

In view of that, a significant consequence of the usage of these techniques is the fact that the military has prevailed as the most visible employer of such techniques. Through these techniques the Turkish military has acted as a democratically unaccountable but a politically over-active securitizing actor. It represented itself to the population as a 'credible' and 'efficient' institution and used its 'historical mission' of being at the service of the country against all kind of external and internal threats. In this fashion, the Turkish military as a security actor has assumed the capacity of the most influential political institution within the existing state structure. It acted not simply as a traditional institution for external security provision but rather as a democratically unaccountable but legally and institutionally powerful domestic political agent. This is not to suggest that the military's established role of external defense ceased. Rather, it is to refer to the increasingly politicized role of the military and to highlight the corresponding results of its interactions with other actors and processes in Turkish politics.

The chapter also noted that the macro and micro interventions have not served as a homogeneous or uniform pattern of military intervention that could be seen in the example of a coup d'etat, which haunt political systems from outside. Instead, these techniques were seen as attempts to haul politics and private conducts into the preconceived programmes and
formula, which are reflective of a set of pro-state and/or illiberal knowledge and values. Consequently, the Turkish military found venues of participation into the political process not as an unwelcome outsider but as a ‘virtues’ agent of the state bereft of the democratic accountability but dutiful to the state secularism and ‘reason of state’ rationalities of security governmentality. It was largely through these techniques that the security governmentality reproduced itself and gave the Turkish military ample ground to reach deep down into Turkey’s socio-political divide.

On the whole, the macro- and micro-techniques of intervention have four main consequences for security governmentality (for other consequences see the Conclusion). First, the chief undercurrent within these techniques is a security rationale manifestly in line with the rationalities of security governmentality argued in the Chapter 3; namely fostering the strength of ‘reason of state’ and the secular character of the state against internal and external challengers, which are legally and constitutionally named as ‘security threats’. Secondly, the micro- and macro-interventionist patterns expand the boundaries of state security not only conceptually, but institutionally and politically as well. Thirdly, these techniques inculcate a socio-political space of confrontation between the state and the individuals/groups. A sense of fear and insecurity prevail, which in turn might call for the military to provide security. Fourthly, democratic institutions and processes are weakened, because the state in general and the Turkish military as a security actor in particular is disproportionately empowered in the decision- and policy-making processes at the expense of such other groups as the civilian governments in power and the non-state agents including the intellectuals, ethnic-religious groups and women. In short, these techniques ‘correspond to a society controlled by apparatuses of security’ (Foucault, 2000: 221).
CHAPTER 5
IDENTITY IN SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY

This chapter aims to establish the identity dimension of security governmentality that gained salience especially since the mid-1990s. The broad argument of the chapter is twofold. Firstly, the identity dimension in Turkey's security governmentality emerges from the state-imposed distribution of secular vs. Islamic identities and secondly this distribution generates a confrontational politics between the state and the society. Crucially, the ensuing political confrontation between these two identity orientations has been couched in state security discourses of security governmentality. To have an understanding of the political furor this confrontation between the secular and the religious sets off, the chapter investigates the processes of secular vs. Islamic identification. Here, the secularist identity refers to the political identity of the state elites and lay the groundwork for their ethical course of action. Islamic identity is upheld by the Islamist political parties who want to react to the state-imposed secular identity. To understand the confrontation between the two, the chapter first examines the attempts to secularize the society by the state elites. Secondly, the chapter probes the counter-identity of Islam. Thirdly, the chapter examines the ensuing confrontational logic and political space deriving from these two identity orientations and their implications for security governmentality. Lastly, the chapter presents a case that illustrates the political relevance of these two identities.

Identity in Security Governmentality
The pertinent issue here is that the discourses and practices of state security aim to foster, promote and attribute various capacities, lifestyles, aspirations, identities to certain individuals and groups with a view to making politically distributed identities such as a good citizen, activist, conscious consumer, hooligan, secular person, pious and so on. It is in this context that spaces of politics and bodies/selves are linked. The state elites attempt to 'affect and shape in some way who and what we are and should be' (Dean, 1999: 12). Therefore, it is imperative to get a grasp on the operative context of the state's ambitious attempts to distribute identities for the people, since it is chiefly through these particular forms/channels that 'the statutes, capacities attributes and orientations are assumed of those who exercise authority and those who are to be governed' (Rose, 1998: 10; Dean, 1999: 32).
Undoubtedly, these two orientations (i.e. secularist/Islamist) do not exhaust the available venues of identity formation for the population concerned. Nonetheless their relevance to our present study is of significance since the confrontational space they produce is a constitutive of the security discourses and practice of security governmentality. It is also equally important to note that the emphasis upon confrontation does not implicate a primordial or in-built necessity for conflict but rather a politically constructed and conflictual political space between those who advocate stringent secularist principles/policies and those who endorse an Islamic political identity and the subsequent life-world it purports to represent.

Here, the secularists are defined as the state elites, which include the military but also parts of the state bureaucracy, civil society associations, bankers, professors and artists (Heper, 1997). The Islamic political identity, on the other hand, is found as an expression in the form of party politics (Yavuz, 1997a). It also includes a cultural space sprung from Islamic networks of communication and dissemination of Islamic culture through newspapers, books, television channels together which help constitute an Islamic 'counter-elites' (Mardin, 1983: 139; Gole, 1997a; 53-7; Howe, 2000: 4).

5.1. SECULARIZATION OF THE POLITICAL IDENTITY

As argued in Chapter 3, Turkish state secularism does not correspond to the Anglo-American experience of secularity, but rather from the antireligious French model that seeks to eliminate or control religion (Candar, 2000: 124-8; Yavuz and Esposito, 2003: xvi; Tank, 2005: 6). To recall, in the Western tradition, secularism is generally seen as the result of functional differentiation of society-economy, rationalization and modernization, which lead to an historical process of separation between sacred and profane and between state and religion (Berger, 1969; Bruce, 1996). It is generally argued that secularity of liberal politics limits the primary purpose of Christianity to that of individual 'therapy' in that secular liberalism fosters the public/private divide, scales down the truth claims, shifts the focus of religious activity from the social to the individual and so on (Bruce, 2000: 35-9). It is in this context that 'religion has been displaced and denuded and the guardians of orthodoxy have either actively promoted the new order or acquiesced in it' (Bruce, 2000: 35). Furthermore, the distinction between private sphere (interior thoughts, beliefs, emotions) and public sphere (government, market) serves as a legal protective umbrella for the Church-State separation and the tensions that might arise between (Garvey, 1993b: 38).
Contrary to this liberal tradition, the Turkish state elites do not necessarily have in mind 'the normative ideal of secularism' (Keane, 2000: 5-6) as a necessary condition of a pluralist democratic order. It is vital to note that in Turkey the term secularism does not conjure up the oft-cited ideal definition of secularity as the separation of temporal/profane from spiritual/metaphysical in policy and law-making or as cutting 'the umbilical cord between heaven and earth' (Madan, 1987: 753). That is, the oft-cited liberal characterisation of secularity as the separation of Church and State does not apply to the state's secular identity. Significantly and paradoxically, secularists in Turkey do not necessarily believe that the clergy should, to quote Alexis de Tocqueville, 'give up the support of the state rather than to share its vicissitudes' (quoted in Marquand and Nettler, 2000: 1). On the contrary, various political uses of Islam by the state-albeit paradoxically-have been a recurrent technique of the security governmentality. The Turkish state's secularization program from its embryonic stages onwards displayed a mode of state control over religiosity of the people. Well-known scholar Ali Fuat Basgil pointed out that this misplaced-secularism in Turkey led to a clamp down on various religious freedoms, which generated a system of a 'state dependent religion' (quoted in Demirel, 2003: 234).

These differences in perceiving secularism notwithstanding, the Turkish state, together with the Iranian state under the Pahlavi rule, has often been characterized as exemplary of 'radical secularization' and as an adamant secular fortress in the Middle East (Najmabadi, 1991: 54-5). Starting with the establishment of the principle of secularism in the Turkish political system in 1937, the founder of the Turkish state Mustafa Kemal Ataturk himself unequivocally saw the role of religion (specifically Islam) as antithetical to the development of the modern Turkish state and society in his ambitious modernization project (Tank, 2005: 5). He had this to say:

The Turkish Revolution signifies a revolution far broader than the work revolution suggests...It means replacing an age-old political unity based on religion with one based on another tie, that of nationality (quoted in Nadolski, 1977: 539).

Replacing religion with nationalism and secularism as an identity and the 'nature of the state' was a palpable difference that marked the distinction between the theocratic political system of the Ottoman Empire and the modern Turkish state (Kasaba, 1997: 24). However, while other institutional structures of the new Turkish republic had been modelled upon the western
examples (such as the Swiss Civil Code and the Italian Penal Code), Turkish secularization, as explained above, did not entail a fully adapted western secular model in which a private space for Islam free from the state control could be set up (Esposito and Yavuz, 2003). Likewise, the appeal of the 'totalistic ideology' of French Jacobinism, which espoused 'the possibility of transforming society through totalistic mobilized participatory political action' (Eisenstadt, 2000: 596) was quite tangible for the Turkish state elites (Candar, 2000).

Concomitant to its radical project of secularism, the Turkish state had to 'intervene' forcefully in the sacral domain of religion and thus-in stark contrast to private–public/state-society distinction in the liberal western tradition-violated its citizens' private spheres in the name, and as the self-declared agent, of modernization. While state elites were attempting to bring Islamic authority under the full control of secular state, secularism was gradually institutionalized within the state: for instance, a Directorate of Religious Affairs, operating directly under the prime ministry, was established so as to bring all religious activities under complete state authority.

As argued in Chapter 3, one major reason for this was that secularism was firmly embraced by the central Kemalist elite for whom Islamic religion became 'synonymous with obscurantism', which should be kept under state control. The secularism the state has espoused in Turkey has been reminiscent of 'the dominant French assimilationist model, rooted across the political spectrum, [which claims] that to be truly French, Muslims must abandon the right to their own identity' (Bouteldja, The Guardian, 22 July 2005, p.25). The principle of secularism has been strictly upheld and the public visibilities of Islamic religion were restricted to the extent that the state elites often looked 'for ways to overthrow Islam, which in their mind was anathema to progress and whose demise was a prerequisite for survival of the state' (Candar, 2000: 124, emphasis added). So much so, as political scientist Binnaz Toprak argues, the politically powerful force of Kemalism has been strictly safeguarded by the courts, the mainstream of university circles, much of the press and the military all of which are important centres of public opinion formation as well as major sources of influence on public policy. This vigil over secularism has resulted in state control over all political activity directed toward promotion of religious interests (1993: 627-8).

Since the setting up of the Turkish Republic, secularism, contrary to its ideal-ideological character, became, in large measure, the embodiment of the belief that Islam was inimical to
the logic and development of modernization and was an 'obstacle' in the process of westernization. The religious-cultural elements were seen as the remnants of the Ottoman state and society and as such were represented as having 'vigorous resistance to westernized innovation'. This 'resistance' necessarily came to an abrupt end with Kemal Ataturk's secularist revolution after 1923, which led to 'the collapse of the existing [Ottoman] order and the formulation of an entirely new rationale of state and society' (Spencer, 1961: 272, 276).

Once perceived and upheld this way, the political changes led to a relatively swift launch of the project of secularization of Turkish society. This cognitive outlook on secularism and Islam was perhaps more widespread and gripping than any other example in the Middle East. For instance, unlike the Iranian example, where secular legacy was challenged also from the secular left in addition to the religious right; in Turkey 'Ataturk left a secular republican legacy behind in Kemalism that continues to this day as the dominant ideology of the Turkish ruling elite' (Tehranian, 2003: 92).

For the Turkish state elites, the appeal of secularism lies in its ability to cut off the Islamic influence on body politic rather than its democratic value (Kadioglu, 1998b). Starting with the new republic, secularization attempts in the Turkish context appeared as an outright elite project to foster individual secular subjectivities in society (Kadioglu, 1998a). After the establishment of the new Republic in 1923, the Kemalist secularization project embarked upon formation of a new identity for the Turks through corresponding legal and institutional practices (Helvacioglu, 1999; Jacoby, 2004: 80). In this process, the Kemalist ruling elites wanted to replace Islam's role as a source of social identity with that of modern national and secular identity. As Eleanor Bisbee (1951) explained, the ruling elites took on board the western cultural and institutional codes of life-conduct for the construction of 'New Turks'. In so doing, the new republic wandered off the Islamic markers of identity pertaining to social and political arrangements. As Spencer argued:

\[
\text{The decades since 1923 have seen the wholesale eradication of the cultural virtually all that was traditional in Turkish culture and society. The Turks had learned to live with new legal codes, with an essentially new economic system, a new calendar, with new modes of dress (1961: 275).}
\]

Building a new source of identification from the moribund Ottoman Empire's multi-ethnic and multi-religious identity-structure proved that the question of finding a new secular
identity for the new Turkish Republic would be of no small magnitude though. Firstly, the
religious-symbolic Islamic administrative system under the political wing of sultan-caliphs of
the Ottoman state was seen as an impediment in building a Turkish national identity. To secure
the establishment of the latter, Ataturk and his followers resorted to ‘enforced culture change’
through institutional, legal and educational reforms from 1924 to 1937 (Spencer, 1958: 642).
They abolished the office of the caliph, religious schools, ecclesiastical law courts, and the
Ottoman ministry of religious affairs. They introduced decrees suppressing the religious
orders, shrines and houses. New legal and dress codes from Western Europe were introduced;
Arabic alphabet was replaced by Latin alphabet. The Gregorian calendar instead of Islamic
lunar (Hicri) and sonar (Rumi) calendars were also adopted. The official weekly holiday was
changed from Friday (the Muslim Sabbath) to Sunday. To further conform to the European
family patterns, family surnames were adopted. The latter change in names together with the
change in alphabet constituted perhaps the most radical reforms to break with the traditional
sources of identification in order to attain the modern form of national identity. Through less
or no access to the Islamic-Arabic literature because of the language reform and lineage
differentiation induced by the family names; these changes made the Turkish people less

Behind these radical transformation efforts was one important conviction on the part of
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his colleagues, which to date informs the views of the secular
forces in security governmentality. This was the conviction that the westernizing state agents
of the late Ottoman reform process (Tanzimat) had got it wrong. That is, the elites of
Tanzimat declined to see that in order to get to the (instrumental) rationality of the West,
which was seen as crucially necessary for the security and prosperity of the state; there was to
be not piecemeal but full westernization including that of changing the individual and social
identity away from Islamic markers and frontiers toward the western cultural edifice (Mardin,

Hence, it should be noted that secularism served another important purpose: a guiding identity
for the Turkish state elites. In other words, secularism for the elites has been a marker of
identity. Through different outward codes, mediums and expressions of secularism; the state
elites have come to experience and exhibit a sense of group persona, identity and distinction
(Gole, 1997a: 46-50), which is likely to appear within ‘a hierarchy of worth’ (Kandiyoti,
1997: 119-20). One major source and outcome of this rather unusual political appropriation of
secularism is that the secularist state elites have an exclusive self-image. They are, according to Hakan Yavuz,

Like the ancient prophets of Israel, they believe they have a duty to guide an exodus from the Ottoman-Islamic past, and they use the French conception of rigid secularism as a compass to determine the direction of the exodus (Yavuz, 1997a: 65).

In this view, since western civilization did not include an Islamic precept, neither should the Turkish modernization project. For the ruling elites of the new Turkish Republic, the Tanzimat remained largely as a political reordering and was not complemented by a social and cultural revolution. According to their view, the social body as well was to be transformed. Kemal Ataturk was determined to discard religion from Turkey's modernization project. This was his distinct approach to the issue of culture change. Overall, the 'significant strand to follow, then, in establishing the link between the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks, and Ataturk [has been] the weakening of Islamic content' (Mardin, 1962: 404).

All these and other relevant revolutionary changes are rightly pointed out as an example of a 'cultural revolution' or 'revolution of values', which brushed aside the institutional religious legitimizing system and replaced it with a secular one (Mardin, 1971). Through these iconoclastic legal changes, 'at a stroke, even the literate people were cut off from their past: overnight, virtually the entire nation was made illiterate' (Ahmad, 1993: 80). Particularly, these reforms gradually made a good deal of people oblivious to their Ottoman-religious and non-national sources of identity. In short, these changes 'aimed at destroying the symbols of Ottoman-Islamic civilization and substituting them with their western counterparts' (Toprak, 1993: 630-1). Instead of Ottoman-Islamic civilization and traditional-religious identity, the Western identity soon became the only 'agent' of the Turkish modernization project in social political and cultural structure (Kahraman, 2003: 126).

Just as in other new nation-states, it has been the state/state elites that represented what is modern (and western and secular) and attempted to mould its citizens in its own image. Religiosity, in particular Islamic identity, was cast in the language of traditionalism that urgently needed to be transformed (Yegen, 1996). Such obstacles on the road to modernization and to have a modern (secular and national) identity constituted security problematic for the state elites whose cognitive make up, shaped in unfortunate times of imperial breakup, matched religious traditionalism with underdevelopment and insecurity of
the state, reasoning that religiosity of the Ottoman state was the major cause of its late
development vis-à-vis the western/European states and ultimately its dismemberment.

Because Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his colleagues saw the role of religion as detrimental to
‘order and progress’ within the state, these secular changes got increasingly radicalized and
shook to its core the role Islam had played historically in the social and political arrangements
(Tank, 2005: 4-7). To strengthen the new Turkish state after the Ottoman decline, the new
state elites cleansed the institutional Islam from the public sphere (Yavuz, 2000b). In terms of
the emergent political identity of the state, Islam was further displaced from the public sphere
by disbanding the institutions of religion (Yavuz, 2000a: 22).

The most interventionist attempt on this this respect was recorded in the 1930s when the
project of secularization and nationalization took its most radical turn: in an attempt to
secularize and nationalize Islam (as part of forming the new identity consciousness of the
New Turk) the secular state elite changed (ultimately unsuccessful, however) the call for
prayers (ezan) from its original Arabic to Turkish under the control of the Directorate of
Religious Affairs. As a result of such a radical intervention into the domain of religious
knowledge and ritual/practice, the Turkish state became both involved in religious
transformation and violated central tenets of secularism of the liberal strand. Turkish
secularization depended on not simply a total exclusion of religiosity from the state or the
social realm, but involved in religious transformation and its ever functioning in accordance
with the political ‘necessity’ of state security and state elites’ project of identity-
(trans)formation.

It should be noted that an essential component of the secularist identity is related to state
elites’ concept and ideology of ‘society’. The Kemalist state elites have been informed by a
particular social ideology, namely the theory of solidarism taken from the French sociologist
Emile Durkheim (Berkes, 1934; Davison, 1997). This ideology of society was in line with the
French official ideology of solidarism in the Third Republic, which was introduced by Ziya
Gokalp—one of the mentors of the republic-through Durkheimian sociology (Spencer, 1958).
This solidaristic ideology foresaw a ‘non-conflictual and/or classless’ society for the Turkish
people and laid the priority of the social reason over individual and/or groups (Parla, 1995:
47-8). This was a this kind of alternative non-religious articulation of solidarity, as claimed by
a veteran retired ambassador, could only be secured through the internalization of the idea of
‘nation-state’ such as denial of ethnic and religious demands of recognition through ‘enforced means’ such as education, legal and political arrangements (Kirca, 2003: 160-7). The Turkish state has largely followed these latter means. In consequence, the state elites have opted for a ‘corporatist’ system of governance and devised a ‘corporatist’ state-society complex, merging rather than separating (liberating) the relationship between state and individual citizens (Parla, 1995). In regard to the latter, for instance, Ataturk in his interviews to the representatives of Istanbul newspapers in the late 1920s explained the necessity of forming a ‘party for the people’ (later Republican People’s Party, CHP). Ataturk had this to say:

Classes of the nation cannot be separated from its other classes...because their interests do not diverge from each other...This means that the purpose of this party is not to garner support of some segments or classes as against the interests of other people and classes of the nation. It is to get the otherwise non-segregated nation into a unified mode of action in order to reach the common real prosperity. The way and extent of endeavour required for this task is different in our case than the natural ways and extents found in other situations in which any nation undertakes this task in security and serenity. It is very different. Because our nation and country is a prisoner of the bad providence of insecurity and bustling even after our most magnificent and stunning glories. The [Ottoman] past, the dark and horrid past left to the nation only such an inheritance (quoted in Parla, 1995: 215-6, emphasis added)

One further marker of distinction from the Ottoman ‘dark past’ was the reconstruction of a new social identity through the political implementation of social scientific knowledge. Via Ziya Gokalp and others, the new ruling state elites held that this knowledge was to be the ‘organicist Durkheimian sociology’. It was thought that evolutionary Durkheimian sociology (by metaphor of organicism) could help delineate the conditions for turning into a modern community from an ‘irrational past’ (Berkes, 1954). By knowing what would be ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ in a given community within a state, one could also know what would ‘strengthen the true state’ (Neumann, 2004: 260-4).

In this positivist rendition of sociology, there was to be an assumed evolutionary march of society from primitive, traditional, rural, segmental and irrational societies to rational, functionally, urban, differentiated, organic solidarity of societies in Western civilization (or from feudal to capitalist) (Eisenstadt, 1984: 3-6). After all, the evolutionary process in Western civilization was made ‘possible’ by ‘the victory of rational mind and positive science over civilizational Christianity’, which is ‘destined to become more secular’ (Berkes, 1954: 388).
In this evolutionary process, every possible complexity that might emerge was dismissed either as ‘erratic’ or ‘transitional’ (Kandiyoti, 1997: 129). Instead, society is believed to have the opportunity to develop its ethnic, folkloric, fully-fledged national authentic/raw culture. The latter culture was necessary for Turkey, which was trying to ‘extricate itself from one circle of civilization [Ottoman and its theocratic political and religious system] in order to enter into other’ and thus to become a part of Western civilization (Berkes, 1954: 386). However, the difficulty of adjustment and the harmony with the latter was ‘the tragic situation’ of the Turkish case. That is, Turkey was ‘out of the folds of European Christianity’ and willing to undertake this process of transformation in the presence and rise of the Western civilization ‘before which [Turks] were in a process of collapse’. As Berkes stressed, it was believed that Turkey could no longer carry on the hang-overs of its imperial and theocratic civilization. It is a homogenized product of various racial, ethnic, and religious elements welded to one another by historical catastrophes [such as the calamity of World War I]...In this new form of nation, all hang-overs from the tribal or theocratic civilizational elements now become “pathological”. Only cultural remains are normal, because it is only these that are alive and capable of giving cohesion and orientation to the life of the nation (1954: 386, emphasis original).

Hence, the leader of the Turkish republic Kemal Ataturk was informed by this sort of ideas put into circulation by the Nineteenth century French philosophers and sociologists (Spencer, 1959) and himself tried to materialize these ideas ‘with the establishment of a nationalist regime in Anatolia’ (Berkes, 1954: 375). It is these positivist renditions of secularism vs. Ottoman religious-theocratic ‘hang-overs’ via the analogy of body that contributed considerably powerful cognitive road maps for the secularist forces of the state in their struggle against political Islamic identity throughout the 1990s (Davison, 1996; Gulalp, 1997).

In short, the ruling elites divested Islam of its function as collective identity provider and confined it to thinly defined private realm. The official ideology of the state was pertinent to this aim in that ‘Kemalism was hegemonic in articulating a central subject position of a de-Islamicized subject’ (Sayyid, 1994: 285, ft. 20). This was deemed necessary by the state elites for the creation and security of a unified national state. That is, a de-Islamicized subject would
steer clear of the hangovers of a culturally and socially diverse Ottoman political system and pave the way for an internally homogenous nation.

Furthermore, the state elites did not take ‘universal tenets of modernization as a world historical process’ but instead understood westernization as necessarily rooted in the cultural practices of the west (Kasaba, 1997: 32). Thereby, state elites’ secular modern subjectivity embodied an unmediated identification with the identity of ‘Western’ men and women. This new identity was, however, selectively appropriated in that the external outward and formal appearances of ‘western modern’ men and women rather than their substantial, democratic, civil, difference-based identity fragments were imported (Yavuz, 2003a: 216-7). Despite all these efforts, however, particularly after the mid-1990s this historical and political project of secularization was challenged by its ‘polar-opposite’ project of Islamization of society through party politics. As Yavuz argued:

In spite of the state-led secularization policy, Islam has remained a depository for regulating day-to-day social life for the masses...the republican goal of secularization has met with opposition. Its advocates did not take into account that Islam is socially embedded in various forms of social life and is more conducive to mass mobilization than either nationalism or socialism because of its flexible networks system, norms and symbolic value (1997a: 64-5).

This challenge of Islamists in the 1990s amounted to a moment of shock for the Kemalist state elites. The latter’s palliative and superficial understanding of secularity in the form of ‘western wholesale cultural package’ appeared to be in stark contrast with the increasing visibility in public space of a newly emergent and abundant Islamic religiosity and especially its outward dress codes (e.g. headscarf). In other words, the republican project of secularization of society declined to live up to the expectations of the state elites and showed particular vulnerability in the 1990s especially with the reemergence of political Islam. As a reaction, the state elites have not embraced Islamic identity orientations as expressions of a liberal democratic plurality. They took up the security measures to ‘address’ this ‘mismatch’ between their version of secularism and an increased public visibility of religious expressions of the citizenry including such private choices as dress codes. Since the mid-1990s, the secularist state elites most notably the military employed an antagonistic confrontation strategy with the political representation of Islamic identity. The relationship between security and secularism has to be scrutinized for a discussion of security governmentality in order to understand how certain (mostly secular) identities are disproportionately cast and empowered.
as opposed to other disempowered (mostly Islamic) identities (El-Affendi, 1997: 3-4; Gole, 2002: 184-7).

5.2. ISLAMIZATION OF POLITICAL IDENTITY

It is not easy to give an all-agreed-upon definition of political Islam and account for its complexities within regional or local contexts (Ayoob, 2005: 951-61). However, it is necessary to differentiate it from a more generic concept often used by the state elites to describe religious activity in Turkey, namely ‘Religious Fundamentalism’.

The term ‘religious fundamentalism’ mainly hides the dynamic regenerative capacity of various Islamic identities to induce new social and political repercussions (Beinin and Stork, 1997: 3). Not only do Islamic identity-orientations display diverse characteristics but also possess and exhibit various ways and means of pursuing power within the purview of ‘the social, economic and political evolution’ (Hunter, 1988: ix-x). Hence, locating the issue of Islamic identity solely within the ambit of fundamentalism conceals from view the crucial and strenuous attempts of Muslims to peacefully straddle between modernity and authenticity and find venues of accommodation rather than confrontation in the destabilizing process of westernization/modernization (Hopwood, 1998: 3). In short, it seems deceptive to refer to ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’, which generally delivers a disservice to our understanding of political articulations of religious identity in the relevant socio-political contexts (Mahmood, 1994: 29). The pertaining point here is that Islamism or more correctly political Islam serves as a better conceptual description than that of fundamentalism in describing the political movements of Turkey’s religious Refah Party and the like (Beinin and Stork, 1997: 4).

In the present study, Islamic identity in Turkey is conceptualized as mainly political and ideological rather than a religious phenomenon (see Tibi, 2000: 844). Hence, the terminology of political Islam is used to better envisage effects and efforts of the Islamic party politics in Turkey, which often get caught in the discourse of fundamentalism, which obliterate its
political immediacy (Shankland, 1999: 15-44). Especially since the 1990s, the Islamic political movement has tried to make its political voice heard not simply by a selective use of Islamic idioms and traditions but also by addressing the contemporary social predicaments through reformulating and regulating the modern conditions of Turkey, for better or worse (Shankland, 1999: 87-109).

Unlike the thesis that Islamic social and political movements represent the failure of the modern Muslims to embrace modernity, the religious political movement in Turkey addresses modern predicaments by relying upon modern organizational and communicative instruments and operating within the institutional and political spaces of the modern Turkish state (Yavuz, 1997a; 2000b; Heper, 1997; Kamrava, 1998). In other words, various party political religious and non-religious discourses do not entertain a ‘fundamentalist critique’ but rather bear witness to the attempt ‘to reconcile traditional Islam and modernism [as scientific and technological progress] at the political level’ (Yildiz, 2003: 189).

Overall, the ebb and flow of the experience of political Islam has revealed in Turkey an ongoing wrangle between political Islam and politics of secularism (Yavuz, 2000a: 30-33). The Islamic movements’ activities and their Islamic universe in Turkish society entrenched not only a ‘growing personal piety and greater interest in Islam as a political force’, but also a ‘competition with the state, while their emotional religiosity makes them almost the antithesis of the sterile rationality of Kemalism’ (Robins, 1991: 9). The ensuing conflict, which gained momentum especially in the 1990s has been between the proponents of a staunchly secularist state identity and those pro-Islamist groups challenging this state identity by seeking change in the political status quo (Gulalp, 1997b: 58-60). In regard to the latter, the challengers compile a large segment of socio-political groupings ranging from those advocating a more politically and socially representative environment for Islamic identities to those with liberal leanings opting for a more literal interpretation of secularity understood as a Lockean separation between state and religion (Salt, 1999: 72-8; Cinar and Kadioglu, 1999: 53-4). The most relevant dimension here for our present discussion of security governmentality is the continuing confrontation between Turkey’s secularist state identity and one of her most vibrant social identities, namely Islam.

Political Islam in Turkey
Observers of Turkish politics have generally been fascinated about the talk of ‘resurgence’ of political Islam at various times and quarters (Lewis, 1968: 416; Yavuz, 1997: 63-4). This is not surprising because Turkey was often dubbed as the example of a successful secular transformation project in the Middle East. Why then has Islamism scored almost always high on the agenda of a secular state? Some argued that seemingly recurrent religious awakenings were but a ‘natural’ reflection of ‘reactionary’ religious groups, which were always against the country’s progressive march towards modern civility especially after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 (Gulalp, 1997b: 52; Kandiyoti, 1997: 129; Bilici, 2000: 35-6).

For some political scientists this confrontation was ‘natural’ given that Islam and the West are mutually opposed (Huntington, 1996). For others, this was rather a passing trend in the modernization process such that as industrialization and urbanization of the masses expand across Turkey, the social bases of these religious movements would be expected to weaken (Sunar and Toprak, 1983; Toprak 1993). These explanations notwithstanding, the debate revolving around the powerful sources of the Islamic appeal in Turkish society and the polity is far from settled across the academic divide (Ayata, 1996; 2004; Mardin, 1997; Gellner, 1997; Al-effendi, 1997; Heper, 1997; Yavuz, 2000b). Here, it is perhaps more helpful to resort to a multitude of factors in the making of this phenomenon of religious awakening rather than limiting it to a number of essentialist conceptions.

As argued above and Chapter 3, having conceived an ‘old-fashioned understanding of Westernization’ within the purview of a ‘progressive, modern, statist, nationalist, authoritarian state perception’ (Buzan and Diez, 1999: 45; Jacoby, 2004a) Turkish ruling elites have long sought to soak secularism in the minds and hearts of population (Heper, 1997). They sought to foster a secular subjectivity over the body politic through legal and political reforms as explained above (Gole, 2002: 184-6). The project of state secularization attempted to establish an all-encompassing secular-national identity through a legal/political reform process. Overall, however, the result of this ambitious project was that the state was able to diffuse such stringently upheld secularism only into ‘important but minority sectors of Istanbul and Ankara bourgeoisie, political, professional and media elites’ (Zubaida, 2000: 71).

Despite exclusion and marginalization, however, Islam remained as a strong personal and social base for identity at the repository of the non-elite and the general public (Mardin, 1973; 2005; Howe, 2000: 2; Laciner, 2001). Islamic identity also ‘has now become an organic part of highly mobilized Turkish society and works through the interstices of the “everyday”...on
the life activities of citizens’ (Mardin, 1997: 72). Therefore, the Kemalist secularist stance against religion exemplified by the secularizing reforms in the 1920s and 1930s ‘never attained its ultimate goal: making religion superfluous in a modern society’ (Raudvere, 2003: 24). The reason for this was not necessarily because ‘Islam was in their [people’s] bones, part of their being’ or because ‘a great majority of the people felt the need of religious experience’ (Millar, 1981: 82). There are various reasons for the increasing visibility, revival and transformation of an otherwise suppressed religiosity in Turkey. These largely stem from the diverse cultural, political, social, and economic sources.

First of all, the rise of Islamic-politics can be seen as a response to the predicaments of social and political change in Turkey induced by the Westernist ‘modernization from above’, a state-led political project and by the enforced secular-nationalism as a social project (Koker, 1990; Keyder, 1997: 49-44; Gulalp, 1997a: 54-8). The various reversals and difficulties in these projects certainly helped Islamists to represent themselves as an alternative to secularist westernization. Furthermore, sharing some elements in the post-modern critique of nation-state and modernism at the global level; Islamists launched their criticism by pointing to the authoritarian-bureaucratic tendencies of westernization (Gulalp, 1997a: 423-6). However, contrary to the lack of social and political alternatives in the ‘cynic and nihilist’ post modern critique, the Islamists proposed an alternative political philosophy (Cinar and Kadioglu, 1999: 64-9). The latter proved especially appealing in the context of harsh economic liberalization programs and rapid industrialization, which failed to bring in a ‘quick-fix’ between democracy and universal human rights in the Middle Eastern countries including Turkey (Koker, 1990; Monshipouri, 1995: 20). To find solutions to the problems associated with the ever-enlarging concentration of social units in mega-cities particularly after the advent of industrialism and nationalism, the Islamists in their local environments resorted to type of solutions founded in social welfare policies (Gulalp, 1997). These policies proved effective in the revitalization of Islamic politics of identity, as the anthropologist Catharina Raudvere observed;

For many decades now the cultural dominance of the urban secular elite in the major Turkish cities has steadily been challenged by first and second-generation rural immigrants as well as by a steadily stronger Muslim middle class (2003: 24)

Concerning personal-religious dimensions, it can be argued that Islam like other belief systems provides meaning to human existence and fill the emotional, personal and ideological
void often generated by the rapid modernization, atomized individuality and subsequent alienation (Toprak, 1993: 628). In this context, the Islamists were instrumental in articulating a discursive stance against the ‘unjust’ elitist and westernist developments in the country by establishing a counter-Islamic discourse on ‘the cause of the just’ and the grievances (Mardin, 1991: 114). Secondly and as mentioned before, the Kemalist state elites were of the conviction that in order to really generate individualistic identities, ‘social reason’ rather than ‘individual reason’ should be a ‘criteria for social reconstruction’. They thought that the personal identity of a Turk should be replaced by a secular and ethnically defined and homogenized concept of (Turkish) nationality (Yegen, 1996). This identity formation strategy proved idealistic nonetheless.

Also crucially, Islamic social and political revival can be related to the successes in mass recruitment of different Islamic orders (Tarikats), which made use of ‘modern organizational techniques emphasizing mass adherence to [their] social-religious movements’ (Ayata, 1996: 50). These orders generally served as the medium of protection and resistance towards secularizing reforms of the state elites. For their members these orders, mainly the Nakshibendi order and its many lodges, provided venues for ‘the renewal of faith in Islam’ under the guise of Sufi Islam. These orders’ struggle revolve around individual ‘self-purification’ against ‘excessive material desires’ to

 overcoming the spiritual and political conquest of the West and of Western materialist culture, defined as self-indulgence, hedonism, consumerism, and greed for wealth and power...The great struggle, the cihad-i ekber, is to be waged against the carnal, bestial, and predatory elements of the individual ego, and cannot take place in a state of isolation. Self-reform requires a leader and a devout Muslim community (Ayata, 1996: 49).

In addition to the factors above, the successful cultural and political expression of these Islamic sensitivities in the 1990s was also made possible through ‘the popularization of knowledge through mass communication...by a new class of intellectuals based in the print and the electronic media, and of the party’s internal organizational flexibility and ideological presentation of the [Islamic] “just order”’ (Yavuz, 1997a: 66-7). Indeed, parallel to this was a new Islamic ‘class of intellectuals’. The ‘new Islamist intellectuals’ employed an effective counter discourse against the established secularist state discourse, not shying away from utilizing modern conceptions of post-modern critique (Gole, 1997a: 53-7; Gulalp, 1997b; Cinar and Kadioglu, 1999: 61-9).
Extending beyond the immediate local/national political boundaries and including the Middle East and Central Asia in particular, the concerted effort for the 'Islamization of society' was also expected to occur through 'self-reform'. A vigilant and powerful social control over a 'righteous community' and its linkage with the individual are seen especially necessary in the market-society of the late modern urban context (Ayata, 1996). Self-reform is in turn facilitated by 'orthopraxy', which means observance of various codes of religious conduct by the individual, which are 'introduced into everyday life of devout Muslim' (Mardin, 1993). These together constitute an Islamic 'identity-formation process', whose 'Other' was the cultural influence of the 'West' (Ayata, 1996: 49). Here, the emphasis upon western values and culture indicates a significant change in the category of 'Other' for Turkey's socially and politically most influential religious order namely 'the Nakshibendi Order'. This, argues Mardin, was about a

[a] basic shift in the nature of the "sounding board" in the elaboration of social identity. In the earlier stages, this resonance was acquired by setting oneself against heterodox Muslims; in the modern stage, the sounding board is the Western cultural "other"...By the very nature of this confrontation a field which in the beginning was theological became cultural. The fact that the West was now perceived as an adversary culture and that this became the primary préoccupation of Islam, promoted the "ideological" use of Islam (1993a: 204-5, 212).

Overall, these Islamic groups and networks in Turkey established themselves in society we can call 'moderate social Islam'. In some respects, Turkey’s experience of the latter is no less different than to the Egyptian 'centrist Islam', which has tried to extend its message of a 'just and humane Islamic society' by social activism in such forms as professional associations and charitable work such as health/medical assistance, housing, poor relief, earthquake relief and so on (Baker, 1997: 122-8).

Consequently, these developments together helped form a new 'consciousness' by and through mass and higher education, and an ever expanding vista for mass communication through print and electronic media that resulted in an increasing influence of the Islamic identity upon otherwise detached people (Lapidot, 1997: 67-70). This new socio-religious environment gradually turned into a politically rewarding supply line for the politicians of the centre and religious right parties (i.e. the majority of the political spectrum). Not surprisingly then, the parties in question politicized Islam by competing over the Islamic electorate. They
employed religiously informed rhetorical strategies and located Islamic discourse in the political debate. Thus, particularly in the 1990s, although Islam had not been 'the language of modern Turkish politics, Turkey's political language has been Islamicized' (Yavuz, 1997a: 73, italics added).

Within this context, political aspect of Islamic identity of the 1990s overtly manifested by a political struggle through the institution of party politics (Yavuz, 1997a). In fact, political uses of Islam have already started with the institution of competitive party politics in 1950; centre-right parties closed in to the religious groups for political purposes and partially voiced their demands. It was the brief Refah Party government (1996-1997), however, which was able to flesh out the demands of religious expression of the electorate (Karabasoglu, 2000: 45-7). It was their Islamic-centred political discourse and policies that touched the raw nerve of the secularist establishment of the state and provoked the ensuing security measures, which led in only one year to the outpost of the party in 1997 from government and the outlawing of the party a year later in 1998 (see Chapter 4). Before analyzing the impact of religio-political identity through the Refah Party, a brief account of the political-historical background is pertinent.

**Political Sources of Religious Identity**

Following the Second World War, there gradually emerged a public resentment against the 'visibility and effective control' of Turkish modern centralist state, which had made its grip over society overwhelming across the country through its national-secular one-party regime (1924-45). Widespread discontent with the latter's radically secularist policies such as enforcing the Turkish translation of ezan (invitation to prayer), increasing alienation and resentment against the state, the changing socio-economic pressures for change, external (US) pressure to democratize helped make possible Turkey's entry into the multi-party period in 1946 and democracy in 1950 (Zurcher, 1997: 215-9).

First the augmentation of the multi-party system in 1945 and later on the fully competitive elections in the early 1950s facilitated bringing the socio-political periphery to the political center with a new political discourse as an alternative to the elitist state discourse. The latter was much typified by the Republican People's Party (RPP/CHP) from its establishment in 1923 onwards. The CHP's political tone represented secularist and modernist views of 'the state-based civil and military bureaucracy' and posed as 'the sole party of the authoritarian
regime that prevailed for the next 27 years' (Tachau 2000: 129-30). Positioning themselves away from both the political centre represented by the RPP and the civilian-military bureaucracy, the emergent Democratic Party and its successor the Justice Party in the 1960s began to voice the concerns of the peripheral traditional constituencies and later in the 1970s and 1980s their repressed religious-social demands in the public realm (Mardin, 1990: 71-7). Consequently, after 1950, the political importance and the demands of the lay person/voter were increasingly felt. Furthermore, the so-called ‘ruralizing election’ of 1950 in Turkey pioneered the impact of the identity of traditional-rural constituencies and helped affect an upward mobilization of the ‘peasant masses’ in the Turkish political system, which has been characterized by Samuel Huntington as a classical example of ‘Green Uprising’ (1968: 75). However, contrary to Huntington’s expectations, the ‘Green Uprising’ did not result in the stability of the Turkish political system (Tachau, 1971; Tamkoc, 1973). The military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980 disrupted periodically the political socialization of the masses: ideological polarization and weak party identification ensued. For after each military coup ideological politics was suppressed, democratic channels were extremely constrained, political parties were closed and all these resulted in weak party identification. Partly for this reason, political opportunism and political patronage became prominent features of the Turkish political system (Carkoglu, 1998: 546). As Sozen and Shaw observed (2003: 114) ‘Having affiliations with large groups, such as families, religious groups (tarikat), political parties…provide security, and hence are seen as very useful, and functional’. These political and administrative elements in turn led to patron-client relations between political elites and the electorate. This type of relationship also ‘filled a vacuum in the absence of legal/rational relations in Turkey’s public administration’ (Sozen and Shaw, 2003: 112).

These enabling and constraining developments notwithstanding, a crucial development for individual identity orientation in the new competitive political environment was that the political utility and moral status of the ordinary person changed. It shifted from simply being a ‘subject’ of the state to being ‘the electorate’, thus assuming a politically important position. Turkish party politics was initially characterized by ‘intra-elitist conflicts rather than through the materialization of the cleavages of society in the national political life’ (Sayari, 1978: 40; Heper, 1993: 35). This began to change especially in the Democratic Party rule between 1950 and 1960. Competitive politics began to openly court the religious vote; all parties ‘turned to Turkey’s oft-forgotten [religious] man and his family-the peasant majority of Turkey’ (Reed, 1954: 71). Democratic Party, whose political leadership was not from periphery and rarely
assiduously cultivated the support of Muslim vote, was nonetheless clearly sympathetic to religious demands and helped relieve some of the restrictions placed upon Islamic expressions. Centre-right parties too represented the religious constituencies but did not cultivate an explicitly Islamic-political discourse or helped contribute to the formation of an Islamic-political identity. Within this context, the expressions of Islamic identity gradually thrived and expanded from private into the official political space of the country. This climaxed in June 1996 with the arrival of the first government led by an Islamic leader affiliated to an Islamic-oriented political party in modern Turkish history.

**Politicization of Religious Identity: The Refah Party Experiment**

The Islamist Refah Party was not the first religious party in the political scene that attempted to tap into the religious sensitivities of the populace. There was initially the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*) that was established in 1970. It established its political identity by an overtly espoused 'Islamist political philosophy' and opened its first congress with cries of 'Allah-u Ekber' (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1988: 14). However, this party was soon outlawed and closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1972 on charges of anti-secularism, that is, for violating the articles in the constitution that guaranteed secularism by outlawing the political use of religion. A follow-up party, the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP*) was formed in 1972 by the same party cadre (Sunar and Toprak, 1983: 432). The MSP wanted to re-Islamize socio-cultural life in Turkey and managed to get this message heard as well by acquiring 11.8 per cent of the total vote in 1973 elections becoming the third major party in the parliament (Toprak, 1993: 635). Throughout the 1970s, this openly religious party in secularist Turkey was able to participate in three coalition governments. Yet, its presence in these coalition governments did not produce any meaningfully distinct 'Islamic' policy outcomes and instead generally took part in the secular policies of other coalition partners. Its lack of (Islamic) influence in these governments notwithstanding, the party was overall successful in establishing itself firmly in the Turkish political scene.

Perhaps the most notable factor behind the success of these early experiences of Islamic political identity was its ability to integrate the peripheral groups into the political system by using Islam as a rallying cry. The party's Islamist political discourse appeared in this regard as an antithesis of the secularist modern nationalist centre. Their call for rapid heavy industrialization and an economy free of foreign capital based upon an interest free banking system were informed by its 'Islamic culturalism' (Ahmad, 1993: 158-9).
party was able to provide an alternative recipe for the increasingly alienated, traumatized, underprivileged and atomized individual of the capitalist-materialist system by offering the brotherhood of the Islamic community (Toprak, 1993: 636-7; Onis, 1997: 749). This aim failed to materialize though. For the MSP was dissolved in 1981 by the military leaders of the 1980 coup. However, the Islamic political orientation reappeared in 1983 (when the military regime ended) as another party all but in name. The Refah Party was born.

The electoral success of the Refah Party became increasingly apparent by the early 1990s. It had already shown its growing political muscle by winning the municipal elections of 27 March 1994 in major cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, Kayseri, Diyarbakir and Trabzon. Concerned over this success, Turkey's Europhile centre-right parties, namely the 'Motherland' and 'True Path', launched a campaign of subversive, dismissive and inflammatory rhetoric about the Islamic identity of the RP in order to scare and hold back the electorate in the 1995 general election process. Uninterrupted by these misgivings, the RP participated successfully in the general election of 1995 along with other mainstream liberal-conservative secularist parties. The RP emerged the first in the national elections in 24 December 1995 by winning 21.1 percent of the vote and gaining 158 seats in the 550-seat Turkish parliament or Grand National Assembly. The mainstream Motherland Party was able to secure only behind the Refah Party (Turkish Daily News, 26 December 1995).

There were a number of factors behind the RP's considerable success, such as its ability to appeal to the voters on economic grounds. The Refah Party was able to garner support from especially underprivileged working and lower middle classes by capitalizing on the harsh economic conditions of the 1990s, which included the troubles of privatization, job losses, decreasing salaries/wages, the annual rate of inflation running at 110 percent and massive devaluation of currency in April 1994, which doubled all prices (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1997: 150; Gulalp, 1997b). The Refah Party offered new avenues in economy and culture and appeared more attractive since it did not share the same discursive universe with the other parties (Sayyid, 1994: 264). As Karnrava underlines, by engaging into politics 'With a populist image, a vaguely Islamic platform, and an impressive organizational set-up actively trying to attract members and supporters, the party largely succeeded in distinguishing itself from the rest of the field' (1998: 276). Crucially, the newcomers in the economy comprised a new conservative bourgeoisie, represented by a peak business organization, the Association of Independent Businessmen (MUSIAD) as an alternative business establishment to the
economically strong and politically influential big business (i.e. TUSIAD) (Onis, 2001; Bugra, 1998). This association and some other newly emerged small-scale provincial economic actors and the petite bourgeoisie of big cities opposed to the state in financing of the rich and in its interventions (Onis, 1997: 750). The new conservative business groups were dubbed the 'Anatolian tigers' or 'Anatolian bourgeoisie', whose ideology was 'socially Islamic', but as well 'economically liberal' (Bugra, 1998: 529-33). They voiced their dissent principally through Islamic idioms, symbols and ethics 'as the best weapon to generate public opinion against the state and big industrialists' (Yavuz, 1997a: 72). Additionally, in its opposition to the Kemalist and secularist political centre, the new conservative businessmen sided with other religious peripheral groups. The latter, as Yavuz observes,

[i]dentify with Ottoman-Islam traditions. Moreover, Sufi orders play a key role in their developing business connections and facilitate their penetration into the economy. The Turkish [Islamic] Naksibendi leaders, like Senegal's murids, employ traditional network systems to pursue modern capital formation. For example, some food items produced by one of the leading firms in the country, Ulker Inc., are distributed by the [Islamic] Nurcu groups in Anatolia and the central Asian republics' (1997a:72-3).

Especially beginning with such centre-right parties as the Justice Party (1961-81), some religious orders (especially the Naksibendi order) began to act as important lobbying groups and supported mainstream political parties, which provided them with access to governmental patronage resources' (Sayari, 1978: 56). Significantly, this clientalistic close relationship also meant placing by these parties men of religious communities in various positions in state bureaucracy, which was in turn seen as part of a general strategy of different Islamic organizations for 'protection against threats from state and secular forces' and gradually led to 'Islamicize the state' (Ayata, 1996: 48).

As the visibility of this project of 'Islamization of the state' at party political level grew and challenged the existing political power structure, it has led to the reinforcement of the state identity of secularism and constituted one basic source of confrontation between the state and such parties. This was basically so, because the secularist state elites were apprehensive of the success of the RP from the beginning and gradually took up such security measures to confront the party, as explained in Chapter 4. Indeed, the existence of the Refah Party in power as the senior coalition partner was in itself sufficient enough to raise tension in the circles of secular elites. However, as argued in Chapter 2, state elites remained committed to a
(rationalist) conception of democracy and tolerated within certain limits such a success by a religiously informed party.

**The Refah Party in Power**

Short of power to grant a mandate to form a government on an outright basis, the RP nonetheless managed to become a dominant partner of a coalition government with the centre-right True Path Party on 28 June 1996. The latter’s Europhile leader Tansu Ciller had been initially reluctant to form a coalition with the Islamist RP. Nonetheless, partly to thwart the threat of parliamentary investigation into her corruption accusations, Ciller agreed to form the coalition government with Refah. This government included dominant pro-Islamic elements. Indeed, this was the very first Islamist government ever in power in a staunchly secular state. The veteran outspoken Islamist leader of the party Necmettin Erbakan became the Prime Minister of Turkey after almost three decades of his party’s political struggle (*Birikim*, November 1996).

In particular, when this religious-based political language attracted masses and yielded the most dramatic electoral success in the form of an Islamist-led coalition government in the summer of 1996, secularist alarm bells went off loudly (Salt, 1999: 72-8). The RP’s religious discourse together with its alternative non-Western foreign policy orientations proved effective in the emergence of the confrontation with the secularist state elites (Ayata, 2004).

**The Refah Party’s Political Agenda: Islamization as a Programme and Project**

The crucial implication of the RP’s electoral success in Turkey was that its overt and powerful presence in the political space was perceived as the success of its Islamic leanings. Despite the secularist anxieties, the Refah Party did not promote the disestablishment of the Turkish Republic, nor did it diverge from nation-state model (Zubaida, 1996: 12; Heper, 1997; Salt, 1999: 72-8). However, although it is a gross mistake to equate Islam with this party, the secular identity carriers (especially the civilian and military bureaucracy in Turkey) perceived it this way (Keyman and Heper, 1998). They *identified* the party as a representative of the country’s ‘irrational’ and ‘backward’ past. Thus, the cardinal concern since 1923 of the central powers of the secularist state, spearheaded by the military became real: men of religion had obtained key political posts (Toprak, 1993: 625). Indeed, this political success was alarming for the secularist ruling elites. It was for the first time that a party with an Islamic political philosophy had come to power. This amounted to be a threatening turning
point in the country’s republican history and generated concerns over the secular ‘nature of
the state’.

By coming to power in 1996, the RP had demonstrated its ability to package its cultural,
political and economic program as constituting the single most popular alternative position on
the political arena fraught with corrupt mainstream secular political parties (Gulalp, 1997b:
58-61). The RP also asserted ‘the superiority of Islamic over Western values’ and its main
political rhetoric read as ‘there are not several parties in Turkey; there are only two: Refah
and all the others who unite in aping the West’ (Gulalp, 1995: 54). The Refah party promised
that at the international level, for instance, the state policy of joining the EU was to be
replaced by the inception of an Islamic Common Market (Erbakan, 1991: 91).

The most alarming for the secular state elites was another radical proposal: a new political-
legal restructuring of the state and state’s relationship to the society. A new legal order based
on ‘multiple legal orders’, for instance, was to grant each community the right to perform and
implement its own laws and conventions within their respective legal system (Gulalp, 1999:
38-40). Plurality of legal system was adopted in the 1993 party convention and threatened the
unitary nation-statehood. The former inspired from religious universe and leaning, came
directly to conflict with the state’s uncompromising secular western unitary legal system. It
also meant a diminishing role for and a reformulation of the state’s most valued principles,
namely secularism. To this end, the RP proposed in the parliament a constitutional
amendment to the principle of secularism, the most sacred doctrine of the republic (Gulalp,
1995).

The Refah Party’s program viewed society in line with its religious outlook and brotherhood
and rather as a harmonious and totalizing entity and practically ignored the social and
economic cleavages underlying Turkey’s society. Instead, the party’s view on the latter
foresaw a ‘congruence of interests between workers and employers, government administers
and the people, doctors and patients, and lawyers and clients’ (Kamrava, 1998: 289).
Moreover, in a strikingly similar line with the secular ruling Kemalist rendition of Turkish
society as cohesion and solidarity, the Refah Party’s definition of ‘people’ was largely based
on the religious identity of being Muslim, which took shape as ‘an organic, collective union
regardless of class or ethnic divisions. It highlights Islamic solidarity...society, for the party,
is composed of Muslims who are unified subjectively by their shared Islamic faith’ (Yavuz,
The party’s discursive universe revolved around various conceptions of the ‘good life’ that are politically crafted, strategically chosen and defined mostly in Islamic idioms (Gulalp, 1997a; 1997b). In essence, this idea of an ‘Islamic union’ and other religious attachment to the party is due much less to a well-articulated religious political system (which was lacking anyway) than its use ‘as a communication system and metaphysical basis of justice’ in garnering the support of the electorate. However, the party elites also discerned a rather state-centric rendition of Islamic idiom, which catered to an entrenched nationalism including such interesting articulations ‘powerful state with religious society’ rather than, say, political and cultural diversity (Gulalp, 1999). This seemed to confirm the observation that such religious activities and strategies generally ‘assume the space of a centralized modern [nation] state, and are directed at its institutions and powers’ (Zubaida, 1993: 50). The party leader Erbakan had his mantra; ‘come, regardless of your background come, whatever you are, you should come, come and internalize our identity in due time’. This invitation was, it is to be noted, not for changing the party platform through the invited individuals’ cultural plurality but to ‘mold and shape individuals’ within the party (Yavuz, 1997a: 75).

As regards to the identity orientations in security governmentality, it is worthwhile to note that like much dissenting discourse in Turkey, the RP was not employing a rhetorical stance against the top-down transformative schema of the ‘Westernization’ project (i.e., social engineering) as undertaken by the Kemalist state elite (Keyder, 1997: 39-46). The RP was rather following the footsteps of the Kemalist elites’ attempts to enforce particular subjectivities. The difference they seemed to propose was that the direction of the subjectivity production scheme should be changed towards the right one: their own ‘National View’ (Kadioglu, 1998b; Dagi, 1998: 25). The ensuing confrontation was one of substance and identity-orientation rather than of a method. That is, the method seemed similar.

The Refah Party’s Foreign Policy Discourse

Another crucial aspect of the Refah discourse and policies concerned foreign policy orientations and objectives. Particularly in the 1990s, it became obvious that the party had a global agenda through which it redefined its national outlook and gained a basic source of political power, thanks to the increasing Islamic sensitivities among the populace after the ineffective Western responses to the Bosnian tragedy and the conflict in Chechnya (Dagi, 1998: 30). In so doing, the RP also acted against the established parameters and objectives of
Turkish foreign policy. As in domestic politics, its discourses and policies were constantly juxtaposed with the established state policies.

The RP had a controversial stand in regard to Turkey's 'role' in world politics in the 1990s. The party leadership claimed that when viewed in historical and cultural terms, Turkey was not a 'Western' country but belonged to the 'Islamic world'. This view also represented the party's official viewpoint, which was not based upon Western models of nationalism, socialism or liberalism but rather Turkey's 'own values and culture' that finds its expression in the so-called party manifesto 'National View'. The latter term referred to a conceptual and historical idea/that drove mainly from the notion of a 'just [Islamic] order' and the Ottoman era respectively (Dagi, 1998: 25; 2005). Clearly, this vision contained a strong dose of criticism of the present modern secular social and political structures, which were brought in as a result of the 'Westernization' project of the early 1920s. For instance, Erbakan stated that the 1991 election was not a mere struggle for power but also 'the struggle over right [civilization] and wrong [civilization] and the most important event at this historical moment' (Refah Party Election Declaration, 1991: 3).

In line with its civilizational essentialist approach that defined Turkey, its history and people; the Refah Party proposed a radically different political philosophy in foreign policy stemming from its Islamic worldview, which came straightforwardly to challenge the traditional 'Western' oriented foreign policy making. Erbakan perceived the Turkish Foreign Ministry as consisting of a 'gentlemen salon', alienated from the country's own culture (Caylan, 1996: 55). The party's new foreign policy discourse juxtaposed the long established state foreign policy of westernization through membership into western institutions. Erbakan on various occasions called the Turkish state nothing but an 'imitator' of the West.

The RP in its 1995 general election declaration denounced the 'dependent' Western-oriented foreign policy, and pledged to craft a new one deriving from Turkey's 'own cultural imperatives'. This new foreign policy was to be 'independent' and 'historically honorable' helping Turkey to be a leader in world politics. Siding neither with the West nor with the Socialist East, the RP's leadership found more comfort in the 'Third Worldist perspective' - a position from which Western values and its imperialism could be attacked and all other parties could be labelled as 'imitators of the West' (Onis, 1997: 753). Rejecting any future membership of the EU, Refah's foreign policy was said instead to reflect an 'Islamic
transnationalism', which foresaw the brotherhood and cooperation within the Islamic world (Onis, 1997: 754). This aim was in stark contrast with the secularist state target of siding with the western world. Particularly in relation to the EU, the Refah party held that there could be economic relations with European states, however, when it came to political integration, the RP clearly refused to accept it (Dagi, 1998: 89-91).

Some of its international perspectives seemed to have been constructed as an alternative to the EU model, which was believed to reflect a ‘Christian culture’, whereas ‘Islamic unity’ would instead be based on a ‘common Islamic perspective’. According to one of the party veterans, Oguzhan Asilturk (quoted in Dagi, 1998: 81), Turkey in this unified Islamic world model could provide an effective model to be followed by the other yet-to-be-revived Muslim states. This new discourse was of role-model for Muslim nations not only different to the established secular Western-oriented foreign policy objectives of the Turkish state, but represented a clear challenge to it. This mapping also clearly demonstrated an ambitious attempt to realize an international Islamic moral community. The ruling RP’s already alarming domestic political moves were hence accompanied with such overconfident foreign policy statements, which in turn shocked the secular establishments, most notably the military (Akpinar, 2001: 178).

Envisaging an Islamic-civilizational community of nations, the RP took on board the practical steps to achieve the goal of establishing an Islamic sort of EU in the form of a pan-Islamic association of the ‘Developing Eight’ amongst the most developed Muslim countries (Onis, 1997; 2001). In this regard, the RP’s leader paid his first international visit to the two most notoriously ‘anti-systemic’ states in the region, Libya and Iran. At the domestic level, these visits were interpreted by many as revealing the ‘real intention’ of the party to derail Turkish state’s European/Western voyage by aligning itself with the Islamic world. Many secular circles and state elites observed these two visits as official welcoming and reception of political Islam by the RP at the national and international scene. This and other foreign policy initiatives served no more than an ‘alarming call’ to secular circles (Milliyet, 07 October 1996; Hurriyet, 07 October 1996). As such, political Islam has constituted the most serious ‘security problem’ for the state. Why has this been so?

5.3. SECULARISM AND ISLAMISM: LOGIC OF CONFRONTATION
The rise of Islamist electoral forces in the early 1990s and onwards brought in a distinct political polarization and tension between ‘the secularists’ and ‘the Islamists’ in Turkey. In the process of confrontation, the secular state elites have deployed a missionary agency for themselves as being ‘progressive secular forces’ against political Islam, which represented ‘relic’ identity orientations of the old Ottoman theocratic regime (Savas, 2001a). The perception of Islamic political identity as the number one security threat to the country has been officialized and legalized in Turkey’s National Security Policy Document (see Chapter 2.5), which was prepared by the military and approved by the National Security Council in 1997 (Jenkins, 2001: 48-9). Consequently, Turkish secular state elites have engaged with the Refah Party’s Islamic political identity in a security mentality and in the discourse of war (Bozarslan, 2000: 70). In other words, the secularist state forces took up the Islamist challenge from the perspective of a new war front, namely a ‘New War of Liberation’ reminiscent of its ‘War of Liberation’ against the Allied Powers after the Second World War (Turkish Daily News, 09 January 1999)\(^1\).

For the secularist state forces, Islamic political identity has been but an ‘obscurantist’ political orientation, bent on destroying the secular foundation of the Turkish Republic. Nothing best summarizes the general view of the secularists about the Refah Party experience than the words of Turkey’s former chief prosecutor Vural Savas. In his application to the Constitutional Court for disbanding the Refah Party, Vural Savas accused it of constituting the greatest danger to the constitutional foundations of the Turkish state. He put a particular emphasis on the party’s views regarding its discourses particularly on the need to relax the strictly observed controversial ban on women dress codes (i.e. the ban that forbids women wearing the headscarf in vaguely described ‘public spaces’, including, for instance, universities). He claimed that such religious discourses of the Refah Party represent the ‘real intentions’ of establishing an Islamic state. This way, he reckoned that the Refah ran foul of Article 68 of the Turkish Constitution, which requires political parties to observe the principle of secularism. Thereby he claimed that the Refah Party represented ‘the greatest danger of obscurantism Turkish Republic has ever faced in its history’ (quoted in Savas, 2001: 347). Upon these accusations, the Constitutional Court disbanded the party in January 1998.

\(^1\) The same could be said of a much-publicized new novel: ‘Su Cilgin Turkler’ [Those Crazy Turks] that dramatizes the Turkish War of Independence and implicitly recontextualizes it within the contemporary national/international political developments and agenda of the ‘Islamists’ and imperialist EU.
The specific connection between security and secularism in security governmentality is complex as will be seen. Secularization has been conceived first and foremost as a political requisite for the state to survive, thrive and prosper. The resultant repercussions, unsurprisingly, go well beyond and even against the rationale of State-Religion separation as defined in the liberal tradition. In other words, secularism's essential value-laden connotation for the Turkish state elites does not seem to derive from being a necessary facilitator of national, economic and democratic development but rather from its relation with the political security of Turkish state. Secularism of the state elites, in this context, has also been informed by the historical memories of political insecurities, which stemmed from the dismemberment of the Ottoman political structure (Candar, 2000; Jung and Piccoli, 2000, also see Chapter 2.2). For the state elites, the ground of the state's survival, fortitude and endurance can come only with sticking at all cost to the secular nature of the state.

The distinguishing feature of the secularist reaction to Islamic political identity was that the latter was constituted as a 'security threat' by the state. Anyone carrying an explicit Islamic political identity has rarely been taken to be a legitimate actor in their struggles. They were instead 'assumed' to be representatives of religious sects and/or orientations, whose 'repulsive', 'retrogressive', 'obscurantist' and 'dangerous' political intentions were to eventually destroy the state's existence (see Savas, 2001a; 2001b). Islamists were constituted as perpetrators of a 'security threat' posed to the state's treasured political principle namely secularism. Attributing such images as 'obscurantism' to this otherwise vigorous political movement in the country, the state elites thought it a 'relic' of pre-modern past; as the bearer of an 'irrational' past. In the secular state discourse, the awakening of religious identities in public space is hence not represented as an occurrence of freedom of expression of individual citizens or religious obligations or personal choice. Instead, those sensibilities appear as political practice and as 'security threats' to the foundations of secularism. Secularism is construed not simply as a matter of political principle, but as a matter of 'life and death'. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk expressed the connection between secularism and Turkey's survival in these words: 'those nations who try to follow the superstitions of the Middle Ages are condemned to be destroyed or at least to become enslaved and debased' (quoted in Kasaba, 1997: 26).

Turkey's 'civilizing project' along with the 'Western values' carved out and bipolarized the political space between the Westernized and Islamized (Gole, 1997a; 1997b). This space has
in turn been concurrently used for the state intervention into the deeds and lives of the society to 'rectify' those who do not confide (Yavuz, 2000a; 2000b). The effect on security governmentality of such a bifurcation of the society along with 'western' and 'oriental' is twofold. Firstly, by rendering identities subordinate/hierarchical and under/privileged it helps construct the selves of the ruling Kemalist elites as civilizing agents and the selves of the ruled as the blank slate. As Nilufer Gole argued, the secularist elites undertook a governing and civilizing mission over their 'primitive' counterparts in the society, which lacks their 'western' attributes (1997a; 1997b). Gole explains the formation of this civilizing mission inside the polity with reference to the construction of barbarians. As regards the issue of barbarism, she argues that

An irony of history is that the Turks, who for centuries symbolized to Europeans the barbarian, Muslim other, are now trying to enter the arena of the ‘civilized’ in part by inventing their own “barbarians” in the form of, first, the Muslims, and second, the Kurds (Gole, 1997b: 85).

At the political level, the demands of these ‘invented /imagined barbarians’ for recognition are not only discarded as ‘relic’, but also as illegitimate and dangerous ‘security threats’ to the unity and secular nature of the state. Through this type of threat construction, the attribution of ‘normal’ to secular and ‘abnormal’ to (political) Islam crucially breeds a security dimension, which helps frame the debate on secular vs. religious in Turkey. The particular security logic here explains that ‘abnormal’ attributes of a society could be detrimental to the existence and strength of the state, just as the ‘pathological’ would be dangerous for a ‘healthy’ body. Here, Islamic public visibility ‘creates such a malaise because it has corporeal, ocular, and spiritual dimension’ (Gole, 2002: 182). Thereafter, a binary logic prevails. That is, the secular/western identity of the state elites is constructed as ‘normal’ against the religious/non-modern attributes of society, which are thought as ‘pathological’ and/or ‘abnormal’. This rendition in turn forms the main constitutive component of the discourse of state security. This juxtaposition also becomes a recurrent theme in the identity discourse of the Turkish state. The utilization of this theme, in turn, constitutes one main component in contemplating the (legitimacy of) subject positions of actors in politics. In order to illustrate this kind of juxtaposition of identities in security governmentality, a case is presented below.
5.4. A CASE STUDY IN THE IDENTITY DIMENSION OF SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY: THE HEADDRESS AS A ‘SECURITY THREAT’

It can be asserted that political Islam and secularism are of crucial significance in understanding how identities are rendered under/privileged and subjected to state practices in Turkey. As explained above, there is also an operational security logic involved in the representation of these identities. That is, the symbolically constructed, enforced and appropriated expressions of secular identity for men and especially women is taken as a positive-constitutive component of the ‘idea of the state’ and of public space, while an Islamic identity is taken as a different conception of a life-world and as a challenge (Gole, 2002: 184-7). The reason for this is that the secular ideal in Turkey is in part transmitted through the images of a westernized woman. As Nilufer Gole contends:

> Every revolution defines an ideal man, but for the Kemalist revolution, it is the image of an ideal woman that has become the symbol of the reforms... Even more than the strengthening of judicial and human rights, it is the status of women as public citizens and women's rights in general that are the backbone of Kemalist reforms. The participation of women in the public sphere necessitates, in the opinion of the modernists, taking off the veil, establishing compensatory coeducation, granting women's suffrage, and the social mixing of men and women (Gole, 1997b: 86).

In this regard, any challenge but especially symbolically staked and publicly visible Islamic identity challenges such as the practice of headscarf wearing can easily become a ‘security threat’ to the state. For a female citizen the taking off the veil (headscarf) comes as the first and foremost task in order to participate in the public sphere. In other words, if a woman does not take off the headscarf she will still be ignored and even criminalized because of her action of entering into the public realm by wearing headscarf. Conflict over outward expressions of identity extends to the body and presentations of the self in the Turkish context, evident in such labels as the ‘civilized and uncivilized bodies’ or ‘White and Black Turks’ (Yumrul, 2000).

Specifically, for the secularists the ‘true’ body imagery for woman requires the so-called western dress codes. On the other hand, alternative (not necessarily non-secular) articulations of body and dress (for instance, in Islam) entertain their own ‘true’ ethics and aesthetics, somewhat in a different mould bearing symbols such as the headscarf. These differences in body conceptions may not only generate ‘cognitive dissonances’ but in some cases also severe
political conflicts between the two sides. Consider the headscarf issue in Turkey: While the headscarf is mostly worn by women as an expression of their *Muslim identity* (Bulac, 2004), this religious attire can be taken by the secularist Kemalist state elites as a symbol of *Islamization* together with the not-so-benign political implications that might follow from this (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 116; Gole, 2002).

One exemplary representation of the conflicting visions of secular and religious appeared in earnest in the Turkish Parliament under the label the 'headscarf crisis' in May 1999. This was about the headscarf worn by the newly elected female member of the 'Islamist' Fazilet Party (successor of the then disbanded Refah Party). This MP was named Merve Kavakci, a thirty one year old female MP. As she entered into the parliament for the swearing-in ceremony on 2 May 1999 suddenly a concerted, noisy and dramatic protest against her burst out. Angry MPs, mostly from the government in power, but also from other oppositional parties in the parliament, stood up in the name of Kemalist secularism and shouted at her in protest (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 115).

Soon the 'protestors' incursion turned into a dance-macabre. It became obvious that this noisy uproar was all about her perceived 'dangerous and threatening' appearance, literally about her dress code or more correctly about her headscarf. The 'crisis' broke out because she was wearing an unacceptable piece of religious attire, a *headscarf*. Her political ideas did not pose a 'security threat', presumably, since she described herself as a democrat rather than an 'Islamist'. Indeed, her formal political identity did not generate the crisis as such, not least because she was legally eligible for being an MP in the first place; she and her party were simply operating within the legal parameters of party politics in Turkey. Further confusion about the nature of the crisis was the fact she was actually wearing an otherwise modern style outfit that was almost identical with the other elected 'modern-secular' female MPs. She was wearing a white headscarf with fashionable frameless eyeglasses and a long-skirted, modern two-piece suit. She was a computer engineer, lived in the United States and was divorced with two children. As such, she somewhat demonstrated an ability to acquire access to 'powerful symbols of modernity and was simultaneously engaged in Islamic politics' (Gole, 2002: 180). The 'problem' with her though was precisely that she was wearing a headscarf at the same time as the rest of her otherwise modern dress. Arguably without the headscarf she would have been perfectly welcomed into the parliament. The crux of the mater was that her headscarf was literally taken to be something 'dangerous' to the modern- secular public space,
that is, the Turkish Parliament (Gole, 2002: 178). Kavakci's personal Islamic identity in the Turkish authoritarian modernity appeared incongruent with the political rationality of the Kemalist secularism, as Gole argued:

Instead of assimilating to the secular regime of women's emancipation, they press for their embodied difference (e.g., Islamic dress) and their public visibility (e.g., in schools, in Parliament) and create disturbances in modern social imaginaries. Islamic women hurt the feelings of modern women and upset the status quo; they are playing with ambivalence, being both Muslim and modern without wanting to give up one for the other. They are outside a regime of imitation, crucial of both subservient traditions and assimilative modernity (2002: 181).

The headscarf represented something of a 'dangerous threat' to the secular public space and then to the state. In other words, because the parliament was supposed to be a secular space and a symbol of the Turkish state; it was held that the ethical precepts of the state and secularism should be policed at all costs even against the representatives of the people. Those who did not conform were to be disciplined and punished by the 'secularists system' of which parliamentarians were part. Such was the reason behind this stormy and noisy protest.

Astonishingly, her troublesome presence in the parliament did not last long. Then PM Bulent Ecevit and other MPs from other parties urged her to even leave the parliament before taking the traditional MP's oath. Indeed after a while, she could not take the oath because of the deafening verbal assaults and physical obstruction and she was soon forced to leave the parliament. She had de facto lost her title as an MP. Sometime later, her exclusion from the polity was also legally legitimized with her dismissal even from Turkish citizenship. (Hurriyet, 03 May 1999, p.1, 15; Milliyet, 03 May 1999, p.1, 10; Radikal, 03 May 1999, p.1, 6; Foreign Policy, 115(Summer) 1999, p.9; Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 115; Gole, 2002: 173-190; Interview with Merve Kavakci, Kanal D 15 November 2005).

This successful securitization of her Islamic identity and the controversy around her headscarf was allowed by the logic of confrontation explained above. Specific details of the process of confrontation went as follows. After an Iranian demonstration in support of her, PM Ecevit stated that 'Iran is continually trying to export its regime to Turkey' (Jung and Piccoli, 2000: 93, italics added). Later, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel named Kavakci as an 'agent-provocateur' under the service of foreign powers 'presumably Iran or some other western powers' (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 115). Along with this, there came highly variant allegations
from the mainstream media against her identity such as her alleged 'link with Hamas and CIA' two of which were for 'undermining' the unity of the Turkish state all the time anyway (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 115). But the most dramatic and provocative reaction came from Turkey's Chief Republican State Prosecutor Vural Savas, who had initially put the case to the constitutional court to disband the Refah Party's successor the Fazilet Party. He charged that she was an agent of Islamic states, which reminded him of 'vampires feeding only on blood' (Jung and Piccoli, 2000: 93).

Later, after a further series of securitizing moves by the secular establishment, her title as a MP was soon legally stripped away from her, because of the Constitutional Court decision on allegations of misconduct. This ousting was generally welcome by the secularist state elites and other forces including the mainstream newspapers (Hurriyet, 04 May 1999, p.1; Milliyet, 04 May 1999, p.1). Thus the state elites had successfully interpreted Kavakci's act (entering the parliament with a headscarf) as a security threat to the 'secular nature' of the state.

The point of this episode is that such reactions cannot be simply dismissed as merely individual or psychological reactions by the state elites. As explained in this chapter, these and other similar reactions can be understood as reactions by the powerful secularist state elites against the perceived failings of their ideal 'healthy' image of modern secular Turkish women (mostly understood as headscarf-free) and with that the Turkish Republican political project thereof (see Savas, 2001a; 2001b). Overall, such impositions or descriptions of the headscarf employed by the prosecutor and other top officials help not only to securitize the culture of the masses but also to reinforce the dubious image of the Islamic identity orientation as a dark, gloomy and sinister figure lurking in the shadows, which waits to strike at a proper time against the security of the state. Such strategies are quintessentially relevant in reproducing insecurity among the public, which can then consent to whatever is done to achieve 'securitization' successfully.

SUMMARY

The chapter has argued that the identity dimension in security governmentality comes with and revolves around mainly two orientations. These two identity constellations are the secularist state identity and political Islam. These orientations are distributed as two of the most effective identity orientations for the individuals and groups concerned. The chapter
identified these two identity orientations, the conflictual space in between, the ensuing political confrontation and the relevant security discourse as the ethical-political space in security governmentality from the second-half of 1990s onwards. These two identity orientations are crucial for the discussion of security governmentality because the confrontational space they produce has been the most notable constitutive and intervening component in the discourses and practices of state security. The secularists here are the ruling Kemalist state elites, which include the military, some parts of the state bureaucracy, also certain civil society associations, bankers, professors and artists. The Islamic political identity, on the other hand, is mostly an expression in the form of party politics. It also refers to a cultural space of Islamic networks of communication and dissemination through newspapers, books, television channels together which help constitute an Islamic ‘counter-elites’.

In order to understand the security aspect of the political furor that this confrontation between the secular and the religious sets off, the chapter investigated the processes of secular vs. Islamic identification, the interface of these juxtaposed identities and their effect upon the country’s socio-political divide. The emphasis upon this confrontation does not imply a primordial or in-built necessity for conflict though. Rather it refers to a politically constructed conflictual space between these two identity groups. At stake between the secularist identity and the expressions of religious identity is a disagreement on the role and scope of political intervention into the lives of the population. A particular emphasis is placed upon the dialogical relationship between secular and Islamic identities (for example over attire/headscarf) to help reveal how groups and individuals come to represent, constitute and attach meaning to their collective and self-identity.

In all, the chapter aimed to show how these identity structures acquire different meanings especially when they are crafted in a security language, which is articulated in a particular logic and space of conflict. It is in this latter conflictual logic and space that social and personal identities gain in political purchase, which is a crucial element for security governmentality. That is, the interface between secular and Islamic identities codify and reinforce political antagonisms to the extent that personal life-conduct and choices of dress become no longer a matter of taste but an issue spectacularly related to political survival of the state via state security discourses. This, in turn, contributes to the ways in which state power and control are exercised upon the body politic. In this way, the study of identification via dress provides valuable analytical tools for advancing our understanding of the
relationship between security and identity/appearances, particularly that of the securitization of images. Another important undercurrent in the discussion is about the ways the state elites in security governmentality find interventionist inroads into the private and public conduct. This confrontation between the secularist identity of Turkey's political centre and the peripheral religious identity orientations in the thesis's analytical framework lays the fertile groundwork for such techniques to be executed (see Chapter 4). Effectively, it is through these inroads that the secular establishment successfully resorts to a series of security techniques in Turkish politics.

To sum, the investigation of these processes of identification is of crucial relevance for the study of security governmentality in Turkey. This is so, because the relevant matrix of collective and confrontational identity formation constitutes the field within which security governmentality operates. Significantly, it is within this operational space that certain capacities and statuses are promised, promoted, fostered, attributed or denied to particular individuals and groups. It is also in this confrontational space between secular and Islamic identity orientations that security governmentality profitably sets in and effectively operates. This identification has long rendered the respective individuals/groups with certain identities as normal/virtuous or abnormal/criminal citizens and then legitimate/illegitimate targets of governing. This easy identification, however, has been challenged by the coming to power of the 'moderate Islamist' political party AKP after 2002. The AKP, with the help of the EU membership reform process, puts forward an alternative identity-engagement with the secularist establishment. Indeed, particularly since 1999 the EU has acted as a catalyst for change in security governmentality not only in its identity dimensions but also in its other dimensions as well. Part III starts to chart these changes in Chapter 6 with the rationality dimensions of security governmentality.
PART III: SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY AND TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH THE EU
CHAPTER 6

CHANGE IN THE RATIONALITY DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY

The official EU candidacy granted to Turkey in 1999 has been a catalyst for changing Turkey's security governmentality. Part III will start examining this change with the rationality dimension of security governmentality. The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section illuminates the historically changing contours of the EU membership conditions. It argues the significance for the state elites of westernization/Europeanization in their EU membership bid. For this reason, it presents a historical background of the relations between Turkey and the EU. The period covered begins with Turkey's first application to European Economic Community in 1959, includes her renewed application for full membership in 1987 to European Community, and ends when the EU admitted Turkey as an official candidate country for full membership in 1999. Omitted here are those changes pertaining to Kemalist secularism, because they are investigated together with the changes in secularist identity in Chapter 8. The second section of the present chapter therefore attempts to identify the changes in the 'reason of state' rationality of security governmentality; assessing how the EU membership reforms strive to inculcate a democratic rationality (enmeshed in EU political conditionality) which, as observed, could gradually replace the 'reason of state' rationality of security governmentality.

6.1 TURKEY-EU RELATIONS FROM THE 1960s TO 2000s

On 31 July 1959 Turkey applied for associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). Turkey was to become one of the first applicant states to be granted associate membership in the EEC. Later, on 12 September 1963, Turkey became officially an associate member by signing the Association Agreement or the Ankara Treaty (Tekeli, 1993). In 1970 an Additional Protocol was signed, which paved the way for a transitional period, expected to end with an economic integration through a customs union between the EU and Turkey (Erdemli, 2003: 4-5). These agreements laid down conditions for the successful negotiation of the transition stages for eventual full membership into the EEC by the mid-1990s.
In the 1960s, the EU was more of an economic community than a political organization. After experiencing the Great Depression and a major war afterwards, the original six member states had set regional economic integration as their target in the post-1945 era (Nas, 2002: 225). Accordingly, the content of the EU’s first association agreements with Turkey consisted of economic matters, which included free trade under institutional and financial cooperation. The latter was expected to culminate in economic integration in the form of a ‘Customs Union’ between the parties (Cayhan, 1997: 35-60).

Throughout the 1970s, the various turns in relations curbed the emergence of a lasting imprint of the EU on Turkish politics. This situation revealed an interesting comparison with the membership process of the so-called Mediterranean trio, namely, Greece, Spain and Portugal, which sought to consolidate their democratic system against their own non-democratic rulers through negotiating the full membership process roughly in the same period (Onis, 2000: 467). EU membership for Greece, Spain, and Portugal meant and provided economic incentives and exerted democratic political conditions, whereas for the Turkish state elites EU membership remained more of an economic integration project in the 1970s and 1980s (Onis, 2003: 10). For largely this reason, the quest for the membership failed to take an account of the political requirements of the EU. As such the membership process did not include a significant shift in Turkey’s military-dominated political system.

Overall in the 1970s a combination of various issues constituted major obstacles for the goal of full membership (Onis, 2001b: 111). These issues included size, the underdeveloped economy, the threat of a potentially disruptive free labour movement to the EU, mass migration, financial burdens, the Cyprus problem, self-exclusion in 1978, the continuous rejection by the unfriendly Islamist party in the coalition governments in the 1970s, and last but not least the military coup that ended Turkey’s democratic politics in September 1980. These developments in turn led to a lack of impetus and ground for a possible process of EU-led political change in Turkey.

The military intervention in Turkey in September 1980 strained and further deteriorated political relations between Turkey and the EU (Erdemli, 2003: 4-5). It is, however, important to note that despite its non-democratic move into politics the military in this period did not drifted away from Turkey’s full membership goal in the course of relations with EU. In December 1981, for instance, the military-led government’s leader Bulend Ulusu stated that
To increase its ties with the west, our government has decided to join the EEC after preparing the necessary political and economic grounds. Our government has always demonstrated special care for the relations with the European Council and European Parliament (Quoted in Cayhan, 1997: 242).

Indeed, this and subsequent attempts by the military showed how the EU project has not been sidestepped and that the desire for membership continued to have an extensive reach amongst the different political actors in Turkey (Cayhan, 1997: 243). The military’s decision not to diverge from the membership goal was in line with its traditional Western oriented foreign policy and ‘Westernization that was the cornerstone of Kemalist state ideology’ (Dagi, 1998: 133) but it also reflected a wider concern that Turkey might be isolated from the western world due to the 1980 coup (Jacoby, 2004: 141).

The EU membership conditions in the 1980s included a new political stipulation in addition to the already existing economic conditionality. Democracy gradually became the required regime type for membership (Onis, 2003: 10-11), while related conditions were also fashioned in the discourse of democracy and human rights, and were implemented in membership processes of Greece, Spain and Portugal. Contrary to the latter developments, these years saw Turkey’s military regime occasionally claiming that the EU had no right in interfering in the country’s internal politics (Dagi, 1998: 132-3). The end-result was that while the EU was changing its policies of conditionality to include a more overtly democratic political proviso, Turkey was driving further towards an authoritarian mentality of rule. Turkey’s reluctance to respond to the EU criticisms throughout the 1980s attracted various counter-reactions by the EU and led to yet another period of frozen relations between the two (Erals, 1997: 101). The influence of the military on Turkish politics lingered to the degree that it could hardly be fully and easily eradicated. This in turn constituted another serious obstacle in advancing further political integration with the EU (Dagi, 1998: 132-3). The military intervention in politics has thus prevented the type of relations that the Southern European trio experienced in their political domain with the EU.

After the dormant EU-Turkey relations of the early 1980s, the Ozal government applied on 14 April 1987 for full membership to revitalize the potential partnership with the EU. The EU Council, however, fell short of processing this application (Eralsli, 2003: 6). Stressing that it was not on the verge of another enlargement wave, the EU commission recommended the
previously anticipated economic integration instead of a full membership, and thus rejected Turkey's application in 1989 (Erdemli, 2003: 6). Another phase began in Turkey-EU relations in the early 1990s, when the hardening of membership conditions started to shape relations. This was a period of momentous change in world politics, having crucial ramifications for Turkey and the EU (Onis, 2003: 9-12).

The revolutions in world politics between 1989 and 1992 shaped a new European strategy towards enlargement vis-à-vis the South/Eastern European countries via various Partnership and Cooperation Agreements coming to force in the mid-1990s (Missiroli, 2003: 10-4). The EU strove to turn the 'threats of instability' emanating from the post-Cold War politics into 'opportunities' by integrating the Central and Eastern European countries in its so-called 'Eastern Enlargement' (Kahraman, 2000: 6; Lynch, 2003: 42-7). These years also witnessed further changes in the nature of the EU project: In the post Cold War environment, the political elements of EU membership were ever-more underlined so that membership status rested on 'performance in relation to democratization and human rights', which found its expression in the so-called Copenhagen criteria laid down at the Copenhagen Summit of June 1993 (Onis, 2003: 11). The criteria disclosed a threefold category of requirements for membership: economic, legal and political. In regard to the latter, the European Council stressed that 'membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights, and the respect for and protection of minorities' (http://europa.eu.int). The evaluation of candidates' capacities in terms of these criteria has recently changed the meaning of the EU membership for Turkey.

Thus, in the 1990s the EU went through a significant transformation with an overt emphasis upon political integration based upon the rule of law, democracy and human-minority rights (Hale, 2003: 108). Political values such as liberty, fundamental human rights, democracy and rule of law gained explicit legal status under the Community Law. These values basically meant that membership into an exclusive economic club was no longer simply the target. Following the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, these political values further constituted the benchmark of political integration and further enlargement for the EU. Meanwhile, the collapse of the Soviet Union had left the central and Eastern European states within the remit of the EU membership. The latter embarked upon a task of political transformation in these states by way of enlargement. The EU was now in full throttle towards becoming an exclusive democratic political club. Membership into this political club required more than a standard
economic conditionality and incurred serious political costs for the aspiring states such as Turkey. The Turkish state elites, however, were slow in comprehending this newly changed EU membership conditionality. Their underestimations constituted one of the main reasons for the strained and problematic relations between Turkey and the EU that ensued. As Aydinli and Waxman argued, Turkey’s civilian and military elites

[repeated ad nauseam the mantra that Turkey rightfully belonged in the European family of nations. They never seemed to ask themselves whether they were prepared to pay the price for admission into this exclusive club. To be sure, since the prospect of admission appeared remote for so long, such a question would have been premature if not presumptuous (2001: 383).

Later, in 1997, and amidst these developments came the EU Luxemburg decision to exclude (albeit shortly) Turkey from membership process (Erdemli, 2003: 6). This decision further alienated the country from both the EU line and the relevant democratic reform process it entailed (McLaren and Muftuler-Bac, 2003: 198-202). The decision not to include Turkey in the list of candidate countries was a major blow to Turkey’s hopes of becoming a member in the EU (McLaren and Muftuler-Bac, 2003: 202). Turkey thereafter in large part failed to develop a sound strategy of adjustment for enacting the new membership requirements. Instead, it retained a rather ambiguous stance and was reluctant to undertake necessary political and legal reforms, which would potentially pave the way for a transformation from a security mentality of rule to a more democratic mode of politics (Onis, 2000: 464).

**Helsinki Summit of 1999: The Inclusion**

After two years of strained relations, the EU’s attitude towards Turkey changed in the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 (Erdemli, 2003: 6). At long last in this summit, the Council decided to elevate Turkey’s status from an applicant country to an officially recognized ‘candidate state’. Turkey was now on track to become a full member of the EU. There appeared to be three main factors behind this drastic u-turn in Turkey-EU relations. Firstly, there was the coming to power of social democratic governments in such major European states as Germany for which Turkey’s membership did not look as undesirable as it did for their conservative counterparts (Akcam, 2000: 42). This political-ideological change in major European governments was a significant and positive development for Turkey’s inclusion because the emphasis on ‘the growing vision of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Europe’ was developed by ‘the new wave of social democrats...to differentiate themselves...
from the right-of-centre conservative parties' (Onis, 2000: 470-1; Avci, 2003: 150). The second positive factor was the renewed recognition of Turkey’s potential geo-strategic and economic contributions to the EU (Muftuler-Bac, 2000: 499). Last but not least was the lifting of the persistent Greek veto over the granting of the candidacy status thanks to the concession Greece acquired over the Cyprus issue and its bilateral disputes with Turkey (Jenkins, 2001b: 270).

The declaration to include Turkey was in many ways a clarifying decision. By granting Turkey candidate status, the EU redressed its ambiguous stance over Ankara’s place in the recent enlargement process. In other words, after the Helsinki decision in 1999, Turkey-EU relations gained a new lease of life. For the EU’s Helsinki announcement has overcome the impasse in Turkey-EU relations by offering an accession partnership (Avci, 2003: 150). The meaning of the ‘official candidacy’ status for Turkey’s governing elite was thoroughly evident such that they saw the decision to include Turkey in the enlargement process as ‘correcting the mistakes of Luxemburg’ (Eralp, 2000: 29). Crucially, this positive view of the Turkish state elite was one vital legitimizing factor for an otherwise reluctant reform process.

Furthermore, by offering an official candidacy status the EU was able to enforce and monitor the reform process in Turkey for the first time by presenting a concrete political programme or a roadmap instead of an abstract ideal of membership. This way, the EU thwarted the oft-stated excuse of Turkey’s state elite to escape from realizing the potential political meanings of membership. This was so because the elites previously were able to distract the reform process by invoking the EU’s ambivalent stance over Turkey’s membership, as exemplified in Luxemburg only two years earlier. As Aydinli and Waxman suggested,

as long as the Europeans kept Turkey at arm’s length, their [Turkey’s military and civilian elite] willingness to implement the domestic reforms necessary for EU membership was never put to test (2001: 383).

Hence with the Helsinki inclusion, the palpable official EU candidacy status rather than a vague promise of it was achieved. This in turn started to put to test the willingness of the state elites to prove their much-coveted desire for westernization, which at that moment meant conforming to the changing democratic conditionality of the EU (Akcam, 1999: 41). Turkey’s state elites have come inescapably to confront the plain fact that (unlike their partnership with the United States), the strategic and economic interests could hardly offset or replace the EU’s
impervious membership requirements on democracy and human rights (Onis, 2000: 465). Thus the European Council’s decision to grant an ‘official candidacy status’ in 1999 rendered more problematic the elites’ reluctant stance on the already pressing issue of reforms democratizing domestic politics (Akcam, 2000: 44).

However, the relations have never gone smoothly. On the contrary, as the nature of the proposed changes became increasingly apparent throughout the early 2000s, the state elites’ difficulties and reluctance to fulfill the membership conditions resurfaced (Jenkins, 2001: 270). The most outstanding impediment was, of course, the conditionality of the Copenhagen political criteria, which disturbed Turkey’s relations with the EU in the early 2000s (Kinzer, New York Times, 11 March 2000), for the EU had made the official candidacy and the expected full membership only conditional upon meeting politically difficult conditions set for Turkey’s existing political system (Onis, 2000: 470). In short, at the domestic level it was mostly after 1999 that the EU was able to firmly convey its political conditionality for membership into the minds of Turkish policy makers. It amounted to a ‘soul-searching’ experience (Avcı, 2003: 156).

The difficulties notwithstanding, the EU Helsinki decision in 1999 brought a renewed confidence and optimism to the Turkish side, particularly on such problematic issues as the democratization process, economic reforms and human rights (Kirzner, New York Times, 13 December 1999; Peel and Boulton, Financial Times, 13 December 1999). The new Accession Partnership and the support of Greece and Germany gave Turkey the necessary hope for full membership by providing a strong impetus for advancing the transformational reform process in Turkey’s domestic political structure (Avcı, 2003: 150-1). Unlike the previous disheartening rejections in 1989 and 1997 and the meager financial support and incomplete programmes in the membership process, the Helsinki approval of Turkey’s official candidacy contributed a great deal and encouraged Turkish policy makers to comply with what was otherwise radical conditionality (McLaren and Muftuler-Bac, 2003).

6.2. POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN ORDER

The importance of the inclusion of Turkey into the European state system can be traced back to the trajectory of socio-political reform processes that started with the late Ottoman Empire.
Turkey's institutional, political and economic presence in Europe started with the efforts of the Turkish modernizers in the period of Tanzimat (1839) with the issue then being involved in the 'Concert of Europe' (Dagi, 1998: 128). In fact, this modernization reform process was understood as westernization/Europeanization dating back to the late Eighteenth century that aimed to create modern state machinery and facilitate the development of modern cultural institutions (Berkes, 1998: 137-54; Mardin, 2005: 145-65). These westernization efforts and the later search for a 'European' identity had become a central hallmark in the Ottoman/Turkish state discourse and a main legitimizing factor for policy making (Onis, 2000: 466; Akcam, 2000: 43; Yegen 1999b). Initially, the ideal of westernization was a currency of the early Tanzimat reforms that reached its zenith in the mid-nineteenth century (Lewis, 1968; Shaw and Shaw, 1977). The westernization efforts in the late Ottoman era were central for the purpose of modernizing the moribund institutions of the empire.

After the Ottoman experience the Turkish Republic continued to carry this reforming process much further (Kadioglu, 1998). The state sought a European, secular and national identity, and to part with the Ottoman Islamic civilization (Yavuz, 2000b). Becoming part of 'European' civilization was supposed to provide these characteristics and disconnect the new state from its Ottoman multi-national past (Kramer, 2001: 21-31). The key drive for the republic was therefore to become an integral part of contemporary western civilization (Onis, 2003: 16-7). To this aim, the ruling elites of modern Turkey attempted a wholesale transformation of not only the state but also the society under the guise of a nation-building project—a 'cultural revolution' (Mardin, 1971; Zurcher, 1997: 184-215). Arguably because the Ottoman state institutions remained intact after the establishment of the Turkish republic (Zurcher, 2004: 103), the modern Turkish state was determined to 'preach a gospel of Westernization' into the hearts and minds of the society (Helvacioglu, 1999). Westernization was taken so seriously by the founding elites that Mustafa Kemal, for instance, clearly related becoming part of western civilization to the security of the state and the very existence of the nation when he said:

_Surviving_ in the world of modern civilization depends upon changing ourselves. This is _the sole law of any progress_ in the social, economic and scientific spheres of life. _Changing the rules of life_ in according with the times is an absolute necessity. In an age [of science] nations _cannot maintain their existence_ by age-old rotten mentalities and by tradition-worshipping (quoted in Berkes, 1998: 464, emphasis added).
The efforts to acquire the features of ‘contemporary civilization’ had thus become an integral part of the social and cultural revolution, which was launched as a part of Turkey’s nation-building project. As Berkes argued:

To reach the stage achieved by the civilized nations! That became the motif of the new [Kemalist] ideology. The reforms to be undertaken would imply nothing but a total revolution— the appropriation of Western civilization (1998: 463).

From its inception in 1923, Turkey has struggled for international recognition as a European state. As part and parcel of this struggle, the full membership of, and the involvement in, the developing institutions of Western Europe since the mid-1950s has been construed as a materialization of Turkey’s desire to be recognized as such (McLaren and Muftuler-Bac, 2003: 197). Along this line, membership in the EU was primary among those institutions that could materialize Turkey’s desire for recognition (Cayhan, 1997: 417). As such, membership into the EU was a central goal for the majority of Turkey’s political and military elites in the modern Republican history (Aydinli and Waxman, 2001: 382; Ulger, 2002). A natural corollary to this was membership in the relevant Western institutions such as NATO and OECD (Aybet and Muftuler-Bac, 2000: 557-582). The particular importance of EU membership for the state elites lies in their perception of the EU that embodies in today’s world the much-coveted ‘contemporary civilization’. This is a commonly visited and well-established element of the official state discourse. For instance, in 2002 the former President Suleyman Demirel said:

Our EU membership effort is not a problem that has emerged recently. Turkey equates the values of civilization in being a part of Europe. The EU issue, for Turkey, is not only an issue of accession; it is an issue of concept, it is an issue of assertion...Turkey’s purpose is not to turn Europe into Turkey, but to make herself European. This is an assertion of Republic, a republic in its 78th year (2002: 46).

The ideal of becoming a part of ‘European Civilization’ was also enshrined in the ‘reason of state’ rationality of security governmentality. Since ‘Western Civilization’ was equated with ‘Europeanization’, the membership into the European states could only be a logical foreign policy direction for the state. Such a membership could confirm Turkey’s ‘Western’ state identity and fulfills the political aim of severing ties with the Ottoman past. Ataturk in 1924 made these two dimensions crystal clear, saying:
There are many nations but there is only one civilization for the advancement of a nation, it must be a part of this one civilization... We wish to modernize our country. All our efforts are directed toward the establishment of a modern, therefore, Western [European] government... This nation has accepted the principle that the only means of survival for the nations in the international struggle for existence lies in the acceptance of the contemporary Western [European] civilization (quoted in Nadolski, 1977: 539, emphasis added).

Other state elites were quick to link the issue of membership into the EU with Ataturk's political vision presented above. For instance, during the signing ceremony of the Association Agreement in 1963 between the EU and Turkey, the president of Turkish Republic Necdet Sunay said: 'With this Agreement we are convinced that we have transcended a serious stage in Turkey's route to westernization, which is a behavior that had been made into a national policy by the beloved Ataturk' (quoted in Nas, 2002: 225). A more recent example in line with this came after the EU granted Turkey the much-awaited official candidacy status in 1999 after which Turkey introduced its National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) as a part of the pre-accession strategy in 2001 (Avci, 2003: 150-1). In the preface of this document, it is claimed that 'the Turkish government regards EU membership as a new step forward, a milestone confirming the founding philosophy of, and Ataturk’s vision for the Republic' (Turkish Foreign Ministry, www.mfa.gov.tr). Hence, it is clear that for the Turkish state membership into the EU has been more than a simple membership into yet another Western institution (Nas, 2002: 225).

Understanding this positive perception of the EU by the state elites is crucial for grasping the potential of a transformation in security governmentality. This is why it is little wonder why after so many moments of political rows and national frustrations Turkey still calls for full membership in the EU (McLaren and Muftuler-Bac, 2003: 199-210; Caglar, 2003: 242). Constrained as part of its national identity and political capital, Turkey's main target has thus been its well-documented aspiration to become full member of the EU. Having acquired this significance, however, relations were rarely bereft of ups and downs. Given the various turning points in relations it is unsurprising why Turkey's application is sometimes dubbed as a 'journey to an uncertain destination' or a 'dream becoming a nightmare' (Aydinli and Waxman, 2001: 382). Indeed, unlike most of other candidate countries, Turkey's relations with the EU have been difficult and rather complex. The nature of the complexities and oscillations surrounding the relationship between Turkey and the EU in recent years will be illuminated next.
6.3. THE EU MEMBERSHIP REFORM PROCESS

Particularly after the Cold War, emphasis on the constitutive liberal norms of proper state conduct became a commonplace emphasis in the politics of international organizations such as NATO and the EU (Neumann and Williams, 2000; Webber et al, 2004). In addition to the traditional tasks of defence and economic integration, these organizations strove to diffuse and promote human rights regimes, the rule of law, and democracy as the targets for aspirant countries. The latter are expected to adjust their state conduct in order to join (Olsen, 2002: 923-6; Lavanex and Ucarer, 2004: 418-25). This new set of conditionality, in turn, has brought in and helped shape new understandings and management in the security field as well (Hyde-Price, 2004: 332-4). More crucially, these organizations have also provided high degrees of social and material rewards for the aspirant or existing member states, such as economic incentives and/or socio-political recognition (Risse-Kappen, 1996). It is argued that

The values of economic liberalization, democracy, the rule of law, the professionalisation of government bureaucracies and civilian oversight of the armed forces constitute the basis upon which new and candidate states of the EU and NATO have been incorporated into these two crucial organisations of security governance. The emphasis on these values and the practical processes of conditionality and socialization which have followed has fundamentally transformed domestic governance in a number of post-communist states as well as laying the ideational basis for inclusion in the broader international processes of security governance (Webber et al., 2004: 23-4).

In similar vein, the EU integrated democratic norms into its institutional identity and membership conditionality (Olsen, 2002: 926-9). It incorporated standards of human rights and democracy into its association agreements and also made its financial and institutional ties/aids conditional upon the fulfillment of these norms (Kordell, 1999: 92). The EU has also developed a more advanced and effective social and material control mechanism than other international organizations such as the OSCE, NATO and the Council of Europe to make sure that member states comply with its basic norms - norms that underlie fundamental principles of liberal democracy.

Particularly with the adoption of the Copenhagen criteria, EU membership requirements aimed at a value-based and normatively institutionalized setting for the aspirant non-member states, such as Turkey (Olsen, 2002: 927). The EU uses the incentive of membership as a

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social and material control mechanism to invoke the fulfillment of its democratic conditionality (Schimmelfenig, 2001: 58-62). Turkey's willingness to act in accordance with the membership requirements increased spectacularly after the official candidacy status was granted by the EU leaders in the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 (McLaren and Muftuler-Bac, 2003: 208). This decision was significant in that the hypothetical prospect of the membership of an otherwise culturally and religiously different country had now been broached by the highest executive branch of the EU, the Council of Ministers. This decision boosted the legitimacy of the conditionality of EU membership in the pro-EU circles in Turkey and bolstered their incentives to undertake reforms, since the EU's official candidacy was now in itself a tangible political reward for Turkey that justified and accentuated the reform process (Onis, 2003: 12). With this decision, the rightness or the 'normative legitimacy' of the EU reform process was enhanced and the EU from then onwards no longer relied solely on its 'normative pull to enforce' (Hurd, 1999: 401). By putting the full membership in sight, Turkey's pro-EU political and state elites' momentum and motivation to execute these reforms was encouraged and since then the reform process has been accelerated. The country's decision-makers began to believe that the reward of membership was worth the costs of adaptation (McLaren and Muftuler-Bac, 2003: 208). This link also served to exert pressure on those--Turkish state elites, who had hitherto merely paid lip service to the membership goal. The credible prospect of full membership in the EU provided those elites with the incentives to embark upon and commit themselves to the reform process, if they were genuinely committed to the EU project (Yesilada, 2002).

The EU emphasis on spreading liberal democratic norms into aspirant states through the enlargement process implies an important undercurrent for the prospect of a transformation in 'reason of state' rationality of security governmentality. Following its 1999 decision, the EU has noticeably found it easier to confer a manifest authority upon Turkey's existing political structures and force it to comply with membership conditionality (Hale, 2003; Onis, 2003). Through its sustained pressure based upon the Copenhagen political criteria the EU calls for serious alternations that might potentially rewrite Turkey's security mentality. In this regard, the most obvious aspect of transformation implicated in the EU membership conditionality aims to replace Turkey's reason of state rationality with a liberal and pluralistic political order (Yesilada, 2002: 102-7; Onis, 2003: 16-23). It can be argued that this kind of replacement and resultant security conception signifies the point that human beings 'need both freedom and security-and the sacrifice of either is a cause of suffering' (Bauman, 2001: 42, emphasis
This EU induced duality of freedom and security or what can arguably called as the 'liberal problematic of security' indicates that security 'can be best attained by creating the condition under which individuals can exercise various liberties' (Dean, 1999: 116-7). Does the EU genuinely lead to a prospect of transformation in reason of state rationality?

The EU Induced Membership Reforms after 1999

Before outlining the reforms undertaken, it is necessary to recall the background. The prevailing norms in security governmentality in Turkey have contributed to a record of human rights violations, legal obstacles to any improving of cultural and minority rights and a malfunctioning of democracy in the country. As regards the Kurdish problem, for example, the Turkish Constitutional Court had closed various pro-Kurdish parties and jailed their parliamentarians starting with the 'DEP Party' in March 1994 (Hale, 2003: 112). Various EU Commission reports pointed out that disappearance under custody, extra-judicial executions, torture and other human rights violations were widespread; freedom of expression and association were seriously curtailed and pressure was exerted upon Turkish authorities to solve the Kurdish problem by peaceful and political means (European Commission Report, 2001, 2003). Turkey's defiant standpoint on the Kurdish problem has resulted in numerous European Parliament (EP) resolutions, asking Turkish authorities to release Kurdish parliamentarians in jail for political reasons. On numerous occasions the EP also explicitly 'called on the authorities to engage in direct talks with the Kurdish people's representative organizations with a view to finding a peaceful resolution enabling their economic, social, political and cultural rights to be recognized' (Muftuler-Bac, 2000: 173).

After granting official candidacy, the EU Helsinki decisions in December 1999 also assigned Turkey, like other candidate countries, a pre-accession strategy in order to stimulate and support its reform process. To this end, the Accession Partnership was adopted in March 2001, which has begun to serve as a roadmap for the priority areas in meeting all the related criteria for accession. On 19 March 2001, the Turkish Government adopted its National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) (Erdemli, 2003: 6). This programme outlined the agenda of political and economic reforms and presented how those reforms would be carried out. The aim of the program was to satisfy the Copenhagen political and economic criteria for membership.
Starting with the October 2001 reforms, and in line with the NPAA, the Turkish Parliament adopted a package of 34 amendments in the Constitution. These amendments, aimed at constitutional liberalization addressed some of the deficiencies created by the traditions of security governmentality, pertaining to freedoms of expression, organization and assembly, the use of minority languages, the abolition of death penalty and the role of the military in politics (Onis, 2003: 13). The EU induced reforms pertaining to the military’s role in politics will be investigated in Chapter 7; the theme here is whether constitutional liberalization promises political liberalization. The next section will therefore focus on those reforms pertaining to the process of change in the ‘reason of state’ rationality in security governmentality. Overall, these EU reforms aim to carry out a set of comprehensive constitutional and legislative changes that reinforce and safeguard fundamental rights and freedoms and democracy. The section below identifies those reforms pertaining to human rights, and identifies the challenging EU reforms under two main headings: democracy (freedom of expression, association and political parties) and the treatment of ethnic minorities (notably the Kurdish people).

**Human Rights**

Under the influence of the EU there have been improvements in human rights provisions in Turkey. Provisions concerning freedom of association, and the right to assembly and peaceful demonstration have been advanced. The death penalty has been abolished. Various legislative and administrative measures against torture and maltreatment have been put into force. The right to retrial in the light of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights has been introduced. Rules concerning conditions in prisons and detention houses have been brought in line with the norms of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), and the recommendations of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). The Human Rights Advisory Board, with a view to form an effective platform for dialogue between the state and civil society in the area of human rights, has become operational in the Office of the Prime Ministry. In addition, several conventions relating to the political criteria have been signed or ratified. They include Additional Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR Concerning the Abolishing of the Death Penalty, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the ILO Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of Worst Forms of Child Labour (No.
and the UN Convention on Prevention of All Types of Discrimination Against Women and its Optional Protocol. Governmental circulars have been issued to raise the awareness of civil servants on the prevention of torture and maltreatment. Human rights training programmes for civil servants, particularly law enforcement officers, have been intensified and broadened. Comprehensive training programmes for judges and prosecutors on the human rights regimes continue in collaboration with the Council of Europe and the European Union (http://europa.eu.int/comnVenlargement/turkey).

The Respect for and Protection of Minority Rights

The EU discourse on minority rights does not spell autonomy or independent statehood for 'national minorities' but mostly articulate cultural rights such as the use of minority languages in education and for official purposes. Although the official Turkish definition of minority (legally justified with a special reference to the founding international treaty of Lausanne of the Turkish Republic) in Turkey singles out only non-Muslim peoples in Turkey (and as such does not include full and normal citizens from the Muslim Kurdish community) the term 'ethnic minority' is nonetheless associated with the rights of the Kurdish population (Onis, 2003: 14-5). In this respect, Articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution that restricted the private and public use of Kurdish language were revised by the EU-induced October 2001 amendments. In line with the clause dealing with the 'protection of minorities' in the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey is in the medium term expected to 'ensure cultural diversity and guarantee cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of their origins' (Hale, 2003: 117). In the process, bylaws on broadcasting in and the teaching of different languages and dialects (i.e. Kurdish) have been adopted; bylaws on the acquisition and disposal of real estate by community foundations (i.e. Christian and Armenian minorities), and on associations, have entered into force, and the relevant administrative restructuring has been completed.

Democracy: freedoms of expression, association and political parties

In this realm of reforms since 2001, various laws have been amended to reinforce gender equality, to protect cultural diversity and guarantee cultural rights, and to enhance the right to learn and broadcast in different languages and dialects. The legislation concerning non-Muslim communities and foreigners has been improved. Most restrictions on freedom of thought and expression, and the freedom of the press have been lifted. A new Penal Code in
2005 that codifies a number of press reforms limits the definition of the criminal act of ‘inciting hatred’ to only those cases where the exercise of free expression poses a ‘clear and present danger’. Furthermore, prison penalties for ‘insulting’ state institutions were reduced with the requirement of proof of intent for conviction. A new press law adopted in June 2004 abolished the authorities’ power to suspend publications, lift prison penalties for certain press offenses, and strengthened protection for confidential sources. The state of emergency that had been effective since 1979 has been lifted in all provinces including Sînak and Diyarbakir. The advisory role of the National Security Council has been redefined, as was the consultative status of the National Security Council (NSC) through constitutional and legislative amendments. The functions of the NSC and the Secretariat-General of the NSC will be harmonized with this new definition (http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/ turkey; CPJ Annual Report, 2004).

The said reforms have introduced path-breaking changes with a view to democratizing the practice and mentality of government in Turkey. Yet, some of the ‘catch-all’ legal precepts remain disquieting for the prospect of a more democratic rule. For instance, Article 69 still allows the shedding of state subsidies for and the closure of political parties by the Constitutional Court. This would be the case when the latter determines that ‘the party in question has become a centre for the execution of such activities’ that ‘violate the fourth paragraph of Article 68’ which outlines the rights and duties of political parties and requires that the ‘statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties, shall not be in conflict with the independence of the state its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation...[or] the principles of the democratic and secular republic’ (Hale, 2003: 111). Furthermore, in civil-military relations the military’s involvement into politics by coups and otherwise remains to be a continuing problematic theme in the relations and presents a problematic area of reform despite the EU’s consistent support for democratic-civilian forces against military-statist establishment (Bayramoglu, 2004; Cizre, 2004).

6.4. THE IMPACT OF EU DEMOCRATIC CONDITIONALITY ON THE ‘REASON OF STATE’ RATIONALITY: TOWARDS A TRANSFORMATION?

This section will assess whether the EU’s democratic conditionality criteria have been effectively changing the reason of state rationality of security governmentality. Given the traits of Turkish political culture, this section draws on the political implications of the
changes introduced by EU conditionality rather than attending to the current legal-descriptive profile made possible by the reform process. As indicated above the incentive for full membership has been playing as the basic mechanism for effective change and compliance, rather than the self-regulation of the aspirant state. Consequently, the central channel of change and compliance has emerged at the intergovernmental level, or more correctly, involved in inter-elite interactions/negotiations more than anyone else. The resultant situation is that the EU-induced process of reform and the prospect of transformation in security mentality remain in large part at the repository of governmental decision-makers. The latter in turn are conditioned by the material and social rewards in the process rather than a genuine engagement with democratic conditionality (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003: 499). In what follows the effects of these reforms are examined to see whether they so far amount to a transformation in Turkey's security rationality.

To begin with, the reform process underway is a comprehensive historical development. Indeed, Turkey has only two historical antecedents to this process. As mentioned, the first was the period of Tanzimat reforms in the nineteenth century Ottoman polity and the second was the Turkish Republican Revolution that saw the birth of the modern Turkish state in 1923. Especially from 1999 onwards, it seems that Turkey's state rationality has once again faced the prospect of change, this time through the EU-induced reform process. Considering its political consequences, some observers have described this new EU-related process as a 'revolution' (Kinzer, 2004: 15). But what happens when two diametrically opposed mentalities of rule, namely the EU-induced democratic conditionality and Turkey's 'reason of state' rationality confront each other?

It should be noted that one of the basic shortcomings of the EU reforms is that it ignores the 'weak foundations of liberal politics' in Turkey and quite counter-productively generates a nationally and politically 'widespread resentment' in the realm of Kurdish cultural-language regulation (Onis, 2003: 15). Crucially, they also pay little heed to the fact that what is important here is not which language is used but what is allowed by the state to be taught and 'on this score numerous constitutional and other rules protecting the territorial integrity of the country would still apply' (Hale, 2003: 118). As to the Kurdish problem, for instance, the military-led state elites have long held that the problem is one of terrorism and continued to
see the problem as a predominantly economic or security issue or external provocation (Hurriyet, 17 August 2005).

An increasing tension can be observed between the state elites and the pro-reformist political elites such as the incumbent ruling party Justice and Development Party (AKP) on the implications of the reforms undertaken. This tension has largely been a function of the concerns of Turkey’s powerful civilian and military elites, who are wary of the reform process. They, therefore, do not refrain from publicly propagating some of their concerns over the perceived consequences of democratic conditionality (Cizre, 2003: 214). A recurrent theme in their speeches is that democratic conditionality risks heightening the ‘threats’ against Turkey’s ‘national and territorial unity’ (Bilgin, 2005: 180). They try hard to sell the view that the envisioned cultural and political rights will endanger the basic idea of the Republican Turkish state. They presume that the specific political rights granted to various groups (such as the Kurds) will pose serious threats to the essence of the secular-nationalist state (Khan and Yavuz, 2003). In addition, the freedom of expression and association, they see, will curb the ability of the state to address these threats (Savas, 2001a; 2001b). Hence it is unsurprising that the state elites have been reluctant to fully endorse the implementation of reforms.

In the reform process, what the secularist security forces, most visibly the military, gasp at is how the politically assertive EU membership process can easily export specific means of democracy so detrimental to their privileged positions in security governmentality (see Chapter 6). But what does EU membership specifically mean imply for the military’s underlying rationale to the EU membership beyond its habitual support? There are certain parameters that delineate the subdued standpoint taken by the military vis-à-vis EU membership. These are related to EU membership mostly through geographic and military-institutional capacities and calculations (Ilhan, 2002). The military’s underlying rationale to EU membership is a particular security approach, which does not bode well with the ‘liberal EU security approach’ (Oguz, 2002; Kosebalaban, 2002). In an interview with a military official the meaning of EU membership in this regard was cast as follows:

The EU membership is detrimental to Turkey’s interests because it brings about a change in the rules of the game designed for the states in which Turkey has so far

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12 The next chapter examines this tension between the Turkish Armed Forces and the ruling so-called ‘Islamic’ party (AKP) in the context of Turkey’s EU membership process.
participated with considerable success. This significant change is worrying simply because it takes away the opportunity to play around the country's external security card as we did through NATO against the Soviet Russia. It [the EU membership] is like throwing out the chessboard. I want to play chess not another game (Interview with military official, Ankara, August 2003).

It can be argued that the military's materialist-rationalist-security outlook on EU membership seems to be at odds with the 'liberal EU security approach'. The former tends in particular to emphasise Turkey's geopolitical position and military assets as important contributions to European security, which in turn is expected to serve as instrumental trump-cards at the service Turkey's bid for EU membership (Bir, 1998). The view here casts Turkey's geography and military capabilities as the main 'assets' for the interaction and eventual inclusion of Turkey in the EU (Bilgin, 2005). In this logic, for instance, membership would be made possible largely by and necessarily because of the Turkey's geography and material security-military capabilities rather than any genuine interest by the state-security elites in promoting democracy (Kardas and Kucuk, 2003: 14). After all, there should be no need to democratize the political system since, in the military's view, since parliamentary formal democracy has already been institutionalized (Jenkins, 2001: 34). For them more security rather than democracy is what Turkey and its state is in need of.

We can illustrate this issue within an example. The military's approach to the Cyprus problem is a case in point here. The EU recently has implicitly linked the Cyprus problem with Turkey's membership, urging Turkey to solve the Cyprus problem (European Commission Report, 2004; The Guardian, 03 September 2005, p. 14). Contrary to the bold peace initiatives of the 'Islamist' AKP government in line with the so-called 'Annan Plan', the military has seemed reluctant to change its policy over Cyprus and as such 'put reservations' against the plan (Cumhuriyet, 5 January 2004, p. 1, 9; Hurriyet, 03 September 2005). The state elites' attitude toward 'Cyprus at the expense of the EU membership' stems from Cyprus's much-coveted 'geo-strategic importance' for the security of the state. The issue is that if Turkey becomes an EU full member, the Turkish army in Cyprus will eventually have to withdraw. The military elites believe that this is likely to generate 'grave strategic problems' for Turkey regardless of the would-be-EU membership (Kardas and Kucuk, 2003: 2-10). According to the Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkok:

Cyprus is situated on a strategic line that starts from Britain and extends to Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, the Suez Canal, India and Singapore. This is why Britain is not letting
its bases in Cyprus come under the European Union acquis. Britain wants to keep them as sovereign bases. The island is a spot in that highly important chain. If we consider this from Turkey's standpoint, a hostile force deployed there would gain access especially if it used air force to those places in the entire eastern parts of Turkey that are currently not accessible by plane. As you know, planes coming from other countries arriving in those parts can stay airborne for only highly limited periods. This is because of the distance involved. It is being said that when Turkey joins the European Union these [hazards] would disappear. Yet, we have to do our thinking on a more long-term basis. Our vision has depth. When we look at the geographical region involved we see that an air force deployed in Cyprus would pose a big threat to Turkey... Cyprus would be a region where we would not be able to move freely towards Turkey. We already have trouble in the west. If trouble arose in the south as well Turkey would become imprisoned. This is what I think (Interview, Radikal, 09 November 2003, English version from Turkish daily News, 11 November 2003, emphasis added).

In interviews with military staff officers, the geo-strategic and security based reservations and misgivings about Turkey's EU membership was also evident. In the following reply to a question as to how EU membership might affect Turkey's military security one officer had this to say:

We are already insecure in our external geography [i.e. the war in Iraq]. The [EU] membership will worsen Turkey's insecurity this time internally because of the domestic implications of the membership conditionality. Here particularly concerning are the legal barriers that can lessen the share of the military spending in the budget and thus can make the country less powerful against internal and external threats (Interview with military official, Ankara, August 2004, my translation).

In addition to the geo-strategic concerns, historical animosity between the Western powers and the Turkish state still looms large in the secularist/Kemalist discourse of the military (Candar, 2000: 122-4). The military-led state elites' position can be understood in terms of the continuation of elite perceptions of the historical sources of political mistrust between Turkey and the European powers (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 115). This indicates that such socially constructed cognitive, historical ideational principles can also help constitute the view of the military towards the European Union membership (Kardas and Kucuk, 2003: 15-20). In this sense, 'external conspiracy' has been particularly operative in the construction of both geo-strategically calculated security assessments and the military's 'Kemalist habitus', in which goals are 'transformed into action in the light of their ideational patterns' (Candar, 2000: 122-4; Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 115-7).
More specifically, the sense of mistrust (exemplified in the so-called 'Sevres Syndrome') revolves around the bitter experiences of the wars which took place between the European allied powers and Turkey during and after the World War I. The consequent security-related mentality affects the perception of EU membership as follows: Just as in these wars the European powers showed 'malign' intentions to 'divide and rule' Turkey, so the EU membership project in its entirety continues and signifies these same intentions to divide and rule (Yazicioglu, 2004: 78). Well-read and retired general, Suat Ilhan (2002: 99-103), has made an explicit connection between the 'Eastern question' and the EU membership process to the effect that the two head for the same objective: the dismantling of Turkey in the name of religious-national minority rights. It seems that these views are shared by military students. In interviews with the students from one of Turkey's military academies, it appeared that Suat Ilhan's books are amongst those most widely read (Interviews with military academy students, Istanbul, April, 2004). Another widely read writer, retired General Hasan Kundakci, claims that there are certain limits to the tolerability of EU-induced reforms, and that the military would not allow the civilian governments to go too far (Interview with Hasan Kundakci, Milliyet, 19 September 2004, p. 13).

In addition, the EU membership reform process exposes how the military's national security based interventions come to blur the EU-induced conception of democracy. For one, the military's custodial political role stands in an uneasy relationship with the conception of power and democracy induced by the EU Copenhagen political criteria and EU membership in general (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Manners, 2002: 235). As will be explained in Chapter 7, the EU membership process has proved great success in lessening the military's political autonomy sprung from the National Security Council decisions. However, the EU's broader democracy definition that includes 'respect for minority rights' and the 'stability of democratic institutions' has come to clash with the military's self-ascribed political role of 'guardianship of the national interest' and its 'political symbol of nationhood and the instrument of preserving the nation' (Kosebalaban, 2002: 135; Cizre, 2004: 120-5).

Understandably, Turkey's secularists are increasingly lacerated by self-doubt in contemplating what has gone wrong in their quest for the EU membership, which happens to candidly tarnish their power bases in the Turkish polity (Aydinli and Waxman, 2001; Khan and Yavuz, 2003). For instance, retired General Suat Ilhan summarizes the opposition to the EU in such a way that Turkey's EU membership is represented to be against the state
ideology of Kemalism to the extent that the EU membership would practically signal the end of this ideology (Ilhan, 2002: 15-7, 35-9, 61-3). It is possible to observe this antagonism towards the EU membership in the reactions of other state elites as well (Savas, 2001a; 2001b). A former veteran member of the bureaucrat elite, Yasar Yazicioglu, who had extensive roles in national and international state services, simply came to the blunt conclusion that EU membership constitutes a 'threat' to the 'national integrity and unity' (Yazicioglu, 2004: 413-8).

In this process of confrontation, the conservative elements in the state establishment have not only been the Kemalist civilian and military elites, the Presidency, but also such political groups as the national left (DSP) and the national right (MHP). The latter have been most vocal in raising their concerns over the above mentioned issues (Tocci, 2003:4; Canefe and Bora, 2003: 127-48). Indeed, the DSP and MHP have strived to save the state from the 'excesses' of democratic conditionality by positing a geopolitical image of Turkey as being 'strategically indispensable' for the security of the Western states and by demanding certain concession and differential treatment in the membership process (Bagci and Kardas, 2003: 39). When short of these concessions, they call for a reconsideration of the membership bid (Avci, 2003: 159).

Furthermore, the public statements of the general secretariat of the NSC, the General Staff, and individual commanders disclose one of their main misgivings and theses about the EU membership conditionality. Such reforms, they reckon, adopted as part of the EU membership requirements are simply detrimental to Turkey's state's existence because the country's sovereign and exclusive political decision-making capacity will be perpetually cramped (Ilhan, 2000; 2002). For instance, some members of the top brass thinks that the proposed 'freedom of expression' ignites 'adverse' Kurdish and Islamic claims for recognition (The TNC Press Release, January 2002; also see the speech by Gen. Hursit Tolon, Hurriyet, 20 September 2005).

Examples of this security mentality of the Kemalist state abound. For instance, the former coalition partner, state minister and the leader of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) Devlet Bahceli said: 'We need to have a just and honorable relationship with the EU. We strongly oppose the notion that we should fulfill every demand of the EU to become a member or that we have to enter the EU at any cost' (quoted in Avci, 2003: 159). In addition, the former
National Security Council Secretary General Tuncer Kilinc, in a reaction to the democratic conditionality criteria, asserted at the Ankara War Academy that the EU would not accept Turkey and that 'thus Turkey now needs new allies and it would be useful if she engages in a search that would include Russia and Iran' (The Middle East, May 2002). As a reaction to the EU membership requirement from Turkey to allow broadcasting and education in Kurdish language, Commander of the Armed Forces Academy, Brigadier General Halil Simsek provided a sample of the views of the top brass when he lamented that the EU conditionality threatens 'breaking up our country in the name of “cultural rights”, “broadcasting in mother’s tongue,” and “educational rights”' (NTVMSNBC News, 11 January 2001). A former prominent diplomat and now commentator Gunduz Aktan also went on to blatantly suggest that the pro-EU reformists have a 'lack of confidence in the nation, the Republic and the institutions [and] everything called Turkish' (Turkish Daily News, 3 April 2002).

It can therefore be argued that Turkey's compliance to the conditionality criteria displays a materialistic approach towards EU full membership. That is, in line with the pattern of 'liberalization vs. security pendulum' encountered since the political class initiated the process of liberalizing the state (Aydinli, 2003) it is likely that the proposed EU democratic rationality will be sidestepped in cases when the military sees a threat to the security of the state. This can be observed on two levels. Firstly (as discussed above), the reform process began to make progress after the tangible prospect of membership appeared in sight, that is, when the material reward of EU official candidacy status was acquired. Had there been an internalized and well-thought need for these reforms in the mentality of Turkish state elites, they could have adopted and implemented the related reforms much before 1999. The reforms were taken up at a time when the EU as an external factor pushed for it. Indeed, most of the significant reform packages were adopted on the eve of the publications either of Commission Regular Progress Reports or the Council summits, when the decision to open accession negotiations was on the table. Secondly, the 'political cost-benefit calculations' (rather than social value mechanisms) have been primary criteria for Turkey's state elites in adopting the necessary membership reforms. In other words, wherever the 'political cost of adoption' appeared high (cost is in terms of the sensitive security problems of the state) the reforms have been downplayed (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003: 509). Those changes undertaken with relative ease, thus, relate to lesser areas of concern emerging from the reason of state rationality. The bold legislative reform packages passed by the parliament in August 2002 and 2003 in fact corresponded to those issues, whose implementation does not require huge
domestic political costs for the Turkish state. An illustration pertaining to the reforms aimed at Kurdish problem may help here.

It is possible to argue that the abolition of the death penalty and the recognition of socio-cultural rights for Turkey's minorities are all rather politically low-cost issues for the reason of state rationality of rulers. This is firstly, because there have been no executions of the death sentence since 1984, that is, there was already a moratorium on capital punishment. Secondly, after the capture of its leader Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK largely refrained from armed conflict with the Turkish forces. Thirdly, the possibility of an independent Kurdish political movement (e.g. the pro-Kurdish DEHAP/DTP party) strong enough to have a seat in the Turkish Parliament is small, because it will have to garner more than ten per cent of the total votes, which is the national election threshold for representation in the parliament (Tekin, 2004: 154-5). Overall, there is neither a prolonged armed conflict between the Turkish military and the Kurdish insurgents (as there was between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s) nor is there a sufficient number of vocal dissenters within civil society (or middle classes) challenging the state on this matter (Aktan and Aktan, 2004: 117; Jacoby, 2004: 158, ft. 99).

Significantly, the implementation of the adopted EU legislation reforms has proved difficult even in the present context when, for instance, it comes to granting the rights of education and broadcasting in Kurdish language. This has been the case, when the state elites have decided that Kurdish broadcasting should best be carried out by the state controlled public broadcasting channel of the TRT, rather than other private TV stations, because the latter might 'usurp' the opportunity and air alternative 'sensitive' programs that would be detrimental to Turkey's national security (Zaman, 02 May 2004). The difficulty is that even the state controlled TRT programming scheme is rather unaccommodating if not antagonistic towards such proposed Kurdish broadcasting programs. The TRT's state appointed bureaucrats have defended their decision by claiming that the TRT does not have such internal regulation mechanisms so as to allow Kurdish broadcasting (Zaman, 02 May 2004). In return, the Minister of Communication Besir Atalay lamented over such TRT bureaucrats' escapist tendency and said that he could not understand why they declined to implement this proviso (Zaman, 02 May 2004). This is a clear instance (and there are others), where the assorted state bureaucrats simply consider themselves as proficiently capable of defending the 'state interests' and 'national security' by proxy even against their own elected political masters (Alper, 2004: 60-77). Therefore, when it boils down to such state security sensitive
issues, state officials (as in the case of TRT bureaucrats) often do not shy away from contemplating newly promulgated legal precepts and even confronting the political authorities.

In short, the secularist state elites seem to construe the membership in the EU in a different fashion than that of their civilian and political counter-parts. The military considers any shift to the newly emerging ‘civilian-power EU’ that could relax nationalist and secularist hold of the state over society as something dangerous and potentially costly for the ‘national unity and security’ of the state to the extent that meeting membership requirements could herald domestic existential security problems for Turkey (Cizre, 2003: 224; Bilgin, 2005: 189). All the above mentioned perceptions by the military and other state elites indicate three main points. Firstly, the norms of EU democratic rationality face difficulties in replacing the incumbent reason of state rationality. Secondly, the above-mentioned reactions and publicized concerns of the state elites over the EU democratic rationality help illustrate that the related democratic reforms have hardly been politically internalized by the country’s influential power brokers. Thirdly, and unless the previous two points change, the EU reforms leading to a more democratic political rationality is likely to remain largely in the legal context rather than be implemented in political practice. The EU-induced legislative reform packages aimed at instigating a more democratic rationality continues to meet internal resistance at the stage of implementation by the state elites. The EU democratic rationality has met little sympathy in the minds of the state elites.

SUMMARY

This chapter first outlined the critical developments that occurred in Turkey-EU relations between 1959 and 1999 with a view to charting the changing facets of Turkey’s membership in a changing EU. The latter began to paly a crucial role in anchoring Turkey’s security governmentality. As explained, Turkey was granted official candidacy status in December 1999, which paved the way for the reform process necessary for attaining EU full membership. Since then, Turkey has stepped up its historic democratic reform process with the help of a pre-Accession Strategy and put forward a National Adaptation Program. This newfound status has enforced most visibly the state elites to undergo a process of change.
Turkey’s search for a ‘European’ identity came to fruit only after the EU’s Helsinki Summit of 1999. Thereafter, Turkey promised to undertake the necessary reform process in its domestic politics in line with the EU Copenhagen democratic political criteria. After the late 1990s and by means of its Copenhagen political criteria for membership process, the EU became an influential actor to reshape Turkey’s state conduct both in its domestic and foreign realms. In so doing, the EU membership process has also effectively paved the way for an otherwise fragile process of transformation in Turkey’s security governmentality. Relations between Turkey and the EU can be broadly characterized as still entailing a lukewarm yet also gradually experiencing a process of change in security governmentality. This process gathered a particular pace in the early 2000s.

Whether this new environment for reform process is going to be sufficient for transforming Turkey’s reason of state mentality was the subject of the second section of the chapter. In the second section, the chapter noted that the EU membership requirements are gradually generating a more liberal political rationality as opposed to Turkey’s ‘reason of state’ rationality. However, the prospect of a change in the latter has also aggrieved the state elites, particularly the military. To make sense of the military’s unbending reason of state rationality in the post-EU official candidacy period, the second section laid emphasis on the military’s geo-strategic threat perceptions and negative understanding of the EU membership process. To this aim, the lack of state elites’ trust in the EU was noted. As such, the persistence of the Kemalist reason of state rationality helped by the military is largely related to the discourse of insecurity based upon the misgivings in international politics of the EU membership reform process.

The chapter found that at a basic level Turkey-EU relations have revealed a significant feature of attitudes of the Turkish state elites. At critical moments in relations, those elites have demonstrated a reactionary and/or defensive attitude towards the EU membership in general and the reform process in particular. At other times state elites have not refrained from breaking-off political dialogue with the EU (e.g., post-Luxemburg 1997), whereas the prevention or lack of implementation of the reforms in Turkey clearly showed their reluctance.

Overall, the EU-related changes in question do bind the state elites as such, but indicate a potential transformation in the country’s erstwhile political rationality and especially its
reason of state mentality. Turkey's ruling elites have been increasingly aware that a change in the latter could not only mean a long-awaited membership for Turkey into an 'exclusive European club', but more crucially, it could also constitute a fundamental restructuring of the Turkey's domestic political order.

In sum, the EU reform process comprises a comprehensive and radical set of political changes, which if successfully implemented and combined with other measures (addressing the military preponderance in politics) might bring about a more liberal and pluralist political rationality; this would be at the expense of the national security-oriented reason of state rationality in Turkey. Although key EU-induced legal and institutional reforms are underway that support a more democratic and pluralist political rationality at the expense of reason of state rationality, the still powerful misgivings held by the military and other state elites cannot be easily by-passed, since they have the political power.
CHAPTER 7

CHANGE IN THE TECHNIQUES OF SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY

This chapter examines the changes in the techniques of security governmentality after Turkey gained the EU official candidacy status in 1999. The aim is to evaluate the impact of EU accession criteria and the relevant reform process upon the specific techniques of security governmentality. The chapter seeks to discover the extent to which the EU reforms have changed the functions and the use of the techniques of security governmentality in Turkey.

7.1. CHANGES IN MACRO TECHNIQUES

Following the elevation by the EU of Turkey’s membership application to that of an ‘official candidate country status’ in December 1999 Helsinki Summit, the domestic adaption and implementation of EU accession criteria gained momentum. Throughout the adaption and implementation process the EU has particularly been apprehensive of the fact that the non-civilian forces, most notably the military, have been wielding significant veto power over elected civilians through various means in the political system. For the EU membership criteria the military preponderance is clearly held to be anomalous for a would-be-member state. Through its membership criteria the EU has on various occasions emphasized the problem of a civil-military imbalance in Turkish politics (European Commission Reports, 2003, 2004). The EU commission in its regular reports clearly states that ‘The basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a number of fundamental issues, such as civilian control over the military, remain to be effectively addressed’ (European Commission Report, 2001).

Indeed, in regard to macro techniques of security governmentality, the EU political reform process most notably concerns with the role that non-civilian forces play in the Turkish polity. As a response to these concerns and other EU accession criteria, the Turkish parliament passed a number of legislative reform packages between 2001 and 2004. Within this context, the EU membership reforms on civil-military relations have gained particular resonance, try to rectify some of the non-democratic techniques of security governmentality. The section below first briefly probes the changes in the national security concept and the National Security Policy Document. Then, because the EU is particularly concerned with the military's
role in the decision-making process, the impact of the related reforms are investigated in
greater detail in relation to the military’s role in security governmentality and the related
techniques.

**National Security Concept**

As explained in Chapter 2, an all-embracing national security concept and related legal
provisions have served as an effective brake on democratizing the country’s politics of
security. This is so because the duties and roles of the military are defined by these crucial
legal provisions. In relation to the EU, it can be argued that the subsequent reform process
seems to have been ineffective in leading to substantial changes in the existing legal
provisions surrounding the concept of national security. Article 2a of the National Security
Law of 1983 (No.2945) is a case in point. As noted by the EU, the wide-ranging national
security definition in this article, which can cover almost every policy area, remains intact.
Likewise, Article 35 and Article 85/1 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law,
which defines the duty of the Turkish military as ‘to protect and preserve the Turkish
Republic on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity, secularism and republicanism’
have not been abrogated in the reform process either (*EU Commission Regular Report*, 2004:
23). Due to these unchanged provisions and as opposed to all other ground-breaking EU
related reforms, it is still possible for the hard-liner state elites most notably the military to
reclaim their grip on the national security policies, which helps ‘to provide the military with a

**National Security Policy Document (NSPD)**

As explained in Chapter 2, the NSPD is a classified document that gives specific direction and
content to state security discourses and practices in security governmentality. Despite its
classified nature the content of this document is sometimes leaked to the media. This is then
not disowned by the military, indicating the complacency on their part (see Ergin, *Hurriyet*,
24 November 2004). From these sources we know that the NSPD not only singles out in
detail the domestic and external threats to national security but also lays down the related
policy guidelines for the government and other state institutions to be implemented (Jenkins,
2001: 43). As described in Chapter 2, the NSPD holds the government responsible for
formulating its policies according to these set security policies/named threats in the context of
the views articulated in the military dominated National Security Council. The latter, not the
Parliament, is ironically also in the position to approve the outline of this document. As such this document is a powerful repertoire for security governmentality.

The question to be discussed here is whether the status and power of the NSPD within security governmentality is changing after the acquiring of the EU official candidacy status and the subsequent reform process. Despite the secrecy cloaking it, according to press reports, there seems to be a ‘prospect of change’ in the content of the NSPD. The military is preparing a new NSPD to be ‘decided’ in the NSC and as such the existing NSPD (last amended in 2001 naming ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ as the most serious threat) is ‘very likely to change’ (Ergin, *Hurriyet*, 24 November 2004). This change was introduced by the last secretary general of the NSC, General Sukru Sariisik, and fully undertaken under the first civilian general secretary, a senior diplomat Yigit Alpogan (Bila, *Milliyet*, 25 November 2004). The latter was appointed in line with the EU reform process, with a view to transforming the role of the military in the NSC ‘into a body serving a purely consultative function’ (*EU Commission Regular Report*, 2004: 22).

Despite the expectations, it is worthy of note that the change in the NSPD appears at best to be a re-arrangement in the internal and external threat cataloguing (Mahcupyan, *Zaman*, 24 November 2005). First, the newest NSPD is claimed to note that the new security concerns such as ‘terrorism’ gains priority over the old issues arising from ‘state-to-state threats’. This new direction in turn is held to necessitate different conceptual and policy guidelines. Hence, at least conceptually, there has been a shift from the classical state-oriented ‘defense’ to ‘security’, which is assumed to better address such contemporary issues as ‘asymmetric terrorism’ (Bilgin, 2002). The latter constitute part of the new security language concurred with globalization that according to the military, further deteriorates the provision of security (Bilgin, 2005). However, the unmistakably unchanging element in the ‘new NSPD’ is the fully-authorized role of the military in addressing these ‘global challenges’. In policy terms, the new NSPD is expected to endow the military with a new mission for addressing thus naming the newfound concern over ‘global terrorism’ that requires only a ‘slightly changed force structure’ (Bila, *Milliyet*, 25 November 2004).

Interestingly, this anticipated change is not about the de-classification or opening up the content of the NSPD to public debate, political control and scrutiny. Nor is it even about stripping the military of its overassertive ability to decide on and enact the proposed security
agenda. In other words, the change seems merely in the content of the NSPD not in the powerful status of the NSPD in politics. Hence, the granting of EU official candidacy status in December 1999 does not seem to have been effective for generating substantial changes in the status of the NSPD in the political system. The NSPD continues to be one of the most effective techniques that grant the military the opportunity to get involved into politics. As such, it is highly likely that the military will continue to have the capacity to name certain internal political and social actors as security threats through the NSPD.

National Security Council (NSC)

As argued in Chapter 4, the NSC constitutes to be a central institutional technique of security governmentality in Turkey. To briefly recall, the NSC was established by Article 111 of the post-1961 coup Constitution. The NSC’s power was then further extended by the post-1980 coup environment under ‘The National Security Council Law of 1983’. The latter law entered into force chiefly for formulating, establishing and implementing the ‘national security concept’ in the form of NSPD, which reflect the military’s exclusive assessment of the internal and external threats to Turkey.

As also outlined in Chapter 4, the conceptual scope and political competence of the NSC has been so extensive that it could be ‘interpreted as covering almost every policy area’ and ‘seen not just as the defense of Turkey’s territory and its political and economic interests, but also the preservation of its Kemalist [ideological] legacy’ (Jenkins, 2001: 46). This process of far-reaching internal and external security assessment takes place exclusively within the NSC, whose decisions are to be implemented without any parliamentary debate or ratification. Thus, the Turkish NSC amounted to, in the words of the most perspicacious observer of Turkish civil-military relations, ‘the most decisive leg of a dual system of executive decision making, the other leg being the council of ministers’ (Cizre-Sakallioğlu, 1997: 158). The crucial issue here was that the widespread scope and political nature of the NSC decisions could be easily be extended well over areas that normally fall under the rubric of state security, which meant bypassing civilian authority in decision- and policy-making.

It was this substantial political weight of the NSC that became a target of the EU that aimed to reclaim the civilian upper hand. In line with EU democratic accession criteria, the Turkish parliament on 3 October 2001 instigated related constitutional amendments to rectify this undemocratic anomaly. Basically, these amendments increased the number of civilians in the
composition NSC so that the civilian supremacy could be established over the military. As opposed to the NSC’s earlier internal structure that was established with Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution, the EU induced amendments that led to the inclusion of the Justice Minister and other civilians in the NSC to establish the arithmetic supremacy of the participating civilian members over the military members (Bayramoglu, 2004: 109-13). The political weight of the NSC has also been slashed by reducing the weight of the executive powers of NSC decisions from having the status of ‘priority consideration’ to that of ‘recommendation’ for the governments (Cizre, 2004a: 120-1).

Specifically, on 30 July 2003, the Turkish parliament again introduced other ‘revolutionary’ changes in the law pertaining to the role of the military in politics to meet EU accession criteria. Indeed, the so-called the seventh National Adaptation package introduced serious steps in changing the civil-military imbalance towards civilian favor by severing the competence and political weight of the NSC and its secretariat (Kardas, 2004). Specifically, these reforms both terminated (Article 9, 14 and 19) and put forth certain amendments (Articles 4, 5 and 13) regarding the crucial National Security Council Law (Resmi Gazete, 7 August 2003, No: 25192). By and large, these reforms were intended to cut the direct links between the NSC and the military and thus put an end to the political responsibility, competency and wherewithal of the NSC. For instance, unlike the previous practices where the selection process of the General Secretary was under complete military design and control, the General Secretary of the NSC is now to be nominated by the PM and approved by the President (Article 15).

As regards to curbing the NSC’s widespread political reach: the responsibility of the NSC was reduced to that of an ‘advisory body’ (Article 4). This was a significant change in that the NSC’s full political competence, which was extended over the Prime Ministerial decision making capacity (Article 9, 14 and 19) were removed. The meeting frequency of the NSC was also lowered such that it is now to meet every second month rather than every month (Article 5). Lastly, the political responsibility of the NSC General Secretary was significantly lessened to common secretariat activities as appropriate to the NSC duties now given as ‘advisory’ decisions (Article 13). This shift meant radical progress towards a more democratic political order. For, the NSC secretariat’s legal-institutional authority to fully supervise the wide ranging NSC decisions at the expense or even contrary to the parliamentary decisions has now been curbed (Bayramoglu, 2004: 110). On the whole, these changes implied significant
ramifications in relation to the technical dimension of security governmentality. We can consider these ramifications on three levels.

1. The first level concerns curbing the knowledge production capacity of the NSC. That is, the EU-induced reforms curtailed such domestic security techniques of interventions into the Turkish body politic as information gathering, which had grown apace particularly in the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Chapter 4).

2. The second level concerns ending the NSC secretariat’s ability to control the social and personal conduct through its institutional techniques of intervention. This is an important improvement if we bear in mind the wide ranging reach of these institutions. The latter included the National Security Policy Headquarters; the Information Gathering, Research and Assessment Office; and the Civil Defense and the Office of Relations with Society. The latter was particularly relevant in that it was designed around five sub-offices: Psychological Action and Education; Print Media; Visual and Arial Media; Internet; and lastly and ironically Office of Civil - Society Institutions. These militarily dominated offices were utilized for ‘manipulation, supervision and policy making activities’ designed exclusively by the ‘political and ideological control of the military’ and undertaken by the majority of the military personnel in the relevant institution (71 percent) (Bayramoglu, 2004: 95-6).

3. The third level concerns challenging the securitization technique used by the NSC. That is, the EU-induced reforms aimed to end Article 13, which rendered the decisions of the NSC with a view to disallowing the securitization of the NSC's acquired information. Initially, securitization was made possible through processing and articulating the acquired information and knowledge by the NSC Secretariat into a security language and then putting it into political-bureaucratic attention for taking ‘extraordinary measures’ to meet the national security policies. With the EU reforms this ability seems to have been curbed (Bayramoglu, 2004: 110).

In all, these EU-induced reforms are truly path-breaking and (if implemented) of utmost importance for a fuller de-securitization and democratization of Turkish politics. So much so that the NSC’s often cited function of ‘legitimizing’ and ‘civilizing’ the ‘military policies’ has been notably restrained by the EU (Bayramoglu, 2004: 112). Through these reforms, the particular functions of the NSC have been substantially and symbolically dislodged. The
significance of these changes can be more easily grasped if we recall how politically scheming institutionally manipulative and legally appropriated the NSC had been throughout the 1990s and 2000s, especially in relation to the so-called 'post-modern coup' in February 1997. Indeed, the significance of all these reforms could be easily recognized if we bear in mind that in Turkey 'since 1909, there has been only 10 years in which a fully civilian administration has governed' (Jacoby, 2003: 669).

**The Military**

This path-breaking set of EU-induced changes in the composition and function of the NSC notwithstanding, it should also be noted that the reforms pertaining to the role NSC fall short of fully addressing the wider issues and complexities associated with the democratization of civil-military relations in Turkey. The still powerful role of the military in politics - even after strict observation of the EU accession criteria-clearly attests to this point (Insel, 2004; Bora, 2004). This shows that socially and historically rooted misgivings regarding the realm of civil-military relations linger (Cizre, 2004; Demirel, 2004b). An analysis follows of how much change has been made after the EU reforms, in relation to the political role the military. After briefly emphasizing the general political, legal, institutional and financial power structure the military still inhabits, the military's paramount-political position is illustrated by presenting specific examples to that effect that occurred after the official EU candidacy in 1999.

Firstly, and as mentioned before, in the literature of civil-military relations the issue of holding the military responsible to the Defense Ministry (rather than the Prime Minister as is in Turkey) has been established as a crucial element for the efforts to bring the military under democratic surveillance (Rial, 1996: 62; Diamond and Plattner, 1996: xxxi; Onyszkievicz, 1996: 106-08). In Turkey this has yet to be attained because making the Turkish Chief of Staff responsible to the Defense Minister instead of the Prime Minister has not been achieved (Cizre, 1997; 2003; 2004a). With respect to the lingering effect of the military in the political-institutional structure, there thus exists this unaddressed issue of the institutionally insubordinate status of the military.

The second example relates to the legal aspects of military power. For instance, the issue of subjecting the decision of the Higher Military Council (YAS, Yuksek Askeri Sura) to civilian judicial competence is yet to be accomplished. Together with other non-democratic
components in the Internal Military Criminal Code YAS has been used by the military high command to assure that some allegedly ‘dissenting’ key middle-ranking officers opposing the military’s role in politics would be either kept at bay or removed from office altogether (Jacoby, 2003; Kardas, 2004). This proved especially useful in the post 1997 coup environment as an effective internal-disciplinary mechanism to thrust aside those ‘unwanted’ personnel from the military because of their ‘obscurantist Islamic’ ideological leanings (Salt, 1999: 72-8).

The third illustration is about the continuation of the power that the military wields in the political system and is related to the lack of effective parliamentary control over the defense spendings. This is another significant indicator established by the literature on civil-military relations as to whether militaries effectively give in to civilian control, because parliamentary control over defense spending is important for enhancing the transparency of the military’s defense expenditures (Diamond and Plattner, 1996: xxxii; Huntington, 1996: 5). Regarding the Turkish case, however, instead of fuller parliamentary control, the procedure of extending the remit of the Turkish Court of Auditors to national defense expenses has been introduced as ‘a substitute reform’ (Bayramoglu, 2004: 113-6). Consequently, although this 'substitute reform' is expected to curb the substantial autonomy the military has in preparing and establishing the defense budgets and controlling the extra-budgetary funds, it clearly falls short of providing EU-set targets on this issue. For example, Article 30 of the Turkish Court of Auditors that exempt the military expenses from monitoring process still remains in effect. Overall, the only change introduced is to monitor and supervise the military in the Turkish Court of Auditors if and whenever Turkish parliamentary deems necessary to do so, which, because of the complaisant political class, is not expected to happen (Bayramoglu, 2004: 114).

Aside from these specific reform-related areas of concern, there are other more straightforward examples regarding the military’s lingering role in domestic politics even after the EU official candidacy status. We can start by referring to a particularly telling event that signaled the persistent nature of the military’s undemocratic interest and power in domestic politics. The ‘Republic National Holiday’ day on 29 October 2001 saw the military commanders telling some ‘accredited’ journalists that the military thought it would be appropriate if the then sick and ailing PM Bulent Ecevit gave the Premiership to one of his ministers: Husamettin Ozkan (Bila, 2003: 24). A second overt political involvement occurred
when it dawned on the military that Tayyip Erdogan’s ‘moderate Islamic’ Justice and Development Party was certain to win the general elections of November 2002. Alarmed by this possibility and in need of reversing this trend in the November 2002 election period, the Chief of General Staff asked the then reluctant popular Economy Minister Kemal Dervis of the main opposition party the Republican People Party (CHP) to take over the party leadership post in order to gain the swing votes and prevent the upcoming ‘Islamist’ Tayyip Erdogan’s government (Sabah, 10 April 2004). These two episodes were blindingly obvious examples of the military’s lingering undemocratic interest in the political order.

As argued in Chapter 2, the compliant political culture has also served as another facilitating layer of military influence in domestic politics and a revealing example of the continuation of this trend can be found in the stance taken by the main opposition party CHP in a rift between the military and the party. On October 9, 2004 this party sacked one of its local party head-representative, namely Mehmet Hasbioglu of Marmaris who caused consternation in the party due to his support for the so-called ‘Netekim Festival’. The latter was to take place in Marmaris, which is normally known as a popular international tourist destination in Turkey’s Aegean Coast. However, the significance of Marmaris for our case lied elsewhere. It derived from the fact that the former Chief of Staff (1977-1983) and later the President (1983-1991) General (ret) Kenan Evren, who was the leader of the military junta that staged the 1980 military coup is residing in his villa in Marmaris.

The politically turbulent ‘Netekim Festival’ was to be a village fete for protesting and calling for the perpetuators of the 12 September 1980 military coup including Kenan Evren to be brought up before the civilian courts. The Marmaris fete was organized by a civil society organization for attracting the public attention against the military junta leader Kenan Evren’s legally and socially uninterrupted period in there. The main opposition party CHP’s local party head-representative, Mehmet Hasbioglu, gave his permission and stood behind the political purpose of this fete, whereas the party’s veterans were much more cautious. Amid the in-party friction about whether or not to support the festival, the seasoned oppositional leader of CHP Deniz Baykal came to Marmaris and implied that he was against such a festival aimed at putting to trial the retired junta leader General Kenan Evren. Furthermore, after the rebuke of CHP leader, Mehmet Hasbioglu was removed from his office and later other local ruling authorities of the township banned the festival (Zaman, 09 October 2004). This confrontation revealed that even such democratically significant political actors (here CHP the
main opposition party) tend to become part of rather than solution to the irrevocable question of the military's power in domestic politics as was the case in this example. Acting this way, the influential politicians do not help reduce the military's shadow in politics, and instead bring in further obstacles in democratizing the civil-military relations.

It should be noted that here the issue is not to point out how ineffective the EU reform process has been. Indeed, these obstacles may not even seem to fall in any of the category of the EU reform process. The point is rather to highlight how the important members of the country's political class fail to flesh out and cooperate with the EU reform process, when it comes to such thorny issues of curbing military's role in domestic politics. This type of non-cooperative stance taken by political parties makes it extra difficult to empower the country's civilian forces, to say the least. Neither is it true that the EU simply declines to pay attention to the problem of the military role in politics. On the contrary the EU knows only too well the role the military plays in politics; as it has repeatedly referred to this problem in its reports (*European Commission Regular Reports, 2000-2004*).

Yet at the same time, the examples given above illustrate how the EU can be limited in spotting these kinds of military interventions mainly because of its legal-procedural approach to the problem of civil-military imbalance in Turkey. For the EU's legal-procedural approach in large measure neglects the role of the indistinct techniques used by the military to influence the socio-political development (Cizre, 2004b: 107-25). In the above example we can note that utilizing the 'accredited' veteran media representatives as the military's 'message-carriers' proves a more efficient yet indistinct method for changing the governmental posture than that of a crude military coup (see Chapter 4 and below section 7.2). The 'Marmaris Fete' example can as well strongly suggest how the military can prove too great an obstacle for the political actors to tackle. This is largely due to the still meek political culture.

There is another difficulty: it should also be noted that in the civil-military literature, effective or 'objective civilian control' over or civilian empowerment against the military is seen as an 'incremental' and gradual socio-political venture, which cannot be simply changed by merely legal procedural regulations (Huntington, 1957: 83-85; Kemp and Hudlin, 1992; Diamond and Plattner, 1996: xxx; Onyszkiwicz, 1996: 99-100; Jones and Mychajlyszyn, 2002). The pertaining EU reforms do not propose such an 'incremental and gradual' approach to the military power in domestic politics (Panel discussion on Turkey-EU Relations, Birmingham
26 September 2003). Additionally, adopting legal changes in the membership context can hardly be considered as sufficient for fully curbing the military’s role in politics. The problem is that the EU is applying a legal-procedural attitude in assessing whether Turkey did, or is likely, to turn into an effective democratic rule (Cizre, 2004a: 107-25). The EU’s inability in this respect derives, in large part, from its liberal conception of civil-military relations, which might not be fully applicable in other contexts such as Turkey’s (Cizre, 2004a: 117).

Arguably even the very distinction between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ might not hold and apply in the same manner in Turkey in that the civilians might just as well help sustain the political weight of the military in the system (Demirel, 2004b: 350). Some civilians and politicians, for instance, might be quite content with the existing political tutelage of the army, as a result of which, historically ‘demands for curbing military autonomy [appear] few and flimsy’ (Demirel, 2004a: 138). Arguably because of the latter fact and as above examples suggest, the main reason as to why the Turkish army has not further escalated its objections to the EU reform process (while it was enacted by the politicians) is that the reforms by themselves do not effectively alter the existing imbalance of power. Therefore, there is little the military is scared of and that its guardianship role can still supersede the political authority, as Cizre succinctly argues:

The fact of the matter is that MGK [the NSC] and the General staff have given the green light to the amendments on condition that integration with Europe will not interfere with the military high command’s traditional involvement in law and order, internal enemies, and foreign policy. Nor does the TSK [The Turkish military] associate democracy packages with the elimination of its political autonomy (Cizre, 2003: 220) ... The high command, being perfectly aware that the voice the military cannot be altered just changing the composition of the [National security] Council, has supported the idea of including more civilian ministers into its fold (2004a: 121).

Overall, it can be argued that the ‘dual system of executive decision making’ in Turkish politics that locate the military and government as two differing sources of authority in the system seems to have continued even after the EU official candidacy status was acquired in 1999. The military’s propensity to influence the fundamentals of the political agenda while remaining beyond the checks and balances of the parliamentary system seems also to remain. On the whole, this implies that the military is still capable of making and delivering decisions as the most influential agent of security governmentality by making use of available techniques of security governmentality in spite of the EU membership reforms such as media-manipulation and securitization.
7.2. MICRO TECHNIQUES

How much has the facilitating/functional role the media plays in the securitization process changed after the official candidacy status was gained? Has the most pervasive technique of security governmentality-securitization-changed as a result of the EU official candidacy status? Has there been a de-securitization process at work for improving the responsiveness of democratic institutions?

The Media and Securitization

Its positive approach to the EU membership notwithstanding, the mainstream media’s role as a message conveyer of the moves of the military seems to have persisted after Turkey gained official EU candidacy in 1999. As illustrated below, the mainstream news media has not declined to disproportionately cover the political ponderings of the military. This has been particularly so in its function of projecting the military’s securitizing discourses. That is, the military’s securitizing attempts of otherwise political issues continues to be facilitated by the mainstream media’s avid coverage. The mainstream media helps elevate the military’s securitizing message to the level of politically significant headlines that helps it more easily acquire the political urgency it needs. Two cases are presented below to illuminate the continuation of the securitization technique that comes out with the help of the media as the ‘functional [securitization] actors’ in the process (Buzan et al., 1998: 36).

There has been a telling example illustrating the continuation of the securitization of political issues. This example concerns a speech delivered at Turkey’s well-known centre-right ‘Motherland’ (Anavatan Partisi) party’s convention on August 4, 2001. The former Prime Minister and the leader of the Motherland Party (that formed one leg of the three-party coalition between 1999 and 2002) Yılmaz delivered an unexpected and extraordinary speech that was formally addressed to his party but in reality it was particularly addressed to the public and the content of the speech ‘sent shock waves right across the political divide’ (Cizre, 2003: 213).

In his speech, Yılmaz apparently wanted to name and shame explicitly what he called Turkey’s ‘national security syndrome’. To his reasoning, the latter curbed the country’s national and democratic development because it fuelled ‘full-scale’ answers to the cryptic
'security threats', which occasionally lead to violations of human rights and civil liberties hence producing a 'low-quality democracy' (Yucel, 2002: 8). According to Yilmaz, Turkey's overburdened state security had impaired democratic system and made the entry into the EU all the more difficult. He further commented on the subject and eventually made it clear that the EU membership in this context becomes a 'prerequisite' for overcoming the 'taboo' of discussing national security. In his own words:

National security is an essential paradigm, which ultimately aims to preserve the survival of a state. Yet the practice of the concept today [in today's Turkey] seems to work quite the contrary. The term national security has become a conundrum that thwarts every single step to enhancing the future of this country. Turkey could have been the only country, which could manage to utilize such a term to cut off all the veins of the state [...] and so did it happen. The key for change is hidden in the term 'national security'. However, it has been virtually impossible to take steps in the attempt of reinforcing the survival and increasing the welfare of our state, repeatedly with reference to national security. If Turkey wants to make progress she has to overcome the national security syndrome. The content and the circumstances of national security should be opened to public debate. The true key and requisite for turning our face to the Europe and hence change is to redefine the limits and the boundaries of the national security. National security deals with the whole nation and so should the nation do with it (quoted in Yucel, 2002: 3-4).

With this speech, Yilmaz gave a compact and unambiguously stated account of how the existing 'state security' rationality crippled Turkish politics (Milliyet, 15 August 2001). What he named as the 'national security syndrome' referred to the military's sense of responsibility to the state and its inapt interventions into politics in the name of protecting the Kemalist prescriptions of secularism and nationalism for the polity (Insel, 2001: 8-13). He also implied that the 'language of national security was being used as a tool to legitimize the need for a military role in civilian affairs' (Cizre, 2003: 213), and criticized the political weight of the military for interrupting the EU reform process of democratizing of the Turkish political system and then went on to argue that the public and political figures alike should question the concept of national security (Radikal, 05 August 2001).

Instead of throwing into relief such a sacrosanct and all-embracing concept of national security, Yilmaz's speech revealingly caused huge consternation across the state elites and across the political divide. Following the speech, different representatives of civilian groups and certain state institutions voiced their understandings and standpoints on national security and its political effects (Yucel, 2002: 5-10). By examining these reactions we can assess
whether since the granting by the EU of the official candidacy status in 1999, any radical change in the techniques of security governmentality is underway and workable.

To start, Turkey’s civil society groups on a wide spectrum were more or less in support of further opening up Yılmaz’s debate on national security. That is to say, although the wording and degree of their support varied, they were generally on the ‘pro-Yılmaz camp’ in the debate and were of the view that national security had had a damaging grip on social and economic development of the country (Yucel, 2002: 7-10). For instance, one influential liberal association, the so-called Patron’s Club, the ‘Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association’ (TUSIAD) had been ‘a driving force behind the integration with the EU and stands for a clear Western and market-economy-oriented course’ (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 102; Piccoli, 2004: 233-4), and despite its close connection with the military and the political and bureaucratic state elites, TUSIAD on this occasion took side with Yılmaz in his attempt to open up the debate on national security (Bilgin, 2005: 192). Another active and devout civil society group, namely the ‘Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People’ (MAZLUMDER) also issued a statement in Yılmaz’s favor and argued that basic rights and freedoms were treated as ‘luxurious’ mainly because of the national security policy, which constituted a ‘taboo’ ‘dictated from above’ (Yucel, 2002: 7). Still another influential group, the ‘Federation of Turkish Labor Unions’ (TURK-IS) also implicitly backed Yılmaz by pointing to the neglected economic dimension of national security and stated that ‘failure to implement social and economic measures in a certain part of the country has resulted in separatist terrorism, ethnic nationalism and other movements’ (Yucel, 2002: 9).

As can be seen from these civil society reactions, the debate on the ‘national security syndrome’ was welcome if not fully embraced. This is significant given the fact that ‘national security’ has been one of the striking taboos of the state establishment (Insel, 1997). In a democratic political order, what is expected from this kind of civil support is to see political parties tapping into the debate and channeling the concerns and expectations of the civil society to the political platform (Keyman, 1999: 94-5).

However, in contrast to this generally supportive civil society environment, the political class gave short shrift to such democratic expectations and found the task of ‘questioning’ the military’s security concept a daunting challenge and simply did not take it on board (Bilgin, 2005: 192-3). Ironically, Yılmaz’s own junior coalition partners both then-PM and the leader
of Democratic left Party (DSP) Bulent Ecevit and Deputy PM and leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Devlet Bahceli declined not only to back his position, but implicitly accused him of meddling into the ‘security realm’, which to their mind is and should remain in the hands and expertise of the military (Bilgin, 2005: 193). MHP’s deputy leader Ismail Kose went on to argue that ‘national security cannot be altered. Our policy of security against those who take up arms against the state in the name of religion or ethnicity will never change’ (Turkish Daily News, 11 August 2001). Another veteran politician and former President Suleyman Demirel also joined in this polarizing debate and took sides with the ‘pro-military camp’ along with many other political actors such as the ‘True Path Party’ (DYP) by stating that ‘Turkey has never been harmed because of national security concept; nor is there a problem with the military’ (Turkish Daily News, 17 August 2001).

Last but not least, Yilmaz’s implicit calls for reform in Turkey’s security politics unsurprisingly attracted a ‘lash-out’ by the military, whose response ranged from the dismissive to the frosty (Bilgin, 2005: 192). Indeed, Yilmaz’s speech, justified on the EU criteria and the immanent reform initiative, was securitized by the military through its official declaration: It addressed Yilmaz’s criticism as being staged against the military as an institution concerned with the security of the country (Yucel, 2002: 6). The General Staff in its four-page press release couched the speech in a securitizing language that interpreted the speech as a ‘political intervention’ into the ‘non-political’ security matters of the country. Other centre-right and left parties agreed (Hurriyet, 08 August 2001). The military, through the subsequent speeches of its service commanders on various occasions, once again reiterated the domestic-oriented national security concept. On 16 August 2001, for instance, Turkish Land Armed Forces commander General Hilmi Ozkok stated that the Turkish military has a serious responsibility to protect the secular regime (Milliyet, 17 August 2001).

In short, the military clearly dismissed Yilmaz’s criticisms by portraying them as a product of an ‘unserious’ party convention, urging that ‘the matters relating to the existence, prosperity and well-being of the Turkish nation should only be discussed at serious platforms’ (quoted in Insel, 2001: 9).

The most important aspect of the military’s response was its atypical nature. The military did not respond to Yilmaz’s path-breaking criticisms through its characteristic manner of engagement such as ‘talking’ through the words of a retired general or in a ceremony in which a serving general would take up the confrontation and respond (Insel, 2001: 9). Instead, the
main response was given through a fully official press briefing by the office of Chief of the General Staff. Here, the crucial matter to note was that after the acceptance of the country’s official candidacy status, and contrary to the EU accession criteria, the military was clearly taking an open political stance, acting in the public space of the Turkish polity and opposing a prominent political party (Insel, 2001: 9). With its declaration on 7 August against Yilmaz’s speech, the military in fact stepped out of the routinely (monthly) instigated institutional NSC meeting platform, which provided ample ground for political intervention. By this intervention the military pulled off something of a successful intervention into domestic politics and openly assumed the power of a political rather than a bureaucratic institution with palpable capacity to intervene into daily politics whenever it deemed necessary (Insel, 2001: 12).

Another aspect worthy of note was that the military’s engagement with the veteran politician and coalition partner Mesut Yilmaz’s speech came through not only in its full institutional capacity and but also by the briefing fully covered by the media. In all, this manner of bold political intervention surpassed the military’s established ‘apolitical’ stance and its other secluded measures based on remote control of the political game (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997; Jenkins, 2001). That is, due apparently to the harshness of the intended criticism, the military this time did not hesitate to undermine its long cherished conceit of staying ‘above and outside’ the daily politics.

Consequently, the political attempt to desacralize the national security concept was thwarted. The ensuing debate did not revolve around the ‘national security syndrome’ or national security concept but rather turned out to be about Yilmaz’s political credentials. This example once again clearly showed ‘the high start-up costs of a fundamental attitudinal shift by the political class on a sacrosanct topic’ (Cizre, 2003: 214). Hence, apart from his close confidantes, Yilmaz’s speech did not touch a deep chord in the political system and the possibility of opening a space for discussion about Turkey’s security politics came crashing down.

The second example concerns the military intervention into an otherwise political and social issue when in May 2004 moderate Islamist the ruling AKP government wanted to pass a legal amendment in the parliament. This securitizing move of the military was presented by the mainstream media in a statist security language (Hurriyet, Milliyet, 1/10 May 2004). The
AKP government’s attempt at a legal amendment was about a regulation which would allow graduates of vocational religious high schools to get an equal grade-credit in the university entrance exams. The new legislation was to abrogate the previous ‘injustices in education’ by giving these students equal chances to sit the examination. The university entrance examination in Turkey is very difficult to pass and even a slight change in grades might effectively fetter the prospect of success. This new legislation was launched to rid these restrictions by giving the vocational high school students an equal chance to enter the examination.

One of targets in this governmental reform was to purge the restrictions on the entry into the university entrance examination of the students of a particular vocational school, namely religious high schools also known as Imam Hatip schools. The latter schools have 71,000 out of 20 million Turkish school students and were initially founded to train mosque preachers but later ‘lost their vocational focus and [have] become state-sponsored religious high schools where conservative parents send their sons or daughters’ (Pope, *The Middle East International*, 14 May 2004, 22).

The ruling ‘moderate Islamist’ AKP government wanted to reform the university entrance system specifically by lifting the existing restrictions on the entrance into universities. More specifically, the existing restrictions meant that whenever these students selected departments other than theology to become engineers, lawyers or doctors: their high school education credits (that were to be added into the university entrance examination score) would be reduced considerably. This disproportionate reduction practically meant that they were allowed to study only theology in the universities. This reform attempt of the AK Party government in the university entry system, hence, ran aground on the realities of Turkey’s security politics, when the military explicitly expressed dismay on this legislative change (*Milliyet*, 07 May 2004).

Before 1997, these students did not have any obstacles to enter the nation-wide university entrance examination to become engineers, lawyers, doctors and so on. That is, the graduates used to have equal-credits necessary to succeed and/or get better results in the university entrance examination. However, after the military intervention against the Islamist Refah government by the so-called ‘post-modern’ military campaign in June 1997 (Chapter 4, section 4.3) there came a military-led ‘preventive’ upsurge against all religious establishments.
including these high schools to curb the kind of 'security threat' they posed (Carkoglu, 2004: 112). The military was of the view that these high-school students were a 'security threat' to the state because they 'were being used to inculcate anti-secularist values' (Jenkins, 2001: 62). Later, the graduates of these religious schools began to feel and bear the consequences of being securitized by experiencing serious restrictions upon their chance for entry into university education put by the military-led secular establishment, which aimed 'to curb the influence of political Islam' (Pope, *The Middle East International*, 14 May 2004, 23).

The military was against the AKP's governmental reform plans since these allegedly intervened into the issues pertaining to 'the security of the secular state' (*Hurriyet*, 07 May 2004). The military's securitizing reasoning into this otherwise political issue of university entrance examination run as follows. Since these schools are high schools, which give religious education (in addition to the regular high school curriculum) to their students, these students should find jobs in religious services rather than in other vocations, which necessitates finishing the relevant university departments of Islamic theology. Consequently, any attempt to switch tracks in their career path should be discouraged. Their grades should be reduced in comparison to other regular non-vocational high schools students, who are freer to choose a non-vocational career path. Since the AKP government attempt to change this logic by a new legislation, then this can only mean that the 'moderate Islamist' AKP government is plotting against the 'secular' character of the state (*Hurriyet*, 07 May 2004). Consequently, the military did not welcome this regulation, because it simply held that it would 'jeopardize' the security of the 'secular state' (*Financial Times*, 07 May 2004). With this logic, the Turkish General Staff issued a stern warning in the form of a public declaration that was immediately grabbed by the media hitting the headlines and later fully covered by the print and visual media. The General Staff declaration stated read:

> Those groups and institutions, who are loyal to the basic natures of the Republic [i.e. secularism] cannot be expected to give consent to such kind of amendments...The thoughts and attitudes of the Turkish Military Forces towards the democratic, secular and social state principles of the Republic is what it was before, it has not changed and will not change tomorrow. Nobody can be expected to misunderstand this fact... We believe that the related institutions and organizations will carefully and common sensually approach the issue and that our great nation will show the necessary sensitivity to this matter... (*TRT News*, 07 May 2004).
This particular securitization by the military regarding the education reform is clearly an example of the undemocratic conduct often seen in security governmentality. Blocking such reforms can only be oblivious to the consequences of excluding these students of religious schools from entering one of the most identity-transforming modern institutions that is the universities. The consequence is that such attitudes against religious high school graduates in the university examination are likely to hinder the development of a wider participation into modernity by the religious citizens (Gole, 2002; Kaya, 2004). Moreover, it also increases the insecurities felt by these students: It is commonly held amongst the students of these religious schools that although their mental or physical outlook is no different than other regular high schools students, the newfound restrictions aimed to specifically block their entrance into universities mostly because of their supposed 'potentially dangerous' Islamic identity. For many, this 'potentially dangerous' identification with the Islamic religion remains a dubious claim and as such the students feel categorized on unjust and unwarranted bases (Interviews with the students, Istanbul, Izmir, April 2004).

Similarly, another instance of successful securitization by the military can be given. This case revolved around the issue of minority rights, another matter relating to the EU reform process for democratizing the country's domestic politics (Yesilada, 2002: 106-7). As explained in Chapter 6, minority rights constitute a considerable dimension of the EU conception of democracy as defined in the Copenhagen criteria. The impact of the military in the domestic political scene here evinced in the publication and press release of an outspoken report on the issue of granting more rights to the country’s minorities (Hurriyet, 30 October 2004; Milliyet, 30 October 2004). The content of the report promoted a more liberal approach to minority rights and proposed that 'Turkish citizenship' should be developed instead of an ethnically oriented concept of 'Turkishness', which was not welcomed by some Kurds (Pope, Middle East International, 5 November 2004: 23). The content also described the fear of granting more rights to minorities as leading to the break up of the republic as 'paranoia' (Pope, Middle East International, 5 November 2004: 23). The advisory body that prepared this report was linked to the prime minister and was formed from a wide range of social institutions and some academics (Hurriyet, 30 October 2004). Released primarily for facilitating an atmosphere of civil debate and deliberation, this report associated with Turkey's 'moderate Islamist' PM Erdogan on human rights instead led to a sharp division across the social and political spectrum (Pope, Middle East International, 5 November 2004: 23). In front of the TV cameras at a press conference a labor union official member of the body grabbed the copy
of the report from the chairman’s hands, tore it in pieces and denounced its content (Milliyet, 30 October 2004).

After the row, the content of the report also proved too harsh to digest for the many quarters of the country’s hard-line security establishment. The head of state President Necdet Sezer opposed the conclusions of the report by stating that ‘the definition of the concept of minority is clearly written in the Lausanne Treaty [which grants minority status to non-Muslim religious groups such as Jews, Armenians and Greeks rather than Muslim Kurds]...and it won’t change’. Despite his otherwise generally moderate stance towards the EU reforms process, the Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Ozkok also took a critical stance by publicly wryly declaring that

There is no reason to be scared of Turkishness being a supra-national identity. The word Turk represents the entire country. I believe any attempt to try to change this will result in great confusion and disturbance (both quoted in Pope, Middle East International, 5 November 2004: 24).

The obvious securitizing move itself came through a press briefing in the Office of the General Staff by the deputy Chief of the General Staff Ilker Basbug:

The most important issue with regard to which the Turkish Armed Forces has always taken a stance and will continue to do so is to protect and preserve the indivisible entity of the Turkish state with its territory and nation. The unitary state is a value not only of the security forces but also of the nation and must be carefully protected and preserved by everyone. The unitary state either exists or not, there is no middle ground (Zaman, 02 November 2004).

Consequently (and quite usually for security governmentality), this securitizing move by the military proved sufficient for the ‘moderate Islamist’ AK Party government to shelve the report. The government later distanced itself from the advisory body that prepared the not-so-debated report (Zaman, 20 November 2004). By securitizing a civil society discussion about minority rights, the military once again both undermined the ground for a democratic debate and established itself as the ultimate arbiter and perpetuator of security governmentality.

As argued above, the EU is mostly blinded to these securitizing moves of the military mainly because of its legal-institutional approach to civil-military relations (Cizre, 2004a: 117-22). The EU seems capable only of dimly spotting the military’s securitizing moves. For instance,
one recent report, namely, the 2004 Regular Commission Report, hints that the military "continues to exercise through a series of informal mechanisms. On various occasions, the military members of the NSC expressed their opinion on political, social and foreign policy matters in public speeches, briefings or statements to the media and declarations" (European Commission Regular Report, 2004: 23). This is rather an underestimating assessment. As can be seen in the above examples, the political effects of the securitizations by the military are graver than assumed by the EU.

In brief, in the aftermath of the EU official candidacy period various securitizations of political issues by the military and by the mainstream media actors have shown how the security mentality still remains powerful. The securitization technique of the military has not seemed to fade away. This has been the case even after and despite the most encouraging and obvious leap forward in Turkey's EU membership process for years, namely the coming of the much-awaited EU Commission Report that recommended opening negotiation talks with Turkey in November 2004.

SUMMARY

This chapter presented the EU-related changes in the techniques of security governmentality. It investigated whether the role of the military and these techniques in security governmentality have been loosing their grip on the political domain after the EU official candidacy status was granted. As argued in Chapter 4, an important issue pertaining to the military's role in Turkish politics has been the specific techniques it uses in security governmentality. The military through these techniques has established itself as the most notable and potent agent of security governmentality. One obvious outcome of using these techniques has been that the military has been able to set forth its influence through and against the democratic procedure. Therefore, studying changes in techniques is vital in grasping the prospect of a transformation in security governmentality.

The chapter noted that there have been some important changes introduced by the EU reform process in regard to the technical dimension of security governmentality. Here, the most significant change involved curbing the power and functions of the NSC. The EU reform process has successfully halted the power and status of the NSC in the political system. However, this successful transformation has not been supplemented by necessary changes in
other techniques of security governmentality. The national security concept that covers a wide range of issue-areas has not been changed. The military's ability to decide on the national security agenda through the NSPD is also left unchanged. The securitization of politics by the military and the role the media plays in securitization are two other unchanged techniques of security governmentality. The examples studied in this chapter also show how the military involvement into politics harvests domestic rows between the governments and the military on various political-social matters and woefully underpower the governments.

In all, the portfolio of changes introduced after the official candidacy in 1999 indicates that the most influential agent of security governmentality the military is still capable of making and delivering decisions through various techniques of security governmentality. The investigation in this chapter also shows that despite the EU-led reforms that call for curbing the military power and democratizing Turkish politics, events continue to point to the power wielded by the military in the political system. The military extracts its interventionist political power from its 'non-political' social and legal position, which is seen as being above the confines of daily politics with respect to its internalized-legalized guardian and vanguard role and its ability to define/act upon internal security threats. These 'apolitical' security interventions and securitizations are then quite paradoxically integrated into and internalized by the political system. These interventions are used as a major policy tool against the serving governments that happen to stay on the military's way. It is these kinds of interventions that the EU finds difficult to realize and/or act upon after so many reforms.

More specifically, it should be emphasized that the current EU reform process seems particularly inadequate in rectifying one of the complex techniques employed by the military in security governmentality, namely the securitization technique that is facilitated and transmitted by the media. The lack of scrutiny by the EU on the uses of the securitization technique in turn contributes to the lack of democratic control over the military's interventionist attitude into politics. Consequently, it can be argued without a concerted emphasis on such techniques it might not be possible to deliver the desired outcome of removal of military further from politics.

Overall, the chapter's investigation about the techniques of security governmentality bears mainly two results for security governmentality. Firstly, is that the EU has been ineffective in fully curbing the political clout of the military interventions in politics. Secondly, and
accordingly, in order to reach out a more democratic system of governmentality the institutional and procedural roadmaps designed by the EU about the role of the military in politics should be supplemented with the efforts to rectify other military techniques such as securitization. If these techniques are reformed, the prospects for a more pluralist democratic rule will be enhanced.
CHAPTER 8

CHANGE IN THE IDENTITY DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY

This chapter explores the changes in the identity dimensions of security governmentality in the period since Turkey gained the EU official candidacy status in 1999. As argued before in Chapter 5, the identity dimensions of security governmentality are about identity-conflicts that function as a central means in the justification and perpetuation of security governmentality. As shown in Chapter 5, the security-based antagonistic and unsettling political space of security governmentality springs from the mutually exclusive confrontational identification between Kemalist secularism and political Islam. Accordingly, it is reasonable to argue that changes in these identities would result in a retreat from this confrontation. In view of that, in investigating changes in these identities it becomes vital to grasp whether they can correspond to broader changes in security governmentality. For it is in part through the securitization of conflicts between these identities that security governmentality finds a fertile ground for political and cultural justification. To this end, the present chapter examines the relevant changes in the secularist and the religious identity orientations. It scrutinizes these identities in line with possible changes in their most visible representatives: the military-led Kemalist state elites and the Islamist politicians. The chapter therefore addresses two questions. First, how much have the secularist and religious identities in security governmentality changed since the EU official candidacy status was gained? Second, to what extent can these changes in these identities affect the competence of security governmentality? To substantiate its claims the chapter employs the 'data triangulation' method (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 23). This involves collecting empirical information from a range different and multiple but related sources including interviews conducted with military personnel and political representatives of the Islamist movement. The latter took place in January, April and August 2004. This information is used to clarify the relevant actors' cognitive affiliation with democratic politics, secularist/Kemalist-Islamic political identity and EU membership.

8.1. CHANGES IN SECULARIST IDENTITY
To what extent has the secularist identity of the state elites changed? It is argued below that in the official candidacy period, the secularist-Kemalist political identity of the military-led state elites has not undergone a substantial change. The military has indeed continued its security-based interventions into domestic political conduct justified in the name of protecting and preserving the secular nature of the state (Jenkins, 2001: 84; 2003). Besides, since the coming to power in 2002 of the 'moderate Islamist' Justice and Development Party the secularist fears/concerns of the military and its interventionist approach into politics therein have not been on the decline (Gurgen, 'AKP'ye İlk Elestiriler', Radikal, 09 January 2003).

As argued in Chapter 3, one of the constitutive dimensions of the rationality of security governmentality is the ideology of 'Kemalist secularism'. Indeed, the Kemalist state ideology concedes a tenacious weight to secularism, which has produced a considerable normative justification for the military coups (Tachau and Heper, 1983; Jenkins, 2003; Demirel, 2003; Cizre, 2003). This secularist excess has at times given rise to a politics of 'militant secularism' (Bora, 1998: 82). As Feroz Ahmad-a prominent historian of Turkey-wrote (1993: 213) in this regard: 'the possibility of another coup [after the 12 September 1980 coup] is always present so long as the Turkish army perceives itself as the guardian of the republic and its Kemalist legacy'. One can argue that more than ten years on Ahmad's prediction continues to hold ground with the important caveat that the military does not simply consider staging direct coups to uphold its political muscle given the availability and efficiency of specific techniques of political intervention in security governmentality as argued in Chapter 4. Out of a repertoire of techniques, the military has at times used the media-hyped concern over the 'secular nature of the state' by way of securitization of Islamic identities to topple governmental policies (Ayata, 2004: 244-8). The section below will show that the military and other representatives of the state such as the Presidency have since 1999 tended to guard the secularist identity of the state no less eagerly.

Militant Secularism vs. Democratic Politics

The basic credentials of parliamentary democracy have hardly been sidestepped merely by the military's (secularist) interventions into politics since 1999. This is particularly visible when we compare the reactions by the military towards the electoral successes of two Islamists parties namely the Refah Party in 1997 and the AKP in 2002. As argued in Chapter 4, the military stage-managed the 1997 post-modern coup with the help of mainstream media that acted as 'functional securitization actor' in securitizing Refah government as an 'Islamist
domestic threat' to 'the secular nature of the state' (Lombardi, 1997: 213). Yet, this kind of dismissive and outright reaction has not appeared against the 'moderate Islamist' AKP government. Instead, the military openly 'accepted' the landslide victory of the AKP in the November 2002 general elections by plainly declaring the electoral result as the 'will of the people' (TRT-INT News, 05 November 2002). Indeed, as Larry Diamond—a leading student of democratization—observes (2003: 169) the decision by 'the national security establishment' 'not to block' the AKP's 'moderately Islamist' electoral victory has signified an important step in the development of Turkish democracy. So much so, that the possibility of another open military coup against Islamists has appeared unpopular amongst the military top brass (Interview with Metin Heper, Zaman, August, 2004). However, opting 'not to block' the 'moderate Islamist' AKP cadres from coming to power does not mean unconditional toleration of its policies by the military (Cizre, 2003: 226; Jenkins, 2003: 66). The point is that the military does not need to block the AKP in the first place because with the help of techniques discussed, it would be able to continue to exert its traditional influence to let or block certain policy initiatives by any government it deems 'anti-secular' and 'anti-Kemalist'. As argued in Chapter 4, the military managed such securitizations not by acting against the legal constraints, but precisely by using such legal precepts that provided the space to take up such securitizing moves.

What drives the military to cast a constant watch on the parliamentary democracy and the representatives of the people? This question is important to consider given the fact that the mistrust in party politics and politicians informs securitizing moves of the military (Cizre, 1997; Yavuz, 2000b; Demirel, 2004b, see Chapter 2.3). The custodial non-democratic role of the military and its institutional political autonomy is sustained by a security-informed task of 'maintaining national unity' (Demirel, 2004a; Jenkins, 2001: 18; Yavuz, 2000a: 36). The crucial ingredient in the military's role in security governmentality has been its constitutional-legal capacity to find political latitude by acting in the capacity of being the 'guardian and guarantor of national security' for 'maintaining national unity' (Jenkins, 2001: 33-5). The latter is officially defined in relation to the 'internal threats to the state unity' or 'threats to Turkey's unitary state quality and secularism' (Cizre, 2003: 216). Behind its mistrust in politics and politicians also is the military's low-esteem for the institution of party politics in general and the professional political class in particular. As Cizre-Sakallıoğlu stresses:
The hallmarks of the civilian world, according to the military are its praetorianism, instability, inefficacy, careerism, populism, lack of prudence, corruption, and irresponsibility. This antipolitical cognitive road map of the Turkish officer corps is incongruent with even the most flexible versions of the concept of democracy (1997: 156).

The mistrust by the military against the institution of politics and the political class have persisted in the post-1999 period including the period of ‘moderate Islamist’ AKP government (Gurgen, Radikal, 09 January 2003). This attitude was evident in the initial secularist reaction to the AKP by the military: the so-called ‘young officers’ crisis that broke in the early 2003. Mustafa Balbay from Cumhuriyet daily reported in a series that some influential officers within the military were ‘uncomfortable’ with the idea that a ‘moderate Islamist’ government could take hold of the state with its ‘anti-secular inclinations’ (Cumhuriyet, January 2003)\(^\text{13}\). Given the fact that the AKP government was just formed, it was not much clear as to what ‘anti-secular inclinations’ did the military have in mind other than the previous political experiences of its leadership. Nevertheless, the sheer spectacle of the report ensued for days and showed that neither the military nor the mainstream media cast away its gaze over the government of Islamic inclinations. When asked in an interview what it meant to be ‘uncomfortable’ with the ‘anti-secular inclinations’ of the AKP, a military officer gave a glimpse:

The company with the AKP leader-PM Erdogan of his wife in public places, who wears headscarf is a sign of their unacceptable religious inclinations... It is not acceptable to see the PM’s wife appearing in public ceremonies wearing a headscarf...She can wear it [headscarf] when she stays at home...Wearing headscarf in public places is against the secularism of the state (Interview with a military officer, Ankara, August 2003).

Another example of such a secularist reaction that showed the continuing prevalence of the secularist identity of the military-led state elites can be given in relation to the EU-induced ‘University and Education Reform’. According to the newly-established ‘moderate Islamist’ AKP government, the latter reform was designed to ‘democratize’ the higher education system by transferring more power to the bottom-up representatives of universities from their state appointed rectors, which necessitated changing Article 2547 of the Higher Education Board (YOK) Law (Guclu, Milliyet, 15 September 2003, p.10).

\(^\text{13}\) Cumhuriyet is the representative of the ideology of the state in the media. Its political power and influence spring from its ideological linkage not correspondent to its level of circulation.
Unsatisfied with this EU induced reform-initiative of the AKP government, some secularist university rectors and other representatives of YOK strove to *bypass* the AKP’s political authority by acting as ‘functional securitizing actors’. The activities of the latter included provoking the secularist sensitivities of the military by presenting the university reform not as one of a democratic necessity but of an ‘Islamist threat to secularism’ (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 September 2003, p. 8). Playing secularist raw nerves of the military by visiting their headquarters, the representatives of the YOK sought refuge in the military’s ‘political autonomy and authority in the system’ (Cizre, 1997: 155-65). The military undertook the visit at the highest levels possible, namely by the offices of Commander of the Army Aytac Yalman and Chief of Staff Hilmi Ozkok himself (*Radikal*, 15 September 2003 p. 7). Following the public row that broke as a result of this university rector/military collaboration, the Office of the Chief of General Staff issued a public declaration, which successfully securitized the governmental reform and eventually resulted in the shelving of the reform. The securitizing declaration read as follows:

As stated in Article 42 of our Constitution, the Turkish Armed Forces holds to heart the principle that “education in Turkey is conducted in line with Ataturk’s principles and revolutions and according to the contemporary scientific and educational bases”...It is natural for the Turkish Armed Forces to carefully and closely watch over the developments [the reform attempt] regarding our national education system, which is of *life-and-death importance for Turkey* (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 September 2003 p. 1; *Milliyet*, 15 September 2003 p. 10, emphasis added).

If we take up the definition of consolidation of democracy by a Turkish student of democracy as ‘a situation in which democracy becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting outside democratic institutions’ (Ozbudun, 2000: 2), the university/military securitization just described reveals a distinct nature of Turkish democracy: Secularism informed security governmentality often trumps basic features/institutions of democracy in Turkey. Thus, in practice the military’s secularist proclivity simply becomes the Achilles heel for any government in power. Also, when considered in this fashion the military’s identification with Kemalist secularism attains a persistent political purchase that well exceeds the capacity ‘to make or break the governments’ within the confines of electoral democracy. Indeed, it is this constantly active secularist gaze that endows the military with the necessary power to outperform the functions of a direct military coup (Salt, 1999: 72-8). This type of acting well outside democratic institutions is still evident even at the apex of the EU membership process, throughout which the military craved to preserve its power (Cizre...
2003: 225; 2004: 108). It is within the context of secularist sensitivities that the military retains an unashamedly proprietorial attitude towards the political system.

Therefore, confronting an allegedly 'Islamist' government in power, the military is likely to retain its 'militant secularist' trepidations and interventions into domestic politics (Jenkins, 2003). However and as argued before, the EU is increasingly apprehensive and critical of the military's influence in domestic politics. Bearing in mind the fact that the military has repeatedly assured the national and the international public that it supports Turkey's bid for EU membership (Altayli, Hurriyet, 21 December 2004), one can expect a less interventionist military. Yet, behind its ostensible official support the military elites have at times rendered the EU political membership conditionality as potentially undermining of the national unity and integrity of the state (Drorian, 2004: 18; Bilgin, 2005). In other words, the kind of the EU membership the military espouses is not quite the one which includes fully embracing the EU as 'civilian power' (Manners, 2002) that is bent on changing the domestic political behaviours of the aspirant candidate states (Schimmelfennig et al, 2003) and especially its politically ambitious plan for transforming the exigencies of Turkey's non-democratic security politics. Consequently, it becomes uncertain whether the military will ever fully embrace the more pluralist democratic public space that the EU promotes.

8.2. CHANGES IN ISLAMIST POLITICAL IDENTITY

Particularly since the collapse of the Islamist Refah Party government in June 1997 as a result of the military's post-modern coup, the manifestations of a major change in Turkey's Islamic political identity have become all the more evident (The Middle East, May 2004: 345; Newsweek, 11 October 2004: 38-42; Yavuz, 2003: 239-65; Mecham, 2004: 339-45; Dogan, 2005: 421-37). Indeed, the coming to power of the 'moderate Islamist' AKP has confirmed the prospect of a political identity change at a nation-wide level. How can we account for this dramatic change in Islamic political identity and its implications for the identity dimension of security governmentality?

The issue of change in Islamic political identity is a rather perplexing one. Deliberations by analysts and political scientists over the underlying economic and political factors that can account for such a change have been recently flourished (Cakir, 1992; 1994; Laciner, 2002; Bora, 2002; Yavuz, 1997; 2003; Heper, 1997; Heper and Toktas, 2003; Yildizoglu, 2003;
Ozel, 2003; Onis and Keyman, 2003; Mecham, 2004; Dogan, 2005). The present section argues that the issue of change should also, perhaps primarily, be couched in the confrontational security space (a product of security governmentality) between the secularist forces (i.e. the military) and Islamist (party political) forces. First though, it is necessary to briefly survey various social, economic and political factors that played significant roles in changing the Islamic political identity in Turkey.

Changes at the Socio-Historical Level

Behind the recent upsurge of changes in the Turkish polity were social and economic troubles that included the catastrophic effects on large segments of society of the rapid inflation in 2001, global competition, and the economic recession that ‘narrowed opportunities for spoils’ and generated ‘large and persistent pockets of poverty’ and further unemployment (Ozel, 2003: 83-5; Onis and Keyman, 2003: 97). In the early 2000s, a palpable widespread dissatisfaction with the ineffective parliamentary system together with rampant cronyism, highly personalized political battles between party leaders, blatant populism, political patronage and corruption all meant an alienated electorate and an ailing political system (Sozen and Shaw, 2003: 61; Ozel, 2003: 86; Onis and Keyman, 2003). The change in Islamic political identity in recent years is also closely related to the decreasing power of the Kemalist state ideology in dominating state-society relations (Gulalp, 1997: 56-8; Keyder, 1997: 46-8; Onis, 1997; Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 119; Jacoby, 2003; Yavuz, 2003: 15). Here, the phenomenal change in the Islamic political identity should be explained with a reference to its roots in the crucible of state-society relations that overtime failed to ensure the steadfast grip of the secular state identity over Islamic social identity (Gole, 1997b: 83; 2002).

More specifically, the historically dominant position of the Kemalist state ideology and bureaucracy was initially weakened as a result of the neo-liberal economic transformation process, which was introduced during the early 1980s by the then PM Turgut Ozal (Ozel, 2003: 84-6). Ozal managed to circumvent the powerful state bureaucracy by his own style of politics (e.g., bold leadership and ruling by decrees for bypassing normal parliamentary constraints) that led to ‘the weakening of the bureaucratic or state apparatus’ (Onis, 2000b: 96-102; 2004: 115). The shrinking of state control over the economy and politics was furthered by the advent of democratization and economic liberalism supported by the EU membership process (Muftuler-Bac, 2000; Onis, 2003). Over time, these weakening factors have also led to the loosening of the tight grip of the state over society, which has in turn
allowed Islam to occupy a more central place in public space (Gulalp, 1997b). By exploiting and being receptive to the growth of the ‘opportunity spaces’ of education and new media outlets within the public sphere; Islamic political identity has ‘become a motivating force for economic expansion, democratization, and the popular acceptance of many aspects of modernity’ (Yavuz, 2003a: 15). The end result of this new Islamic political identity, as Nasr argues, is such that

Its political vision is inclusive of secular ideas and practices and sidesteps the uncompromising demands of Islamist dogma and its goal of creating an Islamic state. Neither is Islamic activism in Turkey directed at the creation of such a state, nor does it view the Islamic state as the guarantor of survival and propagation of Islamic values in society. In fact as the rise of AKP suggests, Islam in Turkish politics is rapidly adapting itself to the demands of a democratic and economically liberal Turkey (Nasr, 2004: 627).

Changes at the Political Level: The Birth of the AKP and the ‘Quite Revolution’

After the military’s post-modern coup (Chapter 4: 3) against the Islamist Refah Party government, the political future of the party was clouded further by the judiciary. In addition to the military campaign, on 22 May 1997 the Public Prosecutor Vural Savas applied to the Constitutional Court for unlocking the drama by asking for the closure of the party on the grounds that it ran foul of secularist principles (Savas, 2001a: 263-274). Furthermore, the pressures of the military-led campaign were accompanied by the erosion of the coalition government’s majority by resignations from the True Path Party. As a result, the first Islamist PM Erbakan resigned on 18 June 1997. Later, in January 1998, the Constitutional Court closed down the Refah Party and banned its leader Erbakan from politics for five years. Alerted by the impending closing net on their party, most of the members of Refah Party joined the Fazilet (Virtue) Party, which was founded by the confidantes of Erbakan on 17 December 1997. Having taken up a more moderate language of politics than the Refah Party’s earlier inflammatory religious rhetoric, the successor Fazilet Party ran for the general election on 18 April 1999 but in the end secured only 15.4 per cent of the national vote. Despite the fact that the Fazilet Party adopted from the onset a more moderate political discourse by declaring its commitment to secularism, the Constitutional Court once again stepped in politics and announced the closure of the party in June 2001 on the same secularist grounds that closed its predecessor Refah Party (Mecham, 2004: 339-46). The Public Prosecutor applied to the Constitutional Court on 7 May 1999 for the closure this time of the Refah’s
successor, the Fazilet Party, by claiming that the party was undermining secularist principles of the state referring to the headscarf conundrum (Savas, 2001a: 443).

Particularly after its unsuccessful election results in April 1999 and the Constitutional bans, signs for a new initiative within the Islamic political cadres became more visible. Afterwards, it emerged that the Islamist political movement could not bear these fatal blows by the hands of the military and the judicial establishment. The movement split into two separate parties. The older generation loyal to the founder of the movement Necmettin Erbakan formed a successor party under a different name: The Saadet (Felicity) Party. The younger generation of the movement headed by Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul, on the other hand, staked their bid higher by establishing a wholly different party: the Justice and Development Party on 14 August 2001. Significantly for security governmentality; the AKP government, unlike its predecessor Islamist parties, has repeatedly underlined its commitment to secularism and has waved the flag of democratic institutions and, last but not least, strove more than any other government for Turkey’s EU membership bid (Dogan, 2005). By according its message to the mainstream centre, the AKP has transformed itself ‘into a politically sophisticated, progressive and moderate participant in normal politics’ (Mecham, 2004: 340). The party immediately disowned its predecessors’ more contentious Islamic demands and adapted a more moderate and avowedly democratic and centrist political stance (Laciner, 2001:4-5). The new AKP then came to power by winning a landslide victory in November 2002 national elections. This political triumph has shown that the electorate was highly receptive of this political-identity change (Onis and Keyman, 2003). In the words of Deborah Sontag:

Justice and Development would be a party in which religious people could feel at home, but it wouldn’t be a religious party. Its members would be Muslim Democrats in the mold of Europe’s Christian Democrats. It would entice Westernized Turks from abroad, like Egemen Bagis, 33, a businessman living in New Jersey until Erdogan recruited him to run for Parliament without, Bagis said, ever asking whether he drank (he does) or whether his wife covered her hair (she doesn’t) (New York Times, 11 May 2003).

Graham Fuller, a close follower of Turkish politics, has argued that one key principle behind the revival of political Islamic movements has been the conviction on the part of its actors, which ‘attribute the past achievements and past durability of Islamic civilization to the very message and implementation of Islam itself’ (Fuller, 2003: 2). In this logic then any straying from that faith might be perceived ‘as a direct source of decline and failure’ (Fuller, 2003: 2).
If this is a yardstick against which we can question the political principles and style of the AKP it is clear that the latter does not constitute yet another version of political Islam. The modernization and politicization of the one of the most influential religious orders, namely Naksibendis-parts of which formed the AKP-also helped change the Islamic political identity (Interview with Prof. Serif Mardin, Milliyet, 28 February 2005). The AKP ideologues now clearly represent the party as a typical 'Conservative Democratic party' that signifies not 'a status quo but open to change and future oriented modern conservatism, which defines change in an evolutionary transformation of society...a space for conciliation' (Radikal, 11 January 2004). Hence, the result is a transformation from political religious discourse to a Western style (conservative) democracy discourse that corresponds to an 'eclectic and liberal' ideology (Akdogan, 2003; Mert, 2004: 36; Alkan, 2004: 50-2).

That the general election of 3 November 2002 has transformed the Turkish political landscape has become the commonplace argument amongst political analysts (Insel, 2002; Cinar, 2002; Bora, 2002; Yarasir and Akgun, 2002; Ozel, 2003; Jenkins, 2003; Yavuz, 2003; Carkoglu, 2003). Between 1986 and 2002, never one party was able to win majority of seats in the parliament. In the November 2002 elections, the electorate ousted (with a 'damning indictment') the incumbent governing parties of centre-left and right-wing tripartite coalition, whose members could not win this time even a single seat in the new parliament (Onis and Keyman, 2003). A then new and untested party namely the AKP achieved electoral victory despite the fact that it has never competed in Turkish national elections before (Laciner, 2002: 13). There was perhaps nothing new regarding this election bearing in mind that Turkey is generally seen as a country fulfilling the necessary (but not sufficient) condition of democracy, that is being 'electorally competitive' political system (Arquiatte, 2004). The victory acquires significance, however, if we consider that as a 'moderate Islamist' party, the AKP was one of 'the parties that Turkey’s politically powerful military least wanted to see win' (Stepan and Robertson, 2004: 143). As Sontag summarizes, the AKP’s victory in the political system

[w]as a resounding rejection of the old, corrupt, mismanaged and fragmented Turkish political order. It was also an embrace of Erdogan personally but not of Islamism. On election night, Erdogan immediately sought to reassure the establishment that he would not be an agent of unwanted change. In a news conference, he said that his government would not interfere with anyone’s way of life, would uphold Turkey’s Western-oriented foreign policy, would abide by an International Monetary Fund
rescue plan and would continue the battle for admission to the European Union. [After which the] Turkish markets soared (Sontag, New York Times, 11 May 2003).

The results of the local elections in March 2004 confirmed, despite all these misgivings, that majority of the electorate embraced the AKP’s political message. This triggered a whole new debate as to what exactly were the hopes of the party and the masses. Contrary to the ‘politics of fear’ that have been prevalently at work for a time (Yavuz, 2002) the economic policies and the general political performance of the AKP government has surprised even the most unrepentant cynics and staunch critics of the party (Altayli, Hurriyet, 30 December 2004; Ozkok, Hurriyet, 30 December 2004).

The AKP and the EU Membership Process
This dramatic rise and ascent to power of the ‘moderate Islamist’ AKP with a massive majority in a most secular and geo-strategically key NATO member and an official EU candidate state has been seen by many observers as something ‘perplexing’ (Mango, 2003; Jenkins, 2003). This is so not least because the Turkish state was always seen as a pro-Western parliamentary democracy, and a ‘success story of secular nationalism’, one which ‘served as the paragon of secularism across the Muslim world’ (Turam, 2004: 358; Nasr, 2004: 627). Questions surrounding the coming to the power of the AKP gained a new resonance and further political importance beyond Turkish polity in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and ‘war on terrorism’. The questions were compounded also after the Turkish parliament’s refusal to allow the deployment of the US troops to form a second front in Northern Iraq in 2003 (Robins, 2003: 547). Furthermore, the AKP’s Turkey has also ‘become a propaganda asset, a riposte to fears of an impending clash of civilizations between Islam and the West’ (Jenkins, 2003: 45; also Toynbee, The Guardian, 20 September 2005; Bunting, The Guardian, 26 September 2005).

A prominent observer of Turkey and journalist Stephen Kinzer has recently suggested that a revolution is taking place in Turkey chiefly as a result of the AKP’s EU policy (2004: 14). Kinzer reckons that the AKP initiatives in the political realm informed by the EU membership process have amounted to a ‘quite revolution’. He noticed that a ‘Muslim party’ takes the lead in Turkey’s quest for the EU and this ‘is a deliciously subversive contradiction’ (Kinzer, 2004: 15). Others have pointed to the potentially transforming effect of the AKP both in Turkish and even Islamic politics in the Middle East. A prominent professor of political Islam
John Esposito of Georgetown University stated that with the coming to power of the AKP, Turkey is developing an inclusive rather than exclusionary ‘democratic secularity’, which should ease the initial fears of the EU about membership. Francis Fukuyama too joined the chorus by praising the ‘conservative democratic’ identity of the AKP, claiming that ‘the best thing that can happen to the Islamic world is to generate an Islamic version of the Christian Democratic movement in Europe’ (both Interviews in Zaman 25 November 2002). The latter view has been echoed in the Arab media as well, as Sid-Ahmed has written:

At a time tensions between Islam and the West are running high, and with the region poised on the brink of a war with unforeseen consequences, the significance of an Islamic party in power that seems determined to address explosive problems in a peaceful manner cannot be overstated. Even if Turkey is an atypical Muslim country, even if it has specific characteristics not shred by other Islamic states, its current experiment with democracy is a beacon of light in a dark landscape. What is happening in Turkey today stands as a denial of the “clash of civilizations”. The rules governing relations between the European Union and the Islamic world are still in the making. The Turkish experiment can do much to suggest positive ideas in this connection (Al-Ahram Weekly, 16-22 January 2003).

Indeed, this manifest transformation from the Refah’s Islamist party ideology to the AKP’s EU endowed discourse of democracy and human rights signals a momentous change in the contemporary identity of the Islamic political movement. It is in part this change that has consequently put the dynamics in motion to transform security governmentality. It seems that Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul and the AKP as a party employ a political discourse attuned to a full EU democratic conditionality, by means of which they target without overt political confrontation the reason of state rationality and techniques of security governmentality (see The AK Party Program, 2005). They articulate their EU-centered democracy discourse by embedding it within a placid socio-cultural ‘Islamic’ identity rather than sticking to a vaguely defined ‘Ottoman golden age’ or the capitalist credentials of the EU (Interviews with the party officials in Istanbul and Kayseri April, August 2004, respectively).

In order to get a glimpse of this profound change one need look no further than the initial landmark foreign visits of the two Islamic-inclined governments, when they first come to power. In June 1996, the first Islamist PM Necmettin Erbakan, had paid a series of visits to Muslim countries including Iran and Libya ‘in a calculated rebuke to Turkey’s Western allies’ in order ‘to form a trading bloc of eight Muslim countries as a potential alternative to the EU’ (Jenkins, 2003: 53). This move eventually fuelled a secularist reactions headed by the military
and the media and led to the downfall of the government as was argued in Chapter 4. Upon taking office in November 2002 the AKP’s preferred political move under Tayyip Erdogan leadership was immediately turning its face to the Western world. In a series of European visits, Tayyip Erdogan made crystal clear its government’s first major policy formulation: Making the case for Turkey’s full membership and integration into the EU (TRT-INT. News, 10 November, 2002).

As was shown in Chapter 6, the EU has increasingly acted as a policy entrepreneur at the international level projecting its policies and institutions (Glenn, 2004: 4-6, 25). Such a ‘policy transfer’ attitude by the EU is basically premised upon its membership conditionality and is in turn adapted by the third countries as ‘a source of legitimacy’ (Radaelli, 2000; Schmelfennig, 2001). The changing contours of EU membership criteria in the early 1990s significantly helped to shore up the democratic political discourse of the AKP and other democratic socio-political forces against the state security discourse (Dogan, 2005: 421-37; Cizre, 2003: 224-9). The narrowed-down political sphere of security governmentality enabled the AKP to expand the political space mostly within the developing context of the EU membership process (Cinar, 2002: 40-2; Cizre, 2003: 224-9). The basic formula to do so lied in the efforts of the party to cross-fertilize the party’s and society’s needs into real politics with the help of the sense of direction offered by the EU conditionality (The AK Party Program, 2005; Dogan, 2005: 421-37).

The EU membership conditionality set in the Copenhagen criteria presented, from a policy-transfer perspective an institutional-discursive niche that has helped the AKP to thwart domestic ‘uncertainty when imitation provides a means to avoid lengthy and controversial policy debates over ambiguous situations at home’ (Lavanex and Ucars, 2004: 421). EU democratic membership conditionality empowered the AKP to be able to put forward an EU-oriented democratic (counter) discourse against the security-strewn discourse of the secularist establishment (Cizre, 2003: 224-9). Turkey’s relations with the EU made it evident that the global conditions of international politics has more and more blurred the boundaries of the national and global, and Turkey’s secularist establishment is now increasingly left in an anachronistic position that fails to withstand the test of the long-cherished state target of reaching the level of ‘contemporary Western civilization’ that is the EU (Cinar, 2004: 31-2). Such a pro-EU move by the AKP exposed the state elites to the charge that the establishment is still embedded in the nineteenth century designed ‘modernization project’ that seems
irreversibly eclipsed by the contemporary EU’s post-modern project (Buzan and Diez, 1999; Onis, 2003).

The AKP capitalizes on EU membership by not only presenting the EU as ‘the twenty-first century phase of modernization’ but also by repositioning itself as a modernizing ‘moderate Islamist’ force, moving its socio-cultural identity from the fringes of policy into the centre (see the speech by PM Erdogan, Hurriyet, 03 September 2005). While the state elites have increasingly found themselves less in touch with the EU project as a whole, the dominant Islamist political movement under the AKP has come to the fore as a pro-EU political force in the system (Laciner, 2004; Dogan, 2005). The AKP strives to realize its political stature first by giving up on confronting the secular sensitivities of the state at the domestic level, and, second by reassuring its moderate Islamic political position by synchronizing its preferences with the EU conditionality. By so doing, the AKP has successfully integrated itself into the internal and international legitimacy channels (Laciner, 2004: 20-2; Hurriyet, 03 September 2005).

Indeed, emerging successfully out of the fringes of the anti-systemic Refah Party politics, the moderate Islamic-oriented AKP has crucially found a politically rewarding refuge in the contemporary democracy discourse of the EU membership process which is to be utilized against the politically influential discourses of state security. In the process of engaging and eventually transforming security governmentality, the EU-membership conditionality has proved particularly useful in helping shape the AKP’s democratizing policy preferences without denouncing frames of its root and letting it to stay mostly within frames of the electorate’s socio-religious identity (Onis and Keyman, 2003: 97,106; Cinar, 2004: 33). The AKP, as a prominent journalist-academic argues,

\[\text{[h]}\text{as succeeded in the last local elections to garner votes from all sections of society who support steps towards greater freedom and prosperity regardless of ethnic origin, religious belief or political conviction, and thus appeared on the national scene as the party that unites the country...[n]}\text{oj doubt that the determination of the AKP government in pursuing the reforms, is the main factor which explains for the 'sufficient progress' in fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria required to start membership negotiations with the EU next year (Alpay, Zaman, 19 June 2004).}

In addition, this interaction with the EU also helps the AKP’s leadership to reformulate the party’s self-styled ‘conservative democratic’ identity (Yildiz, 2004: 54) and accommodate it
with the secularist political system along the spectrum of EU’s democratic discourse. The argument is that because the latter has been established as a ‘state policy’ (Cicek, 2003: 53) AKP discourse and policies should not contradict with state interests and/or ‘the matter of the state’. As Simon Tisdall puts:

In more than 40 years of trying, no previous Turkish leader has come this close to success. Several European governments, having accepted Ankara’s bid in theory, are plainly uncomfortable at having their bluff called at last...The reality is that Mr. Erdogan, both devout Muslim and worldly-wise leader, has imperfectly achieved what many thought utterly impossible: the harnessing Turkey’s religious and secular (military) in joint pursuit of democratic modernization (The Guardian, 14 December 2004).

Perhaps the most obvious turning-point in the transformation of the political identity of Islamists has been the competency of the AKP-led moderate Islamists to be able to revitalize their political discourse and policies in line with the hegemonic ‘state policy’ of Westernization and EU membership (see the speech by PM Erdogan, Hurriyet, 03 September 2005). In other words, the traditional state policy of integration with the western world through its institutions such as NATO and now the EU has, in large measure, overlapped this time with the aims of the AKP to traverse the boundaries of what is politically permissible within security governmentality and ‘bring the politics back in’ (Cinar, 2004: 32). Hence, its self-proclaimed rhetorical identity-tag ‘Conservative Democrat’ notwithstanding, the AKP’s political ideology informs a strategy of integration with the ‘international system by talking the language’ and yearning for ‘globalization, Europeanization and liberation’ together with the ‘modernization of Turkey through the EU’ (Bilici, 2004: 58; PM Erdogan, Hurriyet, 03 September 2005). In this respect, the AKP program clearly reads:

Our Party constitutes a ground where the unity and the integrity of the Republic of Turkey, the secular, democratic, social State of law, and the processes of civilianization, democratization, freedom of belief and equality of opportunity are considered essential... Regarding fundamental rights and freedoms, our Party will achieve the following objectives: Standards in the area of human rights contained in the international agreements to which Turkey is a party, especially in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, Paris Charter and Helsinki Final Act shall be put into force (The AK Party Program, 2005)

Not only has the party embraced and promoted EU-centered democracy discourse at the leadership level but found support also at the intermediate party organizational level (see Appendix 2, the questionnaire distributed with the AKP party members in Istanbul, April
2004). For the active members and officials, the party provides primarily an institutional and social context for otherwise diverse social groups/forces to promote and pursue their interests against the confines of security governmentality rather than being merely a religiously and ideologically motivated site of action (Interviews with the AKP officials, April 2004).

An example of the meaning of articulation of democracy discourse for the party circles, against security governmentality appeared in education policy discussed Chapter 7: the religious school students’ university entry struggle. The exclusionary practices on that occasion seem to have sharpened the political identity consciousness of these schools’ graduates, who have appeared to form a closer bond with AKP than other parties. First and foremost these religious state school graduates have long been aware of the political nature of the state elites’ exclusionary practices, implications and the long-term effects of the ‘stigmata’, of their religious high school education, upon their vocational experiences. For instance, in a rather typical response one graduate had this to say:

Unless I was asked, I did not mention where I graduated from. For I have had difficulties in finding jobs whenever I did not keep my educational background in secret. I know I will constantly struggle to climb the career ladder. Because whenever I revealed my background I was treated in a discriminatory manner and was discarded even though I scored higher in the job-examinations than the other applicants... I now understand why they want to prevent the religious schools students from entering into the university; they do not want to see us in the upper echelons of politics and social strata. These introduced reductions from the grades before university entrance exam and other barriers are for the purpose of holding us back and enlarging the distance between us and upward mobility. This is because these reductions make it extremely difficult to choose a vocation for new graduates other than theology in the university education (Interview, August 2004, Izmir, Turkey).

The perception and reaction of the graduates of the religious vocational schools to the issues pertaining to the political-identity struggle between the secularist state elites and the AKP in government is also worthy of note. Many of the students and graduates I have interviewed seemed to have long left their previous religious concerns and/or any political implication of the Islamic education they have in the schools. Most of them have not only refused to affiliate with one-dimensional, ideological-cultural (Islamic/secularist) cleavage but also repudiated any zealous allegiance to Islamic parties of one sort or another (as in the case of the incumbent ‘moderate Islamist’ AKP). They hardly ever deny that they find themselves closer to the AKP discourse, but the reasons for this are various and can by no means be reduced to the party leadership’s Islamic-political past. From the perspective of EU membership, for
instance, it is interesting to note that the EU discourse of human rights as one condition of membership has gained popularity amongst the religious school students, quite contrary to their traditional religious/Islamic discourse of human rights. The EU’s human rights discourse serves not only as a means for their struggle but also provides a contemporary/universal/legitimate language of dissent to articulate their claims. One of the graduates expressed his take on the controversy in the following words:

They [the initiators of the restrictions] do not understand. Most of us do not want to study theology at the university but rather prefer to be doctors, lawyers, engineers or scientists just like many other students in regular high schools. The buzz of ‘security of the state’ around us [that we may be threats to the state] is pumped up by artificial secularist media-stimulants, which are unfounded...The PM Erdogan himself is a graduate of Imam Hatip [religious high] schools, does this mean he too is a threat to the state or secularism? I think not. On the contrary, he and his party seem to prove just as ineffective against the secularists in bringing back our basic rights to education including those of students with headscarf, the issue which the party promised to solve before they were elected... I mean we do not put in jeopardy or challenge the secular character of the state. It [the university entry restrictions] is not fair. Just because our parents sent us to state’s religious schools, we are discriminated in the education system and cannot even choose the university education we have dreamt of. Now that the so-called Islamist AK party cannot introduce the changes to rectify the situation because of the secularist reaction, our only hope is that of entering the EU anytime soon. I support the EU membership and its emphasis on human rights because it will hopefully provide necessary shelter against such violations of human rights by the state and also will save us from the mercy of the outcome of the struggle between the AK Party [the AKP] and the military (Interview, September 2004, Istanbul, Turkey).

Another sign that the political Islam represented by the AKP and its constituenciency has embraced the EU democratic discourse and occurred in the interviews with the AKP’s heads of youth branches’ women-division in Istanbul’s most populated districts. There the questions revolved around women’s choice of wearing the headscarf so as to understand their stance in relation to the military, the party and the EU. As argued in Chapter 5, the headscarf issue serves as a means of bio-political state intervention into the individual (female) private sphere, and constitutes an important socio-political playground amongst this trio of actors. In addition to the dominant themes in their discourse of peaceful relationship with the military and conflict avoidance, the active female members seemed to have taken the EU membership as an ‘individually and independently embraced socio-political project’ (Interviews, with the AKP Female Members Istanbul, April 2004). During the interviews two questions have taken up of particular significance. The first question concerned the possibility of a scenario in which the EU supports the Turkish military and other state elites’ unbending secularist
opposition to wearing the headscarf in such educational settings as the university. The second question concerned their reaction to a possible EU ban on the wearing of the headscarf in the universities after eventual Turkish membership. Two types of answers to these questions revealed widespread awareness of the EU as a 'socio-political project'. First was the respondents' sheer disbelief in that such a scenario because they held that this would not be possible due to the fact that the freedom of religious expression has been firmly established within the democratic norms of the EU. The second reaction was summed up by the female-head of the youth division in Maltepe district of the AKP. She said: 'we will not give up on our right to wear headscarf, if such a scenario [restrictions on wearing headscarf in public spaces] appears then we will continue our struggle within the EU institutions by democratic means' (Interview with Esra Dalyan, April 2004, Istanbul-Maltepe).

It can therefore be argued that the AKP as a party has largely proven to be the main supporter, carrier and implementer of the discourse of EU democratic conditionality amongst other political entrepreneurs that sought the title of being an EU-oriented party. Overall, not only the party leadership but also 'the rank and file' or 'intermediate party officials' have embraced the EU-induced democracy discourse. The latter is hardly exploited as rhetorical window-dressing but was rather actively supported by the majority of the interviewees. Not only did the majority show familiarity with the potentially 'thorny' repercussions of EU membership such as Kurdish cultural rights, opening Christian religious schools in Turkey and homosexual rights, they also seemed to have accepted all these as necessary 'homework' for eventual membership (Interviews with the party officials, April 2004, Istanbul). This has been so much the case that the AKP government does not shy away from preparing the country for a worst-case situation in which Turkey's EU membership bid would be abandoned by the European Council, a prospect that has recently appeared in sight following the rejection of the proposed EU constitution in France and the Netherlands. Not only is the government 'pledging to walk away if a proposal [of EU] to downgrade its membership to [so-called 'privileged partnership'] is on the table', but also it prepares itself to go alone with the EU-induced reform process anyway under another banner: 'Ankara Criteria' rather than the Copenhagen Criteria (Watt, The Guardian, 03 September 2005 p. 14; Hurriyet, 03 September 2005). In short, the fact that the 'moderate Islamist' AKP government has established itself arguably the most sustained, enthusiastic and successful party bidding for Turkey's EU membership should be a bitter taste in the mouth of the custodian secularist old guard, who was supposed to spearhead Ataturk's modernization (Wallerstein, Zaman, 02 January 2005).
8.3. POLITICAL ISLAM'S CHANGING ENGAGEMENT WITH SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY

Particularly since the 'moderate Islamist' AKP government formed the government alone in November 2002, there has been an ongoing and palpable anxiety and confusion inside and outside of the country about Turkey's modern and Islamic identities (Jenkins, 2003; Kalypso, 2004). It is argued that Turkey stands at the epicenter of the general 'clash of civilizations between Islam and the West' (Huntington, 1993: 42). This is arguably because the 'Islamic' and 'secular' identities and the wrangle between are often held as critical domestic dynamics (Kaya, 2004: 9-14; Pak, 2004: 321). Behind such an international gaze, however, often lay essentialist readings of the role of Islam in society and politics, which continue to punctuate this so-called 'clash' as a peculiarly apolitical (for an exception see Bunting, The Guardian, 26 September 2005). Well-known historian Bernard Lewis, for instance, puts forward (The Times, 15 June 1992, p.24) such an apolitical nature of the 'clash' by stating that there is a

[m]ove and movement far transcending the issues, the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations-the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the world wide expansion of both.

The supposed 'clash of civilization' is carried out ironically in the Turkish domestic political context between the secularist state elites and the Islamist political actors. It is interesting to note how Lewis’s comments came close to the justifications given by the Turkish military for their 1997 intervention against the threat of the ‘Islamist government’ in the name of securing the secular present. There is an intriguing similarity between this discourse of (civilizational) identity-conflict and the discourse of the Turkish military-led state elites. Turkey’s state elites have singled out the rise of the public visibility of the Muslim citizens as an (apolitical) security threat to be eradicated rather than addressed (for such a view see Savas, 2001a; Savas, 2001b). Back to Huntington, he attributed this confrontational attitude to a curiously attained natural counter-positioning between the westernized governing elites and the religious identity of the general population (1993: 39). As a result of the primeval-religious factors, Turkey for him has become 'the most obvious and prototypical example' of a 'torn country' (1993: 42) between 'the west and the rest' (1993: 39). In terms of the country’s
future direction, he went on to ask ‘Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look?’ (1993: 42).

As this chapter has argued, it now appears that an overwhelming majority of ‘Islamic society’ in Turkey, and most of their representatives in the political scene, look directly to Brussels, as the country’s ardent bid for EU membership under the AKP government has demonstrated (Hughes, European Voice, May 2004: 20). Even the Minister of State for Religious Affairs, Mehmet Aydin, has stated that ‘Turkey has turned its full face to Europe-geographically, culturally. We want a clear answer. The EU has the right to say “no, you are not European”; if they do, perhaps we cease to be. Turkey has the full right to press her claim and get a result in the end’ (quoted in Hughes, European Voice, May 2004: 20). Indeed, perhaps most puzzling for the likes of Lewis and Huntington is that Turkey’s membership struggle for the EU has been fervently upheld by the country’s once notorious and maverick ‘Islamist’ incumbent PM, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his party members (Kinzer, 2004: 11). Indeed, EU membership has stood for much of the party’s reputation in the international media so much so that it is often argued that PM Erdogan ‘has staked his political future on the EU’ (Smith, The Guardian, 5 August 2005, p.17).

In addition to the existing interviews with the party leadership, the interviews and questionnaire conducted for the present thesis with the ‘rank and file’ of the AKP in April-August 2004 indicate that two expedient factors have practically helped to achieve the transformation toward an openly ‘liberal-democratic’ discourse: the EU membership goal and the fear of repeating the costly political mistakes of the Refah party within security governmentality. The change in Islamic political identity is related to the desire of the AKP to make Turkey an EU member state. The EU membership systematically helps the AKP to carry out a transformation both in ‘Islamist’ party politics and in security governmentality because the EU membership process requires adapting the democratic membership conditionality and abandoning the religiously-articulated policy choices and fiery political rhetoric (Dogan, 2005: 421-37). In the process, the AKP government has championed Turkey’s EU membership bid and consequently EU democracy conditionality seems to have had precedence over of the previously held and religiously informed Islamist policy choices and rhetoric (Hughes, European Voice, May 2004: 20).
The AKP carries out its political aims in part through the EU membership process that requires Turkey to democratize. Arguably it is in this sense that the AKP's interest in carrying out the reforms in order to achieve EU membership is unrivalled (Alpay, Zaman, 19 June 2004). EU membership offers not only an invaluable opportunity for eliminating the military of its political power but also for a fuller democratization of the political system (Cinar, 2004: 33). In the process of the EU membership struggle, the AKP also hopes to open up a legitimate political space for its religious electorate's demands for recognition (Onis and Keyman, 2003: 105-7). More crucially, the AKP aims to curb the political role of the security actors including the military by replacing the chronic and politically divisive security discourse and logic of security governmentality, which wreck the social and cultural cohesion and diminish that of the democratization discourse of the EU (Interviews with the party officials, August 2004, Istanbul).

The changing 'Islamist' political identity has significant implications for security governmentality. As Chapter 5 argued, the Islamist political identity is in a constitutive relationship with security governmentality for two reasons. Firstly, the exclusive secularist and Islamist identification processes have locked the socio-political actors in security-discourse political confrontations. Secondly, the degree of 'Islamic challenge' to the secular nature of the state has led to the state securitizations that mostly suppressed the demands of identity groups within the public as a whole. Consequently, any change in one of the identity orientations is likely to yield cardinal effects for security governmentality.

One of the most profound results of this newfound 'liberal-democratic' orientation in the 'Islamist' political identity is that it helps release the Islamists from the habit of providing ammunition for the secularist military to justify their interventions into the workings of democratic politics. Thus, after an ill-founded confrontation with the secularist establishment under the Refah, the new moderate Islamist political movement hedged its political bets by cleansing itself of any religious-identity driven security rows with the military-led state elites (The Middle East, May 2004: 17). So far, the AKP has largely refrained from the discursive and institutional confrontations with the secularists, most visibly the military and the mainstream media. Consequently, the AKP rarely finds itself locked in confrontation with the secularist military; in other words it seems watchfully alert to the 'reason of state' and secularist rationalities of security governmentality (for a recent example, see PM Erdogan's
speech in Hurriyet, 16 August 2005). Furthermore, the AKP often shrewdly avows that the secular state is secure simply because it has

pledged loyalty to the principles of the Republic and the Constitution... rejected the use of religion as well as ethnicity for political benefit... promised to strike a healthy balance indigenous values and global norms... took as its basic reference the United Nations Charter of Human Rights and the European Charter for the Protection of Human Rights and Basic Liberties (Heper and Toktas, 2003: 176).

Hence, the AKP government seems quite cognizant of the necessity of undoing the contexts and pretexts for the military's securitization attempts as a means to enhance its political capacity. Having being alerted by previous experiences of the military's politically devastating securitization techniques, the AKP has been vigilant in its steps and political moves, and is insisting in its assertions that it does not challenge 'the security of the state' despite occasional protests to the contrary. The fact that the AKP leader Erdogan strove to make peace with the military, judiciary and the secular circles before coming to power attests to this cautionary stance (Cakir and Calmuk, 2001: 101). As Ozel argued, in this overall process:

Knocked by a mailed fist swathed in the bureaucratic equivalent of a velvet glove, some Islamists awoke from the experience with a newfound apprehension of democratic principles and a systematic resolve-the first ever in their movement's history-to embark upon a principled quest to defend not merely their own liberties, but democratic liberties as such. The much-maligned EU and its norms became a key source of support for the persecuted Islamist parties. In an ironic way that no one fully intended, the postmodern coup paved the way for the generational and ideological cleavage and reorganization within the Islamist movement that gave birth to the AKP (2003: 89).

In all, whereas the previous Refah Party government voiced its opposition by claiming that Turkey was not ‘religious enough’, the AKP basically claims that Turkey is not democratic enough and the way to democratize is attributed to the EU membership (The AK Party Program, 2005). By so arguing, the AKP seeks to free itself from potential anti-secularist charges and/or characterizations by the state secularist establishment, which saw the Refah and Fazilet as ‘a religious, subversive party’ and treated them ‘as colony of lepers’ (Mecham, 2004: 346). This pre-emptive self-identification of the AKP (with Republican values and the EU) leaves little space for the military and the judicial establishment to capitalize on any
inflammatory (religious) discourse and provides the AKP with valuable leverage to de-securitize the political realm.

Therefore, the AKP seems particularly aware of the unsettling confrontational identity dimension of security governmentality. The AKP seems 'skillful' in not evoking any identity confrontations between 'Islamists' and the 'secularists' (Interview with Prof. Serif Mardin, Milliyet, 28 February 2005) since inflammatory securitizing discourse (with the secularists) can well lay the groundwork for, and legitimize, non-democratic security governmentality. As to the secularist state elites, devoid of any avenues/elements that were available to them (like religious rhetoric or religiously informed policies) they have found it increasingly difficult to penetrate the political governmental domain since then.

A specific example in this regard clearly attests to the changing political attitude of the AKP within security governmentality. On 21 November 2002, an influential AKP member and veteran 'Islamist' politician, Bulent Arinc, attended an official ceremony at Ankara airport as the newly-elected speaker of parliament. He was accompanied by his wife, who was wearing a headscarf. Arinc and his wife were playing their role in the state tradition of escorting the President and his wife to an outbound flight. Once again the problem for the secularist establishment was that Arinc's wife's 'headscarf' had (albeit unobtrusively) entered an 'official public space'. This 'action' stirred a confrontation with and attracted the traditional reaction of the secularist state establishment including the military, which took this headscarf issue as 'the incursion of religion into the public sphere' and 'an assault on secularism, no different from Merve Kavakci's attempt to enter parliament in her headscarf in 1999' (Jenkins, 2003: 56). Arinc defended his action of bringing along his wife to an 'official ceremony' as not being an offense to secularism (Radikal, 22 November 2002). The Prime Minister Abdullah Gul (as caretaker PM due to the political ban on Tayyip Erdogan) in a crucial move declined to back Arinc's rather lax attitude and self-interested initiatives. Although the AKP promised to ease the headscarf ban, PM Abdullah Gul in a bid to dispense with the simmering allegations that the AKP was in fact a 'closet Islamist party' stated that the headscarf conundrum requires 'a solution in its own natural [gradual] course' and went on implicitly to criticize Arinc by stating that 'we should refrain from [such] extremities' (Radikal, 22 November 2002).
What does this change in the AKP's political identity mean for the working of security governmentality? First of all, it should be noted that various discursive and policy initiatives of the AKP point to a dramatically changing political style that can potentially undercut the functioning of security governmentality. This is of utmost necessity particularly in order not to touch the secularist raw nerves of the military, the media and other influential actors associated with security governmentality. The party's general political initiatives (and non-initiatives) indicate that the party proceeds with great circumspection. Secondly, the AKP's prudent political attitude heralds a transformation in the Islamist political discourse and practices. As Ozel argued, the AKP seemed to have internalized the lessons of the 1997 coup and the subsequent '28 February Process' (2003: 89). The state secularist policies in time taught AKP party elites and members to acquire a much more moderate take on Islam and its limited role in state. Thirdly, the AKP has adopted the EU-oriented democratic political discourse for addressing the non-democratic deficiencies of security governmentality. In this regard, the AKP government has been pushing for EU-promoted reforms. Indeed, on 7 May 2004, the National Assembly adopted another series of vital constitutional amendments, which, in the words of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, aimed to grant Turkey 'a stronger democracy and a very different place in the world'. With these amendments were all references to death penalty removed; the controversial State Security Court was abolished, the military representative was removed from Higher Education Board (YOK) that governs the universities, and more transparency to military expenditures was established (Pope, Middle East International, 14 May 2004: 22). The change in Islamic political identity in turn helped bring about a prospect of change in the playing field of security governmentality. In a nutshell, the securitization of politics staged by the media and the military after 1997 led to 'profound changes in the composition, ideology and the leadership of the Islamic movement' (Mecham, 2003: 339, 358; Ayata, 2004: 247; Dogan, 2005; Interviews with the party members, April 2004, Istanbul). In general the AKP leaders and the active party officials appear to have carefully crafted an effective and alternative political strategy against security governmentality. Following that, it is possible to argue that security governmentality has paradoxically helped to transform Islamist political identity.

SUMMARY

This chapter has argued that since Turkey gained official candidacy status, the Islamist political identity has significantly transformed whereas such transformation has not taken
place in the secularist identity of the military-led state elites. As a result, one key constitutive (identity) dimension of security governmentality (Islamism) is likely to disappear.

The first section of the chapter argued that the secularist identity of the military-led state elites has continued to punctuate the perception of democratic politics and EU membership. In other words, the Kemalist-secularist state elites in general and the military in particular have viewed democratic politics and EU membership largely from a security-based outlook. In all, the latter view has declined to appreciate the help of democratic politics in recasting domestic problems in non-security logic and language. It has not fully embarked upon EU membership as a primarily political project, which is bent on changing the internal-political structures of the aspirant states through ‘EU policy transfer’. According to the state elites, the issue of a fundamental change in Turkish politics— that would change the political power structure at their expense— could be avoided by construing the EU membership process as a security-based bilateral negotiation process. This, in their view, would only invest the country’s ‘material power sources’ or invoking potential ‘security contributions’ to the EU security rather than embracing a different political logic and agenda. The chapter also argued that the main reason for holding this kind of perception in security governmentality stems chiefly from the military-led state elites’ reduction of national and international politics to a sacrosanct security mentality and statist discourse. This standpoint of the state elites on the EU helps widen the rift with the Islamists (the AKP government). The ‘Islamist’ political actors are on the other hand anticipating different implications from EU membership.

In the second section, the chapter explained that along with other factors, the dynamics of security governmentality forced Islamist political opinion to change to the degree that it has acquired a different and more democratic political vision in keeping with a widespread yearning for EU membership. This change was crystallized in the formation of another ‘Islamist’ party, namely the Justice and Development Party (AKP). After the banning of the Refah and Fazilet Parties by the Constitutional Court in 1998 and 2001 respectively, a modernist fraction within the movement gave birth to the AKP and its alternative political agenda. The AKP elites first had ‘to withstand the legacy of Erbakan’s radical provocations of the establishment [which led to] a crackdown that would pave the way for Tayyip Erdogan’s rise’ (Sontag, New York Times, 11 May 2003). The coming to power of the AKP in 2002 has been central in this transformation process in that the AKP seems to have heralded a new political era for Turkey. This way, the AKP has ironically owed its formation to its veteran
cadres’ initial confrontation with the secularists (Ayata, 2004: 244-8). Indeed, the change in Islamist identity is partly related to the workings of security governmentality. As explained in Chapter 5, their identity was initially premised in part upon security-based confrontations that are found between the Islamic and the secularist state forces.

The chapter found that the politically unsettling identity dimension in security governmentality is rendered as increasingly superficial by the AKP’s prudent and non-confrontational democracy discourse induced by the EU membership process. The chapter also noted that these changes are not only evident at the leadership level but also at the party organizational level. The political transformation brought from being a ‘religious party’ to a ‘conservative democratic party’ has enabled the moderate Islamists under the AKP to accommodate the secular-democratic political system, which in turn helped transform their self-definition and clarify some of their policies on key issues. Hence, the changes in Islamic political identity have been based on the changing contours of the ‘Islamist’ discourse and policies that are successfully articulated by the AKP party elites and executed by the intermediary party officials.

Overall, the change in Islamist political identity has produced a momentous effect on democracy discourse and even secularizing effects on the Islamist movement itself. This was attained first by diffusing the democratic discourse of the party elite down into the party organizational level; and secondly, by extracting the EU-oriented democratic political discourse for addressing the non-democratic deficiencies of security governmentality. This change in question was also established by the desires of the Islamist political party leadership and active members at the organizational level to make Turkey a member of the EU. In all, the EU membership process has helped the AKP to initiate process of a transformation both in the Islamist party politics, with implications in security governmentality. To such an extent that the AKP government is eager to go along with the EU reforms even after some leading EU member states have hardened their stance against Turkey’s EU membership bid after the rejection of the EU constitution by French and Dutch voters, who also registered opposition to Turkey’s membership (Watt, The Guardian, 03 September 2005, p. 14).
CONCLUSION

The central question of this thesis has been the following: what is the nature of the relationship between state security and domestic politics in contemporary Turkey? The question has been addressed in three stages. Part I laid the conceptual and theoretical framework for studying state security in Turkey. It developed an analytical framework, germane to Critical Security Studies and Foucault’s concept of governmentality for investigating the relationship between state security and domestic political conduct. Part II used this framework to organize an analysis of the emergent regime of security practices or what I have called as ‘security governmentality’. In particular, it analyzed the construction of security governmentality in relation to its basic dimensions: visibility, rationality, identity, and techniques. The aim was to show how the dimensions of security governmentality have come to frame the scope of political and personal conduct and shape the state’s response to political challengers. The Turkish military is identified as the main agent of security governmentality by its capacity to define and respond to the ‘domestic threat’ of political Islam particularly ‘posed’ by the ‘Islamist’ Refah government since the mid-1990s and the ‘moderate Islamist’ AKP government since the early 2000s. Finally, Part III explored the prospects of change in security governmentality with special respect to Turkey’s ongoing EU membership process from 1999 to the present. It argued that security governmentality has faced a democratic political-discursive challenge and to experience a potential transformation. This challenge has been evident in the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership and articulated inside by the new strong AKP government.

The conclusion broadly draws on Foucault’s philosophy of criticism, namely his ‘critical ontology of ourselves’ (1984a: 46). The inquiries about a ‘critical ontology of ourselves’ are ‘quite specific in the sense that they always bear upon a material, an epoch, a body of determined practices and discourses’ (Foucault, 1984a: 49). Hence, instead of regarding the presence of security governmentality as ‘a moment for despair, emptiness, shallowness, fragmentation, nihilism...millenarian rupture, final denouement or irreversible loss’, the conclusion seeks to ‘renew acquaintance with the present’ by ‘a permanent questioning of the present, an assault upon the ethical certainties’ within security governmentality (Barry et al, 1996: 6; Dean, 1999: 43-4). After briefly summarizing the main findings of Part I, II, and III, the conclusion is going further to explore two questions:
1. What are the consequences of security governmentality? And

2. What are the prospects for a more democratic mentality and practice of politics in Turkey, which could accommodate the demands of socio-political actors such as those of Islamic persuasion for wider social and political recognition? In other words, how can a genuine transformation in security governmentality be possible?

SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY IN TURKEY

This thesis has argued that since the mid-1990s a set of security discourses and policies have granted state security institutions wide political latitude and that this has given rise to a degree of fusion between state security and domestic politics. Consequently, together with the attendant rationalities, identities and techniques, there has been a newfound political activism relating to security conceptions and institutions (most notably, the military). These politics of state security in turn have established a new style of governing in Turkey, which this thesis labelled as ‘security governmentality’. After Foucault the thesis defined security governmentality as a regime of government and state administration that is primarily undertaken by the military-led state authorities and agencies, which employ an array of techniques and forms of knowledge that seek to shape political and private conduct through the identities, aspirations and beliefs of the population. The thesis used security governmentality as a heuristic device to describe a de facto political regime, which has restricted and sometimes cancelled out the workings of democratic politics. Security governmentality is identified basically as the result of the military-led state elites’ reduction of national politics to a static version of a sacrosanct Kemalist secularism and security based approach to domestic politics. For them state security and secularism are much higher values than democracy. Security governmentality is constituted by four dimensions: visibilities, rationalities, techniques and identities.

Visibilities of Security Governmentality

Turkish state security discourses and practices have two major characteristics that have shaped security governmentality. First there has been a historically constructed set of social, political, institutional and legal sources, whose primary aim is to save the secular state. Second, this set of factors has historically provided the military-led state elites with an enlarged political power and executive domain at the expense of elected governments. These
elites include the secularist military, state bureaucracies and the mainstream media. Amongst them, the military was identified as the main protagonist of security governmentality. It has been argued that the top brass of the military are 'the voice and conscience' of security governmentality and also 'wield a significant moral authority' (El-Affendi, 1997: 4). Since the mid-1990s, the visibility of increased political activism of the military has been realized in the name of state security. In the process, to exert non-democratic security control over domestic politics, the military has developed new security practices such as staging the post-modern military intervention in February 1997. This kind of military activism has produced an unconventional military interventionism into certain aspects of politics and society in the name of Turkish state security. Since the mid-1990s therefore, it has become commonplace especially for the military and the National Security Council to take on the 'domestic threats' to the 'security of the secular state' allegedly posed by the parties with political Islamic roots.

**Rationalities of Security Governmentality**

A key dimension of security governmentality concerns the rationalities of security governmentality that have provided the primary ideological basis for the military interventions. These are brought together in the official state ideology of Kemalism, as was argued in Chapter 3. Kemalism was initially formulated 'in response to the emerging needs of the modernization process and consists of principles such as nationalism and secularism, which can be seen as a rationalization to modernize' (Steinbach, 1984: 78). In particular, it was Kemalist secularism that came to constitute the heart of the contemporary rationality of Turkish state elites, especially that of the military and civilian bureaucracy (Yavuz, 2000a: 33-4). Kemalist secularism is often seen as a 'secular experiment' in nation-building undertaken by the state elites, who want to marginalize the social and political authority of Islam and Islamic groups (Mardin, 1993; Yavuz, 2000a). Since 1997, however, secularism has been serving more than a modernization tool and instead has been seen especially by the Turkish military as a principle to ensure the 'political survival' for the state (Tachau and Heper, 1983: 17; Yavuz, 2000b; Dagi, 2005).

More specifically, Kemalist secularism is understood as 'the independence of the state from religious rules' and is officially referred to as the 'issue of great significance in terms of our internal security' (White Paper-Defense, 1998: 14). Through its officially sanctioned discourses and practices, Kemalist secularism has been increasingly upheld as the 'inviolable'
principle of the republic, which, *inter alia*, situates any visible Islamic expression under the mantle of a ‘security threat’ to the state. A considerable range of religious expressions in this context is seen by key state elites as dangerous, adverse, inappropriate and irresponsible conduct by individuals and collectivities. The latter are seen as supposedly bent on destroying the secular Turkish state as it has developed. Revealingly, such security discourses and practices have been ascendant since 1996, when the Islamic political resurgence culminated in the formation of the first Islamist government in the history of the modern Turkish state. Since 1997, military-led state elites have redefined and broadened the threats to state security so as to include certain ‘Islamic’ domestic political actors as ‘threats’ (Salt, 1999: 72). For Turkey’s military leaders, the ‘number one’ security threat to the state’s existence is political Islam. The former spokesman for the Turkish General staff, General Erol Ozkasnak best summarized this view:

Henceforth the number-one enemy of the state is Irtica ['reactionary' Islam]; that Irtica represents an even greater threat to Turkey than the PKK [Kurdish separatist guerillas]; and that the same diligence with which the armed forces are striving to eliminate the danger represented by the PKK will now be directed against the danger represented by Irtica (quoted in Lowry, 2000: 46).

**Techniques of Security Governmentality**

The techniques of security governmentality exhibit an array of forms for military intervention into politics in the name of state security, as was argued in Chapter 4. Since the mid-1990s the most effective institutional channel for the military’s political involvement has been the national security concept, which was constitutionally designed to encompass a wide range of issues, and the institutions of NSC, whose constitutional functions were enlarged since the 1980 military coup (Heper, 1990: 323; Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997). The NSC has been a strong lever for ‘re-equilibrating’ democracy (i.e., strengthening the executive) according to the aspirations of the military (Heper, 1992b: 162). As argued in Chapter 4, the NCS has proved the most effective macro-technique at the service of the military in order to legalize/formalize its supervision of major external and internal political decisions (Heper, 1992b: 163; Insel, 1997: 17). Since 1997, the great state concern over ‘territorial integrity and national unity’ has been the main discursive ammunition that the NSC employed against socio-political expressions of the Islamic life-world (Savvides, 2000). Crucially the securitizing moves of the military in this regard have been voiced through and made all the more efficient by the
dramatized coverage of the mainstream media, which have proved receptive of publicizing the issues securitized by the military (Kinzer, 2000; Yavuz, 2000b). The techniques in use have given rise to an unprecedented control of the military-led state elites over governments, such that it has become ‘normal’ for the military to monitor, display, boycott, and prosecute certain ‘non-secular’ socio-political actors and dispense with the ‘Islamic capital’ (Yavuz, 2000a; Gole, 1997a; Onis, 1997; 2001; Bugra, 1998; 2002). The interventions have included closing down Koranic courses run by various Islamic foundations (vakif), strictly regulating Imam-Hatip high schools curricula, putting under strict control the activities of Islamic NGOs and foundations and so on (Ayata, 2004). In short, through various techniques, the military sought to oblige both state institutions and even civil society associations to eradicate the publicly visible signs of ‘Islamic threats’ by and from themselves as evinced in the controversy surrounding the headscarf issue.

Analyzing these confrontations helps sophisticate our understanding of the techniques in which state security helps establish power and control over the body politic. For instance, the study of identification via dress codes presents a valuable analytical avenue for advancing our understanding of the relationship between security and identity/appearances/images. Effectively, it is through such techniques that the secular establishment successfully exerts power over the society.

**Identities of Security Governmentality**

The identity dimensions in security governmentality revolve around two main expressions of identity, and the confrontational space these orientations produce, as was argued in Chapter 5. Identities in conflict involve the Kemalist secularism of state elites, and the Islamism of those who endorse an Islamic political identity. Specifically, the secularists are the military, much of state bureaucracy, certain civil society associations, bankers, a good deal of professors and journalists (Heper, 1997). The Islamic political identity, on the other hand, has found expression in the form of party politics (Yavuz, 2000a), but it also includes the cultural space in the form Islamic networks of communication through newspapers, books and television channels which together help constitute Islamic ‘counter-elites’ (Mardin, 1983: 139; Gole, 1997a; 53-7; Howe, 2000: 4). These two identity orientations and the ensuing political confrontation between them feed in the relevant security discourse and contribute to security governmentality. Thus, according to the pre-set boundaries of politics in Turkey, the military keeps an upper-hand through its self-image and role to ‘guard’ the political system against the
‘threat of politicization of Islam’. For instance and as was argued in more detail in Chapter 5, the Republican State Prosecutor Vural Savas took legal action in May 1997 by applying to the Constitutional Court for closing down the Refah party, basing his case on the allegations of the mainstream news-media against some of the party members’ fiery discourses. The ‘28 February Process’ came about. One of the most significant aspects of this was that it denoted an ongoing process of confrontation and standoff between the military-dominated secularist (state) forces and pro-Islamist social forces, a process that in some measure continues to mold the basic contours of political life in Turkey (Civaoglu, Milliyet, 16 January 2001, p.17).

Part III discussed the prospect of change in security governmentality especially under the light of the impending EU membership process. The central claim is that Turkey’s security governmentality faces a vista of transformation because of its EU membership. Significantly, the latter requires Turkey to conform mainly to Copenhagen Political Criteria. Indeed, due to the latter, the Turkish state suddenly found itself at a political crossroads. The EU sought to canvas and forge a new consensus within Turkey for a more pluralist democratic polity to gradually replace rigid nationalist-secularist authoritarian security governmentality. Accordingly, EU membership norms and conditions began to ‘weaken the grip of the state over political processes and [introduce] ‘new’ actors who challenge established approaches to issues (such as cultural pluralism, linguistic rights or gender relations) that are considered “sensitive” by some’ (Bilgin, 2005: 176). The skeptical standpoint of state elites on the EU-centered reform process and the pro-EU stance of the moderate-Islamist AKP government indicate that the two have different expectations from future EU membership. The most obvious paradox facing the governing state elites in their historical yearning for European identity and now full membership is that EU membership would potentially rectify undemocratic aspects of their hold on power (Keyder, 2003: 231; also see Piccoli, 2004). In order for the EU membership dream to come true; political elites have to respond the EU demands for full democratization and strive for building a more democratic plural polity.

Changes in the Rationalities of Security Governmentality

As argued in Chapter 6, the EU membership conditions are in contradiction with Turkey’s ‘reason of state’ aspect of rationality. Overall, the EU package includes a radical set of changes, which if successfully implemented might lead to a more liberal and pluralist political rationality at the expense of the national security oriented ‘reason of state’ rationality. Certain
key EU-led legislation that supports a more democratic political rationality in place of 'reason of state' rationality have been established, yet powerful resistance from the military and state bureaucracy remains hard to evade. These forces still control some of the influential techniques of security governmentality.

Changes in the Technical Dimensions of Security Governmentality

As argued in Chapter 7, there are some significant changes resulting from the EU membership reform process have been in relation to the technical dimensions of security governmentality. This has been resulted in the curbing of the powers and functions of one of the strongholds of military power in the political decision-making process: the NSC. However, this successful transformation in the NSC has not been supplemented by changes in other techniques of security governmentality. The EU seems to have paid attention mainly to the certain forms of military power, such as the NSC. However, the issue is that the military's power is exercised not solely through these institutional channels though. Rather, the military makes use of a matrix of power relations. For instance, the national security concept covering a wide range of issue areas, remains to be changed and military's ability to decide (through the NSPD) the national security agenda is also left unchanged. Most significantly, the securitization of domestic politics by the military and most crucially the role the media plays in helping securitize domestic political issues are two other unchanged techniques of security governmentality. So developments continue to point to the strength of the power wielded by the military in the political system even after Turkey secured official EU candidacy status in December 1999.

Changes in the Identities of Security Governmentality

As argued in Chapter 8, since 1999 Islamist political identity has significantly changed, while the secularist identity of the military-led state elites has not. It can therefore be argued that the secularist identity of the military-led state elites still informs the state vision of democratic politics and EU membership (for a recent example of such a secularist vision see the Land Forces Commander General Hursit Tolon's warning against the threat of 'Islamists', Hurriyet, 25 July 2005). The state elites in general and the military in particular continue to hold the view of domestic politics as largely based on secularist assessments. Meanwhile, the political limitations of security governmentality led the Islamist political grouping to change political agenda and discourse such that it has acquired a different and more democratic political vision in line with a yearning for EU membership. This change was crystallized in the formation of
another party with Islamic roots, namely the Justice and Development Party (AKP). After the banning of the Refah and Fazilet Parties by the Constitutional Court in 1998 and 2001 respectively, a modernist fraction within the movement gave birth to the AKP and its alternative political agenda (Laciner, 2001: 3-7). In other words, the AKP has ironically owed its formation to its cadres' initial confrontation with the secularists (Ayata, 2004: 244-8). The coming to power of the AKP in 2002 has been central in this transformation process.

The change in Islamist political identity seems to be related to the workings of security governmentality particularly to its technical and identity dimensions. As explained in Chapter 5, security-based confrontations between the Islamic and the secularist state forces have helped reshape Islamist identity representations at both the leadership and at the rank and file party levels. This is largely achieved first by diffusing the democratic discourse of the party elite down into the party organizational level, and secondly by using the EU-oriented democratic political discourse for addressing the non-democratic deficiencies of security governmentality. In return, the change from being a 'religious party' to a 'conservative democratic party' has enabled the Islamists under the AKP to accommodate the secular-democratic political system, which in turn transformed their self-definition and clarifies some of their policies on key issues. The changes in Islamic political identity are based on the changing contours of the 'Islamist' discourse and policies that are successfully articulated by the AKP party elites and executed by the intermediary party officials. Hence, from the outset, the AKP employed a prudent and non-confrontational democracy discourse, which embraced-if not simply emulated-the secularist sensitivities of the state elites. The significant outcome for security governmentality of this change in Islamic political discourse is such that the identity confrontations staged often by the military against Islamist political elites are rendered increasingly superficial and one-sided.

THE POLITICS OF SECURITY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

But what are the effects of security governmentality in Turkey? In order to better understand some of the effects of security governmentality in Turkey, first it might be useful to compare the latter with global traits of politics of security and the yawning chasm between security and liberty in some parts of world politics. The recent British political fallout in the aftermath of the 7/7 London terror attacks offers a particularly interesting perspective since like the
The Turkish case relates to a complex relationship between a secular state and Muslim society. On 5 of August 2005 the British PM Tony Blair issued '12 proposals', a set of radical security measures that aimed to restrict some of the civil liberties of the country's Muslim community, which led him to bluntly declare that 'the rules of the game are changing' (Cowell, *The New York Times*, 06 August 2005). While arguably containing some justifiable security measures against those who, 'preach terrorism' and/or 'advocate violence' against the UK, the British government's intended 'change' nonetheless involved a 'startling package of [security] measures [which] signaled a turning point in British post war liberalism' and the possibility of Britain going to 'renounce part of the European Convention on Human Rights' (Wintour, *The Guardian*, 06 August 2005, p. 1, 4). The problem is that these new categories of delinquency (such as 'justifying or glorifying terrorism' against the 'British way of life' and the proposed clampdown on 'specific extremist websites, book-shops, centres, networks and particular organizations of concern') are either unjustifiably vague or needlessly adding to already existing 'race relations legislation' (*The Guardian*, 06 August 2005, p. 4, 21). Besides, not only do these security measures tend to conflate 'the main causes of terror as its cure' by creating an 'us-them divide' within the community, they are also likely to knock back the long-established civil liberties such as extending the period of custody of suspects without charge beyond two weeks, using allegations of 'treason' and the proposed introduction of 'secret courts with security cleared judges to hold pre-trial hearings' without the presence of the accused (Travis, *The Guardian*, 10 August 2005, p. 8; Klein, *The Guardian*, 13 August 2005, p. 20; Yaquub, *BBC-NEWS 24 HARD Talk*, 17 August 2005).

It is tempting to suggest that there appear some similarities between these developments and measures introduced through security governmentality thinking in Turkey particularly on the issue of the securitization of the politics of fear of Islam (Werbner, 2005: 5-9). Blair's '12 proposals' may recall the Turkish NSC's '28 February' security measures (see Appendix 1) taken in the aftermath of Islamist takeover of the government in 1997, which aimed to safeguard Kemalist secularism and prevent divisions in the body politic. Undeniably, as in the Turkish case, such draconian measures (earlier institutionalized in the US under the 'USA Patriot Act') do suggest that there has been an increasing securitization of politics (of Islam) in Britain and the EU (Gervasio and Volpi, 2005) and an emergent imbalance between

14 Surely, this is not to claim that the recent British experience represents a similar case of 'security governmentality'. Instead, here the aim is just to better understand the differences incurred by Turkey's security governmentality.
security and liberty (Williams, *The Guardian*, 10 August 2005, p. 19). However, it would need a stretch of imagination to liken such post-7/7 security measures to what Turkey has experienced in terms of the relationship between security and liberty in security governmentality in the last decade. This would be the case for two reasons. First, Blair’s proposed measures are for the ‘security of the people’, whereas in the Turkish case, the discourses and practices have been put forward for the security of the *state* and particularly its secularist principle. That is, Turkish state secularism as an ideology is the primary referent object of security, not the people. Second and as this thesis showed, the securitization of politics and the chronic imbalance between security and liberty within security governmentality has been quite different in content and form than its British counterpart. For instance, -unlike their Turkish counterparts-the British political elites seem not so easily willing to consent to such governmental securitization attempts and are likely to reject such ‘half-baked’ moves to use the words of a respected former Home Secretary (*BBC2 Newsnight*, 08 August 2005; also see Michael Howard, *The Daily Telegraph*, 10 August 2005, p.1, 22). Thirdly, unlike the Turkish legal and constitutional endorsement of such undemocratic security discourses and practices, there are impending legal pitfalls in the UK that will likely get in the way of these newfound security offences being implemented in the courts (*TheIndependent*, 11 August 2005, p:1; 2). Indeed, Blair’s radical security measures are openly challenged by the judiciary to such an extent that one editorial immediately ridiculed the drafting of these security measures as ‘a job creation scheme for the Society of Unemployed Human Rights Lawyers’ (*The Guardian*, 06 August 2005, p. 21).

Most apparently though, whereas it is the Turkish *military* that attempts to securitize domestic politics and cramp the democratic and peaceful solution of conflicts, in the UK it is Blair’s *governmental* securitization attempts that threaten to set back established human rights regimes. Consequently, the talk of ‘change in the rules of the game’ by the Blair government does not come near such changes wrought by Turkey’s security governmentality, notably the overturning of a cardinal rule of democratic politics: civilian supremacy over the military (Cizre, 1997, 2003; Savvides, 2000). The latter principle of democratic politics has indeed been a raw nerve in Turkish politics to such a degree that observers often point out that ‘military commanders still call the shots in Turkish politics’ (Doxey, 1997: 12; Salt, 1999; Cizre, 2004). In brief, the present thesis has showed what can happen when a close association between security and politics occurs, and there is a real change in ‘the rules of the
game' of democratic politics and an ominous setback in civil liberties. Such effects are summarized in the following five propositions.

CONSEQUENCES OF SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY

1. Security governmentality has obstructed democratic politics.

Although Turkey's experience in democracy has often been in a parlous state since its inception in 1946, 'the poverty of Turkish democracy' has become particularly more palpable in the post-Cold War era (Gulalp, 1999: 35-59). Contrary to widespread expectations, global norms of democracy have fallen short of flourishing and taking root in Turkey. During the 1990s Turkey's integration with global 'turbo-capitalism' has intensified, but political and civil rights based on non-ethnic, civic, non-populist citizenship failed to make an effective entry into the state (Caglar, 1997: 37-49; Gulalp, 1997b). Instead, freedom of expression has often been cramped, human rights abused and the very basic rules of democratic politics have often been violated by state security authorities (Salt, 1999; Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 115-129). In the name of state security, the military-led state elites have exhibited a certain degree of mistrust toward the institutions of pluralist democratic politics such as political parties, the Parliament, NGOs, interest groups, associations, organized social movements and so on (for such an elite view, see Savas, 2001a, 2001b; Ilhan, 2002; Yazicioglu, 2004). They have upheld a vision of politics that 'recalls Plato's government by guardians, who personified the essence of the public interest and the approved [Kemalist] ideology' (Heper, 1984: 93).

The most pressing effect of security governmentality on democratic politics has been the fact that the public and even private matters could easily be securitized and the political space could be emptied of societal demands due to the (media savvy) security language utilized by the military. Specifically, the articulation of different identities and lifestyles in the public sphere has been seen to be dangerous by the military-led state elites, who view politics as 'as a process of guiding political development and engineering a new society' and who believe the public display of cultural diversity will undermine 'the Kemalist vision of ideal secular society' (Yavuz, 2000a: 34). Consequently, while the formal institutions of democracy have indeed been established in Turkey (Heper, 1992b; Stepan and Anderson, 2004), the genuine and full political participation within security governmentality has been restricted mostly to those who subscribe to Kemalist nationalist-secularism. This in turn reveals politics in Turkey to be an empty vessel without public presence, or more correctly devoid of any genuine
expression of diverse cultural, ethnic, religious or ideological interests (Salt, 1999). What instead tends to replace the normal political process in Turkey has been the officially sanctioned ideological discourse of state security (Bayramoglu, et al, 2004: 9). It is also in this context that the nationalist discourses are deployed against discourses informed by Kurdish ethno-cultural expressions for recognition (Bayramoglu, 2004: 37). Overall, the confrontation between state and social identities has often been disguised in a security language articulated by the military in line with the dominant political rationalities described in Chapter 3.

2. Security governmentality has accentuated the Turkey’s ‘double-headed political system’. The politics of security governmentality has led to two parallel regimes of practice on the level of the executive (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997: 157). The political regime has comprised a democratically elected parliament and an elected government with a civilian council of ministers. The security regime has consisted of unelected military-led state elites along with the National Security Council. The political regime has considerable responsibilities and yet little power, whereas the military regime has vast powers and yet few responsibilities. As regards to the relations between the two regimes, the chronic mistrust in the political class informs the state elites’ actions (Heper, 1992b: 147). On many issues that matter for the governing of the state ranging from the appointment of constitutional court judges to critical foreign policy decisions such as the Cyprus Question the military-led state elites have the final say. In these matters, many governments have continued to ‘dance to the tune of the TGS [the military]’ (Lowry, 2000: 50). As such, Turkey’s current imbalance of civil-military relations is in part a consequence of security governmentality. This has been so because the military arbitrarily defined the domestic security threats to state secularism and was able to determine the ‘appropriate’ responses to them by bypassing normal democratic political procedures (Savvides, 2000). State security now is perceived by the military-led state elites ‘as a question of internal stability challenged by the implosion of religious upsurge’ a view strengthened by the ‘moderate-Islamist’ AKP’s electoral victory in 2002 (Cizre, 2003: 229). In sum, state security discourse has been utilized in many instances ‘to legitimize the need for a military role in civilian affairs’ and ‘to prioritize the indivisible and secular character of the regime as more important than the need for democratic reform’ (Cizre, 2003: 214).

3. Security governmentality has significantly enhanced the political profile of the military. The military has historically been a politically autonomous institution ‘unbeholden to society and to civilian rule’ (Yavuz, 2000a: 34). The military’s upper-hand in politics derived in no
small part from its socially sanctioned ‘moral authority’ especially over ‘Turkey’s male population, who have been extensively socialized into an unconditional support for the military values through compulsory military service’ (Cizre, 2003: 217). The military has traditionally been apprehensive of pluralist democratic politics. For the military, democratic politics is permitted as long as it serves as ‘a means of preserving and promoting the state’ (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1997: 156). In this context, it is argued that ‘the past 40 years make it clear that the court of last resort in Turkish politics is not the ballot box but the military’ (Salt, 1999: 72). Over time, the military excelled its interventionist political power with a ‘ratchet effect’ from its non-democratic legal capacity conferred to it mostly after the coups d’état. As a result, for the military, it has become a legal duty to define and act upon domestic security threats in the capacity of a guardian and vanguard institution. This legal capacity has been extended to the NSC and the military itself by the NSC law of 1983 until 2001 when this law was amended under EU pressure.

The secularist military in security governmentality have reproduced an ontological and strategic discourse and political space at the expense of democratic politics by means of countering any contestant that is bent on challenging ‘the secular nature of the state’ as was argued in Chapter 4. In the process, it remains likely that the most visible agent of the secularist bloc, namely the military, ‘will not tolerate even relative minor infractions of its definition of secularism’ (Jenkins, 2003: 61). Any contestation thereof is likely to yield new security-based confrontational spaces that would serve as key constitutive elements of security governmentality. This in turn can trigger a ‘politics of fear’ and might lead, if deemed necessary, even to the toppling of governments in power by ‘the military-led-media campaigns’; this was the case in the ‘post-modern coup’ of 1997. Unlike its predecessor Refah and Fazilet parties, the AKP has so far largely remained reserved and declined to spearhead such a confrontation with the military (and the media) that might have grown concerns over ‘the secular nature of the state’. As explained in Chapter 5, past experiences have thought us that any challenge to the latter spawns a public call by the secularist media, a call which is most enthusiastically responded by the military by interfering into politics.

4. Security governmentality has generated novel techniques of intervention into the political and personal conduct.

As shown in Chapter 4, during the 1997 military intervention against ‘the threats of political Islam’ security governmentality has come to embody much newer techniques of civilian-
military relations. Here, the novelty lies in the formation of distinct channels through which state security discourses and practices enable the military-led state elites to effectively interfere into politics. That is, the military itself has come to the point that it is no longer keen on deploying its well-rehearsed military coups to topple serving governments (Interview with Prof. Metin Heper, Zaman, 12 August 2004). Governments in power are given a freedom of action in their policy-making but this freedom of action is in turn closely monitored and controlled (Cizre, 2003: 222-3). The military has formulated a constitutional-legal backing for monitoring the Turkish political life that lessens the need to intervene directly into politics (Heper, 1992b: 163; Jenkins, 2001). Whenever the governmental agenda does not conform to state security concerns, then the General Staff of the Armed Forces puts into use ever-more sophisticated methods of intervention: to give examples, first, it leads potent public-campaigns in order to galvanize powerful societal elites and to put pressure on the governments mainly on the grounds that the ‘domestic threats’ such as the political Islam looms large (Lowry, 2000: 49). Such methods, secondly, included organizing numerous press-briefings (joined by judicial personnel, officials from many other state institutions and prominent journalists and even civil society organizations) with a view to projecting the ruling parties or certain social groups as ‘reactionary Islamic threats’ to the state survival (Salt, 1999: 74-5; Kinzer, 2001: 21-2). As argued in Chapter 4, these press-briefings have in turn been frantically covered by the mainstream media that helped heap vitriol upon Islamic public displays.

It is true that since the EU-induced reform process has got underway, the power of the NSC has been curtailed down by increasing the number of the civilian politicians within that body and also by declaring constitutionally its decisions ‘only recommendational’ to the cabinet. However, this development failed to signal the end of the military’s upper hand in domestic politics (Hurriyet, 29 July 2005; also see Tank, 2005). Without the NSC’s institutionally enabling and empowering capacity, the military is likely to consider other techniques at its disposal, such as the unchanged national security concept and its scripting of the NSPD. Moreover, the military can as well resort to other channels such as the visual and print media for its securitizing moves. When, for instance, the security of the state was to be invoked as a political act against the moves of the government in power, it was not simply done through institutional routine. Instead, the military effectively incorporates ‘functional securitizing actors’ such as the media on its behalf, indeed as it mobilized the secularist mainstream media to generate public opinion. In short, the military’s interventionist attitude here is related to the
media savvy techniques through which it stages its politics. The military often enmeshes the media-fuelled anxiety with ‘the security of the state’, which often interrupts the functioning of ‘normal politics’ due to the removal of certain issues from the political realm and put them under the security-military logic and expertise. This array of techniques is well supported by a socially and historically produced consent and legitimacy granted to the military as an institution (Demirel, 2004a).

Consequently, some techniques of security governmentality in Turkey are likely to remain intact. The lack of scrutiny by the EU on the securitization technique is a case in point. Securitization circumvents shrewdly democratic control over the military’s interventionist attitude into the political sphere. In order to reach out to a more democratic system of governmentality the institutional and procedural roadmaps designed by the EU about the role of the military in politics should be supplemented, with an effort to rectify other military techniques including primarily securitization. If these techniques checked and balanced, society will be better equipped with alternative strategies for more pluralist democratic rule.

5. Overall, security governmentality has produced an ‘authoritarian governmentality’ that empowered military-led state elites, who regarded ‘the security of the state’ as an effective political scheme for the repression of the domestic dissent.

For long, the unelected state elites have inhibited the development of a socially and culturally responsive and politically accountable pluralist democratic regime. Instead, an all-encompassing national security politics was established, which endorsed socio-cultural homogeneity over diversity, empowered the state over society and privileged the military over parliamentary politics. This in turn trapped the country into enduring political crises and economic inequalities and the overall result was a failure of transition from an anachronistic and superficial secularist-nationalist state ideology to contemporary liberal democracy. The ensuing national security politics has in turn led to a political system which imagined certain segments of the citizenry as ‘the enemy of the state’, hence upsetting any prospect for a pluralistic democratic political community. Over the years and despite all the efforts of the republican state-making elite, security governmentality has not delivered ‘political security’ for the military-led state elites. Nor has it signalled the end of the ‘domestic threat’ construction to the ‘state survival’, as state security discourses and practices hold fast and jaundiced (for instance see, ‘A Word of Warning against Moderate Islam by President Sezer, NTVMSNBC, 7 April 2005). This was mainly because the authoritarian mentality of security
governmentality either denied the multiplicity of the governed (i.e., Kurdish, Islamist etc.) or rejected them to incorporate to the political center. Instead, their participation has been restricted to the political periphery. Having securitized most of the multi-ethnic and/or multicultural-religious demands as 'threats to the state survival’, the political and social space has been occupied by a set of stringent secularist-nationalist practices played out by different state institutions. The ensuing political void not only disciplines the way through which the discourse of dissent might be articulated but also provides a platform for the state elites to reproduce their exclusionary mentality of governing, unitary authority and power.

Hence, security governmentality breeds a politics of fear in which key socio-political actors with potential democratic leanings, including the serving governments, are made less capable because they are named as ‘domestic threats’. In addition to the robust policy effects, the basic outcome of security governmentality reveals itself as an anachronistic secularist, security-stricken political order, which is congruent neither with the state’s superfluous commitment with the widely-held norms of liberal democracy, free market capitalism and nor with its long-lasting desire and struggle to become a member of the European Union.

**THE IDEAL OF EU MEMBERSHIP: TOWARD A TRANSFORMATION IN SECURITY GOVERNMENTALITY?**

Despite all these misgivings, security governmentality has recently come to face a prospect of erosion-in particular in its identity dimension-because the EU membership procedure has signalled the need for a drastic change in the political mentality of rule in Turkey. Although the EU-induced process of change has so far been uneven across the dimensions of security governmentality, the transformative impact of the EU membership bid has nonetheless been perceptible (Aktar, 2002: 21-4). So much so that the former Enlargement Commissioner, Gunter Verhaugen, expressed his amazement about the pace of the political change in Turkish politics by stating ‘I have never seen in my life such a desire to change’ and then he observed that the EU enlargement is remarkably *transforming* the Turkish society and politics (TV Interview with Gunter Verhaugen, *BBC-News 24 Hard Talk*, 16 May 2005). As he suggests at stake is a potentially radical transformation of Turkey’s understanding and practice of politics by means of Copenhagen political criteria (Cizre, 2003). Because security governmentality has run down the political-normative ideal of democratic society in which all can share and/or
participate, Turkey’s membership bid for the EU appears more promising than simply a membership status.

Indeed, since 1999 and in line with Copenhagen criteria Turkey has embarked upon a series of reforms aiming to close the existing gap between its political system and the one envisioned by the EU. This has troubled Turkey’s security governmentality in that EU reforms have begun to sever the structure, cohesion and legitimacy of security governmentality. The most apparent EU-induced paradox has been that involving the constitutive rationality of security governmentality, namely the will to Europeanize/Westernize Turkey appears to be in contrast with other dimensions of security governmentality. For instance, such techniques of military intervention as the National Security Council have been a target for the EU democratic reform package (Buzan and Diez, 1999: 46; Keyder, 2003: 231).

In contradistinction to the EU induced reforms, however, the military-led state elites have yet to admit the necessity of recasting domestic problems in a non-security logic and language and respond accordingly. They therefore defy the reception of EU membership as a primarily political project, which is quite openly bent on changing the internal-political structures of the aspirant states through ‘EU policy transfer’ or otherwise (see for such a view see Ilhan, 2002: 15-7; Manisali, 2002: 183-192; Yazicioglu, 2004: 44). According to the state elites, the issue of change in Turkish politics should and could be avoided by avoiding the ‘dangers of’ EU membership process as a security-based bilateral process (Kardas and Kucuk, 2003: 12-20), which, in their view, would only necessitate using the country’s ‘material power sources’ or invoking potential ‘security contributions’ rather than embracing a different political logic and agenda (Bilgin, 2005).

In addition, as the present thesis argued, security governmentality has exhibited a complex structure of politics of security, which could hardly be wholly rectified simply by passing the related reforms to the institutional and legal effects. Despite immense efforts of the pro-EU actors to adopt the related reforms, the civilian authorities and governments-including the AKP government-still find it difficult to implement their supervisory functions over the military activities in practice such as the formulation of national security policy and its implementation or the fuller control of the defense budget (Bayramoglu, 2004: 108-116).
As to the EU side, it should be noted that the former has not been fully attentive to some of the techniques of security governmentality. That is, the EU seems to only have an 'institutionally biased legal-procedural' diagnosis of the civil-military relations in Turkey, and its remedies demonstrate a lack of proper understanding of the role the military plays and the techniques it employs in Turkey’s political system (Cizre, 2004). In other words, although the EU seems to be acutely aware of the necessity of delimiting the military’s role in politics, it has so far been ineffective to fully curb the political clout of the military. Indeed, the military’s political profile has not been evaded yet since ‘Turkey’s status as an official candidate for EU membership has, if anything, prompted the military to become more deeply involved in politics as it strives to ensure that legislative changes to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria do not jeopardize its perception of national security’ (Jenkins, 2001: 84). As the EU Commission’s representative Hansjorg Kretschmer in Turkey warned, ‘the military is still very effective in the ruling of the country [and this] constitutes an obstacle in the national adoption process for the membership’ (Hurriyet, 29 July 2005). Indeed, this is especially the case with respect to in regard to the securitization technique that at times continues to be facilitated and executed by the mainstream media. As argued in Chapter 4, securitization is a technique that diminishes democratic control over the military’s interventions into domestic political space. As Pinar Bilgin argues in relations to the securitization of politics, the military’s command of ‘security speak’ is so prevalent in domestic politics that:

[s]o long as the military is the major actor in shaping the contours of national security, its role in Turkish politics is likely to remain central. This is because, given the influence of the term ‘security’ has on peoples’ thinking and practices, those who have the power to define what national security means in a given context also have the power to shape political processes (2005: 195).

Consequently, without de-securitizing issues of domestic politics, the EU conditions about the removal of the military from politics are hardly likely to be achieved. The institutional and procedural roadmaps designed by the EU about the role of the military in politics should be supplemented with vigorous efforts to address the consequences of the securitization technique. Then Turkish politics can be better equipped with alternative strategies and political resources for a more pluralist democratic rule.

Overall though, it can be argued that thanks to the EU reform process the state elites are put in a political dilemma either to ‘quit or commit’ in their attempts to become a full EU member.
state. In fact Turkey is either to choose to follow the new European post-Cold War security, identity and socio-political architecture (i.e., the EU) and thus at least reform the two founding components of its political rationality: secularism and reason of state. Or alternatively, it could stick to the rigid interpretation of those two principles and perhaps forget about the membership.

In short, the dream of becoming an EU member seemed to have turned into a nightmare for the governing elites. For the state elites the EU membership has become not only a defining historical moment, but also one of the most fundamental political dilemmas in its modern history. If Turkey quits its historic membership bid by not allowing political and cultural rights to its citizens, it will possibly stay forever out of the EU. If, however, Turkey remains committed to and implements EU political conditionality, then, the EU membership looks set to yield an agonizing transformation of its firmly entrenched political rationalities and techniques within security governmentality. For, the EU requires the Turkish state to give up on its unbridled security discourses and practices and instead full-heartedly implement the EU reforms.

**Democracy and Security Governmentality**

Some of the popular representations both from the inside and the outside of Turkey do not sufficiently reveal or account for the complexities of the Turkish polity, and instead accord to various self-ascribed ideological representations of the Turkish state (Kasaba, 1997: 30-3; Migdal, 1997: 252-9). Such representations often ‘have the ability to close off different meanings’ about the country (Stone, 1998: 3). One such closed-off meaning for Turkish democracy concerns the understudied role of the military in Turkish politics, though we are continuously reminded at least by the ongoing interventions of the military into politics that the military is the Achilles heel for democracy and that the possibility of another military coup is always present (Ahmed, 1993; Jenkins, 2003) and that ‘the military is able to intervene at will in politics’ (Candar, 1999: 140). The president of Turkey’s ‘Human Rights Association’ Husnu Undul believes that ‘You can say Turkey is moving towards democracy but it is not a democratic country’ (quoted in Hughes, *European Voice*, May 2004: 20). Clearly then, those accounts that succumb to such uncritical representations of the country should be carefully unpacked. For the questions about Turkey’s future politics go well beyond such questionable and alarmist declarations of the collapse of ‘secularism’ under the immanent threat of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. In this line, this thesis has attempted to explain
the involvement of the military in politics from a perspective of security governmentality. It argues that Turkey's 'established democracy' (Heper, 1992b: 144) or 'electoral democracy' (Anderson and Stepan, 2004) remains under the tutelage of the military-led state elites with an official ideology of 'secularist Jacobinism' and that authoritarian tendencies within security governmentality continue. What is the state of democracy in Turkey then?

Particularly in the 1990s the various political and economic crises gave rise to a shattered credibility of state security discourses and practices (Yavuz, 2000a: 33-4). In this period, the Turkish political system has been marked by a sporadic 'legitimacy crisis' in the Habermasian sense of the term (Savvides, 2000). As to the understanding of democratic politics, these crises have had a bearing on the people's conventional take on democracy for which 'democracy is equated with populism practiced through clientelistic networks, which often requires the bending of rules and laws to distribute the benefits' (Kalaycioglu, 2001: 67). This perception is obviously detrimental to the prospect of a healthy construction of civilian supremacy over non-civilians (Stepan, 1988; Heper and Aylin, 1996; Ozbudun, 2000; Cizre, 2004). The civilian empowerment over the non-civilians is an important aspect of consolidation of democracy (Onis and Keyman, 2003: 106), and as such can help as an efficient route for democratizing security governmentality. This would be so because the 'perceived political integrity on the part of political actors is indispensable for a viable democracy to flourish' as opposed to the upper-hand of non-democratic actors (Heper and Toktas, 2003: 178).

Having stressed its importance, it is necessary to also note that nominally civilian forces sometimes acted irreverently towards democratic politics, contributing to the strengthening of security governmentality. For example, some civilian forces in the mainstream media have served as 'functional securitization actors' by representing some controversial anti-democratic or anti-secularist remarks in a security language such that the military could draw upon them in taking 'action', which in turn only helped 'lock the political arena into a civil war atmosphere' (Bayramoglu, 2001: 160-2; Akpinar, 2001: 166-78). In the face of such a 'civil war atmosphere', other self-proclaimed civil society groups subsequently carried the claim that 'they count on the army to intervene "to save democracy" -a strange conception of democracy to be sure' (Norton, 2003: 29). They acted like the 'deputies' of the military in the production of 'spontaneous consent given by the great masses' (Gramsci, 1971: 12). In the
second half of the 1990s, in fact, certain influential civil society groups participated in
discursive battles alongside with the non-civilian secularist elites of security governmentality
such as the military to topple the elected Islamist Refah Party from government by the means
of ‘post-modern coup’ in June 1997 and the subsequent ‘28 February process’ (Ayata, 2004:
244).

The sluggish civilian support notwithstanding, the effective impact of continuing local and
global democratizing political forces (the parties having a stake in democratic politics and the
EU) at the heart of the political system has been a helping factor in the de-militarization of
democratic politics. These political actors are helping rebuild ‘the missing dimension of trust’
in political institutions and politicians, which can play a direct role in disaggregating trust in
the military in the system (Cizre, 1999: 15; Cizre, 2003; Demirel, 2004b). The AKP
leadership and active party organization seem to be aware of this and might help change the
widespread public distrust of politicians for the better by altering the perceptions of the people
towards the actors in security governmentality (Interviews with the party officials, August
2004, Istanbul; also see Hughes, European Voice, May 2004: 20). Indeed, a recent poll
indicates a swift change in this direction. A study by Izmir Dokuz Eylul University
International Strategic Research Education and Counseling Center on social trends conducted
in November 2003 (after one year of the AKP government) has revealed some striking
attitude changes in public towards politics in general and state institutions in particular. A
year before, surveys had revealed political parties being ranked sixth in terms of public
confidence and trust in the government ranked eighth. Later public confidence in politics has
grown, with political parties rising to third place. However, confidence in the law seemed to
have waned, with the judiciary dropping to eighth place. Universities, on the other hand, were
at the bottom of the list. This is how the participants in the survey voted, in order of most to
least confidence: the presidency; the Turkish Armed Forces; political parties; the government;
the parliament; civil society organizations; the judiciary; and universities (Zaman, 17
November 2003). If this trend continues to get hold in Turkish society then the prospect of a
stable democracy is likely to grow (Heper, 2005; Kubicek, 2005).

What then about the relationship between Islamic political actors and democracy? Unlike the
Turkish secularist state elites, the idea of ‘marriage between Islam and Democracy’ is
basically shared by scholars (Panel Discussion, *BBC4*, 15 September 2005). Regarding Islam-democracy interaction in Turkey, Metin Heper observed that:

A marriage between Islam and democracy in Turkey can be consummated if the radical secularists stop trying to impose their preferred life-style and set of values upon the Islamists, and if the latter do not undermine by word or deed the basic tenets of the secular democratic state in Turkey (1997: 45).

Arguably, then there will be the issue of *practicing* democratic politics. It seems possible to argue that when such a 'marriage between Islam and Democracy' together with making 'peace with the military' is achieved; then the potential effects are likely to dwindle of the anti-political securitization technique of security governmentality. Yet, de-securitization of the political order could only be a starting point if the aim is not only to dispense with the authoritarian politics of security governmentality but also to change the existing power structures. Indeed, a mere de-securitization can hardly ever dismantle the underlying grids of power relations embellished within security governmentality. For without such an alternative democratic political vision, it is always possible to fall back on Turkey's traditional underlying power relations characterized in security governmentality.

But how can de-securitization of Turkey's politics constrained by the exigencies of security governmentality relate to a more pluralist democratic regime of government? From a security governmentality perspective applied here to the case of Turkey, it can be noted that the securitization theory of the 'Copenhagen School of Security Studies' does not go far beyond pointing out alternative democratic political orders (cf. Williams, 2003). It remains rather quite on the issue of establishing an alternative politics once de-securitization is achieved (Personal Correspondence with Jeff Huysmans, November 2004). Secondly, in the process of de-securitizing issues, the Copenhagen School follows Ernesto Laclau's take on 'the political', which helps challenge securitizations or other 'taken-for-grantedness of social relations' through 'the sphere of choice and contestation by politicization' (Buzan et al., 1998: 143, 161, ft 2). This is an important and helpful approach, however, the underlying assumption of the state for the Copenhagen School remains that of the liberal tradition of the 'strong state' (Smith, 1991: 325-39; Buzan et al., 1998: 146) as opposed to the conception of a strong state which is associated with the strength of the executive over the legislative (Dyson, 1980). Here the problem is that for the Copenhagen School, the securitizing actor within a 'strong [liberal] state' would be almost exclusively the political elite or 'the government'.
which ‘acts only as the legitimate agent of the nation-state and that its claims are subject to public scrutiny and are open to questioning’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 146). Whereas for such ‘strong states’ as Turkey (Heper, 1991) the securitizing agency may be may located in some other state institutions like the military or other branches of state bureaucracy. Securitizing discourse may well stem from the authoritarian political tendencies of the military rather than the government (Heper, 1991; 1992b: 144-5). This gap in understanding of different securitization practices arguably derives from the Copenhagen School’s ‘definition of the political’ which resides in a rather conventional take on ‘the [liberal] state’ as they might ‘want to retain the Weberian ring to the “politics” of the political sector’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 143). However tenable, this vision of politics risks remaining only in a non-political de-securitization level, because as Aradau argues, ‘Deprived of political commitment, desecuritization can only be a relatively sterile tool, unfit for acting upon the world and “transforming prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized”’ (2004: 390).

From a security governmentality perspective proposed and developed in this thesis, securitization is only part of the overall structure of security governmentality. Consequently, security governmentality should be addressed in its full capacity. At least in the case of Turkey we can better disengage the dynamics of politics of security by making ‘the definition of the political a question rather than an assumption’ (Krause and Williams, 1997: xi). Therefore, if de-securitization is to be moved beyond being a ‘sterile tool’, the transformative potential of politics with an interest in ‘human emancipation’ needs to be invoked (Booth, 1999; Wyn Jones, 1999: 153). This concern would be necessary so as to spearhead alternative political struggles for ‘transforming prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which [e.g. security governmentality] are organized’ (Cox, 1986: 208). Then, in the Turkish context, there is also a need for both a re-conceptualization of the political and the radicalization of democracy (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). This could lay the groundwork for the practical issue of the much-needed ‘consolidation of democracy’ for overcoming the problems of security governmentality. Otherwise, the full potential of transformation through the EU membership might yet filter out. In other words, Turkey’s EU membership bid has tossed security governmentality into the air; how things actually settle afterwards, however, is up to the people on the ground. A more pluralist democratic political order will not come about simply by EU membership. It has to be fought for and won. And that process is underway.
1. Secularism is a founding principle of the Republic's Constitution, the fourth of its irrevocable articles. It must be protected scrupulously and with great care. In order to do so, the existing laws of the Republic must be applied without exception. If the present laws are inadequate, they must be revised.

2. As is required by the original Republican law for the unification of education [Tevhid-i Tedrisat], private hostels, trusts and schools with links to tarikats must be transferred to the control of state organs acting under the supervision of the National Education Ministry.

3. The still-forming minds of younger generations must be made aware of the Republic, of Ataturk, of love for country and nation, and of the aim of the Turkish nation to rise to the level of contemporary civilization. They must be protected from the nefarious influence of various centres of activity. Accordingly, (a) Eight years' continuous education must be instituted throughout the whole country. (b) If a family so decides, children who have completed this education may attend Koran courses. The necessary administrative and legislative changes must be made for these courses' activities so that they [are removed from responsibility of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and] come under the responsibility and control of the Ministry of Education.

4. Those of our national education institutions charged with the responsibility to produce enlightened men of religion loyal to Ataturk's principles, to the revolution and to the Republic, must maintain an ethos appropriate to the secular essence of the law for the unification of education.

5. Religious foundations under construction in various parts of the country must not be made the subject of political exploitation and kept on the agenda in order to present and reinforce a message to certain groups. If there is a genuine need for these foundations, they must be realized by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, who will examine the situation and coordinate with the relevant authorities and local administrators.

6. The tarikats prohibited by existing law number 677, and all the activities declared proscribed in that law must be brought to an end. Their threat to democratic society, and the political and social laws governing the social order, must be impeded.

7. Some media groups have been exploiting the fact that personnel are being ejected from the Turkish Armed Forces by the order of the High Military Council because of fundamentalist activities, attempting to show the armed forces as thereby an enemy of religion. Such media groups, and their broadcasts against the Armed Forces and their members, must be brought under control.

8. Personnel who have been ejected from the Turkish Armed Forces because of links with illegal fundamentalist activities or for contravening discipline must not be given employment opportunities in other public bodies and institutions.
9. Public bodies and institutions, particularly the universities, other educational bodies and every level of the bureaucracy and the courts, must apply similar precautions to those taken by the Turkish Armed Forces in order to restrict the activities of extremist religious groups.

10. In order to protect the contemporary basis of Turkish society from possible clashes provoked by religious exploitation, all activities in our country directed against the regime by the Islamic Republic of Iran must be stopped. Whilst so minded, neighbourly relations with Iran and our economic ties will not be broken, but a packet of measures must be prepared and put into action in order to impede these distracted and harmful activities.

11. The extremist religious movement is provoking a separation between sects in Turkey that is leading to a polarization within society. These highly dangerous activities will encourage a division into enemy camps. They must absolutely and without fail be prevented, by both legal and administrative means.

12. The legal and administrative procedures pertaining to those responsible for events contrary to the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, Political Party Law, Turkish Penal Code, and especially Municipality Law must be concluded expeditiously, and measures taken to ensure that they do not occur again.

13. Actions contrary to the law relating to clothing and thereby leading Turkey to assume an anachronistic appearance must be stopped. Above all, an particularly, in public bodies and institutions, the law and the decisions of the Constitutional Courts pertaining to this subject must be applied scrupulously, and without any exception.

14. The procedures governing the various licenses given for short and long barreled weapons must be reorganized by making this the responsibility of the appropriate police and gendarmes. They must be tightened up. In particular applications to obtain pump-action must be carefully evaluated.

15. The collection of sacrificial pelts for financial gain by unauthorized organizations opposed to the present order must be stopped. Those not empowered by the law must not be permitted to collect these pelts.

16. Legal procedures begun against those responsible for security guards dressed in private uniforms must be brought to a swift conclusion. This form of illegal activity may reach extremely grave proportions and therefore all those private security organizations that fall outside the law must be closed and disbanded.

17. Those who adopt the position that the nation's problems may be solved through placing the community of believers [ummet] above that of the nation [millet], and who encourage the idea of approaching separatist terrorist organizations with this slogan, must be impeded by legal and administrative means.

18. Those who are guilty of acting with disrespect towards great Ataturk, or conducting crimes against him, must not escape prosecution by exploiting law number 5816 (Shakland, 1999: 205-8).
APPENDIX 2

QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTED TO THE AKP MEMBERS IN ISTANBUL

Do you support Turkey’s EU membership?
1. Yes 85%
2. No 15%

How do you define the European Union?
1. An Economic Organization 40%
2. A Political and Legal Institutional Model 35%
3. A Culturally and Religiously Distinctive Institution 10%
4. Other 15%

Do you agree with the statement that Turkey’s EU membership will resolve her legal, economic, and political problems?
1. Completely agree 5%
2. Partly agree 90%
3. Disagree 5%

Do you agree with the prediction that Turkey’s EU membership will worsen the Kurdish problem in Turkey?
1. Completely agree 30%
2. Partly agree 25%
3. Disagree 45%

Do you agree with the statement that international organizations like the EU will make Turkey economically and politically dependent on these organizations?
1. Completely agree 20%
2. Partly agree 55%
3. Disagree 25%

Should Turkey continue with the reform process even if her membership prospect disappears?
1. Yes 85%
2. No 15%

Will the EU membership endanger Turkey’s national security?
1. Yes 0%
2. Possibly in the future 60%
3. No 40%

Will the EU membership threaten Turkey’s cultural and religious identities?
1. Yes 15%
2. No 25%
3. Possibly in the future 60%
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