‘Africa for the Africans’! How British Imperial Counter-Intelligence Prevented the Threat of Pan-Islamism to the Security of the British Empire in East Africa during the East African Campaign of the First World War.

Charlotte Catherine Botfield

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Ph.D.

18th January 2019

Department of International Politics

Aberystwyth University
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**STATEMENT 1**

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated.

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Summary of Thesis

The First World War allowed for two sources of Pan-Islamism to mature in East Africa: the German Empire and East Africans and the African diaspora. The former had an incentive to develop Pan-Islamism as an element of the ‘special feature’ policy they were employing to assist in securing victory in the First World War. This was a policy ‘to foster and encourage any movements of unrest and sedition’, including the Pan-Islamic movement, ‘directed against the British Empire’.¹ The latter, who, due to the military needs of the European empires, had been forced to converge in East Africa in a manner never previously seen, conversed about Pan-Islamism amongst themselves. Officials of the British Empire identified that Pan-Islamism had manifested itself into two threats: Pan-Islamic unity and the use of the machinery developed by Pan-Islamism by those who advocated for Pan-Africanism.

The developing counter-intelligence arm of the British imperial intelligence establishment worked to counter these threats. This development resulted in the institution of the East African Intelligence Centre in 1917. They were successful: to a point. The British Empire in East Africa was not destroyed by Pan-Islamism during the First World War. But they were unable to remove the threat posed by Pan-Islamism from the East African region.

In the early Twentieth Century the United Kingdom had revolutionised its intelligence establishment, but it had failed to realise that counter-intelligence in the British Empire had not been accounted for. Consequently, the British Empire was forced to institute a colonial counter-intelligence establishment during the hostilities of the Great War. With little previous work to build upon, the British Empire was faced with a severe shortage in relevant expertise.

Introduction

The East African Campaign of the First World War: an Historiographical Analysis

The East African Campaign of the First World War was fought from 3rd August 1914 to 25th November 1918 between the British, Belgian, and Portuguese Empires and the German Empire. For the Allies, the British Empire was by far the more prominent power. Exact figures for combatants are impossible to come by; when ‘Excluding Allied and Naval personnel’, Malcolm Page has placed the figures at ‘about 114,000 troops.’ When ‘excluding those hospitalized for disease’, he placed the British Empire’s casualty rate at ‘62,220’, whilst the ‘[deaths] from disease were 48,328, mainly due to malaria.’ The majority of the military personnel for both the British and German Empires were not comprised of combatants but of porters. For the British Empire, Page placed these at ‘Between ‘400,000 and 500,000 men’, of whom, at the end of the Great War, ‘40,000... could not be accounted for.’ Many of these porters were Africans; the British Empire’s East African Force was comprised of Europeans, Indians, and Africans.

The East African Campaign developed into a guerrilla war, which heavily impacted upon the East African population. It ‘prevented animal controls, such as quarantine, culling infected cattle, and the strategic application of vaccines that had kept diseases in check’. Tait Keller has recorded how ‘Rinderpest, along with tick and tsetse vectors of other diseases... spread rapidly along military routes.’ The population ‘also suffered a panoply of disease, including bubonic plague, dysentery, sleeping sickness, smallpox, and malaria.’ Famine broke out due to the lack of these animal controls, the spread of diseases, the ‘forced recruitment of

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porters’, and the ‘Scorched-earth tactics [used] by the retreating German army [sic] in Ruanda-Urundi... in 1916-17’.4

‘[Already] racked by the triple curses of war, famine and disease’, East Africa was to face yet another misfortune: the influenza pandemic of 1918-1919. Due to these three ‘curses’, East Africa suffered ‘death rates from flu higher than other regions of Africa’, which in turn were already ‘higher than those of Europe, varying between c.2 and 5 per cent of the population.’ In the East Africa Protectorate ‘as many as 150,000 people died, 5.5 per cent of the population.’

Having suffered from famine, disease, influenza, and the longest campaign of the entire First World War, East Africa was to encounter a further indignity; all of the suffering and all of the death was to be dismissed by historians as nothing more than a ‘sideshow’ to the contemporary events in Europe. A selection of diverse books demonstrates this: Karl P. Magyar’s entry for ‘Africa, 1914—18’ in The European Powers in the First World War: An Encyclopaedia states that the African Theatre ‘remained a sideshow to the real war [in Europe]’ and ‘was largely a European concern, although most of those who died in it were native Africans.’ The East African Campaign ‘was no more than an exotic sideshow’, declares Lothar Höbelt in ‘Mourir pour Liège? World War I War Aims in a Long-Term Perspective’. Richard J. Popplewell writes that the German Empire’s ‘operations in East Africa were only a side-show in the war’ in Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire 1904—1924.8 The Obamas: The Untold Story of an African Family is an example of this term reaching beyond the histories of the First World War, although P.L. Firstbrook paraphrases it from the perspective of Paul von

Lettow-Vorbeck, the commander of the German forces in the East African Campaign. In his fiction work *Lost in Africa*, Stuart Ford refers to it as ‘a strange little sideshow’.  

In *The First World War in Africa*, Hew Strachan presents an argument for why this assessment is unjustified. He writes that whilst ‘the African campaigns of the First World War bore more relationship to the nineteenth-century campaigns of colonial conquest than they did to the Great War’ and that ‘in relation to the outcome of the war they were, as is too often remarked, sideshows’, ‘neither’ of these observations ‘should be allowed to trivialise [the] importance’ of the war in Africa.  

The secondary literature on the East African Campaign is extremely limited, and this was officially sanctioned. The official history of the Campaign was entitled *Military Operations East Africa. Vol. 1, August 1914-September 1916* and was compiled by Charles Hordern; finally published in 1941, there was never a Vol. 2 to cover the period from October 1916 – November 1918. This lack of official interest was then emulated by historians.  

In recent years more historians have been drawn to this poorly researched area of the First World War and period of East African history, many with a similar mentality to Strachan. Of the recent historians who have been drawn to this area: Michelle Moyd has placed African narratives at the centre of her works on the Campaign and has advocated for greater research of African narratives; Robert Gaudi has placed the German commander at the centre of his book *African Kaiser: Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War in Africa*; Anne Samson has written numerous books and articles about the role of South Africa and the impact of inter-relations between those involved; Edward Paice’s *Tip & Run: The Untold Tragedy of the Great War in Africa* is the most comprehensive analysis of the Campaign.  

Although not in the quantities of the European theatres of war, a sizeable amount of primary material does continue to exist. Several diaries and memories from combatants  

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remain. Amongst the most useful or complete include: von Lettow-Vorbeck’s *My Reminiscences of East Africa*; Richard Meinertzhagen’s *Army Diary 1899-1926*; W. Lloyd-Jones’s *K.A.R.: Being an Unofficial Account of the Origin and Activities of The King’s African Rifles*; C. P. Fendall’s *The East African Force 1915—1919*. Some of the usual letters and photographs that one would expect from soldiers writing home have survived. In the National Archives of the United Kingdom and the British Library there remains a significant quantity of imperial documents concerning imperial counter-intelligence, the East African Campaign, and British colonialism in the region more generally. Whilst there is not the abundance of material that other areas of the First World War enjoy, there is enough that, since declassification, the lack of primary material is not a hindrance to research in its entirety.

That the outcome of the First World War was not decided at the Battle of Kilimanjaro is not a view that is disputed by any person. The problem that the word ‘sideshow’ has presented in the literature is not that it does not accurately describe the East African Campaign’s role in the Great War militaristically, but that by dismissing the East African Campaign as unworthy of greater study historians have actually been dismissing the East African narrative itself as unworthy of greater study. This has unfortunate implications to the study of what was at the crux of the entire Campaign: colonialism.

Paice has demonstrated that ‘there were many’ contemporary people ‘who regarded [the East African Campaign] as the very epitome of the “selfish imperialism” which had caused the Great War in the first place’: he lists Jan Smuts, Sir Harry Johnston, and W. E. B. Du Bois. ‘Their point’, according to Paice, ‘was… that the war in Africa put imperialism itself, and all the highfalutin talk of the European Powers’ “civilizing mission”, on trial; and in doing so it exposed the unremitting ambitions of the colonial powers to a degree of scrutiny unsurpassed since the very beginnings of the Scramble for Africa.’

The lack of historical research on the East African Campaign of the First World War has thus hinged on two main points: that it was not the decisive Western Front, and that acknowledging it meant acknowledging the brutalities of European colonialism. In recent years the East African Campaign has been of interest to a new generation of researchers. It

offers exciting new opportunities to study the military history of the early Twentieth Century, European colonialism in Africa, and the experiences of people of colour in the setting of the First World War: a setting that is both so recognisable and is yet so unknown. This newly developing literature has joined the growing literature on non-European centred narratives of the First World War. Guoqi Xu’s book *Asia and the Great War: A Shared History* is a remarkable insight into Asian experiences of the Great War and is one example of this. A collection of articles that were bound into two volumes entitled *Through the Eyes of the Warring Countries’ Historians: The First World War Centenary Symposium* offers the reader analysis from historians from across the world. The centenary commemorations have provided a platform for the experiences of minorities to reach a wider audience: *The Muslim Experience in World War I* twitter account being a case in point.15

**Research Considerations**

On approaching this large chasm of potential research, one could feel quite lost. It was, and still remains, easier to list what has been studied as opposed to what has not. I therefore approached it with two considerations in mind:

The first consideration was that I intended to study the British Empire’s use of intelligence in the colonial setting of East Africa. My historical interests have long focused on colonialism and warfare in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. I was particularly interested in how intelligence developed in colonial settings within the British Empire during the First World War.

The development of the British Empire’s imperial intelligence establishment outside of Ireland is underdeveloped within the literature for this era. Martin Thomas’ *Empire’s of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914* makes an important contribution to our understanding of the role of intelligence in supporting British imperial...

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control in the early Twentieth Century. His work focuses on the British and French Empire’s in the Middle East and North Africa from the start of the First World War to the start of the Second. Consequently, his conclusions are only partially relevant to our understanding of the British Empire in East Africa in the era examined in this thesis, for the British imperial political apparatus in this region was then comparatively too underdeveloped to support an imperial intelligence establishment comparable to those described in his work. Similar can be said of Priya Satia’s monograph *Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East*. Her ‘focus’ for this work was ‘on the formation and fallout of the cultural imagination that shaped agents’ approach and methods’, for ‘the cultural formation of intelligence agents must lie at the heart of any effort to understand British intelligence-gathering in the Middle East’. The conclusions that she draws – that ‘These agents’ most important methodological innovation was an intuitive intelligence epistemology modelled on their understanding of the “Arab mind”’ where they desired the replication of ‘the apparently intuitive knowledge-gathering and navigational practices of nomadic Arabs’ – are drawn from a society and an imperial relationship quite different from that of early Twentieth Century East Africa. Potential developments in this area of this literature that focused on East Africa were clear.

The branch of the imperial intelligence establishment that was tasked with conducting colonial counter-intelligence during the First World War was D Branch of M.I.5. The examination of this branch’s work outside of Ireland is virtually non-existent in the literature. In his book *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* Christopher Andrew makes only two references to it. In the most substantial reference, which does not run to more than half a paragraph, Andrew writes that ‘According to a post-war report on D Branch, couched in unrealistically grandiloquent terms, “particulars were obtained of German activities in all parts of the world, from Peru to the Dutch East Indies and the Islands of the Pacific, and watch was kept on German propaganda through missionaries or otherwise on every continent.”’ M.I.5. did amplify their successes in the First World War in

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this report; preventing the threat of Pan-Islamism, for example, was examined in much greater detail than other issues which were not as thoroughly prevented. But it is not true to write that it was ‘unrealistically grandiloquent’ to say that ‘particulars were obtained of German activities in all parts of the world’, for by the end of the First World War D Branch had examined every part of the British Empire for counter-intelligence needs, and had expanded to cover all those parts of the Empire that were judged to be of risk, even slight.¹⁹ Elsewhere, whilst a handful of books do mention D Branch, Chris Northcott’s *MI5 at War 1909-1918: How MI5 Foiled the Spies of the Kaiser in the First World War* being the most prominent, nowhere in the entire literature of either the First World War or the British intelligence establishment does anybody place D Branch at the forefront of their analysis.²⁰

Many of the primary documents for this thesis are drawn from the KV 1 Series of the National Archives of the United Kingdom entitled *The Security Service: First World War Historical Reports and Other Papers*. The National Archives describes this series as containing ‘the official history of the Security Service work during World War I compiled at the request of the Committee of Imperial Defence.’²¹ This is an extensive series, but it is also a curated one; on reading it, it becomes clear that many documents have not been preserved, at least not in the publicly available archives. Nevertheless, a large enough number have survived to ensure that one can construct narratives on the actions of M.I.5. during the First World War, especially when they are placed in an analysis with the many relevant documents from the War Office, the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and the India Office.

Therefore, I understood that there was not so much a gap in the literature as there was a gaping hole. By joining together my interests in the East African Campaign of the First World War with the development of intelligence in colonial settings within the British Empire during the early Twentieth Century I was able to narrow this gaping hole into a manageable gap.

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The second consideration was that I intended to study the British Empire within the British Empire. I wished the focus of my work to be the Empire itself. I wanted to better understand how the British Empire’s imperial intelligence establishment worked on the ground, as opposed to how it worked from an office in London. To this end, I endeavoured to place the centre of the narrative in East Africa, occasionally looking back at London; as opposed to it being located in the imperial capital, occasionally looking down at the imperial acquisitions. From the start, East Africa and East African concerns were to be at the heart of my research. Whilst there was a large chasm of potential research, I restricted myself to researching how the British Empire acted within the East African region. The only exception to this is Chapter Six, for I realised that for the narrative arc to continue in East Africa it was essential to understand the development of D Branch of M.I.5. in London.

In addition, placing the British Empire at the heart of my work was a practical consideration. It would have been possible to have written a complimentary thesis to this that placed either the German Empire or East Africans at the centre of the narrative. I do not possess the German language skills required to undertake historical research of the German Empire, and I possess no East African language skills at all; it would have been extremely difficult for me to have conducted the oral history that would have been essential for the production of such a thesis. The British Empire retained an extremely limited amount of primary material that was concerned with African views on Pan-Islamism in the early Twentieth Century; there is no great East African archive that is the equivalent of the National Archives of the United Kingdom. Thus, oral history would have been the only avenue available to gain the information that I would have required had I chosen this path. Furthermore, I did not feel that it was ethically correct for a white British person to write a narrative of the British Empire from the perspective of an African. These practical and ethical considerations had the consequence of further limiting the large chasm of potential research to a manageable level.

The historical research for this thesis was, by necessity, undertaken in archives. Having very little knowledge of what I would find there, I was originally somewhat overwhelmed. Bearing in mind the parameters of these two considerations, I soon became interested in those documents involved in M.I.5.’s role in securing the future of its empire in East Africa by preventing the threat of Pan-Islamism to it. Aside from being very interesting, these
documents allowed me to study the British Empire’s use of intelligence in the colonial setting of East Africa whilst placing East Africa and East African concerns at its heart.

After returning to the secondary literature, I soon discovered that the Pan-Islamic narrative of the First World War was yet another area in which the East African voice had been seriously neglected, to the extent that it is usually absent. Rudolf Peters in *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History* writes that ‘Despite the efforts of the Central Powers, the effect of the Ottoman jihad-proclamation and the subsequent stream of religious propaganda was minimal... [because] nowhere did anti-colonial revolts break out in support of the Turks.’ 22 This conclusion is not wrong, but it examined only the impact of the call for jihad within the Ottoman sphere. The measure of Pan-Islamic success in East Africa was not viewed by the British in terms of ‘anti-colonial revolts... in support of the Turks.’ Instead of being excluded, the East African voice has sometimes been dismissed. Jeff Haynes states in *The Encyclopaedia of African History, Volume III*, that although ‘the Ottomans issued a call to jihad against the Europeans that circulated widely in... parts of Kenya and Mozambique’, it circulated ‘without conspicuous numbers of African Muslims heeding the call.’ This in itself is not untrue, but, like Peters, Haynes has only examined the reaction of East African Muslims within the Ottoman narrative. Haynes continued, however, to write that ‘The crushing of the Ottomans during World War I, coupled with the apparently inexorable spread of European power, confirmed to many African Muslims that the Europeans could not be defeated by force and gradually they came to accept European rule.’ 23 This is simply not true; not staging a successful revolution is not the same as accepting European rule. From a wider perspective, revolt did occur: ‘in most of Africa, the early colonial period... was characterized by intermittent rebellions, revolts, and uprisings against the newly established colonial state.’ 24 This thesis demonstrates that far from ‘accepting European rule’, the British Empire was forced to recognise the agency of East Africans to challenge imperial power, albeit on a limited scale.

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The use of Pan-Islamism as a German war strategy has been examined on occasion within the literature, but these examinations: locate it as a subsidiary analysis, rather than as the main analysis; view it through a European perspective; and/or place it in a non-African context. Two examples of such works would be Hew Strachan’s *The First World War: Volume I: To Arms* and Peter Hopkirk’s *On Secret Service East of Constantinople: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire*. Within the literature concerned with the East African Campaign, the Pan-Islamic narrative has been conspicuously absent. This is particularly noticeable in Strachan’s *The First World War in Africa* where, apart from one very brief mention in the preface, the topic is not mentioned in his analysis of events at all.\(^{25}\)

Useful secondary literature on Islam in East Africa and colonial reactions to it in the era of the First World War is extremely limited but includes: Paice’s *Tip & Run* (although his narrative too is Ottoman-centric); Felicitas Becker, ‘Islam and Imperialism in East Africa’ in *Islam and the European Empires*; Rebekka Habermas, ‘Debates on Islam in Imperial Germany’ in *Islam and the European Empires*.\(^ {27}\)

Useful secondary literature that places Islam into the wider setting of British and European imperialism in the pre-First World War era is much more fruitful and has been useful in locating this thesis within its broader context. John Darwin’s *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System* has been beneficial in helping to place the importance of Pan-Islamism within the British Empire in 1914, as have both Ronald Hyam’s *Britain’s Imperial Century 1815—1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion* and Bernard Porter’s *Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa 1895—1914*. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins’s *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688—1914* and Popplewell’s *Intelligence and Imperial Defence* were both important in placing this information into a larger framework containing the Ottoman Empire. Further readings includes: John Slight’s *The British Empire and the Hajj: 1865—1956* and Warren Dockter’s *Churchill and the Islamic World*.


The role that M.I.5., and the British Empire more widely, played in identifying and preventing the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the British Empire in the years of the First World War became my thesis’ overall concern. My central research question developed into its final form: How did the British Empire attempt to prevent what they perceived to be the dangers associated with Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the First World War, and how successful were they in this endeavour?

Road Map

In addition to the introduction, the conclusion, and the bibliography, this thesis is comprised of three sections:

Part I is entitled *The Milieu of the Pan-Islamic Threat* and presents how the changing society in East Africa in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries allowed for the development of Pan-Islamism in the region during the First World War. This change in society was primarily brought about through European involvement in the region, principally due to the consequences of European colonialism and the termination of the Eastern Slave Trade.

Part II is entitled *The Identification of the Pan-Islamic Threat* and is concerned with how British imperial officials identified Pan-Islamism as a threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War. Despite a counter-intelligence effort finally being enacted in the British Empire in East Africa in 1914, racial prejudices meant that the threat posed by the African population to British imperial security in the region was not acted upon in the first half of the Great War.

Part III is entitled *The Eradication of the Pan-Islamic Threat* and analyses how the officials of the British Empire attempted to prevent the threat that they perceived to exist from Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa, and the successfulness of their endeavour. An increase in the imperial counter-intelligence establishment in London allowed for the institution of an East African Intelligence Centre in
the East African region in 1917, which in turn was partly responsible for the attempted implementation of eight different strategies to prevent Pan-Islamism.

**Further Research**

The restrictions placed upon doctoral theses, and my own personal practical and ethical restrictions, prevented me from also undertaking research that placed the German Empire and the East Africans and the African diaspora, the other two main actors in this thesis, at the centre of the narrative. It has also prevented me from undertaking research on the other avenues of interest that my archival research has presented. Therefore, there are many avenues for further research, the most obvious of which would place ‘how did the British Empire prevent what they perceived to be the dangers associated with Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in the years of the First World War, and how successful were they in this endeavour?’ as the central research question. It would be of great interest to research how Pan-Islamism as a threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa during the First World War was viewed from the perspective of either the German Empire or East Africans and the African diaspora by placing them at the centre of the narrative, and to compare the outcome of this research to this thesis. Pan-Islamism was not exclusive to East Africa during the First World War. The long-term impact of Pan-Islamism on the British Empire in East Africa after the end of the Great War, the impact, if any, that the development of Pan-Islamism in East Africa had on the outcome of the East African Campaign, and the relationship between Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism, are also clear avenues of future research.

Future research on these topics would be highly beneficial not only in furthering the research presented in this thesis, but in the further construction of knowledge about the East African Campaign of the First World War. This thesis was begun in the autumn of 2014 and was completed in the winter of 2018; through the years of the centenary of the First World War. Throughout these years the lack of knowledge about the First World War outside of Western Europe has been palpable. I hope that this thesis connects with other
research conducted on the events beyond that principal theatre, to demonstrate to readers, both present and in the future, that the First World War was truly the first world war.
Part I: The Milieu of the Pan-Islamic Threat
Chapter One Beginnings: British Colonialism in East Africa

The formal establishment of the British Empire in East Africa occurred only twenty years prior to the outbreak of the First World War, British interest in the region had existed only a few decades more, and Europeans had ventured into the interior merely seventy years earlier; the British Empire that the British sought to secure from the threat of Pan-Islamism in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War had not been in existence long enough for its establishment to have passed from living memory.

In these early years of British colonialism in East Africa the British felt secure in their ability to maintain their Empire in the region. They received no serious challenge to the land from any other colonial power and they received no serious challenge to the power from the population that lived on the land. The British basked in the apparent security of their imperial project until the world allowed them to savour it no more.

The Arrival of the Europeans

Occurring during the first wave of European colonisation, the Portuguese, led by Vasco da Gama, became the first Europeans to colonise a part of East Africa. Da Gama’s voyage journeyed from Lisbon to Calicut between July 1497 and May 1498, and his fleeting time in East Africa occurred in the spring of the latter year. This journey was ‘much longer’, ‘technically more difficult’, and had a ‘far greater immediate significance than the celebrated voyages’ of Christopher Columbus – who left for his third voyage less than a fortnight after da Gama’s arrival at Calicut – because da Gama had found an over-sea route from Europe to India and the profitable trading links of the Indian Ocean. Because da Gama helped to lay ‘the foundation of global maritime trade’, some historians argue that his voyage was much more significant than Columbus’. Paul Kennedy, an adherent to this view, goes as far as to call the era between da Gama’s voyage and the start of the Great War in 1914 the ‘Vasco da Gama Era’ due to the ‘European hegemony’ that resulted because of it.28

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Portuguese Mozambique (otherwise known as Portuguese East Africa) was by far the longest lasting colony (or overseas province, as the Portuguese regarded it) of the European colonial era in Eastern Africa; it lasted from 1498 to 1975, when independence for Mozambique was proclaimed. The Portuguese failed to make a financial profit from Mozambique; this was an important reason for why nearly four centuries passed before other European nations developed significant colonial interest in the region.

It was in 1844 that two German missionaries – Johann Ludwig Krapf and Johannes Rebmann – became the first recorded white people to enter the interior of what would later become known internationally as Kenya. ‘The evangelical revival in Britain, that led to the great missionary and humanitarian movements of the nineteenth century’ was one of the major factors for the European advance across Africa. The 1869 opening of the Suez Canal – which brought Eastern Africa ‘2,000 miles closer to Britain by sea’ – and the British abolition of the slave trade in 1807 were also significant contributors to the growth of interest Britain and other European nations showed to a part of the world with which they previously had had very little contact.

Settlement by white Europeans in East Africa gently increased over the decades that followed from 1844. At first many settlers were missionaries who did not immigrate to the region permanently but farming opportunities in the highlands of the future colonies of Uganda and Kenya gradually attracted a different sort of settler-coloniser. This second wave of colonisation – entitled New Imperialism – occurred in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. The European colonisation of Africa during this era has become colloquially known as The Scramble for Africa. As a result of the later invasion of Ethiopia by Italy in 1935, every part of Africa was colonised by a European or American power at some point in its history. The British Empire in Africa was particularly large relative to the other European and American empires on the continent. By 1914, the British ruled the following colonies and protectorates in East Africa:

- The East Africa Protectorate (present-day Kenya)
- The British Somaliland Protectorate (present-day northern Somalia)


• Northern Rhodesia (present-day Zambia)
• The Nyasaland Protectorate (present-day Malawi)
• Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe)
• The British Protectorate of Uganda (present-day Uganda)
• The Sultanate of Zanzibar (present-day insular Tanzania)

As a result of the First World War the British also acquired:

• Tanganyika Territory (present-day mainland Tanzania)\(^\text{30}\)

In the wider African locality, the British also ruled:

• The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (present-day Sudan and South Sudan)
• Basutoland (present-day Lesotho)
• The Bechuanaland Protectorate (present-day Botswana)
• British Egypt (present-day Egypt)
• The Union of South Africa (became a self-governing dominion in 1910; present-day South Africa)
• Swaziland (present-day eSwatini)\(^\text{31}\)

A Colonial Paradox Builds an Empire

The Anglo-German Partition of East Africa Agreement was signed in November 1886. With some significant exceptions, the German sphere of influence in East Africa was proclaimed as being south of a line from the Umba River to Lake Victoria, with the British sphere being to the north.

That Britain’s involvement in East African colonialism was at first quite unwilling must appear illogical to the casual observer of history; at the turn of the Twentieth Century the British Empire was as yet still continuing its forward progression in size. Yet, still, this

\(^{30}\) Between 1922—1945 the Tanganyika Territory was administrated by Britain as a League of Nations mandate, and then between 1946 and independence in 1961 it was administrated by Britain as a United Nations trust territory. The administration of the Tanganyika Territory was thus, theoretically, different to the administration of the neighbouring British colonies and protectorates and was not technically a part of the British Empire, although it was often treated as being so.

\(^{31}\) It is often the case that the boundaries of these colonies and protectorates do not directly correlate with the boundaries of the modern-day states which have succeeded them.
assertion is true, for Britain’s ‘unwilling... involvement in East Africa came through the actions of Germany’, who was securing its position of influence in certain parts of East Africa. Concerned with the potential economic gains to be made in the region, a British delegation persuaded the British Government to negotiate the said Agreement. Nevertheless, the British Government ‘was yet... reluctant to become too closely involved.’

This disinclination resulted in a paradoxical scenario for successive British Governments; they ‘were reluctant to spend money in acquiring new colonial possessions in Tropical Africa, but [they] were equally reluctant to leave the field entirely to other European powers.’ For the Government, the purpose of keeping a British presence in the area was because the Germans in East Africa were ‘too near to the Middle East and India shipping routes for Britain’s comfort.’

The founding of the East Africa Protectorate presents an example of one route taken by the British Government to circumvent this paradox. They granted a royal charter to a British company that was willing to exploit the economic potential of the land. Consequently, so the theory went, the British would remain the primary authority in the area, other European countries would be limited in their influence, and the British Government would get what it wanted whilst having to do precious little to achieve it. Thus, it came about that in 1888 The Imperial British East Africa Company was granted a royal charter by Queen Victoria and gained control of the land that would ultimately become Kenya and Uganda.

The potential flaws of such a scheme are clear, and in less than a decade the Imperial British East Africa Company became defunct. Poor fiscal management and personal infighting had led to its quick demise. In order to protect British interests in the region, the British Government proclaimed the Uganda Protectorate in 1894 and the East Africa Protectorate in 1895.

The British Government’s disinclination for the area did not undergo a reversal once it was under its formal control. On the contrary, its disinclination was to continue, for it saw these territories proclaimed not colonies but protectorates, and they were placed under the

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34 MacPhee. *Kenya*, p.34.
administration of the Foreign Office, not the Colonial. On this state of affairs, A. Marshall MacPhee summarised that:

‘British administration had, however, come to East Africa in name only. Some years were to pass before it was a reality and this tardiness of Britain in accepting her responsibilities was typical of the attitude that promoted her intervention in eastern Africa. Little interest continued to be shown in the acquisition of a territory which, in the British view, had always rested on strategic considerations and the need to preserve a dominant position in the Middle East. In 1895 Kenya was economically valueless and the British Government was in no hurry to cover the country with a network of administrative stations or to pour capital into its development.’

Nevertheless, British colonialism in East Africa steadily grew in both size and immigration numbers in the almost two decades that it existed between the proclamation of the protectorates and the outbreak of the First World War. Taking on the characteristics of colonies, administration was passed from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office in 1905, although these territories technically remained protectorates and not colonies.

The United Kingdom retained control of much of East Africa almost solely to prevent another European power from occupying the land, rather than out of any actual interest in developing or colonising it. In this respect, the British colonial occupation was a complete success; between the signing of the Anglo-German Partition of East Africa Agreement in November 1886 and the outbreak of the East African Campaign of the First World War in August 1914, Britain’s rights to the land were recognised internationally almost without dispute.

The Composition of the Population of the British Empire in East Africa

Whilst Britain’s rights to the land that formed its Empire in East Africa were recognised almost without dispute in the international sphere in the decades prior to the outbreak of
the First World War, the same cannot be said for the internal political sphere that existed in those lands; for the internal power structures that governed the population that lived on the land were not always favourable to the British. The power structures of the indigenous Africans, or of those immigrants who had preceded the Europeans to settle in East Africa, did not evaporate on the commencement of British colonial rule.

As the most bureaucratised British territory in the region, it is in the study of the population of the East Africa Protectorate where these internal relations can be best observed. On a basic level this population can be extrapolated out to cover the entirety of the British Empire in East Africa. The East Africa Protectorate’s population in the immediate pre-First World War era can be loosely broken down into four racial divisions in ascending size:

1. The Afrikaner ‘Boer’ Population
2. The European Population
3. The Indian Population
4. The African Population

*The Afrikaner ‘Boer’ Population*

Arriving in substantial numbers after 1906, Afrikaners (popularly known as Boers, but also known by the British as the Cape Dutch) migrated to the Protectorate from South Africa. After the British Empire’s victory in the Second Boer War of 1899-1902 there was some immigration away from South Africa in protest at it being British controlled. Much of it was directed towards South America, but a minority headed north across the African continent. Paradoxically, many of these Afrikaners decided to settle in the British controlled East Africa Protectorate, instead of the German controlled German East Africa, despite Germany having been sympathetic to the Afrikaner’s cause during the Second Boer War (although they officially remained neutral). This is only paradoxical at first glance, however. Brian Du Toit has written an explanation as to why a British administered territory proved to be so attractive to migrant Afrikaners who wished to leave a territory because it was administered by the British:
The East African region into which the early Afrikaner settlers moved was ill defined and only sporadically administered. The Germans were more structured in their administration and more strict; the British allowed a much greater degree of freedom and personal decisions about where and how settlers established themselves. In time the latter would prove more acceptable, even attractive, as settlers who had originally trekked into German East Africa moved across the border into what later became Kenya.  

The majority of the Afrikaners in East Africa eventually settled under British rule, although some remained living in German East Africa; something that was to be unfortunate for them when the British Empire invaded the German colony during the East African Campaign of the First World War.

The European Population

In 1902 a Crown Lands Ordinance was enacted in the East Africa Protectorate to encourage European, or, more specifically, white, immigration to make the Uganda Railway profitable and to expand farming in the highlands of the Protectorate, which had a climate that was considered suitable for Europeans to live and farm in.

The East Africa Protectorate had traditionally been seen as a gateway to the rich interior of Africa – in particular the Uganda Protectorate – rather than a destination in its own right; the Protectorate’s Administration was keen to change this perception by improving the freehold rights of the settlers. The improvement of these rights was somewhat limited; Karuti Kanyinga writes that the settlers argued that it ‘effectively treated the state as a landlord, in which case the settlers were to be subjected to strict state control.' Nevertheless, in pure immigration statistics the Crown Land Ordinance of 1902 had some

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38 The Imperial British East Africa Company had been occupied with building the Uganda Railway; the enormous financial liability passed to the British Government when the British Government took over the administration of the Protectorate from the Imperial British East African Company in 1895.

success in achieving its objectives. In 1903 the Protectorate had an approximate immigrant population of ‘450 Europeans and Eurasians’. By 1911 this had increased to an ‘estimated... 2,500 Europeans’, and within a few months of the outbreak of the First World War the white population had increased still further to 3,175.  

The bureaucratic apparatus of the Protectorate was drawn almost without exception from this tiny white population. Racism was at the core of the British Empire in East Africa. Sir Charles Eliot was the Commissioner (and later Commander-in-Chief and Consul-General) of the Protectorate from 1900-1904, and he was a firm believer in keeping this state of affairs continuing for as much of the foreseeable future as he could control. This belief was one of the prime motivators behind his enactment of the Crown Land Ordinance with its promotion of white settlement. His successors as Commissioner (and eventually Governor) before the First World War broadly agreed with his plan to establish the seeds of growth for subsequent generations of a large white population, but not everybody who was present in East Africa at this time was in full agreement that this plan was the best for the future of the Protectorate.

Captain Richard Meinertzhagen would go on to become one of the heads of the Intelligence Department of the British Empire’s East African Force during the First World War, but between 1902 and 1906 he was attached to the King’s African Rifles. He published his diaries from this period as Kenya Diary 1902-1906 in 1957, in which, in typical Meinertzhagen fashion, he did not hold back on expressing his feelings about the capability of the Commissioner. Eliot makes several appearances in Kenya Diary; not a man to miss a chance to make a cuttingly sharp remark when the opportunity presented itself, Meinertzhagen’s feelings towards the Commissioner can be summarised when he quipped that ‘never did a man more closely resemble to objects of his hobby. He is invertebrate, with an icy cold nature, unsympathetic, but a scholar of the first rank.’ Eliot’s ‘hobby’ – his work on which ‘won him universal recognition as a leading authority’ – was on ‘British nudibranchiate molluscs’: sea slugs. Meinertzhagen knew the Commissioner a little

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40 HC Deb (05 August 1903) Vol. 126, c. 1583; HC Deb (09 February 1911) Vol. 21, cc.431—2; HC Deb (14 April 1914) Vol. 61, cc. 33—136.
socially, and he recounted how the Commissioner batted aside the topic of the potential downfalls of his plan in a discussion on the topic in 1902:

‘He envisaged a thriving colony of thousands of Europeans with their families, the whole of the country from the Aberdares and Mount Kenya to the German border divided up into farms... the whole country... under white settlement. He intends to confine the natives to reserves and use them as cheap labour on farms. I suggested that the country belonged to Africans and that their interests must prevail over the interests of strangers. He would not have it; he kept on using the word “paramount” with reference to the claims of Europeans. I said that some day the African would be educated and armed; that would lead to a clash. Eliot thought that that day was so far distant as not to matter and that by that time the European element would be strong enough to look after themselves; but I am convinced that in the end the Africans will win and that Eliot’s policy can lead only to trouble and disappointment.’

The topic was revived at a dinner a couple of years later. Eliot admitted that even the Foreign Office in London thought that he was infringing on the rights of the Africans, so zealous was he in promoting white privilege within the Protectorate:

‘He tells me he is having a terrific row with the Foreign Office over white settlement and their ridiculous attitude over grants of land in the Kikuyu country, which they regarded as an infringement of native rights. Eliot hopes to attract thousands of Europeans to East Africa and does not appear to accept the fact that natives have any “rights.” I suggested that East Africa belonged to Africans and that we had no right to occupy any land which is tribal land. We should develop East Africa for the African and not for the strangers. I like Eliot, but after tonight I doubt if he likes me.’

In this era, the conclusions of the likes of Meinertzhagen, who himself was hardily known for being a champion of the African population – he referred to having ‘killed... niggers’ in his diaries – were not given much consideration by the British administration of the

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Protectorate. This was despite their reservations having been built on practical, rather than racial, reasons.45 This turned out to be a fallacy on their part; certainly during the First World War, but, more particularly, after the Second. Nevertheless, at the time of the outbreak of the First World War the tiny white population of the East Africa Protectorate controlled all of the major positions in the Administration of that Protectorate. By ensuring that there was a continued British presence in the area, their actions guaranteed that the absolute sovereignty of the British to the land in the international sphere was upheld.

The Indian Population

Despite the growth of the white population in the East Africa Protectorate, it was significantly outnumbered by another immigrant population; one which had had a presence in Eastern Africa for far longer than the Europeans: the Indians.

The Indian population of East Africa was well established by the outbreak of the First World War: ‘the Indians were clearly the most numerous and conspicuous immigrant community’ there.46 In addition to those Indians who had been arriving for centuries to trade, indentured servants had been recruited from India to build the Uganda Railway, and these servants made up a substantial proportion of the Indian population of the Protectorate by the time of the First World War. Gregory ‘recognises that “what proportion of the indentured servants stayed in East Africa has long been a matter of conjecture” because of incomplete and inaccurate documentation. However, from records kept of the [Indian] workers returning [to India] between 1896 and 1923, he estimates that of 39,771 who went to East Africa, 32,493 returned and around 7,278 (18.3 per cent) remained in East Africa.’47 This population was in addition to those Indians who inhabited Eastern Africa but were not indentured servants. ‘Coupland notes that by [1856] on the mainland, “Each Arab coast

town had its little group of Indian traders.”\(^{48}\) These traders were later joined by their families and friends and some moved into the interior, so that in time ‘They monopolized the business life of the towns and acquired ownership of almost all the municipal land.’\(^{49}\)

It is therefore difficult to say with any accuracy how many Indians were living in the Protectorate during the years of, and immediately prior to, the First World War. Lord Harcourt (then Mr Harcourt), the Secretary of State for the Colonies between November 1910 and May 1915, gave the population of ‘Asiatics’ resident there in 1911 as 11,886, but provided no breakdown as to the nationalities of these Asians.\(^{50}\) The Naval Staff Intelligence Department wrote that in 1912 ‘the majority’ of the ‘non-native’ non-European population ‘were British Indians, but Coanese [sic: should read Goanese], Arabs, and natives of the Levant [were] also numerous’; these nationalities presumably are those referred to as ‘Asiatics.’\(^{51}\) The India Office remained engaged with the Indian population in East Africa, and continued to concern themselves in their affairs.\(^{52}\)

Indians outside of commerce and indentured servitude were ‘largely employed on the Railways and in the Telegraphic and Postal Services’\(^{53}\). They also held other posts within the Protectorate; when the East African Rifles was established by the British Imperial Government as a military force in 1895 300 Indian soldiers were recruited from the Punjab. Indians thus represented 3/7 – nearly 43 per cent - of this force when it originated.\(^{54}\) Hence, despite being unable to take on the administrative roles that were reserved for the white population, the Indian population had a large amount of influence on the running of the Protectorate through their various employments.

This influence was recognised by the European population and tension built between the two communities in the decade leading to 1914.\(^{55}\) In summary, the Indian population was


\(^{49}\) Gregory. *India*, p.62.

\(^{50}\) HC Deb (16 April 1914) Vol 61, c.313.


\(^{52}\) See, for example, Gregory. *India*, pp.91—94.


\(^{54}\) Gregory. *India*, pp.118—119.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., pp.79—95.
oppressed within the non-African community, and prevented from areas and occupations on a racial basis:

‘Indians were not nominated to important bodies... The pattern of European privilege in the central government was repeated at the municipal level. Socially, Indians were subject to a colour bar that denied them access to first-class hotels, restaurants, clubs, and resorts... The colour bar extended to the civil service, police, and military organizations in that Indians were never appointed to higher posts.’56

The result of this tension was the creation of the East African Indian National Congress, which had amongst its grievances the discrimination of Indians by the European population. Unsurprisingly, the Indian seditionist movement surfaced in the British Empire in East Africa.

It is not the purpose of this thesis to give an in-depth analysis of the Indian independence movement in East Africa during the First World War, and it would be difficult if it were, for there has been little scholarly attention paid to Indian seditionists in this region. This lack of scholarly attention is not an isolated case; there has been little scholarly work on Indian seditionists outside of India in general. Fischer-Tiné writes that:

‘The radical wing of the Indian independence movement [popularly known as... “seditionists...” among British officials] in the first two decades of the twentieth century is an excellent example of the multilayered [sic] and multifaceted global entanglements of nationalist projects. Nevertheless, not many historians have widened the lens beyond the geographical bounds of India and looked at intercontinental connections in their attempt adequately to explain both the political strategies and the ideological contents of Indian nationalism in this crucial phase.’57

Although the Indian independence movement is not directly relevant to this thesis, that the Indian population of the East Africa Protectorate, and East Africa more generally, were not disposed upon to always view the British Empire with a friendly eye plays into the larger narrative of this thesis; that the population of the British Empire itself was partly responsible

56 Ibid., p.89.
for threatening the security of that Empire in East Africa with Pan-Islamism. Threats to the security of the British Empire lay just as much within its borders as they did outside of them.

*The African Population*

The Afrikaner and white immigrant populations were significantly outnumbered by the Indian immigrant population, but the entire immigrant population was dwarfed by the indigenous African population. The East Africa Protectorate had an estimated population of 2,765,000 in 1911, and of that the white and Indian (‘Asiatics’) populations accounted for only 3,175 and 11,886 respectively. The African population could occupy some roles in the King’s African Rifles and in the Police Force, but, despite comprising almost the entire population of the Protectorate, they had only a very limited role in the formal colonial administration.

The African population primarily lived in, and thus was governed by, tribes. Taking its queue from the indifference of the British Imperial Government towards its empire in East Africa, the Administration of the East Africa Protectorate had neither the inclination nor the personnel to change this status quo. Therefore, despite them having colonised the land, many East Africans had little regular contact with the British colonisers.

This position was a matter of pride for some of the British. Eliot later wrote that as long as the African tribes realised that the white man was superior, which, in his view, every tribe did or would do, there was little need for the British Empire to have a larger presence in their lives, and therefore there was little need for a more comprehensive system of governance in East Africa:

‘In the relation of European and African tribes, it is not true that familiarity breeds contempt. The hostile natives are almost invariably those who know nothing about Europeans, and kill some stragglers out of mere bravado. With the possible exception of the Somalis, who cannot be classed as ordinary African natives, every tribe appears to accept the white man as a superior and not unfriendly creature the

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58 HC Deb (16 April 1914) Vol 61, c.313.
moment he appears as the representative of regular government, and it is surprising how small a force of police is sufficient to support our authority.’

Yet the idea of docile Africans as endorsed by the likes of Eliot is a fake. A brief look at the history of the East African Police Force, as noted by Eliot in his recollections, proves this contrary narrative to be the truth.

David M. Anderson has examined the widespread offence of cattle theft by the African population towards the European farmer settler-colonisers. Whilst a minor grievance, this account proposes that the Africans living on their tribal reserves were not only not cowed by the British Empire, but that they had learnt to play the British governance at their own game. The British Empire relied on the tribal Chief to organise an effective tribal police force and mediate between the two groups; something that they were not always inclined to do:

‘Unfortunately, criminals did not always restrict their activities to the jurisdiction of a single police force. Indeed, many of the most prevalent forms of crime were committed against the property of Europeans in the ‘White Highlands’, by persons who then fled to the Native Reserves. In these circumstances the Kenya Police could not normally pursue the fugitive beyond the limits of their jurisdiction except when in ‘hot pursuit’, and so had to hand the case over to the DC [District Commissioner], or chief, and the Tribal Chief. While there was usually no lack of co-operation from the DC in such circumstances, the response of an African chief was often more fickle.’

Aside from just a perfectly natural dislike of being colonised, there was a second reason for why African tribes did not exist in a perfect state of submission to their colonisers, no matter what colonisers such as Eliot chose to believe; many of them lived under two colonial powers. Some even lived under multiple. Resulting as a consequence of the lines that had been unilaterally drawn on the map of Africa by Europeans in Europe during the Scramble for Africa in the Nineteenth Century, such tribes were by no means uncommon in European colonies. The Wayao and Wangoni tribes, for example, mutually had significant

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59 Eliot, Sir Charles. The East African Protectorate (London; Edward Arnold, 1905), p.188.
parts of their tribes living in both German East Africa and in Portuguese administrated Nyasaland, whilst the Manyema tribe was ‘[a] Congo tribe, from which colonies have been founded in many parts of German East Africa.’ The British considered the Wanyamwezi tribe to be ‘great wanderers [who were] to be found on the Coast and in all sorts of employment throughout German and British East Africa.’ Some border tribes supported one coloniser over another; the Wasukuma tribe, for example, were stated to be ‘a powerful tribe [who were] a constant source of anxiety to the Germans’ and who were ‘reported to have [had] a distinct leaning towards the British.’ Hence, even if one were to support Eliot’s flawed notion that ‘every tribe [accepted] the white man as a superior and not unfriendly creature the moment he [appeared] as the representative of regular government’, the facts do not support any notion that the loyalties of Africans living in border tribes accepted each white ‘regular government’ representative equally. The information that the African population of the British Empire in East Africa could be a threat to the security of that empire were there from the beginning.

In this time era, the African population did not have the agency to take on the might of the British Empire; they did not have the agency to expel the coloniser. Yet this does not mean that they were ever accepting of it. As seen with the example of cattle rustling, minor acts of rebellion were common place. Although Jeff Haynes stated in The Encyclopaedia of African History, Volume III, that African Muslims ‘gradually... came to accept European rule,’ over the course of the first half of the Twentieth Century, this is simply not true; not staging a successful revolution is not the same as accepting colonial rule, especially when the adversary was a global superpower. As stated in the Introduction, revolt did occur: ‘in most of Africa, the early colonial period... was characterized by intermittent rebellions, revolts, and uprisings against the newly established colonial state.’ But not accepting European colonial rule was also a state of mind. East Africans were not on the whole docile

61 TNA: CAB 45/12: The Intelligence Department, British East Africa. Intelligence Notes on British and German East Africa. December 1915, pp.112—115.
and in possession of only a ‘simple... character’; they were humans, with human thoughts and human desires.\textsuperscript{64}

But the likes of Eliot could sell themselves this fantasy for one particular reason; the tribes were not themselves cohesive. The British studied the tribes, and in one such publication they confidently stated that ‘the tribes will not combine’ and were ‘loathe to leave their own tribal territory.’\textsuperscript{65} The East Africa Protectorate was not an African construction; the different tribes that found themselves living in the Protectorate did not have any special loyalty to one another. The same is true for the Uganda Protectorate, or any number of other British imperial territories in the region. Despite vastly outnumbering the immigrant population, the African population of East Africa had little to bring it together. Thus, despite colonial grievances, they could not unite to oppose the colonisers. When added to the reality that they had not the agency to expel the might of the British Empire, this lack of cohesiveness allowed the British to rule its Empire in East Africa in the years prior to the East African Campaign of the First World War with a very small white administration, without any sincere fear of their imperial security being threatened by Africans.

Conclusion

Having never previously received any serious challenges to the land from any other colonial power and having never previously received any serious challenges to the power to administer it from the population that lived on the land, the British Empire was to enter the Great War in East Africa in a naïve manner. Their belief that neither of these two conditions would change was shattered. They were forced to grapple with credible threats to the security of the British Empire in East Africa. Having made little provision, preventing these threats from threatening British imperial security was to become a focus for the British during the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War.

\textsuperscript{64} TNA: KV 1/16: Notley. ‘Appendix M.’, p.141.
\textsuperscript{65} TNA: WO 287/18: The Intelligence Department, British East Africa. \textit{Intelligence Notes on British and German East Africa}. March 1916, p.143.
Chapter Two Power: The Islamic World of 1914

When Vasco da Gama and his crew arrived in East Africa in the spring of 1498 they experienced ‘astonishment’ at the ‘wealth and architectural magnificence of the trading cities of the Swahili coast’; their ‘astonishment’ was ‘mixed with avarice.’ 

Traders from across the Indian Ocean had been arriving on the shores of Eastern Africa to exchange goods since well before the time of Christ. Favourable monsoon winds had been utilised by many traders across the ages, so that those living on the coast in Eastern Africa had traded with merchants from across the Indian Ocean; from as far afield as the Indian subcontinent, Assyria, China, and the Arabian Peninsula.

It was to this culture that the Europeans first arrived at the end of the Fifteenth Century; a highly complex society which had existed for millennia. The arrival of widescale European colonialism in the late Nineteenth Century was to change this culture irrevocably. Islam, a major religion on these trading routes, was to be a recipient of this change.

The Swahili people lived (and continue to live in large numbers) along the Eastern African coast and have traditionally been adherents of the Islamic faith. The first recorded Muslims to arrive in East Africa were two brothers from Oman, Suleiman and Said, in the Seventh Century. They were in due course followed by other Muslims. Many of these early arrivals were fleeing from persecution on the Arabian Peninsula, and so the settlements founded on the eastern coast of Africa ‘became more and more Arab in character’; the years between 975 and 1498 ‘is often called the time of the Zenj empire [sic]’ and was a period of Arab settlement in this area. The Swahili people spoke (and continue to speak) Swahili (a Bantu language with significant Arab vocabulary) and practised (and continue to practise) Sunni Islam. Their trade traditionally focussed upon ivory, slaves, and spices. However, except for when it served the purposes of this trade to travel there via a caravan, they ‘were not to be found in the [African] interior.’ Despite the rich trade that was occurring on the coast, the

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interior therefore remained almost entirely devoid of Islamic influences until the Nineteenth Century.\textsuperscript{67}

The entry of the European empires into the East African region was to fundamentally change the local power structures. A consequence of these changes was that Islam spread rapidly away from the coast to people who had been virtually untouched by any previous Islamic influence. By its promotion of Islam this transformation paved the way for Pan-Islamism to threaten the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War.

Entry into the Interior

After becoming the ruler of Oman in 1804, Seyyid Said turned his attention to consolidating his possessions on the Eastern African coast, which by this date were nominally ruled by the Sultan of Oman for various geopolitical reasons, but in actuality were almost independent. As well as reinforcing his rule by forming an alliance with the British Empire, Said considerably increased the trade, and the subsequent profit, that passed through East Africa. However, similarly to the previous Islamic settlers, he had little interest in the land beyond the coast except for when it directly impacted upon his trade. While caravans did enter the interior under his flag, after his death it was ‘[hard] to define the lands over which he [had] ruled’.\textsuperscript{68} No real attempt was made to export Islam into the heart of Eastern Africa; ‘the Koran… positively forbade any Muslim to enslave another’, and since much of their trade rested on slavery, it would have been counterproductive (from an economic, rather than a missionary, viewpoint) for Said and his fellow merchants to have spread Islam too far amongst the African people.\textsuperscript{69} Islam was therefore seen to be the religion of the coastal

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., p.24.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., p.26. Said and his fellow slave traders were perhaps fortunate that under Islamic law one is not bound to free a slave who later converts to Islam. Nevertheless, eventually freeing slaves who converted to Islam was considered a good thing to do; paradoxically this humanity resulted in the need to capture more slaves to replace those who had been freed, which further helped to increase the profits of Said and his many contemporaries. However, it would be unfair to paint Said and his peers in too bad a light relative to their peers in this regard. Montgomery Watt, William. \textit{A Short History of Islam} (Oxford; Oneworld Publications, 1996), p.86, writes that for expeditions and jihads embarked upon since the time after Mohammad’s death,
elites. The slave trade grew under Said’s rule and the results of this trade on the interior were ‘catastrophic.’

The Slave Trade Act passed through the Parliament of the United Kingdom in 1807. It outlawed the trade, although not the practise, of slavery within the British Empire. It was followed in 1833 by the Slavery Abolition Act, which outlawed the practise of slavery within the British Empire, with some exceptions. Although not subjected to it, the strength of the Royal Navy in enforcing blockades was to have a significant impact upon the slave trades enacted under the flags of other nations. In time, the Eastern Slave Trade, also known as the Arab Slave Trade, was massively curtailed, and large parts of East Africa were to become free of slavery. Slavery as an important part of Swahili trading culture largely disappeared.

There was thus no more an economic hinderance to the conversion of Muslims in the interior of East Africa, but there was an economic hinderance to the cessation of the Eastern Slave Trade. Consequently, larger caravans entered the interior to conduct trade of the non-human variety. These two events were amongst the most important changes which occurred in East African trading culture during the Nineteenth Century; both were to precipitate the rapid spread of Islam amongst the population.

‘Islam’, writes David C. Sperling, ‘was an entirely urban phenomenon [in the early Nineteenth Century in East Africa], and the very process of Islamization was centred on the towns – what we might call “urban Islamization.”’ Urban Islamization increased in the early Nineteenth Century, as the start of the documented spread of Islam in what would become European colonial lands began slowly, but in earnest:

‘The presence of Muslims in rural areas thus grew in several ways: the emigration of Muslims from established towns to found new rural settlements; greater initiative on the part of Muslim traders, who began to frequent and in some cases even settle in the rural hinterland; and the general expansion of agriculture by Muslims into areas that bordered on or intermingled with non-Muslim peoples… Thus, the

while undertaken to ‘gain booty or to extend the territory under Islamic rule’, the ‘Conversion of the heathen was not a prominent aim.’

70 See, amongst others: Marsh. Kingsnorth. An Introduction, Chapters II and III.
number of non-Muslim Africans adopting Islam may have been increasing, but most of these would have still gravitated to urban life. In spite of closer and more frequent contact between Muslims and non-Muslims, there is little evidence that Islam had begun to take hold among peoples in the rural hinterland before the second half of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{72}

Sperling continues by reminding us that ‘Because of the limitation of our sources and consequent lack of knowledge, the history of Islam [in East Africa] necessarily lies hidden behind the secular and commercial activities whose details are so much better known.’\textsuperscript{73} Recorded history has not thoroughly recorded this history; yet, it is possible to reconstruct enough of it to partially understand Islam’s spread throughout East Africa. In particular, the creation of “Rural Islamization” was a ‘significant turning point’ in this narrative:

‘By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, there is evidence that some non-Muslim Africans had adopted Islam and continued to reside in their rural villages – the beginnings of what we might call “rural Islamization.” This change marked a significant turning point in the spread of Islam. Previously, the emigration of Islamized Africans away from their own people to settle in Muslim towns had removed elements that might otherwise have proved innovative, if not disruptive, to their own societies. Now, the presence of indigenous African Muslims in rural villages created new circumstances and the potential for change.’

There were a couple of reasons behind the growth of “rural Islamization” in East Africa. One cause was ‘remigration’; the ‘return of Muslim Africans from residence in towns to their original rural homes.’\textsuperscript{74} ‘The British”, writes Sperling, ‘unintentionally fostered the spread of Islam’:

‘Initially, the process of establishing and consolidating colonial rule, in British East Africa and German East Africa, offered Muslims an unprecedented occasion for expansion throughout the interior. The military conquest preceding the establishment of colonial rule was carried out in large part by Muslim soldiers, many of whom were then stationed in the new administrative centers they helped to

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., pp.280—281.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p.289.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p.281.
create... During the early years of colonial administration, both the British and the Germans relied on Muslims to occupy key positions as chiefs, headmen, clerks, and tax collectors... Colonial governments also founded new administrative centres in the interior in places untouched by the earlier caravan trade... Thus, communities of immigrant Muslims came to live and settle in areas that had previously been closed, unsafe, or only partially accessible to Muslims, and in the midst of non-Muslim societies with little or no previous exposure to Islam.'

Zoë Marsh and G.W. Kingsnorth agree with the assessment that ‘both the British and the German relied on Muslims to occupy key positions’, but their notion of ‘key positions’ (or ‘openings’, as they define it) varies slightly. Amongst the positions they list are: ‘troops, traders, skilled craftsmen, interpreters and domestic servants etc.’; key positions for everyday life for the new colonial administration. Along with Muslims from the coastal regions, Muslims from India came to fulfil some of these new positions, as examined in Chapter One.

That they had precipitated the spread of Islam in East Africa resulted in a rather ironic situation for the Europeans. For they who so often used the notion of Christian missionary to justify their imperial ambitions were a major contributor to the spread of Islam, and ‘[by] the time of the First World War, Muslim communities existed in or near most colonial administrative centres’ in the region.

The British Construction of East African Islam

The officials of the French Empire developed a narrative that segregated Islamic groups along racial lines. The various works on this topic cumulated in the writings of Paul Marty, who published several books on this topic between 1916 and 1930. In this French understanding, Islam bidan (white Islam) and Islam maure (Moorish Islam) were separated from Islam noir (black Islam), which was regarded as a mix of pure Arab Islam and African

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75 Ibid., pp.294—295.
77 Sperling, ‘Coast’, p.296.
beliefs and traditions. Although the British Empire ‘never enunciated a doctrine as elaborate as the French’, Felicitas Becker argues that ‘their view of African Muslims was quite similar.’

The British construction of East African Muslims must be located within the imperial specificities of East Africa itself. Becker writes that ‘The internal diversity of Islam in East Africa, already evident at the onset of European rule, increased further in the colonial period’ and ‘The intensity of this dialogue within coastal society and with the African mainland helps explain the absence of a concerted response, in the name of Islam, to imperial encroachment.’ This ‘internal diversity’ consisted not only of the differences between rural and urban Muslims, but also amongst the urban Muslims of the coast. Due to the geopolitical events concerning Said in East Africa, there was some immigration from Oman into the region during the Nineteenth Century. Randhall L. Pouwels writes that as a result there were ‘differences in outlook’ amongst the coastal Muslims, and ‘a deeper rift in religious authority [that] stemmed from the overall political, social, and economic gains made by Arab newcomers in the nineteenth century.’

This lack of cohesiveness was mirrored on the side of the imperialists, for ‘representatives of European imperial interests had been on the scene for some decades before [1890], expressing widely divergent stances on Islam.’ This ‘disunity lived on in the diversity of opinions concerning how best to relate to Islam that prevailed among Europeans in the early colonial period. Colonial officialdom, missionaries, and government experts debated the merits and problems of Islamic influence without getting close to consensus.’

A debate initiated by Isaac Taylor, the Canon of York, in October 1887 between Islamicists and missionaries highlighted what was at the crux of much of this disunity: racial theory. In this era ‘race had an important place in debates in anthropological and scientific circles and had long been associated with ideas of ‘scientific racism’ based upon notions of biological hierarchies between racial types analogous to those between different biological species.’

Taylor’s argument was that Islam ‘though quite unfitted for the higher races... is eminently adapted to be a civilizing and elevating religion for barbarous tribes’ for whom ‘Christianity is too spiritual, too lofty.’ The response of the missionaries was no less racist. Malcolm McColl ‘disputed Taylor’s view of Islam as appropriate to the “child-like” African mind by offering a counter-metaphor: “A child will develop into a man. But an adult man, deprived of arms and legs, is not in a process of development”.' The argument was not over whether racial theory was correct, but in what exact form it took.

It was against this background that the officials of the British Empire constructed their view of Islam in East Africa. These officials ‘took some pains to cultivate amicable relations with the [coastal] elites freshly displaced from political power’ for they, along with the Germans, held ‘the default assumption that Muslim religious and political representatives of coastal milieus made better intermediaries than other Africans... (in keeping with many coastal notables’ view of themselves as unrelated to ‘mainland’ Africans, than ‘Africans’). They considered Muslim patricians the most ‘civilized’ part of the population’.

This did not include the Islam noir population. Whilst this was partly to do with the Arab ancestry of the coastal Muslims, ‘Part of the explanation lies in a view of African Muslims, especially recent converts, as ‘not really’ Muslims, and, in particular, largely untouched by the doctrines of jihad’. Consequently, ‘British officials and their coastal Muslim intermediaries jointly elaborated notions of Muslim separateness, while largely ignoring, as inauthentic and politically irrelevant, those Muslims who were undeniably African.’

This separateness was so entrenched that it continued until well past the end of the Second World War. J.K. Leslie ‘deemed the majority of African Muslims in [Dar es Salaam] “fundamentally irreligious”’ in 1963; Felicitas Becker contends that this ‘contrasts sharply with oral recollections of Sufi activity in late-colonial Dar.’ W. Montgomery Watt wrote further in 1966 that Islam in the then modern-day East Africa ‘is by no means monolithic’

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84 Ibid., pp.61—62.
86 Ibid., p.119
and that ‘from the political point of view’ the ideological differences which separated different Islamic sects ‘are less important than the racial ones.’

There were varied reasons for why the British and the French Empires believed the African Muslims to not be real followers of the faith of Islam. In addition to the racial arguments about whether African people were mentally proficient enough to fully understand religion, as argued by the likes of Taylor and McColl, they stemmed from arguments for their conversion. Paul Marty himself believed in a mix of reasons: that conversion was ‘out of snobbery’; that certain people ‘suffer from a need to believe’ and Islam was merely a convenient faith; or, for traders, conversion was simply for the ‘sheer practicality’ that Islam sometimes provided on trading routes. Becker argues that conversion sometimes took place because the converts wished to improve their social standing:

‘Marginal townspeople, including advantageously placed slaves, were also experimenting with Islamic identities. In a context of sometimes extreme social mobility, Islam was for established patricians an issue of hierarchy, while for the “plebeians”, as Jonathan Glassman has called them, it was about entitlement. It enabled these “plebeians” to challenge their ascribed marginality.’

The conversion of East Africans to Islam was not usually judged by the Europeans to be because of a profound belief in, and understanding of, the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed.

Although these ideas were based on racist tropes, they do not appear to have been entirely without foundation. In 1919 the Admiralty’s Intelligence Department wrote that Christianity

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89 Islam had been the faith of rich and powerful coastal men like Said. After the abolition of slavery on the island of Zanzibar in 1897, many of the former slaves ‘(redefined) themselves as... a freeborn Muslim’, as stated in Fair, Laura. ‘Identity, Difference, and Dance: Female Initiation in Zanzibar, 1890 to 1930’, *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies*, 17 (1996), p.150.

One Kenyan Muslim, examined in Schacht, Joseph. ‘Notes on Islam in East Africa’, *Studia Islamica*, 23 (1965), p.102, seems to have concurred with Marty’s view several decades after the end of the Great War. He wrote that ‘African Muslims were much concerned with “face”’; they would collect funds to build a Mosque much larger than the possible number of worshippers warranted.’ Harrison, Christopher. *France and Islam in West Africa, 1860-1960* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.130.

and Islam in Africa were ‘important rather as social influences than as creeds, and from this point of view Mohammedanism especially is a strong force’. In particular regard to Islam noir, the Admiralty’s Intelligence Department described their perceptions of the piety of religion by black Africans by stating that ‘A belief in witchcraft and much primitive animism and magic is still widely spread among the natives [of the East Africa Protectorate] in spite of the spread of Christianity and Islam’. They continued: ‘The negroid type of Mohammedanism, which is followed by the Swahili and the tribes under their influence, embodies many heathen practices, for example the initiation ceremonies and dances’.91

As the British construction of Islam in East Africa was based upon the social, scientific, and religious arguments then prevalent in the United Kingdom, the prism through which they understood African Islam was through that of the European Christian gaze. Frank Schildknecht reminds his readers that ‘[t]he concept of conversion in Islam is also different from that of Christianity.’ This is a crucial point, because the Christian Europeans viewed religious conversion differently to that of the converting African. Schildknecht states that:

‘In Christianity it is (as a first step) an aversion from something accepted, and thus a full change of life which brings about a complete change of outlook, a break with the past and a kind of disintegration from, for example, the convert’s tribal society... [therefore] In this instance, for Christians, the notion of natural law was forgotten. Everything African was “pagan,” hence the necessary “aversion” towards the past which was asked of a prospective convert.’

This was different to Islam:

‘Islam does not know, at least not in theory, such a dichotomy. African custom is accepted, and a convert to Islam may continue in his former tribal life as before, taking part in all ritual functions and believing in them virtually as before. Therefore, according to the Christian notion, no real conversion takes place.’92

This different view of religious conversion made it possible in East Africa for the spread of Islam to occur amongst a tribal system without Islam bringing it down, something

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91 BL: IOR/L/MIL/17/17/5: Naval Staff Intelligence Department. East Africa Protectorate (India Office, Military Records, March 1919), pp.33—34.
impossible from the European gaze. The new Muslims of East Africa were therefore adherents of the Islamic faith, whilst also remaining part of tribal life, with all that that brought with it.

By viewing everything through a European and imperialist lens, the British construction of East African Islam was flawed at its centre. The British did not attempt to understand how East African Muslims viewed their religion, dismissing them casually as barely worth the title of Muslim. By failing to understand them, the British were left with a limited ability to exert imperial control over them.

Politico-Administrative vs. Religious Power

By the time of the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 many of the world’s Muslims lived in lands that were ruled under the banners of the Entente Empires: The United Kingdom, Russia, and France. These three countries had quite different political systems: the U.K. had a Liberal Government under a constitutional monarch, Russia had an autocratic tsar, and France had the Third Republic. In common they each had a society which was broadly Christian in nature; a Christian society which was officially recognised in law by the former two countries and, despite the introduction of Laïcité in 1905, continued to exist in the latter. Therefore, under Islamic law all three of these Entente Empires were considered non-Islamic, or infidel.

Islamic law, also known as Sharia Law, governs numerous areas of life for Islamic believers: marriage, hygiene, inheritance, and food are some examples of the differing spheres of interests that are covered by religious legislation. However, there is little in the Quran, or in the six canonical books of the Hadiths, about how political governance ought to be structured. Hence, it is possible for Muslims to live under diverse types of political governance – from autocratic regimes to democratic governments – without technically breaking any Quranic teachings, and although some ‘conservative jurists claim a right to debate whether new laws are in accordance with’ Sharia Law, ‘statesmen are unwilling to concede this.’ 103 Therefore, in this regard it is not against Islamic law for Muslims to live

under an imperial style of governance, such as they did within the British Empire in 1914. The United Kingdom, thus, held the politico-administrative power over the Muslim inhabitants of the British Empire.

Despite the lack of instruction in the Quran or the Hadiths about how political governance ought to be structured, there are verses within the Quran which strongly imply that Muslims should not live under non-Islamic, or infidel, rule. For example, verse 61:9 of the Quran states that ‘It is He who sent His Messenger with guidance and the religion of truth to manifest it over all religion, although those who associate others with Allāh dislike it.’ A few verses before, in 61:4, it is written that ‘Indeed, Allāh loves those who fight in His cause in a row as though they are a (single) structure joined firmly.’\textsuperscript{104} These verses, amongst others, have been interpreted by some, but by no means all, to mean that Muslims should fight, perhaps physically, against non-Islamic rulers. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was one such person; he ‘was troubled by his experiences in British India, where Muslims were ruled by non-Muslims… in his view [Muslims] should only be governed by the faithful’, and he was not content to keep his views to himself.\textsuperscript{105}

Whilst the United Kingdom, Russia, and France, along with the other European empires that had Muslim inhabitants, including the Dutch and the German Empires, held the politico-administrative power over a substantial majority of the world’s Muslims, they did not hold the religious power.

There had been some attempt, notably by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, to change this and allow the European colonialists to assume at least some of the religious, as well as the politico-administrative, power over the Muslims of their empires. On an 1898 voyage to the Holy Land, Kaiser Wilhelm ‘described himself to great public effect as the “friend” of the

\textsuperscript{104} The Qu’rān: 61:2; 61:4; 61:10—12. Trans. by Al-Muntada Al-Islam (Jeddah; Abul-Qasim Publishing House, 2011), pp.566—567. This is followed, in verses 61:10—12 with ‘O You who have believed, shall I guide you to a transaction that will save you from a painful punishment? [It is that] you believe in Allāh and His Messenger and strive in the cause of Allāh with you wealthy and you lives. That is best for you, if you only knew. He will forgive for you your sins and admit you to garden of perpetual residence/ that is the great attainment.’ Some interpret that this verse says that Muslims should physically fight against non-believers, and in doing so they will gain heavenly rewards.

“300 million Mohammedans”.

This image lasted some time, with the idea that the Kaiser had actually converted sometimes added for additional effect. Wilhelm Wassmuss, a German diplomat and spy, told Muslims on the Persian Gulf in 1915 that ‘the German Emperor had himself embraced their faith, and [had] ordered all his subjects to do likewise. The Emperor, he added, had even made a secret pilgrimage to Mecca, thereby entitling him to wear the sacred green turban, and to adopt the name “Haji” Wilhelm Mohammed.’

However fanciful as this may seem in hindsight, Jacob M. Landau reminds his readers that what Kaiser Wilhelm thought and did, and what others believed Kaiser Wilhelm was thinking and doing, mattered; unlike his relations in the United Kingdom, he ‘did not just reign, but ruled, participating actively in major policy decisions, including military ones. Hence his attitude to Pan-Islam had an impact.’

Nor was the Kaiser alone in his attempts to woo the Islamic world. As will be examined in Chapter Seven, the British admitted privately in 1917 that they had also attempted ‘to pose as a great Mohammedan power’ before the First World War. However, this policy had been ‘found wanting, partly from the inconsistency naturally inherent in a Christian Power posing as a Mohammedan, and partly from the ineptitude of the results obtained.’ It was consequently dropped when the British cultivated their strength in the Islamic world as a method of trying to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War.

Despite the attempts of some of the European colonial powers to gain the religious control of their empire’s Muslims, by the time of the First World War none of them were able to legitimately claim that they held both the religious and the politico-administrative power over the Muslims who resided within their empires.

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By the end of the Nineteenth Century the Ottoman Caliphate was one of the few Muslim states that had not been colonised. The Caliph of the Ottoman Empire, who, naturally, was loyal to no empire but his own, claimed the religious authority over the world’s Muslims; yet this claim to religious authority was by no means uncontested.

The noun *Caliph* is usually taken to refer to the person who is considered by Muslims to be their chief religious and civil leader on Earth; the successor to the Prophet Mohammad (although the Caliph is not himself, for it is always a man, considered to be a Prophet). The noun *Caliphate* can refer either to the rule of a certain Caliph (or occasionally groups of Caliphs, such as with the Rashidun Caliphate) or the area ruled by that Caliph during his reign (the Ottoman Caliphate, for example). However, because the *Quran* lacks reference on how political governance had ought to be structured, furthered by the differences between the two main Islamic branches, the Shias and the Sunnis, agreeing on who possesses the legitimate right to the position of Caliph has proved impossible across the Islamic world. 110

Followers of the religion of Islam have failed to unify behind one earthly leader since the time of the Prophet Mohammad. In the Tenth Century, for example, three men claimed to be the Caliph, reigning at Baghdad, Cairoan, and Cordova respectively. This ‘Triple Division of the Caliphate’ agreed on only two points: that they should all ‘[excommunicate] each other’, and ‘that a sectary is more odious and criminal than an unbeliever.’ 111 By 1914, therefore, the Islamic world had been tearing itself apart over who was the true Caliph, and where the seat of the Caliphate ought to be located, for about as long as there had been an Islamic world. The British Empire held the politico-administrative power over the Muslim inhabitants of its Empire at the start of the First World War, but there was no conclusive

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110 Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds briefly explain the difference in the introduction to their book *God’s Caliph: Religious authority in the first centuries of Islam*. Sunni Muslims believe that while political power over Muslims is held by the current Caliph, religious authority remains with the Prophet Mohammad – Muslims should thus continue to look to Mohammad’s teachings for their religious guidance. Shia Muslims believe that both the political and religious power passed from Mohammad to the Caliph on Mohammad’s death. Crone, Patricia. Hinds, Martin. *God’s Caliph: Religious authority in the first centuries of Islam* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.1—3.

agreement on who held the religious power over them. The only thing that everybody would have agreed on was that the British did not.

Conclusion

The French Empire in Africa was predominantly located in the west of the continent. Although Marty’s works were published after the start of the First World War, the ideas behind the concept of Islam noir had been present within the academic community of the L’Afrique Occidentale française (A.-O. F.) for some years.\textsuperscript{112} Islam in West Africa had a different history to that of East Africa; Becker has made the argument that the lack of jihad in the latter as opposed to the former was due to the differing social constructions found in each:

‘The apparent contrast between East Africa and North and West Africa, where armed resistance to European rule under the banner of Islam occurred frequently, therefore does not point to an explicitly different interpretation of legal rules on jihad or Muslim-Christian relations. Rather, it is indicative of the way Islam in East Africa was interwoven with a long-standing practice of exchange in the Indian Oceans setting. These antecedents combined with the social tensions among the region’s Muslims to ensure that the European imperial challenge did not unite them.’

This phenomenon was not confined only to Islam, she continued; social construction in East Africa more widely had developed to naturally reduce conflict:

‘The intensity of this dialogue [between the different Islamic denominations] within coastal society and with the African mainland helps explain the absence of a concerted response, in the name of Islam, to imperial encroachment. But it was not just coastal Islam that was “pacific”, but rather coastal society, which had long

\textsuperscript{112} Harrison. \textit{France}, pp.94—117.
thrived on minimizing conflict with both African mainlanders and overseas contacts in the pursuit of exchange.’

Whilst Becker’s argument stands up to research it is not comprehensive, for it does not analyse the impact that the enormous social changes that took place in East Africa in the early colonial era had on the East African experience of the East African Campaign of the First World War. The notion that adherents of Islam across the African continent, and the world, acted as a single group is one of the major flaws in the historical research that has been conducted on Pan-Islamism and jihadism in the First World War. For by the time of the First World War these new Muslims of East Africa were changing the traditionally established divide in Africa; far from being ‘interwoven with a long-standing practice of exchange in the Indian Ocean setting’, many of these Muslims would have had little to no traditional contact with these trading routes. To write about the Muslims of East Africa as if they remained a homogenous group allows one to present only a partial analysis.

The history of the interaction between Islam and European imperialism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries is greater than can be fully examined here. Concisely, it emerges that the potential for Islam to present a cause by which the East African population could challenge imperial rule was ignored by the British Empire precisely because they believed that most of these recent Muslim converts were simply not learned enough to understand complex theological doctrines such as jihad, and that the ‘pacific… coastal society, which had long thrived on minimizing conflict… in the pursuit of exchange’, would continue to prevent responses similar to those that had occurred in Western Africa and the A.-O. F.

Yet whilst the British Empire confidently wrote in 1916 that ‘the tribes [of East Africa] will not combine’ and were ‘loathe to leave their own tribal territory’, the changing social structures of the early colonial era combined with the British Empire’s military personnel needs of the First World War to make both of these comments redundant during the years of the East African Campaign.

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115 TNA: WO 287/18: The Intelligence Department, British East Africa. Intelligence Notes on British and German East Africa. March 1916, p.143.-
Islam presented a concept by which some Africans could combine: it gave them a shared experience; a shared focal point. Members of separate tribes could feel unity through their new Islamic faith. Whether the tribal members really were ‘loathe’ to leave their ‘tribal territory’ may or may not have been true, and probably was and wasn’t in individual cases; but for officials of the British Empire to have written this in 1916 without accounting for the contemporary events seems astonishing. For the agency on whether to leave one’s ‘tribal territory’ or not was not solely the personal decision of the tribal member in that year, nor the previous two. For in 1916 the First World War would reach its second anniversary of raging conflict in East Africa; thousands of Africans were conscripted, sometimes forcibly, to fight on both sides of the conflict. Many thousands more were to be displaced. The systematic and non-systematic movement of Africans by their European colonisers for their own purposes took little heed as to whether the individual African was themselves ‘loathe to leave their own tribal territory’.

By the summer of 1917 one British intelligence official had noted this change. Captain Tracy Philipps wrote that ‘Islam has a tendency in Eastern Africa to consider itself a political, as much as a spiritual force. Latterly Muhammedans [sic] have in this area tended to consider themselves a Muhammedan nation. So much so that in enquiring the tribe of natives one is frequently met with the reply “I am a Muhammedan”.’116 By the unwitting dictation of the white colonisers, the First World War presented an opportunity for Africans to acquaint and learn that they were both Muslims, and that, despite their differing tribal allegiances, that they were both considered Africans by the European colonisers. With such shared affinities, they could unite.

Part II: The Identification of the Pan-Islamic Threat
In November 1914 the German and Ottoman Empires jointly proclaimed a call for jihad. This was meant to be the beginning of the German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic threat to the Entente Powers, with whom they were fighting against in the First World War. In actuality, it was to be its climax.

The German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic threat was initiated by the German and Ottoman Empires for different reasons, but both wished to use Pan-Islamism to undermine the British Empire. For the German Empire, Pan-Islamism was one of the multiple ways in which they attempted to subvert the British Empire. One of their strategies to weaken the United Kingdom’s efforts in Europe was to destabilise the colonies to divide the British Empire’s interests. This strategic policy was also the rationale for the four-year East African Campaign, in which thousands fought and died in the battle for land that all agreed was strategically unimportant for victory in the Great War. For the Ottoman Empire, Pan-Islamism had been used as blackmail to attempt to gain concessions from the British Empire in the pre-First World War era and their use of it during the War was a continuation of this policy.

The German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic threat was not the same Pan-Islamic threat that was to threaten the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the later years of the East African Campaign, but it was the precursor to it. Pan-Islamism in East Africa was to develop to threaten the security of the British Empire, but it was only able to do this because the groundwork of Pan-Islamism as an anti-Colonial and anti-British movement had already been laid by the Ottoman and German Empires.

Pan-Islamism

‘Over the years, few ideas have excited such passions as Pan-Islam. Few have been subject to so many, divergent – even contradictory – interpretations. As early as 1902, two of the best-known Orientalists of that time, E.G. Browne and C.A. Nallino, gave their expert estimates of Pan-Islam. The former considered it non-existent, while the latter
saw it as a major trend in modern Islam. The controversy has continued unabated to the present.117

Jacob M. Landau’s introduction to his book Pan-Islam: History and Politics demonstrates the difficulty that the likes of the British Empire had in providing a definition to the term Pan-Islam in the early Twentieth Century; there was simply no consensus. It was a relatively new term; Umar Ryad argues that ‘Historians still differ on exactly when in modern times the term “pan-Islam” emerged in Muslim politics’, although ‘the first extensive use of the word’ occurred ‘in the 1880s’.118

For the purpose of this thesis, the importance lies with what the British Empire considered Pan-Islam to represent, for the threat of Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War came about by their interpretation of it as being a threat to British imperial rule. In March 1917 Captain N.N.E. Bray, an expert on Pan-Islamism in the British Empire, wrote an essay entitled Intelligence and Notes on the Pan-Islamic Movement. In this he wrote that Pan-Islamism was ‘a political weapon, used to unite certain peoples, on common ground, otherwise widely separated, even in religious convictions, as for instance the Shias and Sunnis’.119 Captain Philipps, one of the few officials of the British Empire with expertise in Pan-Islamism during the First World War stated, along with two colleagues, Colonel Sykes and Captain Willis, that it was ‘Characteristic of Islam to attempt to unite different nations under the one religious flag as if they were a single nationality’.120 Immediately after the War had ended, G. Wyman Bury, a British political officer who had been involved with the Arab Revolt, asserted that it was ‘... a movement to weld together Moslems throughout the world regardless of nationality... pan-Islam [sic] is more than a spiritual movement: it is a practical, working proposition which has to be reckoned with when dealing with Moslems even in secular matters.’121 The British Empire did not see Pan-Islamism as a religious threat, but as an anti-

119 TNA: FO 141/773/6: Bray, N.N.E. Intelligence and Notes on the Pan-Islamic Movement, 25th March 1917.
colonial one; Pan-Islamism represented an anti-colonial, not a religious, movement to the British Empire.

This identification of Pan-Islamism as an anti-colonial movement by the British Empire during the First World War was not a paradigm shift away from how the British Empire had identified Pan-Islamism since the 1880s. There can be no doubt that Britain’s earlier interactions with the movement influenced the writings of Bray and Philipps.

Richard Popplewell specifies that after 1876 and the ascension of Abdul Hamid II to the throne, the Ottoman Empire ‘used the caliphate much more vigorously as a diplomatic weapon against those European powers which ruled over large numbers of Muslims: namely Russia, France and Britain.’ A brief examination of the events that occurred in the mid-to late-1870s provides an explanation for why the Sultan, who was also the Caliph, decided on this course of action.

In 1875 and in 1876 respectively, there were insurrections in Herzegovina and revolts in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro. Azmi Özcan writes that ‘public opinion in Europe turned strongly against the Ottomans’ as a result of their actions to put down these threats, and they were ‘quickly represented in the press as Christianity versus Islam.’ On his succession ‘the immediate task before’ Abdul Hamid ‘was to preserve the integrity of his country and to resist external pressure for the survival of his Empire’, but then the Russo-Turkish War erupted. ‘As a result of the wars’, Özcan explains that in addition to the hostility of Europe, ‘the demographic situation within the Empire also underwent a dramatic change. By the end of the 1870s... the population of the Empire was overwhelmingly Muslim, more than seventy per cent.’ Özcan concludes that these events forced Abdul Hamid to choose the policy of Pan-Islamism:

‘Against this background what was Abdulhamid to do? He was left with only one option, Pan-Islamism. Thus he had no choice but to put emphasis on Pan-Islamism as the means for bringing about the unity of Muslim subjects and thereby maintaining the integrity of the Empire. At the same time he wanted to use it as a powerful

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device for mobilizing Muslims in support of the Caliphate and thereby resisting European powers, which had large numbers of Muslims under their sway.’¹²³

In short: the new Sultan warned that he was prepared to use his position as the Caliph to unleash the threat of Pan-Islamism against the British Empire; the threat that the Muslims of the British Empire would unite against their colonisers at his word. Although this new approach of using Pan-Islamic loyalty to the Ottoman Empire ‘did not amount at this time to a threat to subvert the British Empire’, Popplewell clarified that it was seen ‘as a kind of insurance policy’ by the Ottomans, ‘for use should trouble arise with the colonial empires.’ Rather than use it as a threat to ‘subvert the British Empire’, something which would have been militaristically beyond the Ottoman Empire as a sole belligerent by this period, the ‘insurance policy’ approach was to be used by the Ottomans to gain concessions from the British if trouble should arise between the British Empire and its Muslim inhabitants. Fundamentally, the idea was to use the threat of Pan-Islamism, Abdul Hamid having ‘claimed a religious authority over all Muslims, whether [they] were his subjects or not’, as a sort of ‘diplomatic’ blackmail in the fractious relationship between politico-administrative and religious power in the Islamic world.¹²⁴

A ‘wary respect for Islamic ‘fanaticism’” had been’, according to John Darwin, ‘the most powerful influence on British policy’ in the Edwardian era. This was defined as ‘the supposed ability of Muslim rulers or preachers to arouse intense popular feeling against ‘infidel’ imperialists. The Indian Mutiny of 1857, Gordon’s fate at Khartoum, and bloody disasters in Afghanistan had ingrained this deeply in the ‘official mind’.¹²⁵ Of the former occurrence, Ronald Hyam is in agreement; the British Empire had not forgotten that ‘Among some Muslim communications there were plans for jihad’, even if ‘this fanatical religious dimension was limited.’¹²⁶ By ‘the early twentieth century there was... extreme pessimism about trouble brewing in India.’¹²⁷ ‘[If] a large part of the British public still retained their old

¹²⁴ Popplewell, Intelligence, pp.178—179.
¹²⁷ Ibid., p.97
arrogance’, Bernard Porter continues on the same point, ‘those who administered the Empire did not share it to the same degree. The Indian Mutiny had taught them the futility of the simple British-pattern method of cultural imperialism.’\textsuperscript{128} Thus, the spectre of Pan-Islamism as a security threat against the British Empire was a very real concern for the officials of that Empire. Moreover, British relations with the Ottoman Empire declined further after the Young Turks came to power in 1908. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins conclude that ‘Far from promoting congenial allies for Britain, the advent of the Young Turks heightened tensions within the Ottoman Empire, encouraged regional defections, and brought the European powers closer to partition.’\textsuperscript{129} In this era the British Empire was faced with the very real challenge of having both an Islamic power, the Ottoman Empire, and part of its Islamic population, predominantly but not exclusively in India, hostile to it.

‘As the ‘great Muhammadan Power’, Darwin states, ‘Britain could not be seen to act against the interests of Islam.’ And yet, he continues, ‘few British observers thought pan-Islamism counted for much... [for they] tended to regard Islam as a culture in decline... Whatever its premises, this sanguine view of Anglo-Muslim relations looked plausible enough before 1914.’\textsuperscript{130} It is important not to overstate how much importance the officials of the British Empire placed on the ability of Pan-Islamism to threaten the security of the British Empire in the immediate pre-First World War era. Four reasons can be examined to demonstrate this:

Firstly, the core problem with such an ‘insurance policy’ was that the divisions across the Islamic world over who truly held the religious power over the world’s Muslims, as examined in Chapter Two, meant that nobody actually held the religious power over all of the world’s Muslims in this era. Thus, using Pan-Islamism ‘as a diplomatic weapon’ against the Entente Powers could have success that was limited only to those that recognised the Ottoman Caliph as holding the legitimate religious power.

Donald M. McKale has demonstrated that it has been possible for such a tactic to work as a sort of ‘diplomatic weapon’ under certain conditions: ‘Medieval history had shown that... the circumstances under which modern Islam could successfully unite different nations

\textsuperscript{130} Darwin. Empire, p.296.
behind Mohammed’s banner... [were] if there existed a powerful Muslim leader and a comparatively weak national feeling in the different lands forming the whole of Islam.’

But Abdul Hamid II, as the Caliph of the Ottoman Empire, was not ‘a powerful Muslim leader’, and national feeling was not ‘comparatively weak’:

‘The central government [of the Ottoman Empire] which existed in Istanbul was weakened by centuries of decline and loss of empire, and it no longer held ascendancy, not even spiritual, over Muslims, except for Turks, either inside or outside its remaining territories. Moreover, the earliest stirrings of nationalism among some Muslims, most notably the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire prompted by their dislike of the Turks or Entente, encouraged among many of them greater interest in the political and economic development of their lands than in the pan-Islamic principle.’

To construe in summary: suggesting that all of the Muslims of this time era would have followed the lead of the Caliph of the Ottoman Caliphate is like suggesting that all of the Christians of this time era would have followed the lead of the Pope of the Roman Catholic Church; that is to say, whilst not theoretically impossible, most unlikely. The British were perfectly aware of this.

The need behind why it was necessary for the Ottomans to undertake such a political approach in the first place demonstrates a second reason for why the British were limited in their response to this threat: namely, the continuing decline of the Ottoman Empire itself, and its relativeness to the British Empire, which had not yet reached its physical peak. By 1876 ‘Paris, Berlin, Vienna and Rome’ thought that the Ottoman Empire ‘had sunk into irreversible decline.’ The Marquess of Salisbury, who as the British Secretary of State for India visited Constantinople in the same year, ‘never did... revise his conviction of [the Caliph’s] worthlessness.’

A third reason is put forward by Darwin himself: that some of the Muslims of the Empire were preoccupied elsewhere or had benefited from British colonial rule, and were therefore

133 Palmer, Alan. The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire (London; John Murray, 1992), p.147.
not in a place to, or inclined to, oppose the British. An example of the former could be observed ‘In India, where most of Britain’s Muslims subjects could be found, Muslim political attitudes were coloured by the fact of competition with Hindus and fear of Hindu predominance.’ As to the latter, in ‘Northern Nigeria, the colonial pax had helped the emirs against their over-mighty subjects and permitted the extension of Islamic influence over long-resistant ‘pagan’ peoples.’

A fourth reason presented itself to the British: the Young Turk Revolution had occurred in the Ottoman Empire in 1908 and Abdul Hamid II was deposed in 1909. For the Committee of Union and Progress (the CUP), which now ruled the Ottoman Empire, ‘the overriding emphasis was not on Pan-Islam as a state ideology but on Ottomanism.’ This, clearly, would have diminished how much importance the officials of the British Empire placed on the ability of Pan-Islamism to threaten the security of the British Empire. ‘However’, continues Özcan, ‘subsequent political developments and the persistence of the non-Muslim components of the Empire to maintain their separate ethnic and religious identity at the expense of the State, soon clearly showed that Ottomanism was not a viable ideology and nothing more than a utopia.’ This, in addition to ‘the disaster of the Balkan wars… inevitably brought Pan-Islamism to the fore as a political force’ and ‘the enthusiasm shown by the Muslims of India, Egypt, and Iran during [them] undoubtedly encouraged the CUP to adopt a Pan-Islamic policy.’ The use of Pan-Islamism during the Balkan War raised the interest of the officials of the British Empire to the prospect of its use against them.

The First Balkan War of 1912-1913 saw the United Kingdom take a neutral position when the Balkan League (comprising the kingdoms of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro) fought against the Ottoman Empire. Despite Britain having ‘maintained a strict neutrality’ during that war, ‘large quantities of Ottoman [Pan-Islamic] propaganda found its way into [British controlled] India.’ This propaganda ‘[called] on Muslims to support their Turkish co-religionists in their struggle against the Christian powers of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece [and Montenegro].’

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134 Darwin, Empire, p.296.
Whilst the British had believed the Ottoman Empire’s propaganda ‘did not amount... to a threat to subvert the British Empire’ in 1876, ‘British concern about the Ottoman government’s [sic] fostering of Pan-Islamic loyalties came... during the First Balkan War of 1912-13’; just a year prior to the outbreak of the First World War. Popplewell writes that the British ‘saw this development... [with] concern’, for ‘By the beginning of the twentieth century, there were clear signs that [Indian Muslims] were concerned both about the weak state of the Muslim powers and about their own decline in importance within India... Indian Muslims felt that Britain’s lack of sympathy for the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan wars paid little respect to their religious feeling.’

Nevertheless, British concern about the threat posed by the Ottoman promotion of Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in the immediate pre-First World War era should not be overstated. Popplewell concludes that ‘British concern about pan-Islamism [sic] within India should not be exaggerated... the Government of India was probably less worried by Muslim support for Turkey at the beginning of the [First World War] than it was during the Balkan wars.’

However, the overall picture was a little less one-sided than it first appears, for although this ‘diplomatic weapon’ had not been successful in the sense that it did not force the hand of the British Empire in 1913, and thus the Ottomans still lost the First Balkan War, it was yet successful in the sense that the British ‘saw [the] development’ of ‘large quantities of Ottoman propaganda’ in India with ‘concern’. The precedent that the Ottomans evidently saw was that whilst their ability to physically attack the British Empire was restricted, they had some ability to cause difficulties for the British in their Empire by kindling parts of the Islamic population in opposition. This opposition could be constructed for their own benefit.

If war was to occur between them after 1913, the British Empire was aware that ‘the Turks [would be] quick to play the pan-Islamic card’. They were also aware of the ‘clear signs’ that the Indian Muslims had displayed in relation to their perceived beliefs of the diminishing level of Muslim importance within their region of the British Empire. The potential threat posed by the Ottoman Empire to the security of the British Empire was not a major concern.

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137 Popplewell, *Intelligence*, p.179.
for the British in the pre-First World War era because of the relative situation of the Ottoman Empire in relation to themselves. If the Ottoman Empire was to make an alliance, that relativeness could change, perhaps dramatically.

The Outbreak of the First World War: the Call for Jihad

The German and Ottoman Empires formed an alliance on 2nd August 1914, mere days after the outbreak of the First World War. For the Germans, this alliance, amongst other considerations, provided them with an overland route from Europe to the British, French, and Russian Empires in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. In turn, the Ottomans gained German support against a potential Russian threat; the British had refused to form an alliance with the Ottomans several times in the years prior to the First World War, which had left the weak Ottoman Empire anxious about the wholly conceivable threats that could come to them from that quarter.

The Ottoman Empire, despite being aligned to Germany, did not itself enter the War until 11th November 1914: over three months later. Whilst the Ottomans declared war on Russia, France, and the United Kingdom on this date, these three countries had taken the initiative and had already declared war on them: the former on 1st November and the latter two on 5th.

On 14th November 1914 the Caliph of the Ottoman Caliphate declared jihad on the Entente Allies:

“Of those who go to the Jihad for the sake of happiness and salvation of the believers in God’s victory, the lot of those who remain alive is felicity, while the rank of those who depart to the next world is martyrdom. In accordance with God’s beautiful promise, those who sacrifice their lives to give life to the truth will have honor in this world, and their latter end in paradise.”

Now that they were openly antagonistic towards the ‘European powers which ruled over large numbers of Muslims’, the Ottoman Empire thought it opportune to use what they saw as their position as the caliphate ‘much more vigorously as a diplomatic weapon’ in the late autumn of 1914. However, the Ottoman Empire was now in an alliance, and for these two allies their reasons for promoting Pan-Islamism in the hope of causing a jihad that would threaten the security of the Entente Empires, and the outcomes they wished its promotion to produce, differed.

The German Pan-Islamic ‘Policy’

Despite being in an alliance, the Ottoman and German Empires possessed different motivations for promoting Pan-Islamism. The reasons for why the Ottoman Empire would promote Pan-Islamism and release a call for jihad have already been examined in this chapter. Whilst certainly disliking the fact that so many Muslims lived in lands controlled by so-called infidel powers from a religious perspective, their primary intention was to secure their own fledging position in the world order by employing Pan-Islamism as a ‘diplomatic weapon’. By utilising what religious power it held to control the political actions of the world’s Muslims, the Ottoman Empire hoped to gain greater political sway over the European empires.

Germany’s reason for allying itself with the Ottoman Empire and supporting the call to jihad played directly into its strategy to win the Great War. At its heart, it too wished to use it as a weapon against the Entente Empires, but it did not need to do so to secure its own existence in the world order. It did so to improve its military prowess and secure victory on the battlefields of the Western Front.

Germany used varies strategies in its attempt to win the First World War; it is their attempt to subvert the British Empire with Pan-Islamism with which this thesis is concerned. After the war, M.I.S. wrote the following on this strategic objective:

‘Apart from attempts to obtain particulars of naval and military affairs, it was a special feature of Germany’s policy to foster and encourage any movements of unrest and sedition directed against the British Empire. Thus it came about that the
Sinn Fein movement in Ireland and America, the Home Rule and seditionary movements in India, the Egyptian nationalist, Turkish Nationalist, Pan-Islamic and Greek Royalist movements, all of which with their accompanying plots and conspiracies, were supported and in some cases promoted by Germany, became the concern of M.I.5.

To achieve this, M.I.5. continued, the Germans would become involved in: ‘Espionage, sedition, treachery, [the] fomentation of strikes and sabotage, and [the] dissemination of peace propaganda.’

This approach was part of an existing wider German strategic approach towards the First World War. Germany understood that, despite its large army, it would find it logistically very difficult to fight on two fronts in Europe against the Russians and the French, who, by 1914, were in an alliance with each other and the United Kingdom. Whilst the Schlieffen Plan was designed to help prevent this situation from occurring, it went wrong from the beginning; Germany soon found itself fighting in both the Western and Eastern Theatres of the First World War in Europe.

Germany knew that for it to have a chance of succeeding on the battlefields of these theatres it would have to reduce the number of enemy troops it faced. This, seemingly, was an obvious strategy; to wound the enemy fatally by killing more of its troops then it kills of yours is perhaps the most obvious of all war strategies. Yet, to varying degrees, the Triple Entente possessed something that Germany did not: colonial troops it could import to Europe.

Despite owning colonies, Germany could not import colonial troops to Europe, for the oceans were dominated by the Royal Navy of the British Empire. To attempt such a move would be akin to a suicide mission for everybody onboard. Hence, whilst the Entente Powers could call for troops to come to Europe from the vast lands that they controlled...

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across the globe, the Germans were forced to be content using only troops that could reach Central Europe by land.

The German Empire’s strategy to subvert the British Empire was borne out of their realisation of this position; the more it managed to subvert the British Empire the more the British Empire would be forced to keep troops in the Empire to maintain the peace. Consequently, less troops would be available to fight for the British Empire on the battlefields of Europe. Popplewell explains that this strategic policy became of importance at the most senior levels of the German Government very early in the war:

‘German interest in the possibilities for subverting the British Empire extended to the highest levels of the German government. A month after war broke out, Bethmann Hollweg, the German Chancellor, stressed the strategic importance of weakening Britain through a campaign of colonial subversion. As he told the German Foreign Office: “…Thus one of our main tasks is gradually to wear England down through unrest in India and Egypt”.’

Whilst a detailed analysis of the different strategies used by the German Empire in its attempt to win the First World War is not the purpose of this thesis, an understanding of this particular strategy explains why Germany was interested in promoting pan-Islamism (despite the Kaiser’s past antics, it was not out of a desire to spread the word of the Prophet Mohammed) and why the Germans established, and then continued, a campaign in East Africa, when everybody involved, themselves very much included, was perfectly aware that victory in East Africa would make little significant difference to the outcome of the war in Europe in any purposeful way.

The German strategy in the East African Campaign is one of the most theoretically successful examples of this policy to subvert the British Empire. The reasons for its relative successfulness, although technically multiple, truly lie with one man alone.

Germany was both lucky and fortunate to have appointed as their commander in German East Africa a man who, in relation to the analysis of his efforts in the First World War, has

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repeatedly been described as ‘brilliant’. Roger Broad states that he was ‘a brilliant guerrilla fighter’ [emphasis added], who, according to W.O. Henderson, ‘brilliantly fulfilled the task which he had set himself.’ [emphasis added.] 142 He outmatched his British rivals and was responsible for the East African Campaign continuing for longer than any other campaign of the entire First World War.

General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck arrived in German East Africa in the January of 1914. Although he later stated that at this time he had ‘hardly suspected the nature of the task that was to confront me in a few months’ time’, he also stated that ‘during the past ten years the universal war had more than once seemed so imminent that I was obliged seriously to consider whether the force under my command would be called upon to take any part in that conflict, and, if so, what its task might be.’

Von Lettow-Vorbeck was greatly experienced in colonial military concerns and guerrilla warfare. He had been commissioned in 1890 and had subsequently served in the Boxer Rebellion and both the Namaqua and Herero insurrections in German South-West Africa. He knew enough about military matters to know that East Africa would be highly unlikely to play a significant role in a potential future war that would put Germany against the United Kingdom. He perfectly understood in 1914 that he alone could not bring down the might of the British Empire in a colonial war between two European powers in East Africa where his forces would be surrounded by the British, Britain’s allies, a British controlled Indian Ocean, or neutrals. Unfortunately for the British, he also knew enough about military matters to know where, despite being unable to physically defeat the British Empire, he would be able to make a significant contribution to such a future war. In his memoires he wrote that he ‘knew that the fate of the colonies, as of all other German possessions, would only be decided on the battlefields of Europe’. ‘The question’ he asked himself ‘was whether it was possible for us in our subsidiary theatre of war to exercise any influence on the great decision at home. Could we, with our small forces, prevent considerable numbers of the enemy from intervening in Europe, or in other more important theatres, or inflict on our

enemies any loss of personnel or war material worth mentioning?’ He ‘answered this question in the affirmative.’

He was able to answer this question in the affirmative because he had already devised a rough plan about what action to undertake. He ‘considered that hostile troops would allow themselves to be held only if we attacked, or at least threatened, the enemy at some really sensitive point.’ He concluded ‘that it was necessary, not to split up our small available forces in local defence, but, on the contrary, to keep them together, to grip the enemy by the throat and force him to employ his forces for self-defence.’ 143

Knowing that he could not actually win such a war, and knowing that there was no guarantee that gambling on the security of German East Africa to detain British imperial forces in the region would actually pay off for the Germans in Europe (which it did not), it is permissible to wonder why von Lettow-Vorbeck did not decide to try and endorse a scenario in which his colony remained neutral, and so prevent the great loss of life that would surely occur (and did occur) if his plans were to be executed. There were some grounds for such an action in the Congo Act of 1885, but, although he examined the lack of legal necessity for such an action, von Lettow-Vorbeck’s reasoning in not pursuing such a scenario rested much more on his overall strategy. To do so, he reasoned with sound logic, would only help the British war effort, whilst continuing in military affairs in the region would prevent the British from moving troops to the battlefields of Europe.144 Von Lettow-Vorbeck’s plan worked brilliantly in theory; the East African Campaign lasted so long that it extended a fortnight beyond Armistice Day. It worked less well in reality; the British Empire never diverted great numbers of troops to the Campaign. Their focus remained on Europe and did not deviate. However, von Lettow-Vorbeck did about as much as he possibly could, and for his actions he was lauded as a hero on his return to Germany in 1919.

Therefore, the German ‘special feature’ to ‘foster and encourage’ the Pan-Islamic movement in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War was not ordained as a strategy to cause the destruction of the British Empire in East Africa, but was part of a larger design to force the British to waste as much time and as many

144 Ibid., p.19.
resources as possible defending an area that was tactically worthless in this conflict, but
which the British Empire could never relinquish without destroying its imperial prestige. In
doing so, the Germans hoped to cause such distractions in the East African region to wound
British efforts in Europe, and hence contribute to a German victory in the First World War.

Compared to von Lettow-Vorbeck’s masterful use of guerrilla tactics, this ‘special feature’ of
Germany’s strategic plan has not featured within the terribly limited narrative of the East
African Campaign. Yet this neglect does not diminish its importance; its importance lies not
just in providing a greater understanding of the experiences of the entire British Empire in
the First World War, but also because it involved Africans occupied in African affairs right at
the heart of the East African Campaign.

The Failure of the Ottoman-German Pan-Islamic Threat

As stated, McKale demonstrates that it was possible for Pan-Islamism to work as a sort of
‘diplomatic weapon’ under certain conditions. He concludes that ‘signs in the fall of 1914
warned... that the reverse held true’: these conditions were not present.¹⁴⁵ Thus, the use of
Pan-Islamism as a ‘diplomatic weapon’ against the British Empire did not work.

A full analysis for why the German-backed Ottoman call for jihad failed is also not the
purpose of this thesis. As has been examined, the short explanation is simply that the
Ottoman Empire did not have the religious power to execute such an action; a worldwide
Pan-Islamic uprising would never have occurred given the circumstances of 1914. An
important conclusion was drawn from these events that was to impact upon the potential
for Pan-Islamism to threaten the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of
the East African Campaign; once the immediate aftermath of the call had passed, the Pan-
Islamic threat was considered to be dead by the British Empire, and has been considered to
have died by historians. This was, and is, incorrect.

Bray wrote in his essay of March 1917 that ‘Experts, who have studied the Pan Islamic
movement in European Turkey, tell us that the Pan Islamic idea is dead or ineffectual’.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ Bray, Intelligence.
Erik-Jan Zürcher writes in *Jihad and Islam in World War I* that ‘It has become almost a commonplace in the historiography of the Middle East in World War I to say that the German-inspired call to Jihad was a complete failure, and it is an indisputable fact that neither mass desertions of Muslims soldiers in the British, French and Russian armies nor large-scale uprisings in their imperial possessions took place.’

Conversely, Bray continued that these experts ‘were on the wrong lines when specialising with Turkey or by ceasing to study it because it is extinct in that country. They perhaps considered Turkey as setting the lead to the Mohammedan world, which was, and is far from being the case.’ Zürcher concurs and states that ‘this negative assessment has to be nuanced.’

Bray concluded that just because Pan-Islamism had failed in Turkey these experts were ‘erroneous to maintain that similarly or in consequence the pan Islamic ideal [was] dead or [had] become ineffectual’ elsewhere. ‘I am convinced in my own mind’, he stated after studying the subject, ‘that there are thousands of sincere Mohammedans sincerely working for Mohammedan independence, there are thousands of more fanatics running before they can walk trying to bring about in a few years, a transformation requiring generations to mature. Gradually I have seen the ideal permeating the minds of the masses.’

Thus, the narrative of the role of Pan-Islamism in the First World War did not end with the failure of the German-backed Ottoman call for jihad. The Pan-Islamic idea continued to exist after 1914 beyond the borders of Turkey. Having concluded that the Pan-Islamic threat was dead, the British imperial intelligence establishment had not prepared for the appearance of this threat in the Islamic population of East Africa.

Supporting and promoting the Pan-Islamic movement ‘was a special feature of Germany’s policy to foster and encourage any movements of unrest and sedition directed against the British Empire’. Supporting the call for jihad in 1914 was one way in which the Germans were successful in planting the seeds of ‘unrest and sedition’, for in the spring of 1917 the

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148 Bray, *Intelligence*.


150 Bray, *Intelligence*.
threat that Pan-Islamism posed to the security of the British Empire in East Africa began to be acknowledged by officials within the British imperial intelligence establishment. They were forced to dispense with the notion that because the German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic threat of 1914 had failed Pan-Islamism itself was no longer a threat.

After reading Bray’s long essay, Lieutenant Colonel Wilson of the British Mission at Jeddah wrote to Sir Reginald Wingate, the High Commissioner for Egypt, to state that: ‘I agree with Captain Bray’s statement that Pan-Islamism is by no means dead and I personally believe that issues of first importance to us as an Empire, with our millions of Moslem subjects, depend upon how the Mohammedan question is handled now and in the near future.’

Far away from the battlefields of Europe, and beyond the sight of the historians who have flocked to cover them, the closing stage of the First World War was to be spent fighting against the threat of Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa and around the world.

Conclusion

There has long been differing positions as to whether the Ottoman Empire would have called for jihad even if their German allies had not been in favour of that course of action. This debate began almost as soon as the jihad was proclaimed, for in 1915 Snouck Hurgronje published his pamphlet The Holy War “Made in Germany.” Hurgronje argued that there was strong historical evidence for this accord: the First Balkan War of 1912-1913. During that War ‘the independence of Turkey was certainly no less seriously menaced than was now the case before the jihad-declaration; but even then it received little support from its German friend.’ Despite sending pan-Islamic propaganda to the British Empire, the Ottoman Empire did not proclaim jihad, in spite of the serious territorial dangers it then faced.

151 TNA: FO 141/773/6: Letter from Lieutenant Colonel C.E. Wilson, Jeddah, to Sir Reginald Wingate, His Majesty’s High Commissioner for Egypt, Cairo, Egypt. 29th March 1917.
152 Snouck Hurgronje, C. The Holy War “Made in Germany” (New York; G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1915).
153 Ibid., p.57.
This argument has been vigorously challenged. Mustafa Aksakal has argued that ‘The manifold presence of jihad in Ottoman… politics… down to 1914… makes a strong case that jihad would have been an important aspect of Ottoman warfare in 1914 without Wilhelm II and the German orientalists.’\(^{154}\)

The notion that the Ottomans may have declared jihad independently of the backing of the Kaiser is interesting, for it shows how the Ottomans believed, as Aksakal puts it, in the ‘malleability’ of jihad; they believed that jihad would shape itself in 1914 into something that would be of benefit to them and their situation, rather than merely having been pressed into that course of action by the Germans, for the gain of the Germans.\(^{155}\)

That Aksakal’s argument acknowledges the role that the Ottomans played is also interesting in its own right; instead of performing the supportive part, this narrative allows the Ottomans to act as the leading role in their own play. This narrative also allows the Ottomans a leading role in ‘Germany’s policy to foster and encourage any movements of unrest and sedition directed against the British Empire.’ Without the Ottoman’s actions the Germans would have found it much harder to support and promote the Pan-Islamic movement within the British Empire more widely.

The Ottoman Empire would not play a large role in the continuing threat of Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa; as Sykes, Willis, and Philipps were to put it, the threat there came from the potential of an ‘African Jehad’, not a ‘Turkish Jehad’.\(^{156}\)

But the importance of the German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic threat to this narrative should not be underestimated; the promotion of Pan-Islamism within the Islamic population of the British Empire by these two powers was heard by that population, and inspired them. Without it, the Pan-Islamic narrative in East Africa may have been much reduced and may not have formed a part of Germany’s subversive policy at all.

Supporting and promoting the Pan-Islamic movement within the British Empire was, as quoted from Popplewell above, part of Germany’s strategy to ‘[weaken] Britain through a campaign of colonial subversion.’ By forcing the United Kingdom to waste resources


\(^{155}\) Ibid., p.199.

analysing and combating the Pan-Islamic movement in the strategically unimportant region of East Africa, one could argue that despite the early failure of the Ottoman Pan-Islamic threat the German Pan-Islamic threat was to find some success.
Chapter Four  Inaction: Imperial Counter-Intelligence in the British Empire in East Africa pre-1917

There is no record in the surviving archives of any imperial counter-intelligence establishment having existed in the British Empire in East Africa prior to the First World War to perform risk analyses of possible threats posed to the British Empire by the African population who lived there. The first attempt to execute an imperial counter-intelligence effort in East Africa occurred on the outbreak of war in the East Africa Protectorate. It discovered that threats existed to the British Empire from amongst the African population, but nothing was done to counter them; nothing was done because racial prejudice clouded the judgement of the officials of the British Empire.

Instead, this early imperial counter-intelligence effort focused on countering the threat posed to the British Empire in East Africa by the use of traditional intelligence methods by the Germans; an approach that utilised secret agents and embedded missionaries. This threat was identified early and was mostly eradicated. Unfortunately, from promising beginnings this counter-intelligence effort failed to diversify to examine all threats. There were no orders from London to do so. That was, until 1917, when the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the British Empire as a whole, and East Africa in particular, forced M.I.5. to act.

As in Chapter One, this chapter focuses on the East Africa Protectorate. The Protectorate was at the centre of the bureaucracy of the British Empire in the region and became the centre of the British imperial military effort of the East African Campaign. As such it can clearly show the growth of the counter-intelligence effort of the British Empire in the region as it responded to the events of the First World War.

Intelligence Acquisition in the British Empire in East Africa prior to the First World War

M.I.5. and the so-called M.I.6. were established in 1909; a fact that M.I.5. openly states in its officially published literature. Yet 1909 was by no means the beginning of intelligence

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work by the British; it is not called the world’s second oldest profession for nothing.\textsuperscript{158} Having known that the proficient use of intelligence can be very beneficial in helping one achieve one’s own ends, the British have not been collecting and analysing intelligence only in those years which have passed since 1909; they have been doing it for centuries. The 1908 document \textit{Organization of Secret Service}, possibly the first document produced by the British Intelligence service that was to be formally established the following year, acknowledged that the ‘Successes of Frederick the Great, Napoleon and [the Duke of] Wellington were largely due to carefully elaborated spy systems.’\textsuperscript{159} Dating from the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Wellington was not the first Briton to have been recorded using intelligence; Elizabeth I of England, who reigned from 1558-1603, was documented as having had a network. But British intelligence prowess fluctuated. There was not, before the Twentieth Century, a continuous intelligence service in existence in the United Kingdom.

\textit{The African Catalyst to British Intelligence Growth}

The Second Boer War of 1899-1902 was a major catalyst for the establishment of this continuous intelligence service in the United Kingdom and presents an interesting comparison of the British Empire’s use of intelligence in Africa in two separate conflicts.

The Second Boer War was fought in present-day South Africa and eSwatini between the United Kingdom, and the South African Republic (also known as the Transvaal Republic) and the Orange Free State. The reasons for this war are complex and varied, and are not of importance here, but, just like the East African Campaign of the First World War, this was a war between white colonialists, the white British and the white Afrikaners, or Boers, who

\textsuperscript{158} The idea that spying is the second oldest profession originates from the Book of Joshua, the sixth book of the Old Testament. \textit{Good News Bible. The Book of Joshua 2:1} (Swindon; The Bible Societies, Collins, 1987), p.209: ‘Then Joshua sent two spies from the camp at Acacia with orders to go and secretly explore the land of Canaan, especially the city of Jericho. When they came to the city, they went to spend the night in the house of a prostitute named Rahab’ The early part of the Book of Joshua is ascribed to having been written during the reign of King Josiah (of Judah, the 27\textsuperscript{th} in Matthew’s account of the genealogy of Jesus), who reigned from 640—609 BCE. This early date, and the presence of the ‘prostitute named Rahab’ – who practised the first oldest profession – have combined to give spying this epitaph.

\textsuperscript{159} TNA: KV 1/1: ‘Organization of Secret Service. (Note prepared for D.M.O. on the 4\textsuperscript{th}. Oct. 1908)’, in \textit{Early documents relating to the establishment of Kell’s Secret Service Bureau etc. 4\textsuperscript{th} October 1908}, p.2.
were descended of Dutch colonisers, that took place on the African continent, in which not only was the indigenous African population forced to become involved, but in which there was also a quick descent into guerrilla warfare that would last for several years.

The Second Boer War was, however, different from the East African Campaign of the First World War because Southern Africa was the only place where fighting occurred. Hence, the British were able to focus the entirety of their strength – both physically and mentally – in this location, rather than, as was the case in the latter conflict, being compelled to fight with limited resources. As such, their military intelligence forces in Africa were much better prepared, and have been much more widely studied by historians, than those of the East African Campaign of the Great War.

The British had anticipated the possibility of war with the Afrikaners and had attempted to establish something like an intelligence establishment in South Africa. They had, as recommended in The Soldier’s Pocket-Book, sent officers to South Africa covertly from as early as 1896, and less covertly from June 1899, to collect intelligence information that could be of use in such a future war. These officers ‘collected a great deal of information’ which was considered ‘useful’ to both the Military Intelligence Department in London and the Field Intelligence Department which was to be founded on the outbreak of war in South Africa.¹⁶⁰

Despite this attempt, Thomas G. Fergusson has examined how by the outbreak of war in October 1899 several problems had been found to exist regarding intelligence collection in South Africa:

1. There were too few intelligence officers, ‘given the enormity of the potential theatre of war’.
2. There was ‘not enough money’.
3. Official restrictions ‘prohibited the establishment of a field intelligence department until after the declaration of war and which made it illegal for them to develop their own sources of information’. Officers themselves ‘had to collect intelligence on their own, whilst masquerading as tourists.’

4. ‘Some of the officers... had had previous intelligence assignments, but many had not.’

It was ‘only when the war began’ that ‘the need for change clearly [became] evident.’

Changes were made to the Field Intelligence Department during the Second Boer War to improve or minimise the consequences caused by these problems, but these changes did not always work brilliantly. Two examples demonstrate this:

Firstly, the British appointed a large number of intelligence officers to combat problem one, but this placed ‘an unbearable strain on the army’s ability to assign qualified, experienced intelligence officers... an ability that was questionable even at the outset of the war’, which plainly exacerbated problem four.

The descent into guerrilla warfare saw further modifications in the Field Intelligence Department, one of which was the centralisation of much of the intelligence operations under Lieutenant-Colonel David Henderson, who was the third and final Director of Military Intelligence during the Second Boer War. This second example saw the British attempt to counteract the issues caused by problem three, for had the Field Intelligence Department existed before the outbreak of war it would have been able to formulate a network of ‘spies and informants’. As the Afrikaners themselves could demonstrate, such a network would have been of use to the British during the guerrilla warfare, and so the modification to attempt to rectify this problem made theoretical sense. However, despite the improvements and modifications that Henderson enacted, Fergusson has concluded that ‘the natural advantages of the Boers as guerrillas fighting in their own land with the support of the civilian population were virtually impossible to overcome. Their intelligence system was so effective that they were able to outmanoeuvre British troops in some situations, even when the Field Intelligence Department had accurate intelligence of their strength and disposition.’

The conclusion drawn from these events was that it was evidently necessary for Britain’s military to not only have a greater amount of better trained intelligence officers, but to organise them in a more beneficial manner in preparation for potential future conflicts. Jim

161 Ibid., pp.148—149.
162 Ibid., p.162.
163 Ibid., p.162.
Beach’s conclusion on the topic is that the ‘ad hoc’ intelligence arrangements which the likes of the Duke of Wellington had used were now ‘inadequate for the new conditions’ of warfare that were in existence at the turn of the Twentieth Century, since the ‘Boer republics and their guerrilla successors were a complex and challenging intelligence target’. Thus, ‘a more sophisticated and formalised system was required to defeat them.’

These conclusions were also reached by the British contemporarily, and in the years of 1904 and 1907 respectively Henderson published the pamphlets Field Intelligence: its Principles and Practice and The Art of Reconnaissance, which contained, amongst other features, his recommendations for how intelligence structures should be reorganised to fulfil the conclusions drawn.

In Field Intelligence, Henderson gave five points for a successful intelligence organisation:

1. ‘[Predictive] intelligence analysis was to be conducted by regular intelligence staff officers in the headquarters of every independent formation’, who would then ‘disseminate’ it.
2. ‘[Intelligence] resources both human and financial were to be administrated centrally by a chief of intelligence at the main headquarters.’
3. ‘[That] any additional manpower should be recruited and controlled through the raising of a temporary Intelligence Corps for the duration of the campaign.’
4. ‘[Local] liaison, interpreters, topographical and counter-intelligence work was to be included within the intelligence portfolio.’
5. ‘[Perhaps] most significantly, that although intelligence collection would include prisoner and document examination, secret agents and signals intelligence, it would be reconnaissance by cavalry and intelligence personnel that would remain the predominant means of collection.’

As a result of Henderson’s work, a great amount of change did occur within British intelligence; the establishment of M.I.5. in 1909 to work on counter-intelligence was one beneficiary. In Europe, this change meant that when the deterioration of Anglo-German

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relations worsened in the approach to the outbreak of war in 1914 the British had an existing intelligence establishment to help them achieve success in their objectives.

Unfortunately, this work was not replicated in the British Empire in East Africa. Despite so much of the change having been fuelled by the knowledge gained in Africa, Africa was not to be a beneficiary of it.

*Exploitation Colonialism*

The British Empire colonised almost a quarter of the land surface of the planet; colonialism did not look the same in every part of it. The term ‘exploitation colonialism’ has been used to describe colonialism where the features were ‘a policy of conquering territories with the intention of exploiting natural and human resources by force, for immediate profit, such as by extracting cheap raw materials and enslaving the native population.’¹⁶⁶ ‘Kenya,’ writes Olúémi Táiwò, was a mix of two different variations of colonialism: ‘exploitation’ colonialism, and ‘settler’ colonialism; literally, colonising by settling.

Some, such as Táiwò, state that the economic exploitation – through ‘exploitation colonialism’ – of the colonies was the prime motivator for the British Empire:

‘Colonies of exploitation were coveted for their resources and the primary aim of white colonists was to exploit these resources for the benefit of Britain and for those colonies to serve as closed markets for British manufacturers. All other considerations... in short, the civilizing mission – pale into insignificance when placed alongside the need to possess and exploit the land and labor of the colonies under this regime.’¹⁶⁷

The problem with this definition is not that it is necessarily wrong, but more that it is not entirely comprehensive; for it does not acknowledge the exploitation of knowledge by
extraction from Africa by the colonists, who subsequently used it not for the benefit of Africa, but for the benefit of themselves. One is unable to say that this extraction of knowledge – such as that extracted by the British in South Africa at the turn of the Twentieth Century – falls under the definition of exploitation colonialism as defined above, for while it does seem to fall under the broader meaning of exploitation colonialism, it was not a physical entity extracted for profit making purposes – in this scenario, it was not even extracted for profit making purposes, but instead for security ones – and thus does not fully fit the definition. The idea of knowledge extraction being itself an independent form of resource extraction by colonialists seems to be lacking in the literature on colonialism.

Despite the British having fuelled much of the change in its intelligence use in the early Twentieth Century by knowledge extracted from Africa as a result of the Second Boer War, Africa was not itself to be a beneficiary of this change. The change was focused in Europe, on European needs. It was a form of extraction colonialism but varies from the accepted definition; it was an extraction of knowledge production in a colonial setting.

(Ironically, this could, and, in this case did, present something of a paradoxical situation. Had the British used the knowledge that they had extracted out of Africa on the East African population, this would have inevitably further suppressed the East African people, for they would have been subjected to the observation of some sort of ‘secret service’. Therefore, by not having used the knowledge that they had extracted from Africa in Africa on Africans, the African population had greater freedom from the British colonisers than they otherwise would have had. Nevertheless, this paradox does not itself legitimise the colonial extraction of knowledge from Africa.)

The Situation in East Africa

In conjunction with the lack of interest shown towards East Africa by the Imperial Government in London as was examined in Chapter One, it thus occurred that there was no innovative change in intelligence, including counter-intelligence, use in the British Empire in East Africa in the years prior to the start of the First World War. Yet, whilst it is true to say that there is no record in the surviving archives of any imperial intelligence establishment
having existed in this time era in this region to perform risk analyses of the possible threats to the security of the British Empire from the East African population, it is not true to say that there was no intelligence establishment at all.

The Intelligence Department of the King’s African Rifles (K.A.R.) was less of an intelligence department, and more something that vaguely resembled an intelligence department. M.I.5. later recorded the attitude that existed in the regiment before 1914: ‘each battalion of the King’s African Rifles was supposed to have an Intelligence Officer with a small office, and a certain amount of permanent records... these departments were starved, partly for want of necessary funds and because of the opinion of some of the authorities that information must be followed by offensive action, partly also because the civil and police authorities did not send on all information.’

In his book on the K.A.R. published in 1926, W. Lloyd-Jones first expressed his feelings of the competency of this department in the contents page; there, he had described it as ‘The “Intelligence” department.’ This view was shared by Charles Hordern, who wrote the official account of the first half of the East African Campaign. In relation to the usefulness of this Intelligence Department on the outbreak of war, he wrote in Military Operations: Volume I August 1914 – September 1916 that ‘When war broke out the two British protectorates [the East Africa and Uganda Protectorates] were in all respects entirely unprepared and gravely at a disadvantage... from a military point of view, especially in the complete absence of intelligence data, the situation was disquieting.’

The activities of the Intelligence Department of the K.A.R. as it existed prior to the outbreak of the First World War do not anywhere seem to have been thoroughly analysed, either contemporarily or by historians. Two comments written by Lloyd-Jones in his work provide a suggestion for why the Intelligence Department of this regiment was apparently so lacking in ability. He wrote that ‘the K.A.R. were certainly never intended or expected to take part in anything but localised operations against a savage, or at the most a semi-savage, enemy’

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and that ‘Although some officers serving with the K.A.R. fully realised the possibility, even the probability, of a European conflagration spreading to Africa, the responsible authorities refused to believe in the likelihood of such a contingency.’

One could argue as a result of these statements that, since the Intelligence Department of the K.A.R. had not been expected to establish an intelligence portfolio that would be of use for such a war as the First World War occurring in a colonial setting, it was not inactivity that prevented it from doing so, but orders. Lloyd-Jones refuted this stance and argued that the Intelligence Department did have such a remit: ‘In Nairobi there was an Intelligence Department whose especial duty it was to prepare for eventualities, but they remained obstinately deaf to all warnings.’ These ‘warnings’ included warnings regarding German colonial intentions:

‘On one occasion a planter who had recently returned from a tour of what was at that time German East Africa reported to his brother, who happened to be serving with the K.A.R., that the German colonists, though they deplored it, believed in the imminence of war and were making arrangements accordingly. The matter was reported to the Intelligence Officer, and a meeting duly took place. The planter repeated his warning, and even offered to return to German East Africa and bring back definite proof to confirm his statements. But all in vain. “Superior Intelligence” knew better, and regaled the brothers with some wonderful tales of how, according to reliable information, it was reported that the askaris in the German service had sworn, in the unlikely event of hostilities, to leave their “brutal” German masters and desert to the British.’

These ‘warnings’, reported Hordern, came to the Intelligence Department not only from within the K.A.R., but also from other interested parties within the British Empire:

‘As early as 1904 Army Headquarters in India, doubtless anticipating the possibility of Indian troops being involved [in any future colonial war in East Africa], had suggested that information of military value regarding East Africa should be collected, but nothing came of it. A similar proposal made by the War Office in 1911 was, it is

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172 Ibid., p.168.
understood, negativated by the Government of the British East Africa Protectorate in the interests of a pacific policy... The British consul at Dar-es-Salaam, Mr. Norman King, had of his own initiative collected some general information which was afterwards utilized.\textsuperscript{173}

The conclusion thus must be that the Intelligence Department of the K.A.R. was lacking because the ‘responsible authorities’, which eventually must become the British Imperial Government in London, refused to prepare the British Empire in East Africa for what was considered by ‘some officers’ of the K.A.R. to be the probable experience of a war similar to that which had been seen in the Second Boer War, in spite of several suggestions to do so. After the cessation of the First World War, the second and last head of the East African Intelligence Centre, a Major Muggeridge, wrote that the ‘pre-war state’ of ‘East African Intelligence’ had been one ‘of Parochialism.’\textsuperscript{174} That it was, but it was not so for the want of knowledge.

The failings of the Intelligence Department of the K.A.R. are apparent, and, evidently, were apparent to those involved. Nevertheless, there were five years between the establishment of M.I.5. in 1909 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 for M.I.5. to have remedied the situation from a different angle; from that of imperial military colonial intelligence. On examination, the answers for why M.I.5. did not remedy this situation can be split into two categories: imperial (in the United Kingdom) and local (in the East Africa Protectorate):

**Imperial**

**The Structure of the Intelligence Services**

M.I.5. have stated that after Vernon Kell and Mansfield Cumming jointly established the Secret Service Bureau in the autumn of 1909 in the United Kingdom they decided that, in order ‘to fulfil the Admiralty’s requirement for information about Germany’s new navy’

\textsuperscript{173} Hordern, Military Operations, p.16.
(then considered the most pressing matter that required the gathering of intelligence) it would be better to ‘divide their work’ up. ‘K’ (Kell) became ‘responsible for counter-espionage within the British Isles’ (the future M.I.5.) whilst ‘C’ (Cumming) became ‘responsible for gathering intelligence overseas’ (the future so-called M.I.6.). The evident omission here is that there appears to have been nobody who was responsible for counter-espionage, or counter-intelligence more generally, overseas in the British Empire.\footnote{175} Thus, from the start, Britain’s secret service broke Henderson’s fourth point, for there was no counter-intelligence within the ‘overseas’ intelligence portfolio.

The Magnitude of Work

In a letter that he sent to the Colonial Governors concerning colonial ‘counter-espionage’ in August 1915, Andrew Bonar Law, then the Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote that the ‘Pressure of work at the War Office has prevented this question from being dealt with before, by the Bureau [M.I.5.] concerned.’\footnote{176} Given the magnitude of the Great War, this provides a reasonable explanation as to why ‘[this] question’ of colonial intelligence was only being considered in August 1915: one year after the outbreak of the hostilities. It does not provide an explanation for why M.I.5. had failed to deal with ‘this question’ in the Empire before the outbreak of war when it had dealt with it in Europe.

M.I.5. themselves offered an explanation to this some years later. After the end of the First World War they wrote that ‘this question had been under consideration even before the outbreak of war, and had only been deferred owing to the enormous volume of work which had to be dealt with in other directions.’\footnote{177} A subtle, but important, difference, is noticeable between the two: the ability to perform this work had been above M.I.5.’s structural ability prior to the First World War, not just during the first year of it. The outbreak of war had therefore presented an opportunity of growth to the bureau.

\footnote{175} MI5. *The Security Service*, p.35.
But Hordern, as written above, wrote that the War Office had wished to collect ‘information of military value regarding East Africa’ in 1911, and only did not because the idea was ‘negatived by the Government of the British East Africa Protectorate in the interests of a pacific policy.’ And that, ‘as early as 1904’ the ‘Army Headquarters in India’ had suggested the same thing, ‘but nothing came of it.’ So exactly when this idea came about in London seems to be a little confusing; different people seem to have had different recollections.

The two different answers for this category intersected with one another. The structure of Britain’s intelligence establishment had been designed in such a way that counter-intelligence work away from the United Kingdom was in neither Kell’s or Cumming’s original remit, whilst the amount of work, coupled with limited resources and apparent obstructions from others, had prevented Kell from resolving the discrepancy: either prior to the First World War – if one believes M.I.5.’s recollection of the event – or during the first year of the First World War – if one believes Bonar Law’s 1915 letter – or 1911, supported by 1904 – if one believes Hordern.

What appears to be the conclusion here is that Kell was simply given so much work to undertake that the colonial aspect to his counter-intelligence work was side-lined with the genuine intention that it would be undertaken in the future; the First World War simply accelerated the timetable.

Local

In November 1915 Major Notley, the Provost Marshal of the East Africa Protectorate, stated that ‘Previous to the outbreak of war no Counter Espionage Bureau existed in British East Africa or Uganda, and the very comprehensive German system of espionage, which has since come to light, was neither suspected or appreciated. This was due to:’

‘[The] unsuspicious nature of the British character.’
Notley appears to be implying here that the idea that one or one’s enemies could, or would, use intelligence was so foreign to the character of the British that it would not enter their heads to suspect such an eventuality. This seems to be ironic, when one considers that Notley wrote this statement in a memorandum to Kell after receiving the letter written by Bonar Law on the matter quoted from above, to say nothing of the history of intelligence use by the British as was observed earlier in this chapter. Perhaps, rather, what Notley meant was that the thought that the Germans might be using such tactics in the East Africa Protectorate, or the British Empire in East Africa more widely, had not entered his mind, nor the minds of his peers in the administration of that Protectorate, nor the minds of the officers of the K.A.R., and that this was surely down to ‘the unsuspicious nature of the British character’, rather than any neglect on their part.

In this scenario, the answer given for why there was no imperial counter-intelligence establishment prior to the outbreak of the First World War in East Africa seems to be that Notley and his peers did not believe in the morality of such work. The real answer from this scenario – if one assumes that a Provost Marshal and the entire British administration of the East Africa Protectorate and all the officers of the K.A.R. did not genuinely have a moral objection to this type of work – seems to be that Notley and his peers simply did not consider the idea at all.

‘[The] fact that no officer or department was specially detailed for such work.’

This appears to be a much more credible, if rather straightforward, reason given by Notley. The lack of an officer or department employing somebody to do ‘such work’ as counter-intelligence provides a perfectly plausible reason for the absence of anybody doing ‘such work’. No one was there to realise that ‘such’ work was needed or was being missed, and so therefore it was not undertaken. 178

Taking these answers together, the blame for the lack of an imperial counter-intelligence establishment covering threats to the British Empire’s security in East Africa does not seem to have existed with any one person. In the years leading up to the outbreak of the First World War there must have been multiple people for whom the need for a counter-intelligence establishment in East Africa passed straight by. These included such departments as: the British administration of the East Africa Protectorate; the K.A.R.; the Colonial Office; the War Office; the India Office; M.I.5. Nevertheless, it was the British Imperial Government who was ultimately responsible for ensuring the security of the British Empire.

Intelligence Acquisition in the German Empire prior to the First World War

This thesis is not concerned with the structure of German imperial intelligence, except for when an understanding of it is necessary for the examination of the central research question. This is one of those occasions, for it would be incorrect to imply that German imperial intelligence was systematically organised to bring about the subversion of the British Empire on the outbreak of the First World War. In respect of his statements quoted above, Popplewell has cautioned that ‘it would be misleading to speak at this time of a German secret service organized for the destruction of the British Empire. The Intelligence Bureau for the East [a branch of the German intelligence system that was responsible for subversion in India] gathered suitable officers wherever it could find them. The Germans who worked for it mostly combined their intelligence functions with their original jobs.’¹⁷⁹

What is clear is that the Germans had developed a skilfully organised traditional intelligence service in the pre-First World War era and had deployed themselves into East Africa unseen by their British counterparts, due to the latter’s lack of an imperial counter-intelligence establishment.

The main historical subject matter of the document entitled ‘Organization of Secret Service’ previously mentioned was a concise analysis of the performances of the respective

intelligence services of Germany and France during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Its conclusions were ones that were full of praise for the former’s intelligence service and full of condemnation for the latter’s, and it suggested recommendations for the development of Britain’s intelligence service to prevent it from arriving at the same ominous situation as the French service did during that war.

The main thrust of the argument is that ‘The French failure in 1870 was largely due to [the] want of [a] Secret Service,’ whilst ‘The German [intelligence] system in France 1870-71 was carefully prepared some years before.’ The French War Minister, realising the mistake, attempted to formulate a French Secret Service on 14th July 1870 by wiring to General Frossard (Charles Auguste; Général de Division dans l’armée française) ‘“Improvise a Secret Service: I allot you one million francs; you will be the eyes of the army.”’ With war on 19th just five days away, ‘It was too late’ for such an action, for ‘the Prussian general staff was famed for the precision and accuracy of its intelligence and war-planning’ at this time; ‘[Planning] and organization were... strengths,’ according to Geoffrey Wawro, which were ‘not conspicuous in the French Army.’\(^\text{180}\) As the French learnt to their great cost, launching an effective ‘Secret Service’ in a time of war is very difficult, and can even be used as a weapon for the benefit of the enemy, for ‘the French found themselves actually dependent on the agents the Germans chose to send them, and were misled.’\(^\text{181}\) The conclusion that was clearly to be drawn from the account of this story was that it is imperative to have established such a ‘Secret Service’ some time prior to the commencement of hostilities, or else risk defeat.\(^\text{182}\) Evidently, the Germans were in possession of such a conclusion.

Along with the testimony of the planter hitherto cited, evidence that the Germans of German East Africa were preparing for the possibility of hostilities commencing between themselves and the British Empire in the region can also be seen in the reminiscences of


\(^{181}\) TNA: KV 1/1: ‘Organization of Secret Service.’, p.2.

\(^{182}\) It would be wrong to give the impression that the German’s use of intelligence was flawless during this conflict. In, for example, Henderson, David. The Art of Reconnaissance Third Edition (London; His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1914), pp. 15—17, Henderson examines the German’s poor use of military reconnaissance and the impact that this had. Whilst it certainly had its flaws, the German’s were certainly much better than the French at planning and utilising this particular skill, and it was a substantial support in the former’s defeat of the latter on the latter’s ground in less than ten months.
Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, as examined in the previous chapter. The Germans had thus organised, as Notley termed it, ‘the very comprehensive German system of espionage’ that only came ‘to light’ after the hostilities had commenced and which was ‘even then being employed to gain information of our movements etc.’

Notley wrote that ‘The following [were] the known channels of German Espionage in British East Africa before the war:’

1. ‘Military Officers visiting the Colony on shooting or other expeditions.
2. Enemy subjects employed on the Uganda Railway.
3. Enemy subjects residing in the Colony as scientific collectors etc.
4. Enemy subjects in Government Departments.
5. Missions.
7. Certain neutrals, having business relations with the enemy.’

The Major gave no analysis about the importance of the intelligence that had already crossed from the East Africa Protectorate into German hands. However, an analysis for the same situation has survived from Uganda. There, ‘the local German and Austrian merchants and planters were believed to have been in possession of all available [intelligence] information’ which, one can presume, was relayed to their respective governments. It was also believed ‘that reports may also have been sent to the German and Austrian Governments by the various scientific parties who periodically visited the Colony [sic].’

Since M.I.5. was to later concede that it was the East Africa Protectorate ‘more than in any other colony [sic], [where] the disadvantages arising from [the] lack of any organisation for dealing with espionage, had been seriously apparent at the beginning of the war’, one must assume that the situation there was even worse than the situation in the Uganda Protectorate.

With the focus on planting military officers, their own ‘subjects’, and neutrals involved in business in situations where intelligence could be gleamed, the pre-First World War

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184 Ibid., p.139.
‘channels of German Espionage in British East Africa’ were not focused on the ‘special feature... to foster and encourage any movements of unrest and sedition directed against the British Empire’ but on more traditional uses of intelligence: gaining ‘information of our movements etc.’ 186

This ‘special feature’ was not absent. George Wyman Bury wrote that ‘Quite early in the War those of us who had to deal with pan-Islamic propaganda realised that the widespread organisation which Germany had grafted on to the original Turkish movement must have existed some time before the outbreak of actual hostilities.’187 A British Foreign Office report from October 1915 detailed the issues that had been occurring on German East Africa’s southern border with Portuguese East Africa. There, German agents had been ‘preaching a Holy War, in the name of the Sultan of Turkey, among the natives of the Nyassa territory, especially among the Mussulmans [sic], and [were] endeavouring to stir the natives up generally’ early on in the War.188 As will be examined in Chapter Five, the Germans of German East Africa had been promoting Pan-Islamism in East Africa prior to the outbreak of the First World War. Nevertheless, as far as East Africa was concerned this ‘special feature’ was not a priority for Germany at this time; traditional methods of intelligence acquisition to gain intelligence on military matters was at the fore.

The German method was vindicated when they won the Battle of Tanga in November 1914. The loss was disastrous for the British Empire, who, along with failing to prevent German acquisition of military intelligence, had failed to adequately prepare their own military intelligence on the German military.189 The consequence was that, unlike in the other campaigns of the African Theatre of the First World War, the East African Campaign would last for all four years that were to pass until the Armistice. Therefore, after identifying this threat the British turned their attentions to preventing any further intelligence acquisition by the Germans in the British Empire in East Africa. Apparently losing the East African Campaign, the British were concerned only with preventing this, and not with Germany’s ‘special feature’ of using Pan-Islamism to subvert the Empire. The call for jihad occurred less
than a fortnight after the Battle of Tanga, but there was as yet little to tie them together in
the minds of the officials of the British Empire in East Africa.

**Imperial Counter-Intelligence in the British Empire in East Africa: 1914-1915**

In addition to his wartime post as Provost Marshal, Major William Notley was also the
Commissioner of Police of the East Africa Protectorate’s police force. It was for this reason
that he undertook the work countering German intelligence in the East Africa Protectorate
in the early First World War period; accordingly, he was chosen by the Governor of the
Protectorate to correspond with Kell at the request of the Colonial Office. This
memorandum was entitled *Memorandum on the Employment of a Counter Espionage
Bureau in British East Africa* and was compiled and sent in November 1915.

At the outbreak of the First World War there had been approximately ‘125 enemy subjects’
– citizens of Germany or Austria – who were known by the British authorities to be resident
in the East Africa Protectorate, the Uganda Protectorate, and the Sultanate of Zanzibar. On
7th October and 11th December 1914 respectively, eighty-five and thirty-two of them were
deporated from East Africa to India. At an unknown date or dates between 12th December
1914 and 30th November 1915, a further five were also deported. Major Notley was thus
able to write in his memorandum to M.I.5. that ‘no enemy subject of a dangerous character
is now resident in B.E.A.’ (British East Africa: the East Africa Protectorate).

However, he was also forced to report that these deportations had ‘by no means removed
the dangerous element’ present within the Protectorate’. Of the several different concerns
he had uncovered, he cited in particular that the ‘Persons of enemy parentage who had
recently become naturalised American, Russian, Swiss and even British subjects, were even
more suspected than enemy subjects.’

**Missions**

The promotion of Christianity was used by the European empires as justification for their colonial ambitions; therefore, there were multiple mission stations dotted around East Africa. These were useful for German intelligence purposes for two reasons: they provided a large number of sympathetic people who possessed legitimate reasons for being in the East Africa Protectorate, and these people had access to ‘educated Africans who, from their local knowledge, would prove most useful.’ Notley stated that he ‘believed’ that the Missions had been ‘the most fertile ground for the seeds of German espionage.’ They had been ‘tampered with and perhaps heavily subsidised by the German Government.’ Some had even been ‘placed on likely Lines [sic] of advance from German East [Africa] into British East [East Africa Protectorate].’

Notley recorded that missionaries were ‘believed to [have been one of the two] channels of enemy espionage’ that the Germans had been able to continue to employ in the Protectorate ‘after the declaration of war.’ This was because ‘A large number’ of them employed ‘either enemy subjects or neutrals of enemy parentage and sympathy’, and ‘The American Missions [contained] a lot of German-Americans.’ Consequently, whilst all of the enemy subjects were deported, many who were sympathetic to the German cause still remained. Through Notley, the British Empire investigated these people; all those who were suspected had ‘their movements and correspondence watched, and in many cases [had their] free movement... restricted.’ If the threat level increased from ‘suspected’ to ‘suspicion’, ‘the individual [was] deported at once, it being considered that this method [was] safer than allowing the individual to remain in residence in the hope of securing a conviction.’

‘Secret Agents resident in British East Africa’

The second of the two ‘channels of enemy espionage’ that the Germans were able to continue employing in the Protectorate ‘after the declaration of war’ was the work of the ‘Secret Agents [who were] resident in British East Africa.’ Notley divided them into six groups:

192 Ibid., pp.138—139.
1. ‘Enemy subjects.’
2. ‘Cape Dutch.’
3. ‘Recently naturalised neutrals of enemy extraction.’
4. ‘Somalis.’
5. ‘Other Africans.’
6. ‘Indians.’

To counteract their work, Notley recorded that ‘The methods employed in Counter Espionage work [were] principally as follows.’:

1. ‘Agents Provocateurs.
2. Intercepted correspondence, Postal and Telegraphic.
3. Police enquiries
4. Secret Agents both European and Native.
5. Enemy subjects in our pay.
6. Coercion and intimidation.’

Due to the limited number of surviving documents it is impossible to fully see how these methods were employed by Major Notley. Nevertheless, enough can be gleaned to give one an understanding. Only records pertaining to the former three methods remain. Thanks to the passage of time one must now take Notley at his word that the latter methods were also used.

**Successes**

The employment of Agent Provocateurs was entirely recorded in relation to an episode that concerned the Afrikaner ‘Cape Dutch’ population of the East Africa Protectorate. As examined in Chapter One, there was a small population of Afrikaners who arrived in the Protectorate in between the end of the Second Boer War and the outbreak of the First World War. Although, like all other European powers, Germany had remained neutral during the Second Boer War, the German population had sympathised with the Afrikaners in their fight against the British Empire. This feeling was exploited by those in power in

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193 Ibid., pp.139—142.
Germany who wished to use the situation to procure the passage of Tirpitz’s Naval Laws, which were to allow for Germany’s navy to be built up to compete with Britain’s Royal Navy, by the Reichstag.\textsuperscript{194} For several reasons not entirely relevant here, in the end the Germans ‘firmly rejected all proposed interventions by third powers’ in the Second Boer War, which ‘was undoubtedly of great assistance to Britain’s war effort.’\textsuperscript{195} Nevertheless, the knowledge that Germany had been pro-Boer was not quickly forgotten by the Afrikaners.

Thus, at the time of the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 many in the British Government well recollected both the German population’s sympathies with the Afrikaners and the German Government’s potential use of Britain’s difficult relationship with them to increase their own military capabilities at sea. For this reason, the Afrikaner population present within the East Africa Protectorate was a source of concern for the British authorities, as it was an obvious environment from which pro-German espionage activity could emerge; an activity that could threaten the security of the British Empire.

Referring exactly to this concern, Major Notley wrote in his memorandum that ‘It is known that soon after the declaration of war, the enemy made great efforts to secure the sympathy and active co-operation of a Dutch Community resident on the “Uasin Gishu Plateau.”’ Knowing that his audience in London were in full possession of the history of the Afrikaner population of the East Africa Protectorate, he continued without elaboration:

‘Very little response was made, though certain individuals, very much in the minority were inclined to listen. Those Dutch, suspected of disloyalty were closely watched and “tested” by Agents Provocateurs. One man only fell, and he was at once deported. From that time, which was nearly coincident with the fall of German South West Africa, no further suspicion has rested on the Boers of British East [Africa], who are now loyally and actively assisting our forces.’\textsuperscript{196}


\textsuperscript{195} Kröger. ‘Boer War’, p.37.

\textsuperscript{196} TNA: KV 1/16: Notley. ‘Appendix M.’, p.140.
That this ‘one man’ fell to Agent Provocateurs whilst the fighting in German South-West Africa was underway was not coincidental. Because of the moral support offered by Germany in the Second Boer War many of the Afrikaners still residing in South Africa were in return sympathetic to the German cause in South-West Africa, with which it shared a land border, and were not best pleased at the idea of fighting against them there for the British Empire in the South-West Africa Campaign. Partly because of this, a Boer rebellion, sometimes known as the Maritz Rebellion, erupted in the September of 1914. 10,000 to 20,000 Boers revolted, and were met by General Botha, then the Prime Minister of South Africa and a Boer himself, with a force of 30,000 Unionist soldiers. To prevent inflaming the situation still further, Botha had wisely chosen for these 30,000 Unionist soldiers to be Boers. The rebellion was mostly over by the November, and officially ceased in February 1915.\textsuperscript{197} Although this all took place a great distance from the East Africa Protectorate, the Afrikaners of East Africa had retained ‘ethnic linkages’ – ‘die Suid’ – with the Afrikaners of South Africa through family, education, and the church, and so the Afrikaners of East Africa must have quickly heard about the rebellion in the South through these links. Although the South-West Africa Campaign concluded in early July 1915 after only five months, because of the Maritz Rebellion the invasion had been delayed until the March of that year and martial law was only declared in German South-West Africa in the May. It is therefore plausible that a man on the other side of the continent would still be inspired by the failed Maritz Rebellion and still believe in German strength – as well as harbouring anti-British sentiments (even if they were not enough to prevent him from settling within the East Africa Protectorate) – in the late spring of that year when Notley implies his ‘fall’ took place.

Those Afrikaner settlers who had decided to stay and settle in German East Africa rather than follow most of their fellow travellers across the border to live under British rule in the East Africa Protectorate were especially unfortunate when confronted by the British Empire’s counter-intelligence effort. The British Empire interned them as enemies along with the German population when it invaded German East Africa in 1916, and eventually deported them to Germany after the cessation of fighting.\textsuperscript{198}


\textsuperscript{198} Du Toit, Brian M. \textit{The Boers in East Africa: Ethnicity and Identity} (Westport, Connecticut; Bergin & Garvey, 1998), p.2.
Although there is no explicit evidence to prove such a hypothesis, the evidence contained in Notley’s memorandum and Brian Du Toit’s statement in Chapter One does implicitly suggest that there was a logical basis for why the Afrikaner population of the East Africa Protectorate almost without exception did not attempt to betray the British Empire to the Germans. As those Afrikaners who were fervently anti-British had chosen to stay in German East Africa rather than join their peers and travel on to the ‘much greater’ advantages of the East Africa Protectorate, almost all of those who would have been so inclined to betray the British Empire had settled under German, rather than British, rule; they had inadvertently self-selected themselves out of the possibility of doing so.\textsuperscript{199} Luck, rather than the hard work of the Agents Provocateurs, was perhaps the real reason for this danger to British imperial security being eliminated. Nevertheless, the preferred outcome was the same.

According to the information provided by Major Notley in his memorandum, the employment of the ‘Police enquires’ and the ‘Interception correspondence, Postal and Telegraphic’ methods were centred on the actions of the European and Indian populations of the East Africa Protectorate.

As recorded in Chapter One, the European (white) population was relatively tiny proportionally to the African population, and this was beneficial to the British counter-intelligence effort in East Africa in the early years of the First World War, for it allowed the actions of this population to be easily tracked. Notley felt that the European community was ‘so small and inhabited areas so restricted, that European strangers could not possibly move about [the East Africa Protectorate, or, indeed, East Africa more generally] and hope to escape detection.’ Consequently, ‘the movements of suspected persons residing in British East [Africa] [were] very easily watched and there [was] little chance of their communicating with the enemy by correspondence or otherwise.’\textsuperscript{200} Notley’s assertions were put to the test in his prevention of enemy intelligence work conducted by ‘Recently naturalised neutrals of enemy extractions’.

The Major identified two key nationalities as a cause for concern: American and Swedish. (Curiously, in a previous comment on this issue within the same document, he had named

\textsuperscript{199} Du Toit, Brian M. \textit{The Boers in East Africa: Ethnicity and Identity} (Westport, Connecticut; Bergin & Garvey, 1998), p.2.

\textsuperscript{200} TNA: KV 1/16: Notley. ‘Appendix M.’, p.141.
four problem nationalities which had not included the Swedish: ‘American, Russian, Swiss, and British.’ He did not go on to discuss the latter three within the rest of the memorandum, seemingly because the enquiries that were made into their actions by the East Africa Protectorate’s police force did not warrant further examination, although he does not make this fact explicit. His exclusion of the Swedish in this first mention is more problematic. Excluding the possibility of it being a simple typing error, the only probable solution that stands out in the face of the evidence is that the Swedish problem was so large that it ought not to be associated with the other four, lest the reader get the wrong notions about the seriousness of them. His inclusion of British and Russians – who most assuredly were not neutral countries in the First World War – seems to be for convenience sake, as recently neutralised Britons and Russians of ‘enemy extraction’ could also have acted for the enemy for intelligence purposes in a similar manner to those of other ‘Recently naturalised’ non-enemy nationals. On the contrary, his inclusion of the Americans as neutrals in his assessment is correct here, for it was not until 6th April 1917 that the United States would declare war against the Germans.)

That Americans were suspected of acting for the enemy would have come as no surprise to Notley, for continual large-scale immigration to the United States in this era had truly made that country a melting pot of people, many of whom had no natural allegiance to the United Kingdom, and some of whom were actively in opposition to it. Yet, despite this melting pot, it was the Swedish, and not the Americans, who concerned Notley a great deal more; this was a concern that was to last for the entirety of the East African Campaign.

The claims made in the memorandum against the recently naturalised Swedish subjects of enemy extraction by Notley were that they had ‘shown a marked sympathy for the German cause’, and that although ‘nothing of a definite nature [had] transpired’ Notley seemed to be warier of them than the Americans. Unlike the Americans, the investigation into the Swedish did not end with the happy note of ‘none have been suspected of more than sympathy’. The British had to conclude that there was more going on within the Swedish population in the East Africa Protectorate as regarded German intelligence work, and so by the time of the writing of the memorandum in November 1915 their movements were ‘restricted and… closely watched.’
It was probably for the same reason as the missionaries that whilst ‘full enquiries’ were made ‘in all cases’ of ‘Recently naturalised neutrals of enemy extraction’, and ‘some arrests [had] been effected,’ there had been ‘no convictions secured’; deporting without trial was simply safer.201

Of the Indian population of the East Africa Protectorate, Major Notley wrote:

‘The low class of Indian in British East [Africa] and the Eastern [sic] love of money, coupled with sedition, has rendered all Indians suspect. There is little doubt that the enemy has employed them largely in prompting discontent among our Indian and African troops in passing over information over the border and in actively assisting enemy patrols etc.’

Along with their posts in commerce and the K.A.R., and their positions as indentured servants, the Indian population was, as examined in Chapter One, ‘largely employed on the Railways and in the Telegraphic and Postal Services’ in East Africa.202 This, clearly, placed the Indian population in a position of potential threat to the British Empire during the East African Campaign of the First World War; if swayed to an enemy, the Indian population could use these roles to threaten the security of the British Empire in the region.

Harald Fischer-Tiné writes that the ‘second objective’ of his paper on transnational and diasporic Indian nationalism at the eve of the First World War ‘has been to provide a litmus test for the hypothesis that the First World War constituted a turning point in the relationship between colonized and colonizing peoples, and thus can be seen as the beginning of the end of the imperial world order.’ Although his paper focuses on London, New York, and Tokyo, his evaluation here is also relevant to the Indian situation in East Africa. He writes:

‘To be sure, this war brought about new opportunities in terms of finance, arms supply, and transmission channels to spread the anti-imperial gospel as well as prospects to build new political coalitions. It is equally obvious that the atrocities on the European battlefields provided particularly powerful ammunition for anti-Western agitation. However, from a South Asianist’s perspective one is left to

201 Ibid., pp.138—140.
202 Ibid., p.141.
conclude that the importance of 1914 has been overstated at the expense of another global moment, namely the year 1905, which witnessed the coincidence of the Russo-Japanese War, the Swadeshi movement and the launch of The Indian Sociologist. As the history of the rapid growth of Krishnavarma’s worldwide anti-imperial web has once more underscored, it did not take the butcheries of Verdun and Gallipoli to instil doubts about European superiority and the legitimacy of existing global power-structures into the minds of colonized elites. Nor were they required to provide the discursive resources and organizational set-up to effectively challenge the ideological justifications of those structures.²⁰³

Although the Indian population of the Protectorate posed a threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa, the threat posed did not mature only on the outbreak of the First World War: it was already in existence. This placed the Indian relationship with German colonial intelligence more on a level with the Afrikaners than that experienced by the ‘Recently naturalised neutrals of enemy extraction’, for the Indians and the Afrikaners already had narratives which involved attempts to subvert the British Empire. Notley noted that ‘Several convictions’ of Indians were ‘secured’, which were ‘followed in some cases by execution’; with only one Afrikaner discovered supporting the Germans, more Indians were involved with subversive activities, although it is unknown what the relative percentages were.²⁰⁴ Notley did not record which methods were used to discover these Indians, although the context confirms that at least one of these methods was employed.

The previous history with subversion towards the British Empire from two of the four populations of the East Africa Protectorate, in addition to those persons deemed suspicious from within the white population, forced the hand of its British Administration at the commencement of the First World War. Notley recorded that ‘On the outbreak of War, the Intelligence Department [of the K.A.R.] and local Police Administration [his own department], working in closest co-operation, soon began to realize that an elaborate system of espionage had been in existence in the past, and was even then being employed’. The work that was quickly commenced was successful in stemming this ‘elaborate system’

and, as demonstrated, much of the hostile activities that had been undertaken by some members of the Afrikaner, Indian, and ‘Recently naturalised neutrals of enemy extraction’ populations. Off the seven ‘known channels of German Espionage in British East Africa before the war’ that Notley recorded, he wrote in his memorandum of November 1915 that they had all ‘been closed since the outbreak of war.’ As already stated, he also confirmed that ‘No enemy subject of a dangerous character [was] resident in’ the East Africa Protectorate by the same date. 205

Thus, having certainly prevented German intelligence from persisting to threaten the security of the British Empire in East Africa by employing counter-intelligence, at first glance the initial attempt of the British Empire in preventing the second of the two ‘channels of enemy espionage’ that the Germans had been able to continue to employ in the Protectorate ‘after the declaration of war’ seemed to have been a success.

The ‘greatest evil’

Notley wrote in comparative depth about the methods he had employed to prevent German espionage being conducted in the East Africa Protectorate through the four groups of ‘secret agents’ hitherto examined: ‘Enemy subjects’, ‘Cape Dutch’, ‘Recently naturalised neutrals of enemy extraction’, and ‘Indians’. Yet there were two further groups that he listed under this heading: ‘Somalis’ and ‘Other Africans’.

An examination of these latter two groups reveals that the initial attempt of the British Empire to conduct imperial counter-intelligence in East Africa was not a complete, long-term, success, despite the achievements listed above. By not ensuring a complete success at this initial attempt at counter-intelligence work, the British Empire allowed for the threat of Pan-Islamism to grow unabated in its East African Empire; a threat that was to threaten the security of that Empire in the later years of the East African Campaign.

The memorandum dealt little with the threat posed by the Somalis because by the time of writing Notley considered ‘the Somali question to be well in hand’. He was able to conclude this because that population was ‘closely watched and [had had] severe restrictions... placed

205 Ibid., pp.138—140.
on their movements.’ This population had been rendered ‘a likely source of leakage from
the Colony [sic]’ because of their ‘treacherous and scheming nature... and their lack of
nationality’, and ‘Some’ of the British Empire’s ‘Somali troops [had] deserted to the enemy,’
whilst ‘German Somali agents [had] entered the country from Abyssinia.’ Of which of the
six methods employed by Notley helped him come to this conclusion, no evidence was
recorded.

Notley split the ‘Other Africans’ section into two parts: ‘Arabs and high-class Swahilis’, and
the rest of the population. As practitioners of Islam for hundreds of years and descendants
of non-Africans, the former group were mostly exempted from the racial classification of
Islam noir and the derogatory stereotypes that went with it, as was illustrated in Chapter
Two, and thus they were considered more dangerous as they were considered more
competent. The Provost Marshal would therefore have undoubtedly been pleased to report
to M.I.5. in London that ‘On the Coast [sic], several Arabs and high-class Swahilians have been
tried and executed for espionage, but during the last three months such agents have been
quiet, due partly to our having caught and executed the Native Head of the German Secret
Service, who foolishly paid a visit to Zanzibar.’

The first of Notley’s comments on the rest of the African population of the East Africa
Protectorate, which included, but was not limited to, the Islam noir population, was one
which racially gloated about this population’s lack of mental ability and the ease that this
presented to the British imperialists: ‘Elsewhere, the simple and uneducated character of
the native, has not lent itself to espionage, and, except, as guides, their use is not of such
value. Their detection is comparatively easy and several convictions have been secured.’

But in the very same memorandum Notley was forced to retreat on two fronts. The first
retreat surrounding his statement that for those tribes who lived on ‘both sides of the
Border... this form of spy work’ [‘guides’] was rendered ‘particularly easy.’ Chapter One
briefly examined that due to their location over multiple different colonies and
protectorates, border tribes did not exist in a perfect state of submission to one coloniser;
thus, their usefulness as guides to transport people or knowledge across the borders

206 Ibid., p.140.
207 Ibid., pp.140—141.
erected by Europeans seems logical. There was no guarantee that the border tribes of the East Africa Protectorate were loyal to the British Empire.

Yet it is a contradictory statement, for in the section on ‘Christian Missions’ in the same memorandum Notley had written that ‘Missions are also peculiarly attractive to the enemy’s secret service as they nearly always contain a proportion of educated Africans who, from their local knowledge, would prove most useful.’ On the face of it this does not seem wholly contradictory; in the first instance Notley talked of ‘uneducated Africans’ and in the second of ‘educated Africans’: an important distinction. However, he stated that the value of the ‘uneducated African’ came from them being ‘guides’ to the enemy, whilst the value of the ‘educated African’ came ‘from their local knowledge’ and the useful information that this may have provided to the Germans. The former group of people, however, had ‘not lent itself to espionage’ whilst the latter were ‘peculiarly attractive to the enemy’s secret service’, despite them both being adapt at what appears to have been the same thing. Notley thus appears to have been downplaying the ability of ‘Other Africans’ to conduct ‘spy work’ that would be damaging to the British Empire, without having proofread his work to realise that he had contradicted himself on the same matter a few pages earlier.

The second retreat concerned the detection of ‘Other Africans’ conducting ‘spy work’. Whilst it was ‘[not] considered possible for enemy Europeans to enter British East as Secret Agents’ due to the work that had been conducted by Notley, Notley conceded that ‘With coloured African races it is different, and the enemy sends in numerous agents at most points of the frontier.’ Effort had been made to check this, he asserted, but it was not wholly successful: ‘A large number have been apprehended and dealt with, and the evil has been to some extent checked; but reliance that can be placed on native reports has proved to be so small, as to render their information of doubtful value.’

‘Their detection’ was therefore not ‘comparatively easy’. Instead, it seems to have been ‘comparatively easy’ to detect the other ‘enemy subjects’ on account of their skin colour. Notley reported that ‘In British East Africa, the European Community is so small and inhabited areas are so restricted, that European strangers could not possibly move about and hope to escape detection. For the same reasons, the movements of suspected persons

208 Ibid., p.139.
residing in British East are very easily watched and there is little chance of their communicating with the enemy by correspondence or otherwise.’ ‘[Several] convictions’ may well ‘have been secured’, but there was nothing in Notley’s memorandum that would correspond with his argument that the detection of ‘Other Africans’ acting in the name of German intelligence was ‘comparatively easy’.

Conversely, it appears that Notley was fully aware of these contradictions, despite his apparent lack of proofreading. He concluded that ‘Though [‘coloured Africans’] is the greatest evil we have now to contend with in the Colony [sic], we understand it does not concern you so much as the question of European Agents, and the matter will not be dealt with further.’

It is here that the proof lies for the argument that the initial attempt of the British Empire to conduct imperial counter-intelligence in East Africa did not maintain its promising beginnings: it could not maintain long-term success. This initial attempt was so focused on preventing the traditional acquisition of intelligence by the Germans that it failed to grasp, in spite of the evidence Notley himself presented, that the African population, and not the European population, of East Africa, was by November 1915 ‘the greatest evil’ to the British Empire. The first attempt at imperial counter-intelligence in the British Empire in East Africa did not diversify itself.

M.I.5. Inaction during the First World War

It is not true to say that nobody in London appreciated that there was a continuing threat from the population of East Africa to the security of the British Empire that needed to be countered; merely, it is true to say only that nobody appreciated that this threat needed to be countered during the years of the East African Campaign.

Notley explicitly stated that there was no cause to expand or improve the British imperial counter-intelligence effort in the East Africa Protectorate beyond that which had been practised in 1914 and 1915. ‘No Counter Espionage Bureau has been formed in this Colony

209 Ibid., pp.141—142.
since the outbreak of war’, he explained, ‘as all necessary work has been done by the Intelligence Department and the Provost Marshal’s Department.’

‘A Counter Espionage Bureau’ was in the pipeline for establishment in the post-war era; Notley’s ‘arrangements could only be provisional’, wrote M.I.5., because ‘it was impossible to make any changes as long as hostilities were going on’. M.I.5. recollected that ‘it was considered to be of the greatest importance not to lose sight of the desirability of organising a local system of counter-espionage as soon as War should be over, especially if there was any likelihood that German East Africa should remain in foreign hands.’

Notley propositioned that ‘At the close of hostilities... such duties should be delegated to a police officer, with full powers to act as he considers necessary, and who should freely consult the Senior Military Officer in the Colony [sic] on all necessary points.’ He may have wished to keep these ‘duties’ within the police force, but he did offer a practical consideration as well: the ‘tenure of office for Military officers in this Colony seldom exceeds 5 years’, he wrote, ‘and if such work were given to a Military Officer, continuity could not be relied on.’

Actions were undertaken to achieve this. It was recorded that ‘[The] outline of a scheme for the organisation of the special [counter-intelligence] Bureau after the war was prepared on 2nd February 1916, by an experienced authority on the subject of East African affairs and was sent to the Special Intelligence Bureau’, and that ‘[this] authority considered that it was absolutely essential for counter-espionage in East Africa to be handled as much from a military as from a political and police point of view, and laid special emphasis on the maintenance of close touch between the Head of the Bureau and the Officer Commanding Troops’. This authority’s proposal was ‘that the Head of the new Bureau should be a police official nominated by the Governor and that a Military Intelligence Officer should always be attached.’

But it is here that the trail runs dry; there are no surviving documents about the effectiveness of the British imperial counter-intelligence effort in East Africa between the

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210 Ibid., p.142.
end of 1915 and the summer of 1917. Furthermore, there are no references within the surviving documents that suggest that any such documents ever existed. After being informed that there was an effort being conducted in East Africa to prevent the threat that was posed to the British Empire from Germany’s traditional intelligence endeavour, and that this effort was fairly successful, M.I.5. appear to have lost interest in this situation for around eighteen months.

Accordingly, M.I.5., Notley, and the others involved with the production of Notley’s memorandum, which included Captain Meinertzhagen, must have all agreed in the winter of 1915 that this imperial counter-intelligence effort was able to adequately counter threats from Germany to get the Protectorate, and, ergo, the British Empire in East Africa more generally, safely through the East African Campaign of the First World War. 214

Conclusion

The initial counter-intelligence effort of the British Empire in East Africa was not structured to deal with the threat from Pan-Islamism in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War because it focused, almost exclusively, on the more traditional intelligence threats to the British Empire’s security that originated from within the non-African population of that region. The ‘very comprehensive German system of espionage’ was the main beneficiary of this activity, but the Indian sedition movement was also a recipient. Therefore, the threats that existed to the security of the British Empire from within the African population were, despite having been deemed the ‘greatest evil’, cast aside.

It was not that Africans were not identified as a source of threats against the British Empire in the first year of the First World War; merely that the threats posed by Africans were deemed unimportant and ignored on racial grounds. As will be examined in the following chapter, these threats, of which Pan-Islamism was dominant, grew to such an extent that by 1917 the British Empire was no longer able to ignore them: to do so would be to risk its security. In 1917 M.I.5. decided that Notley’s counter-intelligence effort was no longer

214 Ibid., p.138.
sufficient to deal with the growing threat of Pan-Islamism: the East African Intelligence Centre was born.
Chapter Five Identification: The Pan-Islamic Threats

An examination of how the entry of the European empires into the East African region fundamentally changed the local power structures was undertaken in Chapter Two of this thesis. A consequence of these changes was that Islam spread rapidly away from the coast into the interior, where Islam had hitherto remained largely absent for geopolitical reasons. This transformation of religious scope paved the way for Pan-Islamism to threaten the security of the British Empire in East Africa during the First World War. But a second event that further changed the society of East Africa had to also occur for this threat to transpire: the First World War itself.

The First World War allowed for two sources of Pan-Islamism to mature in East Africa: the German Empire, through German East Africa, and East Africans and the African diaspora. The former had an incentive to develop Pan-Islamism as an element of its ‘special feature’, whilst the latter, having converged in East Africa in a manner never previously seen, conversed about Pan-Islamism amongst themselves.

Two threats posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa were identified. The first, and lesser, threat was the traditional threat of Pan-Islamism: that of Pan-Islamic unity. The second threat was identified as being the greater threat; this was the possibility that another ideology, one that was more dangerous to the security of the British Empire than Pan-Islamic unity, yet one that was unable to spread easily on its own, could use the machinery developed by Pan-Islamism to grow itself. This ideology was Pan-Africanism: Pan-African unity.

Within the documents relating to Pan-Islamism in East Africa, the officials of the British Empire did not examine their interpretation of the term ‘Pan-Africanism’: a term without a single definition. It was simply taken by the British to mean “Africa for the Africans”: an Africa without the British Empire. The concept of an Africa without the British Empire would, by its very definition, be a threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa.
There were two sources of the Pan-Islamic movement in East Africa in the years of the First World War: the German Empire through German East Africa, and East Africans and the African diaspora.

The German Empire

The German Empire as a Source of Threat: Hypocrisy

The German Empire’s strategic plan to ensure victory in the First World War by using Pan-Islamism to subvert the British Empire was observed in Chapter Three:

‘... it was a special feature of Germany’s policy to foster and encourage any movements of unrest and sedition directed against the British Empire. Thus it came about that the... Pan-Islamic... [movement]... [was] supported and... promoted by Germany...’

Unlike in much of the Islamic world, the uniqueness of the relatively recent spread of Islam across East Africa meant that the Pan-Islamic movement was unknown in large parts of the region prior to the First World War. Thus, whilst in most cases the Germans planned to ‘foster and encourage’ the Pan-Islamic movement, in East Africa the Germans were also a source.

In East Africa the ‘policy to foster and encourage... the... Pan-Islamic... [movement]’ was centred around the German Empire’s only colony in the region: German East Africa. Germany’s attempt to promote Pan-Islamism through German East Africa required work on both the imperial and the local levels so that they could not only be a source of Pan-Islamism to the British Empire in East Africa, but also so they could attempt to counteract the hypocrisy that being such a source ensued.

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The ‘proclamation of the men on the Committee of Unity and Progress’ – the call for jihad – of the Ottoman Empire was ‘to the effect’ of:

‘The Lord of all Mohammedans declares holy war against the enemies of Islâm, who plunder the countries of Islâm and slaughter their inhabitants or reduce them into slavery, it is the duty of all Mohammedans in this world to take part in this war with life and goods; that therefore especially the Mohammedan subjects of France, Russia, and England are also obliged to participate in it; that those who neglect this duty and avoid the struggle incur the anger of God; that, however, Mohammedans who live under the rule of the said powers or their allies and help them wage war against Germany and Austria, the supporters of Turkey, commit a great sin that will certainly bring on the wrath of God.’

The evident drawback that was to be encountered by the Germans in their ‘special feature’ to use Pan-Islamism to threaten the security of the British Empire is that they too had an Islamic population in their own empire: particularly, although not exclusively, in German East Africa. If one were to declare war against those ‘who plunder the countries of Islam’, one would also have to declare war on Germany; something Germany would be somewhat unlikely to think was a wise idea to promote. By writing that ‘all Mohammedans... especially the Mohammedan subjects of France, Russia, and England are... obliged to participate in’ the War and that ‘Germany and Austria [are] the supporters of Turkey,’ the Ottomans clearly made a half-hearted attempt to circumvent this conspicuous problem in this proclamation, yet the final result remained clumsy and unconvincing.

Mustafa Aksakal has written that for Kaiser Wilhelm II, and many German scholars and politicians, ‘pan-Islamism meant the fomentation of resistance against formal and informal Entente imperialism, while Germany played the role of the liberator’. Such a strategy was clearly wholly hypocritical with the continued existence of German East Africa, and the other colonies of the German Empire. A reading of Christian Snouck Hurgronje’s pamphlet

The Holy War “Made in Germany.” offers the clarification that ‘the coal-black Moslems do not count for much even in the eyes of Turks and Arabs.’ A notion wholly consistent with the French idea of *l’Islam noir*, this would suggest that Germany’s continued rule over African Muslims was excused, for these Muslims were not considered by the Ottoman Empire to be true Muslims.\(^{218}\) Even with this explanation the problem does not entirely disappear, for the Swahili Muslims were not usually considered to be *Islam noir*, as was examined in Chapter Two.

On the matter of German imperialism more widely, Snouck Hurgronje wrote that the German Empire was not considered morally superior by being smaller than the British Empire:

‘Where no such natural obstacles existed [to imperialism], Germany took her part as greedily as the others; and in Africa she even has subjected two million Mohammedans to her authority, an authority which will not be found by those concerned to be less tyrannical than the British-Indian and North-African Mohammedans… find the British or French administration.’

He also implied that this hypocrisy did not go wholly unnoticed by the Ottomans, even if in 1914 they saw more benefits to an alliance with Germany than another antagonistic relationship: ‘The Sultan in his manifesto… mentioned the full three hundred million [Muslims of the world], at which the Kaiser estimated the adherents of Islām, as victims to be set free, and… thus by mistake included amongst them the two million German subjects and the Moslims under Austrian and Italian rule, not to mention any others.’\(^{219}\) The pretence was certainly noticed by Enver Pasha, the Minister of War of the Ottoman Empire. He was ‘perhaps more accurately informed about the realistic potential of pan-Islamism’ than the Kaiser, and he ‘reminded Berlin that the declaration of *jihad* would necessarily be directed against all ‘infidel’ powers, including Germany.’\(^{220}\)

Accordingly, from the very start of German support for Pan-Islamism, everybody involved, including the Germans themselves, knew that it was altogether insincere of the Germans to take the moral high ground and accuse the Entente powers of imperialism over the Muslim

\(^{218}\) Snouck Hurgronje. *The Holy War*, p.56.

\(^{219}\) Ibid., pp.55—57.

\(^{220}\) Aksakal. ‘Ottoman Intellectuals’, p.513.
population of their empires, when they themselves held imperialist power over a Muslim population in their own empire. Thus, using Pan-Islamism ‘to foster and encourage... unrest and sedition directed against the British Empire’ was something of a dangerous game for the German Empire; ‘pan-Islamism’ could result in ‘the fomentation of resistance against formal and informal Entente imperialism’, but that did not automatically mean that ‘Germany [would play] the role of the liberator’. The German Empire was a danger to the security of the British Empire because by fostering and encouraging Pan-Islamism they were a danger to colonialism entirely: Pan-Islamism could be seen as the movement of liberation.

Local Level

Despite the German Empire implementing this hypocritical approach, the administration of German East Africa was not lacking in awareness that the Islamic population of German East Africa could, if infused with Pan-Islamic ideas, be a danger to the safety of the German imperial project. Captain Philipps outlined the four phases that the relationship between the German administration and the Islamic population of German East Africa progressed through between the formation of the colony and the invasion by the British Empire in 1916, which demonstrated how it seesawed between co-operation and disunity. The threats that Pan-Islamism posed were not lost on those who navigated this changing relationship:

‘The policy of the German Government in East Africa towards Islam has passed through four distinct phases:-

1st phase: On occupation of the hinterland, the political power of the Arab-Swahili slave traders had to be broken, as being the most antagonistic element to white government. With this object in view the first official policy was anti-Islam.

2nd phase: Arabs, ex-Mahdists from the Sudan, Somalis, and Swahilis were enlisted to form the nucleus of the German Askari forces for the subjugation of the local central tribes. These were all Moslems... Muhammedans were everywhere encouraged during this period.’ The second official policy was pro-Islam.
‘3rd phase: In 1912-14 the local German administrations were very apprehensive of the increase of Islam among local native populations, as likely to threaten white supremacy by a black Pan-Islamic organisation. Hence the complete volte-face in policy depicted by the Moschi papers (1913).’ The third official policy was anti-Islam.

‘4th phase: During the war local policy had to be subjected to German Imperial needs, necessitating another change of attitude to Islam in the colonies, consequent on the Turkish declaration of Jehad.’ The fourth official policy was pro-Islam.\(^221\)

Elsewhere Philipps made his conclusion on this subject plain: ‘In spite of their first willingness to make use of Islam, conversations which I have had with German African administrators before the war showed clearly their apprehensions of what may be abbreviated into an “African Jehad”, viz, a conjunction of an African political Islam versus Europeans.’\(^222\)

Therefore, far from always being supporters of the promotion of Pan-Islam, in the immediate pre-war years the German administration of German East Africa had, due to their concerns about the local conditions and the impact that an ‘African Jehad’ could have on the security of the German Empire in East Africa, actively tried to hinder its growth in their colony.

Consequently, the German Empire as a source of Pan-Islamism in East Africa was hypocritical not only because Germany had little right to portray itself as an anti-colonial liberator, but because the security of the German Empire would itself be threatened if an African jihad came to fruition. The threat posed by the Germans to the entire European colonial project was rightly identified by Philipps as being a threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa.


The German Empire as a Source of Threat

With the exception of Abyssinia, which was not to be colonised until Mussolini’s Italians invaded in 1935, the entirety of East Africa was under some form of European colonial rule during the First World War. Either of the two threats posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa, Pan-Islamic unity and the use by another ideology, such as Pan-Africanism, of the Pan-Islamic machinery, would be a danger to all the European empires across East Africa: the German Empire included. It was somewhat ironic, therefore, that, due to the German Empire being a source of Pan-Islamism in East Africa, Captain Philipps was forced to declare in 1917 that ‘The chief danger zone [sic]... [for the] conjunction of Islamic propaganda with the cry of “Africa for the “African”... might be expected to be German East Africa’. German East Africa was therefore both a source of Pan-Islamism and a potential threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa. Had the German Empire achieved full success with its fostering and encouragement of Pan-Islamism in this region, the phrase ‘Africa for the African’ may have been heard on the streets of Dar-es-Salaam: the Germans may have won the War but lost their empire.

Philipps’ reasoning for why German East Africa was ‘the chief danger zone’ centred on three factors:

The first factor was that German East Africa was ‘common ground for Pan-Islam and Pan Africa.’ Located in the centre of East Africa, it was well placed geographically to not only be a source of Pan-Islamism to the region but to also be a meeting place of both the Pan-Islamism that came from the northern parts of Africa and Pan-Africanism from the south. As will be examined later in this chapter, the First World War was the catalyst for the movement of a great number of Africans to the locality of German East Africa; its central location became important for the spread of ideologies.

The second factor was that in 1917, after the British Empire’s invasion of German East Africa, Philipps had found ‘The Arab-Swahili (i.e. educated) element in German East Africa’ to ‘still [be] sullen’ and to be a population that ‘generally [preferred] German rule, though

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224 Ibid.
not so ill-advised as to admit it.’ ‘The German pre-war policy’, he stated, ‘was to enlist, by commercial fellowship, the sympathy of this element as a buffer state against native rebellion’: the ‘2nd phase’ recorded above.\textsuperscript{225} The German Empire had been a source of Pan-Islamism to this ‘Arab-Swahili’ population, which had turned many of them against the British Empire.

This ‘commercial fellowship’ focused primarily on one issue: The Eastern Slave Trade. The German administration had produced propaganda on this subject which placed them in a positive light and the British Empire in a negative one.

As previously examined in this thesis, the Eastern Slave Trade had been a significant part of the economy in eastern Africa until its termination at the hands of the Royal Navy in the Nineteenth Century; it was this termination which helped to facilitate the spread of Islam throughout the interior of the region. The German Empire had, along with the other major European empires and several other countries, been a signatory to the Brussels Conference Act of 1890. The attendees of this conference stated that they were ‘equally actuated by the firm intention of putting an end to the crimes and devastations engendered by the traffic in African slaves, of efficiently protecting the aboriginal population of Africa, and of securing for that vast continent the benefits of peace and civilization’. Article I Section 2. of the Act – properly known as the Slave Trade and Importation into Africa of Firearms, Ammunition, and Spirituous Liquors (General Act of Brussels) – stated that ‘The gradual establishment in the interior, by the powers to which the territories are subject, of strongly occupied stations, in such a way as to make their protective or repressive action effectively felt in the territories devastated by slave hunting.’\textsuperscript{226}

Accordingly, the German Empire had confirmed in an international arena their intention to be a partner in both the interruption and the termination of the slave trade in Africa. Yet Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and Captains Philipps and Willis were able to discuss in the early summer of 1917 that in German East Africa ‘the temper of the Mohammedan natives is alienated from British rule since they have been taught by the Germans that the British are

\textsuperscript{225} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{226} Slave Trade and Importation into Africa of Firearms, Ammunition, and Spirituous Liquors (General Act of Brussels), signed at Brussels 2\textsuperscript{nd} July 1890.
responsible for the anti-slavery treaties and the Germans only carried them out to the letter, winking at the maintenance of old methods under the guise of labour contracts.’\textsuperscript{227}

William Mulligan has written an interpretation as to why the German Empire would be involved in the pomp of signing such an Act and yet subvert it via ‘the guise of labour contracts’. He states that the ‘proclaimed aims’ of the Act – ‘to eradicate the slave trade, to prohibit the importation of arms, and to regulate the consumption of liquor in Africa – seem either cynical or naïve when viewed in the context of the violent wars, brutal labour regimes, and economic exploitation which characterized the European conquest of Africa.’ Hence, whilst eradicating slavery was laudable, its eradication did little to unburden the continent from colonial oppression. When placed in a wider understanding of European colonialism in Africa Germany’s actions – terminating the slave trade but enacting a ‘brutal labour regime’ in response – were not outside of the norm.\textsuperscript{228}

Mulligan continues by arguing that this Act was never expected to be anything more than a gesture and that one should view the continuation of slavery under another name after its enactment by some of the signatories less as a disappointment and more as a ‘significant’ first diplomatic step on the long road towards the eradication of slavery:

‘Given that its promises and spirit were honoured more in the breach than in the observance, the gathering of the diplomats from Europe, the United States, and leading Muslim powers in Brussels in late 1889 and 1890 appears to have been little more than a talking shop. Yet the event in Brussels was significant in that it was the first diplomatic meeting of the major European powers devoted solely to the suppression of the slave trade.’\textsuperscript{229}

Be that as it may, the Germans were able to undermine the idea that it was the first step on a long diplomatic road by ‘winking’ that they had signed the Act only to maintain face diplomatically, rather than out of any sincerity to the cause of the eradication of the slave


\textsuperscript{229} Ibid., p.149.
In propagating this narrative, the Germans fostered anti-British feelings amongst the Swahili population of German East Africa who had once been slave traders. The British Empire identified that the pro-slavery propaganda would make the Swahili population of German East Africa more amenable to other ideas, such as Pan-Islamism, which were inherently anti-British.

‘The Turkish flag’, had, Philipps wrote for the Arab Bureau in 1918, ‘since the proclamation of Jehad, been flown together with that of Germany’ in German East Africa. Philipps argued that ‘A Swahili control is needed to meet this conjunction.’ Ergo, Philipps’ argument was that it would be necessary for the security of the British Empire to pull the Swahili population away from their loyalty to the German Empire, and to gain it for the British.

Although there was a focus on ‘the Arab-Swahili element’, the German administration also wished to ‘enlist... the sympathy’ of the entire Islamic population of German East Africa, and the entire Islamic population of the region more widely, and they attempted to accomplish this by the production of propaganda.

One mode of propaganda ‘took the form of personal correspondence and of printed proclamations in Arabic and Swahili, signed by Governor Schnee [of German East Africa] and the ex-Sultan Khalif of Zanzibar’. It was to be ‘continuously intercepted by [the British Empire’s] Military Intelligence Agents in the Uganda-Congo-Sudan area’ during the First World War.

In 1914 the Germans ‘at once endeavoured to exploit the personal element by instigating prominent Mohammedans [in German East Africa] to correspond with their former associates along the old slave routes in Uganda and the Congo Belge’. In the middle of the war, in ‘1915-16’, this mode of propaganda ‘assumed a new phase’ when it took the form of ‘Printed proclamations, with the green flag’ which were ‘despatched’ across East Africa. This ‘German-Islamic Propaganda... set forth:

1. The Jehad, laying down that Islam required of all true believers not merely a passive but an active resistance to the Allies.
2. Importance of Allied attempts against German East Africa.

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3. Certainty of eventual German victory in Europe, based on Allied territory actually held.

4. Consequent:
   a. Establishment of Islamic Empire of North and East Central Africa, under benign German “protection”.
   b. Assistance to be forthcoming for all rebellions, as Mohahi in French and Ali Dinar in Egyptian Sudan (Darfur)

5. complete failure of Allied attack on Stanbul (sic).

6. mutiny of Indian troops at Singapore.\(^{231}\)

The British Empire, through Philipps, did not leave any specific details on how many people this method of propaganda reached, or how those persons whom it reached responded to it, but the concern felt by Philipps was palpable. This concern stemmed from the ease at which the Germans were able to spread this propaganda, and the difficulties the British Empire, through Philipps, had in preventing it. ‘With one brigade only on a 300 mile front’, he explained, ‘it [had] been possible for native enemy agents to pass through our lines by night’ and, ‘Once through, every Mohammedan [was] a “brother”’. This was important, he continued, because the ‘native fear of legal complications or odium consequent upon betrayal of a co-religionist, even if his errand is divulged, induces the “friend” rather to pass on the agent quickly than denounce him.’ To diminish the possibility ‘of legal complications’ or any resulting ‘odium’, ‘Further agents were cleverly chosen by clan according to the area to be traversed, ensuring them at least tolerance and probable immunity from “betrayal” to the European.’

The ease at which the Germans were able to spread this propaganda ‘of personal correspondence and of printed proclamations’, and the difficulties that Philipps faced in preventing it, meant that, on understanding the scope of it, Philipps identified it as a threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa, for it spread the Pan-Islamic idea away from German East Africa to the wider region. As will be further examined in Part III of this

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thesis, Philipps was forced to neutralise this threat with ‘A vigorous counter-espionage by the pecuniary and political bribery of prominent enemy pagan chiefs’.232

The German administration of German East Africa also undertook a second mode of propaganda: newspaper publication. They used these newspapers to control the narrative of events depicted to the African population of their colony. Philipps was to summarise their importance when he himself wished for the British Empire to replicate their publication:

‘The German Government in German East Africa maintained two native papers containing items of news from each station and district, compiled by natives for natives under white supervision, with leading articles explaining any native legislation, and giving general ideas of the development of the country. These papers were published fortnightly and monthly. They had a wide circulation among all classes of literate natives and were a great assistance to the Administration. They were much appreciated by the natives’.233

These German newspapers ‘set forth German Imperial doctrine, local news, items from other German tropical colonies, and explained simply any new native legislation and [gave] general ideas of development of the country.’234 Elsewhere, Philipps wrote that these newspapers ‘were in great demand and exercised a quietly penetrating influence’.235 These newspapers supported and promoted Pan-Islamism and assisted in ensuring that the Islamic population of German East Africa received their news from a source that was fundamentally pro-German and, after August 1914, anti-British. As Part III will demonstrate, Philipps identified that if the British Empire was to replicate this idea they could be of use to challenging the Pan-Islamic threat.

The third factor for Philipps’ reasoning centred on the subdivision above: on the German Empire’s hypocrisy and its inability to maintain absolute control over their Islamic population and, consequently, the Pan-Islamic movement that they had released. Although

232 Ibid.
they were a source of Pan-Islamism into East Africa, the German Empire had limited control on how that movement then developed within the region. Although it had the potential to benefit militaristically from the impact of Pan-Islamism on the British Empire during the First World War, the German Empire was as much at danger from the threats of Pan-Islamic unity or the use of the Pan-Islamic machinery as the British Empire was.

A fourth factor, one that was not directly mentioned by Philipps but is always implied within his work and on which his three factors were built, is also of primary interest: that of the size of the Islamic population of the German colony.

Captain Buxton, in the document *Notes on Philipps’ Memorandum* that he authored in December 1917, agreed with Philipps’ assessment about the importance of German East Africa; he furthered this argument by directing the reader to contemplate the size of the Muslim population in the colony: ‘The chief danger zone, Captain Philipps points out, is German East Africa (where there are at present about 300,000 Mohammedans).’²³⁶ It is impossible to know the exact number of Muslims that lived in East Africa in this era, as census records of the African population were not kept with any accuracy. As previously stated, Snouck Hurgronje wrote that the German Empire had ‘in Africa... two million Mohammedans to her authority’. Of Germany’s three other African colonies, Togoland and Kamerun would have had Islamic minorities, whilst German South-West Africa would have had a small Islamic population. If Snouck Hurgronje’s number were correct, German East Africa would have had to have had some of these further 1,700,000 Muslims. It is possible that Buxton was referring only to the Swahili population. Whatever the true figure was, the Islamic population of German East Africa was clearly a significant minority.

Captain Bray wrote in March 1917 that ‘We [the British Empire] must constantly bear in mind that the active and propelling force lies in territories over which we have no control, in countries either independent or under the guidance of other Powers.’ Furthermore, he judged that ‘those working in countries over which we have little or no control are the more insistent in their endeavours.’²³⁷

²³⁶ TNA: FO 141/786/4: Buxton, L. ‘Notes on Philipps’ Memorandum.’, 19th December 1917.
²³⁷ TNA: FO 141/773/6: Bray, N.N.E. *Intelligence and Notes on the Pan-Islamic Movement*, 25th March 1917.
Thus, the Germans had an excellent start to the implementation of their ‘special feature... to foster and encourage’ Pan-Islamism ‘against the British Empire’ in East Africa: they had a large Islamic population that was under their jurisdiction, to which they could be the source of the Pan-Islamic movement in the East African region. This was not a factor that was under their control per se, but it was one from which they benefitted. The British, through Captains Buxton and Philipps, identified that this large Islamic population in German East Africa was a source through which the Pan-Islamic threat against the British Empire from the German Empire was being channelled in East Africa. If they wished to counter this threat they would have to counter this population.

The only way in which the British Empire could suppress the dangerous anti-British components of Pan-Islamism in this large Islamic population would be to implement policies that would suppress those anti-British components. The only way that that would be possible would be to successfully occupy German East Africa.

Despite the potential problems that implementing this hypocritical approach could have in German East Africa, the German Empire proved to be an active source of Pan-Islamism into East Africa in both the pre-First World War and First World War eras. The location of this colony allowed for the ‘special feature of Germany’s policy’ to use the movement of Pan-Islamism to threaten the security of the British Empire in East Africa. Without a dedicated imperial counter-intelligence establishment monitoring this threat, it took the work of a single man, Captain Philipps, to identify this threat; something he was unable to fully achieve until 1917.

East Africans and the African Diaspora.

The African Diaspora in East Africa

The German Empire as a source of Pan-Islamism in East Africa can be clearly seen from the surviving documents; their support and promotion of it was undertaken in such a way that allowed the officials of the British Empire to record it in a chronological manner. The same is
not true of the narrative of the African diaspora as a source of Pan-Islamism in East Africa. There, Pan-Islamism was not used as a ‘special feature’ of a country’s strategic policy. It was instead one of the several ideologies that were informally discussed in the imperial melting pot that was the East African Campaign of the First World War.

The East African Campaign of the First World War began on 3rd August 1914, and, after the aborted efforts of 1914, the invasion of German East Africa began in early 1916, led by Jan Smuts. Smuts brought with him a large army of white men from South Africa; 20,000 African labourers from East and West Africa were joined by Indian bearer companies to serve with them. Due to the political tensions in South Africa Smuts refused to allow black South Africans to participate, although a small amount of ‘coloureds’ were permitted to fight. From late 1915 onwards these latter troops mixed together in the East African region and then with the local African population before also mixing with the troops and civilians of German East Africa. Therefore, by the centre point of the First World War an African diaspora had been sent to, and was becoming scattered across, East Africa, joined in part by Indians.

Philipps wrote several documents dated 15th July 1917, one of which was jointly compiled with Sykes and Willis. In one of his solo documents, Philipps wrote about the mixing of these troops fighting in the East African Campaign. He recorded that ‘During 1916-17’, when the British Empire invaded German East Africa, ‘there has been an unprecedented meeting of the tribes of Africa campaigning in “German East”’. The wording of this document in the present tense submits that at the time of its writing this ‘unprecedented meeting’ was still occurring and was therefore a present concern. These ‘tribes of Africa’ were ‘Natives of the West African Coast and the Cape’, who had then ‘met those from Nyassa, East Congo, Somaliland, Zanzibar and Uganda’ in East Africa. ‘Natives... of the Cape’ would suggest that some black South Africans somehow did make it to East Africa, although he could also have been referring to the ‘coloureds’ recorded as having come from South Africa.

In the joint document, which was actually the notes of a conversation that had occurred on 29th June in Whitehall, these nationalities were chronicled in more depth. They detailed that

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in East Africa there had ‘been an unprecedented mixing of representatives of almost all the black races of Africans, Nigerians, Gold Coast natives, Hausa porters, Cape boys, Zulus, Matabele etc. meeting Sudanese, Azande, Baganda, Somalis and all the local tribes.’

Philipps listed that because he was ‘both Intelligence and Political Officer in an area from Rhodesia to Abyssinia and the Congo to British East Africa, [operated] in German East Africa and [spoke] the languages’, he had ‘been happily situated for the observation of effects resulting from this meeting of the tribes.’ It was happy for the British Empire that he was in such a position, for his documentation of the observed effects of these meetings did not make for light reading regarding their potential impact on the security of that Empire in East Africa. His diligence in not only performing his imperial intelligence work but thoroughly recording it stands him apart within the entire imperial intelligence effort in East Africa. Of the conversations amongst Africans converging in East Africa, he summarised:

‘Round the camp fires there has been much talk – in the lingua franca which never fails the African – starting from stomach and wife, and the distance which they themselves have been brought from home to hardship, and touching on the killing of white by black as illustrated before their eyes. True that the magnitude of a nebulous Empire is made known, but the increasing utilisation of black troops vice white is generally attributed to the lack of the latter, and the consequent doubtfulness of the result of the European struggle where white men are being decimated.’

Therefore, around the campfires of the East African Campaign, Africans from different parts of Africa conversed about the white imperialists whose war had arrived on the East African shore; they conversed not as docile members of a mighty British Empire, but as conscripted people who doubted the ability of the white colonisers to continue the hostilities without their input. Philipps doubted the ability of Africans to understand these concepts on racial grounds. He wrote that ‘“Liberal” ideas from the Cape and Sierra Leone [had] been discussed over the camp fires and a good deal of rather vague political generalisation [had] been

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implanted in minds ill-adapted to digest the matter or to use it properly’. He offered nothing to suggest that these ‘minds’ were ‘ill-adapted’ except implicit racial undertones.

There is no record that any oral history was conducted to record what exactly was discussed by these troops from a primary perspective. Philipps’ work heavily implied that he himself spoke to Africans about these conversations, but there is no documentary proof that he did so within the publicly available archives. It was recorded in cabinet papers in 1915 that ‘In the East Africa Protectorate... the reverse at [the Battle of] Tanga and our failure to make any appreciable progress during the course of a whole year have brought about a considerable change and reports state that our prestige has suffered considerably in the eyes of the natives.’ 1915 was before Philipps’ first surviving document on this topic in the publicly available archives was written, so it is possible that another person was also speaking to Africans and reporting to London at this earlier date; yet this could easily have also been Philipps. Knowledge of what Africans spoke about from a primary source would be hugely beneficial to the narrative of African participation in both early anti-colonial movements and the First World War in East Africa. Nevertheless, it is possible to continue to answer the central research question posed by this thesis, for this central research question is concerned with understanding how the British Empire attempted to achieve their goal of safeguarding the security of their Empire in East Africa during the First World War. How the British Empire perceived the threat, and how the threat actually existed, are two separate entities, and here it is the former, and not the latter, which is of interest. As was identified in the Introduction, further work needs to be undertaken on the African perspective.

The officials of the British Empire identified that two ideologies were prominently discussed around these campfires: Pan-Africanism and Pan-Islamism. From the surviving documents of the British imperial officials, it appears that the first of these ideologies was the more dominant topic of conversation.

In Pan-Africanism The Idea and Movement 1776-1963 P. Olisanwuche Esedebe examines the lack of an agreed definition for the term ‘Pan-Africanism’. His first statement was his summarised conclusion: ‘there is still no agreement on what it is all about’. He lists the

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‘major component ideas’ of the term: ‘Africa as the homeland of Africans and persons of
African origin, solidarity among men of African descent, belief in a distinct African
personality, rehabilitation of Africa’s past, pride in African culture, Africa for Africans in
church and state, the hope for a united and glorious future Africa.’ ‘With some
simplification’, he continues:

‘we can say that Pan-Africanism is a political and cultural phenomenon which
regards Africa, Africans and African descendants abroad as a unit. It seeks to
regenerate and unify Africa and promote a feeling of oneness among the people of
the African world. It glorifies the African past and inculcates pride in African values.
Any adequate definition of the phenomenon must include the political and culture
aspects.’243

Olisanwuche Esedebe’s approach is a useful approach to place here because it identifies
well the confusion that the British felt on observing the introduction of the Pan-African idea
into East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign. They repeated several times one
of the same segments that Olisanwuche Esedebe himself used: ‘Africa for [the] Africans’.
Sykes, Willis, and Philipps, on discussing the introduction of Pan-Africanism into East Africa
as a result of these fireside chats, observed that ‘Especially has the doctrine of “Africa for
the African” taken a definite form as an ideal in the minds of many.’244 Captain Beaton
specified that for the British Empire ‘the doctrine of Africa for the Africans… meant the
elimination of the European and governing power’.245 Unlike Olisanwuche Esedebe, the
British Empire examined the phrase ‘Africa for the Africans’ entirely through a European
gaze. Never was there a nuanced attempt by the British officials of East Africa to truly
understand what Pan-Africanism was; it was merely ‘Africa for the African’, which, by
default, was taken to mean an Africa without the British Empire.

Willis expanded on this perception in the following January of 1918. In this expansion, one
can see how the introduction of such an anti-colonial concept as Pan-Africanism to East

University Press, 1982), pp.1—3.
245 TNA: WO 106/259: Beaton, D. ““The Leader of B.E.A.””, in Memorandum on East and Central Africa with
papers on Pan Islamism and Ethiopianism. 5th July 1919.
Africa and East Africans during the East African Campaign was seen as a threat by the officials of the British Empire:

‘He [Philipps] contends that the introduction of ideas, more especially of a rather advanced political kind, from the natives of e.g. the Cape or Sierra Leone, to tribes who were already imbued with a considerable spirit of independence has been prejudicial to the prestige of the white man as a dominating race, that there has been already in existence a political conception of “Africa for the Africans” which previously was isolated within the borders of separate and unconnected tribes, who have come into contact with one another during the war and found sympathetic feelings on this subject… that what would otherwise be a heterogeneous miscellany of tribes unconnected by any binding tie is liable to be joined by the bond of Islam into an united whole with common religious and political ideals’. 246

It was in the last sentence of this statement that the concerns of the British were laid bare. The British officials of the British Empire in East Africa had observed that the changing power structures of East Africa in the decades prior to the outbreak of the First World War had meant that the previously ‘heterogeneous miscellany of tribes unconnected by any binding tie’ were now often joined by Islam. This phenomenon was, as examined in Chapter Two, observed by Philipps himself, who documented that: ‘Islam has a tendency in Eastern Africa to consider itself a political, as much as a spiritual force. Latterly Muhammedans have in this area tended to consider themselves a Muhammedan nation. So much so that in enquiring the tribe of natives one is frequently met with the reply “I am a Muhammedan”.’ 247

Whereas the Intelligence Department of the East African Force had confidently written in 1916 that ‘the tribes will not combine’, by 1917 Philipps was cautioning against using previously gathered information on tribes to make such conclusions. Such had been the growth of Islam and the upheaval of the First World War in East Africa that one could no longer write of tribal relations without serious references to these events. To use such

246  TNA: FO 141/786: Assistant Director of Intelligence. ‘A Note on Colonial Office Memo. “Africa for the Africans” and “Pan Islam”,’ Khartoum, 17th January 1918.
outdated narratives to understand the relationships between the tribes, and the potential for threat that this created, would render these sentiments misconstrued:

‘It may be urged that the incoherence of native tribes in Central and Eastern Africa, outside the littoral, renders any general conflagration improbable. One should, however, beware of arguing, now or subsequently, on any pre-war premises or relying on opinions not modified in accordance with the enormous upheaval of native thought brought about by the war in these parts. The case of Mopahi (Mopoi) who in 1916 destroyed two French garrisons on the borders of the Congo Belge and French Sudan, and immediately set about organising the surrounding tribes under an Islamic guise, is a case in point. The basis of his movement was anti-white.’

The reason for why the partial bonding of the tribes via Pan-Islamism was important for the doctrine of ‘Africa for the Africans’ was summarised by Philipps in a later appendix, written in October 1917, to his memorandum of July of the same year. This summary stated that:

‘Pan Africanism is scarcely likely to develop into a widespread Pan-African movement without some outside influence, such as political Islam. That is to say, an active “Africa for the black” movement is quite possible, for example, throughout a territory such as Portuguese East Africa under half caste leadership but such an influence would not normally penetrate, or harmonise of itself with similar organisations in say Ruanda [Rwanda; then a part of German East Africa]. In Portuguese territory, however, the Mulatto has both brain to conceive the idea and intelligence to organise parallel movements to one common end... Neither Islam nor Paganism are likely normally to be the least antagonistic to Pan-African feeling.”

Colonel French, a military intelligence officer at the War Office, clarified that for him ‘Ethiopianism (which I do not think finds its source in Abyssinia) is I believe by far the more dangerous to the white race, playing as it does upon the characteristic conceit and excitability of the African.”

A continuation of the lack of nuance showed by the British Empire to this threat, French and his colleagues considered the terms ‘Pan-Africanism’ and

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248 Ibid.


‘Pan-Ethiopianism’ to mean the same thing, and used them interchangeably. Philipps did not record his thoughts so openly nor so frankly, but the amount of work he dedicated to this topic demonstrated that his thoughts were analogous to those of French’s. He detailed how the outbreak of the First World War had brought about an eruption of anti-European sentiment amongst some parts of the African population. He wrote that ‘On the declaration of War there was a further outbreak of anti-Europeanism on the part of [the ‘Nabingi cult’ who lived in, but were considered ‘a foreign element throughout’, Rwanda] with such cries as: “We will get rid of the Europeans” etc’. Later in the same document he further furnished the danger posed by this ‘cult’ to his reader, and told them that ‘Members of this confederation were the actual agents who carried Pan-Islamic proclamations (1915) between the Moslems of German East Africa (North West) and the Arab Swahili settlements on Lake Albert, again illustrating the connection between Pan-Islam and Anti-White movements in Africa.’ Philipps realised that these people had, just like the ‘Mulatto’ of German East Africa, conceived ‘the idea… to organise parallel movements to one common end’.  

Bray wrote that ‘At first sight’ Pan-Islamism ‘does appear to be… disjointed and incapable of cohesion’ yet ‘on close examination… we see that this is not the case.’ This conclusion was drawn by looking at ‘what it has accomplished and in reality it has achieved a great deal. It has bound together the vast majority of educated men and an increasing number of the cases, in each individual sphere, it will do so to a greater extent in the future’. He continued that it had ‘produced a desire in individual countries for independence, which is being resisted in some, assisted in others, yet in none can the Power that governs be indifferent to its insistence.’ Whilst Bray wrote generally of the worldwide Pan-Islamic movement, his description matched the narrative that Pan-Islamism was a cohesive force across the tribes of East Africa.

These British imperial officials were quick to note that if East Africans took up an anti-European ideology the British Empire would be in their direct firing line. French wrote ‘It is likely that, in the future, the British Empire, as holding and controlling the greatest areas in

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252 Bray, Intelligence.
Africa, may provide a focussing point for a great rebellion of black against white and the Britisher will probably be regarded as the chief enemy of the black man or at least most of the converts to Ethiopianism will be found [there]’.253

Sykes, Willis, and Philipps documented that ‘Thus, apart from the dangers of Pan-Islam [Pan-Islamic unity] there is a possibility of the nationalist feeling being tainted by this very dangerous doctrine [of Pan-Africanism] if it is allowed to creep [into East Africa]…

Moreover,’ they continued, ‘the doctrine can be applied to Mohammedans and although admittedly a Turkish Jehad would find few followers, an African Jehad would be widely acceptable and would be likely to spread in a very alarming manner.’254 An ‘African Jehad’ was consequently identified by the British Empire as a security concern to that Empire in East Africa in the latter half of the First World War.

The African diaspora was a source of Pan-Islamism into East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign. This same community was also a source of Pan-Africanism. It was the identification that this latter movement could potentially use the structural machinery of the former movement to propagate itself that helped the British identify Pan-Islamism as a threat to the British Empire in East Africa.

East Africans as a Source of Movement

After it was imported into East Africa by the German Empire and the African diaspora, East Africans were important as a source of Pan-Islamism by moving it throughout the region. As examined in Chapter Four, East Africans had a greater ability than Europeans of moving without detection, and thus they were the obvious choice to move political contraband.

The movement of the German-Islamic propaganda previously detailed is one such example of East Africans as a source of Pan-Islamism. Without the ‘native enemy agents’ willing to move it through the British lines, the Germans would never have been able to disseminate their propaganda beyond their own borders. A similar scenario occurred to the south of German East Africa. During the East African Campaign, the British Empire also became

concerned about German support for the Pan-Islamic movement in Mozambique. This concern related to the porosity of the border between the colonies of Portuguese and German East Africa. Concern about the porosity started in earnest in 1915, when, despite rising tensions, Portugal and Germany were not yet at war. The British were concerned ‘that certain Germans’ were ‘endeavouring to profit’ from ‘the Department of Posts and Telegraphs’ in Nyassa ‘not [being] under the jurisdiction of the Head Office at Lourenco Marques.’ A letter from the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs recorded that there was:

‘little if any room to doubt that the traffic in food supplies and the passage of correspondence between... [Mozambique] and the neighbouring German Colony [had] been carried on since the outbreak of the war to a considerable extent, chiefly through the agency of the German Firms of W. Philippi & Co. and the Deutsche Ost-Afrika Geselleschaft, established at Mozambique... and other places in the Nyassa Company’s territory.’

Some of this intelligence was actually taken across the border by European Germans, which ‘doubtless’ caused ‘the death of several of our [British] men.

Although the British Empire had been confidently assured by the Portuguese Governor in Mozambique that they would clamp down on the passage of intelligence (and material goods, such as food) across the border in August 1915, the British themselves were not as certain of success. A Mr Siggins (a private citizen living in Mozambique who had several sources of intelligence and had made himself available to the British imperial authorities on

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255 See: TNA: FO 929/1: Passage of Food Supplies and Military Intelligence to German East Africa through Mozambique, 1st May 1915—31st August 1915; TNA: FO 929/2: Passage of Food Supplies and Military Intelligence to German East Africa through Mozambique, 1st August 1915—30th November 1915.

256 TNA: FO 929/2: No. 1419/15. Telegram despatched to the Foreign Office, London, in Passage of Food Supplies and Military Intelligence to German East Africa through Mozambique, 14th September 1915.

257 TNA: FO 929/2: No. 1360/15/44. Letter from Errol MacDonell to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, in Passage of Food Supplies and Military Intelligence to German East Africa through Mozambique, 6th September 1915.

258 TNA: FO 929/1: NO. 1360/15/44. Letter from A. J. Siggins, Portuguese East Africa, to Errol MacDonell, His Majesty’s Consul General, Lourenco Marques., in Passage of Food Supplies and Military Intelligence to German East Africa through Mozambique, 21st July 1915.
that regard) wrote that he had ‘no doubt that a certain amount of this illicit traffic [was being] carried on.’\(^{259}\)

Legitimate correspondence between Mozambique and German East Africa via the post office was soon banned. On 6\(^{th}\) September 1915 an order was published in Lourenço Marques stating that ‘all correspondence between any of the German Colonies in Africa and Portuguese colonies will in future not be allowed to pass through the Portuguese post office.’\(^ {260}\) The German authorities protested and ‘[insisted] that the Portuguese authorities should allow the free passage of correspondence, passenger and provisions across [the] frontier.’\(^ {261}\) Despite the implemented measures, Mr Siggins reported to the British in October 1915 that ‘correspondence between here [Portuguese East Africa] and German East Africa still continue native runners being employed to carry the letters’ to bypass these restrictions.\(^ {262}\)

By this point of the war Africans were crossing the border south into Mozambique in search of the food and employment they could no longer find in German East Africa, and the British Empire was using Africans as messengers to travel the opposite way to find useful military intelligence. As will be examined in Chapter Seven Subchapter Eight, the hand carrying of letters around Africa was comparatively easy for Africans as opposed to Europeans, and thus Mr Siggins was probably right that ‘native runners’ were still ‘being employed to carry the letters’.

Once Pan-Islamism had entered East Africa, East Africans themselves became a source of the movement. Their ability to move throughout the region spread Pan-Islamism further into the region than it would have otherwise been able to go.

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\(^{259}\) TNA: FO 929/2: No. 1356/15/44. Letter from His Majesty’s Consul General to Mr A.J. Siggins, Portuguese East Africa, in *Passage of Food Supplies and Military Intelligence to German East Africa through Mozambique*, 6\(^{th}\) September 1915.

\(^{260}\) TNA: FO 929/2: No. 1358/15/44. Letter from Errol Machonell to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in *Passage of Food Supplies and Military Intelligence to German East Africa through Mozambique*, 7\(^{th}\) September, 1915.

\(^{261}\) TNA: FO 929/2: No. 80/1508. ‘Telegram despatched to Foreign Office, London’, in *Passage of Food Supplies and Military Intelligence to German East Africa through Mozambique*, 25\(^{th}\) September 1915.

\(^{262}\) TNA: FO 929/2: No.1949/15/44. Letter from A. J. Siggins, Ibo, Portuguese East Africa to the Acting British Vice Consul, Porto Amelia., in *Passage of Food Supplies and Military Intelligence to German East Africa through Mozambique*, 22\(^{nd}\) October 1915.
Major Notley did little to dissuade Africans from spreading Pan-Islamism, nor undertaking any other antagonistic activity towards the British Empire in East Africa, in the first half of the First World War, but by the second half the British Empire, led by Philipps, had firmly identified that East Africans and the African diaspora were sources of Pan-Islamism in East Africa. Having identified the sources of Pan-Islamism, it remained for the British Empire to define the actual threats posed by Pan-Islamism to its security.

The Threats Posed by Pan-Islamism to the British Empire in East Africa

Two sources of Pan-Islamism in East Africa were thus identified by British imperial officials: the German Empire, who had proven to be an active source of Pan-Islamism into East Africa in both the pre-First World War and First World War eras, and the East African population and the African diaspora, who, as well as both importing and moving Pan-Islamism around the region, were also responsible for importing Pan-Africanism. Because these two sources were identified, the British Empire was able to identify the exact threats posed by Pan-Islamism in East Africa. Two interlinked threats were identified:

1. Pan-Islamic Unity
2. Pan-Islamic Machinery

Pan-Islamic Unity

The concern that Pan-Islamic unity would threaten the security of the British Empire in East Africa from the ‘diplomatic weapon’ viewpoint that had been espoused by the Ottoman Empire is largely absent from surviving documents about the Pan-Islamic threat in East Africa. As was observed in Chapter Three, the use of Pan-Islamism as a ‘diplomatic weapon’ against the British Empire did not work. As the Ottoman Empire did not have the religious power to execute such an action, a worldwide Pan-Islamic uprising would never have occurred given the circumstances of 1914. This holds true for the Islamic population of East Africa, both in 1914 and the years of the First World War that were to come after. All of
Philipps’ surviving documents on this topic were written in the latter half of the First World War, as were the vast majority of the other documents on the topic written by his colleagues; thus, when the potential for Pan-Islamism to threaten the security of the British Empire in East Africa was identified, the realistic potential for this threat to be formed by Islamic unification under the leadership of the Ottoman Empire had already passed. If the use of Pan-Islamism as a ‘diplomatic weapon’ against the British Empire had worked, then the German Empire in East Africa, acting as a source of Pan-Islamism, would no doubt have promoted the unity of the Muslims of the East African region with the Islamic population of the rest of the world as part of its ‘special feature’. How much impact this would have had on the internal security of the British Empire, history never found out.

Despite this failure, the potential for Pan-Islamic unity amongst only East African Muslims continued to pose a threat in the latter years of the First World War in East Africa. A major reason for the failure of the Ottoman-led jihad was because many Muslims did not recognise the Sultan as being the true Caliph. Such discord would not be a problem for a unification that was East African specific, as there was no such Caliph leading the drive for unification in East Africa.

There were three reasons why Pan-Islamic unity in East Africa remained a threat to the British Empire:

Firstly, if the Islamic population was to unify, this unification could then be used by another power for their own ends. Bray wrote in 1917 that ‘The danger lies, not so much in what the Mohammedan countries can accomplish of themselves, but what they can effect as a whole or by the agency of another Power, european [sic] or asiatic [sic].’ The Ottoman Empire had not managed to control such a unification, but this did not automatically mean that another power, such as the German Empire, would not be able to do so. Secondly, Bray explained that Pan-Islamic unity might be used to help the Islamic population of the world gain something else: independence. ‘There are thousands of sincere Mohammedans sincerely working for Mohammedan independence’, he wrote, and ‘there are thousands of more solid fanatics running before they can walk trying to bring about in a few years, a transformation requiring generations to mature. Gradually I have seen the ideal permeating the minds of

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263 Bray, Intelligence.
the masses.'\textsuperscript{264} Pan-Islamic unity in East Africa would be a direct threat against European colonialism.

These two reasons were in addition to the most ominous reason for why the potential for Pan-Islamic unity continued to be a threat to the British Empire in East Africa during the years of the First World War, despite the failure of the worldwide ‘diplomatic weapon’ style of unity espoused by the Ottoman Empire: the potential that other dangerous ideologies could make use of the structural machinery of Pan-Islamism to spread themselves across the East African region.

\textit{Pan-Islamic Machinery}

The Pan-Islamic machinery was the very structure by which Pan-Islamism was constructed in East Africa: the interlinked tribes and the communications between Muslims. It was the possibility that this machinery could be used by another, more dangerous, ideology to spread itself across the region that was identified as being the main threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the latter years of the East African Campaign of the First World War. The ideology in question was Pan-Africanism.

Captain Philipps, as the regional expert on this topic, was incredibly forceful in narrating the dangers that would be posed to the British Empire if Pan-Africanism was able to use the structural machinery of Pan-Islamism. ‘[A] very real danger’, he asserted in July 1917, ‘is to be apprehended from any conjunction of Islamic propaganda with the cry of “Africa for the African”’. Islam would at once provide a cementing factor [between the two], and consequent fanaticism would enormously increase both the military and political difficulty in dealing with the movement. Converts are notoriously more fanatical than those born in the cult.’\textsuperscript{265}

\textsuperscript{264} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{265} TNA: WO 106/259: Philipps. ‘Memorandum. “Africa for the African” and “Pan-Islam”’, 15\textsuperscript{th} July 1917.
Bray, in his more generalised essay, completely agreed with Philipps’ point about the difficulty that the British Empire would face ‘in dealing with’ Pan-Islamism if it became politicised. He wrote that:

‘History teaches us that ideals of nationality once instilled in the popular fancy can never be dispelled or suppressed... It can not [sic] and never will cease to play the chief role in mohammedan politics. We must but acknowledge that this is so and if it is true, can it not be equally true that two such communities, linked together on the common ground of religion and hope of obtaining government by themselves, may unite for a common purpose, and if two such peoples can unite there is nothing but the Occasion to limit the number.’

The use, by the probable merger, of Pan-Islamic machinery by Pan-Africanism, was thus identified as a threat to the British Empire, because dealing with such a merger would be incredibly difficult, and the numbers that it would involve would be great. There would therefore be a rapid spread of anti-colonial sentiment amongst the Islamic population of East Africa at exactly the same time as the British Empire was fighting the First World War. The British Empire had little reserves to spare to put down such an insurrection even in East Africa, where the guerrilla war propelled by Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck continued ever on, let alone from elsewhere in the Empire: the Third Battle of Ypres (also known as the Battle of Passchendaele) was about to erupt on the Western Front.

Philipps affirmed that ‘A Turkish Jehad has not been, and never would be, popular in East or Equatorial Africa, but an African Jehad is not an improbability and would meet with enthusiasm. The Muhammedan is the trading and travelling element. Propaganda travels quickly and unostentatiously by this means. Islam affords a free-masonry which is not hindered by custom, tribes, or dialect.’

He had identified a threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa which the British Empire would have to fight, and it would have to fight it without any significant access to troops or resources.

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266 Bray, *Intelligence*.
Conclusion

Having identified the threats posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War, and with the clear understanding that the British Empire was unable to offer to East Africa any significant increase in troop numbers or resources to counter the threat, the officials responsible for securing the security of the British Empire hatched upon a plan: prevent the further spread of Pan-Islamism in East Africa.

Buxton praised Philipps’ work; Philipps’ memorandum “Africa for the African” and “Pan-Islam” Recent developments in Central and Eastern Africa, Buxton wrote in December 1917, ‘[showed] that the war [had] created a danger in Eastern Africa which did not previously exist.’ 268 The actions and surviving documents of Philipps’ colleagues and M.I.5. in London attest to their agreement with this statement. The only word of dissent came from Sir Charles Lucas of the Colonial Office, and his objections were raised not on the potential threat of Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa, but to the lack of a threat to the security to the United Kingdom itself; ergo, it was of negligible importance. He claimed that he was ‘slow to believe in the possibility of African combination or of African Mohammedanism being ranged en bloc against England’, and in this he was probably right.269

On behalf of the entire British Empire, Captain Bray made the following statement to his readers in London in his essay:

‘We are seriously engaged in a war of the greatest magnitude, all eyes are naturally turned to Europe, but I most earnestly ask that this most serious question, so important to our Empire, should be seriously and fully discussed at our approaching councils.

During the war it has made steady progress, after the war it will make even greater strides.

268 TNA: FO 141/786/4: Buxton. ‘Notes’.
269 TNA: WO 106/259: Lucas, Charles. ‘Note on “Africa for the Africans”, in Memorandum on East and Central Africa with papers on Pan Islamism and Ethiopianism, 18th October 1917.'
We are working for such guarantees as will make for a lasting peace among the powers of Europe, such a solution can never be attained so long as the Mohammedan question is not seriously taken in hand.'

As regarded East Africa, London listened. Buxton wrote in December 1917 that ‘It is clear, at least, that some uniform native policy is wanted to deal adequately with the new situation.’ As Part III of this thesis will attest, by December 1917 policies of this nature and others were already underway. The goal was to prevent Pan-Islamism from continuing to threaten the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War.

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270 Bray, *Intelligence*.

271 TNA: FO 141/786/4: Buxton. ‘Notes’.
Part III: The Eradication of the Pan-Islamic Threat
The imperial counter-intelligence project of M.I.5.D. began in London in the summer of 1915, when Andrew Bonar Law, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, enclosed in a letter to the Colonial Governors of the British Empire ‘a secret Memorandum with regard to counter-espionage which has been drawn up in the War Office.’ This secret memorandum declared that ‘The present war has brought into prominence the importance of arranging for the widest possible interchange of Confidential Intelligence bearing especially upon the activities of hostile secret service agents “throughout the Empire”.’

This ‘prominence’ was brought about by two factors. The first factor was that counter-intelligence work in the United Kingdom was so well organised that it shone a spotlight on the comparatively dire state of affairs that existed in the British Empire. This memorandum stated that:

‘[A] stable organization... exists in this country [the United Kingdom] in the form of a Central Counter-Espionage Bureau with permanent records and a small permanent staff. This Bureau has gained valuable results from their experience in trading and recording the personal histories of some 160,000 aliens, enemy agents and suspects, and by the investigation of numerous cases of espionage during a number of years. Experience has shown [:]

(a) That this co-ordination necessary ot [sic] obtain effective results cannot be expected if such work is confined to the technical Intelligence Sections either of the Army, or the Navy, or to the Criminal Investigation Branches of the Civil Police and Post Office.

(b) That the best results can only be obtained by a Central Bureau, under an officer who commands the personal confidence and assistance of all concerned, and brings to a common focus all the intelligence services.’

The second factor was the dire state of the colonial intelligence records and the limited tenure of colonial service appointments. The memorandum reported that:

‘Colonial Intelligence Reports rendered to the War Office, the Admiralty, and other Departments do not as a rule deal closely with Counter-Espionage and would appear
to be the work of persons who have had but limited facilities and brief local experience. Moreover owing to the short tenure of local appointments by Service Officers these reports lack the width of view and continuity of purpose which is derived from a stable organization having access to all the sources of Intelligence in the country, which is essential in peace and in War; and for the efficient working of such an organization.’

So poor were these reports, and so neglectfully had colonial intelligence been treated in the pre-First World War era, that the War Office was forced to concede that ‘It is possible that there is already some such confidential organization for the work of counter-espionage in existence’. The War Office, and, by default, the British Imperial Government, did not know for certain who, if anybody, was undertaking counter-espionage work in the name of the British Empire.

The issue of the lack of an imperial intelligence and counter-intelligence establishment having existed in the British Empire in East Africa prior to the First World War was examined in Chapter Four. But this was not a situation that was unique to East Africa, and in the summer of 1915 the War Office, having identified the problem as existing across the British Empire, made their first attempt to counter it. ‘It [was] felt’, the War Office wrote, ‘that a free interchange of information about enemy agents, and an effective co-ordination of the means for defeating their activities throughout the Empire, is essential.’

Suggestions for the establishment of local bureaus, modelled on the London office, were provided, and the desire for greater communication on the topic of counter-intelligence was what led to Major Notley writing his memorandum on his activities in the East Africa Protectorate.

A local bureau was not established in the East Africa Protectorate, or in East Africa more widely, in 1915. There were two reasons for this. The first was one that was previously examined in Chapter Four: Major Notley himself explicitly stated that there was no cause to expand or improve the British imperial counter-intelligence effort there during the First World War beyond that which had been practised in 1914 and 1915. ‘No Counter Espionage Bureau has been formed in this Colony since the outbreak of war’, he explained, ‘as all

necessary work has been done by the Intelligence Department and the Provost Marshal’s Department.\textsuperscript{273}

The second reason was that in 1915 there was not a dedicated department in the War Office in London whose purpose it was to evaluate the need for East Africa to have a dedicated counter-intelligence establishment of its own. From the summer of 1915 the knowledge that such a department was needed grew in the minds of those employed by M.I.5. In the September of 1916 D Branch of M.I.5., variously called M.I.5.D. or the Central Special Intelligence Bureau (C.S.I.B.), was established to fill this need.

In August 1917 M.I.5.D. ordered the establishment of a local intelligence centre for the British Empire in East Africa, amongst whose duties was preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the empire there. This intelligence centre was entitled the East African Intelligence Centre and was to stay in existence for the remaining fifteen months of the First World War.

This change in the imperial intelligence establishment in London which brought about M.I.5.D. was vital for preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa, for without it the East African Intelligence Centre would never have been established. The East African Intelligence Centre communicated regularly with London and other local centres; by the end of the First World War preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire had become a global concern.

Much of the information in this chapter was recorded in a report compiled by M.I.5. in 1921. This report was written for the purpose of demonstrating the scope and importance of the work that had been undertaken by M.I.5. during the Great War; probably to promote its continued existence and budget in the post-First World War era. As such, it was not compiled to be a dedicated history of M.I.5.’s activities during the First World War. Primary documents exist within it, but these are usually memorandums and post-war analyses. It is clear that many documents were destroyed, although it is possible that some of the

documents continue to exist but have not been declassified. Therefore, only a limited number of primary documents of M.I.5.’s war time exploits remain in existence.

References to missing raw intelligence and the need to summarise intelligence papers by the authors of individual documents provides the evidence within the 1921 Report that these documents once existed. One such example appears in the document *Summary of the Report on the Establishment of a Special Intelligence Service in the Colonies and Oversea Dominions*, where it was written that: ‘Details of the arrangements made in certain of the Dominions and Colonies are given below [the remainder of the document] as examples of the system which was instituted throughout the Empire.’²⁷⁴ All that is left today are these ‘examples’; no explanation was given as to the methodology used – if, indeed, one was used – to choose which examples to include within the report.

Therefore, it is worth noting in this chapter that the history of M.I.5.D., and through that the East African Intelligence Centre, will always be incomplete; it will never be possible to fully reconstruct the knowledge of how this Branch came about, and how its duties were decided and acted upon. It will never now be possible to truly understand M.I.5.’s position in relation to the British Empire during the First World War. By extension, it will also never now be possible to fully understand the workings of the British in relation to their Empire during the First World War.

This problem appears to have played on the mind of the author of the report on G Branch of M.I.5., who gave this assessment of their work:

> ‘It is as well to emphasize strongly here the limitations of the “G” report, and the large area of the un-investigated field. Much has been done in the time available, but much has been omitted, and the report though apparently voluminous, necessarily omits much that should be included. Most historical reports are more or less misleading for it is ever very difficult to write down the truth very satisfactorily. It is so often not only difficult but impossible to know what is the truth.’²⁷⁵


Subchapter One: The Establishment of M.I.5.D

M.I.5. was established under Vernon Kell in 1909 and became ‘responsible for counter-espionage within the British Isles’. With Mansfield Cummings becoming ‘responsible for gathering intelligence overseas’ there was, as was examined in Chapter Four, the evident omission that there was nobody who was responsible for counter-intelligence overseas in the British Empire. The events of the First World War rendered this position untenable and so, from 1915 onwards, M.I.5. made a concerted effort to improve the situation.

The establishment of M.I.5.D. was to be the result of this concerted effort. This branch of M.I.5., which was also known as “D Branch”, was responsible for counter-intelligence in the British Empire. Due to the difficulties that M.I.5.D. was to experience with terms such as “espionage”, the term “special intelligence” was usually substituted. M.I.5.D. thus acquired its third moniker: The Central Special Intelligence Bureau, or the C.S.I.B. These three terms were interchangeable and tended to be used at the preference of the author; there appears to have been some preference for those located within the British Empire to use the term ‘C.S.I.B.’ to refer to it, with those in London using the term ‘M.I.5.D.’, but this was not a hard and fast rule.

East Africa was just one of the many regions of the British Empire that was to fall under M.I.5.D’s sphere during the First World War. Understanding how this colonial counter-intelligence department developed in London is vital for understanding how, and why, the East African Intelligence Centre, which was tasked with preventing the threat of Pan-Islamism to the British Empire in East Africa, came not only into existence, but came into existence so late during the Great War. As was examined in Chapter One, the British Empire retained control of much of East Africa almost solely to prevent another European power from occupying the land, rather than out of any actual interest in developing or colonising it. The disunity that had existed between the British administrations in the colonies and protectorates of the British Empire in East Africa and the British Empire’s Imperial Government in London had thawed in the years between the late Nineteenth Century and the First World War, but they had not fully melted; the security of the British Empire in East

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Africa had always been low on the list of interests of the British Imperial Government, and the outbreak of the First World War did little to change that.

The Creation of M.I.5.D.

The internal structure of M.I.5. changed regularly, and sometimes considerably, throughout its entire first decade of existence. These changes intensified, rather than diminished, during the First World War, as the rising number of personnel employed within it strived to grasp and execute the ever-growing complex work that was demanded of them for the war effort. By the time of the cessation of fighting in 1918, M.I.5. was comprised of six separate, yet deeply interlinked, branches: A, D, E, F, G, and H. Of these branches, it is D Branch with which this thesis is most concerned.277

D Branch did not exist for the first two years of the First World War. It was only in the summer of 1915 that the British Government, through the Colonial Office, really came to notice, and feel the lack off, a designated department dedicated to organising, administrating, and formulating colonial counter-intelligence throughout the British Empire. Two important events were reported to have occurred in July 1915 that set into motion the creation of D Branch. The first event was when:

‘[The] Colonial Office was approached by M.I.5. with a view to putting into execution the long-projected scheme of establishing direct communication with the British Self-Governing Dominions and Colonies for the purpose of co-operation in Special Intelligence work.’278

The second event was when:

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277 There have been several “D” Branches throughout the history of M.I.5. The branch which came into existence during the First World War was the first to be given this title.
‘[The] scheme for establishing a system of counter-espionage throughout the British Empire, which should be linked up with M.I.5. as a Central Bureau, was initiated by the officers of A and B (afterwards G and F), Branches.’

In the 1921 Report M.I.5.D. recorded a synopsis about how it comprehended its own creation to have come about in the summer of 1915:

‘At that time little was known in this Office of what was happening in the Colonies. Only occasional papers were received through the War Office, the Foreign Office, and the Colonial Office, and an investigation of all possible sources of information had not only revealed the fact that, beyond the Intelligence Summaries of the various Commands abroad, there was no organised system of records, but had shown that, if the activities of hostile secret service agents throughout the Empire were to be defeated, it was essential that there should be an interchange of confidential Intelligence on the subject.

The Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, who was consulted, was of the opinion that the taking up of Colonial Counter-Espionage work was highly desirable, and the Colonial Office also showed complete agreement with the scheme.

On the 5th August 1915, a secret Circular Memorandum, based on a draft which had been prepared in M.I.5., was sent semi-officially to the Governors General of the Self-Governing Dominions with a covering letter from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and on the 18th August copies of the same memorandum were sent to all Colonial Governors and Administrators of Colonies not possessing responsible Government, with a similar covering letter from the Under Secretary of State...

The suggestions made by the Colonial Office met with a prompt response. By February 1916, replies had been received from almost all the Dominions and Colonies, and a report drawn up in March shows that bureaux similar to the Central Special Intelligence Bureau had already been set up in Australia and Malta, while touch with M.I.5. had been established by the Governor or his representative in every other Colony, with only a few exceptions. [This did occur in the East Africa

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Protectorate but, as will be examined later in this chapter, there was then little correspondence between M.I.5. in London and the British imperial administration in East Africa between the end of 1915 and the summer of 1917.]
The Reports forwarded to the head of the Central Special Intelligence Bureau showed that except in Malta, where, at the beginning of the war, a small bureau had been established under the Military Intelligence Depart for the purpose of collecting information, no definite organisation for counter espionage work had ever existed in any Dominion or Colony. Since the outbreak of war, certain preventive measures, such as the institution of the Censorship, had been put into force, in some Colonies Martial Law had been proclaimed, and in other the Governor had made use of his power under an Order in Council of 26th of October 1896 to make emergency Regulations. Where naval and military interests were concerned, Special Intelligence was in the hands of naval and military Intelligence Services, usually working in co-operation with the Civil Police. In some cases the arrangement was satisfactory, in others it suffered from an insufficiency of personnel and from the difficulties entailed by the combination of counter espionage with other duties. In Canada the work was being efficiently carried on by the Police Administration, but wherever it was dealt with by a number of separate Departments or Agencies, as in Australia and Egypt, the lack of centralization was felt.

In certain instances the need of a definite system had led to serious consequences. This had been the case in the Straits Settlements, where the trouble which had arisen among the native troops was believed to have been attributable to German influence, while in British East Africa a comprehensive system of German espionage had been discovered which had been entirely unsuspected owing to the absence of any organisation for the centralization of information. The military authorities in British East Africa were also said to have been handicapped by want of information, which might have been provided had such an organisation been in existence before the war.  

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The officers of A and B Branch did not immediately see the need to establish an entirely new Branch to deal with this new workload, so for the academic year of 1915 to 1916 the work was given to A Branch, which then became G Branch. The structure of G Branch was not terribly well organised for such work, as this paragraph suggests:

‘The work of correspondence and of co-operation with the Counter-espionage services in the Overseas Dominions, Crown Colonies and Protectorates regarding Espionage, sedition, treachery, fomentation of strikes and sabotage, and dissemination of peace propaganda was placed in the hands of G.3., which was already responsible partly in collaboration with G.1., for the preliminary investigation of cases of a similar description in Ireland. For the time being, co-operation with the counter-espionage and police services in India and Egypt on the above subjects remained in the hands of G.2. [b].’

By the September of 1916 the work had grown to such an extent that this configuration had become untenable, and D Branch was created:

‘[The] Colonial work had assumed such large dimensions that it became necessary to create a special branch to deal with it. Accordingly G.3. was constituted a separate Branch to be known as D [M.I.5.D. by War Office designation] its duties remaining as before with the addition of correspondence with the Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence Bureau, recently established at Alexandria for C-E work in Egypt, in liaison with M.I.5.’

The work which had caused D Branch to outgrow G Branch spread right around the world and was undeniably of ‘large dimensions’. It was geographical concerns which were the principle behind the creation of D Branch:

‘According as the necessity arose for dealing with these matters, [such as those of the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland and America, Home Rule and Sedition movements in India, Egyptian and Turkish nationalism, and the Pan-Islamic and Greek Royalist movements which were espoused by the ‘special feature’ of German policy] further extensions of the M.I.5. office organisation were required. The duties

282 Ibid., pp.6—7.
of the several Branch sections had from the first been apportioned according to geographical areas and race divisions. These principles were followed in the formation and development of D. Branch.\textsuperscript{283}

After the First World War, M.I.5. was keen to emphasise the growth of D Branch in relation to the overall Bureau:

‘Originally formed to deal with Colonial correspondence as well as whatever cases of espionage might be reported from Ireland, D, or the Overseas Branch gradually came to be responsible for all work in which M.I.5. was concerned outside [of] Great Britain. Its history shows the expansion of the work of M.I.5. both on its preventative as well as on its detective side. Even before the outbreak of war the need of establishing close relations for the Colonies had been a subject of consideration in this Office, and as, after the commencement of hostilities, it became more and more evident that the secret activities of the enemy extended throughout the whole Empire, it was necessary that the work of M.I.5. should be organised in such a way as to provide means for the acquisition of information whenever mischief was likely be brewing.’\textsuperscript{284}

As was examined in Chapter Four, whether ‘the need of establishing close relations for the Colonies’ really had ‘been a subject of consideration’ for M.I.5. ‘Even before the outbreak of the war’ is debateable.

Exactly how the term ‘counter-espionage’ was defined by M.I.5. during the First World War was never clarified by D Branch. Confusion about the working definition of this term was felt by those who communicated with M.I.5.D. from within the British Empire:

‘In corresponding with the Colonies, it was found that the term “Counter Espionage” was misunderstood by many of them, and in some cases the fear of its connection with “secret service” caused a reluctance to fall in with the suggestions made for establishing a universal system throughout the Empire. The term “Special Intelligence” was therefore substituted for “Counter Espionage” and used in all communications with the Dominions and Colonies. Thus, M.I.5., as represented by D.

\textsuperscript{283} Ibid., pp.4—5.
\textsuperscript{284} Ibid., p.4.
Branch, became known to our overseas correspondents as “the Central Special Intelligence Bureau”.

The ‘Central Special Intelligence Bureau’ was often shortened in correspondence to its initials: “the C.S.I.B.” This passage shows that this change was made at a point sometime prior to October 1917:

‘In October, 1917 a printed Report was issued by the Central Special Intelligence Bureau, copies of which were forwarded to the Self-Governing Dominions as well as to 30 Colonies, including Egypt; also to the Colonial Office, Foreign Office, India Office, Admiralty Intelligence Division, Bureau Central Inter-Allie, M.I.1. and M.I.1.c. In this Report the functions of the Central Bureau are clearly defined and special attention from the rapid means provided for a direct interchange of information. It is pointed out that the term ‘Special Intelligence’ has been adopted in preference to the narrower term ‘Counter-Espionage’, which was found to be misleading as suggesting “Secret Service”.

The ‘fear of its [counter-espionage] connection with “secret service”’ having caused ‘a reluctance to fall in with the suggestions made for establishing a universal system throughout the Empire’ was a direct result of the pre-war disdain and ignorance for intelligence. It was not gentlemanlike enough for those in the colonies to wish to become involved with it, as was demonstrated by Major Notley’s pretext that he and his colleagues had not ‘suspected or appreciated... the very comprehensive German system of espionage’ that had existed in the East Africa and Uganda Protectorates because of the ‘unsuspicious nature of the British character.’ Forced by the hand of the Great War, the likes of Major Notley were forced to put aside their apprehensions for this type of work; the change of name was a concession to this retraction.

On the same theme, the October 1917 report was keen to express and emphasise D Branch’s respectability, for it:

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285 Ibid., p.7.
‘...also expressly stated that the Central Special Intelligence Bureau derives its information from official sources, not from ‘agents’, and that its powers are all covered by legislative enactments.’

Issues relating to the use of terminology were not exceptional to D Branch, and also occurred elsewhere within M.I.5. The term “‘Defence Security Intelligence’” was found to be problematic, as was the word ‘spy’:

‘[Speaking] generally, the difference between the methods and aims of German espionage in peace and war is one of degree and emphasis rather than of quality. Its elements are so various and inclusive that in legislation the wider term, “German agent” is now substituted for that of spy, and similarly the expression “Defence Security Intelligence” of larger connotation that “Counter-espionage” has been adopted to express more adequately the work done by M.I.5.’

The work that D Branch conducted was always considered by M.I.5. to be permanent, and they laid emphasis on this in the report of 1921. Changing the terminology to both placate people’s sensitivities and to ensure wider understanding of the work that was required of them was a small price to pay to ensure, as was desired by M.I.5., good, continuing communication between them and the imperial counter-intelligence efforts within the British Empire both during and after the First World War:

‘From the first, the work was organised with a view to permanence, and the question of reconstruction was carefully considered as soon as the war had ceased. The object aimed at throughout was to secure the same personal relations with the component parts of the Empire as was established before the war, and was afterwards fully maintained, between M.I.5. and the various Constabulary Forces in the United Kingdom.’

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287 Ibid., p.16.
The main duties of D Branch were to collect information on enemy intelligence activities from within the British Empire (and from other locations where it was relevant to the security of the British Empire), to disseminate this information to whomever it concerned, and to aid and facilitate the establishment of local bureaus to combat these antagonistic activities.

When the idea of such a scheme was first floated in M.I.5. in the summer of 1915 – when the officers of the then A and B Branches initiated it – the talk focused not on the security of the British Empire per se, but on the security of the United Kingdom itself. Whilst maintaining the security of the British Empire grew in importance for D Branch over the First World War, maintaining the security of the United Kingdom always remained the primary objective:

‘It was hoped that if M.I.5. could get into touch with the Colonies the Bureau might act as a clearing-house for all parts of the Empire, and thus a rapid interchange of information would be secured. In this way a watch could be kept on the movements of suspects, and means could be taken to prevent the entry of any undesirables into the United Kingdom.’

M.I.5. considered the ‘clearing-house’ side of D Branch’s operation to have been a success. Their own assessment of the progress of the Branch by the end of the war was that:

‘Lists of the papers show how far-reaching the work of M.I.5.D. had now become, and the vast quantity of information that had been accumulated by means of the system of overseas Intelligence organised by the Branch even when direct communication did not take place, arrangements had been made for reports to be sent to M.I.5. through other Departments of the War Office or through the Foreign Office. Thus particulars were obtained of German activities in the remotest parts of the world, from Peru to the Dutch East Indies and the Islands of the Pacific, and a watch was kept on German propaganda through missionaries or otherwise in every continent.’

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291 Ibid., p.13.
For almost the entire period of the War for which it was operational, this ‘clearing-house’ side of D Branch was, as a rule, guarded by D Branch as their territory for security reasons; bureaus who wished to communicate with each other were almost always compelled to go through D Branch as an intermediary. This changed in the closing weeks of the war:

‘Until the autumn of 1918, only a few of the Central Special Intelligence Bureau’s Overseas correspondents were permitted to communicate directly with one another. Frequent requests were received by the Bureau from its principal “links” that they might be placed in direct touch with each other, so that the interchange of reports regarding suspects might be facilitated, but for a long time it was impossible to find a suitable cipher which could be made common to all. This difficulty was at last overcome, and on the 19th September 1918, a memorandum was circulated to thirteen of the Special Intelligence Bureau’s Overseas correspondents, giving a list of those between whom intercommunication was to be established, with their postal and telegraphic addresses, and instructions as to secret correspondence by cable. It was requested that, in order to keep the Central Special Intelligence Bureau fully informed on all points of general interest, copies of messages exchanged direct by any other stations should be sent to London for record.’

Not all of the Bureaus were allowed to communicate in this manner, but the East African Intelligence Centre was included on the ‘list’. M.I.5. established that ‘The following were included in the new arrangements:

- Australia
- South Africa
- Canada
- New Zealand
- Malta
- Egypt
- India
- Singapore
- Trinidad

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• Nairobi [the East African Intelligence Centre, which was stationed at Nairobi.]
As well as the Military Control Officers, in charge of Passport and Travel Control, at
Tokio [sic] and New York, and the British Military Missions in Washington and
Rome.293

M.I.5.D. was also considered a success by M.I.5. due to both the geographical reach that it
managed to formulate and the sheer scope of the subject matters (which often contained
matters related to Germany’s ‘special feature’) which were contained within its papers:

‘The constant exchange of information led to useful results. All the Self-Governing
Dominions except Newfoundland, as well as India, Egypt and the more important
Colonies were provided with the M.I.5. Black List and the circulars amending it, and
warnings about general subjects such as forged passports, the activities of Indian
seditionists and of certain Societies, missionary and otherwise, which were known to
the Bureau as German agencies were forwarded whenever occasion demanded.’294

The Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates of the British Empire were not created equal in
the eyes of D Branch. One example of such a policy can be seen in its filing formulae:

‘The Contre-Espionage [sic] Control Sub-Division deals with papers belonging to four
different classes... 1. British Dominions and Colonies. The papers belonging to this
group are filed geographically. In the case of those possessions in which Special
Intelligence Bureaux have been established, all papers dealing with general policy
and administration are filed together under the name of that Bureau. Reports on
suspects are filed in personal files and indexed in the geographical files. The lesser
colonies and most of the protectorates are, however, grouped together under
general headings.’295

In February 1917, ‘the duties of D [Branch] as a whole were described as: “the co-ordination
of Imperial Counter Espionage”. The knowledge that the Dominions, Colonies and

294 Ibid., p.20.
Registry, October 1917, p.44.
Protectorates of the British Empire were not treated equally by D Branch’s ‘Imperial Counter Espionage’ work can also be seen through its work in Ireland:

‘Since the discovery of the help given to Ireland by Germany in connection with the Rebellion of April 1916, the Irish work of M.I.5. had become more important. By February 1917, in addition to the investigation in consultation with G, of cases of espionage and sedition in Ireland which had considerably increased in number, D. Branch had now become responsible for the examination of intercepted correspondence relating to Colonial or Irish-American affairs, and co-operated with the Home Office and other Government Departments on matters connected with German-Irish-American intrigues; it also dealt with Irish Intelligence Reports, in co-operation with G.H.Q, H.F.’

Given the historic occurrences then happening in Ireland, with the shift away from support for Home Rule towards Sinn Féin after the ‘Rebellion of April 1916’ – the Easter Rising – and the geographical closeness of Ireland to both the island of Great Britain and the Western Front in continental Europe, it is obvious why, out of all of the regions of the British Empire, it was Ireland that M.I.5., and the British Imperial Government more generally, was most concerned regarding imperial security, for these events threatened the security of the United Kingdom itself.

The duties of M.I.5.D. ever increased over the First World War. M.I.5. partially charged that Germany’s ‘special feature’ was responsible for this growth:

‘During the later years of the War, owing partly to the disruptive and deterrent work of M.I.5. acting in England, and M.I.I.6. acting abroad, partly to the progress of hostilities ashore and afloat, the Germans seem to have laid even greater stress upon sabotage and the fomenting of discontent and revolution’.

As to whether the establishment of local bureaus to counter enemy intelligence can be considered a success requires a more comprehensive analysis that would examine all of the local bureaus; an analysis that, by necessity, would need to go beyond the realms of this thesis’ capabilities. D Branch, naturally in a report that M.I.5. wrote to demonstrate the

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scope and importance of the work that it had been undertaking during the First World War, deemed it a success:

‘By degrees the objects set forth in the Colonial Office circular Memorandum of August 1915 came to be achieved. In each of the Self-Governing Dominions and in every Colony means were provided for acquiring information and for handing it on, so that it was hardly possible for the movements of an enemy agent to escape observation. Special measures were taken for the prevention of espionage, notably in connection with the control of the ports, and much benefit was derived from a comparison of Colonial war legislation with the D.R.R. and A.R.O. Touch was established between the Central Special Intelligence Bureau and every part of the British Empire, even the most remote, and the value was proved of cultivating cordial personal relations with the overseas authorities. The Colonial Governors or their representatives were invited to visit the Central Bureau whenever the opportunity should arise, and those who availed themselves of this invitation were shown all the details of the work done in M.I.5. and given a full explanation of the office system.’ ²⁹⁸


*The Structure of M.I.5.D.*

At its foundation in 1916, D Branch was divided into a ‘Head Section,’ known as ‘D’, and three sub-sections, known as ‘D.1.’, ‘D.2.’, and ‘D.3.’ respectively. All four of these sections had one or more officers, with the officers of the three sub-sections ‘subordinate’ to the officer in charge of ‘D’, and each section or sub-section were reported to have had their ‘own secretary and clerical staff’, although only secretaries were mentioned and named subsequently.

The responsibilities of the four original sections of D Branch were as follows:

‘D:’ ‘Co-ordination of Imperial Special Intelligence services in the Overseas Dominions, India and the Colonies; Correspondence with the Dominions, India and
the Colonies by letter and cable; Collection and communication of Special Intelligence affecting the Dominions, India and the Colonies.

Co-operation with Colonial Office.

Investigation of cases of espionage in Ireland in consultation with G. Co-operation with Home Office and other Government Departments on matters connected with German-Irish-American intrigues.

Ciphers.’


Examination of censored letters or intercepted correspondence dealing therewith.

Irish Intelligence Reports and co-operation with G.H.Q., H.F. thereon.

Questions affecting Ireland.’

‘D.2.’ ‘Colonial Affairs, general correspondence with the Colonies.

Questions affecting the Dominions and Colonies except Wei-Hai-Wei, Hong King, Sarawak, North Borneo, Labuan, Straits Settlement, Ceylon, Aden and Egypt.’

‘D.3.’ ‘Oriental Affairs.

Investigation (in consultation with G) and all correspondence regarding suspected espionage, sedition and treachery among Asiatics and Egyptians.

Co-operation with India. Office.

Questions affecting India, the Middle East and the Colonies excepted from the scope of D.2.’

D Branch became the centre of the British Empire’s worldwide efforts to counter the work of enemy intelligence, such as Germany’s ‘special feature’, that was being undertaken in, and/or was detrimental to the safety of, the British Empire. As knowledge about such enemy intelligence was transmitted to London from across the Empire by the likes of

Captain Philipps, it became responsible for countering it; thus, it grew. As M.I.5. adjusted to this influx of new knowledge, multiple internal reorganisations were necessary within the Bureau to attribute this work formally to D Branch. One such internal reorganisation occurred in September 1917, when

‘[The] scope of D’s duties was further enlarged. Hitherto cases of suspected espionage or treachery among Asiatics and Egyptians in the United Kingdom together with the dissemination of hostile and revolutionary Oriental propaganda had been dealt with by G.2B, afterwards G.5, which in January 1917 had been formed into a separate Branch known as B. The two Branches B. and D were now amalgamated, and Oriental affairs became the concern, as well as Irish matters, of Branch D of M.I.5. which had now come to be known as “The Imperial Overseas Intelligence Bureau”’.

In October 1918 the First World War was clearly, and finally, drawing to a close. M.I.5. undoubtedly had their eyes on their position in the post-war world, and it seems that it was for this reason that there was another internal reorganisation of D Branch. This reorganisation demonstrated both the increasing scope and the great importance to the British Empire of the work undertaken by this bureau during the First World War, and M.I.5. saw fit to have this scope and importance thoroughly recorded in the report published in 1921.

There were two important consequences of this reorganisation for D Branch. The first of these consequences was the addition of two new sub-sections, to be known as ‘D.4.’ and ‘D.5.’ ‘D.4. was assigned the duty described as “Co-ordination of Special Intelligence Missions in Allied Counter”.’ ‘D.5. was made responsible for ciphers and codes, the despatch of telegrams other than those addressed to M.C.Os [sic] in neutral capitals (sent though M.I.1.c.) and inland telegrams en clair, as well as for the receipt and distribution of code and cipher telegrams.’ As the report made clear, ‘The code and cipher work had always been part of D’s duties’ and had previously been part of the head ‘D’ section. That it became in

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300 Ibid., p.8.
301 Ibid., p.10.
need of a sub-section of its own appears to have been due to the positive results seen from the use of the ‘suitable cipher’ in September 1918.

The second of these consequences was an internal reorganisation within the D Branch sub-sections that dealt with seditious movements in the ‘Near East:’

‘A re-arrangement of the Branch was also made by the transfer from D.3. to D.2. of work dealing with suspects or seditious movements in, or in connection with, the “Near East” – a geographical area comprising not only the former Ottoman Empire (excepting Mesopotamia) but also the countries of North Africa and of the Eastern Mediterranean. The subsection known as the “Far East” which dealt with the activities of Japanese, Chinese, and Siamese all over the world still remained part of D.3.’

Collected and collating D Branch’s files was considered vital for it to function:

‘The importance of the several sections of overseas work was shown by the fact that as each division of D. Branch was made, a separate section of the Registry [H2] (i.e. H.2., sub-section two of H Branch) was formed to take charge of its papers. Each section had its own card-index, apart from the general indices of the Registry itself, and a specially chosen H.2 worker was made responsible for the files. Thus by the end of the war the subject files of D. were grouped as follows:-

Indian and Oriental Matters.

Far East.

Near East.’

It was not stated which subject file was responsible for the files from East Africa.

These papers were, it is presumed, subsequently destroyed after the writing of M.I.5.’s post-First World War report of 1921, for they are absent from the surviving archives that are publicly available. It is possible, however, that they continue to exist, but the modern British Government has not declassified them.

\[302\] Ibid., pp.10—11.
\[303\] Ibid., pp.12—13.
Therefore, between its formation and the end of the War D Branch grew quickly in both importance and scope. By the latter date ‘M.I.5.D. had reached its fullest development and its sub-divisions and duties as set forth in I.P. Book 9 M.I.5. Distribution of Duties were as follows:

‘M.I.5.D.

Imperial Overseas Special Intelligence.

Irish Oriental and Near Eastern Affairs.

(I) Co-ordination and Imperial Special Intelligence Services in the Overseas Dominions, India and the Colonies.

(II) Co-ordination of the work of Special Intelligence Missions in Allied Countries.

(III) Correspondence with the Dominions, India and the Colonies by letter and cable.

(IV) Collection and communication of Special Intelligence, affecting the Dominions, India and the Colonies.

(V) Co-operation with the Colonial Office.

(VI) Investigation of cases of espionage and sedition in Ireland in consultation with G.

(VII) Co-operation with the Home Office and other Government Departments on matters connected with German-Irish-American intrigues.

(VIII) Ciphers and Codes.’

The duties of the sub-sections were as follows:

D.1.

(I) Irish-American Affairs. Examination of censored letters or intercepted correspondence dealing therewith.

(II) Irish Intelligence Reports and co-operation with M.0.4/B. thereon.

D.2.
(I) Colonial Affairs. General correspondence with the Colonies.

(II) Questions affecting individuals of Near Eastern nationalities and Near Eastern Affairs.

D.3.

(I) Oriental affairs. Investigation [in consultation with G] and all correspondence regarding suspected espionage, sedition and treachery among Asiatics.’

D.4.

(I) Co-ordination of Special Intelligence Missions in Allied Countries.

(II) Receipt, distribution and despatch of correspondence.

(III) Posts.

D.5.

(I) Ciphers and codes.

(II) Despatch of telegrams, other than those addressed to M.C.O.s in neutral capitals [sent through M.I.1.c] and inland telegrams en clair.

(III) Receipt and distribution of code and cipher telegrams.’

The Personnel of M.I.5.D.

As the structure of D Branch expanded throughout the course of the First World War, so too did its personnel. The most complete D Branch figures from the 1921 M.I.5. report exist for the year of 1918, when the Branch was at its largest size; the personnel directly employed by M.I.5.D. in London did not, even by the end of the First World War, number two dozen. In October 1918, the personnel staff numbers of M.I.5.D., broken down into the main section and the sub-sections, were given as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Secretary</th>
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304 Ibid., pp.11—12.
In a different document, which focused more generally on the staff employed by M.I.5. during the First World War, some of the names of these personnel were given. Sub-sections D.4. and D.5. were not included, as this list of names was given on 20th September 1918, one month before their establishment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Secretary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D. Branch</td>
<td>Lt. Col. F. Hall</td>
<td>Miss E.M. Hodgson</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Miss E. Lorrimer</td>
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<td>Miss E. Somerville</td>
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There is little direct information about the hiring procedures for the personnel of M.I.5.D. within the surviving documents, although a wider examination of M.I.5. more generally provides a larger, if still incomplete, scope.

“H” Branch, which by 1921 had changed designation to “O” Branch, saw itself as integral to the M.I.5. for it was, by modern designation, the Human Resources Department. H Branch

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305 Ibid., p.12.
wrote that, by necessity, their section dealt with the wider Bureau as well as the composition of H Branch itself, for the Branch dealt ‘in a great measure with the growth and composition of the Bureau as a whole with its other branches, A, D E, F, & G. All these sub-branches turned to H and its registry for information and records, and also for the providing and supervision of their personnel.’

This H Branch report did subsequently give some brief comments about the hiring procedures for officers for the Bureau. An important, and early, part of this procedure was the exclusion of those officers who were deemed not suitable for such appointments. As befitted a military which had historically placed little importance or respectability on military intelligence, only those men (for there could be no women officers in the regular British Army in this era) who were considered physically unfit for general (active) service were to be considered. Only in ‘very special cases’ were these rules to be discarded, with little consideration given to the intelligence training, academic competence, or, indeed, physical fitness that would have been necessary to assume these highly skilled positions:

‘Officers are selected from a list kept in H. containing the names of those officially recommended by S.D.1 and M.I.6.c. or privately from other sources... The following circumstances should, except in very special cases, be held to disqualify a candidate:

- **Military Officer** Medical fitness for General Service, or the likelihood of being fit within six months.
- **Officers of the Indian Army or Indian Government Services** – Probability of recall to India within twelve months.
- **Civilians** – Liability to be called up for military service.’

Furthermore, it was considered advantageous, but apparently not mandatory, for officers of D Branch – which, of course, specialised on the British Empire – to have some experience of conditions within the British Empire. It was written that:

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308 TNA: KV 1/54: M.I.5. ‘I. Personnel. A. – Officers.’, in Central Special Intelligence Bureau (M.I.5.) Duties of H Branch, December 1917, p.5.
‘As regards the personnel of D. Branch, several of its officers were selected as having already had experience in India and the Colonies and were thus cognisant of local conditions and the peculiarities of race and nomenclature.’

It was also not compulsory, only desired, for officers employed by M.I.5. to have had experience of working in intelligence. The ‘qualifications’ for employment for officers in M.I.5. was as follows:

‘The principal qualities looked for are sound common sense and knowledge of the world. No hard and fast rule can be drawn as to age, but the ordinary limits are 25 and 50. Technical qualification vary greatly; those most useful are previous intelligence, police, legal or administrative experience. A knowledge of languages and foreign countries is also valuable; and while familiarity with the routine of public offices is more valuable than that of private business, it is useful to have an acquaintance with commercial affairs of the larger kind.’

No statistics were provided by M.I.5. Nevertheless, one would have to presume that the number of officers in the British Armed Forces during the First World War who were unfit for active service, and yet were fit enough to assume office work during the duration of the War, or else were willing to come out of retirement to do so, and also had some experience in India and the colonies, and furthermore were known, or at least believed, to have possessed both a general academic competency for this type of work and an ability to remain silent about it, and were aged roughly between 25 and 50, and were not going to be recalled to India within the next year, and were recommended to the Bureau by whichever source, and had some useful technical qualifications, and had a knowledge of languages and foreign countries, and had sound common sense (however that was to be quantified), and were themselves actually willing to take up such a position, was very small indeed.

The man chosen to head M.I.5.D. was Lieutenant Colonel Hall. Hall’s appointment as the head of D Branch demonstrated the importance the British Empire placed on intelligence work in Ireland over any other colony. Already working for M.I.5. at the time of his appointment, he was, as a landowner from County Down, their ‘Irish expert’ who had,
before the war, been the ‘military secretary of the Ulster Volunteer Force and a gun-runner himself.’

Winston Churchill ‘later noted that [Vernon] Kell was “not specially acquainted with Irish matters” and relied on Hall’s expertise’, which Churchill himself ‘admired.’

Christopher Andrew has written that Hall had ‘a strong dislike of Irish nationalism,’ while his colonial credentials appeared to consist of ‘a keen sense of imperial pride’; he ‘[claimed] when he joined MI5 in December 1914 to have visited “every Imperial defended port N. of the Equator except Sierra Leone.”’ East Africa was a concern for the British Empire, but it was not its only concern, or even its chief concern. Ireland, especially after the Easter Rising of 1916, was the chief concern of M.I.5.D., and this was reflected in the choice of its leadership.

Conversely, the appointment of Hall also demonstrates the wider concern of M.I.5.D. towards the entire British Empire. This is a contradiction only at first, for, whilst Irish concerns remained predominant, the knowledge that Hall had gained from dealing with nationalism in Ireland – Martin Thomas reminds us that ‘MI5 was immersed in covert surveillance and infiltration of Irish nationalist organizations long before the Easter Rising of 1916’ – placed him in good stead to deal with the nationalism that was bubbling away in the colonies. ‘The stereotypical subversive nationalist dedicated to terrorist methods to overthrow colonial rule and operating in a cosmopolitan environment of internationally planned covert operations’, Thomas also reminds us, ‘was not entirely a creature of myth.’

Although constructed in a different manner to the nationalism of Ireland, nationalism, via the ideology of Pan-Africanism, did, as previously examined, cause great concern to the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the First World War. This,

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amongst others, was the type of concern that D Branch had been established to face, and the appointment of Hall demonstrated M.I.5.’s commitment to combating it.

To be appointed to their posts, the female secretaries, known as ‘Women Clerks’, had to undergo interviews. The ‘Controller’ who interviewed them ‘[decided] whether she [was]:

i. Trustworthy, discreet and tactful.
ii. Mentally and physically suitable.
iii. Technically efficient.’

The ‘Qualities’ she had to hold, whose ‘importance [were] chiefly attached [to the position, were]:

i. A high sense of honour.
ii. Discretion and reliability.
iii. Sound common sense.
iv. Accuracy.
v. Readiness to take responsibility.
vi. Keenness.
vii. Physical fitness.
viii. Good temper and tact.

Comparatively little stress is laid on technical accomplishments, but

ix. For the Registry the candidate should be able to type thirty words per minute.
x. For clerical work a somewhat higher speed and shorthand are desirable.
xi. For précis writing a University degree in research or literature is desirable.
xii. Knowledge of languages is useful in any capacity.’

There were two factors that could disqualify a woman for the role:

i. ‘Age under 20 or over 30, except in special cases.'
ii. Alien parentage.

The hiring procedures for men and women were separated in the document, *Organisation and Administration: annexures; Duties of H Branch*, which recorded them. This mirrored the separation of the genders within the personnel of M.I.5., including M.I.5.D., in this time era. There were separate jobs for men and women, and they were held to different standards.

**Conclusion**

After its establishment in September 1916 D Branch of M.I.5. grew quickly. By the end of the First World War it was a small yet rapidly expanding branch of the British intelligence establishment which was developing innovative methods both for the implementation of counter-intelligence and for the growth in communications between regions of the British Empire on the topic of security.

However, as a result of it not being established until 1916 the department it was to task with preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa could, naturally, not be instituted until after this date: it was instituted in November 1917. Whilst this department, the East African Intelligence Centre, was able to make gains in the fight against the threat posed by Pan-Islamism in the few months of its existence, it was unable to eliminate it, and British imperial officials in East Africa recognised that the threat posed by Pan-Islamism continued to exist after the end of the First World War.

It is impossible to know whether an earlier date of establishment for M.I.5.D. would have resulted in an earlier date of establishment for the East African Intelligence Centre, and whether that would have in turn allowed for the elimination of the Pan-Islamic threat, rather than the curtailment of it. The unknowable answer to this question is an intriguing one.

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On 20\textsuperscript{th} August 1917 M.I.5.D. directed the institution of the East African Intelligence Centre, and it began its operations two and a half months later, on 4\textsuperscript{th} November.\footnote{TNA: KV 1/16: Muggeridge. C.E. ‘Appendix O. Extract from a Report on the Organisation of the Intelligence Centre at Nairobi.,’ in \textit{Vol II. M.I.5. “D” Branch Report. Imperial Overseas Intelligence 1915—1919: Appendices}, Nairobi, 7\textsuperscript{th} January 1919, pp. 152—153.} The Centre always remained small; the tiny personnel were supported in their work by a few associated people. Yet in the fifteen months in which it existed between the August of 1917 and the November of 1918 it established itself as a fully working department within the British imperial effort to fight the East African Campaign of the First World War. At all points it had a commander, it communicated with other regional bureaus across the British Empire and with M.I.5.D. in London, and it had three interlinked subjects of interest which formed the backbone of its work.

This subchapter will focus on the Intelligence Centre’s physical institution and its personnel. The work that it undertook to prevent the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the British Empire in East Africa during the years of the First World War will be examined in Chapter Seven.

\textit{The Establishment of the East African Intelligence Centre: Location and Co-operation}

M.I.5.D. summarised the establishment of the East African Intelligence Centre thus:

‘The Department [the Intelligence Centre] was started as the result of a telegram dated August 20\textsuperscript{th} 1917, from the Colonial Office to the Governor of the British East Africa Protectorate stating that it was proposed to form a “Permanent Intelligence Centre” under the command of Major C.E. Foster.’\footnote{Ibid., p.152.}

The East African Intelligence Centre was, as its name suggests, an intelligence centre for the entirety of East Africa; it was not, as Major Notley’s operation was, an establishment primarily for the protection of the security of the East Africa Protectorate. By the time of the Centre’s establishment the fighting of the East African Campaign had long since spread...
throughout the region; it was no longer possible to plan the protection of each British colony or protectorate in Eastern Africa as an individual entail. It was essential to coordinate it on a larger footing. Furthermore, Major Foster’s original orders from the Directorate of Military Intelligence in 1917 had stated that he was ‘to obtain all information possible about the Belgian Congo, Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia’; the work of the Intelligence Centre was to be extended to cover not just the British Empire and the arena of hostilities, but the entire region of Eastern Africa.

Nevertheless, a centre of operations had to be chosen for practical reasons, and that, stated M.I.5.D., was to be Nairobi. They recorded that ‘all Intelligence records of permanent interest about the British protectorates and those collected during the military operations in German East Africa were also to be filed at Nairobi.’ As M.I.5.D. chose Nairobi as the place for the library of collected intelligence information, the East Africa Protectorate became the centre of operations of the Intelligence Centre by default.

Nairobi would have been chosen for three interlinking reasons: historical, military, and geographical. In 1920 A Handbook of Kenya Colony and the Kenya Protectorate, which had been written by the Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, was published publicly. It documented that: ‘Nairobi is the administrative centre and capital of British East Africa; head-quarters of the chief Government departments; and chief town of Ukamba province… [with a population of] about 19,000, of which 2,000 are Europeans and 5,000 Asiatics.’ In addition to housing many government buildings and institutions, Nairobi had a fairly substantial infrastructure, relative to contemporary Eastern Africa. It had, amongst others: a railway station, telephone and wireless stations, and ‘swampy ground… [that had] been drained.’ Being ‘5,450 ft. above sea-level’ and ‘327 miles from the coast’, Nairobi had a climate that was considered ‘pleasant’. It was because of these advantages that, the Handbook stated, ‘[during] the war Nairobi had been practically the base as well as the head-quarters of the military forces in the colony [the interior of Kenya became a Colony in 1920].’ This had also been the state of affairs in the pre-war era. The Intelligence

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319 Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty. A Handbook of Kenya Colony and the Kenya Protectorate (London; His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1920), pp.299—303.
Department of the King’s African Rifles, which had been ‘obstinately deaf to all warnings’, had been located ‘in Nairobi’ before the War.\textsuperscript{320}

The Intelligence Centre was not required to become engaged in combat itself, and so the pleasant surroundings of Nairobi, coupled with the government and military departments based there, made it an attractive prospect. Much of the fighting was taking place some way from Nairobi by the time it was instituted in late 1917, yet for practical reasons Nairobi remained the physical base for the Intelligence Centre. While Nairobi was the geographical core it was never to be the sole focus of the Centre; from the beginning, it was to be a centre concerned with the protection of the security for the whole of the British Empire in Eastern Africa.

The original telegram from M.I.5.D. referenced in the quote above was written to the Acting-Governor of the East Africa Protectorate, but it was not meant to be for his eyes only. The telegram ‘directed that its contents were to be repeated to the Governors of Uganda and Nyasaland, H.M. Commissioner for the Somaliland Protectorate and to the Administrator Wilhelmstal [of the Conquered Territory and later to the Resident at Zanzibar].’ M.I.5.D. did not wish for these men to be merely informed of the institution of the Intelligence Centre: ‘it was hoped [by M.I.5.D.] that the Governments concerned would give every assistance to the new Department.’\textsuperscript{321}

One part of the M.I.5. report from 1921 stated that the Intelligence Centre was to be focused specifically around the East Africa Protectorate, Uganda, and German East Africa:

‘In August 1917 when arrangements were being made for the establishment of a permanent intelligence centre at Nairobi for British East Africa, Uganda and German East Africa... the Governor [of Uganda] was asked by the Colonial Office to take steps to ensure the collaboration of the Uganda civil and police officials with the new Intelligence officer.’\textsuperscript{322}


\textsuperscript{321} TNA: KV 1/16: Muggeridge. ‘Appendix O.’, p.152.

This may have been the case purely because these three protectorates and colonies formed the bureaucratic nucleus of the East African Campaign. Nevertheless, the original telegram proves that while these three protectorates and colonies may have been considered the primary focuses, never were they to be considered the sole focus. Indeed, such a conviction was reiterated several times by M.I.5.D. For example, ‘A further telegram from the same source [M.I.5.D.] dated January 5th 1918’ continued to propagate the desire for the Intelligence Centre to spread beyond the boundaries of Nairobi and the Protectorate which housed it, and further expanded the ambitions of this collaboration. This telegram, the contents of which were communicated to all concerned as detailed above, made clear the intention that “close collaboration” was to be established “in regard to every kind of Intelligence between the Civil and Military Officers in all Protectorates”, and referred to the possibility of “General Intelligence Centres which would be branches of that in Nairobi”, being ‘formed in each in course of time.\textsuperscript{323}

The Intelligence Centre followed these orders and did not focus exclusively on the East Africa or Uganda Protectorates, or German East Africa; instead, the Centre opened itself up to collaboration across the British Empire in the region. It communicated with the other ‘British possessions in the East African area’, to inform them of what was required from them. ‘Shortly after his arrival’, Major Muggeridge later wrote, ‘Major Foster addressed a memorandum giving the headings under which information was required to the Secretariat in each of the British possessions in the East African area, at the same time indicating the nature of the collaboration and assistance which was sought for.’\textsuperscript{324}

Foster’s aims for this collaboration were concisely sketched thus: ‘It was hoped that with the help of the Governors, Major Foster would secure the cooperation not only of the battalion Intelligence officers [of the East African Force] but also of the civil and police authorities of British East Africa, Uganda, Nyasaland, Somaliland and German East Africa, so that all information should be available in the one office.’\textsuperscript{325} It is telling that after three and a half years at war, cooperation between ‘the civil and police authorities of British East

\textsuperscript{323} TNA: KV 1/16: Muggeridge. ‘Appendix O.’, pp.152—153.
\textsuperscript{324} Ibid., p.153.
Africa, Uganda, Nyasaland, Somaliland and German East Africa’, which had been invaded the previous year, was not already in existence.

Eventually, this collaboration went beyond even the ‘British possessions in the East African area’ and the ‘Conquered Territory’ (German East Africa) to encompass the entirety of the eastern part of the continent outside of even nominal British control. ‘The term “East African area”’ was ‘employed for the sake of brevity and is intended to apply to those districts with which the East African Intelligence centre [sic] is primarily concerned. These are: Uganda, British East Africa, Conquered Territory, Zanzibar, British Somaliland, Nyasaland and contiguous foreign countries, such as Abyssinia, the Congo Belge, Italian Somaliland and Portuguese East Africa.’

One month before the Great War ended the following was reported: ‘In October 1918, the result of Major Foster’s efforts was reported to the C.S.I.B. and it was stated that all local administration under the Intelligence Centre at Nairobi, except Nyasaland, had fallen in with the registration of aliens entering their territory.’

This infers that the Intelligence Centre did not have the power to force the Governors of the British protectorates and colonies in East Africa to follow their orders. The Intelligence Centre gained its powers from M.I.5.D., which gained its from M.I.5, which gained its from the War Office, which gained its from Parliament, which gained its from the, limited, British electorate. Nyasaland was, like most British colonies and protectorates, mostly an autonomous region for many of its internal purposes; if Nyasaland failed to ‘fall in with the registration of aliens entering their territory’, as directed to do so by the Intelligence Centre, one must ask exactly how much control did the Imperial Government in London truly have over the British Empire?

Subjects of Interest

The work that the newly established East African Intelligence Centre was ordered to undertake can be broken down into three subject areas. These three subjects were interwoven and formed the backbone of the work undertaken:

1. The collection and collation of intelligence records and files from across the wider region to a central library located in Nairobi.
2. The enactment and enforcement of port controls and the ‘registration of aliens’ to prevent the importation of enemy-backed literature, especially religious literature, to prevent the undermining of the programme of censorship.
3. The use of ‘counter-espionage’ to intercept agents in East Africa who possessed propaganda with the intention to spread Pan-Islamism.329

This work, and its impact on preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War, will be examined in Chapter Seven: principally in Chapter Seven Subchapter Eight.

*The Commander of the East African Intelligence Centre*

There is limited content in the publicly available archives on the consecutive heads of the East African Intelligence Centre: Major – later Lieutenant-Colonel – Claude (sometimes incorrectly Claud) Edward Foster and Major Charles Ernest Muggeridge.330 The sources that are available are the M.I.5. report of 1921, Foster and Muggeridge’s service records (known as their Personal Files or Long Service Papers), their Medal Cards, and, in the case of Foster, his private papers. Beyond the occasional mention, there has been no serious analysis in any secondary literature of these men, or how they came to be appointed to their jobs.331 One must piece together morsels of information from these different sources to present this narrative.

Major Foster

M.I.5.D. recorded that ‘Major Foster of M.I.2.B. (after having visited M.I.5.) was sent out to Nairobi, where he was to join the staff of the King’s African Rifles and to form an Intelligence centre [sic]’. 332 The documents do not state if Foster was appointed on 20th August 1917, or at a later date before 4th November 1917.

Foster was born on 1st August 1876; at 41; he was nearly a decade older than Major Notley. He received his commission on 20th February 1897, whence he joined the Suffolk Regiment. On his appointment as a Captain he joined the Royal Lancaster Regiment on 23rd April 1902, before being seconded to the Egyptian Army from 23rd May 1904 to 21st October 1905. He resigned his commission in the October of the following year. 333 He re-joined the army on the outbreak of the Great War. This must have occurred at some point before 29th November 1914, for it was on that date that he wrote to the Adjutant of the 6th Battalion of the Royal Lancaster Regiment requesting to be transferred to the Royal Flying Corps. He documented in support of this application that he ‘had experience with internal combustion engines.’ 334

As it had been decided that ‘officers belonging to units in the 3rd Army (1st New Army) [were] not to be considered for appointment to the Royal Flying Corps’ he was rejected on 20th January 1915 and instead was moved with the 6th Battalion to Gallipoli. 335 By the November he was sick with both enteritis – so common at Gallipoli that one officer present

334 TNA: WO 374/25160: Letter from Captain C.E. Foster to the Adjutant 6 Bt. The King’s Own (R. Lanc) Reg., in Lieutenant Colonel Claude Edward Foster, The King’s Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment.) Personal Files, 29th November 1914.
335 TNA: WO 374/25160: Letter from SGD. E. Turner. Lt Col, for Assistant Director of Military Aeronautics., to The General Officer Commanding 13th (Western) Division, Choldorton., in Lieutenant Colonel Claude Edward Foster, The King’s Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment.) Personal Files, 20th January 1915.
described it as one of the four ‘Gallipoli plagues’ – and jaundice.\footnote{Cooper, Bryan. \textit{The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli} (Ebook; Pickle Partners Publishing).} He was subsequently invalided home on 29\textsuperscript{th} November and placed on leave for 6 weeks.\footnote{TNA: WO 374/25160: ‘Proceedings of a Medical Board’, in \textit{Lieutenant Colonel Claude Edward Foster, The King’s Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment.) Personal Files}, 29\textsuperscript{th} November 1915.}

Records detailing the following eighteen months of Major Foster’s life are absent from his Personal File. The next chronological piece of information contained within this file was another ‘Proceedings of a Medical Board’ form, this time dated 17\textsuperscript{th} May 1918 from the British General Hospital in Nairobi. This medical board found that Foster was ‘suffering from D.A.H.’ (Disordered Action of the Heart - an anxiety disorder; it is possible that Foster was suffering from P.T.S.D.) and that he had ‘had 7 severe attacks of a similar nature during the past few years... He looks very ill, is sallow in appearance and anaemic.’\footnote{See: Skerritt, Paul W. ‘Anxiety and the heart – a historical review’, \textit{Psychological Medicine} 13 (1983), pp.17–25.} As a result, he was found ‘unfit for service at present’ for ‘six months’ and was invalided to the United Kingdom for ‘further treatment.’ He did not return to service in East Africa and was demobilised on 23\textsuperscript{rd} September 1919. He was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel on the same day.\footnote{TNA: WO 374/25160: ‘Proceedings of a Medical Board’, in \textit{Lieutenant Colonel Claude Edward Foster, The King’s Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment.) Personal Files}, 23\textsuperscript{rd} May 1918.}

What was not recorded within these documents was Foster’s relationship with M.I.5. This relationship most definitely existed before he was sent to Nairobi, for D Branch itself recorded that on his arrival in Nairobi he ‘established close touch with the Central Special Intelligence Bureau, where he was personally known, as well as with M.I.1. (Fighting Intelligence).’\footnote{TNA: KV 1/15: M.I.S. ‘1. British East Africa’, p.144.}

As was examined in the previous subchapter, the origins of M.I.S.D. were set in motion in the summer of 1915, with D Branch itself formed in the September of 1916; thus, to be ‘personally known’ to the C.S.I.B. when the Intelligence Centre was placed under his command Foster must have had contact with them after he returned to the United Kingdom from Gallipoli, for it did not exist prior to his departure. There is no record within Foster’s Personal Files as to his location and activities between 29\textsuperscript{th} November 1915 and 4\textsuperscript{th} November 1917, excepting that he was invalided to the United Kingdom on the former date.
Therefore, it seems evident that at some point between December 1915 and November 1917, Foster became known to M.I.5. After becoming known to M.I.5., he became ‘of M.I.2.B’ and became ‘personally known’ to M.I.5.D.

The declaration that Foster was ‘of M.I.2.B.’ makes perfect sense in relation to his later appointment, for this was ‘The geographical section of the War Office’s military intelligence directorate responsible for the collection and collation of information about various regions of the world, each assigned a subsection.’ Michael Smith has elaborated that M.I.2 was: ‘Military information concerning the Americas (except Canada), Spain, Portugal, Italy, Liberia, Tangier, the Balkan States, the Ottoman Empire, Arabia, Sinai, Abyssinia, Egypt, Sudan and West Persia.’

There are very few primary documents relating to M.I.2. in the surviving archives, so there is very little primary evidence to present an explanation of Foster’s work in M.I.2.B., except to say that it was clearly international in nature: a professional characteristic that would surely have been of importance for M.I.5.D. when they sort to engage a suitable person for the position of the commander of the East African Intelligence Centre.

The picture formed when one examines the information contained within these morsels of information directs one to the understanding that Foster was most probably working for M.I.2.B. in the period immediately prior to him assuming his duties for M.I.5.D. in Nairobi, and that through this work he was in some way known – either personally or by reputation, or more conceivably both – by his colleagues in M.I.5., and maybe also by those in M.I.1 (Fighting Intelligence), and that the personnel at M.I.5.D. – probably Hall or one of his subordinates – recommended him for the job in Nairobi, which he was disposed upon to accept.

(Exactly what ‘M.I.1. (Fighting Intelligence)’ was is not clear. In common with all parts of the British intelligence establishment, M.I.1s went through several reorganisations during the First World War, but none of the sub-sections appear to have ever officially been called ‘M.I.1. (Fighting Intelligence)’. Presumably this was an informal name used within the organisation that did not need to be clarified for the external reader, for, as a secret

intelligence document, it was not designed to be read by such a person. Nigel West provides the following brief structural breakdown for M.I.1. during the Second World War, with various notes on the activities of the sub-sections during the First World War:

- ‘MI1 (b), a cryptanalytical organisation developed during World War I, located at Cork Street, Mayfair, and staffed by Intelligence Corps personnel; later responsible for censorship, publicity, and propaganda policy’.
- ‘MI1 (c), the original War Office military intelligence designation for the Secret Intelligence Service, referred to in official handbooks as “special duties”’.
- ‘MI1(d), the clerical division responsible for the distribution of paper and the allocation of travel grants’.
- ‘MI1 (e), a cipher bureau based at Le Touquet during World War I for the study of German codes; later responsible for artillery, small arms, explosives, and mechanization intelligence’. 343

Of these four sub-sections, M.I.1. (b) and M.I.1. (c) seem to be the most likely for Foster to wish to ‘establish close touch with’ professionally in relation to his work in the East African Intelligence Centre, and so could have been the official name for ‘M.I.1. (Fighting Intelligence).’ Unfortunately, neither of these sub-sections have left a sufficient number of primary records to positively establish which one of them was being referred to.

John Ferris has stated that: ‘MI1b, the War Office code-breaking bureau during 1914-18, is the worst documented of British intelligence agencies between 1900 and 1945.’ 344 Peter Freeman provides two reasons for this. One is simply that there was a ‘near-total failure to preserve any records of its wartime achievements’. 345 The second reason is that it has suffered an unfair comparison to the famous Room 40 ‘within the secondary literature’; they had similar functions in different organisations:

‘The War Office’s First World War cryptanalytic bureau MI1(b) has been severely overshadowed by its more glamorous equivalent in the Admiralty, ‘Room 40’. In particular its diplomatic decryption work has gone completely unnoticed; yet this

was its main activity, and it contributed more than did Room 40 to their common successor, the Governor Code and Cypher School (GC&CS).  

1917 ‘saw a revolution in MI1(b)’s size and scope. They solved diplomatic codes of Argentina, Brazil, Denmark, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Persia, Sweden, Uruguay and the Vatican.

As for the other option, M.I.1(c) is, as previously stated, referred to by West as ‘the original War Office military intelligence designation for the Secret Intelligence Service’: S.I.S. It was the ‘cover’ name for the section of military intelligence which, during the First World War, was being run by Mansfield Cumming, the future so-called M.I.6. This was the organisation ‘responsible for gathering intelligence overseas’.

‘Fighting Intelligence’ in this instance could have thus meant ‘Fighting’ enemy ‘Intelligence’ by decrypting diplomatic messages, or it could have literally meant ‘Fighting’ the enemy via ‘Intelligence’ means; i.e. espionage.)

A second, less likely, possibility for the first contact between Foster and the British intelligence establishment also presents itself: before the outbreak of the First World War. This would help to partly explain his application for the Royal Flying Corps. Founded in April 1912, the R.F.C. pioneered imagery intelligence (IMINT) in the British military. Thus, had he been accepted, the R.F.C. would have allowed Foster to work within the Military Intelligence apparatus, whilst still being an officer who was fit for general service.

Yet Foster’s own explanation for his application to the R.F.C. was that he had ‘experience with internal combustion engines’; there was no mention of any experience with enemy reconnaissance, or that he had any expertise which could have been of use to the newly developing IMINT. Presumably he must have had some experience with internal combustion engines for, had he not, his lie would surely have been discovered almost instantly. The simplest explanation would seem to be that he applied to join the R.F.C. because he

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346 Ibid., p.206.
347 Ibid., p.214.
genuinely did have ‘experience with internal combustion engines’ and, since it was not
formed until April 1912, he had not had the chance to do so during his first commission.

Therefore, the most likely chain of events would appear to be that Foster was unknown to
the British intelligence establishment prior to his return from Gallipoli. After submitting to
the third medical board of his career as a result of that Campaign, and in respect of his age
being advanced for that of a front-line soldier, Foster was recommended to join M.I.2.B.,
after which he moved to the East African Intelligence Centre.

Exactly what his credentials were to be placed in command of that Centre, and so
consequently be tasked with preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the
British Empire in East Africa, must now remain lost to history; one must accept that in the
eighteen months or so that Foster was most probably working for the British intelligence
establishment in London he learnt enough skills to qualify him for the role.

‘In May 1918, Major Foster was invalided home and was succeeded by Major C.E.
Muggeridge, G.S.O., 2. King’s African Rifles, a local planter who had joined up for the War
and returned to Nairobi after seeing active service.’^350

Major Muggeridge

Similarly to the appointment of Major Foster, the appointment of Major Muggeridge to the
post of the commander of the East African Intelligence Centre was not clearly recorded in
the surviving records. Whilst the two men shared the similarity of having no direct
connection to the intelligence establishment prior to the First World War recorded within
their personal records, unlike Foster there is no surviving evidence within M.I.5.’s publicly
available records, or any other publicly available document, that Muggeridge had any
contact with M.I.5. at all before his appointment to the above post in May 1918.
Muggeridge’s narrative does possess evidence that proves he had a solid background in
military intelligence; however, it is not clear exactly in what form of military intelligence this
background was spent, or how this equipped him to run the East African Intelligence Centre.

Muggeridge was born on 4th January 1876. He applied for a temporary commission in the Regular Army for the period of the War on 29th May 1915 and was subsequently admitted on 5th July of the same year. On the outbreak of the War he had been resident in the East Africa Protectorate, and on receiving his temporary commission he left Africa to participate in the hostilities in Europe. He had two separate periods of service during the War; the distinction between these two periods was important: they were from 5th July 1915 to 17th January 1917, and then again from 25th June 1917 to 3rd August 1919, the date on which he was demobbed. (As opposed to his Service Papers, The London Gazette gave a different date – 17th September 1919 – as the date on which Muggeridge relinquished his commission. The date of 3rd August 1919 is recorded several times within his Long Service Papers so, on balance, the latter date seems to be more likely; in relation to the argument of this thesis, it makes little difference either way.)

He returned to East Africa in the break between these two periods of service. In his first job on his return, from 25th June to 24th October 1917, he was employed at a POW Camp somewhere within Eastern Africa; the details were not recorded. On 31st July he was promoted to the rank of temporary Captain, as recorded in The Supplement to the London Gazette. Why he returned to East Africa is not made known within his Long Service Papers, except that there are no medical board documents currently included within it; ill health was probably not the cause. Nor is there any reasoning for the long gap of five months between the two periods of service, except possibly for the long journey. What else he was doing during this time is unknown, although a ‘C E Muggeridge’ was recorded as having registered a firearm – a D B shot gun 12 – at Mombasa on 6th June 1917, giving his place of residence as Nairobi. This was a new licence, and not a renewal of an existing one;

Muggeridge had registered a gun in the Protectorate before the War, but the licence must have expired during, or as a result of, Muggeridge’s European war service.\(^{357}\)

Muggeridge’s Service Papers state that there was no gap in his service after he left the POW Camp, but it is impossible to know with absolute certainty what he was doing between leaving the POW Camp on 24\(^{th}\) October 1917, and succeeding Foster to the command of the Intelligence Centre on 24\(^{th}\) May 1918, for it was not recorded within his Papers.\(^{358}\) However, it is possible with informed speculation to make an educated deduction about his whereabouts and activities for these missing seven months.

It is certainly possible, even probable, that it is not coincidental that his departure from the POW Camp occurred less than a fortnight before the Intelligence Centre began operations on 4\(^{th}\) November 1917; it logically may have also corresponded with Foster’s physical arrival on the continent. Such a proposition that Muggeridge worked under Foster for these months would seem likely, given that the former immediately took over the leadership of the Intelligence Centre from the latter as its commander – not its caretaker – when Foster was suddenly invalided. Foster’s medical board occurred on 17\(^{th}\) May and he left the department on 24\(^{th}\), there was only exactly one week to arrange for Muggeridge’s succession; a little quick, perhaps, for an outsider to be appointed to such a post in such a location.\(^{359}\)

Two pieces of evidence in particular stand out strongly in favour of this notion. Whilst Muggeridge’s periods of service were recorded in his Service Papers as being, as previously stated, from 5\(^{th}\) July 1915 to 17\(^{th}\) January 1917, and then again from 25\(^{th}\) June 1917 to 3\(^{rd}\) August 1919, the distinction between the period of ‘Imperial service’ and the period of ‘total service’ for financial reasons is an interesting one, for these financial periods did not divide equally with his periods of service. Muggeridge was in ‘Imperial service’ for the entirety of his first period of service, but only from 25\(^{th}\) June 1917 to 24\(^{th}\) October 1917 in his second; the financial period of ‘Imperial service’ ended when he left the POW Camp for the

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\(^{358}\) TNA: KV 1/16: Muggeridge. ‘Appendix O.’, p.159.

\(^{359}\) TNA: WO 374/25160: ‘Proceedings of a Medical Board’ in Foster, 23\(^{rd}\) May 1918.
unrecorded work that he must have been performing prior to 24th May 1918. His salary for the period 25th October 1917 to 3rd August 1919 was not paid for by imperial funds as had been the case for the previous period under ‘Imperial service.’ His salary for this period was paid from another source. Since his salary from 24th May 1918 to 3rd August 1919 must have been paid by, or on behalf of, M.I.5., it stands to reason that this was also the case for the period of 25th October 1917 to 23rd May 1918 as well, as no distinction was made within the document that concerned the change of Muggeridge’s own status between 23rd and 24th May 1918.360

The second piece of evidence in favour of the idea that Muggeridge was originally appointed as Foster’s assistant is a statement by M.I.5.: ‘No establishment beyond the appointment of Major Foster as G.S.O.2 [General Staff Officer Section 2 – Intelligence, security and information operations] and that of a Staff Captain as Assistant was arranged [prior to 4th November 1917].’361 No further information was given about the identity of the ‘Staff Captain’, but it does prove that there was an assistant to Foster, who logically could have been Muggeridge. If this is the correct deduction, it would prove that Muggeridge had connections with M.I.5. prior to 31st July 1917 – the date on which that edition of The Supplement to the London Gazette was published – and would also help to support the argument that Muggeridge’s return to East Africa occurred with the principle objective of his employment with the Intelligence Centre in mind. In such a scenario, his work at the POW Camp may have simply provided him with work until he could assume his position. Conversely, the provenance of the source works against this notion; the author of this sentence for M.I.5. was Major Muggeridge himself in 1919 and referring to oneself in that manner seems somewhat uncomfortable. Nevertheless, no other candidate for the position presents itself at all.

Confirmation of Major Muggeridge’s war work cannot be fully achieved with such limited surviving documentation; it must remain, to some degree, mere conjecture. However, these financial considerations strongly support the concept that Muggeridge worked for the Intelligence Centre for the entire period of 25th October 1917 to 3rd August 1919. Yet, as

likely as these dates may seem, they offer one no insight into the qualifications possessed by Muggeridge to hold such positions as the commander and the assistant to the commander of an Intelligence Centre, particularly during the fighting of the East African Campaign, which had descended into guerrilla warfare by this period. M.I.5. recorded only one sentence which can properly be described as providing an example of a relevant qualification held by Muggeridge which qualified him to hold these posts; that he was ‘a local planter who had joined up for the War and returned to Nairobi after seeing active service.’

Naturally, the official story is not quite the full story. How the British defined ‘local’ – as in ‘local planter’ – was not explained. As was examined in Chapter One, the British Administration of the East Africa Protectorate encouraged white immigration in the years prior to the First World War. In an edition of the *Official Gazette of the East African Protectorate* dated 15th December 1913, a ‘C. E. Muggeridge’ was recorded as having been awarded a ‘One Year’s Resident’s Licence’ on 12th August 1913. There was no remark to suggest that this was a renewal, although there was also no remark to say that it definitely was not. The 1902 Crown Land Ordinance leased the land for 99-years; if he had arrived earlier and applied under the terms of that Ordinance he would have had no need to apply for a One Year’s Resident’s Licence in August 1913.

Exactly how long Muggeridge had been in the Protectorate prior to the outbreak of war is unclear. Although he was not recorded in the censuses of 1901 and 1911 in the United Kingdom, this does not prove that he was resident in East Africa, and the above evidence strongly indicates that he had not been in the Protectorate very long prior to the summer of 1914. Presumably he was one of the six hundred and seventy-five Europeans to arrive in the Protectorate between 1911 and 1914 as part of the Administration’s efforts to increase white settlement, but that, at least prior to August 1913, he had not yet applied for, or been allocated, land under the Crown Land Ordinance.

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364 HC Deb (09 February 1911) Vol. 21, cc.431—2.
Accordingly, Muggeridge was only a ‘local planter’ in the sense that he had briefly been present in the East Africa Protectorate before the outbreak of the War. For M.I.5.D. to have called him a ‘local planter’ seems to have been something of an exaggeration, except that due to the tiny number of Europeans who lived in the Protectorate he could well have been the only person who worked for M.I.5. to have any claims to such a title whatsoever. M.I.5.’s report of 1921 was compiled for the purpose of demonstrating the scope and importance of the work that had been undertaken by M.I.5. during the Great War; exaggerating to imply that they had employed a man who knew the local area would not appear to be amiss, especially when one considers that Foster was not presented with any claims to such a title.

Muggeridge’s upbringing had been typically English and upper middle class. A biographical note in a book on alumni of the University of Cambridge states that he was born at Carshalton, Surrey, and attended Winchester School before graduating from Trinity College Cambridge in 1897. He was also present in England on his death on 15th October 1941, which occurred in Tunbridge Wells. Muggeridge was well decorated for his war work; he held a Military Cross, which was awarded on 1st February 1917, and an O.B.E., which was awarded on Tuesday 3rd June 1919 in the King’s Birthday Honours ‘for valuable services rendered in connection with military operations in East Africa’.

As far as can be seen, Muggeridge seems to have been a well-connected and well-regarded member of the British establishment. Although the book on the alumni of the University of Cambridge contained only a short segment on Muggeridge, one short sentence stands out in relation to his work with the East African Intelligence Centre: he ‘Served in the Great War, 1914-19 (Intelligence Section, 1915-19…).’ This is the only firm record of Muggeridge having had any involvement with the British intelligence establishment prior to May 1918. Therefore, the façade that M.I.5.D. used to portray Muggeridge in their very brief characterisation of him, that he was merely ‘a local planter who had joined up for the War and returned to Nairobi after seeing active service’, appears to have been a disingenuous one, albeit true. Since he was admitted to a temporary commission in the Regular Army in

366 ‘Tuesday, 3 June, 1919.’, in Tenth Supplement to The London Gazette of Friday 30th May, 1919; ‘Awarded the Military Cross’, in Supplement to The London Gazette, 1 February 1917.
367 Venn. Alumni Cantabrigienses, p.492.
the summer of 1915 and would have had to have travelled from East Africa in the same year, he must have immediately begun work for the military ‘Intelligence Section’ on his arrival in Europe. He left the ‘Intelligence Section’ for reasons unknown in 1917 and began work for M.I.5. Such a narrative could be constructed to suggest, but, once again, not to prove, that Muggeridge may have had some connection with people working for the British intelligence establishment prior to his war work; a background such as Muggeridge’s would make him holding personal acquaintances with the relevant people a possibility, although any acquaintances could also have been professional. What does seem to be clear is that Muggeridge was less connected than Foster with M.I.5. and similar departments, for there was no mention of him having been acquainted with any of the sub-sections in the way that Foster was. Nevertheless, as Priya Satia writes in respect to the imperial intelligence growth then occurring in the Middle East, ‘It is difficult to overstate the importance of personal relationships to the form of this organization [intelligence]’, and so any personal connection between Muggeridge and a person or persons within M.I.5. would have been following a set precedence.\textsuperscript{368}

An overview of these sources therefore suggests that the only appropriate qualification held by Muggeridge that made M.I.5.D. believe him to have been eligible for the appointment to the position of commander of an Intelligence Centre was that he had around eighteen months previous war work with the ‘Intelligence Section’ in Europe. Two other pieces of evidence exist that suggest that Muggeridge was qualified for such a position; however, they are extremely circumstantial, to the extent of almost being inadmissible.

The first of these two pieces is that in the immediate aftermath of the War Muggeridge expressed the opinion that ‘it was important that East African Intelligence should not be allowed to relapse into what he described as “its pre-war state of Parochialism”.’ This would imply that he had some understanding of the pre-war state of intelligence in East Africa, that he understood that this state had been parochial, and that it would not be in the long-term interests of the British Empire for this state of affairs to be repeated in the post-First

\textsuperscript{368} Satia, Priya. \textit{Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East} (New York; Oxford University Press, 2008), p.57.
World War era. Both of these stances could easily have been formed during his service in the First World War, but his use of the word ‘Parochialism’ is quite strong.

The second piece of evidence is even more tentative. M.I.5.D. recorded that ‘The relations between the Central Special Intelligence Bureau and Major Muggeridge became extremely cordial and much information was furnished by Major Muggeridge as to the work of the Intelligence Centre at Nairobi and its prospects after the War.’ Almost all of this correspondence is either lost, or, if it survives, is not in public archives, so it cannot be analysed itself. This sentence would indicate that not only was Muggeridge affable, but that he was also good at his job; or at least good enough to please the personnel of M.I.5.D. in London. Again, Muggeridge may simply have been a quick learner, a natural even, and an affable-like gentleman, no doubt helped by class affiliation; yet it is also possible that Muggeridge had some sort of previous experience which helped him to build such a successful working relationship in such a short space of time.

The one major downside to the conception that Muggeridge held other qualifications or had gained previous experiences which were relevant to his appointment to the position of the commander of the East African Intelligence Centre is that M.I.5. did not record any previous connection with him in what was a secret document. The report of 1921 was not produced to be an official history of M.I.5.’s war time activities; therefore, an in-depth analysis of Muggeridge would have been inappropriate, but more morsels of information relating to Foster were included.

As will be examined in Chapter Seven, Foster was reasonably successful in his command of the Intelligence Centre. It would seem odd to have appointed as his successor a man with no credentials to his name other than that he was a ‘local planter’; unless there was a complete breakdown of reason amongst the personnel at M.I.5.D., which is not supported in any way by the surviving documents, Muggeridge must have had credentials enough for them to be assured of the continuing performance of the East African Intelligence Centre under him. As with Foster, we must content ourselves with this limited knowledge.

Very little information about the structure of the work force of the East African Intelligence Centre has survived in the publicly available archives. Excepting the Majors Foster and Muggeridge, few names were recorded; when referred to, which is itself a rare occurrence, other members of the East African Forces attached to the Intelligence Centre were usually described simply as ‘Officer’ or ‘N.C.O.’ One paragraph written by Muggeridge, which was briefly quoted from above, illustrated that the work force employed by the Intelligence Centre was not large:

‘No establishment beyond the appointment of Major Foster as G.S.O.2 and that of a Staff Captain as Assistant was arranged but an Officer of the K.A.R. [King’s African Rifles] for cipher and other duties, and two N.C.O’s for correspondence were attached to the Central Office. More recently [as of 7th January 1919 – must have occurred in 1918] it has been arranged for three officers of the K.A.R. to act as representatives of the Department in Uganda, Conquered Territory and Nyasaland in addition to their other duties in each case, and several N.C.Os have been temporarily lent too, in connection with the searching of passengers passing through the ports for mischievous correspondence.’

Assuming this to be correct, for there is no other extant source with which to cross-examine it with, only six officers ever worked for the Intelligence Centre. Only a maximum of five of these could have been working after 24th May 1918, since there is no evidence that any external officer replaced Muggeridge after he replaced Foster; the ‘Assistant’ role remained empty. Three of these officers only worked for the Intelligence Centre part time; hence, Muggeridge and the unnamed K.A.R. Officer ‘for cipher and other duties’ must have been the only officers working fulltime in the Intelligence Centre after the departure of Foster. The ‘two N.C.O’s’ appear to have been permanent staff members, whilst the ‘several N.C.Os’ were not. This would result in a sum of five, and, after Foster’s departure, four, permanent members of staff for the Intelligence Centre, with an unknown, but seemingly small, number of part time or temporary members of staff attached in some way.

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Although there were only a few N.C.O.s they were imperative to the work of the Intelligence Centre. Muggeridge later wrote that: ‘[the Intelligence Centre] is... greatly indebted to the King’s African Rifles Headquarters Staff for the loan of several N.C.Os without whom it would have been impossible to find a suitable personnel to supervise and carry out the searching’ for port controls.\footnote{\textit{TNA: KV 1/16: Muggeridge. ‘Appendix O.’, p.159.}}

In continuation of the above quote that begins ‘It was hoped that with the help of the Governors, Major Foster would secure the cooperation not only of the battalion Intelligence officers but also of the civil and police authorities...,’ the following sentence was written: ‘it was also hoped that at least one civil and one police officer might be associated with the Intelligence officer so that all branches of the Administration might be represented in the Intelligence office.’\footnote{\textit{TNA: KV 1/15: M.I.5. ‘1. British East Africa’, p.143.}} If this actually occurred as written is unrecorded, but since there was cooperation between the Intelligence Centre and the different colonies and protectorates, one can assume that at least some civil and police officers became associated with the Centre; therefore the number of people who worked in some capacity for it was increased slightly from the formal numbers above.

No mention is made of any non-Officer or non-N.C.O. having worked for the Intelligence Centre. It would be unthinkable for this to have been the case. Unless the five permanent staff members of the Centre were unusually, almost to impossibly, physically active in a region with little permanent infrastructure which was in a state of guerrilla warfare, it must have been the case that others were involved. Much of the legwork of the labour accomplished by the Intelligence Centre was almost certainly exerted by Africans employed as soldiers and porters; their exertions were not recorded for posterity by M.I.5.D. One must read between the lines to see that while the Intelligence Centre was commanded by white male Britons, black Africans were integral to its achievements.

Overall, the actual number of people who would have worked in some capacity for the Intelligence Centre would have been larger than the official figures already stated. Over and above the Majors Foster and Muggeridge, the other permanent and part-time staff members, the associated civil and police officers and the unmentioned Africans, the
Intelligence Centre had connections with other administrative bodies across the wider British-controlled region. Along with the overlap with the East African Force’s Intelligence Department, the likes of the various censors, Provost Marshals and Governors would, by the very nature of their work, have facilitated the aims of the Intelligence Centre. Nevertheless, it seems clear that in spite of its large geographical range, at no point in time was the East African Intelligence Centre a large operation in terms of its workforce. The obscurity surrounding the exact size and composition of this workforce is not a historiographical problem that is unique to East Africa in the study of the use of counter-intelligence in the British Empire during the First World War. Again in respect to the events then occurring in the Middle East, Satia has concluded that ‘As intelligence began to widen its domain to include administration and operations planning, it also sank further into the recesses of the covert world.’ Said covert world provides many interesting sources to the historical researcher but lists of names and positions tend not to be abundant amongst them.

Conclusion

The institution of the East African Intelligence Centre occurred on 20th August 1917. Excepting the unfortunate event of Major Foster having to be invalided back to the United Kingdom in the May of 1918, this institution appears to have been smooth and orderly. The Intelligence Centre cultivated cordial communications with M.I.5.D., to whom it reported, it developed a small workforce, and it encouraged interactions with other interested parties in the region.

Although small, the Intelligence Centre was solid. This solidity allowed it to undertake the work that was required of it to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa during the East African Campaign of the First World War, as will be examined in Chapter Seven. However, its limited size restricted its ability to be fully successful in all of its endeavours on this matter.

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373 Satia. Spies in Arabia, pp.48—49.
Conclusion: Chapter Six

The imperial counter-intelligence project of M.I.5.D. began in London in the summer of 1915 and continued throughout the remaining years of the First World War. The commencement of this project was vital for preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa during the latter part of this war, for it brought about the institution of the East African Intelligence Centre. This Intelligence Centre immediately set about tackling the tasks in hand in November 1917 and, although small, achieved some success.

The deficiency of the Intelligence Department of the King’s African Rifles was examined in Chapter Four; the British Imperial Government in London refused to prepare the British Empire in East Africa for the potential of a war on the African continent between two white colonisers, as had occurred in South Africa at the turn of the Twentieth Century. This Department evolved into the Intelligence Department of the East African Forces during the East African Campaign of the First World War and was led by Captain Richard Meinertzhagen from early 1915 to the summer of 1916. It was concerned with military intelligence and, whilst there was overlap, as befitted a region experiencing guerrilla warfare, it was not directly responsible for preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire. As such an in-depth look at its structure, duties, and accomplishments is not necessary to answer this thesis’ central research question.

The most obvious example of this overlap can be seen in an analysis of Major Notley’s Memorandum on the employment of a Counter Espionage Bureau in British East Africa, November 1915, which has previously been cited in this thesis. Whilst this was signed only by Notley, it was written in the first-person plural.\(^{374}\) In the “D” Branch Report. Report on the Establishment of a Special Intelligence Service in the Colonies and Overseas Dominions the

reason for this was made clear; the memorandum had been ‘drawn up’ by ‘the Provost Marshal [Notley], and the Chief of the Military Intelligence Staff’: Meinertzhagen.\(^{375}\)

The Intelligence Department of the East African Forces had relatively little to do with preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa. However, its expansion demonstrated the wider growth of the British Empire’s intelligence network in this region in the years of the First World War.

The British Empire could potentially have also been represented by another intelligence department in East Africa in 1918: the ‘Eastern Africa Mohammedan Bureau. (Under the Arab Bureau)’.\(^{376}\) In the January of 1918 Captain Philipps was ordered to draw up the particulars for the proposed scheme. His particulars were well detailed, but there is no evidence that they were ever adopted.\(^{377}\) Why this was the case was not recorded, but it may have been due to the institution of the East African Intelligence Centre two months previously. In January 1919 Major Muggeridge wrote that ‘Pan Islamism, Pan Ethiopianism, and the activities of Missionaries [were] amongst the subjects in regard to which every endeavour [had] been made [by the Intelligence Centre] to collect information and record the opinions of those competent to judge.’\(^{378}\) Whilst the British imperial intelligence establishment was expanding, the officials involved may well have considered it unnecessary for the British Empire to found and financially support two counter-intelligence departments which were working on the same subject in the same location at the same time.

Although in 1918 Philipps became ‘attached to the Arab Bureau Force, and served in Cairo, Jerusalem, Syria, and Abyssinia’ he remained active in dealing with the threat of Pan-Islamism in East Africa. He eventually returned to Uganda to become a District


Muggeridge thought so highly of Philipps’ work that after the end of the war he took the trouble to write to him to say ‘thank you for all the assistance you have given the [East African Intelligence Centre]’, and to inform him that ‘The information you have sent from time to time has been most useful and has been carefully carded. I am very grateful.’ According to Muggeridge, Philipps’ ‘heart was in the work.’ As will be examined in Chapter Seven, Philipps’ work was vitally important for preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa during the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War.

The argument Thomas presents in his subchapter ‘Intelligence Gathering and Stereotyping’ in Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 is a pertinent one for both this chapter and its successor:

‘Colonial intelligence gathering was not everywhere a matter of misperception and chimerical fears... But in times of acute political crisis, security service personnel reverted to a simpler typology. When the colonial order was under threat, indigenous subjects were more often viewed monolithically as potentially, if not actually, dangerous rather than as a differentiated, heterogeneous national population among which only a tiny minority of individuals harboured seditious ideas. This conflation of the dependent population into the category of potential enemy – a classic case of “othering,” ... – reflected the underlying structural weakness of colonial states.

The propensity to stereotype suggests that additional sources of information and new intelligence bureaus to process it did not invariably mean better analysis of local social conditions.’

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The establishment of M.I.5.D. and the institution of the East African Intelligence Centre made a large impact upon the use of counter-intelligence by the British Empire in East Africa, but they did not change the character of the imperial relationship upon which they were built. Thomas continues by stating that ‘It was perhaps an obvious point, but one that was often lost by more senior officials: to understand the indigenous population – and avoid the worse of stereotyping – one had to move among it.’ 382 The short time that it was in existence, coupled by the very limited number of personnel it could employ, meant that the Intelligence Centre, and through it M.I.5.D., was unable to mitigate its inherent impediments. The work done by the Intelligence Centre was an improvement on the work done by Major Notley, but it was only an improvement; it was not a revolution.

382 Ibid, p.78.
Chapter Seven Action: Preventing Pan-Islamism from Threatening the Security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War

After identifying the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa, as was detailed in Chapter Five, Captain Philipps concluded that ‘A small commission of enquiry, or at least an officer’ should ‘be detailed, to submit full first hand [sic] information and practical suggestions to the Government with the object of obtaining a definite co-ordinated policy and specific measures to cope with these movements in the territories concerned at the earliest possible date.’\(^{383}\)

Yet there was a note of caution looming over this entire issue. At the beginning of his essay Captain Bray took the trouble to make one fact very plain: the British Empire would be unable to prevent Pan-Islamism from existing in the British Empire.

He began this note of caution by informing his reader that ‘The effort against us, is... spread over a wide area, in fact over the whole of the Mohammedan world... It must be recognised that the movement [Pan-Islamism] has been going on for a considerable number of years, it has gained many adherents, it has become an ideal with thousands of the younger generation, and those imbued with modern mohammedan [sic] ideas of education’.\(^{384}\)

The consequences of this were, Bray continued, that ‘We [the British Empire] can not [sic] hope to eradicate by suppressive measures in [the British Empire], the elements forming dangerous material, we can not hope to wipe out by violent measures so deep-rooted, so widely spread a movement; any more than we can hope by similar measures to supress the Socialist movement in Europe.’ Therefore, the conclusion was that ‘Purely suppressive measures merely drive it [Pan-Islamism] under-ground and we lose its threads, wholesale arrests merely frighten for the moment and eventually lead to greater discontent; while those arrested, being regarded as Martyrs in a noble cause, will by their sacrifice, draw more

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\(^{383}\) TNA: WO 106/259: Philipps, J.E. ‘Note on preventive measures against conjunction of Pan-Islam and Africa for the Africa.’, in Memorandum on East and Central Africa with papers on Pan Islamism and Ethiopianism, 1918.

\(^{384}\) TNA: FO 141/773/6: Bray, N.N.E. Intelligence and Notes on the Pan-Islamic Movement, 25th March 1917.
into the field against us, while those working in countries over which we have little or no control are the more insistent in their endeavours.’

Bray ended this section with a substantial recommendation to those in the British Empire who were tasked with preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of that empire:

‘The point therefore I wish to emphasise is, that the movement has taken too firm a hold in the minds of Mohammedans, for us ever to hope to eliminate it. That even in India however severe our suppressive measures, it will gain new direction, in countries outside India it will gather fresh momentum.

Therefore the methods we use and the policy we adopt in the near future will make for us many friends or many enemies. If we show ourselves completely hostile to this movement, the fact will be welcomed by those working against us and is the very attitude they would wish us to adopt.’

In short, Bray’s argument was that attempting to prevent Pan-Islamism from existing within the British Empire was not only impossible but would actually backfire. Consequently, the British Empire would need to prevent the threat from Pan-Islamism without being seen to work against Pan-Islamism itself. British officials in East Africa heeded these words, and developed strategies to prevent the threat without openly preventing the movement.

It does not appear that ‘A small commission of enquiry, or at least an officer’ was ‘detailed’ for the work until the institution of the East African Intelligence Centre. All of the major players in the region, the Intelligence Centre included, suggested various ideas to prevent only the threat, not the philosophy, from Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire both across the world and in East Africa specifically:

Bray himself suggested that ‘The influence of Islam for good or evil will depend on its ethical quality and political character. Consequently the importance of securing the best and most enlightened Islamic teaching is very great, and effort and money should be expended to this and in combatting detrimental and reactionary opinions.’

385 Ibid.
386 Ibid.
387 Ibid.
that ‘Christian Missionary enterprise... may [check], and even in places [prevent]... Islam, as a creed and social system’. \footnote{388 TNA: FO 141/786/4: Letter from Reginald Wingate, Cairo, to the Right Honourable Arthur James Balfour, 20\textsuperscript{th} February 1918.}

388 Sir Charles Cleveland, the Director of Criminal Intelligence in India, suggested ‘that the detailed information put into our hands justifies and requires an effort on the part of Government to destroy the lines of communication and intrigue which have been revealed to us and to repress a few of the more important individuals concerned, for the good of the whole community and for the peace and safety of the Empire.’\footnote{389 Bray, Intelligence.}

389 The East African Intelligence Centre was to suggest various ideas, such as the enactment and enforcement of port controls to prevent ‘the hand-carrying of letters [including Pan-Islamic propaganda] in and out of [East Africa]’.\footnote{390 TNA: KV 1/15: M.I.5. ‘VI. African Colonies & Protectorates. 1. British East Africa’, in Vol. I. “D” Branch Report. Report on the Establishment of a Special Intelligence Service in the Colonies and Overseas Dominions. 1921, p.145.}

390 Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and Captains Willis and Philipps recorded what the Imperial Government in London had suggested. They recorded that ‘it [appeared] that the policy of H.B.M’s Government in this area should be to the development of national feeling within its natural divisions, to develop deliberately the ‘insulating area’ between the great Mohammedan populations, to restrain by means of religious toleration and secular education the inroads of religious fanaticism of whatever origins, and to prepare the way for intelligent participation by the natives in their own administration and self control [sic] within the limits of their nation.’\footnote{391 TNA: WO 106/259: Willis, C.A. Philipps, J.E. ‘British Policy in Africa. Note on a conversation which took place at 2, Whitehall Gardens, between Col. Sir Mark Sykes, Capt. C.A. Willis, A.D.I. Sudan Govv., and Capt. J.E. Philipps, Intelligence Department., East Africa Force.’, in Memorandum on East and Central Africa with papers on Pan Islamism and Ethiopianism, 15\textsuperscript{th} July 1917.}

These suggestions were all based upon Bray’s substantial recommendation. If implemented, they would not appear as if the British Empire was hostile to the Islamic world; if successful, they would prevent the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to East Africa.

Therefore, whilst the need to develop a strategy to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa was unanimous amongst the British imperial officials concerned, suggestions of what this strategy should be were not unanimous. Eight different strategies were suggested in total; rather than examine them and decide which strategies presented the best prospects for success, the British Empire went with a blunt
approach and tried to implement all eight simultaneously. Amongst the reasons for this blunt approach were that some of these strategies began to be implemented before the institution of the East African Intelligence Centre, whilst others were implemented as a result of the changing military landscape of the East African Campaign.

The eight different strategies proposed were as follows:

1. The Physical Expansion of the Size of the British Empire in East Africa.
3. The Growth of the Attributes of the Imperial Intelligence Establishment of the British Empire.
4. The Cultivation of British Imperial Strength in the Islamic World.
5. The Promotion of Weak Central Government and Strong Nationalist Feelings amongst the Islamic Population of East Africa.
7. The Implementation of Counter-Intelligence in East Africa.
8. The Production and Dissemination of Pro-British Propaganda.

Alas, the surviving documents demonstrate that despite trying to simultaneously implement eight different strategies for the same problem tempers did not fray; everybody remained affable, even friendly. A loss to a detached reader perhaps, but no doubt a relief to those who were attempting to implement them.

These surviving documents also do not treat all eight of these proposed strategies equally; some of the eight strategies were recorded in multiple documents, and some only in a few. As was previously noted in the Introduction to this thesis, due to the constraints imposed upon doctoral theses the analysis of these eight strategies will cease at the end of the First World War. In some cases, the primary sources dry up rather quickly, before even the end of the War, whilst in some they carry on for years after 1918; in all cases more work needs to be undertaken on this topic in the post-First World War era.

Care has been taken to demonstrate the breadth of labour that was undertaken in both the planning and implementation of these strategies. Extensive research into these surviving documents allows one to construct the narrative for how the British Empire prevented Pan-
Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War.
As the German Empire had been identified as a source of the Pan-Islamic movement in East Africa one path forward seemed clear to the British Empire: the removal of German influence from East Africa. As Pan-Islamism had a second source into East Africa through the actions of some East Africans and the African Diaspora, the removal of German influence would not prevent the threat from coming to fruition; yet removing one source, that of a major European colonial power no less, could be nothing but beneficial to preventing the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the British Empire. The proposal to remove German influence from East Africa was simply outlined: colonise German East Africa for the British Empire. Thus, the first of the eight strategies proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa was to win the East African Campaign of the First World War and expand the physical size of the British Empire to encompass that land which had hitherto been part of the German Empire in the region. A relatively simple outline, but, as any history of the East African Campaign will inform its reader, one that proved to be harder in practice than theory.392

Nevertheless, when the threat from Pan-Islamism in East Africa was identified in 1917 the East African Campaign had already swung in the British Empire’s favour. The implementation of this first strategy was successful before it had even been suggested, for by 1917 great swathes of German East Africa were already under the control of the British Empire and German influence in the region was dropping dramatically. This success resulted not only in the removal of the relatively large Islamic population of German East Africa from the colonial authority of a power with which the British Empire was at war, but in the relocation of most of this authority to the British Empire itself.

The British Empire expanded in East Africa to gain physical control of German East Africa, but the formal status of the former German colony was to remain unsettled throughout the First World War. This problem forced the British Empire to consider the positions of the different colonial administrations and states who possessed some jurisdiction over the

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Islamic population of the East African region when it interacted with this population. They were forced to fudge the problem; a settled status for German East Africa did not occur until after the end of the First World War.

The Physical Conquest of German East Africa

After the abortive attempt of 1914, the invasion of German East Africa by the British Empire began in 1916 under the leadership of Jan Smuts. The future Prime Minister of South Africa, Smuts switched from fighting the British Empire during the Second Boer War to become one of the Empire’s most important figures in both the First and the Second World Wars. Smuts’ invasion marked 1916 as the year in which the British gained the advantage against the German Empire militarily in the East African Campaign; in early 1917 Smuts ‘marked his withdrawal from the fray with a declaration of victory in East Africa.’ As Paice has considered, ‘It was certainly the case that his decisive leadership in the field, and his willingness to take risks, had wrested more than one million square miles of German territory from the Kaiser’ in less than a year.

However, Paice concludes that this ‘declaration of victory’ was proclaimed ‘In order to safeguard his reputation’, for ‘von Lettow-Vorbeck and [Governor] Schnee [of German East Africa] remained undefeated in the field’. Despite the fall of one million square miles of German territory, von Lettow-Vorbeck’s troops did not vacate German East Africa for good until 1918. Travelling then to Northern Rhodesia, von Lettow-Vorbeck accepted the armistice on British imperial territory, for which he returned to Germany a hero. The First World War in East Africa was to continue for the better part of two years after Smuts made his declaration of victory.

Nevertheless, most of German East Africa was in the hands of the British Empire by the start of 1917; the physical conquest of German East Africa placed great swathes of former German territory under the control of the British Empire. Not only was the relatively large Islamic population of the former German colony removed from living under the authority of a power which wished to threaten the security of the British Empire by the promotion of

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393 Paice, Tip, p.293.
Pan-Islamism, it, due to them being the conquering powers, came under the authority of the British Empire itself.

**The Unsettled Status of the Conquered Territories**

Despite Smuts and his successors’ hard work, there was never any assurance at any point during the First World War that German East Africa would become a part of the British Empire at the cessation of fighting; there was not even any assurance that it would not remain a part of the German Empire. This was unfortunate for Britain’s aspiration to prevent German influence upon the Pan-Islamic movement in East Africa, for Germany remaining absent from the region was considered to be fundamental to the success of many of the other seven proposed strategies. On this topic, a Colonel from M.O.2., another branch of the British imperial intelligence establishment, stated in July 1917: ‘So much turns on German East Africa remaining British... that it is impossible to lay down definite schemes for development at present.’

Notwithstanding this statement, officials of the British Empire felt that it was essential to attempt to ‘lay down’ some ‘schemes’ across the East African region to help prevent the threat from Pan-Islamism, even if these ‘schemes’ would not be ‘definite’ in the intervening time period before ‘German East Africa remaining British’ could be assured. However, the major stumbling block to the idea to go ahead and implement ‘schemes’ in East Africa was that there were other administrations and states that had, in a variety of forms, jurisdiction over the Islamic population of East Africa: it would be necessary to co-ordinate them all.

Sir Reginald Wingate wrote that ‘The requisite co-ordination of policy’ was ‘complicated by the fact that the Moslem regions in Eastern Africa’ were in February 1918 ‘administered (eliminating Germany) by four separate authorities – the Colonial Office, the Anglo-Egyptian Government (under the Foreign Office), Abyssinia and Italy.’

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When he wrote that it was ‘clear, at least, that some uniform native policy [was] wanted to deal adequately with the new situation’, Captain Buxton agreed with Wingate on the necessity of co-ordinating policy across jurisdictions, but Buxton calculated them differently. Instead of totalling four, Buxton made it five with the addition of Germany: ‘But such uniformity can hardly be realized’, he wrote, ‘if the area concerned is still to be administered by five separate authorities – the Colonial office [sic], the Egyptian (or Sudan) Government, and the governments of Abyssinia, Italy, and Germany.’ Buxton, it emerges, was not quite as prepared to eliminate Germany from German East Africa as Wingate was; there had been no fundamental change in the East African Campaign in the two months that separated their statements. Buxton then furthered his sum still further: ‘If the desire of the settlers in British East Africa for responsible Government should be granted’, he continued, ‘a sixth would be added.’

Neither Wingate nor Buxton was correct, for both failed to note that the Portuguese and Belgian Empires also administered Islamic populations in East Africa and, in the case of the latter, Central Africa. To truly be able to organise ‘The requisite co-ordination of policy’ across ‘the Moslem regions in Eastern Africa’ the British would also need to co-ordinate with these two colonial administrations.

There was yet a further authority – the ninth – that must be added to such a list: The United States of America. Having entered the war on 6th April 1917 on the side of the Allies, the Americans would need to be either consulted or pointedly excluded from discussions involving territorial changes in any peace settlement. Buxton was in favour of the latter approach, arguing that it was ‘important… that this colony should become British, and not “international”, as suggested by Liberal and Labour Politicians’, for administering German East Africa internationally would require the presence of the Americans, and any American influence, he argued, would be a recipe for disaster: ‘Any kind of international administration would almost certainly be weak, and would probably be controlled by the Americans, who have shown a marked incapacity for dealing with negroes.’

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396 TNA: FO 141/786/4: Buxton, L. ‘Notes on Philipps’ Memorandum.’, 19th December 1917.
397 Ibid.
Setting aside the USA’s racial difficulties – which could not possibly be comprehensively analysed here – Buxton may well have had a point. The idea that all nine of the different authorities who had some jurisdiction over the Islamic population of East Africa would have managed to agree on a ‘uniform native policy’ that would have been able ‘to deal adequately with the new situation’, whilst fighting not only the East African Campaign but all of the campaigns of the First World War, does seem terribly unlikely, especially when one includes Germany itself.

The obvious solution was to reduce the number of interested parties. Buxton suggested that if ‘the number of these authorities could be reduced to two – Egypt and Italy – the problem would be much simplified.’ Egypt was chosen by Buxton to act for the British Empire because ‘The most influential elements in Eastern Africa are Arab or semi-Arab, and there is no Government more qualified to control them than that of Egypt.’ After the cessation of fighting Captain Philipps presented the more idealist approach that ‘The war happily has demonstrated that thought must henceforward be in terms of Continents, no longer in those of State or Protectorate.’ No one made that claim in this regard whilst the fighting was still being engaged.

In the summer of 1917 Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and Captains Willis and Philipps determined this matter. Because ‘German East Africa, if it remained in the hands of the Germans after the war, would provide not only a menace to the neighbouring Colonies of the British Empire, but as an easy submarine base against India, would threaten a still wider sphere (viz. all shipping routes to the East)’ they declared that ‘it was therefore assumed that for purposes of general policy G.E.A. [German East Africa] could be considered as a part of the British Empire.’ Their declaration that for the duration of the First World War it was to become an unofficial part of the British Empire was apparently not immediately heeded by Wingate and Buxton; communication across the Empire was poor. The remaining authorities were co-ordinated with when necessary.

398 Ibid.
The expansion of the size of the British Empire in East Africa into German East Africa would not allow the British Empire to act with impunity over the entire Islamic population of the region. However, as the major military power for the Allies in the East African Campaign, as well as the major colonial power, the British Empire was, on the whole, able to independently implement their strategies to prevent the threat posed by Pan-Islamism until the First World War finally came to an end.

**Conclusion**

As the long-term status of German East Africa was to remain unsettled for the entirety of the remaining years of the First World War, the expansion of the size of the British Empire in East Africa into German East Africa did not give the British Empire unilateral control over the Islamic population of the region. Yet it did have two important consequences: it removed the relatively large Islamic population of German East Africa from the colonial authority of a power with which the British Empire was at war, and it placed that Islamic population mostly under the authority of the British Empire itself.

The British Empire had to strategise for the potential of German East Africa returning to German rule after the First World War. ‘Whether we eventually take over the country or restore it’, Philipps wrote, ‘it is equally necessary to have immediately a co-ordinated and active Islamic policy’. Therefore, ‘Should the country be restored to Germany, the effect of such influence, exerted meantime, upon the natives and Moslems in particular will be of the greatest value in counteracting German anti-ally policy which will probably be in Africa, again propagated through Islamic agency.’

The British Empire got most of what it desired after the Great War. German East Africa was not to return to German rule, yet neither was it formally given to the British Empire. The international organisation of the League of Nations declared the new Tanganyika Territory a League Mandate under the administration of the British Empire on 20th July 1922. Buxton may have been appeased to know that the United States of America never joined the

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League, and so had no administrative control over the Tanganyika Territory until it was declared a United Nations Trust Territory after the Second World War. The Tanganyika Territory remained under the control of the British Empire until its independence on 9th December 1961.

Despite these successes, it must be observed once again that the German Empire was not the sole source of Pan-Islamism in the region. Consequently, the outcome of this first strategy did not result in the termination of the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa. Paradoxically, the expansion of the British Empire into German East Africa exacerbated the second source, as it caused Africans from across the continent to converge in East Africa: the camp fires were lit, and conversations ensued.
Subchapter Two: The Development of the East African Force Along Tribal Lines

The development of the East African Force along tribal lines was a second strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War. As was observed in Chapter Five, ‘an unprecedented’ fraternisation of soldiers from different parts of Africa occurred around the campfires of East Africa. The conversations that flowed from the non-local to the local soldiers were a font for the spread of certain ideologies into an area of Africa which had hitherto remained almost entirely unaffected by them.\(^{402}\) The ideas espoused by these ideologies were a potential threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa. Whilst Pan-Islamism was not singled out for specific notice in the reports about fraternisation, the reports themselves, not least their titles, demonstrated that Pan-Islamism was a major ideology that was finding a source into East Africa in this manner.\(^{403}\)

After the threat of these campfire chats had been identified by Captain Philipps, thought turned to how to prevent these soldiers from continuing to be a source of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism. The African soldiers could not be expelled as they were still needed to fight in the East African Campaign; preventing any further ‘unprecedented mixing of representatives of almost all the black races of Africa’ was established as the only way to counter this problem. The East African Force was to be developed to achieve this.\(^{404}\)

The theory was sound, but the reality was quite different; implementing measures to prevent further fraternisation proved to be difficult during a time of hostility. Yet even if they had been successful it may well have made little difference; Pan-Islamism had already

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entered East Africa via the African diaspora and no strategy the British Empire could propose could change that fact.

The Rapid Growth of the British Imperial Military Force in East Africa during the First World War

Due to the outbreak of the East African Campaign of the First World War on 3rd August 1914, it was necessary for the British Empire to quickly expand its imperial military force in East Africa. Prior to this date the development of the King’s African Rifles (K.A.R.) had been primarily designed with colonial conflict in mind. Charles Hordern chronicled that ‘Although both the German and the British protectorates [of East Africa] had been generally pacified, certain areas still required special measures… expeditions in the unadministered northern areas of British East Africa and Uganda’ to perform such actions as ‘to check the raiding propensities’ of certain tribes ‘were thus absorbing the greater part of the slender military resources of the two protectorates when, as a result of events in Europe, East Africa was unexpectedly drawn into the “World War.”’

Consequently, the K.A.R. had to develop along other lines very quickly. However, most of the troops that joined it on the outbreak of war were poor. The Cabinet Office recorded that ‘At the outbreak of [the First World War] the only military forces in the East Africa Protectorate and Uganda consisted of [the] King’s African Rifles (native soldiers with European officers)’ but many members of the European community of the region wished to enlist; hence, ‘steps were at once taken locally to raise a body of mounted and unmounted European volunteers.’ Furthermore, ‘[it] was also decided, in accordance with recommendations of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, that troops from India should be brought to East Africa both for defensive and offensive purposes.’ Thus, in August 1915 ‘a considerable number [of the British Empire’s troops in East Africa] [consisted] of Indian troops’, who, according to the Cabinet, had ‘been found to be of little value from a military point of view.’ The effort of the ‘white troops’ was not commended either: ‘Of the white troops’, cabinet papers recorded, ‘a large proportion have little military

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training; the number of really first-class troops is very small. The sickness among the troops generally has been considerable and has had a discouraging, if not demoralising, effect.’

‘After the humiliations of [the Battles of] Taveta, Tanga, and Jassini, [in 1914 and early 1915] the British fought more creditably’, writes Robert G. Gregory, and it was out of the need to ‘marshall [sic] their resources for an effective pursuit’ that ‘the British at the end of 1915 organized an East African force, which consisted of all the British, Indian, and African troops then in East and Central Africa as well as contingents from South Africa.’ It was at this point that a fighting force designed around the needs of the East African Campaign, rather than one just adapted from peace time, came into fruition. ‘The forces at Smuts’s disposal’ by February 1916 ‘consisted of 4,575 Europeans, 5,704 Africans, and 14,303 Indians of whom 373 were officers. There were also 3,564 Indian and 19,451 African ‘followers’, mostly porters and servants.’ By the end of the First World War the K.A.R. ‘had grown to be 35,424 strong, in twenty-two battalions, the KARMI [mounted infantry] and a Signals Company. Eleven per cent of the regiment were Europeans.’ As mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis, ‘[excluding] Allied and Naval personnel, about 114,000 troops had been engaged in the conflict’, omitting the porters.

The British Empire was consequently in possession of a substantial imperial military force that was formed of a large number of Indians and an even larger number of Africans; mixed together in a heterogenous manner across twenty-two battalions, the KARMI and a Signals Company. Sitting around the campfires, this ‘unprecedented’ fraternisation of soldiers from different parts of Africa resulted in:

‘much talk – in the lingua franca which never fails the African – starting from stomach and wife, and the distance which they themselves have been brought from home to hardship, and touching on the killing of white by black as illustrated before

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406 TNA: CAB 37/133/16: Photographic copies of cabinet papers. ‘German East Africa.’, 26th August 1915, pp.1—3.
their eyes... for the first time in Eastern Africa [had] arisen a conscious feeling of the possibilities of a “black Africa”.'

'Homogeneous Rather than Heterogeneous': The Difficulties of the Practical Implementation

To prevent Pan-Islamism or Pan-Africanism from continuing to spread in this manner, Colonel French argued that ‘it should be laid down as a guiding principle that companies should as far as possible be homogeneous rather than heterogeneous, tribal rather than mixed.’ M.O.2. concurred that the ‘development of our military forces’ in East Africa was necessary. They recommended that ‘As far as possible, it seems wise to use, for native garrisons, tribes recruited at a distance from their habitats’ to prevent fraternisation between them and the people of the locality.

French declared that the development of the East African Force was ‘a point on which it appears that immediate action can be taken in organising African troops’. Conversely, this was not the same declaration made by the Colonel of M.O.2., who wrote that they had found Philipps’ memorandum “Africa for the African” and “Pan-Islam” Recent developments in Central and Eastern Africa ‘interesting’, for it bore ‘out our insistence on a really sufficient garrison for East and East-Central Africa after the war; and justifies our demand for Artillery and Auxiliary Services for the Kings [sic] African Rifles. It also justifies our demands for the re-organization and expansion of the Sudanese Army... to check the southward movement of Islam’. M.O.2. was therefore of the opinion that ‘immediate action’ could not occur, and that the development of the East African Force to prevent fraternisation would have to wait until ‘after the war’. Interestingly, the answer to why they thought this came from French himself, who allowed that due to the ‘very great expansion of the [East African Force] which [had] recently taken place’, he was ‘not sure whether it [had] been found possible to adhere to this practice.’

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contradictory, it was not; ‘immediate action’ of some level could be taken, but the development of an East African Force that contained companies comprised only in a homogenous tribal manner could not, due to its inflated size, realistically be undertaken in a time of hostilities.

**Conclusion**

Whilst everybody involved was in agreement that the theoretical proposal that the ‘companies’ of the East African Force ‘should as far as possible be homogeneous rather than heterogeneous, tribal rather than mixed’, to prevent recurrences of ‘the introduction of ideas’ which were ‘prejudicial to the prestige of the white man as a dominating race’, was a good proposal, it was decided almost immediately that the practical implementation of it was unrealistic whilst the East African Campaign of the First World War continued.\(^\text{416}\) This, as expressed by French, was because the Force had grown to such an extent that a full-scale reorganisation would be needed; a reorganisation that would be virtually impossible whilst it was engaged in guerrilla warfare.

This lack of urgency can, however, be attributed to a second cause. Officials of the British Empire understood that whilst measures could be implemented to prevent further fraternisation, Pan-Islamism had already entered East Africa via the African diaspora and no strategy could change that fact. With that in mind, spending many, potentially fruitless, hours attempting to redevelop the East African Force along tribal lines whilst it was in the midst of the East African Campaign may have seemed pointless.

When taken together, these two causes combined to result in the second strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the First World War not progressing to the implementation stage.

\(^{416}\) TNA: FO 141/786: Assistant Director of Intelligence. ‘A Note on Colonial Office Memo. “Africa for the Africans” and “Pan Islam”’, Khartoum, 17th January 1918.
Subchapter Three: The Growth of the Attributes of the Imperial Intelligence Establishment of the British Empire

The third strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War was to grow the attributes of the imperial intelligence establishment of the British Empire. Sir Reginald Wingate wrote to the Foreign Secretary in February 1918 espousing such a course of action:

‘[As a] guarantee against native unrest... I have for long felt that it is desirable to obtain a freer interchange of opinions and information about the progress, moral and material, of the Moslem populations throughout the Empire, and more direct communications between the Administrations of the less important dependencies and the principal centres of Islamic thought. At these centres only can the real trend of Moslem opinion be correctly estimated, and the general lines of our Moslem policy, propaganda and counter-propaganda be usefully determined.’

Wingate therefore advocated two interlinked courses of action to grow the attributes of the imperial intelligence establishment of the British Empire:

(1) ‘[To] obtain a freer interchange’ about ‘the Moslem populations throughout the Empire’.

(2) The implementation of ‘more direct communications between the less important dependencies’ such as East Africa and ‘the principal centres of Islamic thought.’

The first course of action advocated by Wingate was successful, but only as far as the constraints of the First World War would allow. The ability to interchange information about the Islamic population of the British Empire was constrained by the lack of expertise on the subject, and such expertise could not be easily acquired.

The second course of action provided for great success. The improvement in communications between different areas of the British Empire allowed for information on the threat of Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire to be delivered quickly to the

\[417\] TNA: FO 141/786/4: Letter from Reginald Wingate, Cairo, to the Right Honourable Arthur James Balfour, 20th February 1918.
area where it was required; this significantly helped the British imperial officials who were working to secure the Empire in East Africa with their endeavour. However, whilst communications did grow and improve, it was ironically less successful in communicating that communications had been upgraded. Relevant people continued to lambast the poor communications provided by the British Empire after the British Empire had provided the desired improvements in communications. Whilst the attributes of the imperial intelligence establishment grew, their effectiveness was compromised by this rather bizarre blunder.

‘[To] obtain a freer interchange of opinions and information about the progress, moral and material, of the Moslem populations throughout the Empire’

An important issue, not mentioned in Wingate’s letter, is immediately obvious. To be able to ‘interchange... opinions and information about the progress, moral and material, of the Moslem populations throughout the Empire’ there must first be people who were in possession of ‘opinions and information about the progress, moral and material, of the Moslem populations throughout the Empire.’ Persons with such specific knowledge of East Africa were scarce in the years of the First World War. The British administrations that had formed the governance of the British Empire in East Africa had been far too small in the pre-war years to employ somebody to become an expert in such an apparently inconsequential topic as *l'Islam noir*. There were several people who were able to provide some expertise, but only one person can truly be described as having been an expert on the Pan-Islamic threat in East Africa in its entirety.

Thus, to ‘obtain a freer interchange of opinions and information’ it was also necessary to not only consult people of expertise, but to actually discover them.

The Need for Experts and for Expertise

In his long essay Captain Bray asserted on several occasions the need to have a greater expanse of expertise amongst those who inhabited positions in the British imperial intelligence establishment; the lack of knowledge possessed by British officers troubled him
deeply from a security viewpoint. He was particularly insistent that local knowledge was key to securing the British Empire, stating that ‘Trade and war go hand in hand, local knowledge of a locality may ensure a victory, knowledge of events and people prevent a war.’ Giving an example that concerned India, he wrote that there had ‘recently been discovered in India a conspiracy aimed directly at British rule’, and that it had taken ‘the head of our C.I.D. [the Criminal Investigation Department] three hours to explain it to some of our most experienced officers, yet this conspiracy, serious as it is, is but one small stone of the edifice.’

The military and security forces were not Bray’s only object of concern: “‘Our civil officers have become office bound’.” On Islam in particular he was even more damning about this lack of expertise: ‘the knowledge of British officers of Pan-Islamism and its working even of mohammedan history and religion’, he determined, ‘is practically nil.’ Bray had both a moral as well as a security objection to this lack of expertise on Islam, for he believed that ‘we owe it to our Mohammedan subjects to study the question from every standpoint, at home and abroad.’

Bray wished to make it very clear that he was not criticising the character or the respectability of the people about whom he referred, but merely their lack of expertise on Islam:

‘No-one will deny, myself least of all, the excellent, nay affectionate relations that exist between British officers and the native ranks... In the army this has been built up by sport and the scrupulous fairness of the Britisher, but I know I do my brother officers no injustice when I say that as a whole we are woefully ignorant of Mohammedan customs, history and religion, and policy.’

For Bray, education was the key approach to improvement. He wrote that ‘I think everyone will agree with me when I say that in the past we have paid far too little attention, as Civil and Military officers, to [the] problem’ of the ‘Education of our officers, Civil and Military, in

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418 TNA: FO 141/773/6: Bray, N.N.E. Intelligence and Notes on the Pan-Islamic Movement, 25th March 1917.
419 Ibid.
420 Ibid.
421 Ibid.
422 Ibid.
knowledge of the problem [of Pan-Islamism].’ His proposed approach to improve the education of British officers as it regarded Islam was as follows:

‘No British officer should enter the Indian army [sic] before he has passed an examination in these subjects, of however simple a nature, at Sandhurst or elsewhere... Every officer in the regiment should travel his recruiting area, retention examinations should have a stiff paper of the different classes of which his regiment is composed... It would help enormously to give a greater understanding between Civil and Military administration and be of inestimable value to the State.’

Bray continued his rationale by stating that this education should not be stopped once the officer had left formal education. Education in the field was to be just as important as education in the classroom:

‘Let more initiative, in local officers, in dealing with provincial questions be encouraged. Let British officers be encouraged and assisted in going on leave to Persia, Syria, and other countries to add to their inside knowledge of India, the conditions prevailing abroad. The British officer is, generally speaking, popular wherever he goes. It will increase our influence, add to our knowledge, and help to safe-guard us.’

At the end of his essay Bray stated that as ‘Long as this note is I have but touched the fringe of this huge problem, each subject mentioned is in itself an immense study, which can be solved by the loyalty and co-operation and greater knowledge possessed by experts in each particular sphere.’ This lack of expertise evident in the British military, he thus inferred, could not be solved overnight. If ‘each subject’ would need ‘an immense study’ and the ‘experts’ of ‘each subject’ needed to gain ‘greater knowledge’, then his approach was not a quick fix to get the British Empire securely through the First World War; his approach would require a paradigm shift in the British imperial forces on how they dealt with knowledge acquisition both in the classroom and in the field. His approach would require a paradigm shift on the exploitation of knowledge from colonial settings.

423 Ibid.
424 Ibid.
Yet it was here that lay the problem, for in the year that Bray composed his essay, 1917, the British Empire needed quick fixes to get the British Empire through the First World War without its security being compromised by Pan-Islamism. It had neither the time nor the resources to promote paradigm shifts.

Majors Foster and Muggeridge of the East African Intelligence Centre thus had to devise a solution to gain the expertise they needed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa during the First World War without there actually being many people who had the credentials to express valuable ‘opinions and information about the progress, moral and material’ of the Islamic population of East Africa, or the time for any person to gain such credentials.

Firstly, Foster and Muggeridge took full advantage of what expertise East Africa did possess. On 5th January 1918, two months after the Intelligence Centre began operations, Foster sent a telegram, ‘the contents of which were communicated to all concerned’, which ‘made clear the intention that “close collaboration” was to be established “in regard to every kind of Intelligence between the Civil and Military Officers in all Protectorates” of East Africa, and referred to the possibility of “General Intelligence Centres which would be branches of that in Nairobi”, being formed in each in course of time.’

Co-operation amongst the officials of the British Empire in East Africa was of paramount importance for the acquisition of imperial knowledge, including imperial knowledge concerning Pan-Islamism. ‘The term “East African area” [was] employed for the sake of brevity and [was] intended to apply to those districts with which the East African Intelligence centre [was] primarily concerned.’ These ‘districts’ were listed as: ‘Uganda, British East Africa, Conquered Territory, Zanzibar, British Somaliland, Nyasaland and contiguous foreign countries, such as Abyssinia, the Congo Belge, Italian Somaliland and

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426 Ibid., p.153
Portuguese East Africa'; gaining expertise on all of these ‘districts’ was a considerable task for Foster. M.I.5. therefore stated that ‘It was hoped that with the help of the Governors, Major Foster would secure the cooperation not only of the battalion Intelligence officers but also of the civil and police authorities of British East Africa, Uganda, Nyasaland, Somaliland and German East Africa, so that all information should be available in the one office.’ Wanting not only passive co-operation through the ‘interchange’ of information, Foster ‘also hoped that’ there would be more active co-operation, with ‘at least one civil and one police officer... associated with the Intelligence office so that all branches of the Administration might be represented in the Intelligence office.’ As examined in Chapter Six, it was unrecorded if this hope was fulfilled, but since there was cooperation between the Intelligence Centre and the different colonies and protectorates, one can assume that at least some civil and police officers became associated with the Centre.

The ‘nature of the collaboration and assistance which was sought for’ included ‘[notes] on firms and individuals in regard to whose movements or activities suspicion was entertained’ which were ‘largely culled from the Censor’s records’. Furthermore, ‘it was considered highly desirable that a representative of the Natives Affairs Department should form a part of the Intelligence Department’, so that information on this topic could be acquired. However, while practical, it provided little about the ‘opinions and information about the progress, moral and material’ of the Islamic population of East Africa. Here the Intelligence Centre was forced to turn to the tiny number of people who had expertise on Pan-Islamism in the British Empire. Only one person was able to provide sustained and useful expertise on this topic in relation to East Africa: Captain Philipps.

Captain Philipps explained his field credentials at the beginning of his first memorandum “Africa for the Africans” and Pan-Islam” Recent developments in Central and Eastern Africa, and these were detailed in Chapter Five. At the time of writing this memorandum on 15th July 1917 his professional credentials were that he was a Captain of the Intelligence Department of the East Africa Expeditionary Forces and had ‘lately’ been ‘Chief Political

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427 Ibid., p.152
Officer Uganda area’. As well as this memorandum Philipps wrote multiple documents that either directly dealt with the issue of the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa, or were related to this topic. Much of his work on Pan-Islamism is cited in this thesis. Although he worked for the Intelligence Department his work appears to have been mostly self-directed.

As examined in Chapter Six, a letter sent by Muggeridge to Philipps after the First World War clearly demonstrated the importance that his work had had on the success of the Intelligence Centre. Muggeridge wrote that ‘I should like to thank you for all the assistance you have given the department... The information you have sent from time to time has been most useful and has been carefully carded. I am very grateful.’

The solitary person to directly cast doubt on Philipps’ statue as the only expert who could provide sustained and useful expertise on this topic was an unnamed ‘Colonel’ from M.O.2., who wrote that he had ‘been carefully through Captain Philipps [sic] two Memoranda’ and had assessed that ‘whilst they do not contain anything new, they are of considerable interest.’ This Colonel may have been right; M.O.2. may have already been in possession of all the information contained within Philipps’ writings. However, there is no surviving evidence to prove that this was the case, and even if it was the case it would have made little difference, for it is clear by the absence of any reference to any previous work on this topic by the British imperial officials working to prevent the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa, including Philipps himself, that they had not had access to this information before Philipps wrote it. In his letter, Muggeridge wrote that Philipps’ information had been ‘most useful”; a curious statement to make if Philipps was merely producing work that did ‘not contain anything new’.

Secondly, Foster and Muggeridge simply accepted their lot. After the above avenues of expertise had been exhausted, the Majors understood that there was simply neither the time nor the resources during the First World War to wait whilst people gained the

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credentials to express valuable ‘opinions and information about the progress, moral and material’ of the Islamic population of East Africa. It was necessary, they seemed to have reasoned, to do as much as they could, and then accept the situation from there.

This attitude can be seen best in their acceptance of the limited amount of progress that could be made in the enactment and enforcement of port controls in the East African region. As will be examined in greater depth in Subchapter Seven, the ability of the Intelligence Centre to enact and enforce port controls was assessed after the War by M.I.5., who deemed it to have ‘only been partially successful.’ Simply, the extension of port controls to ports across the East African region did not occur because between them neither the Chief Censor nor the Intelligence Centre had the trained personnel to staff all of the major ports to prevent the hand-carrying of letters to bypass the censor, nor the expertise to prevent the smuggling of Pan-Islamic propaganda through smaller ports. Accepting immediately that they were not going to get such expertise or trained personnel, Muggeridge recollected after the War had ended that ‘It was obvious from the first that, in a country like Africa, especially, it would be impossible to prevent hand carrying of letters and pamphlets.’ Rather than fighting for expertise that they knew would never come, Foster and Muggeridge accepted the situation for what it was and did as much as they could with the little that they had. Confirming that this had been their plan, Muggeridge wrote that ‘The utmost that could be aimed at was to check the practice, and by the capture of a certain number of documents to get valuable clues’.

Overall, the main purpose for all the officers of the British Empire involved in the East African Campaign was to help that Empire win the First World War, or, as it transpired, not to lose it. Foster and Muggeridge appear to have understood this and did their best to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in these years with the limited expertise that they possessed, in order to prevent Pan-Islamism supporting British defeat in East Africa.

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Establishing a ‘freer interchange’ of Expertise

A ‘freer interchange of opinions and information about the progress, moral and material, of the Moslem populations throughout the Empire’ did come to fruition, but it was perhaps not quite as fluid as Sir Reginald Wingate would have ‘[desired] to obtain’.

The principal reason for this was, as was just examined, the lack of expertise. The likes of Captains Philipps, Buxton, Bray, and Wingate himself formed the crux of the British Empire’s expertise on the prevention of the Pan-Islamic threat to the security of the British Empire; the limited number of these experts naturally obstructed the ability to create a truly free interchange, as a small number of people, all of whom were non-Muslim and non-African men, could provide only a small number of opinions.

It is impossible to say with any certainty exactly how much the interchange between these persons became ‘freer’ as the First World War progressed; nevertheless, it is clear that they read much of each other’s works and did engage in an interchange. Buxton, Sir Charles Lucas, and M.O.2. all have surviving documents where they critiqued Philipps’ work.436 Muggeridge’s letter proved that he, and possibly Foster before him, interacted with Philipps professionally, and Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and Captain Willis collaborated with him in London.437 Philipps had also interchanged expertise with Willis elsewhere.438 Colonel French commented on both Philipps’ and Willis’ work.439 Wingate’s correspondence shows him to have been on top of the matter, and whilst Bray’s work did not contain any references to specific names, it is clear that he must have been well versed on his topic.440

440 TNA: FO 141/786/4: Letter from Wingate to Balfour, 20th February 1918; TNA: FO 141/773/6: Letter from Lieutenant Colonel C.E. Wilson, Jeddah, to Sir Reginald Wingate, His Majesty’s High Commissioner for Egypt.
On reading Bray’s work, Lieutenant Colonel C.E. Wilson of the Arab Bureau wrote to Wingate to say that ‘The remarks made [by Bray] under the heading “Intelligence outside India” deserve, I think, special attention.’

The problem with using any of these documents to prove that a ‘freer interchange of opinions and information about the progress, moral and material, of the Moslem populations throughout the Empire’ came to fruition is that they were almost all written before Wingate wrote that sentence. Why would Wingate call for a ‘freer interchange’ if the interchange was already working at the best of its, albeit limited, ability? The answer lies in the difficulties that the British Empire had communicating about communications.

‘[More] direct communications between the Administrations of the less important dependencies and the principal centres of Islamic thought’

In his essay Bray also asserted the need for enhanced communications between the officers of the British Empire. He declared that ‘The whole question [of communications] is an Imperial one. India, Egypt, Aden are but links in the chain of dominion. Yet before the war we were woefully ignorant of conditions prevailing in each other’s spheres. A perpetual interchange of views, of Intelligence, of affairs, of policy, is an absolute necessity, an obligation to our Empire as a whole.’ Such a scheme of organising ‘a good Intelligence system’, he argued, ‘would be by no means difficult to organise’, and ‘the expense would be trivial compared to the information we should get, the touch we would maintain.’

Bray did not directly state the need to establish ‘more direct communications between the Administrations of the less important dependencies and the principal centres of Islamic thought’ as expressed by Wingate almost a year later, but his ideas were generally similar. He favoured the idea of a ‘central’ office at the centre of an imperial intelligence communications web, which would encompass both military and civilian activities:

Cairo, Egypt, 29th March 1917; TNA: FO 141/786/4: Letter from Lee Stack, the Acting Governor General of the Sudan, Khartoum, to Sir F.R. Wingate, Cairo, 7th February 1918; Bray, Intelligence.

441 TNA: FO 141/773/6: Letter from Wilson to Wingate, 29th March 1917.

442 Bray, Intelligence.
'Since the question is an Imperial one, all information thus received should come into one central office and be distributed to all concerned. In short time we could organise an Intelligence service that would cover the whole area, would watch each separate society, and warn us of any trouble in good time. Our Consular service could collect locally and this service should have a military as well as a civil side.'

Yet the above comments were written in March 1917, and the letter written by Wingate to Balfour was written in February 1918; M.I.5.D. had been founded in September 1916: six months previously in Bray’s case and seventeen months previously in Wingate’s. As they appeared to be advocating for the establishment of an M.I.5.D.-esque organisation, their statements imply that they did not know of M.I.5.D.’s establishment. That, inadvertently, rather proved their point; the British Empire could not have an effective imperial intelligence establishment if it was so poor at communicating that people who worked in imperial intelligence did not know that M.I.5.D. existed. Communications between different localities needed improvement, but so did communications between people.

Nevertheless, Wingate and Bray would no doubt have been pleased to have discovered that M.I.5.D. shared their views on the need to improve communications, for part of its mission was to receive information ‘into one central office’ and then distribute it ‘to all concerned’. M.I.5. ‘hoped’ that if M.I.5.D. ‘could get into touch with the Colonies [M.I.5.D.] might act as a clearing-house for all parts of the Empire, and thus a rapid interchange of information would be secured.’ This ‘clearing-house’ side of D Branch’s operation was considered to have been a success by M.I.5., who positively evaluated that ‘Through the connection established with the Colonies, the Central Special Intelligence Bureau became a centre for information and enquiries from all parts of the Empire.’

The establishment of M.I.5.D., its receipt of information from across the Empire, and its distribution of this information to the East African Intelligence Centre when it ‘concerned’ them had an enormously positive impact on the overall implementation of counter-intelligence in East Africa, for before August 1917, when this Intelligence Centre was

443 Ibid.
instituted by M.I.5.D. ‘The liaison established between the C.S.I.B. and British East Africa was not very active.’\textsuperscript{446} This liaison had been overturned and was to remain overturned; at the end of the War M.I.5. recorded that the relationship ‘between the Central Special Intelligence Bureau and Major Muggeridge became extremely cordial’.\textsuperscript{447}

Documents recording the exact nature of the information that was interchanged have survived in the public archives only in very small numbers. M.I.5. recorded what sort of information M.I.5.D. was interchanging in October 1917:

‘Although correspondence was confined to the transmission of Intelligence concerning the activities of enemy agencies and individual suspects in British possessions only... the Central Bureau also worked in close co-operation with the Department which dealt with information regarding individuals in foreign countries, and was in direct communication with the military Control Officers in allied and neutral countries who had charge of the issue of permits and visas to persons travelling to the United Kingdom and British Overseas possessions; it also maintained constant touch with other State Departments.’\textsuperscript{448}

M.I.5. was careful to institute an interchange of acquired knowledge amongst many different interested organisations without stepping on anybody’s toes: ‘Friendly relations were also kept up [by M.I.5.D.] with the naval and military authorities, while at the same time any possible encroachment upon their work was avoided, and the satisfactory results of close co-operation were constantly evident.’\textsuperscript{449}

As it was a two-way operation, the East African Intelligence Centre sent acquired knowledge to M.I.5.D. themselves. Muggeridge recorded that ‘From the first, monthly reports [had] been prepared and despatched to the Director of Military Intelligence and others likely to be interested’ and that these reports had ‘contained a summary of the Intelligence that [had] been obtained and in some cases, short sections on special subjects.’\textsuperscript{450} Muggeridge wrote a paragraph on the nature of some of this intelligence:

\textsuperscript{447} Ibid., p.147.
\textsuperscript{448} TNA: KV 1/15: M.I.5. ‘1. Introductory Sketch.’, p.16.
\textsuperscript{449} Ibid., pp.17—18.
\textsuperscript{450} TNA: KV 1/16: Muggeridge. ‘Appendix O.’, p.154.
‘Notes on firms and individuals in regard to whose movements or activities suspicion was entertained, largely culled from the Censor’s records, have been forwarded from time to time to other Intelligence Centres and the War Office, when it was felt that these were of more than local interest, and a statement, chiefly compiled from information from the same source, in regard to those individuals whose record seemed to render their future residence in Conquered Territory undesirable has been forwarded to His Honour the Administrator and General Headquarters on request.’\textsuperscript{451}

The founding of M.I.5.D. to act as a clearing house for intelligence relevant to such threats to the British Empire as Pan-Islamism meant that ‘communications between the Administrations of the less important dependencies and the principal centres of Islamic thought’ were had from 1916, and from 1917 specifically in the case of East Africa. However, such communication was often not ‘direct’. For almost the entire period of the First World War for which it was operational, this ‘clearing-house’ side of D Branch was considered to be almost exclusive, and only in the closing weeks of fighting did this change. The Intelligence Centre then started to communicate directly with other interested parties; Muggeridge recorded that ‘liaison was established with the Intelligence Departments at Khartoum, Cairo and Berbera with H.M’s Minister at Adis Ababa and H.M’s Consul General at Lourence Marques.’\textsuperscript{452}

Furthermore, it is worth noting that something similar to the commencement of ‘communications between the Administrations of the less important dependencies and the principal centres’ occurred within the British Empire in East Africa itself with the institution of the East African Intelligence Centre. The original telegram that formed the Intelligence Centre ‘directed that its contents were to be repeated to the Governors of Uganda and Nyasaland, H.M. Commissioner for the Somaliland Protectorate and to the Administrator Wilhelmstal, and that it was hoped that the Governments concerned would give every assistance to the new Department.’\textsuperscript{453} Situated in the East Africa Protectorate, the Intelligence Centre brought all of the ‘lesser important’ British colonies and protectorates of

\textsuperscript{451} Ibid., pp.155—156.
\textsuperscript{452} Ibid., p.153.
\textsuperscript{453} Ibid., p.153.
East Africa into direct communication with the protectorate that was of most bureaucratic importance during the fighting of the East African Campaign.

The growth and improvement of communications between different regions of the British Empire, and between the different administrations of the British Empire in East Africa, to deliver information on the threat of Pan-Islamism, significantly helped the British officials who were working to secure the Empire in East Africa from Pan-Islamism with their endeavour by allowing both gathered intelligence and expertise on the matter to be shared. Whilst it was unfortunate that the improvement in communications was less successfully communicated, the information exchanged, and the relationships forged, represented growth in the attributes of the imperial intelligence establishment; growth that aided this establishment with countering the threat from Pan-Islamism.

Conclusion

The growth of the attributes of the imperial intelligence establishment of the British Empire allowed what little expertise did exist within the British Empire on preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of that Empire in East Africa, both in a practical sense – such as through knowledge about port controls – and a theoretical sense – such as through knowledge about Pan-Islamic opinions – to be shared amongst those whose occupations concerned this issue. As such, the third strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War was amongst the most successful of the eight strategies in both its implementation and the achievement of its aims.

However, despite the success of this third strategy the British Empire could not turn back time and reduce the growth of Pan-Islamism that had occurred in the years prior to August 1917, when their use of counter-intelligence in East Africa had been severely limited. The British Empire had to focus on preventing Pan-Islamism from fulfilling its threat and damaging the security of the British Empire in East Africa whilst the Great War continued to persist; any long-term analysis about how best to approach the topic would have to wait.
Subchapter Four: The Cultivation of British Imperial Strength in the Islamic World

The cultivation of British imperial strength in the Islamic world was the fourth strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War. Cultivating their strength through the Islamic world was a concept the British had already been using to rule their imperial acquisitions in this era; this strategy adapted this existing concept to fit this new threat.

On the outbreak of the First World War the British Empire ruled several territories with large Islamic populations, such as Egypt, Sudan, India, Sierra Leone, and the Straits Settlements, and several more with Islamic minorities. Due to the events of the First World War the British Empire gained several protectorates, including Iraq and Jordan, which further increased their Islamic population. Whilst it ruled these territories, Mark Curtis reminds his reader that the British Empire ‘often ruled through... Muslim forces... by proxy’ and ‘sought to uphold “traditional” Muslim authority as a bulwark of its continuing authority’, with ‘Islamic law... often allowed to continue in its more conservative forms.’ Thus, the British Empire was well versed in cultivating its strength in the Islamic world to allow for British imperial rule in territories with large Islamic populations. Curtis argues that the ‘co-operation of Islamic elements [with the British Empire] had profound consequences; it helps explain the failure of Muslims in many British-ruled territories to respond to the call of Turkey’s Ottoman empire [sic] for jihad against the British at the beginning of the First World War.’

Captain Buxton wrote in December 1917 that ‘According to Sir. Harry Johnston [a British explorer of Africa who had worked for the British colonial service], many of the Arab chiefs whom he knew in the neighbourhood of Lake Nyassa were intelligent and enlightened men, and they or their successors would be likely to take a keen interest in the Anti-Turkish movement in Arabia.’ Therefore, ‘[if] a suitable Sherif [sic] could be found who would be willing to undertake long journeys in the interior, for the purpose of visiting the local Arabs and informing them of the situation in the Hejaz, his mission might have valuable results.’

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455 TNA: FO 141/786/4: Buxton, L. ‘Notes on Philipps’ Memorandum.’, 19th December 1917.
Britain’s attempt to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the Empire in East Africa by cultivating its imperial strength in the Islamic world rested on two points raised by Buxton: the need to demonstrate that the Ottoman Empire was no longer a power in the Islamic world, and the need to demonstrate to the Islamic population of East Africa that the Ottoman’s decline had happened at the will of the British Empire: a much stronger power.

The British Empire brought about the first of these two points by engaging in military hostilities against the Ottoman Empire and by supporting the Arab Revolt in the Middle East during the First World War. These two events were successful in bringing about the militaristic fall of the Ottoman Empire; although the Ottoman Empire did not formally cease to exist until 1922, and the caliphate was not abolished until 1924, by the second half of the Great War the Empire was irrevocably crumbling away. With ‘many of the Arab chiefs’ in East Africa ‘likely to take a keen interest in the Anti-Turkish movement in Arabia’ the successfulness of the ‘Anti-Turkish movement’ would help cultivate British imperial strength in the Islamic world of East Africa, for not only had the Ottoman Empire’s power collapsed, but the British had proved themselves to be the stronger power.

The British Empire was less successful in controlling the Middle East; the relationship between the British and the leader of the Arab Revolt soured before the end of the First World War. Yet, paradoxically, this was successful in an unsuccessful way. By the end of the First World War the British Empire, which had by then militaristically defeated the Ottoman Empire, no longer needed to have such a positive relationship with this leader, so cultivating a positive relationship with this man was no longer important to the cultivation of British imperial strength in the Islamic world. As regarded East Africa, the success of the anti-Turkish movement would remain the same, but bringing about the second point, communicating it to these ‘Arab chiefs’ in the manner described by Buxton, would become harder, for it would be difficult to find ‘a suitable Sherif... who would be willing to undertake long journeys in the interior, for the purpose of visiting the local Arabs and informing them of the situation in the Hejaz’, when the British Empire was no longer much concerned with the situation in the Hejaz. The production of propaganda, as will be examined in Subchapter Seven of this chapter, meant that communicating with these chiefs could still occur, but in a different manner.
In perhaps not the way that Buxton originally intended, the implementation of this fourth strategy was successful and positive results were gained as a result. The British Empire positively cultivated its strength in the Islamic world, and information about this filtered across the Islamic world to the Muslims of East Africa who admired the British Empire’s ‘anti-Turkish’ stance.

*The Fall of the Ottoman Empire*

The Hejaz is an area in the west of the modern-day state of Saudi Arabia; the area known as the Hejaz during the First World War does not correspond directly with the modern-day province of the same name, but it was located in the same general area. Due to the events of the Arab Revolt the Ottoman Empire was forced to surrender power over the Hejaz to the Sharif of Mecca. Buxton wrote his remarks in December 1917; as the Arab Revolt began on 10th June 1916, he wrote with the knowledge of the events that had occurred during the previous eighteen months. On that date in June 1916 the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein bin Ali, declared the creation of the Kingdom of Hejaz with himself as the monarch.

When the suggestion to do just that had initially been broached by the British Empire the Sharif had not been terribly keen. He was a member of the Hashemite family traditionally chosen by the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire – the Caliph – to be the steward over the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and to protect pilgrims when they performed the Hajj. Thus, the Sharif owed allegiance to the Sultan. Successive Sultans had ensured that successive Sharifs remained weak so as not to be a challenge to their rule. Hussein bin Ali entered into correspondence with Sir Henry McMahon, Sir Reginald Wingate’s predecessor as the British High Commissioner in Egypt and as a consequence of this correspondence he sought to establish an independent Arab Kingdom, with a few ‘modifications’ as instructed by McMahon:

‘Subject to [these] modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the Independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca... I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards
the aspirations of her traditional friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them.\textsuperscript{456}

To launch a successful endeavour the Sharif of Mecca understood that he too would need to cultivate his strength in the Islamic world. His approach was a diplomatic one; it was essential that those Arabs who had respected the Ottoman Empire, militarily or religiously, were not made to feel foolish for having once done so. To humiliate these Muslims would not make allies of them. In this course he made a proclamation on 27\textsuperscript{th} June 1916 – 25\textsuperscript{th} Shallban 1334 in the Islamic calendar – in which he established the narrative that the Ottoman Empire had been corrupted under the influence of politicians. Therefore, those who had supported, or continued to support, the Sultan and wished for the Empire’s preservation as the leading power in the Islamic world could legitimately turn away from it without feeling that they were betraying it: ‘They made weak the person of the Sultan; and robbed from him his honour, forbidding him to choose for himself the chief of his personal cabinet. Other like things they did to sap the foundation of the Khalifate. Therefore it had been clearly our part and our necessary duty to separate ourselves from them, and renounce them and their obedience.’ He continued: ‘We bore with them until it was open to all men that the rulers in Turkey were Enver Pasha, Jemal Pasha and Tallat Bay, who were doing whatsoever they pleased... We have attained independence – an independence of the rest of the Ottoman Empire – which is still groaning under the tyranny of our enemy.’

Asserting the independence of the Hejaz Kingdom from the Ottoman Empire, he concluded: ‘Our independence is complete, absolute, not to be laid hands on by any foreign influence or aggression, and our aim is the preservation of Islam and the uplifting of its stand in the world.’\textsuperscript{457}

The short-lived Kingdom of Hejaz was founded in 1916; it lasted not a decade, but it lasted for the remaining years of the First World War. With the capture of Jerusalem in December

\textsuperscript{456} F.O. 371/2486, 163832/34982, text of letter to Sharif enclosed with McMahon’s despatch no. 131 Secret, Cairo, 26\textsuperscript{th} Oct. 1915., in Kedouri, Ellie. \textit{In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations 1914—1939} (Oxford; Routledge, 2014), p.97.

\textsuperscript{457} BL: IOR/L/PS/10/599 Pt 3: No. 132. The Text and Translation of the Grand Sheriff’s proclamation, 25\textsuperscript{th} Shallban 1334. Sent from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. H. McMahon, British High Commissioner, Egypt, to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, Simla, 16\textsuperscript{th} August 1916.
1917, the British Empire held the advantage over the Ottoman Empire in the Sinai and 
Palestine Campaign and, through the Sharif of Mecca, in the Hejaz. Although that Campaign 
was to continue until the following October, the British Empire had already gained, through 
the cumulation of both its military prowess and its diplomatic dealings with the Sharif, what 
it wanted: it eliminated the Ottoman Empire as a militaristic threat and cultivated its own 
imperial strength in the Islamic world for doing so.

Having been successful in this endeavour, those officials of the British Empire who were working to prevent the Pan-Islamic threat in East Africa wished to communicate this accomplishment to those in East Africa who were potential recipients of Pan-Islamic propaganda and who would be impressed by such an accomplishment. ‘[Intelligent] and enlightened... Arab chiefs’ who lived in German East Africa, Nyasaland, and Mozambique who took ‘a keen interest in the Anti-Turkish movement in Arabia’ were just the sort of people these officials of the British Empire were interested in. In addition to the influence they wielded by being Arab chiefs, many lived in German East Africa, which had been identified by Captain Philipps as the ‘chief danger zone... [for the] conjunction of Islamic propaganda with the cry of “Africa for the “African”; the British Empire was keen to counter Pan-Islamism within the population of the former German colony.458

Hence, the British Empire had been very successful in cultivating its imperial strength in the Islamic world. To transfer this success into the practical prevention of the Pan-Islamic threat to the British Empire in East Africa the news of this success would have to be delivered to the Islamic population that resided there.

Communicating the Fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Islamic Population of East Africa

It is not clear whether the ‘suitable Sherif’ proposed by Buxton was meant to be the Sharif of Mecca. The wording is strange if this was indeed the case; ‘a suitable Sherif’ appears to be talking about a hypothetical Sharif, rather than the Sharif of Mecca. It seems likely therefore that Buxton spoke not of the Sharif of Mecca, but of a hypothetical Arab who held

the title of Sharif who would be willing to work on behalf of the British Empire to spread the positive news of ‘the Anti-Turkish movement in Arabia’ to the ‘Arab chiefs’ of ‘the neighbourhood of Lake Nyassa’.

The question as to why Buxton did not intend for the Sharif of Mecca to make this journey must therefore be answered. The first answer is perhaps the most obvious: the Sharif of Mecca would be far too busy fighting the Arab Revolt to wish to take a long and uncomfortable journey through a war zone to talk to ‘Arab chiefs’ over whose lands he could make no claim and for no discernible benefit of his own. But a second answer is the political truth: by the December 1917 date on which Buxton wrote these remarks the British would not have wanted the Sharif of Mecca or his representative to have made this journey. The relationship had soured.

On the British side their self-interest in the Arab Revolt waned quickly in favour of other avenues of advancement in 1917. As stated, militarily the British Empire held the advantage over the Ottoman Empire in the Sinai and Palestine Campaign, which cultivated in the capture of Jerusalem only eleven days after Buxton wrote his remarks. And politically, the Empire had other fish to fry in the region; most notably of all, the Balfour Declaration of 2nd November 1917. Famously stating that ‘His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object’, this was seen to be in contention with the contents of the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence quoted from previously.459 Furthermore, a secret agreement between the United Kingdom and France written in 1916, popularly known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, carved up the Ottoman Empire’s territories in Asia between them; this was exposed in November 1917. Such was the betrayal felt by the Sharif of Mecca that Elie Kedouri has written that ‘It is perhaps not too much to say that for half a century the correspondence haunted Anglo-Arab relations.’460

As to whether the Arab Revolt would have ever been a success beyond the Kingdom of Hejaz is debatable. Isaiah Friedman has argued in the negative, writing that ‘there was no prospect of Hussein being recognized by the Arabs outside of the Hedjaz as their leader;

459 The Balfour Declaration, 2nd November 1917.
460 Kedouri. The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence, p.3.
“the Arab movement” was a British, not an Arab, invention.’ ⁴⁶¹ But the issue that soured the relationship between the Sharif of Mecca and the British Empire can best be summarised by a comment made on the situation by Captain Bray in March 1917. He wrote that ‘Nor must we forget the very effective help, this rebellion has been to ourselves. It has helped us to an extent, Political and Military, that has perhaps not been fully appreciated.’ ⁴⁶² But whilst the British did not forget, they did not remember either; greater gain could now be achieved from elsewhere, and they sought to achieve it, regardless to the long-term consequences of their actions.

However, on the Sharif of Mecca’s side there exists a tale that is not entirely one of victimhood. As early as September 1916 the Arab Bureau recommended caution to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department. The reason for this caution was that they had received information from an informant that the Sharif did not himself intend to be honourable to the British:

The informant ‘expresses his own belief that it was the Sheriff’s original intention to play off British against Turks and induce Turks by this means to grant him independence guaranteed by Germany. [The informant] recommends us [the British] in conclusion to give [the] Sheriff just enough assistance to ensure protraction of the struggle between him and [the] Turks, thus keeping them employed and unable to detach troops to Iraq.’ ⁴⁶³

The idea of cultivating British imperial strength in the Islamic world was exactly that: to cultivate British imperial strength. The British Empire, suggested the Arab Bureau, needed to be careful that its support of the Arab Revolt did not subsequently lead to the Sharif becoming too powerful for them to easily contain.

So whilst the British Empire was successful in cultivating its power in the Islamic world to ensure the rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire, it failed to follow Buxton’s advice on how to demonstrate to the Islamic population of East Africa that this had happened at the will of the British; there is no surviving document that indicates that they found ‘a suitable Sherif...
who would be willing to undertake long journeys in the interior’ to tell the ‘Arab chiefs’ what had occurred.

As will be examined in further detail in Subchapter Seven, sanctioned newspapers were distributed to the Islamic population of East Africa. *El Hakikat* was published by the Foreign Office, *El Mokattam* was ‘more suited for general distribution’, while *El Kibla* was to be circulated only to ‘one or two leading Muslims’; the latter probably because it was produced by the Sharif of Mecca. Downing Street was less enthusiastic about this latter paper; they had ‘some hesitation with regard to the advantages of propaganda of this nature.’ The Governors of the East Africa Protectorate, Zanzibar, and German East Africa were allowed to distribute these newspapers in whatever manner they thought fitting.464 It was through these newspapers and journals that the Islamic population of East Africa was informed that the Ottoman Empire was no longer a great power in the Islamic world, and that this had occurred at the hand of the British Empire: the stronger power. British imperial strength in the Islamic world had thus been cultivated.

*The ‘Dilemma’*

While successful, cultivating imperial power in this manner does pose the question as to why the British Empire, the largest empire in history, chose to be the director, but not the lead actor. Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and the Captains Willis and Philipps had questioned just the same thing: ‘In respect to Panislam [sic] the British Government [was] confronted with a dilemma – either to pose as a great Mohammedan power herself and to exercise a direct influence in the affairs of Islam, or to maintain an attitude of tolerance in matters of religion and to counteract the Panislamic [sic] propaganda by suitable measures.’ Their conclusion as to why they chose the second method was that ‘The former policy, - that of Disraeli, - has been already tried and found wanting, partly from the inconsistency naturally inherent in a Christian Power posing as a Mohammedan, and partly from the ineptitude of the results obtained. The second policy therefore seemed the more desirable.’465

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464 TNA: CO 323/781/41: Letter from JC Macnaghten to Bryan Cooper, Downing Street, 16th May 1918.
Count Leon Ostrorog, in his essay *The British Empire and the Mohammedan*, concurred. He wrote that ‘It would obviously be a mistake to have either the restoration of the legitimate Caliphate or the Reformation of Islam openly engineered by British Christians... Mohammedans [should be] exclusively appearing on the stage, although inspired by British statement.’\(^{466}\)

Sykes, Willis, and Philipps affirmed that despite this it was the British Empire who was truly leading. They clarified that it was ‘not sufficient to supress [Pan-Islamism], we must give a LEAD to Mohammedans, intensely loyal as they are to His Majesty and to the British Raj they are looking to us in a time of great trouble for sympathy and a lead.’\(^{467}\) Ostrorog concurred again, this time in slightly blunter language: ‘But the mistake [to lead openly] would be of so childish a nature that it would want very poor brains to commit and still poorer brains to advise it’.\(^{468}\)

Bray was also in agreement with these gentlemen, but he proposed a slightly more prominent position. He propositioned that ‘If... we come out into the open and publically [sic] support the Sherif, as an ally in a Military sense, if we pose, as we can rightly do, as the liberators of an oppressed people, if by propaganda we explain this to the masses, with firm conviction, I say that we will earn the gratitude of the vast majority of our Mohammedan subjects.’\(^{469}\) Having written this in March 1917, it would have been interesting to compare these thoughts to Bray’s thoughts in 1918, after the British Empire’s relationship with the Sharif of Mecca had soured. Alas, Bray’s thoughts in this latter year are unknown.

It can never be known how well it would have worked for the British Empire to have taken the other option: ‘to [have posed] as a great Mohammedan power’. As it was, taking the directors role was enough to get the British Empire through the years of the First World War without the threat from Pan-Islamism turning into a reality; the actions they did undertake

\(^{466}\) TNA: FO 141/786/5: Ostrorog, Count Leon. ‘The British Empire and the Mohammedan’, 9th August 1918, pp.28—29.

\(^{467}\) Bray, *Intelligence*.

\(^{468}\) TNA: FO 141/786/5: Ostrorog. ‘The British Empire’, 9th August 1918, p.28.

\(^{469}\) Bray, *Intelligence*. 
were sufficient to prevent Pan-Islamism from being able to threaten the security of the British Empire, including in East Africa, during those years.

Conclusion

Cultivating British imperial strength in this manner succeeded in helping to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa by allowing the British Empire to demonstrate to the Islamic population of East Africa that the Ottoman Empire was no longer a major power in the Islamic world, and that this downfall of the Ottoman Empire had happened at the will of the British Empire: the stronger power. The British Empire did not cultivate its imperial strength in the Middle East for the purpose of executing this fourth proposed strategy, but this cultivation of strength was opportune; the officials of the British Empire in East Africa who were concerned with preventing the threat from Pan-Islamism understood how it could benefit British imperial security for the knowledge of these events to be made known in their region.

What the British Empire absolutely did not do is concern itself to any great degree in trying to rectify the inevitable political fallout that was to come as a result of their actions in the Middle East. The British Empire’s primary aim was to win the First World War: this they achieved. Their actions prevented threats, such as Pan-Islamism, from threatening the security of the British Empire across the world, including in East Africa, during these years; what was to happen after 1918 could be dealt with then.
Subchapter Five: The Promotion of Weak Central Government and Strong Nationalist Feelings amongst the Islamic Population of East Africa

The fifth strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War was the dual promotion of a weak central government and strong nationalist feelings amongst the Islamic population of East Africa. Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and Captains Willis and Philipps expressed their belief that it was ‘a characteristic of Islam to attempt to unite different nations under the one religious flag as if they were a single nationality’; they charged that ‘such a policy’ of Pan-Islamism would only be possible if there was ‘a strong guiding hand at the head of Mohammedan affairs with a comparatively weak national feeling in the different units forming the whole.’ Therefore, they proposed a ‘proper check… to PanIslamism [sic]’ that comprised of two parts: ‘(1) a weak central government with no more than a spiritual ascendancy over Mohammedans outside its territories, and (2) a strong national feeling in every Mohammedan country, which would make the population more interested in the political and commercial development of their own country than in the Panislamic [sic] principle.’

Their conversation having occurred on 29th June 1917, Sykes, Willis, and Philipps resolved that the first check had already been ‘met by the establishment of an Arab Kingdom’. However, they knew that the second check would be ‘more complicated’ to execute. The unique political situation in East Africa during the First World War meant that there was ‘some danger of the “nationalist” theory if developed leading to disaster’; this ‘disaster’ was that Pan-Africanism would use the machinery of Pan-Islamism to spread itself across the region. The three gentlemen knew that the resulting ‘African Jihad would be widely acceptable and would be likely to spread in a very alarming manner.’

Through their actions in the Middle East, the British Empire was indeed successful in ensuring that the Islamic world, and thus the Islamic population of East Africa, had only ‘a weak central government with no more than a spiritual ascendancy over Mohammedans

outside its territories’. The people who ordered these actions to be undertaken in the Middle East would not have ranked the implementation of this fifth strategy as especially high amongst their priorities; nevertheless, the outcome of their orders was of benefit for this strategy. Conversely, the British Empire was not successful in promoting ‘a strong national feeling in every Mohammedan country’; the weapon of nationalism was determined to be too dangerous a weapon for them to wield in East Africa.

(1) A Weak Central Government

Sykes, Willis, and Philipps were able to resolve that the first check against Pan-Islamism had been ‘met by the establishment of an Arab Kingdom’ because of two factors previously examined in Subchapter Four: the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which had knocked out the only Islamic power in the world with the potential to hold the qualifications to be a strong central government with ascendancy over Muslims outside its territories, and the establishment of the Arab Kingdom under the Sharif of Mecca, which would never have anything beyond a theoretical potential to hold such qualifications. Count Leon Ostrorog argued that with the establishment of this Kingdom ‘the Turkish Sultan [had been] reduced exclusively to his territorial importance. All pretence to a spiritual influence over all the Believers of the earth [became] impossible’. 471

By initially supporting the Arab Revolt, the British Empire had brought into existence a person, the Sharif of Mecca, with the theoretical potential to form a strong central government with ascendancy over Muslims outside its territories. This theoretical potential stemmed not only from the decline of the power of the Ottoman Empire, but also because the Arab Kingdom held ‘the Holy Places and [was] technically adequate to maintain the Khalifate.’ However, Sykes, Willis, and Philipps were not concerned, for they believed that:

‘[The] poverty of the Kingdom, the ignorance amongst the Arabs of modern methods of both trade and warfare, their natural conservatism and their low standard of mental, moral and physical activity induced by generations of inbreeding,

[combined] to make it probable that the Kingdom will not bear much weight in the councils of the world, which may be attempted to be increased by politico-religious propaganda from Mecca.\textsuperscript{472}

Captain Bray was ‘convinced [that the Arabian Peninsula would unite ‘under one government’], not in the sense of the tribes all acknowledging one absolute ruler, having the power of life and death over them, but to the possibility of the confederation of the country, under one nominal head over say five sub-divisions of local chieftains.\textsuperscript{473} Such a confederation existing ‘under one nominal head’ would by necessity be weak, and, when combined with ‘the poverty of the Kingdom’, Sykes, Willis, Philipps, and Bray were in agreement that whilst the Arab Kingdom had credentials enough to make it ‘technically adequate’, at its core it was so weak that it actually had the qualifications necessary to fulfil Sykes, Willis, and Philipps’ first check against Pan-Islamism.

\textit{(2) A Strong National Feeling}

Sykes, Willis, and Philipps felt that while ‘a weak central government with no more than a spiritual ascendancy over Mohammedans outside its territories’ was fairly self-explanatory, their understanding of how ‘a strong national feeling’ would be a ‘proper check’ to Pan-Islamism required ‘a somewhat detailed examination’. This they accomplished by providing their reader with a succinct note as to the ‘national feeling’ in each British colony or protectorate in East or North-East Africa:

‘\textbf{In Egypt} there is a nationalist party largely engineered by self-seeking newspaper proprietors. There is also a far more important section of educated Egyptian opinion which has considerable motions towards nationalism but is rendered inarticulate because they will not identify themselves with the ‘newspaper nationalists’, which they know to be dishonest; and they will not ask assistance from the British whose presence they deplore. There should be no difficulty in developing a national feeling in Egypt though it will be far more difficult to control it.’

\textsuperscript{473} TNA: FO 141/773/6: Bray, N.N.E. \textit{Intelligence and Notes on the Pan-Islamic Movement}, 25\textsuperscript{th} March 1917.
In the Sudan the greater part is inhabited by Arabs and Sudanese who are all Mohammedans; and there is amongst some sections of the more intelligent natives a growing desire to take part in their own administration and to be rid of the mediation of the Egyptian who has hitherto filled all the lesser administrative positions. During the war the dislike of the Egyptian on the part of the natives of the Sudan has become much more apparent and with it a desire to elaborate the Sudan custom in language, education and manner of life... The formation of a strong national feeling in the Sudan would take some years, and would require careful handling and far-seeing administration, but it is not impossible.’

In the South where the negro and negroid population is mainly pagan, the people are too primitive to have a conscious feeling of nationality and although some tribes are both united and organised, others are only organised locally, while some seem to possess no internal control of any lasting value.’

The same may be said of a large part of British East Africa. It is these fairly populous tracts of pagan population that form a fertile field for proselytism to Islam. Very little, if any interference with native custom is involved by such conversation, but the negro turned Mohammedan (as the Mahdists) is a fiercer and more fanatical upholder of the faith than the more educated Arab.’

In German East Africa there is already a considerable Mohammedan population, and there is a tendency, from the coast upwards, for the educated classes to embrace Islam. In the course of the war there has been an unprecedented mixing of representatives of almost all the black races of Africans... “Liberal” ideas from the Cape and Sierra Leone have been discussed over the camp fires and a good deal of rather vague political generalisation has been implanted in minds ill-adapted to digest the matter or to use it properly. Especially has the doctrine of “Africa for the African” taken a definite form as an ideal in the minds of many.474

Having examined the ‘national feeling’ in the British Empire in East and North-East Africa, these three gentlemen conceded that nationalism was a dangerous weapon for them to wield in the region against Pan-Islamism for, as was stated openly regarding Egypt, creating

and controlling such a weapon were two separate things. They discussed that there was ‘a possibility of the nationalist feeling being tainted’ by both ‘the dangers of Pan-Islam’ and ‘this very dangerous doctrine [Pan-Africanism] if it [was] allowed to creep in from the South.’ If ‘nationalist feeling’ was ‘tainted’ in such a way, an ‘African Jehad’ would occur, which ‘would be widely acceptable and would be likely to spread in a very alarming manner.’

Philipps himself argued that the use of nationalism in East Africa should not be entirely dismissed. He reasoned that ‘a definite policy of encouraging strong and isolated tribal nationalism should be one of the most effectual barriers against a violent Pan-African upheaval which is, in this conjunction, a very real danger.’ Nevertheless, he, along with Sykes and Willis, concluded that Islam was to have ‘its political influences... very closely watched’.

Conclusion

Although his portrayal of the Islamic population of the Arabian Peninsula as suffering from ‘inbreeding’ and ‘ignorance’ was a racist examination, there was some credit to Philipps’ accusations that ‘poverty’ and ‘conservatism’, as well as the tribal politics examined by Bray, would prevent an Arab Kingdom from forming a strong central government with ascendancy over Muslims outside its territories. The gradual removal of ‘spiritual ascendancy’ over Muslims, such as it had been, from the Ottoman Empire, and the mutual decline of its military prowess during the First World War, removed from that Empire any claim to be the strong central government of the Islamic world. Together, these two factors ensured that Sykes, Willis, and Philipps’ first check against Pan-Islamism succeeded.

Conversely, although Philipps promoted the potential of tribal nationalism, the British Empire found the use of nationalism too dangerous a weapon to wield against Pan-Islamism.

475 Ibid.
in East Africa. Therefore, this second check against Pan-Islamism was unable to be fulfilled during the years of the First World War.

Overall, the fifth strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa had a very mixed outcome.
Securing the ‘insulating belt’ of East Africa was the sixth strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War. ‘Insulating belt’ was the term given to the geographic area of central East Africa in which Islam was seldom present in 1917, as opposed to the areas around it. There were no definite geographic limitations of this ‘belt’; Captain Philipps defined it as ‘between Northern Islam (Arabia and Sudan) and the Congo-German East Africa group, viz, the Azande, the Baganda, and also the tribes of British East Africa’, whilst Colonel French defined it as spreading ‘from Abyssinia with its debased but ancient Christianity, to Lakes Albert and Victoria, and which is peopled by pagans untouched by any religion and Baganda Roman Catholics and Protestants’. On a separate occasion, Philipps described it more simply as being ‘N.E. Congo, Uganda [and the] East Africa Protectorate’.

This sixth strategy was relatively simple in theory: if Islam could be prevented from spreading into the ‘insulating belt’ then there would be no chance of Pan-Islamism developing there; ergo, there would be no threat from Pan-Islamism. Philipps described the belt as ‘an opportune insulating belt of tribes’, and also, when earlier joined by Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and Captain Willis, as an area that ‘separated… two large Mohammedan populations’. Securing the ‘insulating belt’ meant preventing these ‘two large Mohammedan populations’ from merging. Although preventing the entrance of Islam into the ‘insulating belt’ was the primary concern, it was also hoped that it would be a ‘natural

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barrier equally against an Aethiopian movement [Pan-Africanism] [and] Pan-Islam, or, the greater danger of their combination as “Pan-Africa”.481 [Emphasis original.]

Two methods were suggested to be implemented to secure this ‘insulating belt’:

1. The Promotion of Christianity
2. The Establishment of a Secular Schooling System.

Philipps had two commandments for the implementation of these two methods:

1. ‘Preventive measures should be inaugurated SIMULTANEOUSLY in each area of the Belt’.
2. ‘Such measures should be UNOSTENTATIOUS.’

He asserted that these two methods needed to be implemented quickly, for ‘to await development of the dangers indicated and then to be compelled openly to create means of combating them may end in serious complications with the new forces of Islam.’482 No doubt he was thinking of Captain Bray’s note of caution, as examined in the introduction to Chapter Seven: the British Empire would need to prevent the threat from Pan-Islamism without being seen to work against Pan-Islamism itself.

Yet whilst he wished to act quickly, Philipps candidly remarked that he was not sure when these measures could be implemented. He wrote that they should be inaugurated ‘Either at once as a war measure of imperial safety, possibly legislatively and financially the easier course, OR as part of inevitable changes consequence upon post-war territorial re-adjustments.’ He expressed concern if the post-war plan was chosen, for he believed that ‘From the North strong Islamic propaganda is to be anticipated as one of the first acts of peace carrying its habitual political aspirations.’483

Whilst the sixth strategy was relatively simple in theory, it was anything but simple in practice.

The limited surviving documents demonstrate that the implementation of the first method did occur during the years of the First World War, but only on a very limited basis. The promotion of Christianity was chosen as a method because the ‘insulating belt’ area had ‘a

482 Ibid.
483 Ibid.
considerable Christian population and a number of pagan tribes... whose tendency [was] to adopt Islam with ease and enthusiasm.’ Sykes et al. realised that this presented ‘a considerable field for Mohammedan propaganda, and the possibility of a wide movement towards Panislamism [sic] in the near future [made] it desirable to define the Government policy towards Islam in these parts and to take steps to adopt suitable measures in anticipation.’

Beyond circumstantial evidence, there is no surviving information specifying the successfulness of the very limited implementation of this method.

Detailed plans for the implementation of the second method were drawn up, but there is no hard evidence to prove that a secular schooling system was established by the efforts of the imperial intelligence establishment.

The ‘insulating belt’ of East Africa did remain predominantly free from Islam, and thus secure, until the end of the First World War. Although the methods chosen to ensure this seem to have failed, this measure of success was the only measure that truly mattered. Consequently, the sixth strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War was successful.

**The Promotion of Christianity**

Philipps provided a brief breakdown of the different reasons for why the tribes who inhabited the ‘insulating belt’ were not Muslims:

‘Islam has so far been able to make but little impression, spiritually or temporally, on the spirit-worshipping Azande-Monbuttu tribes to the North West of Lake Albert’;

‘The Baganda are chiefly Christian, though markedly retrograde owing to recent and rigid enforcement of monogamy by the Church Missionary Society.’; ‘The tribes of British East Africa are primitive, incoherent, and pagan, though least likely to

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withstand any wave of Islamic feeling sweeping down from the North or up from the coast.  

Yet whilst the documents record that Christianity was promoted to these tribes, they seldom record how. Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General of Sudan, provided one rare example of this promotion when he wrote in a letter to Sir Reginald Wingate that ‘With this end in view Mongalla Province’, in the south of Sudan, had ‘been staffed with Christian officials, as far as possible’ by early 1918, ‘and some time [sic]’ prior to early 1918 ‘Sunday was made the day of rest in stations away from the river’. Whilst the lack of surviving records is certainly a primary reason for the deficiency of recorded cases, there is a second reason: the British Empire found that there were difficulties with this method, and so its implementation was limited.

Philipps deemed the Baganda tribe to be ‘facile princeps among the Bantu peoples in mental capacity and natural civilisation’ and so ‘admirably adapted to form the strongest link’ in the ‘insulating belt’. Promoting Christianity to the Baganda late in the war presented difficulties due to an event that had occurred in 1914, when ‘Owing to a rigid insistence on the part of the C.M.S. [Christian Missionary Society] on the doctrine of monogamy... anti-Christian spirit showed itself in the destruction of native teachers’ houses and numbers of Baganda either reverted to Paganism, embraced Islam, or emigrated.’ A new sect started in 1915 in opposition of this rigid insistence ‘gained numbers of converts’ and, whilst it was ‘nominally Christian in enjoying baptism and various Christian virtues’, it was considered only nominal because they permitted ‘polygamy and [were] markedly anti-European (e.g. forbids the use of any European drugs or medicine)’. The ‘younger followers’ of the Baganda ‘showed a tendency to adopt the theory that they might as well try the Germans under whose régime they hoped to find smaller demands for labour and a lower tax.’ Philipps’ analysis of the issue between the Baganda and the C.M.S. was a little too simple, for ‘In theory, virtually all missionaries were opposed to polygamy and most were opposed to the baptism of polygamists... However, we should not be misled into reading

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486 TNA: FO 141/786/4: Letter from Lee Stack, the Acting Governor General of the Sudan, Khartoum, to Sir F.R. Wingate, Cairo, 7th February 1918.
decisions passed by a majority as if they had unanimous support’, clarifies Steven Kaplan.\(^{489}\) Yet the point was made; the topic of polygamy would cause issues if Christianity was promoted to the Baganda tribe. To remedy ‘the dangers and difficulties’ that arose from ‘a Christian education’ due ‘to the Christian attitude to polygamy’, Sykes et al. recommended that ‘it would seem desirable to establish secular schools... where possible.’\(^{490}\)

Fortunately, this difficulty was mitigated slightly by the knowledge that by 1917 no enemy missions continued to exist in the ‘insulating belt’, and that the Deputy Governor of the East Africa Protectorate, Sir Charles Bowring, had prohibited them from returning to that Protectorate after the cessation of the First World War. Enemy missions had been discovered to have been ‘the most fertile ground for the seeds of German espionage’ in the early part of the First World War, and consequently the missionaries had been moved or deported.\(^{491}\) Browning was ‘therefore strongly of opinion that no re-opening of any previously existing mission nor the establishment of any new mission by an enemy subject or under enemy direction should be permitted after the conclusion of the war, and that the employment of an enemy subject in a mission in any capacity should be also prohibited.’\(^{492}\) Thus, the ‘younger followers’ of the Baganda would have less opportunity to ‘try the Germans’.

A second difficulty was found when Christianity was promoted in the military sphere of East Africa. There is evidence that suggests that the British Empire considered developing the East African Force along religious lines; in his letter to Wingate, Stack wrote that in February 1918 there were ‘now no Mahommedan troops in the [Mongalla] Province’.\(^{493}\) But there is no further evidence that this occurred; presumably, in similarity to the proposed strategy to develop the East African Force along tribal lines, the practical implementation of this was unrealistic during the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War.

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\(^{492}\) TNA: CO 323/697/67: ‘East Africa Protectorate. Treatment of German and Austrian missions: report on the principal missions in the protectorate controlled by enemy subject; recommendation that these should be closed at the end of the war.’ Original Correspondence from: Deputy Governor Bowring, 22nd February 1916.

\(^{493}\) TNA: FO 141/786/4: Letter Stack to Wingate, 7th February 1918.
The disunity that was apparently inherent in Christianity was a third difficulty discovered. Willis wrote in January 1918 that he had reservations with this entire method. ‘Christianity’, he wrote, ‘does not appear to be likely to be the common bond that may bind the races together in the future, nor is there any religion so adaptable to the needs of these tribes as Islam.’

These difficulties seem to have combined to result in a method that was occasionally implemented, but not implemented enthusiastically or ‘simultaneously’ across the ‘belt’. There are no surviving documents that analyse how the promotion of Christianity aided the securing of the ‘insulating belt’. To this day Christianity remains the prominent religion in Kenya and Uganda, but this is merely circumstantial evidence in the judgment of the successfulness of this method. Nevertheless, Christianity and paganism remained the prominent religions in the tribes cited by Philipps during the First World War, and that was always the desired outcome.

The Establishment of a Secular Schooling System

The second method proposed to secure the ‘insulating belt’ of East Africa was to establish a secular schooling system for the education of the African population of the British Empire. As stated, Sykes et al. had recommended this for the Baganda tribe as opposed to the promotion of Christianity, but it was recommended more fully to remedy the perceived issues of Islamic education: ‘the dangers and difficulties’ that the British Empire perceived to arise from a ‘Mohammedan education’ were ‘its tendency to acquire political with spiritual ascendency’.

The German Implementation

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494 TNA: FO 141/786/4: Assistant Director of Intelligence. ‘A Note on Colonial Office Memo. “Africa for the Africans” and “Pan Islam”.’, Khartoum, 17th January 1918.
The British Empire was aware that implementing such an education system would be advantageous to the prevention of Pan-Islamism because another colonial power had already used it in East Africa for the same reason: the Germans of German East Africa. 

‘[Fostering] and [encouraging] any movements of unrest and sedition directed against the British Empire’ was shown in Part II to have been ‘a special feature of Germany’s policy’ during the First World War, and that amongst the movements, ‘with their accompanying plots and conspiracies’, which ‘were supported and in some cases promoted by Germany’, was the Pan-Islamic movement.496 The drawback of such a scheme, as outlined in Chapter Five, was that the German Empire itself had an Islamic population; if the threat posed by Pan-Islamism towards European imperialism was to come to fruition, German East Africa would itself be impacted. This knowledge was not lacking in the German administration of that colony. In the immediate pre-war era of ‘1912-14 the local German administrations were very apprehensive of the increase of Islam among local native populations, as likely to threaten white supremacy by a black Pan-Islamic organisation’. The ‘official policy’ in these years ‘was anti-Islam’.497 Philipps concurred: ‘It was sudden realisation of the danger of political PAN-ISLAM infecting the negorid races which induced the German Government to establish secular tribal education in East Africa.’498

Willis explained why the Germans attempted to use this method to achieve their goal: it was because education and Islam were so intertwined. ‘There is little doubt that the chief incentive to turn Mohammedan, in the minds of many pagans’, he wrote, ‘is that it provides the quickest and easiest way of acquiring a modicum of culture. So much so that in Uganda the word “Kafir” has acquired the meaning of uneducated.’ The trick, according to Willis, was to provide Muslims with an education without also providing them with a religious education; thus, they would be happy at gaining schooling and the imperial authorities would be happy because that schooling would not be converting them. The Germans, he announced, had worked this out: ‘The passion for education can be met without necessarily

combining with it any special religious teaching, and the pagan might then attain equality of intellectual training with others, and still maintain his pride in his tribal unit which tends to be lost upon the adoption of any special faith.”

Maintaining tribal unity was vitally important for the Germans of German East Africa, because, similarly to the British, the German Empire relied upon these tribe’s inability to unify and challenge imperial rule. In the Bukoba (Lake Victoria) District ‘the German Government exercised no direct control over natives but worked through the six Sultans whose powers, save for the death penalty, were almost despotic. The Germans had found a native population of 170,000 of an unusually high grade of civilisation separated in sympathy only by domestic feuds and slight variations of dialect. That is to say’, Philipps stated in a document entitled Tribal Secular Schools: German Model., ‘a formidable potential enemy whose intelligence might be expected to prescribe alliance as the best means of resisting European control in its earlier stages.’ He declared that he had ‘been much struck recently in this district by the intense tribal pride existing in small communities under separate Sultans, and an aloofness amounting to antipathy to neighbouring tribes with whom they are naturally allied by some similarity of speech and custom.’ Concluding, Philips wrote that this was ‘the result of a careful and successful German policy of weakening isolation, in which secular education is the chief factor.’

Knowing that the British Empire was investigating the establishment of a secular schooling system, Philipps also provided a detailed plan on both how German secular schools had been financed and the structure of its syllabus:

‘Method.’ From the Hut Tax, ‘Sultans were expected to maintain: (1) Sultans’ armed police. (2) Tribal Schools, within their Sultanates.’ For example, in one place ‘two white schoolmasters educated natives for positions as:

(a) Tribal Teachers.
(b) Government Tax Collectors.
(c) Sultans’ Clerks
(d) Clerks to German planters and business houses.

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499 TNA: FO 141/786/4: Assistant Director. ‘A Note’.
Subjects taught were:

(a) Kiswahili: the official and commercial tongue.
(b) The three R’s and bookkeeping.
(c) German imperial history.

Shortly before taking up their duties in their Sultan’s school, tribal teachers were given individual attention by one of the white teachers on tribal history and the agricultural development of their districts.\textsuperscript{501}

The Germans had also considered one further issue that was at the crux of imperialism: the need to educate Africans only to their proscribed place on the chart of civilisation as ordained by the Europeans. Knowing that the British Empire valued similar racist policies, Philipps wrote an explanation of how the Germans had achieved it:

‘It was everywhere clearly laid down that native development was to be on parallel not joint lines with European civilisation. The ‘Normal’ schools were built and maintained at provincial headquarters by Government. Tribal schools were maintained by Sultans. In this district there are many soundly educated pagans. German was only taught in exceptional cases. Results, from the German political and social standpoints, have been excellent. It had not produced the result of either bad manners nor any tendency to make the native ape the European which has sometimes been the effect of Christian mission education.’\textsuperscript{502}

The establishment of a secular schooling system was not considered with the interests of the African population in mind.

\textbf{The British Implementation}

The credit for suggesting the establishment of a secular schooling system to secure the ‘insulating belt’ was given by Philipps to the Director of Military Intelligence, George Macdonogh, and Colonel French of M.I.1.\textsuperscript{503} French did make such a suggestion in August

\textsuperscript{501} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{502} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{503} TNA: WO 106/259: Philipps. ‘Note on preventive measures’, 1918.
1917, but there are no surviving documents that prove that Macdonogh did.\(^{504}\) In addition, this was the only referenced mention of Macdonogh’s engagement with the threat of Pan-Islamism towards the British Empire in East Africa contained within Philipps’ notes. His presence here is noteworthy, but not impossible. As the inspiration came from pre-war actions of the German Empire, it is certainly plausible that intelligence on those actions crossed his desk at some point during the hostilities.

Whilst Philipps gave the credit to these gentlemen, it was certainly him that studied the German secular schooling system; his long documents are recognition of his thorough work.

Philipps’ first commandment was that ‘Preventive measures should be inaugurated \textsc{simultaneously} in each area of the Belt’. He designated these areas to be: ‘Uganda, the East Africa Protectorate, the Southern Sudan, German East Africa and the adjoining Portuguese and Belgian territories.’ The implementation of a secular schooling system in each area was remarked upon:

The East Africa and Uganda Protectorates were deemed to be places where the potential for positive improvement could be seen by both French, who remarked that in the secular schools ‘the spirit of... the tribe, should be cultivated and nowhere can this be done with better chances of success than in British East Africa and Uganda where there are numerous tribes ethnographically quite distinct from one another’, and Sykes et al., who remarked that:

‘In view of the dangers and difficulties arising from either a Christian or Mohammedan education (the former owing to the Christian attitude to polygamy, the latter owing to its tendency to acquire political with spiritual ascendency) it would seem desirable to establish secular schools in these parts where possible, this has been tried with success by the Germans and it is notable that the term ‘Kaffir’ in Uganda implies lack of education since all schools there have a definite religious tone.’\(^{505}\)

The Governor-General of the Sudan merely remarked that ‘The Education Department is considering a scheme for starting secular schools in which the vernacular will be taught’.


Stack hoped that this would result in ‘a sufficient number of natives... trained to enable the district [Mongalla] to be staffed with officials who will not be Arabic speaking.’

Philipps remarked that ‘The Portuguese and Belgian Administration might be approached; the danger to themselves of neglect pointed out and their active co-operation at least in policy, invited. Portuguese East Africa has, historically and racially become a peculiarly dangerous seeding ground for “all-black” movements, and needs particular attention.’ Furthermore, he stated that the:

‘Azande and Mambettu tribes of the N.E. Belgian Congo are among those to whom the policy should be applied. It so happens that they are tribes with a proud national record and are also more advanced in natural development than any other Congolese peoples. Further, they adjoin British territory on two sides. Even were the Belgian administration financially unable to agree to the establishment of the secular tribal school system, the application of a definite co-ordinated policy could still be carried out by them with appreciable effect.’

However, these remarks have one important aspect in common: they were just remarks. Despite finding agreement from as high as Macdonogh, there is no evidence to prove that a secular schooling system was established. The British admired the German secular schooling system enough to wish to replicate it; why they did not was not positively recorded in the surviving documents.

Conclusion

French noted that the promotion of a secular schooling system to secure the ‘insulating belt’ of East Africa would not be without its European critics; primarily, the Christian Missions who ran Christian schools in the region. He believed that these missionaries would not allow such a schooling system to exist for any period of time significant enough for the British imperial intelligence establishment to secure the ‘insulating belt’: ‘[The] missionaries will not for long be satisfied to allow such secular schools to monopolise the training of the

506 TNA: FO 141/786/4: Letter Stack to Wingate, 7th February 1918.
507 TNA: WO 106/259: Philipps. ‘Note on preventive measures’, 1918
natives. They will compete with them and will bring every possible pressure to bear on the Government to ensure equal treatment. It will not be possible to withstand such pressure.

This is the only indication enclosed within the surviving records for why a secular schooling system was apparently not established. French suggested that a solution might be found by allowing ‘only one denomination to work in two adjacent areas (vide Sudan).’

Willis was more optimistic, and stated that secular schooling ‘would not be prejudicial to the Missions in as much as they would be offering to the natives not only the education that they could obtain at a Government school but also the religious [Christian] teaching into the bargain.’ But the promotion of Christianity across the ‘insulating belt’ was not enthusiastically embraced by the British imperial intelligence establishment; the difficulties of promoting Christianity had already rendered that method unfeasible.

If a secular schooling system could not exist in anything but the short-term in order to pacify other European interests in the region, then a secular schooling system to secure the ‘insulating belt’ of East Africa could not exist. This realisation apparently led to the shelving of a method that was universally agreed upon by all the British Empire’s officials in East Africa who were charged with preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire.

The first of the two methods suggested to secure the ‘insulating belt’ of East Africa was implemented only on a very limited basis. The second was apparently not implemented at all. Yet the insulating belt held. Willis reported that by January 1918 ‘There [had] not been any influx of “liberal” ideas from outside to the black tribes of the Sudan.’ The combined efforts of the seven other strategies proposed to prevent the threat of Pan-Islamism resulted in the securing of this ‘belt’. Paradoxically, whilst the implementation of it was unsuccessful, the outcomes desired by the implementation of the sixth strategy were attained.

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509 TNA: FO 141/786/4: Assistant Director. ‘A Note’.
510 Ibid.
Subchapter Seven: The Implementation of Counter-Intelligence in East Africa

The seventh strategy proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War was the implementation of counter-intelligence in the region. Of all eight strategies, this seventh strategy was the most diverse in nature; for it was comprised of several facets. The use of counter-intelligence grew exponentially in East Africa in the latter eighteen months of the Great War. The creation of M.I.S.D. and the East African Intelligence Centre were examined in great depth in Chapter Six. Although the evidence is circumstantial, it can surely be of no coincidence that the Intelligence Centre was initiated immediately after the production of several pieces of work, Captain Philipps’ memorandum “Africa for the African” and “Pan-Islam” Recent developments in Central and Eastern Africa in particular, that detailed the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa. Through the production of these pieces of work, the British Empire gained the knowledge that their imperial territories in East Africa could be threatened not only through the prism of guerrilla warfare, but through the prism of Pan-Islamism.

The implementation of counter-intelligence to counter the threat posed by Pan-Islamism in East Africa can be split into four sections, all of which were either placed under the direction of the East African Intelligence Centre or were implemented by others alongside it. The first of these was the collection and collation of records of intelligence from across the East African region, and the surviving documents show that this was a very successful endeavour. The second involved the enaction and enforcement of port controls and the registration of aliens across the same space; due to the lack of surviving raw intelligence, it is difficult to give an objective analysis on how successful this section was. The third section, censorship, had been under the direction of the censor prior to its move, after its institution, to the East African Intelligence Centre. Censorship was also vital to the implementation of the first two sections. The fourth was principally successful; it involved the interception of the agents of Pan-Islamism in East Africa. But this success, Philipps volunteered, could have only a limited impact on preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa.
Despite some failures, overall the implementation of counter-intelligence by the British Empire made important inroads to the prevention of Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of that empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War. Out of all eight of the strategies proposed to counter this threat, it was this seventh strategy which was the most successful and, consequently of that fact and of its diversity, it is this strategy for which there remains the most surviving documentation.

**The Use of Counter-Intelligence by the East African Intelligence Centre**

There were three counter-intelligence subjects implemented by the East African Intelligence Centre; these three subjects were interwoven and formed the backbone of the work of that establishment:

1. The collection and collation of intelligence records and files from across the wider region to a central library located in Nairobi.
2. The enactment and enforcement of port controls and the ‘registration of aliens’ to prevent the importation of enemy-backed literature, especially religious literature.
3. Censorship.

**The Collection and Collation of Intelligence Records from Across the East African Region; the Acquisition of Imperial Knowledge**

The collection and collation of intelligence records from across the East African region to a central library located in Nairobi was a successful endeavour and made an important contribution to the prevention of Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa. Written in January 1919, Major Muggeridge gave a brief historical account on how this subject matter had been conducted by the Intelligence Centre:

‘From the inception of the Department [the Intelligence Centre] it was realised that the old available Intelligence files, dealing with tribes and native food supplies were out of date and in many cases much information that would be of value was lacking. Steps were therefore taken with the object of obtaining as much information as
possible on these subjects as well as in regard to European man power, privately owned motor cars and similar subjects.\(^{511}\)

The lack of the ‘Intelligence files [which dealt] with tribes and native food supplies’ and information concerning ‘European man power, privately owned motor cars and similar subjects’ had an impact across the entire East African Campaign. In 1921 Brigadier General C. P. Fendall published *The East African Force 1915—1919*; an account of the actions of the East African Force during the First World War. In this book he was scathing of the failure of the British Empire in East Africa to organise its infrastructure for military purposes. He separated the infrastructure difficulties faced by the British Empire’s forces into two sections: ‘natural difficulties’ and ‘artificial difficulties’.

By ‘natural difficulties’ he ‘meant those due to the composition of the force, to the distance from sources of supply, to the shipping shortage, to the country and climate.’ By ‘artificial difficulties’ he meant ‘those due to want of suitable organisation, the idiosyncrasies of chief administrative officers, and deliberate obstruction on the part of some who had to do with the supply of the force.’

The ‘natural difficulties’, Fendall determined, could not be helped; for their faults, they were but merely the products of the harsh environment in which the fighting was being fought. Conversely, the ‘artificial difficulties’ had been brought about in the East African Campaign of the First World War by the lack of work to prevent them in either the pre-war or early-war period. A central library, such as the collection that the Intelligence Centre would create, of the intelligence records from across the East African region would have been made good use of earlier in the War to reduce these ‘natural difficulties’, but for its lack of existence.\(^{512}\)

The Intelligence Centre was not the first establishment to attempt to overcome the ‘artificial difficulties’ which occurred because of the lack of a central intelligence records library. The Intelligence Department of the East African Force had also collected and collated similar information and published it in *Intelligence Notes on British and German East Africa*, of

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which there are two surviving editions: December 1915 and March 1916.\footnote{TNA: CAB 45/12: The Intelligence Department, British East Africa. \textit{Intelligence Notes on British and German East Africa}. December 1915; TNA: WO 287/18: The Intelligence Department, British East Africa. \textit{Intelligence Notes on British and German East Africa}. March 1916.} Both of the surviving editions of \textit{Intelligence Notes} were ‘compiled from “Field Notes on German East Africa, Aug., 1914,” and from reconnaissance, patrol reports, and other information gained since the outbreak of war... [they were] of necessity incomplete.’\footnote{TNA: WO 287/18: The Intelligence Department. ‘Preface.’, in \textit{Intelligence Notes}. March 1916; TNA: CAB 45/12: The Intelligence Department. ‘Preface.’, in \textit{Intelligence Notes}. December 1915.} Captain Meinertzhagen appealed that anybody who possessed ‘any additional information’ should ‘at once [submit]’ it ‘to the Intelligence Department at Headquarters.’\footnote{TNA: WO 287/18: The Intelligence Department. ‘Preface.’, in \textit{Intelligence Notes}. March 1916} \textit{Intelligence Notes on British and German East Africa} was a useful start, but it was by no means a library; Meinertzhagen made no endeavour to collect and collate intelligence records from across the East African region to a central library himself, despite fully understanding the difficulties that resulted from the lack of such a central library. He merely appealed for others to send him any relevant information they happened to hold. The Intelligence Centre was therefore the first establishment to undertake such work; work that was, despite its importance, not undertaken until the very last year of the conflict.

The intelligence records to be collected comprised of ‘all the existing Intelligence papers which had hitherto been filed at the headquarters of the various battalions of the King’s African Rifles’ and ‘All Intelligence records of permanent interest about the British protectorates and those collected during the military operations in German East Africa’. They were to be ‘filed at Nairobi’, the location of the Intelligence Centre. ‘[All] information possible about the Belgian Congo, Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia’ was also to be obtained.\footnote{TNA: KV 1/15: M.I.5. ‘VI. African Colonies & Protectorates. 1. British East Africa’, in \textit{Vol. I. “D” Branch Report. Report on the Establishment of a Special Intelligence Service in the Colonies and Overseas Dominions}. 1921, pp.142—143.} Major Foster endeavoured to undertake this work immediately. It was recorded that:

‘Shortly after his arrival [in the autumn of 1917], [he] addressed a memorandum giving the headings under which information was required to the Secretariat in each of the British possessions in the East Africa area, at the same time indicating the nature of the collaboration and assistance which was sought for. A Memorandum on
the Collection of Military Intelligence... [was] compiled and distributed to officers at various stations and posts’. 517

Consequently, these intelligence records, and the information subsequently collected to enhance them, were collected by the Intelligence Centre, who then collated them into the form of ‘A properly indexed library of maps and a system of charting and filing road reports’ that was structured to ‘be readily available’ when needed. This collation started from the inception of the Intelligence Centre:

‘In the early days of the Department a card index was commenced in connection with subjects, tribes, persons and places. This has been religiously kept up and forms a valuable means of reference. An attempt has been made to study conditions in Abyssinia and British Somaliland; the reports from these places and from Khartoum are carefully read and carded as are any available books on these territories.’

This collection of relevant information does not appear to have slowed down throughout the remaining months of the East African Campaign, for on 7th January 1919 Muggeridge wrote that ‘Both the maps and the road reports [were still] constantly being added to.’ 518

Exact details as to what was included within these intelligence records was not included in the document Extract from a Report on the Organisation of the Intelligence Centre at Nairobi; the raw intelligence of this ‘Military Intelligence’ is missing. However, Muggeridge did feel the necessity to highlight the three topics that were of the greatest interest to the Centre: ‘Pan Islamism, Pan Ethiopianism, and the activities of Missionaries [were] amongst the subjects in regard to which every endeavour [had] been made to collect information and record the opinions of those competent to judge.’ 519 Thus, right from the beginning of the institution of the Intelligence Centre the collection and collation of intelligence on Pan-Islamism was a focal point; Foster appreciated the need for ‘obtaining as much information as possible’ on this subject.

Yet Muggeridge appears to have been something of a pragmatist. Due to the lack of previous imperial intelligence in East Africa, the intelligence required to prevent Pan-

518 Ibid., p.154.
519 Ibid., p.154.
Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa was not always contained in intelligence records, waiting to be collected and collated into a central library by the Intelligence Centre. Therefore, it would have to be discovered. The Intelligence Centre was instituted in November 1917 and the armistice was finally enacted in November 1918; Muggeridge seems to have understood that due to them spending only a relatively short period working in the longest campaign of the entire First World War, there were many subjects on which he and his colleagues were not, and could not become, the leading experts upon, and that in order to succeed in their positions and make the Intelligence Centre an operational success it would be imperative for them to gain both intelligence and analysis from other, more qualified, sources. Therefore, as examined in Subchapter Three of this chapter, the Centre sought out what limited expertise on Pan-Islamism, and other subjects, existed. Philipps’ work shone through as being the most informative; Muggeridge’s letter to Philipps, in which he wrote that he ‘should like to thank you for all the assistance you have given the department... The information you have sent from time to time has been most useful and has been carefully carded. I am very grateful’, demonstrated the importance of Philipps’ work for the acquisition of imperial knowledge by the Intelligence Centre.  

The collection and collation of intelligence records from across the East African region, and the discovery of information and the employment of expertise when these intelligence records fell short, was therefore a success for the East African Intelligence Centre; it facilitated them in acquiring imperial knowledge about Pan-Islamism. By understanding as much as they could about the threats to the British Empire, the Intelligence Centre was able to use that knowledge to promote the security of its empire in East Africa in the years of the First World War.

The Enaction and Enforcement of Port Controls and the Registration of Aliens

Port Controls

Due to its geographic location on the western shores of the Indian Ocean, the importation of physical Pan-Islamic propaganda into East Africa occurred primarily by sea. The British Empire was aware of this method of ingress and had been since the summer of 1914. Therefore, it was ‘Prior to the arrival of Major Foster’ that the ‘searching of natives, both male and female, arriving at the ports of the East African [sic] Protectorate’ had commenced, and this ‘had been carried out under the supervision and largely at the instigation of the Hon. The Chief of Customs’. Earlier in the same document it becomes evident that this ‘searching of natives’ occurred not only when they were ‘arriving at the ports’, but also when they were ‘leaving’. 521

The East African Intelligence Centre found these port controls to be inadequate, and the desire was expressed to improve them to prevent the physical importation of Pan-Islamic propaganda into East Africa through this channel. For guidance ‘Major Foster sought advice from the Central Bureau [M.I.5.D.]’ on the subject ‘of the hand-carrying of letters in and out of the country, and in this instance... he was provided with a copy of the Regulations issued in Egypt for the prevention of letter-smuggling.’ 522

The co-operation received by the Intelligence Centre was vital to their endeavour to prevent Pan-Islamic propaganda from entering or exiting the region by enacting and enforcing port controls. Foster ‘adopted and extended’ the important measure ‘initiated by the Chief Censor and Chief of Customs’... [of] ‘the searching of persons, entering and leaving British East African ports for hand carried correspondence or mischievous pamphlets’, and received support from the latter to do so. 523 Reflecting on this support, Muggeridge wrote both that ‘the Department is greatly indebted to [the Hon. The Chief of Customs] for his enthusiastic support of, and assistance in connection with, the more complete measures, embracing Europeans, which followed’, and that ‘The Department [was]... greatly indebted to the King’s African Rifles Headquarters Staff for the loan of several N.C.Os without whom it...”

would have been impossible to find a suitable personnel to supervise and carry out the searching’.  

At first glance the outcome of this adoption and extension looked positive. M.I.5.D. wrote that:

‘Major Foster instituted a searching squad at Mombasa, and it was reported in October, 1918, that his arrangements were working quite smoothly, and that several convictions for hand-carrying had been obtained. Major Foster’s successor [Muggeridge] was encouraged by the Central Bureau in his endeavours to extend this system to other important ports, and to arrange for a travelling squad to visit the less-known points of entry unexpectedly from time to time.’

However, this was not quite the full story. M.I.5.D. continued their statement: ‘In January 1919… it was reported that [the Intelligence Centre’s] efforts to carry out these measures had only been partially successful.’ And whilst Muggeridge wrote that ‘The Department’ was ‘greatly indebted to the King’s African Rifles Headquarters Staff… to supervise and carry out the searching’, he concluded this sentence by writing ‘even at the few ports where this has been done.’ Furthermore, ‘It [was] to be regretted that subsequent attempts to extend the searching arrangements at other Ports in Conquered Territory’ – the same German East Africa that Philipps described as ‘The chief danger zone… [for the] conjunction of Islamic propaganda with the cry of “Africa for the “African”’ – ‘and to provide for a small section to pay surprise visits to harbours frequented by dhows only were not encouraged.’

Hence, whilst the British improved the enaction and enforcement of port controls in the East African region it remained possible, if one desired to do so, to circumvent them.

Muggeridge did not attempt to deny this issue; in fact, he directly addressed the problem:

‘It was obvious from the first that, in a country like Africa, especially, it would be impossible to prevent hand carrying of letters and pamphlets. The utmost that could be aimed at was to check the practice, and by the capture of a certain number of

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524 Ibid., p.158—159.
documents to get valuable clues in regard to mischievous intentions and connections. This has to some extent been accomplished, either through the instrumentality of the Intelligence Searching Squad at Mombasa, Kilindini and Kisumu, or owing to the vigilance of the Censors and Political Officers, and many convictions were obtained as the result.\textsuperscript{527}

Thus, the Intelligence Centre worked with what limited elements it had. Knowing that they had neither the personnel nor the expertise to completely prevent the importation of Pan-Islamic propaganda into East Africa via the Indian Ocean, ‘to check the practice’ at the most popular ports and to ‘capture... a certain number of documents to get valuable clues’ about the threats associated with Pan-Islamism seems to have been a sensible course of action to undertake to help curb, if not completely prevent, the spread of Pan-Islamism in East Africa and so, consequently, to help lessen, if not completely prevent, the threat of Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in the region during the First World War.

The Registration of Aliens

In addition to attempting to control the physical movement of written material around the region, M.I.5.D. recorded that ‘One of Major Foster’s first steps was to bring about the registration of aliens in East Africa’; the Intelligence Centre intended to also control the physical movement of people. Foster ‘appealed to the Central Special Intelligence Bureau for advice in the matter.’ They obliged and ‘arranged for the Report of the Aliens Registration Committee published in Cairo in April, 1917, to be sent to Major Foster by the Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence Bureau, as the Regulations and policy adopted in Egypt were especially well suited for adaption in East Africa.’ Further to this, ‘At the request of the C.S.I.B. the Assistant Director of the Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence Bureau also sent suggestions to Major Foster on the subject.’\textsuperscript{528}

‘[The] compulsory registration of all persons other than members of His Majesty’s Forces entering the area (Nyasaland and British Somaliland excepted)’ was the second of the ‘Two

\textsuperscript{527} TNA: KV 1/16: Muggeridge. ‘Appendix O.’, p.159.
important measures initiated by the Chief Censor and Chief of Customs’ that the Intelligence Centre ‘adopted and extended’. However, the Intelligence Centre hit upon a problem when it attempted to improve them. ‘The proclamation in regard to’ this measure was separately ‘issued by the Administration’ of each part of the British Empire ‘in each case (except in Conquered Territory, where it was promulgated under Martial Law)’. Consequently, they ‘differed slightly the one from the other, as it was found impossible to reconcile conflicting views as to details... Thus, in some cases, natives of Africa were included, in others excluded’. Sometimes Africans were treated in the same manner as Europeans and Indians by the British Empire and sometimes they were not.

Muggeridge gave an account both about how the registration of aliens worked and about the benefits this had for the Intelligence Centre’s endeavour:

‘[The] main result was that at all events all Europeans and Indians (except members of His Majesty’s Forces and in some cases members of the Administration) [and Africans where excluded], had to register their names, nationality, place of residence, business, duration of stay, and other important particulars on landing, or otherwise entering the area, and severe penalties were incurred for a false declaration. An Identity Card with a special number was issued to each individual and this was subject to visa at specified places. Series of numbers were allotted to each territory within the area, so that it was possible to tell at once, on examination of the card, whether it had been issued in Uganda or, say, Conquered Territory. A note of the number was made on the Registration Form and a duplicate of that sent to the Central Office. Persons disembarking at Kilindini could therefore proceed to Conquered Territory or Uganda with the one card and without further trouble, except for visa. It is perhaps unnecessary to detail the precautions taken to prevent evasion. The assistance of the Police and Civil District Officers was called upon in many cases where Censor’s Officers were not stationed, and, on the whole, the arrangement has worked satisfactorily and has been productive of valuable information, while at the same time giving the authorities a hold over the movements of undesirables. The fact that persons of British Nationality were

required to register was an unanswerable argument to objections raised, in a very few cases, by others.\textsuperscript{530}

The information gained by this practise was mixed with the information gained via the censorship of the post to help the British Empire identify those who needed to be identified to continue to secure the British Empire in East Africa against threats: ‘Careful records were kept of individuals in regard to whom, from one cause or another, suspicion arose, with the object of ensuring that information in regard to undesirables should be readily available. Lists of Germans in the field were also supplied by [the censorship] section of the department.’

Additionally, to help identify those who needed to be identified to continue to secure the British Empire outside of East Africa, ‘Notes on firms and individuals in regard to whose movements or activities suspicion was entertained, largely culled from the Censor’s records, [were] forwarded from time to time to other Intelligence Centres and the War Office, when it was felt that these were of more than local interest’. Furthermore, the security of the British Empire in the post-war era was also considered: ‘a statement, chiefly compiled from information from the same source, in regard to those individuals whose record seemed to render their future residence in Conquered Territory undesirable [was] forwarded to His Honour the Administrator and General Headquarters on request.\textsuperscript{531}

However, the registration of aliens was not altogether effective. ‘In October 1918, the result of Major Foster’s efforts was reported to the C.S.I.B... In the opinion of the Central Special Intelligence Bureau, the Identity Card and Declaration Form was open to some criticism... but satisfaction was expressed that Major Foster’s efforts had not been entirely in vain.\textsuperscript{532}

The intended outcome of the compulsory ‘registration of aliens’ was not elaborated upon by the Intelligence Centre. It is clear having greater control over the movements of some, albeit not all, of the people entering and leaving the region and moving between areas within the region, would help the British Empire to prevent the spread of ideologies by preventing the movements of ‘undesirables’. Because of the lack of raw intelligence remaining in the surviving documents it is difficult to give an objective analysis on how successful the

\textsuperscript{530} Ibid., pp.157—158.
\textsuperscript{531} Ibid., pp.155—156.
registration of aliens was on preventing the Pan-Islamic threat to the British Empire in East Africa.

Censorship

Censorship commenced on the very first day of the Great War in East Africa. On that day Zanzibar started to censor all civilian post. Soon, post proceeding to East Africa was censored at Cape Town in advance of it reaching its destination.\textsuperscript{533} The German propaganda that was prevented from entering East Africa as a result took the forms of war pamphlets, newspapers, and enemy trading letters.\textsuperscript{534} General Botha, the Prime Minister of South Africa, was not impressed; the censorship instructions for South Africa, he complained to Jan Smuts, were ‘entirely based on European conditions and letters are censored for all kinds of nonsense.’\textsuperscript{535} The British Empire was apparently not swayed by such grumbles; the censorship was continued for the duration of the hostilities. In January 1919 Muggeridge was able to conclude that over the course of the Great War ‘Cable Censorship, centered [sic] at Zanzibar, [had] been efficiently carried out.’\textsuperscript{536}

Censorship was therefore a branch of the British counter-intelligence effort that existed throughout the entire East African Campaign to prevent threats to the security of the British Empire in East Africa. ‘[I]n the early part of 1918’, censorship, ‘which had hitherto been part of Force Intelligence General Headquarters was incorporated in the East African Intelligence Centre’, where it was ‘most efficiently conducted under the direction of Major R.B. Hopkins O.B.E.’\textsuperscript{537}

The censorship of the press was just as thorough as the censorship of the post; this had ‘been perhaps more strictly conducted in East Africa than in many other places, chiefly on

\textsuperscript{534} TNA: FO 929/1: NO.143 (1824/15/44). ‘Extract from a Report from the Chief Censor (Union) at Cape Time, on the Examination of Mails from Portuguese East Africa, homeward bound per S. S. “Kenilworth Castle”, on 17\textsuperscript{th} October, 1915.’, in \textit{Passage of Food Supplies and Military Intelligence to German East Africa through Mozambique}, 10\textsuperscript{th} November 1915.
\textsuperscript{536} TNA: KV 1/16: Muggeridge. ‘Appendix O.’, p.156.
\textsuperscript{537} Ibid., p.155.
account of the effect that articles of news of a certain type, which though suitable for European consumption might have on the native mind, but the restrictions imposed have resulted in very little friction on the whole.’ There was, however, some friction caused because of this racial distinction; this friction came about because the narrative published in East Africa to prevent ‘the native mind’ from consuming what the British Empire thought it ought not to consume was not followed in Europe or in South Africa, resulting in an inevitable clash:

‘The position of the Cable Censor was for a time rendered somewhat difficult owing to the Civil Authorities in [Zanzibar] objecting to the publication there of many enemy communiques as well as to that of certain portions of Reuters referring to our retreat and German atrocities, even though the Cable Censor considered these suitable for publication in British East Africa in many cases... to avoid one version of Reuters appearing in Zanzibar and another in Mombasa, and Nairobi (which would have been contrary to War Office Instructions) the Cable Censor had, under the circumstances no alternative but to delete the portions objected to by the Zanzibar Administration, which thus in fact became the authority for censoring Reuters over the whole area. The gist of the deleted portions subsequently appeared in papers received from home or South Africa with the result that the public began to feel that the position was worse than it was, while the Press was irritated at what was considered to be the unnecessary cutting out by the Censor of news for which it had to pay. It was realised however, that to achieve the best results amicable relations must be maintained between the Intelligence and those with whom it had to deal. Great care was taken to avoid friction, and the turn of events resulting in more optimistic news put an end to any divergence of opinion as to what should be published.’

By initiating ‘the searching of persons, entering and leaving British East African ports for hand carried correspondence or mischievous pamphlets’, which resulted in many ‘convictions’ being ‘obtained as the result’ of their ‘vigilance’, and by introducing ‘the compulsory registration of all persons other than members of His Majesty’s Forces entering

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538 Ibid., pp.156—157.
the area’, and by ensuring that ‘careful records were kept of individuals in regard to whom from one cause or another, suspicions arose, with the object of ensuring that information in regard to undesirables should be readily available’, and by keeping ‘lists of Germans in the field’, the censorship played a vital role in all of the successes achieved by implementing counter-intelligence to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa.

The Use of Counter-Intelligence Conducted Alongside the East African Intelligence Centre

There was one counter-intelligence subject implemented alongside the East African Intelligence Centre:

1. The Interception of the Agents of Pan-Islamism

The Interception of the Agents of Pan-Islamism

It is not entirely clear how involved the East African Intelligence Centre was with the interception of the agents of Pan-Islamism; Foster and Muggeridge were certainly communicating with Philipps, who was the person primarily responsible. As Philipps was attached to the King’s African Rifles as the Chief Intelligence Officer in Uganda, in 1917, when much of this work took place, the Intelligence Department of the East African Force was technically responsible for the implementation of this section.

As was partially quoted in Chapter Five, Philipps stated that ‘Throughout the German East African Campaign, from the 8th August, 1914, onwards, German Pan-Islamic propaganda [had] been continuously intercepted by our Military Intelligence agents in the Uganda-Congo-Sudan area.’ Philipps continued: ‘In 1914 the enemy at once endeavoured to exploit the personal element by instigating prominent Mohammedans in his territory to correspond with their former associates along the old slave routes in Uganda and the Congo Belge.’ These Muslims had agreed to this work because ‘Prominent positions were promised in the future Germano-Islamic Empire of Eastern Africa in return for services to be rendered as
spies or in tampering with Sudanese troops.’ In 1914 this propaganda took ‘the form of personal correspondence and of printed proclamations in Arabic and Swahili, signed by Governor Schnee and the ex-Sultan Said Khalif of Zanzibar... German Pan-Islamic agents were everywhere amply supplied with funds.’ By 1915-16 ‘enemy propaganda [had] assumed a new phase. Printed proclamations, with the green flag, were despatched... They set forth:

1. The JEHAD, laying down that Islam required of all true believers not merely a passive but an active resistance to the Allies.
2. Importance of Allied attempts against German East Africa.
3. Certainty of eventual German victory in Europe, based on Allied territory actually held.
4. Consequent:
   a. Establishment of Islamic Empire of North and East Central Africa, under benign German ‘protection’.
   b. Assistance to be forthcoming for all rebellions, as MOHAHI in French and ALI DINAR in Egyptian Sudan (DARFUR)
5. Complete failure of Allied attack on Stanbul [sic].
6. Mutiny of Indian troops at Singapore.'539

Islamic propaganda was ‘printed and written’ with these ‘green flags’ ‘during the [entire] war’; green is the traditional colour within Islam for flags and banners.540 Due to the dates, it was doubtless the production of this ‘new phase’ of ‘enemy propaganda’ that caused the likes of Philipps to investigate the threats posed by Pan-Islamism to the British Empire in East Africa.

Philipps oversaw the interception of these ‘agents’. He gave a concise account about how these ‘agents’ were able to both pass through British military lines, and then continue to avoid detection:

'With one Brigade only on a 300 mile front it has been possible for native enemy agents to pass through our lines by night. Once through, every Mohammedan is a ‘brother’, and native fear of legal complications or odium consequent upon betrayal of a co-religionist, even if his errand is divulged, induces the ‘friend’ rather to pass on the agent quickly than denounce him. Further agents were cleverly chosen by CLAN according to the area to be traversed, ensuring them at least tolerance and probable immunity from ‘betrayal’ to the European.'

These ‘Pan-Islamic agents’ were ‘frequently... intercepted by Uganda Intelligence Agents en route from German East Africa to the Sudan, Congo & Darfur. The Ex-Sultan Said Khalif of Zanzibar, recently captured, was a leading spirit.’ Philipps recorded the three techniques he employed to intercept these ‘agents’:

The first technique was to simply bribe people to betray them: ‘A vigorous counter-espionage by the pecuniary and political bribery of prominent enemy pagan chiefs resulted in my receiving notice of despatch of enemy agents supplied by chiefs’, he wrote. This proved to be very successful: ‘interception [occurred] in eighty per cent of cases.’

The second technique was a tested method of Notley’s: arrest any European found to be involved and deport them. This technique took longer to execute; he had ‘long suspected... that two Greek traders... acted as agents between the enemy and the ARAB-SWAHILI colonies on Lake Albert’ on the Uganda-Congolese border before he was ‘in a position to report’. These Greek traders were called ‘Angelopoulos’ and ‘Lorenzi’, they were ‘flotsam of the salve trader’, they ‘acted as forwarding agents to the Sudan’ and they had ‘commercial relations with [a firm] of Mombasa.’ Philipps reminded his reader that ‘It should be borne in mind that Greeks have everywhere in G.E.A. [German East Africa] been not only strongly pro-German in sentiment but also most active contractors to the enemy troops in the field.’ That reader was the Foreign Office. ‘I beg’, wrote Philipps to them, ‘to submit that steps should be taken to place these Greeks, if not the supporting firm, upon the ‘black list’.’

544 Ibid.
The third technique was to prevent Muslim Indian seditionists from sending ‘enemy propaganda’ to East Africa from abroad. This was partly combated by enacting and enforcing port controls, but it was also combated by attempting to prevent the material from being sent in the first place. ‘Attempts are made to counteract enemy propaganda among Mohammedan, especially the seditious Indian propaganda which emanates chiefly from the United States and Switzerland, by the stoppage of the distribution of pamphlets and newspapers through the post and otherwise’, wrote the Foreign Office. They continued: ‘The French and Italian Government have prohibited the circulation of such matter in their respective possessions.’ The Foreign Office wrote in December 1916; this was earlier in comparison to many of the other documents relating to East Africa because this issue was an empire-wide concern. In East Africa specifically, M.I.5.D. reported that in 1917 ‘revolutionary tendencies still existed’ amongst Indian Seditionists in the East Africa Protectorate and that these tendencies were ‘inflamed by the Ghadr [a newspaper], many copies of which were still finding their way into the Colony.’ In July 1917 Major Notley ‘suggested that the moment was opportune for the suppression of the paper’, and in the following September M.I.5.D. ‘was able to state that representations had been made to America for the suppression of the Ghadr and that the editor and staff were under arrest.’ Subsequently, ‘It was hoped that the whole matter was now at an end.’

The success of the implementation of this method was greatly mixed on geographic lines. Due to the ‘vigorous counter-espionage’ he undertook, Philipps was able to report that as British imperial troops advanced through the area around Lake Victoria he had enough information to immediately arrest ‘all prominent native enemy propagandists in that area thus avoiding the danger of their continuing their tactics behind the line of our advance. The enemy subsequently attempted to communicate with them in vain.’ Whereas further east he had encountered more difficulties: ‘But on the Uganda-Congolese front where the local native could not be employed by the enemy, I have hitherto been unable to locate his local

forwarding agents. Yet in the north, Captain Willis reported that ‘although it [had] been reported on one or two occasions that propaganda [was] sent in the direction of tribes of the Sudan from German East Africa there is no reason to believe that it reached its destination.

Captain Bray offered no words of comfort from a wider imperial perspective; he felt that intercepting ‘agents’ would do little to truly stem the tide of Pan-Islamism. He argued that ‘To arrest the principle members, though it removes for the moment inflammable material, has no more effect in freeing us from kindred and future dangers, or from stopping the trend of Mohammedan events, than drawing a few buckets of water from a river stops its flow.

Many of these ‘agents’ of Pan-Islamism were intercepted, but this could have only a limited impact on the prevention of Pan-Islamism; new agents were recruited to fill the gap. But not attempting to intercept these ‘agents’ would have only worsened the situation; if those who wished to spread Pan-Islamism had encountered no physical barrier they would have been able to spread their message to a greater geographic extent, which would have increased the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the British Empire in East Africa. Consequently, the conclusion here seems to be that whilst the interception of the ‘agents’ of Pan-Islamism may have had no real success in ‘stopping the trend of Mohammedan events’, by providing some form of contest it was successful in preventing Pan-Islamism from spreading to a greater geographic area.

Conclusion

‘On the 1\textsuperscript{st} December, 1917’ Foster ‘reported to the C.S.I.B. that all active espionage had been, for the time being, suppressed. He drew attention to the active part played by Martial Law in attaining this object, stating that all convictions of sedition and espionage had been obtained before Courts – Martial and that suspects had

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548 TNA: FO 141/786/4: Assistant Director of Intelligence. ‘A Note on Colonial Office Memo. “Africa for the Africans” and “Pan Islam”.’, Khartoum, 17\textsuperscript{th} January 1918.
549 TNA: FO 141/773/6: Bray, N.N.E. Intelligence and Notes on the Pan-Islamic Movement, 25\textsuperscript{th} March 1917.
\end{footnotesize}
been deported or restrained by the Military Authorities under Martial Law, as circumstances demanded.’

This was a premature assertion to report. Muggeridge’s statement, regarding port controls, that ‘The utmost that could be aimed at was to check the practice’, was written after 1st December 1917; it could have been written about any of the topics raised in this chapter. It could be the case that Foster, in a similar manner to Notley, was referring only to non-African ‘active espionage’, in which case he was mostly correct. The learning curve that the intelligence establishment of the British Empire underwent during the East African Campaign was that the African population of the British Empire could threaten the security of the British Empire, and the East African Intelligence Centre was a part of that learning curve.

In 1914 a man was prevented from passing into India via the Khyber Pass from Afghanistan; messages to Indian Muslim leaders about the Ottoman Caliphate’s decision to proclaim jihad against the British Empire in the event of war had been found ‘Sewn into the linings of his clothes.’ This incident did not occur in East Africa, but it presents another narrative of consideration when analysing the usefulness that the implementation of counter-intelligence had on the effort to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War: a narrative of luck.

The British Empire was fortunate that those who wished to spread the Pan-Islamic message in East Africa were not themselves particularly sophisticated in their methods; either because they did not have access to objects that would allow them to become more sophisticated, or because they did not have the knowledge. This meant that great advances were able to be gained in preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa by such simple tactics as enacting and enforcing port controls at the major ports, bribing tribal leaders, and censoring the post. When one takes an overarching viewpoint, it appears that much of the success achieved by the British Empire in preventing the threats posed by Pan-Islamism were down to the good fortune of having

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unsophisticated opponents, than it was to their own abilities. Nevertheless, some significant successes were achieved by the implementation of this seventh strategy, and that was the object of implementing them.
Subchapter Eight: The Production and Dissemination of Pro-British Propaganda

The effectiveness of Pan-Islamic propaganda, and the success of the Pan-Islamic movement more generally, depended not only on its physical progress throughout the British Empire in East Africa, but also on the reception that it would meet from Muslims when they received it. In short, the British Empire understood that it would matter a great deal less if Pan-Islamic propaganda reached its intended recipients if those recipients were not amenable to its messages. The British Imperial Government thought that the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in the years of the First World War was sufficient enough to undertake a programme of initiatives to ensure that the Islamic population of East Africa was not amenable to its messages. The production and dissemination of pro-British propaganda for this purpose was the eighth and final strategy proposed.

The British attempted to influence the opinions of the Islamic population of its Empire by utilising the written word. By both collecting written addresses of loyalty from Muslims of high standing and by producing newspapers with a pro-British stance they hoped to convince the Islamic population of the British Empire that their loyalty rested not with a Pan-Islamic ideal, but with their colonisers. This area of work was most intense in the second half of the First World War when the potential threat that Pan-Islamism posed to the security of the British Empire around the world came to be better understood by British imperial officials, but it did exist in the former. In the former the propaganda dealt more with the potential German-backed ‘Turkish jihad’ rather than the potential ‘African jihad’ of the latter period.552 Furthermore, only a minority of the production of pro-British propaganda was focused upon East Africa itself; this was an imperial project predominantly run out of Whitehall, and encompassed the British Empire in its entirety. Of all eight strategies, this eighth strategy had the greatest geographic scope.

Success in this endeavour was mixed; some calamitous failures occurred in the international arena, but real achievement was gained in promoting a pro-British message to the Islamic

population of the British Empire. The British Empire did not produce any analysis about the reaction of the Islamic population to this propaganda; it is therefore impossible to conclusively state to what extent this eighth strategy was responsible for preventing the threat from Pan-Islamism to that empire in East Africa. However, the linear increase in its production and the continued enthusiasm shown by British imperial officials to furthering its scope heavily suggests that the production and dissemination of pro-British propaganda achieved success right across East Africa and beyond.

Addresses of Loyalty from the Muslims of the British Empire

Copying the French

In December 1914 the French Government compiled Volume XXIX of the *Revue du Monde Musulman*, which was a volume composed of ‘Addresses and Testimonials of loyalty from Chiefs and religious leaders’ from within the French Empire’s Islamic population. The French Empire in North and West Africa had a large Islamic population; the French Government was not slow in compiling a new volume of the *Revue du Monde Musulman* to help ensure that this population was not swayed to side with the enemy against their imperial colonisers by demonstrating that the ‘Chiefs and religious leaders’ of the Islamic population were firmly on the side of the French Empire.553

A similar episode ensued in the first half of 1916. In the early summer of that year the War Office of the United Kingdom received a letter from the propaganda section of the French General Headquarters which detailed how tricolour postcards had been distributed to Muslims in the French Empire in North Africa, many of which had then been returned with pro-French sentiments written upon them, which would be ‘suitable for valuable propaganda’ purposes.554 One such postcard contained a poem, which included the words: ‘Salut à toi, ô Drapeau qui donnes la vie aux âmes, à la science, à la justice, aux bienfaits, aux

efforts... Ne sois pas abaissé, ô emblème d’élévation! La gloire est pour ceux qui placent leur refuge à ton ombre, ô drapeau!555 ‘Suitable propaganda’ indeed!

After receiving this letter, the War Office became markedly interested with both the postcard scheme and Volume XXIX of the Revue du Monde Musulman. On 2nd June 1916 the War Office wrote that Volume XXIX ‘contains a remarkable testimony of sympathy with France from native Moslem Chiefs, and communities in the French Colonies... They condemn the intrigue of the Turkish Government and protest against the proclamation of a Holy War at the dictation of the Germans.’ Copying such an idea, the War Office proposed to the Colonial Office, could be useful for securing British standing amongst the Islamic population of its own Empire, which, in turn, would reduce any threat from the Islamic population via Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire: ‘In drawing your attention to these publications I am to point out their obvious value for the purposes of propaganda, and I am to suggest that a similar production should be undertaken by His Majesty’s Government.’556 A letter written on 27th June 1916 made it clear that this propaganda was to be published amongst the Islamic population of the British Empire, and that in particular within these testimonies those received from Islamic Chiefs and religious leaders would be published, as had occurred in the French Empire. Other letters or documents which could be suitable for publication for the same propaganda purposes were also sought. East Africa was specifically mentioned in this letter as being a place from which the War Office was interested in collecting Muslim testimonies of loyalties.557 As regarded the postcard scheme, the War Office suggested to the Colonial Office that such a scheme be enacted throughout the British Empire and that ‘a collection of the replies, if satisfactory, should be published.’558

Collecting the Addresses of Loyalty

Consequently, addresses of loyalty were received from the Islamic population of the British Empire: East Africa included. Written on 21st September 1916, one example of such an address originated from Malindi in the East Africa Protectorate:

‘We rejoice greatly that the exalted British Government is defeating this our common enemy. The British Government has always been just, and has encouraged the Islamic Faith. We have never heard that the great British Government has interfered with the Mohamodan religion, and therefore we shall never cease to pray to the Most High God to give the British Government strength to defeat all their enemies.’\(^559\)

Amongst these addresses of loyalty to the British Empire came an address from the Sultan of Zanzibar himself. So important was this considered that Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, requested that fifty copies be made.\(^560\) A great many addresses were collected, each with the author expressing a ‘remarkable testimony of sympathy’ with the British Empire; the volumes used to bind them are of some considerable weight.\(^561\)

Yet despite this considerable weight one attribute is notable; all of the addresses of loyalty are positive. No surviving negative addresses have been preserved. It is theoretically possible that the British Empire did not receive any, but that explanation would be less likely than the prospect that any negative addresses received were simply destroyed without documentation. Furthermore, the addresses received were by no means representative of the Islamic population of the British Empire as a whole. One must account for the illiterate, for those marginalised in the societies in which these testimonies were written (most of the women, the children, the remaining slaves, the ill, and the poor), for those invested in their self-preservation, and for those whose words were effected by peer pressure; the potential of a member of these groups writing their truthful thoughts to their colonisers must, by necessity, have been low.


\(^{560}\) TNA: CO 323/736/20: Zanzibar: Testimonials of loyalty from Moslems, 11th January 1917.

\(^{561}\) See: BL: IOR/L/PS/10/599 Pt 3: ‘German War: Arab revolt; Muslim feeling etc’; BL: IOR/L/PS/10/599 Pt 4: ‘German War: Arab revolt; Muslim feeling etc’.
From a historiographical perspective these addresses are of limited use to understanding the true feelings of the Islamic population of the British Empire towards that empire in the era of the First World War. However, the British do not appear to have ever intended to study them in such a way; their sole use was to be for propaganda purposes.\textsuperscript{562}

Despite the War Office writing that a ‘similar production should be undertaken by His Majesty’s Government’ in 1916, the British Empire had in fact received similar ‘[testimonies] of sympathy’ from its Islamic population in 1914. A fuss was made of the Sultan of Zanzibar’s 1916 address, but he had been amongst those to have sent one at this earlier point in time, where he had written that it was:

‘My wish that at this time you [his fellow Muslims] and all true Mahommedans remain steadfastly loyal to the British Government. Let no consideration or promises from Germans prevail upon you to change your allegiance from the mighty Empire of England. Remember that England has ever been a true friend and of our interests and religion and I commend to you and all Arabs that your attitude now be of unswerving loyalty to Great Britain… The German Government is harsh and cruel, and they have ever shown themselves scornful and despising Mahommedans. Do not believe their words for they lie to gain your confidence and then they will crush and ill treat you and our religionists. The Germans in Europe are failing and Great Britain and France and Russia and Japan with their millions of soldiers will surely crush and defeat these cruel Germans.’

Earlier than either the Shariff of Mecca or the British Empire, the Sultan was already espousing the narrative that one should critique the Ottoman Empire but not critique those who had supported it. His approach was to suggest that the Ottoman leadership was being forced into fighting the British Empire by the Germans: ‘I learn from Stamboul [sic] itself that the Turkish people do not want to fight the English their friends, but the Germans have

\textsuperscript{562} In Rogan, Eugene. \textit{The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East, 1914-1920} (New York; Basic Books, 2015), pp.70—72, Rogan examined Indian expressions of loyalties in 1914; for the British they meant that ‘Muslim loyalty (was) confirmed’. Curtis also stated that it was the French Empire ‘[followed] the example of British India’ that promoted the French Empire to ‘[mobilise] loyal Muslim notables to denounce the Ottoman entry into the war on religious ground’, which resulted in the publication of ‘dozens of such declarations in Arab, with translations judiciously edited by French scholars.’
forced the Turks to fight. The Germans have taken charge of Constantinople and will verily bring to destruction the Turkish Empire and our holy places to suit their own ends.\textsuperscript{563}

These testimonies remain intact in the British Library in London. There remains little evidence indicating which testimonies were published, where and how they were published, or to whom they were published. The only indication as to their success in East Africa is that the Pan-Islamic threat to the security of the British Empire in that region continued after 1916. Therefore, the publication of pro-British propaganda in the form of addresses of loyalty ‘from Chiefs and religious leaders’ of the Islamic population of the British Empire could have had only limited success in preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War, because the Pan-Islamic threat continued.

\textit{The Production and Dissemination of Pro-British Newspapers to the Islamic Population of the British Empire}

In an era when the written word was not only the principal means of communication but often the \textit{only} means of communication across any distance where it was not feasible to meet somebody in person, newspapers and pamphlets played a major part in the lives of both the educated – who read them – and the uneducated – who either had their contents explained to them or felt the consequences of the ideas espoused in them. As was surveyed in Subchapter Seven, censorship played an important role in the prevention of the Pan-Islamic threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa throughout the entirety of the East African Campaign of the First World War. However, the censorship and the insufficient port controls were inadequate to censor all of the activities of the entire population of the East African region associated with the written word. One newspaper that was of particular concern for the British was \textit{The Daily Chronicle}.

Although its contents were examined by the Foreign Office, there is very little in the surviving documents as to this newspaper’s provenance. However, if one looks forward a

\textsuperscript{563} BL: IOR/L/PS/10/519: Letter from the Sultan of Zanzibar to the Liwali of Mombasa and Muslims residing on the mainland, January 1915.
few decades another newspaper called *The Daily Chronicle* surfaced in what had by then become Kenya Colony. F.D. Corfield described *The Daily Chronicle* to the British Government as ‘one of the two leading radical Indian newspapers’ in the Colony. ‘[The] spread of irresponsible publications’, he wrote, ‘was central in the rise of African resistance or subversion.’ He wrote here principally of the Mau Mau nationalist movement. Corfield’s ‘assessment was shared by the authorities, as can be seen from the Intelligence Services’ close attention to non-European newspapers and political pamphlets. In Corfield’s view, Indian “dissidents” egged on the subversive intent and practice of the African papers.’

Corfield wrote that ‘the Indian-owned and edited *Daily Chronicle* [had a] blatant bias against both Government and the European, never missing an opportunity of supporting African claims, however fantastic or subversive’. It is not clear whether *The Daily Chronicle* of the immediate post-Second World War era involved the same people as the First. Two things suggest that the same type of person probably ran it: that the same title was used – perhaps to invoke recollections of the original – and that *The Daily Chronicle* of the First World War also published material that would have ‘egged on the subversive intent and practice’ of Africans interested in Pan-Islamism. This type of person would have been somebody who was not acting with the British Empire’s interests – security or otherwise – in mind.

The occurrence that brought *The Daily Chronicle* to the notice of the Foreign Office was related to the episode examined in Chapter Two: the supposed conversion of Kaiser Wilhelm II to Islam. In September 1915 Eyre Crowe wrote on behalf of Grey to Sir Henry McMahon, and forwarded to him the relevant extract:

‘I transmit to you, herewith, an extract from the “Daily Chronicle” relative to a letter alleged to have been addressed to the Sheikh Senoussi by the German Emperor. This letter is analogous to other pronouncements whereby, as is reported, it has been sought to represent to Moslem opinion that the German Emperor has embraced the Islamic religion. No such publications have as yet come to my notice, but I should be glad as to be furnished with any evidence which may exist as to propaganda of this

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nature having deliberately been restored to by responsible German agents. It is clear that such evidence would be of considerable value in influencing Roman Catholic opinion in allied and neutral countries.’

The Headline of the piece was ‘Allah’s Envoy, Islam’s Protector: Kaiser Wilhelm. The piece, in the form of a letter, read:

‘A French torpedo-boat the other day captured, near Tripoli, a sailing vessel flying the Greek flag. On board [was a]... letter, in Arabic, from the Kaiser to the chief of the warlike Senoussi tribe:- Praises to the Most High God, Emperor William, son of Charlemagne (sic), Allah’s envoy, Islam’s Protector, to the illustrious Chief of Senoussi.

We pray God to lead our armies to victory. Our will is that thy valorous warriors shall expel infidels from territory that belongs to the true believers and the commander...

Our common enemies, whom Allah will annihilate to the last man, shall fly before thee. So be it – William.’

The letter continued: ‘The “Matin” adds that the Kaiser sent similar messages to Morocco, India and Egypt’. The ‘Intelligence Department’ of the Foreign Office doubted the credibility of the contents of this letter: both the idea that the Kaiser had converted and the ‘Matin’ itself were areas of scepticism for them:

‘But of the statement made in the Daily Chronicle, viz., that the Kaiser has written to the Sheikh es Senussi in a manner calculated to lead the latter to believe that he had become a Moslem, there is no available confirmation. The Matin, which is a sensational newspaper, is responsible for the text of the alleged letter. The only letter from a similarly exalted source which has to our knowledge fallen into French hands in the South east [sic] Mediterranean is one addressed or purported to be addressed by the Sultan to the Senussi leader.’

Thus, this illustration demonstrated to the British Empire how newspapers and similar methods of communication were being used to promote a Pan-Islamic cause to threaten the

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566 TNA: FO 141/465/5: Letter from Eyre Crowe to Lieutenant Colonel Sir H. McMahon, 10th September 1915.
568 TNA: FO 141/465/5: Intelligence Department. Note... containing evidence gleaned from Refugees’, October 1915.
security of the British Empire. To retaliate, they resolved to publish their own pro-British propaganda.

**Pro-British Newspapers: Content and Destination**

In December 1916 the Foreign Office gave a summary about its work in a memorandum that displayed an ‘outline of measures taken in various territories with Muslim populations’. By this date the Office had begun to identify the threats posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire, and they had commenced actions to mitigate them. They produced and disseminated pro-British propagandist newspapers throughout the entire world to pacify the Islamic population of the British Empire:

‘The Foreign Office, in conjunction with the India Office, circulates as widely as possible a propagandist newspaper, “El Hakikat,” with text in Arabic, Persian, in Chinese, which will be useful for Kansu and Chinese Turkestan; and a second with text in four Indian languages, which will be useful, as far as this Department is concerned, for Indian colonies in neutral countries. Similar work is being done with other publications in Arabic, such as for example the Moshi document (the latter has been circulated in all languages spoken by Moslems, including Chinese and Javanese); the Shereef’s [sic] proclamation; a Map of the World at War, with Arabic text; an edition of Raemaekers’ Cartoons, with explanatory text in Arabic and an Arabic translation of Dr. Ruy Barbosa’s famous speech at Buenos Aires: and there has previously been a distribution of two Arabic pamphlets; Cooks “Great Britain and Turkey,” and another entitled “The Violation of Belgian Neutrality.” Wide circulation has also been given to the true story of the deposition of the late Sheikh-ul-Islam and to the manifesto of Bosnian Mohammedan students in Switzerland.’

The events then playing out in East Africa made a direct contribution to this work of the Foreign Office. An event ‘of particular interest to Moslems’ in Tripoli, Algiers, Tunis, and Tangier was to be telegraphed to them: this was the Moshi document referred to.\(^{570}\)

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\(^{570}\) Ibid.
Moshi document was a document found in Moshi in German East Africa by the East African Force in 1916 which did not portray the German governance of its colonised Islamic population in a positive light. An excellent propaganda piece that could help the British Empire to destroy German prestige amongst the Islamic population in East Africa, and around the world, it was to be added to the anti-German narrative already espoused in pro-British newspapers. One Arabic journal that advocated this narrative contained a piece in January 1917 entitled ‘German Atrocities Among Muslims in East Africa’. This piece included this segment: ‘Those German tigers who were want to devour the Muslims here have been hunted away by the victorious British forces, who have captured Dar-es-Salaam. God having delivered us from their claws, we are filled with gladness and rejoicing, as men who come forth from a prison of misery where they have languished long.’\textsuperscript{571} Such a narrative as this could be only beneficial to securing the British Empire in East Africa from the threat of Pan-Islamism; the promotion of the British as the champions and the Germans as the hypocrites was excellent for this end. Unfortunately, the mistranslation of the Moshi document severely limited its ability to be used in this way. As will be examined, the fiasco of its mistranslation panicked the British Imperial Government, for they knew that if it were to become known it would have the opposite effect than that which they had hoped for.

The production of counter-propaganda against the pan-Islamic threat continued to 1918, by which time the Foreign Office no longer had a monopoly on its creation. As was examined in Subchapter Four, a paper entitled \textit{El Mokattam} was by then being published in Cairo. Although it was an Arabic paper it was, according to the War Office, ‘practically controlled by our people there.’ \textit{El Kibla} was another Arabic paper; this one was published in Mecca by the Sharif. In April 1918 the Foreign Office asked the War Office to send copies of each issue of these papers to ‘our Consuls at Tripoli, Tunis, Tangier, and other places where there is an Arabic-speaking Mohammedan population’; preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire during the First World War was a truly global affair by this year.

The War Office proposed that \textit{El Mokattam} was ‘more suited for general distribution’ while \textit{El Kibla} would be circulated only to ‘one or two leading Muslims’. Downing Street was less

\textsuperscript{571} TNA: CO 323/748/40: ‘German Atrocities Among Muslim in East Africa.’
keen about such an idea and wrote in May 1918 that they had ‘some hesitation with regard to the advantages of this nature.’ Although there were some reservations, Downing Street was not antagonistic to the idea of using the production of pro-British propaganda for the purpose of preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa, and around the world. Firstly, they were happy to send copies of these papers to the Governors of several colonies and protectorates in East Africa to allow them to decide, based on local conditions, how these papers should be disseminated. Secondly, the reason that was given as to why Downing Street was so late in replying to the War Office’s letter on this matter – an entire month – was because they themselves had been dealing with ‘urgently pressing questions regarding Oriental newspaper propaganda.’

By the last year of the First World War, newspaper propaganda had stepped up to be a major component in preventing dangers, including Pan-Islamism, that threatened the security of the British Empire worldwide.

However, whilst the production and dissemination of pro-British propaganda had by the end of the First World War become a major component in preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire worldwide, less interest was given to East Africa specifically.

The German administration of German East Africa had themselves produced pro-German propaganda in the form of newspapers. Captain Philipps summarised the German approach of using these newspapers to control the narrative they wished for the population of their colony to have access to:

‘The German Government in German East Africa maintained two native papers containing items of news from each station and district, compiled by natives for natives under white supervision, with leading articles explaining any native legislation, and giving general ideas of the development of the country. These papers were published fortnightly and monthly. They had a wide circulation among all

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572 TNA: CO 323/781/41: Letter from JC Macnaghten to Bryan Cooper, Downing Street, 16th May 1918.
classes of literate natives and were a great assistance to the Administration. They were much appreciated by the natives’.  

These German newspapers ‘set forth German Imperial doctrine, local news, items from other German tropical colonies, and explained simply any new native legislation and [gave] general ideas of development of the country.’ Elsewhere, Philipps wrote that these newspapers ‘were in great demand and exercised a quietly penetrating influence’. Because they had been so ‘appreciated’ by them, the population of German East Africa ‘much regretted when [the British Empire’s] Administration refused to carry them on’ after the German colony came under British imperial control. By ‘[refusing] to carry them on’, the British Empire lost one opportunity to control the published narrative to the population of German East Africa.

In 1917 Philipps made that exact argument: the papers ‘should be at once resuscitated’, he wrote, because ‘the renewal of these papers would be a valuable measure in combating the movements in question, since the educated native conveys the ideas they contain to his illiterate friends who are as eager as the Athenians to tell or hear some new thing.’ Philipps did not underestimate the difficulty of such a scheme. ‘The employment of a native press of explanatory Islamic propaganda is a delicate operation necessitating expert and up-to-date knowledge’, he wrote half a year later in January 1918. ‘When dealing with the opposing sects of Islam and their attitude to Turkey and the Sherif, we cannot be too careful, in satisfying the increasing interest of nominal Moslems in religious politics, to present the facts in their true light as this crisis of the Moslem faith.’ Nevertheless, he believed that controlling the narrative would allow the British to publish ‘sympathetic explanations of current events’ which would ‘forestall the malicious and ignorant rumours

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which so continually arise among all native peoples.’ ‘[Forestalling]’ these ‘malicious and ignorant rumours’, such as the Pan-Islamic ideology, would, in his eyes, prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa.579

This did not happen. In 1920 Philipps wrote: ‘In 1917 I urged the Foreign Office (Propaganda) to replace the popular German Swahili press by a simple and popular British paper for all Swahili Africa.’ His idea behind this paper ‘was to explain British African legislation, as it is introduced, clearly setting out in what way it directly benefits the native concerned. Explain, on “Boy’s Own Paper” lines, by what slow process all peoples have developed and must develop. To give hints on agriculture and technical education.’ ‘The proved value to the Germans of their native press, and its popularity, was admitted’ by the Foreign Office, who ‘offered liberally to finance a Swahili press’. Yet in pencil he underlined the ending of this sentence for emphasis: ‘the Colonial Office refused to undertake it.’580

M.I.S.D.’s recollections state that they did publish a newspaper. ‘Early in 1918’, they wrote, ‘a native propaganda publication was started and was issued, about once a month, in British East Africa and Conquered Territory. The vernaculars employed were Swahili (both Roman and Arabic characters), and Gujerati.’ However, the purpose of this ‘propaganda publication’ was not as grand as Philipps’, for the ‘object aimed at was’ only ‘to explain the causes and the progress of the war in very simple language and to counteract mischievous rumours.’581

East Africa was not ignored in the production of pro-British propaganda to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire, but neither was it singled out for any special attention. However, it did benefit from the global view taken by the British Imperial Government to the production of this propaganda. Although there is no surviving analysis which directly investigated the implementation of this idea, it is apparent from the linear increase in the production of propaganda, and the enthusiasm of the likes of Philipps, that success must have been felt from the eighth strategy’s implementation.

580 Ibid.
Although successful, the production and dissemination of pro-British propaganda for this purpose was not without the occasional chaotic occurrence. Whilst no surviving analysis exists, two chaotic occurrences were recorded that must have reduced the successful impact that the production and dissemination of pro-British propaganda had on preventing pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa.

Forgery

It was anticipated that the addresses of loyalty received from the Islamic population of the British Empire would prove ‘suitable for valuable propaganda’ purposes. This project was a success from the collection perspective; a great many addresses of loyalty were received. It was possibly this success, in addition to the aforementioned Moshi document, that drove the Director of the Arabic Press Bureau to forge an anti-German pro-British statement from a Muslim supposedly living in Dar-es-Salaam in 1917. This supposed Muslim was meant to have sent a letter to a ‘friend’ living in Tripoli that described the horror he had lived under when Dar-es-Salaam had been under German rule, and his gratefulness to the British Empire for liberating him and his fellow Muslims. This forgery contained such sentiments as:

‘We have been like abject slaves, and worse; assuredly the very dogs in civilised lands are treated better than the Germans treated us.’

‘For the considered end and purposes of the Germans is nothing else than the destruction of our race and the ruin of our religion.’

‘The German officials here were cruel oppressors, imposing upon the natives a single law – that of the rod.’
‘On the day that we beheld the German forces fleeing in a rout before the triumphant British Army our joy overflowed.’

The French Government, who came across the letter, had sincerely believed it to be genuine and, up until a conversation with the author of the letter in April 1917, British imperial officials had had no reason to doubt French assertion of its legitimacy. Why the Director of the Arabic Press Bureau did not inform the British Imperial Government, for whom they ultimately worked, of their activities is not recorded. Unfortunately for the British Empire, so good for propaganda purposes had this fake letter seemed, they had not only produced copies of the letter in both English and Arabic for dissemination amongst the Islamic population of the British Empire, but they had also made large posters in which the letter’s contents were written in Arabic. The copies were, naturally, withdrawn, but not before the German authorities had got hold of a copy and described it on the wireless as ‘a clumsy forgery.’ This attempt at counter-propaganda had been so poor that there wasn’t even a Muslim in Dar-es-Salaam with the given name used in the letter.

Fiasco

The previously quoted address of loyalty from the Islamic population of Malindi to the British Empire on 21st September 1916 was written at a meeting held in the town on the same day. At this meeting a letter from Jan Smuts, dated 14 Rajab 1334 of the Hijri (Islamic) calendar (which, within one day of probability of error, would have been 17th May 1916 in the Gregorian calendar), was read out. In this letter Smuts detailed how he had ‘discovered among the German official letters a circular which expressed the antipathy of the German Government towards Mohamedanism in their African colonies. Their policy is to prevent and wipe out Mohamedanism and they show by the evil designs their strong disapproval of Islam.’ This circular became known as the ‘Moshi Document’. Originally written in German, an English translation was made.

582 TNA: CO 323/749/89: ‘German Atrocities among Muslims in East Africa.’
583 TNA: CO 323/749/89: Paraphrase of telegram to Mr Cave (Algiers), 11th April 1917; TNA: CO 323/749/89: Paraphrase of telegram to Mr Cave (Algiers), Foreign Office, 9th April 1917.
Imperial British officials became very excited about the discovery of this document. It proved that the Germans, through the German Governor Dr Heinrich Schnee, far from being a friend of Islam, were merely using it for its own ends: namely, the ‘special feature of Germany’s policy to foster and encourage any movements of unrest and sedition’, such as the Pan-Islamic movement, ‘directed against the British Empire’. The propaganda possibilities were endless. However, the Colonial Office were soon to rain on the parade:

‘According to War Office official translation of General Schnee’s anti-Islamic circular contemplated employing Government officials to counteract and even prohibit Islamic propaganda, whereas original German seems merely directed against participation of Government officials as such in propaganda. Should our interpretation be correct publication of mis-translation is likely to embarrass and discredit us when real meaning becomes known.’

This mistranslation was a disappointment to these imperial officials of the British Empire; disappointment no doubt compounded by the knowledge that the mis-translation was already in the public sphere. Andrew Bonar Law did not send a telegram stating that it ‘should not be published as it is not altogether accurate’ until 31st May; fifteen thousand copies had already been ordered to be translated into Malay at the request of Grey over a week earlier. Bonar Law did not put a date on when the new translation would arrive, merely informing his audience that the ‘Correct version should reach you from Egypt in due course.’

It is not clear what version was read out at Malindi on 21st September 1916, yet the date of 17th May heavily suggests that it was the mistranslated version. It is also not clear which version was examined in the Arabic journal in January 1917. If this mistranslation had become more widely known, it surely would, as they feared, have embarrassed and discredited the British Empire ‘when [the] real meaning [became] known.’

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586 TNA: CO 323/711/78: Telegram from Viceroy, Foreign Department, 20th May 1916.
587 TNA: CO 323/711/78: Paraphrase of telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of the East Africa Protectorate, 31st May, 1916; TNA: CO 323/711/69: Letter from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 23rd May 1916.
Conclusion

The British Imperial Government in London took an interest in the production and dissemination of pro-British propaganda to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in the years of the First World War; it took less interest in preventing the Pan-Islamic threat to East Africa specifically. Primarily, this appears to be because the British Empire took a global view on the production of pro-British propaganda. But, secondly, this may have also occurred due to the lack of expertise on Pan-Islamism as examined in Subchapter Three of this chapter; the very few experts on Pan-Islamism in East Africa were seldom present in London during the First World War. Thus, in the seat of power the imperial East African voice on this issue must have been relatively subdued.

Real achievement was gained in promoting a pro-British message to the Islamic population of the British Empire. From 1915 onwards the British Imperial Government promoted the production of it for this purpose, and many pieces of propaganda, often in the form of newspapers or journals, were published and disseminated. Although few of these pieces of propaganda were tailored to the East African audience, the Islamic population of East Africa was informed of the pro-British message. With the lack of any post-war analysis on the Islamic population’s reactions to this propaganda it is impossible to say to what extent this eighth strategy was responsible for preventing the threat from Pan-Islamism in that region. However, the linear increase in its production, coupled with the continued enthusiasm for this production, heavily suggests that the British Empire believed that the production and dissemination of pro-British propaganda achieved success right across East Africa and beyond.
Conclusion: Chapter Seven

The successfulness of the implementation of these eight strategies proposed to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War was therefore mixed: some were thoroughly implemented, some were not implemented at all, whereas in some, whilst the implementation was unsuccessful, the outcomes desired by the implementation were nevertheless still obtained.

The East African Intelligence Centre and the other interested parties in the region all heeded Captain Bray’s note of caution. Despite attempting to implement eight different strategies to prevent Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in the region, they did not attempt to prevent Pan-Islamism itself from existing. The cultivation, promotion, and implementation of different strategies to curtail or manipulate Pan-Islamism was tolerable, but outright suppression would never have been accepted by the Islamic community.

In the conclusion to Chapter Six it was acknowledged that due to both the short time that it was in existence and its small number of personnel the East African Intelligence Centre was unable to mitigate its inherent impediments. Yet Majors Fosters and Muggeridge appear to have done all that they could do to mitigate or eliminate its extrinsic impediments. Unable to visit all the ports to ensure that port controls were being enacted and enforced, they arranged so that a few ports were visited to ‘check the practice and... to get valuable clues in regard to mischievous intentions and connections.’\textsuperscript{588} When faced with the lack of a central library for intelligence records, they successfully assumed the task of collecting and collating them from across the East Africa so that such an establishment could be formed in Nairobi. And when it was beyond their control to mitigate or eliminate an impediment, they simply worked with it, exhausting the avenues of expertise on the Islamic population of East Africa that were open to them and then accepting that they would gain no further support from that junction. The work the Intelligence Centre performed was an improvement on the

work done by Major Notley, but that was all it could be, and Foster and Muggeridge appear to have accepted that.

Major Muggeridge identified that ‘Pan Islamism, Pan Ethiopianism, and the activities of Missionaries [were] amongst the subjects in regard to which every endeavour [had] been made to collect information and record the opinions of those competent to judge.’\footnote{Ibid., p.154.} The prevalence of information that M.I.5.D. enclosed about the former, as opposed to the latter two, of these three subjects in their section of the 1921 Report demonstrated the enthusiasm they possessed to have their success in this area be recognised by the British Imperial Government as it transitioned the use of intelligence into the interwar period.

On the close of the First World War in November 1918 the British Empire in East Africa found itself in one piece. Battle-scarred and wounded, it had not been defeated by any threat that had been posed to it. The British Empire had prevented the threat posed to their security by Pan-Islamism in East Africa: neither Pan-Islamic unity, nor the machinery of Pan-Islamism, had been successful in bringing about the destruction of the East African region of the British Empire.

This was the conclusion of the counter-intelligence effort against the threat of Pan-Islamism in the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the First World War. Yet when the likes of Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, Jan Smuts, Richard Meinertzhagen, Claude Foster, and Tracy Philipps had left the region far behind East Africa had to attempt to recover. The ‘triple curses of war, famine and disease’ were only starting to be overcome when the influenza pandemic of 1918-1919 resulted in the deaths of ‘as many as 150,000 people’ in the East Africa Protectorate alone: ‘5.5 per cent of the population.’\footnote{Phillips, Howard. Killingray, David. ‘Introduction’, in The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919: New Perspectives, edited by Howard Phillips and David Killingray (London; Routledge, 2003), p.9.} The Great Depression, the Second World War, and several decades of colonialism still to come placed further European burdens on the heads of the East African population. Independence from the British Empire was to come to most of East Africa in the 1960s and the continent became fully independent from the European empires in the 1970s. The legacies of colonial rule, however, could not be as easily discarded as a flag lowered from its pole.
Conclusion

On 25th November 1918 the armistice was formally declared in the East African Campaign of the First World War. Some fighting was undertaken in the fortnight that intervened after its declaration in Europe, but the delay rested principally with Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck’s march to Abercorn in Northern Rhodesia. As the only enemy commander to end the First World War on British imperial territory, von Lettow-Vorbeck’s place in the history books was confirmed.

As much as an armistice could allow one to do so, the British Empire claimed victory in the First World War. No threat posed to the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign had been successful enough to bring about its destruction; the counter-intelligence arm of the British imperial intelligence establishment had become sufficiently developed to effectively counter the threat posed by Pan-Islamism, although it was unable to eliminate it.

The original research that has been presented within this thesis speaks to several different literatures. It improves our understanding and challenges our perceptions of such events as: the East African Campaign of the First World War, and, therefore, the First World War in an imperial setting; the development of British imperial counter-intelligence in Africa in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries; and the Pan-Islamic narrative of the Great War, where an account that does not prominently involve Europeans has been examined for the first time.

The events of the East African Campaign have been dismissed by historians such as Karl P. Magyar, Lother Höbelt, and Richard Popplewell as nothing more than a ‘sideshow’ to the more important events in Europe. Whilst militarily correct in regard to the outcome of the First World War, this dismissal of the East African Campaign as being unworthy of greater study has actually been used to dismiss the East African narrative itself as insignificant; this

thesis will join the small, yet growing, literature which is tackling this huge gap in the historical narrative. By seeking to decentre the automatic centring of the European narrative in First World War studies, history such as this is reclaiming history for those whose history was once dismissed, and rethinking history for those whose history once dominated.

The development of the counter-intelligence arm of the British imperial intelligence establishment did not come about in a timely manner in East Africa; the East African Intelligence Centre functioned for less than thirteen months of the Great War. Through its examination of an area of the British imperial intelligence establishment of the First World War that has never previously been examined, this thesis has significantly contributed to the historiography of British imperial intelligence during this war by providing a great wealth of new knowledge and new avenues for research. By placing the work of M.I.5. in an imperial setting, this thesis has demonstrated how the negligence of the British Imperial Government to its empire in East Africa, how the casual racial prejudice of British imperial officials, and how the lack of expertise on Pan-Islamism all interlinked to result in the British Empire facing a threat from Pan-Islamism in a region that was not strategically significant to victory in the First World War.

Through its examination of imperial counter-intelligence used in East Africa during the First World War, this thesis has also presented new information about the role of East Africa within the wider British Empire. This information has significantly contributed not only to the historiography of East Africa, but also to the historiography of the United Kingdom, for events on the ground in the British Empire are as much a part of British history as events in the Imperial Government in London are a part of East African history.

The study of the Pan-Islamic threat to the First World War has focused on its impact on the hostilities that existed between the Europeans and the Ottoman Empire; it has focused on those areas that most impacted the Europeans. Whilst, as has been examined, Europeans were certainly involved with the Pan-Islamic narrative in East Africa, Pan-Islamism in the region did not impact upon the outcome of the War in Europe; thus, the differences between the Ottoman and East African experiences of Pan-Islamism have been dismissed. Those few historians who have examined it in relation to East Africa have done so only vaguely and without any apparent attempt at significant archival research. Such statements as ‘The crushing of the Ottomans during World War I, coupled with the apparently
inexorable spread of European power, confirmed to many African Muslims that the Europeans could not be defeated by force and gradually they came to accept European rule. This could only have been written by a historian, and be espoused by historians, who had not researched the East African narrative that has been preserved in the archives. Had they done so, they would have understood that far from them ‘accepting European rule’, this narrative proves that the British Empire was forced to recognise the agency of East Africa’s Muslims to challenge imperial power. This thesis is entirely original in placing at its heart Pan-Islamic concerns in East Africa; in doing so, it places East African concerns at the heart of a study about the workings of the British Empire.

The British imperial intelligence establishment learnt during the First World War that there was an operational need for a counter-intelligence effort to exist in the East African region of the British Empire. This knowledge was not entirely lost in the post-war era, but the East African Intelligence Centre was disbanded and the effort severely downgraded, despite the threats from Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism still existing. Whilst colonialism continued the simple fact of the ending of the First World War could not bring peace to East Africa, but British imperial officials were not terribly concerned; the British counter-intelligence effort in East Africa during the First World War had been conducted solely to secure the security of the United Kingdom, and with the armistice that had, in the short term at least, been achieved. Whatever the wishes of M.I.5., the British Imperial Government had no further need for such a large effort. The development of M.I.5. in the British Empire outside of Ireland in this era is largely non-existent in the literature; this is because this literature, just like the establishment itself, is predominantly concerned with the narrative of the United Kingdom. The contribution of this thesis to this literature is thus highly significant; it places M.I.5., and thus the British Imperial Government, in the British Empire in East Africa, and examines British imperial rule through the prism of intelligence, in a way that no other work has previously undertaken regarding the First World War.

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The Thesis

The growth of the imperial counter-intelligence effort of the British Empire in East Africa is a major area of thematic concern for this thesis. Other major areas include the entry of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism into the East African region and the expansion they then undertook. The key findings of this thesis are examined in brief below, and answer the central research question of this thesis: How did the British Empire attempt to prevent what they perceived to be the dangers associated with Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the First World War, and how successful were they in this endeavour?

The Initial Lack of Counter-Intelligence in the British Empire in East Africa

The First World War erupted in August 1914; whilst the British Empire immediately recognised the potential of the German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic threat to the security of the British Empire, the threat of an ‘African Jehad’ in the British Empire in East Africa was not to be identified for a further three years.593 There were two major reasons for this: the first was that the governance of the East Africa Protectorate, the premier bureaucratic British protectorate in the region, had been neglected by the British Imperial Government; thus, on the outbreak of the First World War, there was not in existence a counter-intelligence bureau to undertake the work that was required there, and the counter-intelligence work that was being undertaken in London was not extended to cover the British Empire in East Africa. The second was that when the Police Force of the East Africa Protectorate was tasked with undertaking some counter-intelligence activities in the early years of the War, they infused their work with racial prejudice. In 1915 the Provost Marshal, who was also the Commissioner of Police, believed that M.I.5. was not interested in the actions of East Africans; he believed them to be primarily interested in the actions of white ‘enemy

subjects’. Consequently, he did not elaborate on the danger posed by this population to the security of the British Empire in East Africa, and M.I.5. did not rectify this until 1917. Therefore, no counter-intelligence establishment was formed in the East African region of the British Empire prior to 1917 due to these two reasons.

_Neglect_

The United Kingdom retained control of the land that was to form the East Africa and Uganda Protectorates primarily to prevent another European power from occupying the land, rather than out of any actual interest in developing or colonising it. Successive British Governments had been ‘reluctant to spend money in acquiring new colonial possessions in Tropical Africa’, yet had been ‘equally reluctant to leave the field entirely to other European powers.’

Formal British imperial rule existed in East Africa out of a perceived necessity to protect British imperial security in the Middle East and India, rather than out of a desire to physically extend the Empire.

In the early Twentieth Century the British transformed their intelligence establishment to fit the needs of the contemporary world; much of this change was fuelled by the knowledge they had extracted out of Africa during the Second Boer War. Yet this change was focused in Europe, on European needs; it was an extraction of knowledge production in a colonial setting. Like the entire African continent, East Africa was not to be a beneficiary of this change.

Vernon Kell and Mansfield Cumming jointly established the Secret Service Bureau in the autumn of 1909 in the United Kingdom. They decided to ‘divide their work’ up. ‘K’ (Kell) became ‘responsible for counter-espionage within the British Isles’ (the future M.I.5.) whilst ‘C’ (Cumming) became ‘responsible for gathering intelligence overseas’ (the future so-called


M.I.6.). The evident omission was that there was nobody who was responsible for counter-espionage, or counter-intelligence more generally, overseas in the British Empire.596

With the British Empire ruling there out of necessity rather than desire, and with the need for colonial counter-intelligence forgotten about in London, there was no imperial counter-intelligence establishment in the East Africa Protectorate prior to the First World War that could, on the outbreak of that war, work to identify, and then counter, the threat from Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa.

*Racism*

Major Notley, the Provost Marshal of the East Africa Protectorate, wrote in November 1915 that ‘Previous to the outbreak of war no Counter Espionage Bureau existed in British East Africa or Uganda, and the very comprehensive German system of espionage, which has since come to light, was neither suspected or appreciated.’597

Notley was tasked with performing a limited amount of counter-intelligence. He focused on preventing the work of white ‘Secret Agents’ in the Protectorate and, by his own account, he was mostly successful. Although he continued to have problems with some ‘Recently naturalised neutrals of enemy extraction’, principally Swedish, he had neutralised the threats posed by ‘Enemy subjects’ and the ‘Cape Dutch.’ However, Notley had a major flaw; he allowed his work to be infused by racial prejudice. Peculiarly, he was aware of this racial prejudice, but believed that M.I.5. in London would not be interested in the actions of Africans in East Africa. He wrote: ‘Though [‘coloured Africans’] is the greatest evil we have now to contend with in the Colony [sic], we understand it does not concern you [Vernon Kell: M.I.5.] so much as the question of European Agents, and the matter will not be dealt with further.’598 The British Imperial Government’s main interest in preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa was not for the sake of protecting East Africa, but was to protect the security of the United Kingdom itself. The

598 Ibid., pp.139—142.
German Empire’s strategy to subvert the British Empire was based on the idea that the more it managed to subvert the British Empire the more the British Empire would be forced to keep troops in the Empire to maintain the peace; consequently, less troops would be able to fight for the British Empire on the battlefields of Europe. This, the Germans hoped, would result in the British Empire either losing the First World War or being forced to sue for peace at a disadvantage. Notley’s counter-intelligence effort countered some of this threat, but in the early years of the First World War M.I.5. did not appreciate that ‘coloured Africans’ resident in East Africa also had the agency to subvert the British Empire, and so did not prevent the mixing of Africans from across the continent when they began to arrive in large numbers in 1915 to fight in the East African Campaign.

The East African Intelligence Centre was instituted in November 1917; only on this date did imperial counter-intelligence arrive in East Africa. The imperial intelligence establishment in London grew rapidly in the two years that had intervened between this date and the date on which Notley wrote about his counter-intelligence work. M.I.5. had inaugurated a dedicated branch to be responsible for imperial counter-intelligence in the British Empire: “D” Branch, and it was “D” Branch that was responsible for the Intelligence Centre’s institution. However, in these intervening two years the Pan-Islamic movement, and nationalist ideologies such as Pan-Africanism, had become firmly established in East Africa, because there had been no person or department working to prevent such an occurrence.

Countering the Threat from Pan-Islamism in the East African Campaign of the First World War

Several officials of the British Empire were responsible for identifying the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire, but Captain Philipps was primarily responsible for having identified the specific threats posed by Pan-Islamism to the East African region. Firstly, he identified the two sources of the movement in East Africa: the German Empire, through German East Africa, and East Africans and the African diaspora.

In East Africa, unlike in much of the Islamic world, the Germans were a source of the Pan-Islamic movement, for, due to the relatively recent spread of Islam across the region, the movement was largely unknown there prior to the First World War. Their ‘policy to foster
and encourage’, and in East Africa to be a source of, Pan-Islamism was a small part of their larger strategy to subvert the British Empire. Philipps studied the relationship between German East Africa and Pan-Islamism, and found that it had gone through several different phases in the years between the establishment of the Colony and the invasion by the British Empire in 1916; using Pan-Islamism for political reasons had not always been well regarded by the administration of the German colony.

Africans arrived in East Africa from across the continent at the behest of the British Empire, who needed their labour to fight the East African Campaign of the First World War. These Africans mixed in East Africa; they then subsequently mixed with the local African population and, eventually, the troops and civilians of German East Africa. An African diaspora soon existed across the battlefields of the Campaign. Philipps, who could speak African languages, documented that ‘During 1916-17 there [had] been an unprecedented meeting of the tribes of Africa campaigning in “German East”’ and that ‘Round the camp fires there [had] been much talk... touching on the killing of white by black as illustrated before their eyes.’ Because they were discussed around the camp fires by these newly arrived Africans, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism found a source into East Africa.

Having identified the two sources of Pan-Islamism in East Africa, Philipps then worked to identify the exact threats posed by the movement to the British Empire in the region. He identified two. The first threat was the traditional threat of Pan-Islamism: that of Pan-Islamic unity. The second threat was that another movement or ideology that had difficulty spreading on its own would use the machinery of Pan-Islamism for its own benefit.

The first threat was considered the lesser threat. Pan-Islamic unity had been attempted before, notably during the German-Ottoman Pan-Islamic threat of the early First World War period, and had been found wanting. However, the potential for Pan-Islamic unity, particularly in an East African specific context, did still exist.

The second threat was identified as being the greater threat. The movement that the British imperial officials were concerned would take advantage of the Pan-Islamic machinery was

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Pan-Africanism, which the British took to mean “Africa for the Africans”: an Africa without the British Empire. Any ideology or movement that proposed an Africa without the British Empire would, by its very definition, be a threat to the security of the British Empire in Africa.

The Prevention of the Pan-Islamic Threat to the Security of the British Empire in East Africa

Two events occurred to prevent these two threats from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War.

The first was the initiation of the East African Intelligence Centre in November 1917. Whilst this Intelligence Centre was not exclusively for the prevention of Pan-Islamism, Major Muggeridge, the second commander of the Intelligence Centre, did place Pan-Islamism as one of the only three ‘subjects’ he specifically identified ‘in regard to which every endeavour [was] made to collect information and record the opinions of those competent to judge.’

The second event was the proposal of eight strategies to counter the threat from Pan-Islamism. Rather than examine them and decide which strategies presented the best prospects for success, the officials of the British Empire went with a blunt approach and tried to implement all eight simultaneously. Amongst the reasons for this blunt approach were that some of these strategies began to be implemented before the institution of the East African Intelligence Centre, whilst others were implemented as a result of the changing military landscape of the East African Campaign. Naturally, the implementation and subsequent success rate of these eight strategies varied significantly:

The Physical Expansion of the Size of the British Empire in East Africa.

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The removal of the German Empire from East Africa would remove the ability of the German Empire to act as a source of Pan-Islamism in East Africa; thus, the first of the eight strategies proposed was to win the East African Campaign of the First World War and expand the physical size of the British Empire to encompass that land which had hitherto been part of German East Africa. This was harder in practice than in theory, both because von Lettow-Vorbeck was a formidable opponent, and because the British Empire was unable to take control of German East Africa without regard to the many other states and administrations who could claim some jurisdiction over the former German colony.

Although neither of these two concerns were resolved before the end of the East African Campaign, this first strategy was successful in two ways: it removed the relatively large Islamic population of German East Africa from the colonial authority of a power with which the British Empire was at war, and it placed that Islamic population mostly under the authority of the British Empire itself. Thus, the ability of the German Empire to be a source of Pan-Islamism, or to foster and encourage it, in East Africa was significantly reduced in the latter half of the First World War.

The Development of the East African Force Along Tribal Lines.

The theory of the second strategy, to prevent any further ‘unprecedented mixing of representatives of almost all the black races of Africa’ by developing the East Africa Force along tribal lines, was sound.\(^{602}\) However, its implementation transpired to be too difficult during a time of hostilities.

The Growth of the Attributes of the Imperial Intelligence Establishment of the British Empire.

The third strategy was comprised of two courses of action:

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(1) ‘[To] obtain a freer interchange’ about ‘the Moslem populations throughout the Empire’.

(2) The implementation of ‘more direct communications between the less important dependencies’ such as East Africa and ‘the principal centres of Islamic thought.’

The first course of action was successful, but only as far as the constraints of the First World War would allow; the ability to interchange information about the Islamic population of the British Empire was constrained by the lack of expertise on the subject, and such expertise could not be easily acquired. The second course of action proved to be a great success; the improvement in communications between different areas of the British Empire allowed for information on the threat of Pan-Islamism to be delivered to East Africa quickly.

_The Cultivation of British Imperial Strength in the Islamic World._

The fourth strategy was probably not implemented in the way that Captain Buxton, who proposed it, intended for it to be. Nevertheless, it achieved what he desired: the cultivation of British imperial strength in East Africa. To achieve this, the British Empire demonstrated to the Islamic population of East Africa that the Ottoman Empire was no longer a major power in the Islamic world; it did this by defeating them militaristically in the Great War. The British Empire then informed the ‘many... Arab chiefs... in the neighbourhood of Lake Nyassa’ who ‘would be likely to take a keen interest in the Anti-Turkish movement in Arabia’ that the downfall of the Ottoman Empire had happened at their will, but this was also not implemented in the way that Buxton had intended. 603

_The Promotion of Weak Central Government and Strong Nationalist Feelings amongst the Islamic Population of East Africa._

Overall, the fifth strategy had a very mixed outcome. Lieutenant Colonel Sykes and Captains Willis and Philipps proposed a ‘proper check... to PanIslamism [sic]’ that comprised of two...

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603 TNA: FO 141/786/4: Buxton, L. ‘Notes on Philipps’ Memorandum.’, 19th December 1917.
parts: ‘(1) a weak central government with no more than a spiritual ascendency over Mohammedans outside its territories, and (2) a strong national feeling in every Mohammedan country, which would make the population more interested in the political and commercial development of their own country than in the Panislamic [sic] principle.’

These gentlemen agreed that, due to the events in the Middle East, the first part had already succeeded, but that if the second part was implemented there was ‘some danger of the “nationalist” theory if developed leading to disaster’. For this reason, the second part of this strategy was not implemented.

The Securing of the ‘Insulating Belt’ of East Africa.

The sixth strategy had a rather perplexing outcome. ‘Insulating belt’ was the term given to the geographic area of central East Africa in which Islam was seldom present in 1917. To prevent Islam, and the potential of Pan-Islam, from entering the area, it was proposed to insulate it from the surrounding areas. This was to be achieved by a mix of the promotion of Christianity and the establishment of a secular schooling system. This strategy was never implemented, but, due to the results of the other seven strategies, the belt remained insulated; the outcome was a success, which in reality was all that was desired by the officials of the British Empire.

The Implementation of Counter-Intelligence in East Africa.

The seventh strategy specifically concerned the implementation of counter-intelligence in the region. This was implemented predominantly, but not entirely, by the East African Intelligence Centre. There were some failures but taken as a whole this implementation of counter-intelligence made important inroads in preventing Pan-Islamism from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa.

The seventh strategy was the most successful of the eight strategies. It is also the strategy for which there remains the most surviving documentation.

**The Production and Dissemination of Pro-British Propaganda.**

British imperial officials understood that the effectiveness of Pan-Islamic propaganda, and the success of the Pan-Islamic movement more generally, depended not only on its physical progress throughout the British Empire in East Africa, but also on the reception that it would meet from Muslims when they received it. They therefore produced pro-British propaganda to ensure that the Islamic population of East Africa was not amenable to its messages. Success in this endeavour was mixed; some calamitous failures occurred in the international arena, but real achievement was gained in promoting a pro-British message to the Islamic population of the British Empire.

This eighth strategy was run on an imperial level; only a minority of the production of pro-British propaganda was focused upon East Africa itself. Because it existed on the imperial level, the documentation proves that this strategy had the greatest geographic scope of all the strategies.

In total, these eight strategies were successful in achieving the conclusion that the imperial officials of the British Empire in East Africa desired of them, irrespective of whether each individual strategy’s implementation and outcome was obtained: the threat posed by Pan-Islamism did not bring about the destruction of the East African region of the British Empire in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War.

**The Objectives for Success**

The primary British objective of the East African Campaign of the First World War was the prevention of the injury to, or the destruction of, the British Empire in East Africa or the Indian Ocean area. Whilst other objectives, principally the conquest of German East Africa
and the expulsion of the Germans from the continent, were to present themselves in time, the primary objective always remained by far the most important. It truly overshadowed all others.

However, whilst this primary objective remained paramount, it did not command devotion. The British were not willing to allow the accomplishment of their primary objective of the East African Campaign to have any impact upon them accomplishing their primary objective of the First World War: Allied success in Europe.

In the introduction of this thesis Malcom Page’s figures for the East African Campaign were noted. When ‘Allied and Naval personnel’ were excluded, he placed the figures at ‘about 114,000 troops.’ When ‘excluding those hospitalized for disease’, he placed the British Empire’s casualty rate at ‘62,220’, whilst the ‘[deaths] from disease were 48,328, mainly due to malaria.’ Another ‘400,000 and 500,000 men’ served as porters.\(^6\) The importance of the East African Campaign as a campaign of the First World War in its own right should not be underestimated, but it is worth placing these figures in context:

‘Between August 1914 and November 1915, 4,970,902 men were enlisted in the British Army... With the existing forces in August 1914, that yielded a wartime total of 5,704,416 men in the army at one time or another, approximating to 22.1 per cent of the male population of the United Kingdom (thus including Ireland) ... To these figures can be added 2.8 million men from the Empire.'\(^6\)

Based on these figures, only 1.5 per cent of enlisted men from the United Kingdom and the British Empire saw service in the East African Campaign. Although one should respect that the porters were not included within these figures, this represents only a tiny amount of the British Empire’s fighting capabilities.

The German Empire did not win the First World War, or even the East African Campaign, but they successfully sued for an armistice that they ensured did not occur until 25th November 1918. They were successful in forcing the British Empire to fight for four and a quarter years in a region that was strategically useless in achieving victory in the First World War, even if

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\(^{6}\) Page, Malcolm. A History of the King’s African Rifles and East African Forces (South Yorkshire; Leo Cooper, 1998), p.49.

the percentage of British imperial personnel they detained in this region was tiny. For this, it is possible to grant Germany, and principally Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, some level of success in this campaign.

The subversion of the British Empire through the promotion of Pan-Islamism was one of the strategies undertaken by the Germans to force the British to waste resources in their empire. The resources spent on preventing this threat could have been spent elsewhere, and in this respect the German Empire got what it desired: the British Empire had to spend time and resources battling a threat that would have no impact on the outcome of the battlefields of Europe. But granting Germany success on this precise issue becomes a little problematic when one approaches it from a numeric viewpoint. No more than six officers ever worked for the department that was established to combat this issue: the East African Intelligence Centre. And even when one considers all the people associated with it, such as the colonial officials, the personnel of M.I.5.D. in London, and the Africans that must have been employed by it as soldiers and porters, even a generous analysis of the evidence does not point to the number being any higher than just into three figures. Due to the spread of Pan-Islamism amongst the African population and the possibility of its machinery being used by Pan-Africanism, the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to East Africa was very real. However, for the duration of the First World War it could be constrained by a small number of allied personnel. Slight success can possibly be granted to Germany for forcing a small number of officials of the British Empire to prevent the subversive potential of Pan-Islamism in East Africa, but it would be an enormous stretch to offer them anymore than this.

Despite them being limited, the time and resources spent by the British on preventing the threat from Pan-Islamism in East Africa did demonstrate that East Africans had some agency to threaten the security of the British Empire. The British Empire’s rights to the land that formed its Empire in East Africa were recognised almost without dispute in the international sphere in the early Twentieth Century, but that had never been the case in the internal sphere of the region. The need to employ these eight strategies confirmed that the British Empire’s control over East Africa was not internally complete, even excepting the conflict with Germany. Their desires for nationalism, self-governance, religious freedoms, and other personal expressions of liberty were expressed by some Africans towards their colonisers, and by identifying this threat and allocating, albeit meagre, time and resources to its
prevention, the British Empire recognised the agency of East Africans to challenge imperial rule.

The British Empire’s Counter-Intelligence Effort in East Africa in the Immediate Post-First World War Era

The years of 1914—1918 do not stand out so starkly in East African history as they do in European history; colonialism had existed in 1913, would exist in 1919, and continued to exist in the intervening years. The British Empire’s counter-intelligence effort in East Africa was one entity, however, for which the years of 1914—1918 did stand out; from having not existed at all in 1913, it slowly crescendoed in the years of 1914—1918, before almost collapsing in 1919. This collapse occurred not out of a want of intelligence subjects to counter; for the threat posed by Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism did not disappear in 1919. It collapsed because the British Empire reiterated that their interest in East Africa existed primarily to secure the security of the United Kingdom.

The British Empire declared success against the Pan-Islamic threat to the security of the British Empire in East Africa in the years of the East African Campaign of the First World War. But the threat did not disappear as von Lettow-Vorbeck’s ship slipped over the horizon; as Captain Bray had warned in March 1917, Pan-Islamism had ‘gained many adherents’ and ‘become an ideal with thousands of the younger generation, and those imbued with modern mohammedan [sic] ideas of education’. The future of Pan-Islamism, and the potential for it to merge with Pan-Africanism, in East Africa, remained a source of concern.

In 1917 Philipps had prophesised that ‘From the North strong Islamic propaganda is to be anticipated as one of the first acts of peace carrying its habitual political aspirations.’ Mr A.D. Bethall wrote in March 1918 that ‘Hundreds of ex-soldiers, discharged from the French and Italian services, [had] already returned to Somaliland’ and that ‘their experience’ in the First World War had ‘immediately promoted them to the military leadership of their sub-

608 TNA: FO 141/773/6: Bray, N.N.E. Intelligence and Notes on the Pan-Islamic Movement, 25th March 1917.
tribes... In tribal fights men have now learned to some extent to hold their fire, to estimate ranges, to use the utmost skill in approach, and to value cover... Unless strong measures are taken to suppress it, gun-running will assume unwanted dimensions as soon as hostilities are over. Bethall wrote of Somaliland, but similar narratives could be written about many parts of colonial Africa. The First World War had not only brought about the anti-colonial Pan-Islamic movement, but it had trained and armed East Africans, and returned them home with their skills, where they might be, if they had not already been, confronted with Pan-Islamic propaganda.

Nationalist movements continued to grow in the post-First World War era; in addition to Pan-Islamism, these presented machinery by which the Pan-African movement could spread. On 29th July 1919 Major Muggeridge wrote to Notley about one such ‘native movement’:

‘The fact that the movement is not confined to any one tribe seems to be to constitute a possible future danger, for, in the event of a personality or personalities ever attempt to organize Pan Ethiopianism [Pan-Africanism] in Central East Africa they would be likely to find this society machinery already prepared. The great safeguard against Pan Ethiopianism has always been considered to be the unlikelihood of tribes combining together, but with such a society as I have indicated, getting a wide grip on the natives, the difficulties in the way of engineering such a movement are considerably lessened. I would be very greatly obliged if you could find out anything more definite about the Society, its aims, and personalities, and forward such information as you are able to obtain to this office.’

The threats posed by Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism in East Africa during the First World War that had been identified by the likes of Philipps did not disappear in November 1918; if anything, they became a great deal more complex as men of fighting age were released from the European armies. But instead of continuing, or even expanding, the imperial

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610 TNA: WO 106/259: Bethell, A.D. ‘Note on “AFRICA for the AFRICAN” and “PAN-ISLAM”’, in Memorandum on East and Central Africa with papers on Pan Islamism and Ethiopianism, 12th March 1918.
counter-intelligence work to prevent any them from threatening the security of the British Empire in East Africa, the British Imperial Government did exactly the opposite:

‘I am very sad to think that the Intelligence Section is to be allowed to sink into obscurity. It makes one feel that all the work one has done is simply wasted. I was fool enough not to believe that the C.O. [Colonial Office] had it in them to cut the whole thing down like this, especially as they do not appear to have consulted the local government at all. Some day there will be a local bust up and nothing will be known of it. Then questions will be asked as to what the Intelligence was doing. I suppose I fought too hard to get a special staff and frightened them. I should particularly have liked to have got you [Philipps] a decent job as I know that your heart was in the work. However; sic transit, as you say.’ \(^{612}\)

Muggeridge did not hold back with his thoughts on the dissolution of the East African Intelligence Centre in this letter to Philipps in the summer of 1919; this is unsurprising, when one considers that he was recorded as stating that ‘it was important that East African Intelligence should not be allowed to relapse into what he described as “its pre-war state of Parochialism”.’ \(^{613}\)

The dissolution of the East African Intelligence Centre was replaced by a ‘one man job’; Muggeridge complained that the Colonial Office ‘never consulted the people here in the matter at all.’ \(^{614}\) The Intelligence Centre was instituted to ensure that the security of the British Empire in East Africa whilst it was threatened during the East African Campaign of the First World War; with success ensured, the Intelligence Centre was surplus to requirements. It was never instituted to support security in East Africa for East Africa’s sake; the needs of the Europeans had been fulfilled.

Thus, Pan-Islamism, and, most importantly for later African history, nationalist movements, could exist and grow in the East African territories of the British Empire with only the most

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\(^{614}\) TNA: WO 106/259: Letter from Muggeridge to Philipps, 28\(^{th}\) July 1919.
minimum of oversight from the imperial colonisers in the immediate post-First World War era.

**The Contribution of the Thesis to the Literature**

**Contribution**

When I designed this thesis, it was my aspiration for it to contribute to several different literatures. This was partly because I wished for my work to have the greatest possible impact, but also because it is, at its very core, interdisciplinary; it draws from history, politics, and geography, and is involved as much with the actions of Muslims in East Africa as those of Vernon Kell in London. This aspiration has come to fruition; there are five different literatures to which it has contributed significantly:

1. The First World War
2. East African History
3. Intelligence History
4. Islamic History
5. Imperial History

**The First World War**

Having once been dismissed by historians as nothing more than a ‘sideshow’ to the contemporary events in Europe, this thesis joins the small, yet growing number of works focusing on the East African Campaign of the First World War. The history of the British Empire’s attempt to prevent the threats posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa through counter-intelligence is but a tiny part of the narrative of the Campaign, but it is a part that places East Africa and East African concerns at the heart of the research. By producing a narrative that places research about the British Empire within
the British Empire, I have placed the British Empire in its true location; not in the corridors of Whitehall, but in the streets of the colonised world.

**East African History**

As I examined in the Introduction to this thesis, I endeavoured to place the centre of narrative of this thesis in East Africa, with occasional glances back to London, as opposed to placing it in the imperial capital, with occasional glances down at the imperial acquisitions. From the start, East Africa and East African concerns were to be at the heart of my research. This entire thesis is East African history, but two parts of it demand greater focus here:

The first is that I have established that the Islamic population of East Africa had an experience with Pan-Islamism that was independent of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. This narrative has been missing from East African historiography because the East African experience of Pan-Islamism did not notably impact upon the outcome of the First World War for the European colonial powers.

The second is that my research will help to dispel the lingering statements within the literature on African colonialism that Africans were docile people who came to accept European rule. This thesis proves that, contrary to this, the British Empire was forced to devote time and resources to countering the actions of some East Africans and some members of the African diaspora; British imperial officials were forced to conclude that, despite their racial prejudices, this African population had some ability to threaten the security of the British Empire.

**Intelligence History**

In the intelligence literature there has been a scarcity of knowledge about how the British Empire’s imperial intelligence establishment worked on the ground in East Africa, as opposed to an office in London, in this era. I intended to research exactly this, and I have been successful. This thesis is the first ever piece of research to produce a comprehensive analysis of M.I.5.’s growth in East Africa during the First World War, and its work to counter
the threat posed to the British Empire in the region from Pan-Islamism. This analysis spreads new light not only on M.I.5.’s conduct in the British Empire, but also on topics such as how M.I.5. dealt with racial prejudice and how they overcame the lack of expertise in an environment where gaining it proved difficult. In short, this thesis has developed an entirely new subfield of the intelligence literature: the subfield of the development of M.I.5.’s imperial counter-intelligence effort in the British Empire during the First World War.

Islamic History

The contribution of this thesis to the literature on Islamic history is in many ways bound up with the contribution of this thesis to the literature on East African history. The knowledge that the Islamic population of East Africa had an experience with Pan-Islamism that was independent of all other experiences with Pan-Islamism during the First World War adds a previously unknown element to this literature.

This thesis also contributes a longer history of Pan-Islamism in East Africa than is already provided for in the literature. One cannot draw a direct line between the growth of anti-colonial Pan-Islamism in the First World War and modern-day jihadist fundamentalist groups, such as Al-Shabaab, in the same region, but there is a historical connection; the move away from Pan-Islamism as a religious doctrine towards an anti-western doctrine was in full swing during the East African Campaign of the First World War, and it did not disappear on the commencement of peace.

Imperial History

This thesis has offered a fresh perspective on the East African Campaign of the First World War by situating the work of the officials of the British Empire into the world of the colonised subjects of East Africa. Thus, East Africa does not exist just as another distant part of the British Empire at war; instead, Europe exists as a distant coloniser with limited ability to enforce its will on its colonised people.
Rethinking history in this manner has allowed my thesis to contribute the knowledge that East Africans and the African diaspora in East Africa were able to make use of the First World War for their own purposes: to discuss, to examine, and to propagate Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism even whilst they were being ordered to fight or to porter for the European colonisers. It has decentred the European narrative of the First World War and replaced it with a more cohesive one that acknowledges the contribution of others.

The actions of the European colonisers themselves have different light shed upon them from this perspective; the British Empire claimed to have covered nearly one quarter of the world’s land surface, but this claim existed only in the international sphere. In the internal sphere, the power dynamics could be very different.

Future research:

Some avenues for future research were briefly examined in the Introduction to this thesis. Because this thesis contributes new knowledge to so many different literatures, it opens many avenues of potential future research.

The study of the East African Campaign presents an exciting prospect for any historian interested in the First World War. Due to its neglect within the vast literature on the First World War there are many possible ways in which one could study the Campaign and make a large impact on the literature: from military perspectives to the perspectives of the civilians who lived through the guerrilla warfare, and from topics as diverse as gender studies to animal husbandry. To work on uncovering narratives that have been dismissed for so long presents the historian with a great challenge. The impact, if any, that the growth of Pan-Islamism had on hostilities in the East African Campaign is one avenue of future research I would be particularly keen to see pursued. One source of Pan-Islamism into East Africa was through Africans sent to labour in the East Africa Campaign; I believe it would be interesting to uncover how Africans who espoused Pan-Islamic ideals conducted themselves in the armies of the European empires.

The long-term impact, if any, of Pan-Islamism on the British Empire in East Africa would continue the work of this thesis into the post-First World War era. Such a research proposal
would be of benefit to the historiography of East Africa, for it would surely support the conclusion of this thesis that the Islamic population of East Africa had an experience with Pan-Islamism that was independent to other experiences.

This thesis has focused upon the British imperial counter-intelligence effort in the East African Campaign of the First World War, but M.I.5.D. was involved with many areas of the British Empire. Research needs to be undertaken on the work of the entirety of D Branch, both from a bureaucratic viewpoint and a thematic one; Pan-Islamism in East Africa was only one subject about which D Branch was concerned. Furthermore, the East African Intelligence Centre was dissolved in the immediate aftermath of the War; the immediate post-First World War narrative of M.I.5.’s imperial counter-intelligence effort, both in East Africa and around the world, is a further topic of research that this thesis has demonstrated has the potential to be undertaken.

Two avenues of future research clearly present themselves: those that place the German Empire and East Africans at the centre of the narratives. Studies that placed these two at the centre of their narratives would present a comprehensive analysis of both the threat posed by Pan-Islamism to the security of the British Empire in East Africa during the First World War and the subsequent outcomes of that threat, as well as expand on the conclusions that have been drawn in this thesis.

Africa is projected to have an enormous population growth throughout the Twenty-First Century; whilst the legacies of colonialism continue to exist, African influence in world politics is ever increasing. Historians of the academy have traditionally been white men and have traditionally focused on the history of white men; dismissing the history of East Africa as a ‘sideshow’ to the important events in Europe can no longer be accepted. The East African narrative of the First World War proves that the First World War was the first world war; this should never be forgotten.
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