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Published in:
Democratization
DOI:
10.1080/13510347.2018.1557148
Publication date:
2019

Citation for published version (APA):
Bridoux, J.-F. (2019). Shaking off the neoliberal shackles: “Democratic Emergence” and the negotiation of
democratic knowledge in the Middle East North Africa context. Democratization, 26(5), 796-814.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1557148
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To cite this article: Jeff Bridoux (2019) Shaking off the neoliberal shackles: “democratic emergence” and the negotiation of democratic knowledge in the Middle East North Africa context, Democratization, 26:5, 796-814, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2018.1557148

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1557148

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Published online: 23 Jan 2019.

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Shaking off the neoliberal shackles: “democratic emergence” and the negotiation of democratic knowledge in the Middle East North Africa context

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ABSTRACT
There is a general assumption in democracy promotion that liberal democracy is the panacea that will solve all political and economic problems faced by developing countries. Using the concept of “good society” as analytical prism, the analysis shows that while there is a rhetorical agreement as to what the “good society” entails, democracy promotion practices fail to allow for recipients’ inclusion in the negotiation and delivery of the “good society”. Contrasting US and Tunisian discourses on the “good society”, the article argues that democracy promotion practices are underpinned by neoliberal parameters borne out from a reliance on the transition paradigm, which in turn leave little room to democracy promotion recipients to formulate knowledge claims supporting the emergence of alternative conceptions of the “good society”. In contrast, the article opens up a reflective pathway to a negotiated democratic knowledge, which would reside in a paradigmatic change that consists in the abandonment of the transition paradigm in favour of a “democratic emergence” paradigm.

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 22 June 2018; Accepted 5 December 2018

KEYWORDS knowledge production; democracy promotion; United States; Middle East and North Africa

Introduction
This contribution to the special issue on “Negotiating the Promotion of Democracy” looks at the issue of inclusivity of recipients of democracy promotion in the negotiation of what democracy means and what it is supposed to deliver; the “good society”. Referring to the range of issues open to negotiations in the context of democracy promotion, this contribution focuses thus on normative premises that shape interactions in democracy promotion. The article seeks to answer the following questions: To what extent is democratic knowledge negotiated between democracy promoters and recipients? In what way could democracy promoters generate more knowledge about recipients’ conceptions of democracy and conceptions of a “good society”?

The article starts with a review of the literature on democratization with a special emphasis on the wider question of replicability of liberal democracy and local
ownership. The article then defines the concept of “good society”; the analytical prism used to identify the value-commitments of democracy promoters and recipients in their production of democratic knowledge. The article performs a critical discourse analysis of the Obama administration’s speeches, policies, and reports from 2007 to 2014, when the Obama administration defined and started to implement its approach to democracy promotion. This discourse is then contrasted with knowledge claims and expectations about democracy made by Tunisians since 2012. These expectations are analysed based on focus groups reports published by NDI, and on my own fieldwork conducted in 2014. I organized focus groups with 45 Tunisian students in Sousse to tease out their understandings of the meaning of democracy and their expectations.

Tunisia is of particular interest due to the extensive US support to the process of democratization; thus constituting a relevant space in which contested notions of democracy come into play. The Tunisian experience may not be entirely relied on to expand findings to other MENA countries but nevertheless provides interesting and pertinent insights into contestation of democratic knowledge in an Arab context. In turn, such insights could prompt a reflection on how to improve current democracy promotion practices to facilitate negotiations with recipients. Genuine negotiations about the meaning of democracy are essential to maximize recipients’ expectations informing democratic futures, if the MENA region eventually manages to dispose of the shackles of authoritarianism.

Section one concludes that recipients’ expectations are in line with democracy promoters’ discourses on democracy and “good society”. Yet, despite of this alignment, practices reveal that the model promoted remains liberal democracy and free markets, without much preoccupation for social justice claims made by recipients.

The second section shows a discrepancy between US discourse on democracy promotion and practices through the establishment of priorities that do not reflect the concerns of democracy promotion recipients. The article briefly reviews the literature on modernization theory and the transition paradigm and then claims that the source of the discrepancy identified above resides precisely in the domination of such paradigms in development aid communities, and more particularly in democracy promotion. This domination translates into the adoption of neoliberal practices that reduce democracy promotion to a depoliticized technical agenda seeking to implement donors’ model of democracy. Current democracy promotion practices, ensconced in neoliberal parameters, do not lead to a genuine empowerment of recipients through a mutual acceptance of respective knowledge claims made about democracy and value-commitments to a “good society”. Such a conclusion is problematic when considering the potential for negotiation between democracy promoters and recipients about the meaning of democracy.

The third section of the paper opens up a reflection on how better knowledge of democracy and of each other’s expectations and aspirations can improve the outcome of democracy promotion. Such a reflection includes a reconsideration of modernization theory and the transition paradigm as keystones of democracy promotion practices. The article offers a “way ahead” in terms of consciously changing the reaffirmation of the structure brought about by the transition paradigm and neoliberal practices. The article argues that the outcome of a critical analysis of democracy promotion practices begs for the need to revisit democratic knowledge. One pathway to a negotiated democratic knowledge resides in a paradigmatic change that consists in the abandonment of the transition paradigm in favour of a “democratic emergence” paradigm.
Issues on negotiation table: the non-negotiation of democratic knowledge and the “good society”

Studies in democratization focus on comparative analysis of replicability of institutional frameworks and democratic values in countries undergoing political transition, on socio-economic conditions enabling democratization, on the impact of democracy aid, and on democratization through a shift towards empowerment and local ownership of democratization processes. The article speaks to the four main debates that animate democratization studies but focuses especially on the replicability of liberal democracy and impact of democracy promotion issues.

The universal character of liberal democracy is not questioned by some or even though there is an acknowledgement that there is a variety of Western and non-Western models of democracy on offer, the irrelevancy of a liberal model of democracy is questioned. Instead, the argument goes, variations of democratic models can happen within the limits of liberalism, and there is scepticism about the potential of non-Western democratic models to lead to genuine democratization. Indeed, there is a risk that turning away from liberal democracy may lead to illiberal democracy or semi-democracy in the best of cases, or to a return to authoritarianism in the worse cases.

Such a position became questionable. While the world has witnessed significant political and economic liberal gains in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa since 1989, the literature has recorded a reversal of the trend towards political and economic liberalization in many countries. Following the Arab Uprising of 2010, many observers, claimed that democratic progress was once again on the march. The Arab Uprising would give a second chance to Western-led democracy aid to facilitate the rise of new democratic polities in a region where political liberalization was notoriously lagging behind.

Yet, despite initial hopes, the processes of political liberalization in most countries affected by democratic uprisings petered out. Ideas and values articulated by Western democracy aid do not seem to generate traction across all segments of Middle Eastern and North African societies. This is especially baffling in the wake of the Arab Spring, when large sections of the populations rejected authoritarian regimes and called for alternative values than those offered by those regimes: freedom, democracy, liberty, and most importantly dignity and social justice; the very same values enunciated by Western donor agencies.

This contribution suggests that part of the explanation for such a mitigated outcome resides in too little attention paid to actors at the receiving end of political aid. Indeed, the article contends that it is important to comprehend meanings attributed by recipients of democracy aid to the concept of democracy and to what kind of society they wish to see emerge. This shift need not only to be rhetorical but translate into practices that genuinely include the “local”.

The concept of “good society” is a useful analytical prism to contrast US discourses on with Tunisian discourses on democracy and expectations of a “good society”. According to Etzioni, the concept “good society” refers to the formulation and upholding of “some particular social conceptions of the good” and is centred around a core of substantive, particularistic values. He adds that “good societies promote particularistic, substantive formations of the good; that these are limited sets of core values that are promoted largely by the moral voice and not by state coercion.” This last point is
particularly important for the purpose of this article: values that constitute a specific definition of the “good society” should not be imposed by the state but emerge from the moral stance of society stemming from a “shared moral dialogue.” The outcome of this shared moral dialogue results in the prioritization of specific values that contribute to the definition of a “good society”. Liberals favour individual freedom and a limited role for the state. Social conservatives promote order and security. Utilitarians such as Bentham privilege happiness. Marxists are interested in material needs and economic justice. Whatever the value-commitment a society formulates, what matters is that these specific values constitute what society identifies as essential for its well-being. The “good society” is not unified and varies from one country to another. There are thus many formulations of what a “good society” entails, all particular and reflecting the specific value-commitments of societies.

As an illustration, the article now briefly compares the Obama administration and Tunisian value-claims about the “good society”. Far from being technical (specific material measures will lead to “good society”), knowledge about the right types of measures to be implemented reflects a normative and political commitment to a specific conception of how a “good society” works. The key question, however, is whether such a conception of the “good society” is in line with expectations of democracy promotion recipients.

**US democracy promotion and the quest for the “good society”**

The various contributors to the literature on US democracy promotion disagree on many things such as the purpose of promoting democracy, the potential destabilization effects on societies subjected to democracy promotion, or the wisdom of trying to impose democracy on non-democratic societies. They, however, tend to agree that when it comes to democracy promotion, the United States seeks to project an image of a successful economy, a diverse society, and a strong and stable political system. Free market economy, protection of fundamental freedoms, and liberal democracy are the main ingredients that generate this success. Promoting this recipe is not only in the interest of the United States but above all in the interest of recipients of democracy promotion and the world as democratic nations contribute to a peaceful and prosperous world. As expressed in the *National Security Strategy 2010*: supporting human rights and democracy abroad is necessary because “governments that respect these values are more just, peaceful, and legitimate” and because “[p]olitical systems that protect universal rights are ultimately more stable, successful, and secure”. Democracy thus contributes to the making of good societies. But what is meant by “good society”?

A “good society” has two facets. The political dimension refers to the democratic nature of society. It is a society that lives by the rule of law and respect for human rights, enacts genuine and competitive elections and political processes, harbours a dynamic and politically active civil society, and has a government that is transparent and accountable. The economic dimension refers to the social and economic needs of the populations. These needs must be addressed if democracy is to succeed in countries undergoing democratic transition.

Compared to more classical approaches to democratization that focus on prioritization of elections, institutional capacity building, development of democratic culture, protection of human rights and empowerment of civil society, as well as on an
expansive economic liberalism advocating free markets to foster economic growth,\(^27\) the Obama administration insists on economic development as essential to democratic success. Discourse analysis shows that social and economic justice, gender equality, and the fight against corruption are all identified as advancing democracy.\(^{26}\) The US official discourse thus considers that to successfully democratize, governments need to institutionalize the exercise of democracy by their populations and provide economic and social benefits that make their societies just and better: “good societies”. It is indeed critical to address “underlying political and economic deficits that foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism” and hence limit the capacity of governments to deal with threats and to address global common challenges.\(^{29}\) Obama thus develops a more holistic approach to democracy and democracy promotion: democracy, human rights, and economic development are seen as mutually supportive, and in addition to freedom, dignity and social justice are essential to ensure the success of liberalization on the long term to achieve a “good society”.\(^{30}\)

Thus, the US rhetoric on democracy promotion conceptualizes a “good society” as democratic, based on a representative government, with a high degree of citizen participation in governance and public affairs, and allowing for a “more bottom-up, community-based system of economic and social management than the centralized, bureaucratized, liberal-capitalist system evident among advanced industrial states today”.\(^{31}\) Is this conceptualization of the “good society” in line with democracy promotion recipients’ expectations?

**What do recipients want?**

Tunisian citizens identify socio-economic issues as the most pressing. Their conceptualization of democracy and the “good society” it is supposed to deliver puts socio-economic concerns at the centre of their claims to knowledge about democracy. For example, unemployment remains their main preoccupation\(^52\) and a direct link is established between dignity and consideration for democracy:

> You have to provide people with a minimal amount of dignity for them to think about democracy, because you cannot give democracy to people who can barely make it to the next day, and maybe we don’t have that kind of sharp poverty in Tunisia as in other African countries, now we do, yes, but how can you give, like, someone who does not have food, and talk about democracy?\(^{33}\)

> We are not feeling secure. We have neither stable jobs nor health insurance (CNSS) and people are even unable to feed their kids!!\(^{34}\)

> We made a revolution because of unemployment, but on the contrary it’s getting worse than it used to be.\(^{35}\)

These statements clearly identify basic socio-economic needs as pressing. People need to be able to provide for their families, they need a stable source of income, they need access to healthcare, and they need to feel secure on the long term. Democracy is not an end in itself but a means to achieve these objectives:

> The way that you are putting things is, you are suggesting that democracy is an end in itself. It is not an end, it is a means. At the end, why do we need democracy? We need democracy to have a better life as human beings, not as nationals, not as Tunisians, not as Arabs, as Muslims, but as human beings.\(^{36}\)
Such a better life can be achieved in a “good society”, a society that protects liberal values but only to a certain extent. A viable democratic regime in Tunisia, it seems, would also need to include an active role played by the government in the management of the economy. Thus, it seems that the Obama administration’s take on the “good society” and its concerns for a just society are in line with the expectations of Tunisians:

The politicians should try to drive the country out of the crisis, and create safety nets for the people like it happened in UK and the US in the time of the Great Depression, like the New Deal. We need Medicare, we need it because the revolution was, I mean, poverty and unemployment was the spark that ignited the revolution, so people are still unemployed, people are still poor …

Tunisians support democracy but not any kind of democracy. The model of democracy that seems to generate most traction in the region will have to deliver on economic well-being above all other considerations. As Heydemann argues, the grievances of populations in the MENA region stem from two decades of market-oriented reforms and their effects on society. The MENA populations formulate a fundamental critique of markets with the main drivers of the Arab Spring being “economic exclusion and inequality, economic insecurity and vulnerability, failures of authoritarian governments to protect citizens from worst effects of market-oriented economic reforms.” In the wake of years of failure of social and economic policies, these populations wish to see a new social contract with commitment to distributive justice. This is their definition of the “good society”.

It thus seems that both US democracy promotion and recipients share a similar notion of what a “good society” entails. It is important to note, however, that this similarity ends at the level of rhetoric. The following section observes that when it comes to democracy promotion practices, these concerns for dignity, social justice, and equality are pushed in the background. It appears that the type of democracy promoted by the US is essentially neoliberal in nature, with a clear advantage given to policies that promote the opening of markets, without much consideration for the effects that these may have on the populations concerned. The translation of social justice and dignity concerns from rhetoric to practices has not gained traction.

Parameters: neoliberal pathways to democratization

Knowledge and power: modernization theory and transition paradigm

While there is an agreement that democratization consists in achieving “political changes moving in a democratic direction”, the identification of independent variables that facilitates democratization remains elusive. Democratic theory offers a large body of literature on macro-mechanisms to help analysts to understand what causes democratic governance. They constitute the knowledge basis of modernization theory and transition paradigm. Lipset argued that socioeconomic development levels constitute pre-requisites for successful democratization. Others argue that the way elites interact and the type of authoritarian regime in which bargaining takes place are critical for democratization to succeed. Political culture and civil society constitute another independent variable useful to assess the potential for democratization. Almond and Verba argue that people’s attitudes towards each other, their government and policies, democracy, and values underpinning democracy are critical to assess the quality of democracy and likelihood of democratic transition. Education and high
literacy rates constitute another independent variable that helps to sustain the belief in democratic norms and make people less permeable to “extremist and monistic doctrines.” Political institutions that privilege negotiations, cooperation, and compromise are more conducive to democratization than political institutions that tend to the power of specific political factions to the detriment of others. Democratic theorists also contend that national and social unity contributes to democratization. Ethnic or religious divisions, or social disparity impede on democratic development. At a structural level of analysis, the pressures generated by the international context on nation-states also constitute an independent variable that explains the likelihood of democratic consolidation. Finally, Pevehouse argues that democracy is facilitated in regions where democratic countries are already established or where political liberalization is happening.

Yet, knowledge and experiences that underpin modernization theory and transition paradigm are proving problematic on two grounds. Firstly, the transition paradigm’s main assumptions, growing from experiences of 1990s democratization in Eastern Europe, have become gradually irrelevant. This is particularly the case for “grey-zone” countries; countries that are not authoritarian but also not heading in the direction of democracy: “what is often thought of as an uneasy, precarious middle ground between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship is actually the most common political condition today of countries in the developing world and the post-communist world.”

Secondly, the reliance on a fixed set of knowledge claims of democratization defined by Western practices and experiences institutes a hierarchy of power between democracy promoters and recipients. As Sadiki argues: “Democratic knowledge, theoretical or practical, is not neutral. It is implicated in the web of power relations that is moulded by knowledge or, in turn, moulds it.” Democratization studies and democracy promotion practices focus on Western-centric transitional mechanistic processes aiming at the replication of the Third Wave of democratization through an analysis of variables such as “institutions, elite cohesion, ruling parties, elections, coalitions, impact of democracy promotion, security, and in the case of Arab countries, role of Islam in absence of democracy.” This is problematic because it causes a disconnect between theory – the transition paradigm – and conditions on the ground. As will be developed further in this article, a reconsideration of the assumptions made by the transition paradigm is needed. It is critical for democracy promoters to engage in a genuine process of negotiation of democratic knowledge with recipients rather than for democracy promotion to remain shackled to assumptions that do not reflect the political and social realities of countries democracy promoters intervene in. The lack of flexibility imposed by the transition paradigm and modernization theory actually impedes on democratic progress and on the emergence of a conceptualization of the “good society” by recipients of democracy promotion.

**Neoliberal practices and technocratic agenda**

This lack of flexibility on behalf of democracy promoters is further compounded by development aid practices, including democracy promotion. Such practices are the product of neoliberalism, the dominant philosophy in Western societies; neoliberalism conceived as a “politically imposed discourse … a specific economic discourse or philosophy which has become dominant and effective in world economic relations as a
consequence of super-power sponsorship [the US].\textsuperscript{54} As Harvey puts it: “neoliberalism … has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense many of us interpret, live in and understand the world.”\textsuperscript{55}

As \[Author\] argues, knowledge produced by Western government and organization is neoliberal in nature: “Positivism and quantitative methods are embedded in all attempts to generate knowledge about and in all manners of managing the social world.”\textsuperscript{56} Such specific knowledge is needed to maximize the neoliberal zeitgeist that shifts the focus of economic activity as organizing principle of all social and political relations on competition between economic actors, in contrast to classical liberalism and its focus on exchange.\textsuperscript{57} The maximization of the principle of competition across society requires a specific type of governance: “creating calculable spaces to monitor outcomes (relying heavily on auditing, targets, and ranking) …”\textsuperscript{58} In other words, progress must be measured in order to maximize competition in between social actors. Quantitative analysis is thus the dominant mode of assessment; considered as the most objective way to set benchmarks and assess how well individuals perform.\textsuperscript{59}

How is this dominance of neoliberal practices in knowledge production reflected in US democracy promotion? The main expression of neoliberal practices in US democracy promotion consists in the ever-present principle of competition in how USAID manages its relations with recipients of aid and in the reduction of its activities into a sequential technical agenda of measurable outcomes with the aim to insert capitalism in developing societies.

The introduction of Partnering with USAID: Building Alliances leaves little doubts regarding the purpose of US foreign assistance: “furthering America’s foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world.”\textsuperscript{60} It is interesting to note that for all the discourses on democracy, ownership of development and sustainability, a free market economy and its principles of rationalization, efficiency, profit making and risk-taking remains central to an American conception of development, not only as an end in itself but also as organizing principles of how development aid is dispensed. Indeed, USAID insists that the most efficient way to achieve development is to “embrace a culture of risk-taking and entrepreneurship that has driven much of our progress and prosperity”.\textsuperscript{61}

Competition, as regulatory mechanism, creates a bias in the attribution of contracts; in a competitive market some are more equal than others. This competitive selection process impacts USAID partners; they must bow to efficiency principles that will ensure the best return on investment for USAID. This is less an issue for governments and multinational corporations than for smaller actors who may not have the required expertise to go through the selection process. USAID’s obligations for FY 2012 shows that no NGO based in developing countries is in the top 40 of USAID’s partners.\textsuperscript{62} USAID’s procurement rules condition the way private actors of democracy promotion offer their services according to the laws of the market.

Free market rules also apply to recommending democratic norms to be promoted. Democratic rules and norms that facilitate free market economy are at the forefront of USAID’s programmes and are also implicitly hidden in the procurement system. For example, the document informing for-profit corporations about how to partner with USAID identifies “rule of law and transparent governance” as one programme area of public-private partnership relevant to “finance, media and ICT industries” with the following potential areas of shared interests: “rule of law and business-friendly
operating environment, supporting transparent elections and political processes, promoting free and independent media.” Multinational Corporations do not object to these as they facilitate their operations and USAID is quick to point out shared interests in reinforcing public-private partnerships for development initiatives that “benefit businesses by mitigating risks, creating access to new markets, training workforces, and building relationships with key stakeholders.” Moreover, partnering with USAID “can lend authority and legitimacy to a business’ development efforts. Development initiatives can also create new customers and new markets” USAID thus acts as a facilitator for US businesses to develop their activities in developing countries, in turn helping USAID to achieve development aid objectives, of which democratization is an aspect, which in turn contributes to reach more general US foreign policy goals: expanding democracy and free markets.

Another consequence of neoliberal aid practices concerns the willingness to empower local governmental actors of development in order to achieve ownership and long-term sustainability of development aid, including democracy promotion. This is based on the premises that “successful development depends in large part on the efficiency, integrity and effectiveness with which a country raises, manages and expends public resources.” As USAID forcefully points out, this requires working through host country systems that need to be reformed in order to match USAID’s expectations. This entails creating an economic climate friendly to business, notably through offering stability and predictability. Reforming host country systems thus starts with improving public financial management including a reform of the public procurement system for a more efficient use of public resources, greater accountability and transparency guaranteed by “a vibrant and strengthened civil society that monitors performance, encourages transparency and demands results.” But what does improving public financial management entail?

According to USAID, achieving sound public financial management in developing countries means institutional strengthening of the ministry of finance, more legislative oversight of the budget, financial management process and civil society budget oversight, strengthening of government audit and internal control, and implementing procurement reform. Procurement is considered an essential element of public financial management because it is the most susceptible to corruption, which is seen as threatening good governance and democracy, deterring foreign investment, crippling economic growth and development.

Those reforms will strengthen sustainability and develop capacity but will also facilitate the opening of local markets to economic globalization. Indeed, as USAID argues, through its engagement with local government and supporting transparent rule of law, USAID reduces regulatory risks that endanger foreign investments. USAID thus seeks to reform local legislation by increasing transparency and support for compliance codes and labour regulations supportive of stable operating environment for business. Measures that target the improvement of local systems thus aim at creating conditions facilitating free markets – that is transforming local governmental institutions so that they embed procedures protecting core elements of free market economy like limited governmental control, protection of private property, open competition, etc …

In summary, neoliberal governmental practices result in the adoption of a business-driven approach that does not widen the pool of recipients of democracy aid and allows for greater local ownership. Instead, such practices turn democracy promotion into a depoliticized agenda that is not open to the contestation of liberal democracy and
free market economy identified as the two pillars of the “good society” by Western actors: “too deeply is a generically liberal democratic discourse embedded within its history and its political, economic, and bureaucratic discourses and structures.”

Despite a rhetorical agreement on the nature of a “good society” and its focus on socio-economic justice, US democracy promotion practices make this convergence irrelevant and recipients’ knowledge claims about “good society” invisible.

Such a conclusion is problematic when considering the potential for negotiation between democracy promoters and recipients about the meaning of democracy and how it can help building the “good society”. Indeed, the problem is structural, not agential. Because democracy promotion operates within a neoliberal framework that expresses the transition paradigm, knowledge about democracy that matters is essentially produced by democracy promoters. The alternative is for democracy promoters to realize that negotiating democratic knowledge is critical if democratization is to succeed. Through a pluralization of debates about the meaning of democracy, political and civil society in supported countries will be able to formulate a political project that reflects emancipatory political futures in tune with the aspirations of their populations. Democracy aid community and its recipients must speak the same language of democracy if democratization is to be successful and if the “good society” is to be viable. Current democracy promotion practices do not lead to a genuine empowerment of recipients through a mutual acceptance of respective knowledge claims made about democracy. The alternative would be for democracy promoters to engage in negotiations with recipients to define a substance of democracy that meets MENA populations’ expectations. That means allowing for the emergence of alternative claims to democratic knowledge.

**The desirable outcome: “democratic emergence” and the alternative pathway to the “good society”**

For democracy promotion to gain legitimacy through enhanced efficiency there is a need to break free from hegemonic structures of knowledge production. One way to move forward, this article argues, would be the abandonment of the transition paradigm, its deconstruction, and reconstruction of new structures of democratic knowledge. As Kuhn argues, when existing paradigms fail to deliver on their cognitive agendas, they lose their *raison d’être*. They must be substituted for new paradigms.

Moving away from linear and transitional understandings of the evolution of politics, “democratic emergence” would allow for a transdisciplinary research agenda of the past, present, and future evolution of political societies with the aim to pluralize democratic knowledge. Assuming that the “good society” is still most likely to be catered for by democracy, the focus of such a research agenda would be the identification and analysis of sources of democratic knowledge understood in their multiplicity. Rejecting the notion that the path to the “good society” is ultimately the one walked by a combination of liberal democracy and free-markets, “democratic emergence” studies analyse the sources and distribution of ideas, norms, principles, and institutions most likely to deliver the “good society” without being subjugated to the shackles of positivism and neoliberal practices. How would such a conceptual move be implemented? How much of it could be negotiated?

Such a renegotiation in the MENA context concerns a reconsideration of good government and the “good society”. Sadiki contends that good government, and hence the
opportunity to deliver the “good society” to citizens, “must be grounded in a local system of knowledge.” As much as democracy is a contested concept, meaning a variety of things to a variety of actors, democratization is also a contested concept; it is context-sensitive. The cookie-cutter approach to democratization has shown its limits. A genuine engagement and understanding of the local is needed. What matters is to generate the conditions to trigger such an engagement with local systems of knowledge.

One way to achieve this objective is to consider the “local” as a filter; that is to investigate “locality and specificity in the assimilation, application and interpretation of ideas, values, morals, myths, symbols and the technologies they necessitate.” Sadiki contends that there are two dimensions to consider: knowledge system and social imaginary. The Arab world has developed its own intellectual traditions that led to the formation of knowledge system (makhzun) and social imaginary (mikhyal). The makhzun as a knowledge system encompasses “cumulatively inherited and adapted learning, spiritual, intellectual and technological” but also “engenders belonging.” Al-mikhyal helps people to define who they are by mapping out the world and making sense of it. The social imaginary pictures the world in a specific way, including the role and place of a given society in this world. Critically for our purpose, social imaginaries are mutually constitutive. They are not static. They evolve through exchange with each other. That means that there is room for negotiation of mutually constituted values and norms. Applied to democratization and the formulation of competing claims to democratic knowledge, it means that it is essential to analyse how knowledge system and social imaginaries have interpreted and filtered it: “A democratic knowledge … suited for Arabs or the Maghrib must be created only within the local makhzun and mikhyal and via local agency.” This statement emphasizes the need for situated knowledge when it comes to democratization. Better objective knowledge is produced when the social context of the knowers is at the heart of the analysis. Social contexts allow and limit knowledge producers in their ability to perceive information, conceptualize, and understand. When it comes to democratic knowledge, it is thus critical to consider its contingent nature; the influence of language, history, culture, and social imaginaries on its formation.

Yet, knowledge about “the other” remains Western-centric, elitist, and reproducing patterns of political, cultural and social domination. As long as the foundations of such a Western-centric democratic knowledge production are not challenged, there is little chance that a genuine process of negotiation of democratic knowledge can unfold. There is indeed a need to “decolonise knowledge production” on democracy to move beyond cosmetic accommodations that do not question the fundamental flaws of democracy promotion conceptualization and practises. In that sense, it is essential to move the field of democracy promotion and its hierarchies of power away from Western practices. It is critical, to achieve emancipation and facilitate the emergence of genuine alternative conceptualizations of the “good society”, to allow for the emergence of an Arab heterodoxy of democracy. Then, negotiations between promoters and recipients can begin on equal footing.

Such re-negotiation, Sadiki suggests, should be rethought along heterogeneous lines and go beyond its operationalization as pragmatic and analytical categories closely tied to interests (that is security, hegemony, expansionism, opposition to Islamism, etc.) or ideology-driven agenda (liberalism, capitalism). Sadiki calls for a “democratic knowledge turn” that favours the indigenous perspective “in which the makhzun and mikhyal
are privileged for they are the mediums of self-conception that record local experiences, thought, practice, norms, values, continuities and discontinuities.” Only then, through a locally constructed system of democratic knowledge can Arabs “engage democracy and democratization, reflexively (with their own language, categories, theories, etc.) and adaptively (co-learning with all kinds of ‘otherness’).” With the construction of such democratic knowledge, Arabs can also engage in negotiated knowledge practices with democracy promoters. Refusing to passively receive and ingest Western knowledge systems supposed to lead to modernity, Arabs can empower themselves through epistemological contestation and the assertion of “know-how that balances looking to the past with grasping the present’s learning curves so not to miss democratic futures.” Practically, this would involve taking into account traditional mechanism of governance that may be radically different than Western traditions of democratic governance. The question is whether democracy promoters are ready to contribute to the emergence of alternative concepts of the “good society”.

**Conclusions**

This contribution asks to what extent is democratic knowledge negotiated between democracy promoters and recipients and in what way could democracy promoters generate more knowledge about recipients’ conceptions of democracy?

The article contrasts US democracy promotion and Tunisian discourses on democracy and the “good society” to illustrate that a “turn to the local” never left the realm of rhetoric. Due to democracy promotion neoliberal practices, recipients do not enter into serious negotiations with democracy promoters about the meaning of democracy and about how to achieve meaningful transition to a desirable political future that would deliver the “good society”. Section two demonstrated that the dominance of the transition paradigm and neoliberal practices that organize democracy aid’s implementation create power structures in the field of democracy promotion that preclude such ownership of democratic knowledge. Instead, democracy promoters, armed with the “right” democratic knowledge, propose a Western-centric conception of democracy lauding liberal democracy and free-markets as the medium through which the “good society” will eventually come to life. As such the emergence of alternative conceptualization of democracy grounded in local knowledge defining the “good society” remains difficult.

The final section of the article offers an initial reflection on the relevancy of “democratic emergence” as an alternative paradigm to modernization theory and the democratic transition paradigm. This initial reflection, in line with the empirical theme of the article, stems from a reading of Sadiki’s work on the need for a “democratic knowledge turn” in the Arab world. Pushing Sadiki’s reflection further, I suggest that a fundamental reconsideration of the conceptual parameters that underpin democracy promotion is needed. As the literature on democracy promotion argues, modernization theory and the transition paradigm have little to show for when it comes to positive democratization results. A conceptual reconfiguration of democracy promotion along the lines of “democratic emergence” would set up the first stepping stone on the way to more inclusivity and ownership of democratization of countries receiving democracy aid. This inclusivity and ownership are critical to allow for a deviation from the liberal democracy and free-market mantra hammered by democracy promotion, which has resulted in mitigated outcomes of democratization. Instead,
opening to the door to genuine negotiations of the substance of democracy and expectation of what "good society" entails would not only allow for greater ownership of processes of democratization but also negate the current unequal power relationship between democracy promoters and recipients of democracy aid embedded in neoliberal practices that allow for little to no deviation from the liberal model imposed on recipients. The idea of "democratic emergence" requires far more work and should be the subject of a whole book in its own right. It is hoped that this article will generate interest in such an idea and open up a debate on its conceptual contours and possible development.

Notes

2. Middle East North Africa.
4. Lipset, "Some Social"; Boix, Democracy; Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalism; Berins Collier, Paths; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic; Przeworski and Limongi, "Modernization".
5. Youngs, "European Union democracy promotion policies"; Burnell, Democracy Assistance; McFaul, Advancing Democracy Abroad; Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: the Learning Curve; Carothers and Ottaway Funding Virtue; Carothers and Ottaway Uncharted Journey; Cox et al., American Democracy Promotion; Kurki, Democratic Futures; Bridoux and Kurki, Democracy Promotion.
6. Cernea, Putting People First; Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the First Last; Jennings, "Participatory Development as New Paradigm"; OECD. Shaping the 21st Century; OECD. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action; Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies; Bush, "Beyond Bungee Cord Humanitarianism"; United Nations, Secretary General Underscores; Choprat and Hohe “Participatory Intervention”.
10. Geddes, "What do we know about democratization"; Mansfield and Snyder "Democratic Transitions"; Burnell and Calvert Promoting Democracy Abroad; Sandbrook, Closing the Circle; Robinson and White, The Democratic Developmental State; J Grugel, Democratisation; Whitehead, The International Dimensions.
15. Ibid., 99.
16. Ibid., 103.
21. For a comprehensive analysis of the philosophical roots of conceptions of "good society" and for a comparative analysis of what "good society" means to various countries, see Etzioni, The New Golden Rule.
23. See Barany and Moser. Is Democracy Exportable?; Goldsmith “Making the World Safe”;
27. Carothers and Ottaway, eds., Funding Virtue.
32. NDI, Progress and Priorities, 14.
33. Bridoux, Focus Group 3.
34. NDI, Public Opinion Research, 8.
35. NDI, Progress and Priorities, 12.
36. Bridoux, Focus Group 3.
37. Bridoux, Focus Group 1.
40. Geddes, “Changes”.
41. Lipset, “Some Social”; Boix, Democracy; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, Capitalism; Berins Collier, Paths; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic; Przeworski and Limongi, “Modernization”.
42. O’Donnell et al., Transition; Geddes, “Changes”.
47. Whitehead, The International.
51. Sadiki, “Towards a democratic”, 710.
52. Ibid., 712. See also Guilhot, The Democracy.
55. Harvey, A Brief, 3.
57. Read, “A Genealogy”.
58. Leitner et al., Contesting, 4.
60. USAID, Partnering.
61. USAID, Implementation and Procurement.
62. See USAID, Where Does the Money Go?
64. Ibid., 3.
65. Ibid., 3.
66. USAID, Building, 3
67. Ibid., 3.
68. USAID, USAID Anticorruption Strategy.
69. Ibid., v.
72. Kuhn, _The Structure_.
73. Sadiki, “Towards a Democratic”, 703.
75. Sadiki, “Towards a Democratic”, 703.
76. Ibid., 705.
77. Ibid., 704.
78. Ibid., 704.
79. Ibid., 705.
80. Harding, _Whose Science_; Harding, “After the Neutrality”.
81. Sadiki, “Towards a Democratic”, 713.
82. Ibid., 713.
83. Ibid., 718.
84. Ibid., 718.
85. Ibid., 718.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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