Fortified Societies.
The Mobilisation of Shared Anxieties

Alexander Mack

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Declaration

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This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed: (Alexander Mack)

Date: 06/03/2019

STATEMENT 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by in text references and footnotes. A bibliography is appended.

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STATEMENT 2

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

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Abstract

My thesis argues that shared anxieties embedded in representations of transnational migration fortified societal orientations in Britain and Australia. The language of political leaders in liberal democratic societies frequently interpret the transnational movement of people in conflicting ways. On the one hand, there are appeals to a more open society with more diverse sets of identifications and the loosening of societal regulations. On the other hand, there are appeals to a more closed society, with more narrow sets of identifications and the tightening of societal regulations. I build a sociological model for shared anxieties that synthesises features of process and risk sociology, developed by Norbert Elias and Ulrich Beck respectively. This synthesis offered a conceptual vocabulary to investigate the migration representations embedded within the speeches, interviews and press conferences of British and Australian Prime Ministers from 2001 to 2017. I reconstructed the societal processes that have propagated the relations expressed in the Brexit vote and the distortion of Australian diplomacy. Broader societal fears of various established groupings infused images of transnational outsiders. These stigmatising representations have raised the barriers to societal inclusion and widened forms of societal exclusion. British and Australian leaders circulated and cultivated more reductive modes of thinking and orientating.

Keywords: shared anxieties, orientation, fortification, leaders, migration
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Preface & Acknowledgements

My thesis is the culmination of approximately 3 years of focused research from June 2015 to submission in September 2018. The project explores a very different topic from the proposal that helped secure my admission to the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, and 3 year Doctoral Career Development Scholarship (DCDS) funding from September 2014.

This current project has benefited from a generalised stream of funding that was not tied to a specific research project crafted by another researcher, which helped me to chart and craft, my own course as a relatively autonomous scholar. I fear that this type of sponsorship is becoming increasingly uncommon due to changes in the socio-structural relations in Higher Education. The consequences of this shift will be felt over the next years.

Societal scientific PhD's require time, thinking space, confidence and reciprocal dialogue with fellow scholars. When the endeavour of scholarship is reduced to the politics of academic hierarchies, the depth of publically available research suffers.

The task of completing the PhD has been greatly assisted by a number of people.

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Introduction

Political leaders in liberal democratic state-societies frequently interpret the transnational movement of people in contradictory ways. These interpretations encompass a welcoming outlook that is more comfortable with diverse forms of identification. Openness to transnational movements symbolises an open society proclaimed by political leaders. Appeals to inclusion open possibilities for forging deeper forms of human relations. This open perspective is contrasted by a more exclusive outlook, which rejects the transnational movement of people and symbolises greater hostility towards migrants and ‘foreigners’. There is the reassertion of stringent forms of societal controls, less comfortable with multiple identifications. Closure towards transnational movement symbolises a closed society as painted by political leaders, which cultivate practices that appeal for the greater exclusion of certain societal groupings.

Societal tensions between openness and closure, inclusion and exclusion are present in a range of liberal democratic state-societies. German Chancellor Angela Merkel (2017) illustrated a set of contradictory outlooks in her 2018 New Year Address. She remarked that “on the one side” there are people who believe that Germany is an economically prosperous, cosmopolitan society bound by the Basic Law of the constitution\(^1\). Efforts to assist refugees are an example of how Germany is “a wonderful country” where millions of people willingly help others. “On the other side” she said that there are people struggling with the pace of societal changes, concerned about the management of immigration into “our country” based on personal struggles, and worries about the presence of crime and violence. Merkel’s address demonstrates the interdependencies of open and closed forms of

\(^1\)The term ‘societal’ is used in preference over the term ‘social’. Terms such as ‘social’, ‘political’ ‘economic’, ‘international’ and ‘global’, can falsely sub-divide the processes of human relations into seemingly independent spheres. This conceptual division blocks understandings of the interconnection, the interdependence of all of these areas.

The only exception to this preference is in Chapters 1 and 2 that note the development of reductive terms in the historically distinct field of ‘social science’. For a further socio-historic account of the development of the sciences see Gouldsblom (1990).

\(^2\)Also known as the Bonn Constitution inaugurated in 1949 in what was then West Germany.
societal understandings, showing the combination of receptive and hostile attitudes to transnational movement.

My thesis will examine how political leaders in Britain and Australia have dealt with these contradictory trends, and the associated anxieties.

In particular, I examine how leaders represent transnational migration. The language of British and Australian leaders shows negotiations of attachments and disengagements between cosmopolitan humanist-egalitarian and anti-cosmopolitan collective-nationalist moral codes. Often simultaneous appeals to these interdependent codes stretched the habituated identifications within these societies and situated relations across broader globalised societies.

I investigate the speeches, interviews, and press conferences of political leaders in Britain and Australia from 2001 to 2017. The British example will focus on Prime Ministers Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Theresa May. The Australian example will concentrate on Prime Ministers John Howard, Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull. Leaders in Britain and Australia share a common language and forms of expression. This provides the foundation for a comparative study into the contradictory representations of transnational movement in liberal democratic state-societies at the turn of the 21st century. I will explain these contradictory societal representations through a methodological framework that synthesises features of Process Sociology developed by an international network of scholars influenced by Norbert Elias, and a strand of Risk Sociology developed by Ulrich Beck.

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3 I have used the term globalised to emphasise the forms of interdependent organisation that bind relations between people and other living organisms across 'the globe'. This term is used to replace and expand what IR has called 'international society' (see Bull and Watson 1984). Other similar terms are the term 'global' appearing sociology under heading “global sociology” for example see Cohen and Kennedy’s textbook (2012).

There is confusion that arises through ambiguous use of the concept of global/world. On one hand, it more accurately refers to a geological process (Gouldsblom 1996: fn1 16, 30). On the other hand, it is used synonymously to describe humankind as whole, which is the meaning that Beck (1999) channels for example in the title World Risk Society. This seemingly subtle difference has large ramifications, because discussions of globalised relations are not reducible to geophysical processes.
My thesis argues that shared anxieties embedded in representations of transnational movement fortified British and Australian society.

The language of leaders in Britain and Australia reflects the standpoint of various ‘established’ societal groupings that project conflicting representations of transnational outsiders. They mobilised shared anxieties through simultaneous commitments to a cosmopolitan humanist-egalitarian, and an anti-cosmopolitan collective-nationalist codes. Repeated overtures to the collective-nationalist normative code circulated an anti-cosmopolitan consciousness sustained by the idealised protection of borders from harmful transnational outsiders. The ‘border’ symbolised and signified increasingly insecure modes of thinking. Party-political insecurities attached to the maintenance of ‘public confidence’ infused the expression of more harmful risk orientations towards transnational movement.

Political leaders dominated what process sociologists have called the means of societal orientation, in the form of criminalised and objectified depictions of refugees/asylum seekers/migrants. British and Australian leaders propagated harmful imageries of transnational movement with broader societal fears, which steered wider relations within and beyond these societies. Overtime, the language of political leaders harnessed the processes accentuated in the Brexit vote in Britain, and the distortion of Australian diplomacy. These modes of thinking and orientation raised barriers to inclusion, and widened forms of exclusion, circulating orientations that fortified British and Australian societies.

The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part builds a model for understanding shared anxieties. Chapter 1 explains the model of process sociology, and Chapter 2 illustrates the model of risk sociology. I argue that a dialogue between these models can further understandings of shared anxieties, shaping relations within and beyond liberal democratic state-societies.

The second part of the thesis investigates the representations of transnational movement by Prime Ministers in Britain and Australia that fortified societal orientations. Chapters 3 and 4 evaluate the migration vocabulary of British Prime

Contribution & Literature

Understanding the sociological processes that fortify attractions for some forms of human movement and the repulsions towards others remains under researched. The following section outlines the two interconnected contributions of the thesis. The first is a sociological model for shared anxieties that synthesises features of process and risk sociology. This provides a conceptual vocabulary that leads into the second contribution, which is to trace the migration language representations that have fortified British and Australian societies. I will show how current discussions of contradictory representations of migration in societies such as Britain and Australia rely on the problematic use of three models: liberal paradox, securitisation, and classical moral panic. More recent revisionist moral panic research that explores both moralising and emotionalising processes offer an incomplete but more process sociological way forward for understanding societal contradictions.

Process Risk Synthesis & Sociological Model For Shared Anxieties

The first contribution of the thesis is to build a sociological model for shared anxieties. Anxiety in liberal democratic state-societies is commonly understood as a singular attribute of isolated individuals: a highly personalised experience divorced from broader societal processes. This is seen for instance in phrases such as “our anxieties”, the “our” noting people in the singular (Jacobs 2015: 800). Alternatively, it is “a social condition” and “shared experience”, which prompts perceptible action by large numbers of people (Jackson and Everts: 2010: 2792-2793). Anxiety is also connected to fear, which is understood as an immediate

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4 This can become an extreme condition requiring intervention and treatment by trained specialists.
objective existential threat motivating people ‘out there’, while anxiety is a more
generalised internal condition of unease (Gilpin 1984: 290; Bourke 2003: 126). In all of these accounts, anxiety is an inert experience that is unconnected from
ongoing developments of human relations.

In contrast, my thesis articulates a more sociological conceptualisation of collective/shared anxieties. Elias (2009 [1948]: 138-140) mentions what he calls “social anxieties” resembling particular societal situations and the fears that inform people’s lives, shaping their individualised characteristics. Beck (1992: 49, 100) mentions the “social power of anxiety”, how social crises have become solely understood as individual crises, which has blocked the interconnections between individual crises and wider social crises. For Beck (2013b: 69), the conceptualisation of ‘risk’ replaces notions of crisis. The personalised anxieties and risk orientations of individuals are bound with their membership in an ever-larger globalised interdependent array of societal groupings, which stretches and questions their common attachments and identifications towards groups such as nation-states.

Anxieties are the shared tensions of collective experiences, identifications and associations. There has not been a prolonged attempt to conceptualise shared anxieties, and reconstruct the societal processes that sustain the orientations, which contribute to the growth of socio-psychological fortifications and/or defortifications in societies.

Political leaders mobilise diverging appeals to the societal codes that affect orientation. These figures and other recognisable persons can propagate the societal tensions noted by Elias (2013 [1989]) as the duality of nation-state normative codes: the habituated development of humanist-egalitarian and collective-nationalist normative codes. The societal tensions highlighted by Elias parallels the dialectical pressures of cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitanisation discussed by Beck (2006).
Highly idealised appeals to cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian and anti-cosmopolitanised collective-nationalist codes may reduce the space of societal reflection and narrow the forms of societal orientation creating power struggles within individuals themselves and across societies as a whole.

My conceptualisation of shared anxieties synthesises the sociological vocabulary of process and risk sociology, developed by Elias and Beck respectively.

On the one hand, ongoing\textsuperscript{5} professionalization has fragmented sociology into a range of competing conceptualisations frequently associated with the works of a particular researcher and/or sets of researchers. On the other hand, this has opened possibilities for the development of more synthetic sociologies that more verifiably encapsulate the diverse, multifaceted interdependencies that define the identifications, experiences and associations of contemporary human societies.

The work of Elias and Beck synthetically grapples with the socio-psychological tensions that interweave the relations of ever-larger human groups. Dunning and Hughes (2013) note that the contribution of process sociology involves an interconnected conceptualisation of the development of human knowledge, interdependence and power relations. The sophistication of Elias' model is through his synthetic engagement and amalgamation of the work of Karl Marx, Max Weber and Sigmund Freud (Dunning and Hughes 2013: 30).

My contention is that the sociology of Beck through his conceptualisation of risk shares a sustained interest in similar human knowledge, interdependence and power relations nexuses. The risk synthesis of Beck is unpinned by his amalgamation of works by Marx, Weber and Jürgen Habermas. Beck (1999) is more explicit in his engagement with the likes of Marx and Weber. Elias's work is more implicit, and assumes that his reader already has a firm grasp of 'classical' sociology, although he tries to remedy this assumption in \textit{What is Sociology?} (2012b [1978]).

\textsuperscript{5} Elias (2012b [1978]: 46) observed this process in 1970s.
Elias and Beck were chosen over other candidates for synthesis such as Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault\textsuperscript{6} because of their common thematic interest in human knowledge, interdependence and power relations nexuses, and commitment to conceptual amalgamation. The synthesis of process and risk sociology pursued in this thesis, should not be confused as an attempt to canonise\textsuperscript{7} both researchers.

They also share some common criticisms due to the ways in which their work navigates contemporary polarisations between deterministic reification and voluntaristic individualisation. These polarisations often come under the umbrella of structure–agency or society–individual questions. Both have been chided for being conduits of ‘Eurocentric’ onto-epistemological scholarship that perpetuates contemporary Western Enlightenment ignorance of the views, knowledges and experiences of non-European peoples (Pepperell 2016; Bhambra 2013; Goody 2002; c.f. responses to Linklater 2016 in Hobson et. al. 2017). Eurocentrism critiques of Elias and Beck present a deterministic reification accusation of being Trojan horses for European ‘progress’ power superiority, because of their concepts of civilisation in the case of Elias, and cosmopolitanisation in the case of Beck. There is also the voluntaristic individualisation allegation that their work dismisses the agency of non-Western peoples.

Both sets of critiques are premised on an egocentric model of knowledge development that places exclusive categories as the sole object of study. The egocentric model presumes that the only ‘valid’ forms of knowledge are those pertaining to particular individuals, nations, and/or larger societies, with no possibility for any form of relational understandings between these categories.

In contrast, the sociologies of Elias and Beck offer a more relational model that reorientates research to the study of human interdependencies and power relations. Beck’s later accounts of cosmopolitanisation processes engages with

\textsuperscript{6}For differing accounts on the possibility for a sociological synthesis of Foucault see Hughes (2010); Dunning and Hughes (2013); Fox (1998).

\textsuperscript{7}For a critique of this approach from an IR perspective see Jeffery (2005).
Elias’s figurational sociology to highlight changing patterns of identifications that interweave smaller particular figurations with larger universal figurations (see Beck and Levy 2013: 9-10). Firstly, Elias (2012a [1939]: 474) and Beck (1992: 184) are highly critical of linear accounts of ‘progress’ highlighting the ambiguities of Western state-societal formations. They spoke of progressions in the technical sense of expanding human interdependencies (Liston and Mennell 2009: 53; Beck 2006: 74). Secondly, both focus on the development and perpetuation of unequal societal power relations that has affected Western and non-Western identifications (Elias 2012a [1939]: 472-474); Beck 2006: 80). Elias and Beck would be hesitant in replacing one form of subjective methodology with another form of subjective methodology (see Beck 2006: 2), because that in turn ignores how groups have become interdependent and the forms of power relations that affect the boundaries between peoples.

Elias and Beck share a common commitment to Wissenssoziologie (sociology of knowledge). The investigation of the mutual expansions and contractions of human knowledge processes in ways that are both planned and unplanned. Beck’s sociology of risk is a cognitive sociological effort: “political sociology and [the] theory of the risk society is in essence cognitive sociology” (Beck 1992: 55). By “cognitive” Beck is referring to the development of knowledge processes. This parallels the links between Elias and Karl Mannheim highlighted by Richard Kilminster (2007). The model of the risk society is an account of the unintended consequences of long-term human relations. The awareness of these processes often arouses modes of unawareness of these same developmental relations, shaping the reciprocation of societal power relations.

There is also a mutual ethos to develop a more practical conceptual vocabulary, which does not reduce conceptualisations of societal processes to static conditions. One of the defining features of process sociology is resistance to the common tendency to reduce the development of human relations into isolated, static, unchanging objects, through conceptualisations such as agency – structure, and “the individual and society” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 106-108; Dunning and Hughes 2013: 50-56). Beck shares this commitment to eschewing “process-reduction” (Elias
2012b [1978]: 107; Dunning and Hughes 2013: 51), remarking the need for a “process-orientated sociology” to investigate cosmopolitanisation “i.e., the systemic attempt to avoid the reduction of process to static concepts” (Beck 2006: 94).

Beck (1992; 1999) draws attention to how understandings of risk have become process reductive. He tries to processualise risk through the interconnection with the concept of “reflexive modernisation”. The process theorisation of risk by Beck connects with Elias’s observation about the “scientification of modes of speaking and thinking”. How certain conceptualisations from the natural sciences have been superficially appropriated into explanations of human relations in the social sciences (Elias 2012b [1978]: 12-13).

Migration & Societal Fortification

The second contribution of the thesis is to offer a unique way of understanding the socio-psychological tensions circulated by interpretations of transnational migration. I do not devote sustained attention to secondary material in migration studies, because the focus is on the socio-psychological power struggles and changes in power balances amongst the diverse societal groupings that make up liberal democratic state-societies. My approach moves beyond Torpey’s (1998) Weberian account of state monopolisation over the means of movement. It is less a study of migration and more an investigation into forms of the societal relations that often come under the umbrella ‘migration studies’. Conceptualisations of migration are inseparable from the wider conceptualisations of societal development (for attempts see Castles 2010; Castles 2007; Zolberg 1989; Castles et.al 2014).

Representations of transnational migration mobilise the tensions within the duality of normative codes, reviving dormant webs of association within the habituated identifications that constitute liberal democratic state-societies.

My study reconstructs the ongoing socio-historic processes embedded in depictions of migration. Suliman (2015: 705) remarks that migration is “constitutive of the
politics of development, by which social relations are organised through world historical processes” (c.f. Manning 2014). Migration implicitly refers to the development of long-term, large-scale processes that include for example, militarisation, industrialisation, urbanisation, technization\(^8\), and the broader developments of ever-larger human groupings across the course of human history.

My thesis investigates how the migration language of British and Australian Prime Ministers propagated more fortified modes of societal orientation. Fortification processes emphasise the restrictive forms of thinking and narrow means of societal orientation that are mutually interdependent with substantive practices. The building of ‘walls\(^9\) and wider militarisation processes within and beyond societies are evidence of wider socio-psychological fortification processes that are more than just a “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994; c.f. Andreas 2003; Carter and Poast 2015). Physical fortifications and practices are interdependent with broader socio-psychological fortifications, and perpetuated by particular forms of societal relations. Socio-psychological fortifications may continue even after the elimination of physical fortifications\(^{10}\). The societal processes and forms of power relations that sustain the continuation and/or expansion of socio-psychological fortifications demand greater examination and reconstruction.

**Reductive Conceptualisations in Literature**

Interpretations of transnational movement by political leaders can circulate shared anxieties. Contemporary discussions of the migration experienced by societies such as Britain and Australia utilise reductive conceptualisations that diminish understandings of shared anxieties and societal fortification processes. I have categorised these frameworks as liberal paradox, securitisation, and classical moral panic literatures.

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\(^{8}\) See Elias’s (1995) essay on Technization and Civilization.

\(^{9}\) See recent efforts by US President Donald Trump (Durkin 2018).

\(^{10}\) For example, the reunification of Germany in the 1990’s did not automatically resolve the societal inequalities between West and East Germany (Beck 2013a; Fuchs-Schündeln et. al. 2010; Nolte and McKee 2004).
The first model is the liberal paradox literature informed by politico-economic theory. This model uses “container state” understandings of society, where the facilitation of internal movement has impeded external movement (Mau et. al. 2012: 24; Agnew 1994). Mau et. al. (2012: 2) have remarked that “liberal states face the challenge of facilitating wanted mobility and restricting unwanted mobility”. These contradictions formulate the “liberal paradox” of markets versus rights, where humanitarian and economic liberties are set against the rights of sovereign groups (Hollifield 1992: 231-232; McNevin 2007: 626).

Liberal paradox models have an implicitly thin account of conflicting societal power relations. International economic forces prompt greater openness and domestic political forces prompt greater closure (Hollifield 2004: 886). For Hollifield, migration forms part of economic forces that include trade and investment. Highly skilled professionals are welcome into ‘the nation’, while low-skilled and unskilled migrants/proletarians are unwelcome (Mavroudi 2010: 223). Efforts to conceptualise the inconsistency of inclusionary and exclusionary tendencies have taken a more functionalist turn, exemplified in Boswell’s (2007) account of the state’s pursuit of legitimacy. Hampshire (2013: 12) uses a similar model to build an account of liberal statehood noting how openness in the form of capitalist accumulation and constitutionalism, is juxtaposed with nationhood and representative democracy. Liberal paradox literature reproduces a series of self-contained reductive models.

The second model is securitisation literature. This model has developed in the field of international relations (see Balzacq et. al. 2016). Securitisation introduces language to understand societal contradictions. This is through the exploration of “threats to referent objects”, where ‘actors’ use speech acts to ‘securitise’ particular threats and to support emergency measures (Buzan et. al. 1998: 4-5, 25; Waever 1995: 54-58). There are divisions between an internalist textual speech act focused reading, and an externalist social structural reading (Stritzel 2007: 359). Societal contradictions are reduced to combinations of linguistic utterances and structural ‘logics’. The focus of securitisation models is more on a pronouncement of danger towards a referent object most commonly ‘the state’, which simulates an
‘extraordinary’ reaction to an identifiable threat. There is much less discussion of how certain ‘threats’ become understood as endangering particular societal groups.

Discussions of migration as a threat to societies have encouraged applications of the securitisation model to cases in Australia (McDonald 2011; Curley and Vandyk 2017; McKay et. al. 2017), the EU (Léonard 2010) and the UK (Huysmans and Buonfino 2008). Immigration discourses illuminate the interrelation of three modes of securitisation: national, societal and human, each bound to the relationship between the self and the other (Doty 1998: 72-74). The combination of concerns around internal security, cultural security, “crisis of the welfare state” has contributed to the representation of migration as a danger to Western European societies (Huysmans 2000: 752, 758). Huysmans and Buonfino (2008: 767) note the securitising frames within UK parliamentarian political debates around counter-terrorism and migration/asylum. These frames create a politics of exception and unease: the threat to national life brings a trade-off of liberty for security, and the use of policing technologies to combat deviant practices. In the EU and Australia, migration management involves the intertwinement of humanitarian and securitisation logics, forming part of the biopolitical modes of governance with the focus on care and the continuation of life, which has developed into an autoimmune crisis (Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017: 543). The securitisation model repeats the same reductive conceptualisations of liberal paradox scholarship with greater obsession over concepts like ‘threat’ and ‘security’, demonstrating an insufficient understanding of how perceived societal threats come about.

Liberal paradox and securitisation models are process reductive. They provide thin conceptualisations of societal relations in ways that are ahistorical, unchanging and presume false demarcations that separate interconnected areas such as economics and politics, international and domestic, groups and individuals.

More recent critiques of liberal paradox note the intersection of politics and economics: the interconnections between the development and maintenance of middle-class national status groups along class/status, ethnic, gender lines (Garapich 2008: 739; Elrick and Winter 2017). Horvath and Meeus (2016: 101) also
note that the model lacks “a diagnosis of concrete historical constellations”. Paradox as a concept is a static understanding that presumes that something is contrary to a commonly accepted attitude or view. What those attitudes are and how they developed remains unclear.

In securitisation literature, there is an unspoken and unchanging prescription of what ‘ordinary’ societal relations should be, which is deeper than McDonald's (2011) preference for the desecuritisation of issues. Desecuritisation assumes that societal relations can return to a static condition of normality. De/securitisation models ignore how those societal relations have changed through persistent representations of extreme threat/ catastrophe that directs attachments into the fetishized mythologisation of particular groups. Securitisation models slice societal relations into threats and non-threats reducing any comprehension of the long-term processes that situate how something becomes securitised and threatening in the first place. Emergency measures can overtime become more permanent features of societies11. Persistent repetition of the need for emergency measures creates a new normal that can become part of habituated identifications. What is also missing is an account of how certain groups come to feel insecure and how their desire to be more secure often involves the stigmatisation of other societal groups.

The vocabulary of liberal paradox and securitisation literatures such as ‘self and other’, ‘liberty and security’, ‘threat and non-threat’ blocks the conceptualisation of sociological processes. These self-contained terms cultivate restrictive conceptualisations that cannot grasp the interconnected development of how some forms of movement are more desired while other forms of movement are less desired in societies like Britain and Australia.

The third model is classical moral panic literature, elaborated in the area of cultural studies and sociology. Moral panic literatures introduce emotions to understanding societal contradictions. There is a deeper account of societal relations that

11 See Elias’s (2012 [1939]) example of how French kings repeatedly invoked ‘emergency taxation decrees’ to gradually monopolise orientation in feudal French society. A more contemporary example is in sections of the Malaysian Constitution that can be traced to emergency measures from the Malayan Emergency (see Whiting 2013).
recognises both conflicting power relations and language practices compared with liberal paradox and securitisation literatures.

First conceptualised by Stanley Cohen, moral panic emphasises a phase of societies where particular people and/or social groups become understood as threats to social values. Depicted as stylised folk devils by the mass media, which serves as examples of who ‘we’ should not be (Cohen 2002 [1972]: 1-2). Moral panics depict cultural conflict driven by emotional energy between resistance and innovation on one side, and indignation and outrage on the other, which arouse feelings of anxiety (Young 2009: 4, 13). The depiction of refugees and asylum seekers as objects of moral panic show politicised clusters of social identities (Cohen 2002 [1972]: Xxi).

A range of studies exploring migration representations have utilised the ‘classical’ model of moral panic. Slovenia experienced three cyclical moral panics around immigration in 1992, 1999 and 2000-2001. This was where the media contributed to ethnic antagonisms between Slovenes and foreigners, creating national identifications that distanced Slovenia from the Balkans and Eastern Europe and embraced the “European, civilised world” (Erjavec 2003: 97). Exaggerated and politically opportunistic fears of mass migration from new EU member states in the Netherlands from September 2003 to February 2004 constituted a contemporary moral panic (Pijpers 2006: 95). Bogen and Marlowe (2015:1, 6) note that in absence of critical discussions, contemporary depictions of asylum seekers by politicians and the media, a “culture of indifference”, is moving New Zealand towards a moral panic. In Australia, the moral panic over asylum seekers and refugees has become “relatively permanent” due to recurring “fears and anxieties” bound to “a global moral panic over fundamentalist Islam” and the demonization of people from the Middle East (Martin 2015: 307-308). In the aftermath of the 2005 Cronulla riots in

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12 Cohen (2002 [1972]) admits that he and Jock Young borrowed the term from Marshall McLuhan (2001 [1964]). A mark of the success of the term has been its transition into popular usage. For example see Devetak (2004: 103-104) and Baumann (2016). An unplanned process/unintended consequence of the popularisation of the term moral panic has been the distortion of moral panic as a sociological concept. This is changing with the work from the likes of Rohloff et.al. (2016).

13 There is also the term “migration panic” recently used by Baumann (2016; cf. Walters 2006: 32), which showed an unawareness of the work of Cohen.
Australia, there has been the revival of ‘ethnic crime’ moral panics by the NSW government, manipulating fears of immigrant crime gangs to support law and order policies (Poynting 2006: 90).

The classical model of moral panic has been challenged by more revisionist efforts. This research highlighted problems of normativity, temporality, and (un)interntionality (Rohloff, and Wright 2010). These efforts further sociologise moral panic and offer a more dynamic way of conceptualising societal contradictions through the interconnected development of power relations, language practices and the resonance of emotions.

Revisionist moral panic research highlights the interconnection of moralising and emotionalising processes. This is through engagement with “wider historical structural processes” from process/figurational sociology (Hier 2011: 12; Rohloff, and Wright 2010; Rohloff 2011a; Rohloff 2011b; Rohloff 2008), as well as the risk sociology of Beck with the merger of moral panic and risk research (Hier 2011: 12; Howarth 2013; Ungar 2001; Hier 2003). There is an effort to further conceptualise morals and panics in a processual sociological way in order to show the connection of moralisation processes to longer-term developments, and how the deployment of moralising discourses can obscure practices of power (Rohloff et.al. 2016: 7-8).

‘Panics’ involve constellations of emotions. Rohloff et.al (2016: 12) note the neglect of emotive processes. This is what Christopher Husbands (1994: 193) has called the anxieties of national identities that appear as “crises”, which erupt in response to certain events, expressing latent concerns. Panics about migration are long-term societal disputes that have become “well established” into societies with ownership of the issue being dominated by particular societal groups (Best 2011: 49). How migration panics continue to repeat in an almost never-ending cycle is yet to be fully conceptualised. The sociological conceptualisation of moral panic by the revisionists remains incomplete, as the interconnections between process and risk sociology need to be further elucidated.

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14 This is used in preference to ‘constitution’ to direct attention not just to the structure but also the relations of emotions.
My work builds on the research of the revisionists to further the research in an expanding space of sociological conceptualisations in International Relations (IR)\textsuperscript{15} that also integrates emotional management (for instance see Ross 2014: 154; Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Bleiker et. al. 2014; Hutchison 2016). IR, Sociology and Psychology are part of wider Societal Scientific efforts to understand the development of human relations both chronologically and phaseologically\textsuperscript{16}.

Method: Language, Leaders & Societal Power Relations

My thesis reconstructs the societal processes embedded in the speeches, interviews and press conferences of British and Australian leaders. Process reconstruction and the model of process sociology is further elaborated in Chapter 1. The following section explains the combination of process constructive and discursive methods that inform the thesis, the decision to focus on the language of political leaders, and the choice of material.

Process reconstructive method offers a model of power and interdependency that can reveal the common ideologies and mythologies\textsuperscript{17} that accentuate shared anxieties and the developmental tensions fortifying/defortifying British and Australian societies. The goal of process reconstruction is to reassemble the blind societal processes and forms of power relations that situate how people and their groups orientate themselves across interweaving webs of societal interdependence (Elias 2012 [1978]: 149; Dunning and Hughes 2013).

This method complements a specific focus on textual performative material. Societal scientific research that focuses on texts often comes under the umbrella of discourse analysis (Milliken 1999; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002; Neumann 2008; Krebs and Jackson 2007). One of the more dominant forms of discursive analysis

\textsuperscript{15} For example examples of Process Sociology see van Benthem van den Bergh 1977, van Benthem van den Bergh 1992, Linklater 2004, Linklater 2011, Linklater 2016, and Linklater and Liston’s edited edition of the journal \textit{Human Figurations} 2012. The only sustained example of an IR engagement with the Risk Sociology of Beck has been Clapton 2014.


\textsuperscript{17} See Elias (2012 [1978]) and Gouldsblom (1987: 334) on the sociologist as a myth hunter (Mythenjäger).
takes inspiration from the work of Michel Foucault (2002 [1966]). This is where discourse can be understood in three approaches: a general area for all statements, an individualised group of statements referring to structures within discourse, and a regulatory practice concentrating on the rules that produce texts (Mills 1997: 6-7).

The focus on societal discursive formations and forms of power regulation is a common theme across the diverse range of discursive methods in the societal sciences. The intersection of power/knowledge and the continuum of societal and self-restraints developed by Foucault intersects with the work of Elias (Hughes 2010), as well as the strand of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), employed by Richard Jackson (2005), who in turn builds on the work of Norman Fairclough (2015; 2012; 2003).

CDA emphasises argumentative structures within the text, which complements process reconstructive methods. The approach developed in CDA understands the language in texts as “a socially conditioned process” practiced by sections of society (Fairclough 2015: 55-56). CDA concentrates on the argumentative structure and makeup of texts to reveal the power practices within and the behind the content (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Arguments can disseminate “imaginaries”: future visions of societal relations that “give people reasons for action” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012: 104; see Jessop 2003).

The argumentative claims and vocabularies within texts as understood by CDA are interdependent with the power relations of groupings within societies. Language practices and rhetorical performances disseminate the boundaries of how people come to understand particular societal relations and orientations.

My thesis concentrates on the argumentative claims and rhetorical performances in the texts of political leaders, who intersect the range of groups that made up liberal-democratic societies that broadcast a range of often competing identifications.

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18 The differences as noted by Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:18-23) are in questions of ideology, ontology and analytical focus.
Their texts set the tone for societal orientations in the society they lead, through their embeddedness across both ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ (see Putnam 1988) web of relations. In degrees, political leaders can raise and maintain the salience of certain issues in the forefront of public consciousness, while lowering and overlooking other issues.

Political leaders are more visible societal coordinators, articulating risk orientations that morally propagate forms of emotional management.

Political leaders are coordinators of societal functions. In liberal-democratic societies, groupings that come under headings such as ‘state’/government/polis incorporate the coordination of functions across a variety of interconnected bonds. The functional differentiation of societal roles through developing webs of the interdependence generates power opportunities. Access to and occupation of coordination and integration roles circulates dilemmas of institutional control over ‘who’ should occupy these roles (Elias 2012b [1978]: 140).

Decreasing power differentials between government and governed can circulate higher degrees of involved insecure forms of thinking within political establishments. These developments increase the chance for political leaders to be less focused on the functional practices of governing/coordinating, and more focused on short-term political survival. Blends of involved and detached forms of orientation can swing towards the pursuit greater fantasy based understanding of societal relations. In this context, the pursuit of “planned actions in the form of government decisions may have [even greater] unanticipated, unplanned consequences” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 141). The infusion of greater fantasy content into the language of leaders increases the likelihood for situations where the singular pursuit of goals such as political survival or ‘the national interest’, can block the perception of wider effects and relations.
The language of political leaders\textsuperscript{19} disseminates a range of risk orientations. Articulations of the term ‘risk’ itself assemble certain blends of societal relations, which legitimise their power claims. Political leaders raise the awareness of some globalised relations and lower the awareness of other relations. Leaders are the producers of some transnational risks that are categorised as harmless, and the protectors from transnational risks categorised as harmful. Risks deemed relatively safe and harmless can direct attention away from more harmful repercussions, which sustain particular power relations, revealing the kinds of sub-state societal groups reliant on the harmfulness/harmlessness of a particular risk.

Political leaders such as Prime Ministers are moral propagators\textsuperscript{20}. They circulate forms of emotional management oscillating across a continuum of societal–self-restraints and releases. The vocabulary of leaders is both a response to underlying societal developments and attempts to direct those same experiences with varying degrees of success. They are involved in a constant array of negotiations that showcase forms of emotional management (see Mastenbroek 1999): circulating greater restraints of some emotions and greater releases of others. The language of leaders helps substantiate the kinds of practices that become accepted as ‘reasonable’ actions. Their texts detail the circumstances for societal action, establishing the parameters of thinking, building public narratives, through a voluminous corpus of official speeches, media interviews, press releases and other public addresses (Jackson 2005: 2, 17). Leaders are also reliant on what Richard Rose (2001) calls “managed populism”. The democratic features of liberal democratic societies require leaders to hold degrees of popularity and affective connections within their own political parties, and across society as a whole.

By investigating the language of leaders, I provide an insight into the power and interdependency tensions, which highlight the kinds of societal formations that make up liberal democratic societies. A more cohesive study of leader language verifies, how “the axes of tension and figurational dynamics in the one case

\textsuperscript{19} See Beck’s (2013a) evaluation of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who is given the moniker “Merkiavelli”.

\textsuperscript{20} I am indebted to Jason Hughes for this suggestion.
facilitates comparisons and an understanding of how other instances came of
develop differently” (Mennell 1998: 88).

Textual performative representations of migration by leaders are one way of
understanding the development of shared anxieties in liberal-democratic societies.
The migration texts of Prime Ministers in Britain and Australia provide a unique
insight into socio-psychological tensions and orientations of these societies,
because of ambiguous movement of various groups with varying power ratios. The
thesis contributes to wider inquiries into societal representations of migration,
such as those projected in the media (see Pickering 2001; Gale 2004; Lueck et. al.
2015). Further research would need to corroborate the extent to which the
processes and forms of orientation found in migration representations are also
present across other forms of societal relations.

For the British case, the primary source material was taken from the UK
Government Web Archive accessed through the National Archives. This is the
repository of public statements and transcripts made by Prime Ministers Blair,
Brown, Cameron and May. As well as the British Political Speech online archive,
with speeches made at annual Political Party Conferences. For the Australian case,
I used the PANDORA Archive of Australian Prime Ministerial Websites run by the
National Library of Australia. These websites hold a repository of public statements
and transcripts by Prime Ministers Howard, Rudd, Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull.
Each of these archives included some addresses to parliament. I did not undertake
an exploration of Hansard. The emphasis of my study is on public statements to a
wider societal audience, as opposed to the more narrow audience of Parliament21.

The migration language of Australian Prime Ministers displayed heavy engagement
with popular media22 through the vast number of press conferences and doorstop
interviews. They have become media celebrities in themselves. Blair was an

21 Future research would need to do a comparison of the parliamentary addresses and the media
addresses, as well as how television news reports selectively distort certain parliamentary
addresses.
22 Future research could build on this study through a long-term popular media analysis across both
British and Australian societies using a range of mediums such as both news and social media.
exception among the British Prime Ministers of this period, as Brown, Cameron and May all preferred set piece speeches and addresses to a captive audience, rather than more spontaneous interviews. Spontaneous interviews can give equally as much information as set piece speeches, through glimpses into the thoughts and orientations resonating at the forefront of a leader’s consciousness in ways that are both purposeful and accidental. Constant public engagement makes Australian PMs more receptive to the concerns of their societies, but they can also be held hostage by certain sections on whose support they are dependent. The greater reliance on set piece speeches by British PMs has the advantage of providing greater detail and explanatory depth, because of the more explicit influence of speech writers and other members of staff. That said the content of any public performance by a PM shows degrees of influence exerted by Ministerial staff.

My thesis is an exploration of how Prime Ministers circulate particular claims and tensions from their attempts to steer the kinds of societal relations that contextualise large groupings such as Britain and Australia. It is not a systematic fact-checking exercise of each and every claim made by leaders under discussion.

Each primary reference expresses sets of relations that form part of wider societal processes. These have been cited using an 8 digit combination of day.month.year. I separated mentions of migration using the following keywords: refugee, asylum, migration/migrant/immigration, population, border, risk, movement, interdependence. Over the course of the study, particularly in the Australian case, iterations around the term “boat” gained particular prominence. The Appendix at the end of the thesis has a full list of primary sources. It enables the verification of the claims made in the thesis, and provides a repository for future research.

The study begins in 2001 and ends in 2017, a timeframe of approximately 16 years. 2001 was chosen as a starting point because it was an election year in both Britain and Australia with the re-election of Tony Blair and John Howard. The year

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23 The vocation of ‘spin doctors’/Communications Managers was depicted in the Australian political satire *The Hollowmen* broadcast in 2008, as well as the British political satire *The Thick of It*. For a more detailed explanation satire as a form of political education see Hall (2014).
coincided with the beginning of the US led ‘war on terror’, discussions in Britain about the Sangatte refugee camp\textsuperscript{24} near Calais, and the Tampa\textsuperscript{25} crisis in Australia. It ends in 2017 with the Brexit process in Britain and the ongoing efforts by Australian leaders to mitigate the effects of mandatory detaining asylum seekers arriving by boat.

**Thesis Outline**

The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part involves the conceptualisation of shared anxieties. Chapter 1 explains the model and vocabulary of process sociology. Chapter 2 explains the model and vocabulary of risk sociology. These complementary frameworks help interpret the language of transnational migration projected by political leaders.

The second part evaluates the migration language of British and Australian Prime Ministers from 2001 to 2017. Showing how these representations fortified British and Australian societies. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the British Prime Ministerships of Blair, Brown (2001-2010), Cameron and May (2010–Present). Chapters 5 and 6 examine the Australian Prime Ministerships of Howard, Rudd 1 (2001–2010), Gillard, Rudd 2, Abbott, and Turnbull (2010–Present). The conclusion will summarise the conceptualisation of shared anxieties, the fortification processes in Britain and Australia and suggest further avenues for research.

\textsuperscript{24} See Schuster 2003; Cohen 2004.
\textsuperscript{25} See O’Doherty and Augoustinos 2008; Marr and Wilkinson 2004.
Chapter 1. Shared Anxieties & Process Sociology

My first chapter explains the model of process sociology and how it relates to the conceptualisation of shared anxieties. Soren Kierkegaard (2015 [1844]: 51) describes anxieties as the dialectic of “sympathetic antipathy and antipathetic sympathy”. Anxieties are more than just a psychological experience. They reveal the socio-structural tensions and overlapping identifications that can pull and stretch societies in different directions, the shared anxieties. Political leaders portray certain features of the society they speak and act for. They propagate the developmental tensions of those broader groupings. A process sociology framework can reconstruct the relations that situate representations of transnational migration by political leaders.

I will argue in this chapter that the model of process sociology provides a foundation for understanding shared anxieties. Process sociology presents a set of synthetic models that conceptualise the ways in which people have come to think and orientate themselves across a range of interconnected groups overtime. This blend of socio-psychological synthesis can help refine a larger sociological outlook for shared anxieties, through an amalgamation with risk sociology.

Processual models have been developed and refined by an international community of scholars influenced by the work of Norbert Elias (Dunning and Hughes 2013). These models offer sophisticated ways of understanding the development of knowledge, webs of interdependence and power relations. The growth of human knowledge (epistemic philosophy) parallels the development of human relations (history). Developmental knowledge processes are interdependent with the expression of societal identifications and the expansion of societal and self-constraints (psychology/psychoanalysis).

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explains the models of processual sociology. The second section explains that the vocabulary of process sociology can build a sociological model of shared anxieties. The third section shows
how the language representations of transnational migration by political leaders, can mobilise shared anxieties, dominate societal orientation, and steer the directions of societal change.

The Models of Process

The following section illustrates the models of process sociology that problematizes reductive conceptualisations in social science. Process sociology developed from the sociology of knowledge discussions in Weimar Germany. Sociology of knowledge approaches challenged the separation of thinking and being. The growth of reductive, static conceptualisations often linked to the perpetuation of political and intellectual ideologies form knowledge blockages that demand investigation.

The sociology of knowledge proposed by process sociology offers a more relational reconstructive model to understand the development of knowledge processes. It is an open people model that focuses on webs of human interdependencies, and shifting power ratios, illustrating how people (including researchers) develop their most rudimentary orientations of themselves in the world. This is through a balance of involvement and detachment, as part of overlapping interdependent groups. The tensions and anxieties of human groups are bound with webs of societal interdependencies, and intertwined with power relations. Process sociology offers an interplay of conceptualisation and empiricisation to understand the shared anxieties of human societies.

Reductive Knowledge Approach

Process models problematize the separation between thinking and being. This puzzle illuminated the sociology of knowledge (Wissenssoziologie). A strand of sociology that emerged from the intellectual milieu of Weimar Germany and inter-institutional intellectual status competition in German speaking universities from the 1900s to the early 1930s. It became a response to the ontic (objects of science) – ontological (questions of being) dualism in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time

The epistemological polarisations that characterised the political, philosophical and sociological discussions of Weimar Germany contextualised Elias’s development of a process/relational sociology. These polarities included subject–object, rational/irrational, relativism versus absolutism, culture versus civilisation (Kilminster 2007: 44-45). The common thread between Mannheim and the work of Elias, noted by Kilminster (2007: 47-49), is the concept of existential boundedness (Seinsverbundenheit). Sentience, the ability for human beings to perceive and feel, is relationally bounded with consciousness, the awareness and perception of one's surroundings, which varies over time.

Polarisations that illuminated discussions in Weimar sociology continue to contort discussions in both sociology and international relations today. More recent literature that builds on the work of Elias argues that contemporary trends and relations in Weimar Germany (both intellectual and political) could be understood and potentially overcome, through “the recovery of long-term horizons” (Bjork 2005; Linklater and Mennell 2010: 385).

Elias’s approach emphasised conceptual reconstruction that is verifiable through greater empirical research. Elias’s magnum opus *On The Process of Civilisation* (2012a [1939]), first published in 1939 suggests a more relational way of understanding the polarisation of societal relations. He reconstructs the long-term processes by which European societies came to see themselves as “more civilised” and better people. The study investigated the interdependencies between

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26 My addition, Elias’s preliminary solution to the culture-civilisation debate is in first section of *On the Process of Civilisation* (2012a [1939]).
emotional regulations, changes in societal structure, and state dominations over violence and taxation across both domestic and international relations.

Process sociology problematizes the metaphysical, epistemic–methodological and spatial–organisational polarisations that have developed in the social sciences (Goudsblom 1987: 322; Quilley and Loyal 2005: 813–814; Linklater and Mennell 2010: 410 with my additions). Metaphysical polarisations comprise debates about mind–body, individual versus society\textsuperscript{27}, material versus ideational\textsuperscript{28}, agency versus structure, self and the other\textsuperscript{29}, ‘we’ versus they\textsuperscript{30} and friend versus enemy\textsuperscript{31}. Epistemic–methodological polarisations encompass discussions around theory versus practice/empirics\textsuperscript{32}, natural science versus social science\textsuperscript{33}, and micro versus macro. Spatial–organisational polarisations comprise debates about ‘the economy’ versus ‘the state/politics\textsuperscript{34}’, order versus disorder\textsuperscript{35}, and ‘domestic policy’ versus ‘foreign/international\textsuperscript{36} policy’. These polarisations as well as terms such as human condition\textsuperscript{37} and human nature\textsuperscript{38} often appear in everyday speech and the media\textsuperscript{39}. The terms presume an unchanging insight of a particular group of people, defining what is human and juxtaposing relations/practices that are non-human.

\textsuperscript{27} In *The Society of Individuals* Elias expends significant effort in explaining this false distinction.

\textsuperscript{28} See Katzenstein and Sil 2004; Sil and Katzenstein 2010

\textsuperscript{29} For example, see Neumann 1996, and Neumann and Welsh 1991.

\textsuperscript{30} See Elias’s (2012 [1978]: 132-133) discussion of this polarisation, where he notes that many sociological theories such as those of Durkheim focused on exploring ‘they’ functions/attachments, missing interconnected ‘we’ attachments.

\textsuperscript{31} This distinction is made by political theorist Carl Schmitt (1996 [1932]).

\textsuperscript{32} In conversations with some fellow PhDs during the first year of my doctoral research, I expressed my desire to do a project that combined theorisation with empiricisation. This was met at best with bewilderment, at worst with indignation of why are you doing that? I found myself categorised by some PhDs as a ‘theorist’ incapable of and someone who should never attempt empirical research.

\textsuperscript{33} See Gouldsblom’s (1990: 28-30) critique of the distinctions drawn by biologist Richard Dawkins.

\textsuperscript{34} Belief in an autonomous economic sphere can be traced to the development of the industrial entrepreneurial bourgeoisie relations with pre-industrial aristocracy. The belief ignores the interdependencies between occupational organisation and state organisation (Elias 2012 [1978] 135-139).

\textsuperscript{35} See Bleiker (2005); Elias 2012 [1939].

\textsuperscript{36} For an attempt to move this polarisation see Linklater (2016). Elias (2012 [1978]: 64 my italics) remarks how “it is even more unrealistic than before to make a theoretical distinction between, on the one hand, a social development seen as internal to the state in question and, on the other hand, the development of relationships between states, of the world-wide balance of power system, or in other words the society of states, which are seen as matters of ‘foreign policy’.”

\textsuperscript{37} See van Benthem van der Bergh 2012.

\textsuperscript{38} This is also the name of an Australian popular music group formed in 1989.

\textsuperscript{39} For example, see Dreger 2015; Brändlin 2017; DW 2010; Rooksby 2010.
The development static polarisations in the social sciences corresponds with the ongoing growth of universities as research/learning institutions (see Gouldsblom 1990), and personalised political and intellectual identifications. They have become both a conceptual vocabulary and form of intellectual identification. Each of these dichotomies set up an either/or exchange of knowledge, where the most correct, most authentic, the most ‘real’ explanation becomes the one favoured by the speaker themselves. More idealised explanations become confused for more realistic explanations, becoming monolithic categorical imperatives. Explanations are ideologised⁴⁰, becoming static nouns.

Ideologised explanations in the forms of -ism⁴¹ and/or -ity suffixes cultivate basic forms of societal orientation in the form of exclusive doctrines, standards, and/or pathological⁴² conditions. These forms of orientation can be emotionally satisfying, with the promise of short-term immediate relief and cures for societal ills, encouraging actions dictated by wishes or fears (Elias 2012b [1978]: 65; Elias 2008b [1990]: 209). Elias (2013 [1989]: 173) remarks how “in many cases norms are conceptualised in a highly idealised manner which allows the user to see those functions of norms which he or she wishes them to have and blocks the perception of those functions which he or she does not wish to perceive”. Knowledge blockages facilitate narrow and often insecure forms of orientation that inhibit broader long-term understandings of societal relations.

All of these polarisations are false dichotomies. Attempts to bridge these gaps are fruitless exercises⁴³, when each side is understood as an independent self-contained sphere of human relations. There has been an ongoing distortion of sociology and ideology, bound with shifts in the distribution of societal power and tussles

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⁴⁰ My term that means make into an ideology.
⁴¹ A suffix denoting a unique doctrine.
⁴² Alcoholism is one example.
⁴³ See Kilminster (2007: 30-31), quotes a question and answer exchange during a seminar at the University of Leeds in 1974, where Elias continually replied “Why do you ask that question?” when asked “How do I know what I know”. This partially explains the struggles and reservations about International Relations theorising during my Honours year. Where I attempted to bridge a gap that was tenuous in the first place (see footnote 5) and none of the scholars around me could help because they themselves were invested in closed person models, all be it in different ways.
between “great social belief systems” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 148; Dunning and Hughes 2013). This twists conceptualisations of societal organisation by mistaking one form of human arrangement as illustrative of all forms of human arrangement. For example, in the contemporary era, there is the ongoing misunderstanding by some sections of societies that ‘economic’ organisation is the only form of human arrangement that exceeds all others.

Polarised outlooks reproduce a “we-less I” model that understands the relations of human beings as a closed person (homo clausus) (Elias 2010: 178-179). It is an image of a mature ‘rational’ unchanging western adult male as the model for the human sciences (Quilley and Loyal 2005: 813). The model has dominated Western understandings from the Renaissance onwards. Closed person models understand knowledge to be ‘produced’ by a singular isolated person completely separate from the people around them.

The attenuation of emotional identifications and legitimisation of some attachments over others increases the likelihood for antagonised societal relations, when one group of people understands themselves in complete exclusion from another group of people. For example in Schmitt’s friend–enemy dichotomy, there is little contemplation of how people identified as ‘friends’ came, and continue to be distinctive from people identified as ‘enemies’. The development of static categories such as race, gender, ethnicity and class are “ideological avoidance” actions, isolating peripheral characteristics from the legitimisation of unequal societal relations (Mennell 1998: 121-139). There is the process reduction (Zustandsreduktion) of the longstanding development of human interdependence, and the forms of societal power relations.

44 For example, between capitalism and communism during the period understood as the Cold War from 1945-1991.
45 I use the term organisation, as a substitute for the term ‘structure’.
46 Here Elias is particularly critical of Jean-Paul Sartre’s work and Albert Camus’s (2014 [1942]) character Meursault from The Outsider (L’Etranger).
47 Certain forms of societal binding such as friend–enemy dichotomy can escalate into a primal contest (see Elias 2012 [1978]: 71).
To summarise, reductive knowledge processes perpetuated through frozen dichotomies diminish, rather expand the ways in which people have come to know and relate to the world around them.

**Process Sociology Approach**

Process sociology reorientates conceptualisations in the social sciences away from static, reductive polarisations, towards more dynamic relational models. This is the shift from singular closed person (*homo clausus*) understandings to open people (*homines aperti*) in plural (Elias 2012b [1978]: 120). There is no “I’ without ‘we’” (Elias 2007: 19).

Process models understand the forms of interdependent relations within and between groups of peoples and wider living organisms: “the manifold ways in which people are bounded to each other, in co-operation as well as conflict” (Goudsblom 1987: 330).

The focus on human interdependencies is a departure from contemporary attitudes in the social sciences in two ways. The first is the idealised desire for either a more pleasant, or more conflictual image of society (Goudsblom 1987: 331-322). The second attitude is what Hughes (2013) calls the “habits of good sociology”. These habits include the prioritisation of empirical legitimacy, political alignment, and the relativistic egalitarianism of increasing specialisation over synthetisation. There is the need to shift from the use of static nouns, in the form of -ism, and -ity suffixes, to more processual terms to avoid process reductive formulations (Quilley and Loyal 2005: 814).

The start of a process sociological inquiry is to focus on webs of interdependencies, and fluctuating power ratios. The term power ratio provides a more dynamic way of explaining the tensions within diverse interweaving characteristics of relationships, across a range of societal relations such as work, leisure, love and learning. These tensions develop in conjunction with uneven regulations over non-human events, interpersonal, and personal relationships, the “triad of basic
controls” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 111, 151-152; Elias 2007: 106; Goudsblom 1987: 331-322). Mennell (1998: 115) remarks that the struggle for societal power is “a polymorphous, figurationally generated property of all social interdependencies” where “the styles of life competing and coalescing groups were neither static nor isolated traditions, but developing over time, changing and adapting in response to each other and in accordance with changing power differentials in each strata”. Power relations and ratios can resemble static objects, frequently in the form of symbols, which one group of people can hold over another group of people.

Symbolic power representations are shared between people in ways that characterise forms of interdependent relations. For example, through instruments of violence, monuments, gestures, clothing, decrees and/or other societal codes. Process sociology asks how have particular polarisations “emerged and become rigid in repeated contests between interdependent groups of adversaries” (Goudsblom 1987: 322). To understand how events and polarised practices are in contemporary society. There needs to be an understanding how these came to be.

A processual approach to understanding the interdependent development of human relations involves a sociological conceptualisation of knowledge. In blends of involvement and detachment that refer to the “different ways in which human beings regulate themselves. In their self-regulation people can be more detached or more involved” (Elias 2007: 29). Involvement and detachment is an open ended conceptualisation of “whole persons”, their emotional balances and relations with other people (Kilminter 2007: 115). It is a five dimensional understanding of how people come know about the world around them. This orientation comprises the 3 dimensions of space, the 4th of time/history, and the 5th of experience (Elias 2011). The fifth experiential dimension includes emotional regulations through symbols and other societal codes (Elias 2012b [1978]: 132-133). Blends of involvement and detachment break through the Weberian polarisation of political–values and value–freedom, and the reduction of knowledge processes into purely subjective or purely objective understandings (Weber 2009 [1946]).
Processual approaches to the development of human knowledge directs attention to the socio-psychological attributes of human relations. This opens the space for a higher degree of synthesis. One thread of the sociology of knowledge is to trace the development and consequences of the ‘sciences’ as understood by human societies.

The other thread is to focus on the development of what process sociologists call the means of orientation. This refers to the rudimentary ways in which people navigate their multifaceted relationships across a range of overlapping interweaving groups. I focus more on the socio-psychological means of orientation thread, noting that both strands are not mutually exclusive.

Human knowledge processes form an open spectrum in blends of subject and object orientation. More involved magical-mythical knowledge that is relatively subject-orientated, and more emotive, forms an elastic tension with more detached verifiable knowledge that is relatively object-orientated, and less emotive (Mennell 1998: 160). People orientate themselves through blends of involved and detached knowledge. Blends of fantastical and verifiable content situate how they regulate themselves as well as others. There is no mutually exclusive polarisation between independent oppositions. According to Kilminster (2007: 121-122), it is misleading to equate involvement with passionate feeling and detachment with emotionless reason. Passionate advocacy with greater subject orientation is mutually inclusive with the pursuit of more verifiable knowledge that has greater object orientation.

The challenge faced in the social sciences is that people are both the subjects, and the objects of study. It is easier for more involved ideological magical-mythical knowledge to distort the pursuit of more detached verifiable understandings of human societies. For example, Elias notes how Marx managed to distort a more detached insight about human ‘class’ stratification into a more involved teleological narrative, which turned the working class into an idealised unchanging model for

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48 This is what process scholars have called reality-congruent/reality-adequate knowledge (Mennell 2016; Linklater 2016; Kilminster 2007).

49 A recent example is Alice Dreger’s (2015) memoir navigating her advocacy for intersex rights and her attachment to scientific research.
all of humanity (Elias 2012b [1978]: 181-182; see Saramago 2015). Eric Dunning highlights the “need for human beings is the production of a solid body of reliable knowledge about themselves, the complex societies that they form and why people recurrently drift into crisis after crisis” (Rojek 2004: 343). These crises are periods of sustained highly involved modes of thinking50.

The ratio of unplanned unintended consequences to planned intended consequences of societal practices is bound to particular power ratios. These develop from webs of interdependence, in ways that have exceeded societal understandings of these interconnections (Dunning and Hughes 2013: 47; Elias 2007: 115; Mennell 1998: 170).

“Viewed over a long time span, social sequences proceed blindly, without guidance – just like the course of a game. The task of sociological research is to make these blind, uncontrolled processes more accessible to human understanding by explaining them, and to enable people to orientate themselves within a web of interdependences – which, though created by their own needs and actions, is still opaque to them – and so better to control it” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 149)

Process models contend that the task of social science is to reconstruct the interconnected webs of relations that constitute ever-larger human societies, from which people draw their unique sets of identifications and associations. Process reconstruction helps trace the development of the blind societal process that often become discernible through polarised representations of human relations. There is a more normative preference for reconstruction over deconstruction, a “priority to synthesis over analysis” (Goudsblom 1987: 330; Elias 2007: 16).

50 Sustained episodes of what process sociology would call high involvement has been characterised by Cohen (2001 [1972]: 1) other moral panic scholars as “periods of moral panic” with constellations of more visceral emotions shaping forms of societal relations (Rohloff et al 2016: 12).
Process reconstruction encompasses the synthetic amalgamation and refinement of interconnected understandings to build a larger outlook. This facilitates a sophisticated synthesis that provides a more realistic five dimensional picture of societal relations. For example, in *On The Process of Civilisation* Elias (2012a [1939]) references historical discursive material in form of manners books, pictures and documentary evidence. He develops a reservoir of verifiable evidence to support his conceptualised reconstruction of the process of civilisation. Other process scholars note a range of methods to gather evidence, from documentary and archival material (Hughes and Goodwin eds 2014), to media (Dunning 2014), ethnographic fieldwork (Gornicka 2016) and visual material (Hughes ed 2012).

The process model emphasises the interplay of empiricisation and conceptualisation. There is the need for more synthetic research that is verifiable and open to refinement to replace myths and metaphysical speculations about human relations (Elias 2012b [1978]:48-49; Gouldsblom 1987: 334; Mennell 1998: 15). The replacement of myths involves the creation of relational orientations, “the course of which theoretical and empirical knowledge becomes *more extensive, more correct, and more adequate*” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 49; Dunning and Hughes 2013: 2, 201). Empiricisation and conceptualisation are interconnected.

The development of more relationally orientated research offers practical recommendations to provoke constructive societal catharsis. More comprehensive reconstructive research about webs of interconnected relations, knowledge processes and power relations can inform more conscious ‘political’ interventions that “have a cathartic effect” (Dunning and Hughes 2013: 47; Elias 2013 [1989]: 24). Reconstructive research facilitates more skilful\(^5\) negotiations of contemporary crises, through further reflections on how particular events came to be.

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\(^5\) This is similar to the often cited definition of ‘diplomacy’; “the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states” (Roberts ed 2009: 3).
A Process Vocabulary For Shared Anxieties

Process sociology offers a model and vocabulary for conceptualising shared anxieties from the webs of interdependence and forms of power relations within and beyond societies. The goal is to explain how “people are exposed even today to pressures and anxieties they cannot comprehend”, recognising that when “people in distress are unable to live without some explanation, the gaps in understanding are filled out by fantasy” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 22). Understanding shared anxieties requires a vocabulary to conceptualise the pressures from processes of societal and self-conscience formation.

The following section explains the vocabulary of processual models, and how these terms inform a sociological model for understanding shared anxieties.

The terms of process models adopted in this thesis are applicable to understanding the societal relations of larger groups such as liberal-democratic societies. The vocabulary conceptualises the processes of societal and self-conscience formation through terms that include webs of interdependence, the duality of nation-state normative codes, I-we images and ideals, habituation, established-outsider relations and stigmatisation. The power struggles from webs of interdependencies and conflicting normative codes can circulate guilt, shame and embarrassment anxieties. Struggles for status by insecure and secure sections of established groups contextualises forms of societal orientation. Outsider groups become feared through the greater dissemination of more involved magical-mythical forms of thinking. This cultivates double bind processes and fear-arousing constellations unpinned by fears of decline, disorientation and contact, which can invoke forms of societal survival organisation. The vocabulary remains imperfect and open to further refinement, as terms such as established and outsider can lend themselves to carelessly static use (Mennell 1998: 125).
Societal & Self-Conscience Formation

Liberal-democratic societies are the organisational outcomes from developing webs of interdependence. These large societal groupings and their populations have become bound by a globalised web of interconnected relations shaping localised life practices (see Gouldsblom 1996: 16; Linklater 2016). This is what Elias calls "functional democratisation", a process described by Mennell (1994: 183) that "longer and more differentiated chains of interdependence mean that power differentials diminish within and among groups because incumbents of specialised roles are more interdependent and can thus exert reciprocal control over each other". Liberal-democratic societies are characterised by forms of societal and self-regulation. These identifications situated particular forms of conscience formation that amalgamated smaller groups into larger groups.

Democratisation and nationalisation processes contextualised the societal and self-conscience formations of liberal democratic societies.

Democratisation processes encompass the equalisation of some societal power relations in the form of emancipation struggles. This has disseminated an understanding within these societies that they are more equal, and morally 'better' than non-democratic societies (Elias 2008b [1990]: 209). Differentiation between liberal-democracies and non-democracies accompanied the mutual awareness, identification and attachments towards other liberal-democratic likeminded groupings as well as themselves.

Nationalisation processes stress the power differentiation of international societal relations (Elias 2013 [1989]: 168), for example in self-determination struggles. There are attachments towards a particular liberal-democratic state-

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52 For example, in from of ethnic, gender, class struggles and societal movements.
53 One recent development concerns the development of illiberal democracies (NYT 2018; Bayer and Grey 2018), linked to de-democratisation (see discussions by Mennell 2014; Wouters 2016)
54 Nationalisation processes are also bound to processes of state-formation, consistent with, in a European context, the monopolisation of violence and taxation (Elias 2012 [1939]; Linklater 2016).
55 Such as decolonisation movements accelerating from the end of the Second World War onwards.
societies are based on ‘national’ cultures that are exclusive from other national cultures.

Processes of democratisation and nationalisation cultivated the development and learning of a dual set of conflicting nation-state normative codes. There is a collective nationalist code with principled attachments to state-society, and a humanist egalitarian code with principled attachments to fellow individuals (Elias 2013 [1989]: 169-170). The collective nationalist code stresses the process of nationalisation, and an aristocratic ethos. Adherence to this code is through a reservoir of symbols, physical structures in form of parliaments, flags, songs (national anthems), and institutions such as the military. Nationalised symbols can project more mythical narratives of national development. This is through the arousal of more visceral collective experiences such as war against an opposing state-society, as well as more pacified national sport activities.

In contrast, the humanist egalitarian code emphasises the process of democratisation. This developed from the growth of the bourgeois societal groupings, and an tiers-état ethos. Attachment to the code underpins symbols such as education and healthcare institutions and law courts, accentuating the notion that no one person is ‘above the law’. There are mythical narratives of individual entrepreneurial development, recounting how particular people managed to advance themselves through society against other individual opposition.

Mutual identifications and attachments from both collective-nationalist and humanist-egalitarian codes can formulate blends of I-we images and ideals. These terms conceptualise the interdependencies of mutual identifications, which overtime are habituated into conscience formation.

“A person’s we-image and we-ideal form as much part of a person’s self-image and self-ideal as do the image and ideal of him- or herself as the unique person to which

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56 Elias (2013 [1989]: 169) calls this the “duality of normative codes within the nation state”.
57 Education and healthcare also have a national dimension that demonstrates the habituation and interdependence of both codes. Remarks in Chapter’s 3 and 4 will further discuss the notion of healthcare fears.
he or she refers as 'I’” (Elias 2008a [1976]: 27). Societal attitudes are elastically bound to individual attitudes. People have multiple interconnected identifications, informing sets of relations, capable of invocation at any particular time. Each has degrees of fantasy and verifiable-adequacy content. These amalgams of involved fantastical and detached verifiable understandings become motivations for actions and practices (Elias and Scotson 2008 [1965]: 28; Mennell 1998: 171). I-identifications are bound to we-identifications, a person’s membership in a range of interweaving groups. None of these identifications is static. Each strand of identification has developed and emerged overtime, often incorporating many strands of personal and shared experiences.

Habituation is the incorporation overtime of certain images, memories, and experiences into conscience formation, with the development of psychologised personal structures. Habitus refers to the “taken for granted” quality of shared traits within one’s own group. There are aspects that appear to be natural and innate, which are contrasted with the habitus of other groups that may appear unusual and/or bizarre (Mennell 1994: 177).

The development of liberal-democratic societies encompassed the habituation of collective-nationalist and humanist-egalitarian codes into ‘taken for granted’ identifications. Attachments to these codes signify particular historical narratives of national and personal development. Varying degrees of attachments towards particular societal groups motivate and legitimise individual practices. This corroborates Mennell’s (1994: 178) remark that “various layers of habitus simultaneously present in people today may be of different vintages”.

More powerful established groups in liberal-democratic societies utilise processes of conscience formation in relations with less powerful outsider groups. Established–outsider relations are a universal process where “members of groups which are, in terms of power, stronger than other interdependent groups, think of

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58 For example, in advertising particular identifications and attachments as a ‘parent’ are attempts to elicit the purchase of a certain product.

59 The phrase “psychologised personal structures” is my way of avoiding the reduction of conscience formation to static understandings implicit in terms such as ‘personality’.
themselves in human terms as better than the others” (Elias 2008a [1976]: 1). The terms established and outsider, come from Elias and Scotson’s (2008 [1965]) study of Winston Parva, a small Leicestershire community in the 1960s. This study investigated how older residents of the community came to understand themselves as more powerful, and “better human beings” than their neighbours, the ‘newcomers’ from other regions (Elias 2008a [1976]: 2). The study is an empirical conceptualisation of societal power relations, formulating a small scale model that is verifiable, enlargeable and open to revision (Elias 2008a [1976]: 3). Mennell (1998: 138) summaries established outsider relations as the following.

“In studying the relations between groups of people, look first for the ways in which they are interdependent with each other. That will lead directly to the central balance of power in the figuration the groups form together. In assessing how far power ratios are tilted towards one side or the other, how stable or fluctuating they are, look at what goals and objectives, what human requirements are actually being pursued by each side. Ask to what extent one side is able to monopolise something the other side needs in pursuing these requirements. Then, if the balance of power is very uneven, be alert for the operation of group charisma and group disgrace, the process of stigmatisation, the absorption of the established group’s view of the world within the very conscience and we–image of the outsiders, producing a high measure of resignation even though the tensions remain. Where the balance of power is becoming more equal, expect to find symptoms of rebellion, resistance, emancipation among the outsiders. In all this it will be relevant to look to the past, to how one group came to impinge on the other, to how the way they are bonded to each other makes them pursue the objectives and human requirements they actually do pursue.”
Established groups are characterised by their greater socio-psychological organisation. More cohesive group attachments cultivate proficiencies to mobilise a system of attractive attitudes and beliefs, which stresses the superiority of themselves and the inferiority of outsiders (Elias and Scotson 2008 [1965]: 59). Elias notes that the term noble refers to a higher societal rank and compliance towards higher valued human beliefs. These more elevated beliefs define the attractive group charisma of established groups, who have a high power ratio, in comparison with other interdependent groups in society (Elias 2008a [1976]: 2). The projection of value supremacy within established groups forms a common reservoir of memories and experiences codified in sets of communal norms, codes and laws that define standards of respect.

To be ‘established’ is to hold a positive attitude and more assured form of societal orientation, which corresponds to a higher power ratio. This status is maintained by reserving societal power positions and exclude other groups (Elias 2008a [1976]: 5). Established groups circulate particular blends of more realistic I-we images and more fantasy based I-we ideals that dominate societal resources and the means of orientation. The course of becoming ‘established’ requires not only degrees of detachment to recognise and seize power opportunities, but also degrees of involvement to solidify higher status through highly emotive societal symbols, for example through practices like marriage. The representations that ruling sections of society have of themselves is often through “minority of the best” members (Elias and Scotson 2008 [1965]: 49). There is the elevation of sections of the established, whose attitudes and actions most closely correspond to the I-we ideals of the group. These role models are able to exercise degrees of influence, to steer the course of the group as a whole.

Outsider groups are distinguished by their lesser socio-psychological organisation. Less group cohesion means that outsider groups are more ambiguous, and are often partial strangers to each other. Smaller bonds of mutual identification make it

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Marriage has been used to reaffirm and raise the status of families. For example see the depiction of familial relations in the novel War and Peace by Leon Tolstoy (2008 [1867]), which is a fictionalised account of tangible sets of societal relations.
difficult for outsider groups to develop forms of communal attachments, creating the circumstances for misunderstandings within outsider groups (Elias and Scotson 2008 [1965]: 108).

Established groups also exploit the looser forms of attachment and organisation to sustain their higher power ratio and perpetuate the lower power ratio of outsider groups. The self-perceived nobleness and elevation of established groups contrasts to the notion of villain, which refers to groups of lower societal standing and lower human values/morals (Elias 2008a [1976]: 2). Images of outsider groups can become modelled on a “minority of the worst” members (Elias and Scotson 2008 [1965]: 49), allowing the vilification of sections of outsider groups that appear most opposed to the I-we-ideals and images of the established. There is the projection of value inferiority justifying forms of denigration. “Established groups with a great power margin at their disposal tend to experience their outsider groups not only as unruly breakers of laws and norms (the laws and norms of the established), but also as not particularly clean” (Elias 2008a [1976]: 2).

To be an outsider is to experience stigmatised exclusion from accessing societal resources, perpetuating a less assured orientation. Where power differentials are particularly stark, outsider groups are expected to internalise societal power differentials into understanding themselves as being personally inferior.

Established groups are able to stigmatise outsider groups. “Stigmatisation as an aspect of an established–outsider relationship is often associated with a specific type of collective fantasy evolved by the established group. It reflects and, at the same time, justifies the aversion – the prejudice – its members feel towards those of the outsider group.” (Elias 2008a [1976]: 19). Stigmatised depictions of outsiders are an insight into the kinds of contesting attitudes and orientations held by established groups in liberal-democratic societies.

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61 For example, a Christian church has a different physical appearance from an Islamic mosque.
However, tensions can emerge from the ongoing societal power shifts that contextualise the development of conscience formation. Outsider groups are not total strangers to wider society, though their images are often distorted by highly involved mythical depictions.

The lower power ratio of outsiders is also never absolute. There are chances for societal advancement, should they gain greater group cohesion to counter the stigmatisation and reverse overtime the domination of orientation enjoyed by established groups.

The high power ratio of established groups is never absolute. There are always pressures from within the group, from other members of the established, and beyond ‘from below’, from perceived outsiders.

Societies experience power shifts in either direction. Overtime, former outsider groups can become established, where the experiential knowledge of being an outsider can be forgotten, and/or subsumed into conscience formation. Likewise members of established groups can perceive themselves as becoming outsiders, and cling onto more magical-mythical I-we ideals of themselves from a time where their group enjoyed greater societal supremacy.

Power Struggles and Webs of Interdependence

Understanding the webs of interdependence and interconnected power struggles of established–outsider relations helps expand the conceptualisation of shared anxieties. Established groups exert greater societal and self-regulation with identified outsiders as well as towards themselves. These regulations can lead to greater domination and subjugation of outsiders through coercive practices such as enslavement. The “impact of group charismatic belief upon group members has its most exemplary form in the case of powerful nations dominated by party-government establishments and, thus, united against outsiders by a common social belief in their unique national virtue and grace” (Elias 2008a [1976]: 26).
In liberal-democratic societies, established group attitudes to outsider groups are situated by appeals to both collective-nationalist and humanist-egalitarian normative codes in ways that induce greater restraint on some behaviours and lesser restraints on other behaviours.

Relations with outsider groups can mobilise shared anxieties from the struggles for dominance by both collective-nationalist and humanist-egalitarian codes. Blends of involved idealisations towards both collective-nationalist and humanist-egalitarian normative codes can induce the development of neuroses (Elias 2013 [1989]: 24). These socio-psychological contestations that bind established groups to outsider groups help circulate experiences of guilt, shame, and embarrassment anxieties. Guilt emerges when the breaking of one code results in castigations from the other code (Elias 2013 [1989]: 172). This can also lead to embarrassment and feelings of ‘bad conscience’. Elias (2012a [1939]: 460) has remarked that:

“Just as shame arises when someone infringes the prohibitions of his own self and of society, embarrassment, occurring when something outside the individual impinges on his danger zone, on forms of behaviour, objects and inclinations which have early on been invested with fear by his surroundings….Embarrassment is displeasure or anxiety that arises when another person threatens to breach, or breaches, societies prohibitions represented by one’s own superego.”

Expanding webs of interdependence have also expanded the ‘danger zone’ experienced by liberal-democratic societies through the awareness of globalised power differentials. Widening dangers zones show blends of idealisation and irritation (Wouters 1992: 241). This is bound to the awareness of potentially harmful globalised outsiders beyond, whose behaviours and practices that can affect the relations of established groups within societies. There is the sharp idealisation of the both normative codes, as well as an irritation that particular outsiders seem incapable of adhering to the rules and ideals of the established. This
can also lead to frustration that other members of the established group do not share the same impassioned attitudes towards the outsiders.

Established groups have different interpretations of the outsiders depending on their balance of relatively insecure to relatively secure forms of orientation. They are aware of their precarious societal position and fear the development of harmful events in the future should they lose it. Fear is an ubiquitous characteristic of human relations, something that “all human groups are prone to induce in each other. It may be fear of total enslavement, fear of exploitation, of robbery, of bodily destruction” (Elias 2008b [1990]: 230). Societal pressures produce self-pressures in a sensitisation to actions and practices that could threaten their status. Blends of realistic I-we images and more fantasy based I-we ideals forms of thinking can swing towards more involved orientations.

Depictions of particular outsider groups can reveal changes from more insecure to more secure, or conversely from more secure to more insecure forms of thinking and orientating. There is the ongoing development of circles of association and disassociation. This is similar to what Abram de Swaan (1995; 1997) calls widening circles of identification and disidentification.

Association and disassociation emphasise the interweaving bonds of affective collaboration and aversion that situate relations between societal groups. If the ‘we’ of established groups shifts towards greater openness and inclusion. These identifications indicate decreasing distance with outsider groups and greater forms of association. If there is the increased use of personal pronouns: ‘we’ identifications exclusive to the ‘they’ identifications of outsiders. This indicates growing distance between established and outsider groups and widening disassociation. Circles of disassociation circulate the possibilities for more insecure forms of orientation. The insecure established are

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62See Elias’s (2012 [1939]: 466) example of how ‘established’ members of European court aristocracy were sensitised to the practices from ‘outsider’ bourgeois groups, whose customs in their eyes, infringe on their "hereditary privileges".
“sections of an established group whose members are most insecure, most unsure of their own value and standing as a group, tend to be most hostile in their stigmatisation of outsider groups, most unrelenting in their effort to preserve their status quo and not allow the barriers between established and outsider to be lowered, let alone be torn down” (Elias 2008b [1990]: 230).

Highly insecure members of the established foresee that any greater openness to outsiders comes at the expense of their own interests. These sections can include both more affluent and less affluent ‘economically disadvantaged’ members of established groups (Mols and Jetten 2017). They can fear loss of status should the outsiders gain any form of empowerment, which encroaches on their lifestyles and practices. Insecure established collectives can interpret outsider groups as a threat to their own group cohesion. They enforce greater, harsher collective measures aimed at stigmatising the outsiders, as well as advocating new rules and norms aimed at maintaining, even increasing the barriers between themselves and the outsider groups. These cultivate greater attachments towards themselves and other ‘like’ individuals, as well as greater stigmatisation of outsiders, which raises and perpetuates high socio-emotive barriers.

In contrast, the secure established interpret relations with outsiders with greater detachment and relatively secure orientation. In the Maycomb model essay, Elias gives the example of Atticus Finch, from Harper Lee’s novel To Kill A Mockingbird (1997 [1960]). Finch forms part of the “exceptional minority” acting on more detached insight, and did not share the same fears of the insecure established in Maycomb (Elias 2008b [1990]: 218, 224). His more secure orientation and realistic I-we image of himself enabled him to empathise and defend Robinson. He overcame the societal trap, the double bind that ensnared the insecure established of Maycomb with the fate of Robinson. Elias (2008b [1990]: 230) remarks that “one may expect greater equality to prevail among human societies only if one is able to lower the level of fear humans arouse in each other, individually no less than in groups”. Finch serves as an example of how the more secure sections of the
established can act with greater detachment and be more empathetic towards outsiders, by lowering the socio-emotive barriers between them.

Development of Fear-arousing Constellations

Established groups hold three fears: decline, disorientation and contact. These fears are illustrated through Elias's Maycomb, Brahmin and Burakumin examples. These constitute the creation of fear-arousing constellations that stigmatise relations between established and outsider groups. The term constellation\(^{63}\) emphasises the steering features of these sets of fears. "Deep-rooted in the customs of each skein of more or less interdependent subgroups is often the notion or legend that one of them brought fear into this world. It is usually one of the others. The beginningless character of fear-arousing constellations is quickly forgotten; so is their reciprocity" (Elias 2008b [1990]: 228).

Established groups fear decline from the presence of outsider groups: the weakening of their group charisma and distinguishing qualities that indicate their higher status. Elias again uses the example of John Robinson from Harper Lee's *To Kill a Mockingbird* (1997 [1960]) to explain established fears of decline. Groups of white families and farmers formed the establishment of Maycomb. Their group charisma was bound to maintaining the barrier between themselves and the black community through the domination of violence and interaction with white women. Robinson “lived in a situation in which every single option open to him in relation to a white girl could easily turn into disaster” (Elias 2008b [1990]: 221). The gravity of the injury suffered by the established of Maycomb, seemingly left no other possibility, other than the death of Robinson (Elias 2008b [1990]: 224). Established groups in Maycomb believed that Robinson’s continued existence would lead to an inevitable decline of their group charisma that situated their status and orientation in Maycomb.

\(^{63}\) Also emphasising the historical cosmological constellations that guided sailors in maritime voyages.
Established groups fear disorientation from outsider groups. The circumstance where they are no longer the centre of communication and knowledge, and experience a powerlessness to situate and place themselves in society. Elias’s example of caste-outcaste relations from India illustrates fears of disorientation. “The priestly establishment, the Brahmins, used their domination of the means of orientation and of the control of the invisible powers systematically as an instrument of rule and a weapon of exclusion” (Elias 2008a [1976]: 33). The established Brahmin monopolised orientation to maintain superiority through the claimed access to magical-mythical knowledge. They emphasised their uniqueness and connection to the gods to preserve their domination, reserving power positions for themselves, and rejecting the claims other castes. Established groups “deny information to those they exclude. And, in one sense or another, the denied information serves those who withhold it as a source of superiority, as a means of higher status and power” (Elias 2008b [1990]: 225). They maintain their status by regulating knowledge, creating and regulating particular images, symbols and impressions, which can elevate themselves, and relegate outsider groups.

Established groups fear contact with outsider groups. The moral contamination from closer relations, which jeopardises their moral supremacy. The example of the Burakumin in Japan demonstrates fears of contact. Established groups in Japanese society have maintained a longstanding stigmatisation of the Burakumin ‘class’. In societal beliefs that deemed the Burakumin to be a dirty, filthy people based on their social occupations, with an imaginary myth of a blue birthmark that symbolised their lower status and intrinsic vilification (Elias 2008a [1976]: 13-15, 19; Sunda 2015). The stigmatised mythologisation of the Burakumin maintained the high societal barriers and the socio-psychological distance between themselves Japanese established groups. “The avoidance of any closer social contact with members of the outsider group has all the emotional characteristics of what in another context has come to be called ‘the fear of pollution’” (Elias 2008a [1976]: 9). Stories such as those told about the Burakumin limit deeper societal contact with

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64 The dirty stigma indicates a societal inclination towards certain standards of cleanliness and hygiene, which is exemplified in Japanese society but can be found in many other societies.

65 For example, these occupations have included slaughterman, undertakers, leatherworkers, executioners, and sanitation workers,
the outsiders, maintaining the distance and perpetuating unequal relations, in order to prevent established groups from being 'polluted'.

Fears of decline, disorientation and contact interweave insecure sections of established groups in double bind processes, which reproduce highly involved modes of thinking. "Ideas about dangers are therefore heavily charged with fantasy, leading to the constant reproduction of the high level of danger and therefore modes of thought governed more by fantasy than by reality" (Elias 2007: 107). The practices of outsiders confirm, and cultivate further established group measures that extend widening circles of disassociation to maintain a 'safe' distance between themselves outsider groups. Often, the maintenance of safe distance perpetuates high degrees of experiential danger posed by outsider groups in a seemingly endless cycle.

Insecure sections of the established experiencing high degrees of experiential danger appeal to the survival unit figuration. This refers to the bonds of human groupings that pursue common survival through physical force against other groups that is interdependent66 with the development and continuation of occupational67 bonds (Elias 2012b [1978]: 134). The survival unit is the figuration of figurations, a "community of fate" in Hegelian terms (Kaspersen and Gabriel 2008: 376). People live in a survival unit that situates their orientation and development of societal relations. Greater functional differentiation of societal functions/occupations parallels amalgamations into larger physical survival groups that at present take the form of nation-states. Occupational survival has become interdependent with physical survival.

Appeals to the survival unit can influence sections of society through the mythological infusion greater fantasy content. Memories of trauma68 and

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66 This is an example of the Weber – Marx synthesis that Elias (2012a [1939] employs. Where Weber discusses the monopolisation of violence, and Marx notes the monopolisation of the means of production. Elias shows in Part III of On the Process of Civilisation that these processes are not mutually exclusive. Monopolisations of violence and production developed in parallel.

67 These “cannot be reduced to ‘economic’ functions, neither is it separable from them” (Elias 2012 [1978]: 134).

68 See Hutchison 2016.
articulations of fears from a previous phase\(^6^9\) of societal development are passed from generation to generation. These recollections of how a survival unit behaved in the past and the kinds of demarcations they constructed to defend themselves offer paths for present and future actions. For the insecure established, appeals to the survival unit become a powerful weapon for the stigmatisation and exclusion of outsiders, who are deemed to be such a threat to group charisma that the survival society as a whole is believed to be in jeopardy. This opens the space for a range of practices that normalise unequal relations between established and outsider groups, through perpetuating fear-arousing constellations.

**Political Leaders & Language Representations**

The following section demonstrates how the vocabulary of process sociology provides a method to understand the language representations of transnational migration articulated by political leaders. The language of political leaders mobilises shared anxieties. Competing identifications and associations from conscience formation processes can dominate societal orientation, and steer of the direction of societal change.

**Political Leaders & Process**

Liberal-democratic societies oscillate between degrees of socio-psychological openness and closure. Political leaders can disseminate more fortified societal orientations\(^7^0\). “The ruling elites and many of their followers in each nation (or at least in each great power) imagine themselves to be in the centre of humanity as if in a fortress, contained and surrounded by all the other nations, yet at the same time cut off from them.” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 24-25). This same process can also run in

\(^6^9\) For example, Christopher Clark (2007: 36) notes in his history of Prussia, whose expansion merged into the development of modern German society. “The all destructive fury of the Thirty Years War was mythical not in the sense that it bore no relation to reality, but in the sense that it established itself within collective memories and became a tool for thinking about the world”.

\(^7^0\) One example is Japan's Sakoku (closed country) programme pursued by the Tokugawa shogunate from 1633 to 1853 (Laver 2011; Itoh 2000).
the opposite direction. They can also lower socio-psychological barriers (however minutely) by pursuing programs infused by more detached verifiable understandings of the society they lead. Lowering socio-psychological barriers between peoples, however, requires the transgenerational development of societal and self-restraints, and high degrees of discipline throughout the webs of relations.

An exploration of the language representations of transnational outsiders is one way to glimpse the overall direction of liberal-democratic societies. From this, we can understand the particular combination of societal openness and closure during a period of societal history. Political leaders propagate representations in the form of gossip. These are often bound to the idealisation of communal norms and relationships (Elias and Scotson 2008 [1965]: 122). Forms of gossip encompass the elevated praise of established groups, often those connected political leaders themselves, and relegated blame towards outsider groups (see Elias and Scotson 2008 [1965]: 133).

The Winston Parva study by Elias and Scotson was an investigation of intra-state migration, but the same patterns of societal power relations can be found in inter-state migration experienced by larger liberal-democratic societies. People can effortlessly become outsiders through increased forms of human movement across the globe, due to wider societal organisational incentives. Global establishments from universities, to transnational corporations and state-societies themselves, help maintain outsider identifications. These large groupings are dependent on the growth of occupational bonds that demand constant movement from one job in one state-society/community, to another job in another state-society/community. People are often thrust into becoming outsiders, forming new relationships with pre-existing established groups with different standards and societal sensibilities (Elias and Scotson 2008 [1965]: 182). Stephen Mennell observes, “cheap transport and increased mobility over longer distances, have made it still more common throughout the world for displaced groups to impinge on older established groups” (1998: 124).
Political leaders’ representations of transnational migration can mobilise shared anxieties. More insecure and more secure sections of the established can pursue idealised strategies that premise either collective-nationalist or humanist-egalitarian codes. The insecure established can pursue measures justified by attachments to the collective-nationalist code. They may only perceive the positive attributes of border protection measures, which they advocate and legislate. Whereas the secure established may pursue practices supported by attachments to the humanist-egalitarian code that eliminates the need for national borders and fosters greater individual mobility. Societal conditioning means that groups are unable to recognise the elastic bond that binds them both together within the habituated identifications of liberal-democratic populations, with each section unwilling to engage with the opposing position.

Political leaders can be resistant to embarrassment after violating a particular normative code. They can retreat from one normative code into another normative code. In efforts to block the experience of shame and guilt, through the pursuit of further measures emboldened by that code. Societal pressures may illicit a degrees of greater openness, a mea culpa admission of error, or greater closure and further fortified retreats. These recoils only reinforce their involved pursuit of political survival, expanding degrees of interpreted danger.

Political leaders’ representations of transnational migration can dominate societal orientation, through fears of decline, disorientation and contact. Migrant outsiders can be stigmatised with fears of decline, through the appearance of being divergent from the customs, symbols, memories and stories that sustain the group charisma of established groups. The insecure established may interpret migrant outsiders as a threat to their group charisma. They can invoke the survival unit with its reservoir of past traumas, and form a powerful, visceral imagery to stigmatise migrant outsiders. New arrivals of people are interpreted as a challenge to the dominant societal orientations of society. Fears of disorientation sustain praise and blame gossip, which crystallises a series of dominant narratives and stories. Finally, migrant outsiders can become marked by fears of contact: the belief that their presence may morally contaminate the rules and norms of established groups.
Insecure sections of the established advocate for newer, stricter norms, and rules, and can only perceive the more positive attributes (directed towards themselves), while blocking the less desirable unplanned consequences. These cumulative fears increase the barriers of social inclusion between established groups, and the migrant outsiders.

Political leaders’ representation of transnational migration can steer the direction of society. This sets the stage for societal confrontations between more insecure and more secure sections of the established. Secure established group could advocate societal strategies that lower societal barriers. They can activate images of compassion and empathy towards outsiders. Whereas the insecure established groups offer societal strategies that raise societal barriers and cultivate collective symbols and habituated fears against migrant outsiders. Decline, disorientation and contact fears of the insecure established circulate double bind processes and fear-arousing constellations, which entrap representations of transnational migration. These depictions promote societal strategies that perpetuate the exclusion of migrant outsiders through repetitive gossip, symbols and appeals to the survival unit. Depending on the ratio of secure to insecure, the overall direction of liberal-democratic societies oscillates in blends of openness and closure.

Conclusion

I have argued in this chapter that process sociology offers a model and sets of vocabulary to conceptualise the shared anxieties of political leaders in liberal-democratic societies. Process models provide a relational reconstructive model of open people that illuminates the development of knowledge processes through the blends of involvement and detachment, webs of interdependence and changing power ratios. My approach also highlights the interplay of conceptual reconstruction and empirical verification to understand tensions and anxieties from webs of interdependence, which reveals the socio-structural tensions and identifications that situates how people orientate themselves through interweaving groups.
Process sociology introduces a vocabulary to understand the development of societal and self-conscience formations. Power struggles from established outsider relations linked to the development of conflicting normative codes circulate guilt, shame and embarrassment anxieties. In struggles for status where outsider groups can become feared through the infusion of more involved magical-mythical forms of thinking.

The vocabulary of process sociology presents a method to understand the language representations of transnational migration by political leaders. These representations can show the mobilisation of shared anxieties, domination of societal orientation, and steer the overall direction of society with degrees of inclusive openness and exclusive closure.

The next chapter will demonstrate that an outlook on shared anxieties is further enhanced through an explanation of the model and vocabulary of risk sociology. Process and risk sociology share a common interest in exploring the effects of unplanned unintended consequences of knowledge processes on the development of human interdependence and societal power relations.
Chapter 2. Shared Anxieties & Risk Sociology

The last chapter introduced a process sociological approach to comprehending shared anxieties. This outlook provided a relational reconstructive model understanding the conflicting identifications in liberal democratic societies, through knowledge processes, webs of interdependence and power relations. Process sociology provided a vocabulary to conceptualise shared anxieties through processes of societal conscience formation and the power struggles from conflicting normative codes. The model and vocabulary of process sociology presented a method to understand the language representations of transnational migration expressed by political leaders, who mobilise shared anxieties, dominate societal orientation, and steer the course of societal change.

My second chapter explains the model of risk sociology, how it complements the conceptualisation of shared anxieties initiated by process sociology.

In this chapter, I will argue that the strand of risk sociology developed by Ulrich Beck enhances a sociological outlook for understanding shared anxieties. For the purpose of this chapter, risk sociology refers to the strand developed by Beck. His risk model was refined through discussions across the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. Based on this model, risks are the unplanned outcomes of globalised interconnected human relations, which oscillate between safety and catastrophe. Interpretations of risks situate the ways in which people relate, situate and orientate themselves in societies. The conceptualisation of risk signifies “a peculiar state between security and destruction, where the perception of threatening risks determines thought and action” (Beck 1999: 135). People build risk narratives to legitimise the desires and practices of particular societal groups. These appeals can raise the degrees of catastrophic risk consciousness in some circumstances, and lower the degree of risk consciousness in other circumstances.

71 For example, there is the risk of harmful pesticide residues in food (Keating 2017).
72 For example, see justifications by resource extractive industries on the safety/lower risk of contamination by coal seam gas exploration (Evershed 2018).
I contend that the risk orientations projected by political leaders can reveal the blends of socio-structural tensions and competing identifications that affect the direction of change in liberal democratic societies.

Shared anxieties develop through the contradictory awareness of people as risks. A risk sociology framework can help reconstruct the sociological processes embedded in interpretations of transnational migration, which expands understandings of the socio-psychological tensions in societies.

At first glance, a sociological synthesis of Elias and Beck appears to be problematic because of contrasting accounts of knowledge production and unintended consequences. Elias’s sociological synthesis would note that uncertainty could be overcome: awareness of unintended consequences enables more verifiable scientifedated knowledge of societies.

In reply, Beck would cautiously note that the acceleration of scientific knowledge sustained a reductionist model of ‘industrial’ society that dismissed and sustained unequal sets of relations with destructive consequences, which are revealed by the awareness of the unintended consequences of human actions and knowledges. The scientifedated model of society has circulated more rather than less suspicions about human relations. Beck (1994: 177; 2006: 34-35) avoids the swing to nihilism by positioning his conceptualisation of risk as a “theory of ambivalence” that is neither purely optimistic nor pessimistic. He argues that his sociological synthesis is “more neutral and more complex” than Horkeimer and Adorno’s *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, because societies can alter relations in different ways through the awareness of globalised risks.

The common link between Elias and Beck is their investigation of uncertainty: how human groups negotiate the ambiguities of their relations. They place the examination of human societal ambiguities at the forefront of sociological research.

Together Elias and Beck offer a sophisticated model of knowledge and interdependency and power interconnections to conceptualise shared anxieties.
Where process sociology investigates the ambiguous webs of interconnected identifications from smaller to larger groups of people. The Beck strand of risk sociology explores how contradictory webs of interconnections across larger globalised groupings, situates identifications within smaller localised groupings.

This chapter consists of three sections. The first section explains the model of risk sociology. The second section explains how the vocabulary of risk sociology contributes to the study of shared anxieties. The third section shows how the risk orientations of transnational migration in the language of political leaders can mobilise, dominate and steer the direction of change in liberal democratic societies.

The Models of Risk

The following section illustrates the model of risk sociology. It explains the sociological synthesis developed by Beck, which complements the model of process sociology. This approach problematizes the reductive conceptual legacies of ‘industrial’ society and the development of ‘national’ social science.

The risk sociology developed by Beck conceptualises the sociology of knowledge shift to the risk society. Awareness and unawareness of ‘reflexive’ modernisation situates perceptions of global interdependencies and global risks. Risk consciousness contextualises the forms of power relations in global risk societies. The development of global risk societies necessitates a cosmopolitan social science that combines conceptualisation with empiricisation. Risk sociology offers a model for shared anxieties through understanding the tensions of globalised risk societies.
Understanding Risk & Reductive Knowledge Processes

Risk has become a ubiquitous term and concept across the societal sciences and wider liberal democratic society\(^{73}\). The term first emerged as a means of sociological understanding in the 1980s and 1990s in the work of scholars\(^{74}\) that not only included Beck, but also Mary Douglas, Aaron Wildavsky and François Ewald. The intention of these scholars was to “wrest the issue of risk away from specialists (the risk analysts) and place it on a wider social scientific and public agenda” (Scott 2000: 34). These ‘risk analysts’ formed two strands of risk conceptualisation. The first strand emerged from commercialisation processes with the development of the insurance industry. Risk was conceptualised as the protection of businesses from the uncertainties of trade and transport, for example, the insurance of valuable shipping cargos that included people/slaves\(^{75}\) as well as commodities (Pearson 1997; Crothers 2011; Spooner 1983). The second strand emerged from scientification processes with the expansion of military-techno industrial manufacturing, and the need to mitigate unexpected accidents. Risk was conceptualised as protection from the possibilities of nuclear accidents from the development and deployment nuclear weapons (Sagan 1993), and to manage the likelihood of unintentional global atomic conflict (Kissinger 1960; c.f. Bull 1976\(^{76}\)).

Risk sociology of Beck problematizes the reductive conceptualisations implicit in commercialised and scientificated understandings of risk. The distinguishing features of the Beck strand of risk scholarship is the synthetic engagement with sociological threads from the work of Karl Marx, Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas. These underpin a sociology of knowledge processes. This synthetic account of risk provides a common ‘classical’ sociological foundation sufficient for amalgamation

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\(^{73}\) For an historical overview see Matthias Beck and Beth Kewell’s *Risk: A Study of Its Origins, History and Politics* (2014). For a more thematic account of the different strands of risk scholarship see Lupton (2013).

\(^{74}\) For example, see Ewald (1990; 1999). For a synthesised Foucauldian account of risk see Amoore (2013).

\(^{75}\) See “Marine insurance policy, no. 2157, Alexandria Marine Insurance Company, June 21, 1809. This policy insured the cargo of the Dorchester, consisting of thirty slaves valued at $9,000, traveling from Alexandria [Virginia] to New Orleans” (Pearson 1997: 626).

\(^{76}\) Bull (1976: 6) notes the need “to minimize the risk of general nuclear war”. 
with process sociology. Firstly, in contrast with Marx, societal stratifications and power relations from risk consciousness replaces and subsumes class-consciousness (see Beck 2013b). The production and projection of risks by sections of society replaces the production of wealth/capital as markers of societal power creating new forms of societal and self-regulation. Secondly, Beck (1999: 139-140) rejects Weberian understandings of bureaucratic control and asserts that “Weber does not recognise or discuss the concept of ‘risk’” and does not perceive the relationship between societal regulations, and the production of risks. He calls his conceptualisation of world risk society as the “antithesis” of Weber’s iron cage of modernity (Beck 1999: 140, 147). Thirdly, the Habermasian undercurrent of Beck shows how risk orientations form part of dialogical learning processes from changing forms of societal organisation (Lash and Wynne 1992: 8).

Risk models also problematize the reductive polarisations that underpinned the model of the industrial society. These include spatial, communal, gender, vocational and environmental distinctions. Spatial inside–outside polarisations encompass the development of contained “nation-state societies” whose institutions are delimited by territorial boundaries (Beck et. al. 2003: 4; Beck 2007b: 287). There are communal polarisations between ‘free’ individuals moulded by societal institutions, including gender polarisations that separated male and female roles through idealised practices such as the nuclear family (Beck 1992: 104). Vocational polarisations distinguish between wage labour and leisure time (Beck 1992: 142). Environmental polarisations that comprised an exploitative understanding of nature that exists ‘outside’ of society, which enables the displacement of negative consequences from exploitative practices ‘inside’ society (Beck et. al. 2003: 4). These distinctions sustained the dismissal and blocking of undesirable consequences from the pursuit of these ideologies.

Idealised understandings of industrial society stimulated the development of ‘national’ social science. The model of particular ‘national’ industrial societies became a subsuming generalizable paradigm for the broader study of societies (Beck 2004: 142; Beck 2007b: 286). Methodologically nationalist approaches shaped the work of scholars such as Weber and Talcott Parsons. They channelled
the images and impressions of their own nationalised societies, namely Prussian/Wilhelmine society and post-World War II American society into their larger conceptualisations. These approaches equated the limits of sociological research with the static, spatial limits of a particular state-society. Social science becomes caught in the "prison error of identity" where “each human being has one native country, which he/she cannot choose; he is born into it and it conforms to the either/or logic of nations and the associated stereotypes” (Beck 2006: 6, 25, 28; c.f. Rosenberg 2016).

Beck identifies and problematizes closed models in social science. In the particular, the vocabulary of either/or explanations that exclusively differentiate between separate independent categories (Beck 2006: 4-5; Beck 2008; 795). These narrow knowledge processes justified power relations such as men over women and humanity over nature. For example, environmental polarisations circulated the desire for greater degrees of human regulation over the natural environment across all areas of human relations (Beck 1999: 76). Techno-economic advancement became the standard of judgement that defined the ‘progression’ of all other areas of industrial society such as family, gender and vocational relations. This was justified through the tactile creation of labour saving devices and observable improvements in standards of living (Beck 1992: 201-202; Beck 1994: 10). There was the presumption that techno-economic ‘progress’ equated to societal ‘progress’.

Models from ‘national’ industrial societies are reliant on particular forms of reductive knowledge processes. For Beck, the development of global risks resisted reduction into controllable and dismissible industrial hazards or accidents. This development challenges the idealised models of national industrial society. Hazards or accidents are definable and containable into closed localised events (Beck and Willms 2004: 115). Globalised risks are the unplanned outcomes of global interdependencies, which are irreducible to the models of industrial society. These side effects are the unintended consequences of decisions made by areas of societal expertise from political groups to large organisations that situate the ways in which societal groups are bound together (Beck 1999: 50). “Global risks produce global
risk society: sociology’s view of society as a closed and self-equilibrating system full of linear processes, a view most clearly embodied in the work of Talcott Parsons, is being historically superseded by "reflective modernisation" (Beck and Willms 2004: 31).

The awareness and unawareness of ‘reflective’ modernisation emphasises the socio-psychological experiences of global interdependencies. Some knowledge processes can open spaces for greater understanding, stimulating awareness, while also blocking other pathways, inspiring unawareness. Beck (1992: 50 n. 1) defines modernisation as the knowledge processes that contextualise changes in societal organisation, the forms of power and influence, attachments, lifestyle, political participation and repression that constitute and reshape understandings of reality, and the standards of knowledge. What processes sociology understands as the means of orientation, the rudimentary ways in which people have come to situate themselves in societies.

This is a different understanding of reflexive modernisation used in other areas of sociology. Kilminster (2011: 91, 101-102) remarks that the notion of modernity with its focus on the study of advanced societies remains one of the dominant themes and assumptions of 20th century sociology, which has become a personified "guilt-cause" to be blamed for unpleasant unplanned societal developments. Responses from guilt opened the space for work by sociologists such as Zygmunt Bauman (1992; 1997) exploring societal transformations to a post-modernity.

The risk sociology of Beck can also be mistaken for proposing a teleological end-condition. Particularly, when his work appears alongside the likes of Giddens and Lash (1994; 1994). For Giddens (1990; 1994), modernisation and the awareness of risk is the means to a more desirable form of societal ordering through the creation of dialogical democracy. Giddens reduces modernisation processes into a reified state or condition. This reductive understanding fostered the ideology of the Labour Party under Tony Blair (Freeden 1999).
Giddens and Lash provide a linear account of reflexive modernisation that premises a closed circle of ‘aware’ rational experts. Beck is critical of this approach where closed circles of expertise presume sets of undisputed power relations, between people who are ‘aware’ and those who are ‘unaware’ of the consequences of societal practices. For Beck (1999: 125, 130-131) this underestimates the diversification of alternative explanations and the effects of unawareness. In his view, Giddens and Lash dismiss unawareness as irrelevant to the understanding of reflexive modernisation (Beck 1999: 125). This dismissal involves a double construction of unawareness. Firstly the rejection of other forms of knowledge, and secondly the inability to admit uncertainty (Beck 1999: 131).

Beliefs in ‘expert’ explanations reveal the forms of power relations that dismiss and silence any other form of understanding. The singular focus on “progress becomes a substitute for questions, a type of consent in advance for goals and consequences that go unnamed and unknown” (Beck 1992: 184). The reductive explanations from Giddens and Lash show an unawareness of the social, political, ecological and individual risks exceeding the limits of societal regulation (Beck 1999: 72-73).

Global Interdependence Risk Approach

The Beck model of risk and reflexive modernisation articulates the effects of modernisation/global interdependence processes on individual and collective conscience formations. Reflexive modernisation is a much broader term. It includes both concepts of *reflect* and *reflex*. Reflexive is “tied to the *unintended consequences* of modernization.....alongside reflection (knowledge), *Reflexivität* in German also includes *reflex* in the sense of the effect or preventive effect of non-knowing” (Beck 1999: 109).

The _reflexive_ feature of modernisation is the intertwining of planned processes with the unplanned developments. The awareness (*wissen*/knowing) of side effects from modernisation processes accompanies degrees of unawareness (*nicht-wissen*/not knowing) (Beck 1999: 127).
The emergence of invisible side effects in the form of risks stimulates a range of competing explanations. Risk consciousness “opens up a battle-ground of pluralistic knowledge claims. This involves knowledge of the consequences of industrial modernisation even on the lowest rungs of the ladder of social recognition” (Beck 1999: 120). Known unawareness comprises a more empathetic opening towards alternative explanations (Beck 1999: 126). This acknowledges that explanations are often incomplete, with the proactive desire to widen and deepen those understandings of human societies. In contrast, unknown unawareness and the obliviousness of not knowing, becomes an anticipatory defence against the moral and economic costs for changes in politics and lifestyle (Beck 1999: 121, 127).

Awareness and unawareness of risk becomes a way of managing both the desirable and undesirable side effects of global interconnections. People in large societies have become engaged in an unseen, often coerced, and at times confusing banal experience of interdependence (Beck 2006: 7-10, 48)\(^7\). This encompasses the development of multiple attachments and the awareness of transnational forms of life. Everyday relations with transnational groups are the means through which globalised long-term processes become intertwined with localised relations. Beck (2006: 73) notes that “the experience of global interdependence and global risks alter the social and political character of societies within nation-states”.

Beck evaluates the societal scientific implications and sets of relations from the development and practice of risk. In an effort to understand how people and their groups are, and have become bound together in the form of risk societies. His conceptualisation of risk concentrates on understanding the unintended consequences of human regulatory developments within and between societies, what process sociology understands as the interplay of planned and unplanned societal practices, where “all planned social practices take place within a stream of

\(^7\) This parallels Johan Goudsblom’s (1996: 16) remark that “global interdependency has become a hard and undeniable fact”: people from Western Europe to Africa and Asia are mutually interconnected, by political, military and economic ties shaping the way of life and survival “for all of us”.
unplanned, aimless, through structured processes, at a variety of interdependent levels” (Elias 2007: 115).

In common with process models, risk models emphasise the interdependence of human knowledge processes. This avoids the realism – social constructivism divide in the social sciences (for example see Rasborg 2012), which emphasises the independent separation of subjects and objects. In contrast to those reductive models, risk models stress the interdependence of human lifestyles and knowledge development through blends of subject perception and object knowledge of invisible side effects or risks (Beck 1992: 55).

Risk models further the strand of the sociology of knowledge associated with the scholarship of Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno (1997 [1944]). The development of societal and self-regulations with non-human events/nature has infused understandings of people relations. This is similar to what process sociology calls the triad of basic controls, the uneven development of regulations over nature/non-human relations, inter-state – intra-state relations, and personal relations (Elias 2012b [1978]: 151-152; Elias 2007: 106).

Risk consciousness illustrates the shifting power relations of world risk societies. For Beck (1999: 16), the power relations of global risk societies include “those who produce and profit from risks and the many who are afflicted with the same risks”. There is the shift of catastrophic risks and consequences, from higher protective, higher wage state-societies, to less protective state-societies, lower wage, with less appreciation of individual rights. For example from the distribution of torture practices, waste and dangerous substances (Beck 2007a: 693). Risks concentrate attention towards certain relations, legitimatising degrees of societal and self-regulation. The ways in which some kinds of risks are accepted, and other kinds of risks are dismissed can reveal the forms of power relations that organise societies.

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78 Mennell (1998: 170) uses the distinction of technological, social and psychological regulations.
79 See recent discussions of British complicity in the torture of terrorism suspects (Beaumont 2018).
“Risk presumes a decision, therefore a decision-maker, and produces a radical asymmetry between those who take, define the risks and profit from them, and those who are assigned to them, who have to suffer the ‘unforeseen side effects’ of the decisions of others, perhaps even pay for them with their lives, without having had the chance to be involved in the decision-making process.” (Beck 2007a: 692)

Risk orientations steer changes in societal organisation. These interpretations galvanise membership in some groups, and stigmatise other groups through claims about their limited expertise. Risk orientations can cultivate the perpetuation of unequal relations between and within societies. Awareness of some risks can also cultivate movements that desire more equal forms of societal organisation.

The contradictions of global risk societies demand the replacement of national outlooks with cosmopolitan outlooks to formulate a cosmopolitan societal science. For Beck (2008: 794), global interdependence “is as much a reasonable option as it is a sentiment” (c.f Linklater 2010). Cosmopolitan societal science investigates “actual enforced cosmopolitanisation” to incorporate a “process-orientated sociology”, which methodically avoids the reduction of processes to static models (Beck 2006: 94; Beck 2007b: 287). This is distinct from the “retrogressive idealism of the national perspective” and the normative philosophical ideal of cosmopolitanism (Beck 2007b: 287, 290). Cosmopolitan societal science supersedes methodological nationalism with methodological cosmopolitanism, through synthetic both/and explanations and terms that supplants reductive analytic either/or explanations (Beck 2006: 4-5; Beck 2008: 795).

Cosmopolitan societal science amalgamates conceptualisation with empiricisation. The development of global risk societies requires an “analytic-empirical approach” to global risks, globalised and localised interconnections, and global inequalities (Beck 2004: 133). The goal of this programme is to “produce a reasonable picture” of societal relations “that people and institutions can use to orient themselves” (Beck et. al. 2003: 3).
Global risks encompass a range of health, lifestyle, environmental/ecological, financial and other human practices. Beck’s earlier work focused on environmental ecological risks, but later expanded to broader economic, violence and moral struggles from global interdependencies (Beck 1999: 34-35; Beck and Sznaider 2006: 11). Scott (2000: 35) notes that the immediate contextual background for Beck’s *Risk Society* was the emergence of protests against the construction of a nuclear processing plant in Wackersdorf, Bavaria. Scott also mentions the parallels with the Dreyfus Affair as inspiration for Emile Durkheim’s work and Prussian bureaucracy for Weber. Beck also reflects on the industrial disasters of Villa Parisi, Bhopal, and Chernobyl occurring in 1984, and 1986 (Beck 1987; Beck 1992: 43-44).

The Risk Vocabulary for Shared Anxieties

Risk sociology offers a model and vocabulary for conceptualising shared anxieties from globalised interconnections and power relations shaping localised identifications. The awareness of the globalised consequences of human decisions overtime have disseminated forms of relations that oscillate between safety and catastrophe. One example of risk society anxieties is the development of climate change risks. Rohloff (2011a: 639) demonstrates the interconnections between individual management of risk and the expert management of moral panics. These relations form part of the continuum self-controls to societal controls.

The following section explains the vocabulary of risk models, and how these terms illuminate an understanding of shared anxieties.

The vocabulary conceptualises the cosmopolitanisation processes of societal conscience formation from the everyday experiences of globalised interconnections. Interdependency crises circulate cooperation pressures that challenge identifications between politico-economic *citoyen* and techno-economic *bourgeois* sections of liberal democratic societies. There are power struggles between conflicting cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitan movements. Cooperation pressures mobilise shared anxieties through harmful catastrophic and
harmless safe interpretations of risk. Symbolic orientations in the form of possibility judgements substantiate particular risk interpretations and define the attributes demanded by localised societal institutions through the pursuit of avoidance imperatives. The forecast of possible futures opens the space for scapegoat, catastrophic and self-critical anticipations for societal change.

Cosmopolitanisation Processes & Interdependency Crises

Liberal democratic societies experience the intended and unintended consequences of human interdependencies. Cosmopolitanisation processes contextualise the development of contradictory modes of thinking and orientating in liberal democratic societies. Cosmopolitanisation is a “multidimensional process” that interconnects globalised and localised relations (Beck 2004: 136; Beck 2006: 72-73). The growth of relations within societal groups of ranging sizes cultivates the development of particular identifications and forms of cooperation.

Ambiguous experiences of cosmopolitanisation processes situate forms of societal conscience formation. The development of transnational relations disruptively “transcends the distinctions between aliens and nations, friends and foes, foreigners and natives” (Beck 2006: 65-66). Enforced cooperation can generate concerns about changes in lifestyle practices that bring about shifts in identification. Beck (2006: 23) notes how “the everyday experience of cosmopolitan interdependence is not a love affair of everyone with everyone. It arises in a climate of heightened global threats, which create an unavoidable pressure to cooperate”.

Cosmopolitanisation processes provoke overlapping ecological, economic, violence and moral struggles. These interdependency crises entangle more developed and less developed state-societies into a global risk society (Beck 1999: 34-35; Beck and Sznaider 2006: 11). Each struggle is influential to the extent that one or all invoke societal survival bonds. The four axes circulate cooperation pressures through interpretations of transnational risks from overlapping interdependent human practices and forms of societal organisation. The struggles encompass the expansion of human made decision dependent dangers into globalised risks, which
resist isolation, and containment into the reductive conceptualisations of industrial society (Beck 2006: 22).

Interdependency crises challenge the habituated identifications within liberal democratic populations. In particular, the contradictory models of divided citizens between immobile politico-economic *citoyen* and mobile techno-economic *bourgeois* identifications (Beck 1992: 183-184). The immobile politico-economic *citoyen* understands societal change from the public fulfilment of democratic rights through nationalised parliaments. Politico-economic *citoyen* identifications emphasise attachments towards particular state-societies, which parallels the development of protective communal family bonds. In contrast, the mobile techno-economic *bourgeois* understands non-democratic societal change by private fulfilment of individual rights, with individual identifications towards industry, technology and business groups, which correspond to vocational bonds.

There is the power struggle of cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitanisation movements within liberal democratic populations. Each movement utilises the language of risk to reveal, and respond to the challenges of the cosmopolitan interdependence. There is an awareness that transnational forms of life permeate national societies. Cooperation pressures compel the creation of identifications that prioritise differing accounts of societal regulation. This prompts the contestation of imperatives with different degrees of inclusive open cosmopolitan consciousness and exclusive closed national consciousness.

The cosmopolitanisation movement appeals to a more open consciousness. There is an understanding of transnational risk that emphasises the need for self-critical changes to society. Cosmopolitan consciousness expands the possibilities for creative responses to common, human made risks. Transnational risks are opportunities for cooperation to lower the boundaries between peoples.

The European Union is one example of a cosmopolitanisation movement because to be European is to hold both a national and non-national forms of identification (Beck 2006: 173). For example, events in July 2016 prompted Germany’s Chancellor
Angela Merkel (2016) to defend her policy of openness, despite growing anti-cosmopolitan pressure, referencing both Germany and Europe. There is a more constructive understanding of societal diversification. This movement prioritises a common humanity that reconciles, balances, and embraces diverse forms identification. It recognises the importance of varied national identities, offering a more open society that empathises with different opinions and forms of orientation (Beck 2006: 77).

In contrast, the anti-cosmopolitanisation movement appeals to a more closed consciousness. For the anti-cosmopolitans, transnational risks stimulate catastrophic and scapegoated changes to society. Transnational risks are justifications for cooperation to raise the boundaries between peoples.

Anti-cosmopolitanisation movements are observable through the support for Pauline Hanson in Australia, Nigel Farage in the UK, Donald Trump in the US, and Marie Le-Pen in France. The movement is “an attempt to restore national priorities and categories by conferring [a] cosmopolitan legitimacy on them” through a shallow awareness of cosmopolitanisation processes and transnational relations (Beck 2006: 74). This awareness legitimises polarisations between exclusive societal groups, often appealing to localised concerns. There is a more destructive understanding of societal diversification through the reaffirmation an exclusive national consciousness. Anti-cosmopolitans stress the need for a more closed society to protect vulnerable provincial identifications but still open to narrow forms of techno-economic bourgeoisie identification.

Power Relations & Symbolic Risk Orientations

Shared anxieties can be mobilised through the entanglement of cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitanisation movements. There are socio-psychological tensions between a national consciousness that emphasises a more closed society, intermixed with a cosmopolitan consciousness emphasising a more open society. Cosmopolitanised empathies and nationalised empathies “permeate, enhance, transform and colour each other” (Beck 2006: 6). Each movement seeks
an empathetic resonance within liberal democratic societies. In efforts to define the outlooks and orientations that raise and lower, both the physical and sociological boundaries between people.

The power matrixes of global risk societies are the ways in which, what is deemed uncontrollable can become controllable. Something deemed low risk can be defined as *harmless* and safe. Something deemed a high risk is characterised as being *harmful* and catastrophic. Characterisations of particular risks can legitimise the power claims of some societal groups, while delegitimising the claims of others.

Interpretations of what is harmful risk and what is harmless risk contextualise societal power relations. There are contestations between each movement over more and/or less acceptable interpretations of ecological, economic, violence and moral crises. Assertions of risk enables sub-state societal groups to establish and legitimise their power claims over other groups. Sub-state groups include the participation and input of producers, analysts, profiteers, mass media, scientific and legal professions (Beck 1987: 162). Their interpretation and awareness of risk facilitates forms of action, as well as blends of unawareness and forms of inaction. The ad hoc participation of sub-state groups circumvents the institutional controls of state-society such as political parties and parliaments (Beck 1992: 23; Beck 1999: 39, 140). Each of these groups offers distinct possibilities for influence from the interdependencies between them (Beck 1987: 162-163).

Symbolic risk orientations through numbers, statistics, images and wider symbols legitimise particular risk interpretations and power claims. Possibility judgements (*Möglichkeitsurteile*) are probabilistic projections that can redefine standards of responsibility, trust and security (safety monitoring and insurance calculation) (Beck 1994: 6). There is the causally implicit assertion of moral standards through cultural values and symbols, which becomes a “mathematized morality” (Beck 1992: 33, 176; Beck 1999: 138, 143). Societal symbols make visible, the side effects of cosmopolitanisation processes. In a projection of possible outcomes which may

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80 See Amoore (2014).
or may not come about. Symbolic risk orientations become forms of societal regulation mapping both present and future directions of societal change.

Societal risk symbols galvanise public consciousness leading to neurotic interpretations of societal relations. Perceptions of collective crisis and sickness become individual crises and sicknesses creating forms of guilt ascription. Societal inequalities are individualised into personal inequalities and psychological dispositions (Beck 1992: 100, 136).

Fear management becomes a characteristic of societal institutions, through the demand for new rules, norms and standards of behaviour to control and alleviate the threat of particular risks. Experiences of societal endangerment emerge from “social dependencies of information and knowledge” (Beck 1989: 91). Certain societal groups define themselves and legitimise their power claims through the elimination of particular risks and accompanying fears.

Risk consciousness emphasises avoidance imperatives that situates the demands of societal institutions. "To the extent that risks become the all-embracing background for perceiving the world, the alarm they provoke creates an atmosphere of powerlessness and paralysis" (Beck 1999: 141).

Liberal democratic populations are caught in risk traps. They become communities of danger organised around the consciousness of risk arising from experiences of societal endangerment (Beck 1992: 47; Beck 1989: 88). The “handling fear of and insecurity becomes an essential cultural qualification, and the cultivation of the abilities demanded for it become an essential mission of pedagogical institutions” (Beck 1992: 76). Certain interpretations of risk filter through areas of societally recognised expertise, which include schools, universities, public institutions and other sub-state groups. More harmful catastrophic interpretations of a particular risk stimulate the pursuit of avoidance imperatives (Beck 1994: 9; Beck 1999: 141). These decisions stigmatise and separate that precise object/societal group defined as a risk. The need to regain societal control cultivates societal institutions to anticipate and pre-empt a conceivably catastrophic outcome.
Risk Orientations & Directions of Societal Change

Risk orientations by collective institutions shift the directions of societal change in a combination of three directions. Scapegoat, catastrophic and self-critical visions of society. These forecasts cultivate societal orientations around suspicion, alarm or acceptance. These forecasts are not mutually exclusive. Societies can change in uneven blends of all three, creating tensions. Each direction fashions modes of identifications and associations organised around the management of doubt and the alleviation of risks. These projections circulate alternate forms of societal organisation, “whose world views, norms and certainties are grouped around the centre of invisible threats” (Beck 1992: 74).

The first direction of risk societal change is the scapegoat society orientated around the allocation of blame. According to Beck (1992: 75) "as the dangers increase along with political inaction, the risk society contains an inherent tendency to become a scapegoat society: suddenly it is not the hazards, but those who point them out that provoke the general uneasiness". Risk classifications stigmatise and circulate doubt about certain individuals and groups. These categorisations justify the exercise of societal power to exorcise that risk from society as a whole. In the scapegoat society certain persons, events and actions become culpable for the pathological effects of risk and prompt the allocation of blame. Certain social groups project themselves as the protectors of society. They maintain their dominance by dramatising the societal harm posed by those stigmatised groups. Pinning blame is a process of stigmatisation that re-orientates society away from understanding broader cosmopolitanisation processes, and towards the search for fictive, static causes.

The second form of risk societal change orientates around the alarmed panicked prevention of a catastrophic society. Beck notes that a catastrophic society is where the “the state of emergency threatens to become the normal state.....[with] a tendency to a legitimate totalitarianism of hazard prevention, which takes the right to prevent the worst and, in an all too familiar manner, creates something even

81 Also see van Benthem van den Bergh’s essay on the attribution of blame (1977).
worse" (Beck 1992: 79-80). There is an emphasis on the immediacy of risk, as narratives of societal endangerment dominate public discussions through the probabilistic projection of potential catastrophic outcomes. An identified risk is deemed so grave, its threat so great that it demands preventative measures seeking to mitigate and alleviate the attendant dangers. The desire to pre-empt a looming catastrophe forms the justification for the normalisation of emergency measures that perpetuate the risk traps.

The third form of risk society is the self-critical society structured around the acceptance of risks. For Beck (1992: 176), the self-critical society is the preferable vision of a risk society. He notes that "the risk society is potentially also a self-critical society. Reference points and presuppositions of critique are always being produced there in the form of risks and threats". This is where the awareness of globalised risks cultivates opportunities for new bonds of ecological identification. The management of doubt can stimulate more constructive societal cooperation, for example, the vitality of Europe is apparent in its ability to “renew itself through radical self-criticism and creative destruction” (Beck 1994: 24). There is the need for society to embrace ecological issues that facilitate a move towards a “universal self-reformation” of fatalistic industrial modernity to ensure a sustainable future (Beck 1994: 51-52). Self-critical societal changes are calls for solidarity through the mutual desire for a sustainable, cosmopolitan future.

**Political Leaders & People Risk Orientations**

The following section demonstrates that the vocabulary of risk sociology provides a method to understand the language representations of transnational migration projected by political leaders. Blends of people risk orientations mobilise shared anxieties, dominate societal orientation and steer the direction of societal change.
Political Leaders & Risk

Risk orientations projected by political leaders can cultivate the development of further socio-psychological fortifications within liberal democratic societies. The cosmopolitanisation movement embraces multiple identities, accepting limits to societal control and advocating for an open society. This movement interprets transnational risks as an opportunity to lower the barriers between peoples. While the anti-cosmopolitanisation movement in contrast embraces a singular, nationalised consciousness, with a belief in more absolute societal controls, and advocates for a closed society. This movement interprets transnational risks as threats to vulnerable localised identifications, which justify raising the barriers between peoples.

One blend of cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitanisation is the development of greater fortifications in state-societies. These societal amalgams practice a “democratic authoritarianism”, where openness to global markets paralleled “a heightened fear of foreigners, born out of the apprehension of terrorism and bristling with the poison of racism” (Beck 2002: 49-50).

Risk orientations of transnational migration can reveal the contrasts between cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitanisation movements, providing a glimpse into the overall direction of societal change.

People risk orientations challenge the idealised conceptual legacies of industrial society. The movement of some people and some capital is deemed safe, while the movement of other people and other capital understood as harmful. The movement of “people as risks” shows the contradictory identifications within contemporary liberal democratic societies (Heyman 2013: 70). Migration risk disrupts the seemingly homogeneous, controllable boundaries of liberal democratic state-society. Industrial society was a mobile society, where participation in work “presupposes mobility and the readiness to be mobile” (Beck 1994: 16). People risk orientations ties into the legacies of the highly unequal social relations such as slave ownership (Crothers 2011: 626), where the movement of slaves represented
financial risks. In the modern context there is also an ambiguity in transnational people movements: “migrants embody all the gradations of both/and: they are native foreigners or foreign nationals whose social competences are not only indispensable but also enrich cultural and public life by making it more colourful, contradictory and conflictual” (Beck 2006: 104).

Concerns for people risks also blocks the interconnections with and awareness of other risks such as financial and environmental risks. For example, the projection and acceptance of the relatively safe financial risks inhabits a grasp of the unintended harmful consequences of austerity policies (Beck 2013a). Transnational people movements are in fact combinations of globalised risks.

Against this backdrop, people risk orientations projected by political leaders can mobilise shared anxieties. The cooperation pressures of independency crises and complex interconnectivity encourages the contestation of cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitanisation movements.

The cosmopolitanisation movement is more accepting of migration risks. New arrivals are contributors to society, enriching social life, providing new ways for creative self-critical transformation. They embrace a cosmopolitan empathy, a consciousness open to multiple identifications. This accepts the importance of national identifications and extends those bonds in a process of integration that adapts the national with the cosmopolitan and cosmopolitan with the national. Beck remarks that “cosmopolitanism without provincialism is empty, provincialism without cosmopolitanism is blind” (Beck 2006: 7). Migration risk is an opportunity for further universalised cooperation to cultivate a sustainable human ecology that lowers barriers of exclusion and widens the possibilities of inclusion. There is a recognition that there are limits to the control of migration risk, and this awareness is a means to realising more sustainable human societies.

In contrast, where the cosmopolitans see relative harmlessness, the anti-cosmopolitans see more harmful people risks. The movement of migrants, refugees, or asylum seekers are a threat to a singular, localised national consciousness,
prompting forecasts of both scapegoat and catastrophic transformations of society. This interpretation of harmfulness encompasses the proactive demonization/stigmatisation of migration risks, which becomes the fictive cause for a range of social concerns. Transnational people movements are interpreted as an ecologically destructive practice, a threat to economic livelihoods, social cohesion and introducing the threat societal violence. The presence of migration risk invokes the creation and perpetuation of preventative measures through new laws and norms aimed at raising barriers between oldcomers and newcomers as noted by Elias in the Winston Pava example. These barriers are aimed at protecting a vulnerable provincial identity, in a closed society that resists attempts to integrate newcomers with oldcomers, and rejects appeals to universal obligations. The raising of barriers is idealised, but in reality, fruitless. Beck (2006: 117) emphasises that global risks such as finance, the environment and terrorism are indifferent to the walls put up by ethnic populists.

There are power struggle over migration issues in liberal democratic populations. Political leaders harness particular interpretations of migration risk to legitimise their actions. ‘Guilt feelings’ become an area for political struggle. Different societal groups cultivate empathetic attachments and identifications from cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitanisation movements, to circulate and perpetuate standards of acceptance and rejection.

Political leaders’ risk orientations can dominate societal orientation. The interpretation struggles of harmful/harmless migration risk become crucial for practicing societal power. Political leaders channel the views of mass media, pedagogical institutions and other subpolitical groupings to legitimise their interpretations of safety and/or catastrophe. There are abstract reductive distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migrants, which justify relative interpretations of harmlessness and harmfulness.

Political leaders problematize migration, using symbolic figures such as numbers of boat arrivals, deaths at sea and overall calculations of migrant intake however specified. Numbers, statistics, images and symbols, highlight the urgency for action
and need/lack thereof to assert control over certain kinds of people movement. The movement of people is quantified through a mathematised morality that dictates the necessity for greater or lesser forms of social regulation, for example by the tightening of visa requirements, greater powers for law enforcement agencies, additional border controls and offshore detention. These stimulate simultaneous forms of inclusive societal openness and exclusive societal closure through the creation of both physical and socio-psychological boundaries. Leaders imply that only they have the solution, only they can be trusted with the responsibilities of power and their opponents cannot.

The migration risk orientations projected by political leaders can influence the direction of societal change. Migration risk becomes localised, as people become aware of the presence of globalised people risks in ‘their neighbourhoods’. This becomes a personalised experience through images and symbols projected by political leaders and the mass media. These stimulate a public consciousness around specific interpretations of secure and catastrophic migration risk.

Liberal democratic populations can become entrapped by avoidance imperatives that empower and/or discourage relations between themselves and people identified as migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. They are torn or divided between competing socio-moral responsibilities. Cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitanisation movements represent the contemporary development of contradictory forms of identification between the mobile techno-economic bourgeois and immobile politico-economic citoyen. Commitments to these movements generate societal expectations of what ought to occur when confronted with migration risk as well as tensions when these anticipations are unfulfilled.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that risk sociology further develops a sociological outlook for understanding the shared anxieties of political leaders initiated by process sociology. Risk models understand the contradictory development of global interdependencies and global risks through the awareness and unawareness of
‘reflexive’ modernisation. The development of global risk societies and the power relations of risk consciousness demands a cosmopolitan societal science that replaces national models and the reductive conceptual legacies of industrial society.

Risk sociology offers a vocabulary to conceptualise cosmopolitanisation processes from the everyday experience of globalised interdependence and interdependency crises. The power struggles from diverging cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitan movements mobilise shared anxieties from the interpretation struggles and possibility judgements between harmful catastrophic and harmless safe interpretations of risks. These movements parallel the duality of nation-state normative codes highlighted by Elias. The management of fears bound to risk orientations becomes a desired feature of societal institutions.

The vocabulary of risk sociology provides a method to understand the language representations of transnational migration by political leaders. People risk orientations can demonstrate the mobilisation of shared anxieties, the domination of societal orientation, which help steer the course of societal change.

The next four chapters will empirically demonstrate the synthesis of process and risk sociology through a sociological model for shared anxieties. These chapters will evaluate the migration language of British and Australian Prime Ministers from 2001 to 2017 by combining the models and vocabularies of process and risk sociology. The chapters will trace the fortified societal orientations in Britain and Australia, revealing the tensions in liberal-democratic societies discussed by both Elias and Beck.
Chapter 3.
An Investigation into the Major Public Migration Speeches by Tony Blair (2001-2007) and Gordon Brown (2007-2010)

The last two chapters outlined a process and risk sociological approach to understanding shared anxieties. These outlooks provided complementary models to understand the development of knowledge processes, interdependence and power relations. Process and risk sociology provided a vocabulary to conceptualise shared anxieties through cosmopolitised interdependent webs of relations moulding societal formations within liberal-democratic societies. Interpretations of interdependency crises arouse power struggles between conflicting cosmopolitan humanist-egalitarian and anti-cosmopolitan collective-nationalist nation-state normative codes. The oscillations between harmful catastrophic and harmless safe risk orientations propagates societal fears held by sections of established groups, situating relations with outsider groups. The models and vocabularies of process and risk sociology offer a method to grasp the language representations of transnational migration circulated by political leaders, who attempt to mobilise shared anxieties, dominate societal orientation and steer the avenues of societal change.

A sociological model for shared anxieties offers a more sophisticated framework to understand the socio-psychological tensions that bind liberal-democratic societies. By investigating the migration representations of political leaders in Britain and Australia, my study expands comprehensions about societal tensions through a model of interdependence and power relations nexuses. These empirical examples can help refine and extend the vocabularies of process and risk sociology. Together Chapters 3 and 4 help investigate whether the same societal processes found in the language of British Prime Ministers were also present in Australian leaders explored in Chapters 5 and 6.
My third chapter evaluates the migration language of British Prime Ministers Tony Blair (2001-2007) and Gordon Brown (2007-2010). The aim of this chapter is to reconstruct the societal processes that shaped British society during this period, using the vocabularies of process and risk sociology. Blair and Brown encompassed a period of British history from 2001 to 2010 under a Labour government. Their speeches, interviews and press conferences set the tone for the kinds of policies, practices and societal expectations that moulded relations within British society.

The chapter is the first demonstration of the process reconstructive method proposed in Chapters 1 and 2 to understand shared anxieties. I have reconstructed the specific blend of socio-psychological tensions present within British society during this period. These tensions encompassed the synergies binding decolonialisation, Europeanisation and commodification processes, with cosmpolitanisation–de-cosmpolitanisation pressures that swayed the criminalisation, objectification and stigmatisation of transnational people movements.

In this chapter, I will argue that the migration language of Prime Ministers Blair and Brown propagated greater socio-psychological fortifications within British society. Blair and Brown propagated more harmful catastrophic interpretations of transnational migration. At first, these harmful representations focused on asylum seeker movement. Over the course of this period, increasingly harmful negative representations of European migration distorted relations with the European Union (EU). Together, these depictions helped restrict the modes of thinking and narrowed the means of societal orientation in British society. Blair and Brown raised the barriers to societal inclusion and widened forms of societal exclusion.

This chapter consists of two sections. The first section explains the mobilisation of shared anxieties and the development of more reductive modes of thinking in British society. The second section explains the domination of societal orientations, which fortified British society.
Mobilisation of Shared Anxieties by Blair & Brown

The following section illustrates the development of reductive modes of thinking in Britain, through the conceptual terms developed in Chapters 1 and 2. It explains the mobilisation of shared anxieties embedded in the language of Blair and Brown. Ambiguous interpretations of transnational migration infused the societal conscience formations of British society. Blair and Brown channelled the understandings of established groups in Britain to commodify the movement of outsider groups. There were conflicting attachments to the humanist-egalitarian normative code and collective-nationalist that trapped depictions of migrant outsiders. The former stressed the idealised tolerance of a Britain that is open and appreciative to the movement of people. There is greater evidence of a shift towards the latter, a more collective-nationalist code that appealed to a closed consciousness idealising “British values” and the commitment to controlling borders. Commodification processes intermixed with more nationalised appeals and cultivated more involved fantasy based understandings of transnational movement. Transnational people movement became a risk to more insecure sections of established groups within Britain.

Decolonialisation & Europeanisation Processes

Societal experiences of decolonialisation and Europeanisation processes affected the conscience formations of established groups in Britain during this period. Awareness of wider webs of interdependence and belief in the higher power ratio of British society is evidenced in the language of Blair and Brown.

Decolonialisation processes and accompanying people movements have sustained the belief that Britain remained a powerful participant in broader international society. Relative openness to people movement kindled lingering identifications with a powerful Britain at the centre of a global empire. Post-imperial migration from the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent contributed to a style of multiculturalism that incorporated notions racial equality (Koopmans and Statham
1999: 693; Hansen 2000). Hansen remarks (2000: 20, 26) that from the 1960s onwards, there was a bipartisan consensus that made “good race relations” dependant on regulating numbers of migrant arrivals. He noted that the UK shifted from an imperial orientated openness to people movement designed to cling onto the vestiges of empire to “one of the strictest migration policies in the Western world” by the 2000s.

Public hostility to migration, sustained by appeals to uniquely ‘British values’ has been aided by a strong executive and weak parliament eager to satisfy popular demands, with more liberal openness channelled into developing anti-discrimination legislation (Hansen 2000; Ashcroft and Bevir 2018: 6-7). Enoch Powell’s (MacArthur ed. 1999: 383-392) infamous rivers of blood speech connected post-imperial migration with fears about communal violence and reduced access to public services. The speech also drew implicit forecasts of societal collapse through the idealised symbolic association between the British and Roman empires. This symbolic connection between Britain and Rome perpetuated a mythical understanding of collective supremacy that resonated within more nationalised sections of established groups in British society.

Resistance to Europeanisation processes fed into hostilities toward European migration. From the 2000’s onwards, British interpretations of transnational people movement became Europeanised, and “illustrative of European interdependencies”, where “Britain shares substantive policy preferences in key areas of migration and asylum policy with other EU member states and is tied to them by interdependencies generated by Schengen” (Geddes 2005: 738, 740; Beck and Grande 2007). These webs of interdependence encompassed the four freedoms: free movement of people (in the form of the Schengen area of passport free travel), capital, goods and services within the EU first set out in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The domestication of labour movement within the EU was interdependent with the externalisation of territorial boundaries beyond Europe and the management of non-EU movement. British resistance to non-EU movement merged

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82 Hansen (2000: 128-129) cites Home Secretary Frank Soskice as the figure who first bound immigration restrictions with anti-discrimination procedures.
with resistance to EU labour movement. Opposition to the Europeanised control of external borders blended with opposition to the Europeanisation of domestic law that integrated the “positive rights” of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to ameliorate the weak constitutional protections for immigrants in Britain (Ette and Gerdes 2007: 103-104, 111).

Commodification & Established Outsider Relations

Blair and Brown channelled the attitudes of various established groups with higher power ratios in British society. These groups were bound by beliefs in the commodification of societal relations through movements of people and financial capital. Their language displayed evidence of more globalised ultra-rich established groups and more localised established groups.

On the one hand, they represented more mobile techno-economic *bourgeois* identifications, connected to an ultra-rich globalised establishment that held a relatively strong power ratio in British society. Their status resides in the accumulation and continued facilitation of the movement of financial capital within and beyond Britain. These groups value the movement of capital, which is distilled into phases like ‘the economy’ and commitments to ‘economic growth’. On the other hand, Blair and Brown also represented more immobile politico-economic *citoyen/citizen* identifications. Their status is bound to a localised establishment through the containment of financial capital for the assistance of ‘citizens’.

Blair and Brown demonstrated ambiguous understandings of the movement of people in relation to the movement of capital. Speeches to audiences such as the Confederation of British Industry (27.04.2004; 29.11.2005; 24.01.2007; 26.11.2007; 05.09.2008; 23.11.2009) revealed the forms of people movement that were more or less attractive for established groups in British society, as shown the following accounts.
“the movement of people and labour into and out of the UK is, and always has been, absolutely essential to our economy. And the economic contribution of visitors and migrants is nothing new. At crucial points over the past century and beyond we have relied on migrants to supply essential capital to our economy and plug the labour gaps when no others could be found. As we approach 1 May[^83], there are similar scare stories about the movement of workers from Eastern Europe. There are half a million vacancies in our job market and our strong and growing economy needs migration to fill these vacancies.” (27.04.2004)

“The world is more mobile than ever before. Capital moves freely across national boundaries. Information is transmitted digitally, in an instant. Trade growth. We now have large-scale movement of people around the world, with 30 million non-EU foreign nationals passing through the UK every year. But the open world brings with it new problems too. Identity theft for financial gain, illegal immigration and illegal working have all increased. 1 in 4 criminals use false identities. Some terrorist suspects have as many as 50 assumed identities. Indeed this has been part of the training at Al Qaeda camps” (06.11.2006).

“a balanced approach to migration allows businesses to benefit from the specific skills that economic migrants can bring to our country and improves the responsiveness of our labour market to fluctuating demand.” (05.09.2008)

[^83]: The date refers to the 2004 enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 member states.
The accounts above illustrated how forms of movements were actively promoted by techno-economic *bourgeoisie* identifications, as well as discouraged by politico-economic *citoyen* identifications. Account 27.04.2004 discussed the economically historic contributions of migrants to “our strong and growing economy”. The freer movement of people accompanies the freer movement of capital “across national boundaries”. This enabled businesses in Britain to benefit from the skills of “economic migrants” (06.11.2006; 05.09.2008). These three accounts verbalised attachments towards a neoliberal ideology, a system of beliefs that prioritised the movement of capital as the fundamental social value.

Blair and Brown linked economic development to the movement of people into Britain, with the aim of maintaining Britain’s status as a highly ‘advanced’ state-society. Contributions to the economy formed an important way of orienting society, directing the participation of all members, loosening behaviour deemed ‘economic’ and restraining non-economic behaviour. The accounts depicted a Britain that is open to the movement of capital, but also vulnerable to “new problems” with potentially harmful side effects from the transnational movement of people. Accounts 27.04.2004 and 06.11.2006 noted the development of “scare stories” about the labour movement from Eastern Europe84, and concerns over transnational violence from “criminals” and “terrorist suspects”. Capital movements were exclusively beneficial, but people movements were potentially detrimental to British society.

Blair and Brown commodified migrant outsiders into harmless benefits and harmful costs to British society. This process shows conflicting understandings of human interdependencies. Migrant outsiders are harmless benefits to the economy and labour markets (06.11.2006). But they were also associated with presumably harmful practices such as illegal working, criminal activity and terrorism (06.11.2006). Portrayals of migrant outsiders were highly ambiguous, depending on whether they were categorised as refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants, but also as tourists, students and visitors.

84 Growing concerns over Europeanised people movement is an ongoing theme that will be further discussed in this chapter, and into the next chapter.
The distinguishing feature of all of these categorisations is the relatively low power resources of these groups. In the following accounts, migrant outsiders became representations of harmful and harmless side effects of human interdependencies.

“Interdependence is obliterating the distinction between foreign and domestic policy. It was the British economy that felt the aftermath of 11 September. Our cities who take in refugees from the 13 million now streaming across the world from famine, disease or conflict.” (01.10.2002)

“you have got globalisation which is pushing waves of people, you know crossing frontiers across the world, most of those people we want in our countries because they are students, visitors, tourists, people who come to work for good reason. As globalisation takes effect, then what happens is the challenges of the system become immense.” (06.06.2006)

“But as people are ever more mobile, it also becomes ever more important to develop a new approach to managed migration. This should be founded on an affirmation of Britishness in a covenant that has as its heart the rights and obligations of modern citizenship. And it should set immigration within a clearer framework of social responsibility that makes sure migration benefits us as much socially and culturally as it does economically.” (20.02.2008)

Each of the accounts above verbalised harmful and harmless understandings of migrant outsiders. There are “waves of people” such as students, visitors and tourists who are more desired by established groups in Britain due to their perceived harmlessness and societal utility (06.06.2006). There are cooperation
pressures binding established groups with migrant outsiders such as refugees that are fleeing famine, disease and conflict (01.10.2002). Personal pronouns through terms such as “our” and “us”, show the weighting of reciprocal relations in favour of established groups (01.10.2002; 20.02.2008). Migrant outsiders were required to affirm their “Britishness” and attachments to the collective of British state-society to ensure that “migration benefits us” and are deemed to be more harmful because of pressures on “our cities” and broader societal “system” (01.10.2002; 06.06.2006; 20.02.2008). They became more of a burden and less of a benefit to the established in British society.

Tensions over Normative Codes in the Language of Blair and Brown

Ambiguous representations of migrant outsiders showed evidence of power struggles between cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian and de-cosmopolitanised collective-nationalist normative codes. Blair and Brown maintained idealised attachments to both codes, yet the balance was never uniform. Their articulations of humanist-egalitarian tolerance though never completely abandoned, became increasingly overshadowed by collective-nationalist propagations of ‘British values’, the national interest, and border controls.

Blair and Brown channelled idealised commitments to the humanist-egalitarian normative code through affirmations of societal tolerance. They repeatedly clung onto to identifications towards a Britain that is a “tolerant country” (20.06.2002; 27.04.2004; 06.05.2005; 12.05.2005; 27.06.2005; 08.12.2006; 20.02.2008). These affirmations corresponded to identifications towards a more open Britain that should be more accepting of transnational people movement. There were appeals to common human obligations towards migrant outsiders, such as providing refuge to people fleeing persecution as enshrined in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The following accounts expressed commitments to a more open consciousness that channelled adherence to the humanist-egalitarian normative code.
“I think most people in this country are tolerant and they know it is right to give a haven to people genuinely fleeing persecution. They know that we need, and indeed should value, migrants who add to our economic well-being. I think it is not that people are anti-immigrant or anti-asylum seeker, but I think they are anti-disorder, they are anti a system that doesn't appear to have proper rules to it.” (20.06.2002)

“We all have responsibilities: Government to put in place the policies and rules that make migration work for Britain; migrant communities to recognise the obligations that come with the privilege of living and working in Britain; the media in giving as much attention to the benefits of migration and successes of diversity as to the dangers and fears; local authorities and community groups in working for integration and cohesion on the ground. And ordinary decent British people - including generations of migrants themselves - to keep faith in our traditions of tolerance and our historic record of becoming stronger and richer as a result of migration and diversity.” (27.04.2004)

“On the contrary, we know migration has been good for Britain. We acknowledge the extraordinary contribution migrants from all faiths and races have made. We are a nation comfortable with the open world of today. London is perhaps the most popular capital city in the world today partly because it is hospitable to so many different nationalities, mixing, working, conversing with each other. But we protect this attitude by defending it. Our tolerance is part of what makes Britain, Britain. So conform to it; or don’t come here.” (08.12.2006; cf. 31.03.2010)
In the accounts above, Blair demonstrated commitments to the humanist-egalitarian code. He expressed an openness to the movement of migrant outsiders into Britain. There was the idealisation of collective tolerance towards migrant outsiders that expressed the unquestionable virtuousness of established sections in British society. People in Britain are “tolerant” of migrant outsiders who are “genuinely fleeing persecution” and those that provide economic contributions to society (20.06.2002). For Blair, migration was sign of societal vitality, which made Britain successful because of the societal contributions of people from multiple nationalities, faiths and racial backgrounds (27.04.2004; 08.12.2006). He reinforced the societal ideal of a tolerant, developed Britain. The direction of reciprocal relations veered towards a more romanticised grasp of societal tolerance, in the form of sentimental representations of “ordinary decent British people” (27.04.2004). There are caveats to the ideal of societal tolerance, however, through the criteria of genuine persecution, economic behaviour and conformity to the rules set by established groups.

Commitments to societal tolerance shifted in favour of greater devotion to the collective-nationalist normative code. There was a detectable shift to a more closed consciousness, which emphasised obedience to ‘British values’ characteristic of politico-economic *citoyen* identifications. The term British values are as ambiguous as the notion of Britain itself. This vagueness enabled Blair and Brown and their party-government establishment to provide a definition that suited their own involved short-term preferences at the time, particularly, the desire to maintain their place in the balance of societal power.

The requirement to accept British values was an enforced subscription to particular accounts of British history and corresponding societal conscience formations. These narratives were crafted overtime by the groups that make up the ‘British establishment’: urban bourgeois and rural aristocratic elites, working from a largely English metropole\(^85\). The commitment to upholding British values was interdependent with long-standing historical power struggles within and beyond

\(^{85}\) Immigration remains subject to the Westminster Parliament in London and is not part of 1997 devolution reforms in Scotland and Wales.
British society. Narrow attachments to British values limited broader societal reflection on the extent to which these ideals are also shared by both migrant outsiders, and people in other large societal groupings, such as societies in Europe.

The move towards a more nationalised consciousness emphasising the uniqueness of the territorialised nation-state of Britain was epitomised in the following accounts.

“we are very proud of the British way of life, and we're proud of the fact that we treat people fairly, that we welcome in people who are fleeing persecution. But I'm sorry, people can't come here and abuse our good nature and our tolerance......but if people want to come here as refugees fleeing persecution, or as people seeking a different or better way of life, they come here and they play by our rules and our way of life. If they don’t then they are going to have to go because they are threatening people in our country and that’s not right either. The way to protect our way of life is to respond very clearly to that clear view of the British people, that yes we have responded to the 7th July\textsuperscript{86} attacks by saying that we want to keep our country together, and to respect all out communities” (05.08.2005)

“in future the aspiring citizen should know and subscribe to a clear statement of British values, proceeding toward a citizenship explicitly founded not just on what they receive from our society but what they owe to it.....let me acknowledge today the many hard working men and women who have come to Britain in recent years and have made a huge contribution to our country and to our prosperity by adding flexibility to our labour market, helping make a

\textsuperscript{86} Referring to the attacks in London that year, see paragraph on terrorism in Section Two.
success of our businesses, working hard and paying taxes, and in some cases by **supporting our** most essential **public services** including the **NHS**. We must - and will - continue to ensure that we attract the skilled workers from overseas that our businesses need. And we will at all times maintain our tradition of giving refuge to those fleeing persecution - and of tackling racism and discrimination. But we must also set a policy that **serves** the **British national interest** --- that acknowledges that what we need economically, what strengthens our society and our communities, must come first.” (20.02.2008)

“Immigration is not an issue for fringe parties nor a taboo subject - it is a question to be dealt with at the heart of our politics; a question about what it **means to be British** - about what are the values we hold dear, the responsibilities we expect of those coming into our country; about how we secure the skills we need to compete in the global economy; about how, out of diversity, we preserve and strengthen the richness of our communities............In a fast moving world it is vital for cohesion that all people in Britain explicitly sign up to the direct responsibilities that come from being part of a community. So, in the interests of fairness, a condition for entry to our home, our British family, must be that you will commit to maintaining all that is best about the country we love. **British values** are not an add-on for us - an option, or an extra to take or leave. Those who wish to come to our country must embrace them wholeheartedly and proudly, as we do.” (12.11.2009)

In the accounts above from Blair and Brown, the ideal of tolerance became conditional on the fulfilment of a nationalised commitment to upholding the “British way of life”. The humanist-egalitarian emphasis on societal tolerance became
conditional on the adherence to a more collective-nationalist normative code and attachments towards the nation-state of Britain. The struggle between these normative codes and effects on the development of national we-identifications in British society stretches back as far as the 19th century (Elias 2013 [1989]: 177-181). In the 05.08.2005 account, Blair articulated a demand that “our” good and nature our tolerance” cannot be abused. Migrant outsiders must adhere to the rules and “way of life” of the established groups in Britain, regardless of whether they are refugees, or people motivated by varying reasons to enter Britain. Bundled groups of more harmful migrant outsiders became commodified harms, required to leave Britain if suspected of breaking the rules of the established, “because they are threatening people in our country”.

Brown expressed more explicit accounts of conditional tolerance, where the techno-economic bourgeoisie recognition of migrant outsider contributions to businesses and the NHS\(^{87}\) swung towards more politico-economic citoyen identifications (20.02.2008). This development culminated in the 12.11.2009 account, where he dictated the conditions for acceptance into Britain. Migrant outsiders must explicitly embrace “British values” to preserve the qualities and affirmations of established groups in Britain.

**Control over Borders & Societal Fortification**

The language of Blair and Brown fortified British society, through the propagation of suspicions about migrant outsiders. Their commitments to the control and protection of borders are evidence of these societal apprehensions (06.04.2004; 14.12.2007; 17.06.2008). They became more reliant on the proliferation of national symbols for their hold the balance of societal power. Blair and Brown’s attachments towards the humanist-egalitarian code did not sufficiently restrain and counter concerns about transnational people movements.

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\(^{87}\) The National Health Service, broader fears about healthcare are explained later in the chapter.
References to the border symbolised national vulnerabilities to globalised people movements and associated harmful consequences. Blair expressed the following phrase: “we can and should take all the measures necessary to control immigration in the UK” (27.04.2004). The statement cultivated greater contemplation of more coercive practices to regulate the movement of migrant outsiders. It opened the space for contemplation over whether those measures included, for example the sanctioned use of violence, or measures short of violence such as detention and deportation (see Schuster 2003: 511; Malloch and Stanley 2005; Gibney 2008). The statement forms part of a consistent demands for the protection of borders shown by the following accounts:

“Secondly, in relation to issues to do with asylum and immigration, gives us a greater opportunity to take the action that we need, not just in our own countries but also the European Union, to try and make sure that we doubt those asylum claims that are not genuine asylum claims, and also that we can return people to their countries of origin should their claims fail in an easier manner……what we want is a Europe of Nations, not a federal super state, and that issues to do with taxation, foreign policy, defence policy, our own British borders will remain the prerogative of our national government and national Parliament.” (20.06.2003)

“The best that you can do is to take every single action you can to try and secure your own borders, to try for example to make sure that the entry from France into this country, and across the Channel into this country, is as closely monitored and watched as possible….Now as a result of the border controls that we have introduced, as a result of the closure of places like Sangatte88, as a result of the changes in the law

88 The Sangatte reception centre in Calais, for more extensive account see Schuster 2003.
we have made it far more difficult for people to come into this country, as well as come into it and claim asylum.” (01.04.2004)

“So this is the system we have introduced which gives us the ability to secure the skills we need and to secure our borders against those who are not welcome here. And I believe the responsible way to debate migration – and I believe this is what many companies want to see – is to debate how we can use this system over the coming years to continue to control migration fairly, to reduce the overall need for migration, while continuing to attract the key people who will make the biggest contribution to the growth of our economy. The debate just isn’t about who will open all the floodgates and who will shut all doors. Neither of these are responsible options. It’s actually about the flexibility to access the skilled workers we need when we need them; and to exclude the rest. It’s about control.” (31.03.2010)

For Blair and Brown, protection of borders from more harmful migrant outsiders symbolised societal vulnerabilities through reinforced attachments to the collective-national normative code. In the 20.06.2003 account, Blair discussed “the action that we need” across both Britain and the EU with resistance to sharing reciprocal function of taxation, foreign and defence policy and border controls. Depictions of migrant outsiders intertwined with the continuing development of Britain’s terse relationship with EU. The 20.06.2003 account highlighted a pattern that became more pronounced across this phase of British society culminating in transformative events such as the 2016 EU Referendum. The 01.04.2004 account noted increasing the barriers to the movement of people through enhanced border controls in France and “a tough approach” that included greater coercive surveillance. In the 31.03.2010 account, Brown linked the imperative to secure borders to the need to reduce societal dependencies on the movement of people,
while maintaining degrees of limited tolerance to migrant outsiders who provide large economic contributions to British society.

People Risks & Societal Concerns

Blair and Brown became reliant on the support of more insecure sections of established groupings in British society. Migrant outsiders became characterised as risks in ways that show the interdependencies of globalised movements and localised power struggles.

Insecure sections of the established are more sensitive about their status, and more prone to understanding the movement of migrant outsiders as an encroachment on “our way of life” (see account 05.08.2005 mentioned earlier). Migrant outsiders are more than just isolated individuals, but communities in the making that can tilt the balance between established and outsider groups in some local communities, urban and rural. Insecure localised established groupings are more inclined to embrace harmful depictions of migrant outsiders. They are notable for the constant repetition of the possessive pronoun ‘our’: “our borders”, for example appealed to collective-nationalist attachments, which manufactured an objectified symbol that demanded protection. These attachments perpetuated a cycle of societal expectations set by Blair and Brown over who could better protect the border. The question of who can protect ‘our border’ reduced the space of societal thinking and attempted to arouse greater attachments towards party-political establishment represented by Blair and Brown.

Societal expectations for the maintenance of borders set the scene for greater concerns and suspicions of migrant outsiders, in particular, when the perception arose that the Blair could not protect the border. For example, during the period of August/September 2001, there was fervent tabloid media coverage of asylum seeker movements surrounding the Eurotunnel and Sangatte reception centre, which asserted that Britain under threat of invasion (Schuster 2003: 511).
Commodified migrant outsiders became a more harmful cost and less of a harmless benefit to British society. Blair and Brown circulated greater fantasy infused depictions of migrant outsiders. In the following accounts, Blair and Brown aroused societal vulnerabilities, and relied upon the support of more insecure sections of established.

“The worry from our point of view as policy makers is you will send a signal right across the system that Britain is again open for business on asylum claims that are not genuine. Now I have said that we will look into this very, very carefully, this country is a tolerant country and I wouldn't want it on my conscience, apart from anything else, of sending people back to torture and abuse and so on......And we are worried, having really battened down the hatches on the asylum system and managed to get real progress so that the claims are now a quarter of what they were three years ago, we are worried about re-opening this” (27.06.2005).

“If the main effect of immigration on your life is to make it easier to find a plumber, or when you see doctors and nurses from overseas in your local hospital, you are likely to think more about the benefits of migration than the possible costs. But if you’re living in a town which hasn’t seen much migration before, you may worry about whether immigration will undermine wages and the job prospects of your children - and whether they will be able to get housing anywhere near you. And everyone wants to be assured that newcomers will accept the responsibilities as well as the rights that come with living here - they’ll accept the responsibilities to obey the law, to speak English, to make a contribution (12.11.2009).

89 In this period, the British government was engaged in the practice of "sending people back to torture", people specifically suspected of ‘terrorism’ (Beaumont 2018).
“immigration understandably and legitimately generates strong feelings right across our communities. I know how people worry that immigration might be changing their neighbourhoods. They would worry if immigration was putting pressure on schools, hospitals and housing; and they question whether immigration might undermine their wages or might harm the job prospects of their children. They question whether migrants are getting ahead of them in the queue for housing; or sometimes they ask us whether the nature of our communities is changing at a pace that’s simply too rapid. And I know people think it’s unfair when it feels as though some can take advantage of the freedoms and opportunities we offer in Britain without making a fair contribution or playing by the rules. So do I.” (31.03.2010)

In the accounts above, Blair and Brown appealed to insecure sections of the established through harmful depictions of migrant outsiders. Blair articulated a storm analogy through the phase “battened down the hatches”, which likened asylum seekers to an uncontrollable natural event that must be resisted (27.06.2005). He also expressed the humanist egalitarian code that Britain is “a tolerant country”, yet shifted to the avoidance of being “open for business on asylum claims that are not genuine” (27.06.2005).

In account 12.11.2009, Brown depicted migrant outsiders as harmless ‘benefits’ in form of plumbers, doctors and nurses, as well as a harmful ‘costs’ that reduced wages and job prospects in some local communities. He raised degrees of suspicion over people who are not reasonably contributing and obeying the rules of the established becoming a ‘cost’ to established groups in British society (31.03.2010).

The transnational movements of people were interpreted as more harmful catastrophic risks. Early in this period, Blair called for the introduction of new legislation that matches “the risk we face” (04.10.2001). One of those risks was the
deportation of people who abuse “our asylum procedures”. The practice of deportation also regulated people suspected of terrorism. Insecure established politico-economic citoyen concerns over communal violence and suspicions of dishonest asylum seekers were bound to techno-economic bourgeois identifications with “economic confidence”. Concerns of over communal violence and economic contributions were amalgamated into depictions of migrant outsiders. Further accounts highlighted that successful membership in the EU enabled the regulation of “terrorism, crime and illegal immigration”, and would not be “put at risk” (29.03.2004). There was the reduction of relations with the EU into the three poles of terrorism, crime and immigration regulation. Over the course of this phase of British society, more catastrophic risk narratives of migrant outsiders narrowed the means of societal orientation.

Dissemination of Fortified Orientations by Blair & Brown

The following section demonstrates the growth of narrow societal orientations that fortified British society. Depictions of economic migrant outsiders shifted towards more harmful risk orientations. These depictions dominated societal orientations, criminalised other groups of migrant outsiders such as asylum seekers, and shaped understandings of Europeanised movement. The objectification of migrant outsiders legitimised the criminalisation of transnational movement. Widening circles of disassociation strengthened a highly suspicious risk narrative that justified the greater exclusion of migrant outsiders. Blair and Brown propagated constellations of fears about migrant outsiders, which intermingled concerns about healthcare, welfare, economy, crime and communal violence. In parallel with the use of aquatic metaphors, these fears stigmatised migrant outsiders and mythologised the protective capacities of Blair and Brown. Fear constellations about migrant outsiders circulated greater socio-psychological fortifications that infused comprehensions of the EU, for example the EU Commission.
Distinctions between Skilled and Unskilled Movement

Characterisations of ‘economic migrants’ swung between harmless safe and more harmful catastrophic risk orientations. The term ‘economic migrants’ demonstrated forms of association and disassociation. Brown remarked that industrious, “highly skilled migrants” who provided economic contributions to British society were more desired (12.11.2009; 20.02.2008; 31.03.2010). He reflected the beliefs of an insecure localised politico-economic citoyen establishment, the belief that Britain should attract only the most skilled forms of labour. He also illustrated an unawareness of Britain’s long-standing reliance on ‘unskilled’ migrant labour in areas such as agriculture (Collins 1976). The belief in ‘high skilled migrants’ raised the barriers for acceptance and identification.

Depictions of economic migrants came to be part of widening circles of disassociation, characterisations that swung to more harmful catastrophic risk orientations in the following three accounts.

“it is a problem all over the European Union, indeed I would go further and say all over the world at the moment. And what is happening is that as part of globalisation you are getting these vast numbers of both economic migrants and genuine refugees who perfectly naturally want to search for a better life, but that then ends up as a major problem for the host country that takes them in.” (24.10.2005).

“we were one of the first, if not the only large country that when the new countries came into the European Union, like Slovakia, we opened our labour markets as well as our borders. And indeed I think we were saying there are 35,000 Slovaks working in the UK at the moment, and 2,000 Slovaks studying in the UK, and it is an interesting example of the future, this. When we first took the decision to open our markets to those people from central and Eastern Europe,
many people worried that it would be bad for our economy. Actually it has been positive for our economy, because **new people** coming in have **contributed dynamism** and enterprise and actually hard work to our economy.” (10.03.2006).

“Where the rules allow us to **limit migration within the EU**, we will also use them where appropriate --- as we have imposed **restrictions** on migrants from **Romania** and **Bulgaria**, in particular their **access to our labour market**. And we will make sure that where EU citizens do come to Britain they are exercising not an open-ended right but their treaty right which is a right to work --- we are able to **remove EU citizens** if they come here but are not employed after three months or are not studying or self-sufficient. I believe that European Member States should work together to ensure EU migration works to the benefit of all and that EU migrants contribute fully to our society. The **British Government will review access to benefits for EU migrants**, and what more can be done to disincentivise and punish criminality.” (20.02.2008).

Blair framed economic migrants and “genuine” refugees as a threat to society coming in “vast numbers” becoming a “problem” for established groups in Britain (24.10.2005). The movement of economic migrants was less acceptable than more genuine refugee movement\(^90\). Economic migrants are more acceptable when they come from places like Slovakia\(^91\) (though expanding to Central and Eastern Europe).

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\(^90\) In another account, Blair remarked that “economic migrants should come in through a proper immigration process” (30.09.2003).

The notion of refugees as stigmatised economic migrants can be traced to the phrase “**Wirtschaftsemigranten**” describing Jews fleeing German society controlled by Nazi Party in the 1930s (Loescher 1996: 17).

\(^91\)The account has the title ‘Meeting with Students in Bratislava (10 March 2006)’ see Appendix.
These more desired economic migrants were a “positive for our economy” because of their personable qualities of vitality and industriousness (10.03.2006).

In account 20.02.2008, Brown highlighted the change to more catastrophic risk orientations, regarding migrant outsiders from the EU, in particular people from newly acceded members from Eastern Europe. This is where EU migrants (particularly those from Romania and Bulgaria) were accepted so long as they fulfil their “treaty right” under the Lisbon Treaty. Should they become unemployed, fall out of education, and/or engage in criminal activity, they are recategorised as catastrophic risks and can be deported.

Criminalisation of Movement by Blair and Brown

Blair and Brown criminalised migrant outsiders and cultivated more coercive, stringent societal regulations. Criminalisation processes were expressed through high degrees of alertness to the harms inflicted by migrant outsiders to established groupings. Wacquant (1999: 219) remarks that the “criminalisation of immigrants” inspires targeted groups to develop clandestine ways of escaping state regulation, which in turn attracts greater attention from law enforcement. These regulations reproduce double bind processes in relations between insecure sections of established groups and migrant outsiders.

The criminalisation of movement sustained narratives of insecurity and legitimised the shift to a more closed consciousness unpinned by the collective-nationalist code. Remarks by Brown emphasised “a continued commitment to strong borders and the rigorous enforcement of the laws against illegal immigration” (12.11.2009). Blair and Brown circulated perceptions that the costs of accepting migrant outsiders outweighed the benefits.

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92 Legal scholar Juliet Stumpf uses the term “crimmigration” (2006), an understanding used in criminology literature see Brouwer et. al. 2017. The historical precedent is the criminalisation of Roma communities (Feischmidt et. al.; Joskowicz 2016).

93 There is also the counter movement of decriminalisation, behaviour once seen to be harmful and offensive becoming more accepted.
The incessant repetition that people entering Britain from overseas have abused standards of migration regulation propagated imageries of abuse. This perpetuated an ongoing moral panic surrounding perceived ‘abusive’ asylum seekers (Young 2003; Welch and Schuster 2005). Representations of globalised and localised system abuse were a consistent theme for British leaders (04.10.2001; 22.05.2003; 30.07.2003; 02.12.2003; 06.04.2004; 05.08.2005; 06.11.2006). Blair stated this directly when he noted that “the asylum system is a system in Britain as in other parts of the world that has been subject to general and widespread abuse” (06.04.2004). The imagery of abuse sustained collective-nationalist attachments to border controls; suspicion of abuse justified additional measures such as legislative changes and the creation of further institutions, such as the UK Border Agency. From 2001 to 2010, there were 253 new immigration acts passed, a remarkable figure given that only 82 new immigration acts passed from 1991 to 2000, an increase of 309% (for a list of the key immigration acts see Mulvey 2010: 461-462).

Numbers, Points and IDs

The objectification of migrant outsiders into quantifiable numerical symbols legitimised the criminalisation of their movement. Less numbers of people movement was more desired than greater numbers of people movement. This ratio is the opposite of preferences towards the movement of capital, where greater financial capital flows are more desired, and lesser capital flows are undesired. The numeric symbolic objectification of people has developed into an important feature of liberal-democratic societies. It has not only enabled the identification and provision of public services, but also became a tool for established groups to isolate outsider groups and enforce societal regulations. People became easier to regulate when they are ‘depersonalised’ into numeric symbols, a process starkly conveyed in the statements by British leaders.

At first, the objectification of migrant outsiders focused on numbers of asylum seekers. Mulvey (2010: 445) remarks that “government framing of asylum as a numerical crisis and threat, aided by the media, not only contributed to that crisis but also implied the solution, a reduction in numbers”. Over the course of this period of British society, the focus on asylum numbers expanded to other forms of transnational movement that included Europeanised movement. For example in the following accounts:

“The numbers have fallen now by more than 45% since we passed the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act last year, with 4,500 applications in March compared with almost 9,000 in October last year. So we remain fully on track to meet our pledge to cut applications by half by September. The figures also show, incidentally, that we are removing record numbers of those whose claims do not succeed, deciding more appeals, and reducing the number waiting for an initial decision. However we are by no means complacent

94 The ‘solution’ of numbers reduction proposed by the Conservative Party opposition became a totalising obsession for Cameron and May in the next phase of British society see Chapter 4.
about what we have achieved already. That is why I also welcome the Home Secretary's announcement this morning that we will draw up **further legislation** to continue to **bear down** on the **abuse of the system**.” (22.05.2003; 30.07.2003; 02.12.2003)

“10 years they would say well actually there have been and I think the real issue is the gap between what people now expect from the system and what they are seeing, so for example if you take immigration and asylum, as a result of the **reforms** that have been made, we used to only remove one in five failed asylum claimants. We now for the last year, 2006, for the first time in the Immigration Department’s history have got a **tipping point** where we are removing more people than we are taking in, in unfounded claims.” (24.01.2007; 16.01.2007; 14.03.2006)

“Some people talk as if **net inward migration** is rising. In fact, it is falling – down from 237,000 in 2007, to 163,000 in 2008, to provisional figures of 147,000 last year. Some people talk as if all immigrants stay here forever. In fact, most come for short periods and then return to their own country. And last year alone, over **100,000 Eastern Europeans left Britain to go home**. Our new points system is radically changing the way we are dealing with immigration from outside the European Union. The essence of it is to refuse entry to people who cannot contribute to the economy in the way we need – and to clearly delineate those skills that we cannot immediately generate in our own country.” (26.03.2010)

Each of the accounts above revealed the objectification of asylum seekers, which supported the development of more catastrophic risk orientations. This assisted the desire for coercive practices to reduce and remove asylum seekers, and expanded
into the need for more regulations of other migrant outsiders such as people movement from Europe. In the 22.05.2003 account, Blair spoke of the reduction from 9,000 to 4,500 asylum applicants. The 14.03.2006 and 24.01.2007 accounts discussed the removal of failed asylum seekers (people whose application was not accepted). Blair’s government reached the “tipping point” with a greater number of deportations\(^95\) than acceptances. Deterministic phrases such as “tipping point” propagated more fantasy based societal expectations about the protection of borders linked to numbers of overall people movement. Blair and Brown validated their imagery of abuse through the numerical symbolism of asylum numbers. They also directed public support towards their party-government establishment using collective-nationalist appeals to protect British state-society from the harmfulness of abusive asylum seeker movement.

The net of presumed abuse not only included the movement of asylum seekers but also the movement of Eastern Europeans. There was a shift from numbers of harmful asylum seekers to numbers of net migration\(^96\). In account 26.03.2010, Brown blurred the distinction between the EU and non-EU movement. The shift towards net migration became an edict to reduce the overall movement of people into Britain. This is at odds with the initial if shallow recognition that some types of people movement contribute to the economy.

Towards the end of this phase, there was the introduction of a points-based immigration system. It was an attempt to balance the need by techno-economic bourgeois sections of established groups desiring greater labour movement with concerns of politico-economic citoyen sections. Brown remarked that if “you have points that will allow you to get in if you have got a skill to offer, but if that is not the case then we have the right to say as a country that if you don't have a contribution to make then we do not need to take you” (11.12.2008). The balance usually swung in favour of politico-economic citoyen identifications and attachments to the collective-nationalist code.

\(^{95}\) Also see (20.06.2002).

\(^{96}\) Net migration is the difference between movement into an area (immigration) and movement out of an area (emigration).
Blair and Brown enlisted other parts of society to implement the more coercive measures against migrant outsiders. These professions included the judiciary, where Blair remarked that "we have also got to make sure frankly that we get the right court decisions that allow us to deport people who are failed asylum seekers" (14.03.2006). He gave an authoritarian edict that called for the judiciary to become more subservient to his government by facilitating the demand to deport "failed asylum seekers". Increasing the deportation of rejected asylum seekers was a celebrated achievement for Blair’s Labour government (Gibney 2008). In account 14.03.2006, Blair undermined the status and relative independence of the judiciary by requesting "the right court decisions". This presumed that the 'wrong' decisions were those that favoured asylum seekers who successfully appealed their deportation. The 'right decisions' favoured attachments towards the collective-nationalist code, and weakened connections to the humanist-egalitarian normative code. In addition to the judiciary, the same coercive strategies were also applied to health professionals (29.11.2004) and airline staff (14.12.2007).

The criminalisation of migrant outsiders justified the proposal for identity (ID) cards in Britain. In liberal-democratic societies, the possession of identity documents in the form of written, printed, or electronic matter such as passports and social security numbers confirms the relative harmlessness of the document holder. The presumed destruction of or failure to hold such documents confirms interpretations of harmfulness. Blair noted the need “to tackle the problem of asylum seekers who deliberately destroy or dispose of documents in order to make fraudulent claims and prevent removal, which is unacceptable” (22.05.2003).

The requirement for identity documents has been argued as an unrealistic expectation placed on asylum seekers fleeing societies where acquiring ‘valid’ travel documents risks imprisonment and/or death (see Maley 2016: 80-81). Regardless, the burden of proof falls on the migrant outsiders to satisfy the criteria

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97 Discussions are ID cards are not unique during this phase of British society and were introduced during the First and Second World Wars then dismantled (see Agar 2001). For a broader analysis see Lyon (2007; 2001)
98 For example see Torpey's history of the passport (2000).
of established groups for confirming their relative harmlessness to the society they enter. In the following accounts, the case for ID cards formed part of broader efforts to stigmatise migrant outsiders with particular societal fears.

“I am simply suggesting that it is an important addition in the fight against terrorism. But there is a third reason which I wanted to emphasise today, terrorism and security is not the only reason for having identity cards, they will also have a big impact in relation to illegal working and illegal immigration, they will also have an impact in the access of public services where at the moment, although the rules are in place to enforce entitlement to use for example the NHS free, it is difficult for people who are the frontline professionals to enforce those requirements without a proper means of assessing identity.” (29.11.2004)

“the only thing I would say to people is don’t tell me I have got to try and tackle these problems of identifying illegal immigrants, people coming into our country for organised crime purposes, or people trafficking, fraud on the National Health Service, fraud on the benefits system, and then when the overwhelming evidence is the best way of giving yourself the best chance, not perfect, but the best chance of dealing with it is an identity system” (06.06.2006)

“To ensure that we protect our borders and detect possible terrorist suspects, members of the new UK border agency will have the power, from January next year, to detain people not just on suspicion of immigration offences or for customs crime but for other criminal activity, including terrorism. Powers will also be given to airline liaison officers to cancel visas when justified.” (14.12.2007)
The accounts above displayed the persistent stigmatisation of migrant outsiders through the infusion of broader societal fears. In accounts 29.11.2004 and 06.11.2006, Blair discussed how a "national identity system" not only controls illegal immigration but also other societal harms such as illegal labour, organised crime, people smuggling, healthcare fraud, welfare fraud and terrorism/communal violence. ID cards became a totalised 'solution' to societal concerns including but not limited to migration. He expressed efforts to limit access/"entitlement" to public healthcare to members outside established groups, presuming insufficient societal resources (29.11.2004).

In account 14.12.2007, Brown highlighted measures to prevent 'illegal immigrants' impinging on the privileges of established groups. These more coercive methods included the creation of the UK Border Agency, a new institutionalised regulatory body with powers of detention and removal and the enlistment of "airline liaison officers" (14.12.2007; see Malloch and Stanely 2005). The collective-nationalist protection of borders became a totalising pursuit of societal safety, which legitimised the authority of British leaders. The suspicion of abusing immigration procedures became justification for the detention and removal of migrant outsiders associated with harmful practices from criminal activity to terrorism. Broader societal concerns around terrorism, crime, health and welfare were bundled with concerns over migrants.

Fear Constellations & Stigmatisation of Migrant Outsiders

Migrant outsiders were stigmatised with broader societal fears, which widened circles of disassociation with established groups in British society. Blair and Brown disseminated risk narratives that justified the exclusion of migrant outsiders through fear constellations around five major areas: healthcare, welfare, economy, crime and communal violence. They bundled these fears in the same sentence and the same breath (see account 29.03.2004 previously which speaks of "terrorism,)

99 Speech is a physiological practice interdependent with the societal practice of speaking. Speech projects a flow of words before the speaker has to inhale air into the lungs to maintain communication with someone and/or a group of people.
crime and illegal immigration” cf. 01.07.2005; 23.06.2005). These fears were the foundations for the stigmatisation of the migrant outsiders, and a perceived challenge to societal dominations enjoyed by the established groups in British society. Insecure sections of established group were offered reasons to reject the movement of migrant outsiders into British society.

Fears about healthcare and the movement of people came from the provision of a comprehensive public health service in Britain: the National Health Service (NHS). Fears about public healthcare are concerns bound to personal and societal survival. The NHS forms a crucial focal point of British identification it is a reservoir of collective-nationalist forms of group charisma sustained by both personal and collective memories. Its uniqueness as a ‘national’ societal institution is contrasted with healthcare in other liberal-democratic societies, built on and the history of its emergence at the end of the Second World War. Established groups in Britain are apparently highly sensitive to notions that migrant outsiders could defile or abuse this collective national institution, as seen in the following account.

“Health care, the NHS for example people who are wrongly accessing non-emergency services in the NHS that we will have a secure way of checking up on that and of course that is a major problem for us as a country, but it is one example of where this whole business is changing. You see the important thing is really this. I wouldn’t be proposing this identity card scheme or the identity database were it not for the fact that biometric technology gives you a far more secure way of checking on people, were it not for the fact that in today’s world where people are migrating across frontiers identity abuse is an even bigger problem” (06.11.2006)

In the account above, migrant outsiders were entangled with concerns over the healthcare system, and meant that they were blamed for any perceived

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100 For a more detailed analysis of the enduring relations between the migration and the NHS see Bivins (2015)
insufficiencies. Insecurity about the capacity of the NHS leads to questions of scarce societal resources and the creation of another justification on which to reject migrant outsiders who could use it undeservedly. This reductive thinking and orientating again represents migrants as stigmatised fantastical symbols of malign intent.

Fears about welfare and the movement of people were linked to the idea that the migrant outsiders become an additional burden to the collective societal resources for established communities. There were distinctions made between ‘deserving’ refugees and the ‘undeserving’ asylum seekers (Sales 2002). In liberal-democratic societies, fears over welfare can refer to monetary apprehensions bound to dependencies on the government establishments for financial assistance.

“We are putting in place tighter rules to restrict migrants’ access to benefits and social housing. Migrants will not be able to access social housing unless they are here legally and are working. No-one will be able to come to the UK from anywhere in the enlarged EU simply to claim benefits or housing. There will be no support for the economically inactive.” (27.04.2004)

In the account above, the term ‘benefits’ describes government assistance in the form of monetary payments, which are the property of the established, a gift to those deemed ‘worthy’, with Dickensian echoes of the well deserving poor. Migrant outsiders were feared as burdens to society (see the earlier 20.02.2008 that mentions access to welfare for EU migrants, plus more general mentions 22.07.2004; 06.06.2006), and compete with insecure sections of the established for limited sources of government assistance. Established groups include people who are more or less ‘well off’\textsuperscript{101} in British society. Insecure sections of the established who are relative outsiders within the UK are more alert and sensitive to the notion that migrant outsiders might have access to ‘special privileges’ and other societal

\textsuperscript{101}See Mols and Jetten (2017).
entitlements. They therefore insisted that there is the need for greater moral regulation to raise the standards governing entitlements over who is entitled to government assistance, with the migrant outsiders becoming convenient scapegoats for the concerns of the insecure established. This harmful association inhibited broader societal reflection on the processes that lead to people requiring government assistance in the first place.

Fears about the economy reflected the neoliberal economistic orientation of British society. Relations with migrant outsiders were defined by sets of ‘valued’ skills and vocations, while other skills were deemed threatening to established groups. The interpretation of greater vocational threat is particularly salient for insecure sections of the established. These groups are already sensitive to encroachments on vocational identifications due to societal pressures such as the de-industrialisation of certain areas and the increased neoliberal fluidity of labour. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis further aroused economic and vocational concerns. Mentions of “illegal working” (20.02.2008; 17.06.2008; 12.11.2009) gave insecure sections of the established reasons to stigmatise migrant outsiders. They became a conduit for fears about the economy and corresponding concerns about lower development and the decline of British society.

Fears about societal crime associated with the movement of people have also become rampant in established groups. The group charisma of ‘our laws’ was accompanied by the stigmatisation of practices deemed to be criminal. Migrant outsiders were understood as a carrier of deviant behaviour that includes organised crime (20.12.2005; 06.06.2006; 17.12.2007), fraud (30.09.2003; 22.05.2003; 06.06.2006), and human trafficking (23.06.2005). Fears about organised crime linked migrant outsiders to a threatening parallel organisation that defies established institutions. The links to fraud simulated fears that some migrant outsiders are engaged in attempts to deceive established authorities and the link between human trafficking and migrant outsiders recalls the shadow of human slavery. The presence of human traffickers in Britain aroused fears about the kidnapping of people outside of Britain and the destabilisation established institutions within Britain.
Fears about globalised violence and the movement of people was where the migrant outsiders became harbingers of communal violence. This coincided with the rise of transnational terrorism, which in itself challenges the nation state’s domination of violence. Blair advocated ways to secure Britain from harmful communal ‘terrorist’ violence. Britain directly experienced an occurrence of terrorist violence with the July 7 2005 bombings, the first since IRA’s campaigns of the early 1990s, and in the context of high degrees of social insecurity from events such as September 11 and July 7, migrant outsiders became the embodiment of fears of a sudden, unexpected violent death.

The language of transnational migration was entangled with the language of the ‘war on terror’. Migration and terrorism often appeared in the same sentence, for example in phrases such as “how we give greater security in the era of global terrorism and mass migration” (26.10.2005b; 26.10.2005a; 27.10.2005). Blair drew attention to globalised events in Africa where “mass migration and terrorism and conflict that could be exported beyond the boundaries of Africa to our countries” (26.06.2006). He commodified societal vulnerabilities to violence into objects exportable via the movement of migrant outsiders to communities in Britain. The term “mass migration” reiterated and reinforced patterns of “anonymous masses” found in visual images of asylum seekers (see Bleiker et. al. 2013: 413). The following accounts highlighted how fears about unexpected violent death in the form of transnational terrorism suffused depictions of migrant outsiders.

“Here in this country and in other nations round the world, laws will be changed, not to deny basic liberties but to prevent their abuse and protect the most basic liberty of all: freedom from terror. New extradition laws will be introduced; new rules to ensure asylum is not a front for terrorist entry. This country is proud of its tradition in giving asylum to those fleeing tyranny. We will always do so. But we have a

102 Though in March 2001 there was car bomb explosion outside the BBC’s headquarters attributed to republican splinter group the Real IRA.
duty to protect the system from abuse.” (02.10.2001; 04.10.2001)

“in the areas that Europe can cooperate together, we are setting clear rules that allow us to be more effective in ensuring, for example, those claiming asylum are genuine asylum seekers. I also believe that we found today's discussion very useful on how we make sure that those coming into our country are free from any suspicion of terrorism or, if they are suspicious as potential terrorists, we are able to deal with them” (13.07.2004)

“This is a new and more mobile world and so we have to step up the protection of our borders against terrorism and illegal immigration. And it means we must take a tough approach to who gets to come to our country and who gets to stay. Tightening our points-based immigration system ensures that those who have the skills that can help Britain will be welcomed, and those who do not, will be refused.” (29.09.2009)

In each of the accounts above, migrant outsiders became carriers of communal violence. In account 02.10.2001, Blair expressed limited appeals to the humanist-egalitarian normative code through mentions of “giving asylum to those fleeing tyranny”. His focus swung to understandings that asylum seekers have abused the migration regulations of established groups in Britain. The continuation of that exploitation results in a ‘Trojan horse’ of people movement that brought terrorist violence and implicitly death to British communities. For Blair, suspicion of terrorism is sufficient justification for additional societal controls to distinguish harmless “genuine” asylum seekers from harmful presumably violent asylum seekers (13.07.2004).
In account 29.09.2009, Brown articulated the consistent swing to the collective-nationalist normative code through the “protection of our borders against terrorism and illegal immigration”. The possibility of transmitting terrorist violence into Britain stigmatised migrant outsiders, creating a brutalised image and turning them to scapegoats to be blamed for an occurrence of communal violence. These stigmatisations obscured violence in other areas such as domestic violence within British families and state-society transnational violence, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq and military involvement in Afghanistan from 2001.

Blair’s language mythologised migrant outsiders. They became the personification of more insecure collective fantasies, which developed into a figure of blame and a fictive cause of healthcare, welfare, the economy, crime and communal violence fears. The mythologisation of migration narrowed the space of societal reflection and increased the distance between the established of Britain and migrant outsiders through widening circles of disassociation.

The tendency of Blair to use ‘aquatic’ metaphors narrowed the space for more detached reflections on the five fears related to healthcare, welfare, the economy, crime and communal violence, and widened depictions of the migrant outsiders as a threatening presence. Water themes are a common pattern in studies of migration vocabularies (see El Refaie 2001: 359). Metaphorical uses by Blair included “waves”, “flood”, “streaming”, “battened down the hatches”/storm and “big waves of migration” (01.10.2002; 27.06.2005; 27.03.2006; 06.06.2006; 03.10.2006; 30.05.2007). These emphasised the existence of an onrushing, uncontrollable force, which aroused personal horror and visceral imaginings of drowning: a society/collective that is on the verge of sinking unless there are changes in behaviour. In societies with Judeo-Christian influences like Britain, the term flood can also denote a punishment from a supernatural deity. Terms such as ‘flood’ conjured mythical imaginings of onrushing migrant outsiders that justified greater societal regulations and guided societal attachments towards the British leaders themselves.
Island Fortifications in Britain?

The development of more hostile relations with the EU illustrated the growth of greater socio-psychological fortification processes. Harmful catastrophic depictions of migrant outsiders by Blair and Brown propagated more antagonistic relations between British society and the EU.

In brief moments, Blair and Brown showed more humanist-egalitarian interpretations of Europeanised migration, as the following account demonstrates:

“Perhaps we should also acknowledge, as a matter of fact, that migration within the European Union is a two way street. Around 1 million citizens of other EU countries are now living and working in Britain – but there are also around 1 million Britons living and working in the rest of the EU, making the most of the opportunities and new horizons that EU membership brings……first detailed analysis of the contribution to our economy of the eastern Europeans who came to Britain in the last few years – showing that in every year their net contribution was positive – and that even after 5 years here they are over 50 per cent less likely than British people to receive benefits or tax credits and over 40 per cent less likely to live in social housing. They pay 5 per cent more than their share of tax, and account for a third less than their share of the costs of public services.” (31.03.2010)

The excerpt highlighted the improvements to both British and European societies brought about by the reciprocal Europeanised movement of people (see also 27.04.2004; 10.03.2006). The tone of these justifications was always defensive. Blair and Brown were constantly defending their openness to Europeanised movement, while simultaneously committing to greater societal controls that criminalised the movement of asylum seekers and economic migrants (non-EU movement).
Consistent appeals to the collective-nationalist code reinforced by the demand to protect borders generated identifications exclusive of Britain’s broader membership in the EU. Blair and Brown cultivated ignorance of the growing interdependencies between Britain and Europe, for example, in the 20.02.2008 account, the phrase “EU migrant” displayed identifications towards a Britain that is separate from the EU. EU migrants became separate category of people movement subject to more coercive established regulations, even though under EU rules, the movement of people from the new acceded Eastern European member states is not illegal and there are accounts that actively expressed the need for the movement of people from EU members into Britain (see 10.03.2006). There are growing antagonisms towards Britain’s membership of the EU and growing nationalised attachments to British state-society.

Blair and Brown’s unswerving attachments to the collective-nationalist code circulated a more closed consciousness that exacerbated long-standing antagonisms towards Europe, and mirrored the attitudes of United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) (see Ford and Goodwin 2014). UKIP “sought to ‘put an end to mass immigration’, linking opposition to immigration and EU membership as nationalist concerns” (John and Margretts 2009: 501).

The Blair and Brown period shows a power struggle within Britain on the question of whether it should separate from the EU. This occurred at a time when other members of the EU were lowering barriers to the movement of people and abolishing internal border checks through the Schengen Protocol that was part of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. This commitment built on the 1985 Schengen Agreement that guaranteed the free movement of people within Europe.

Commitment to Schengen saw the development of more equal sets of power relations among continental European members. This change was strongly resisted in Britain, as established groups sought to maintain their strongly nationalised collective superiority and group charisma against European neighbours. They resisted measures perceived as diluting their regulations over societal orientation,
particularly nationalised system of border checks vis-a-vis Europe. Britain maintained internal controls choosing to opt-out of the Schengen Area, and preserved the system of border checks with Europe and extending them into France via the 2003 Le Touquet Treaty, even as it paid lip service to continued commitments to the free movement of people within the EU. The tension between inclusive societal openness to Europeanised movement and exclusive societal closure was a visible in the following accounts from 2004:

“On 1 May the EU will enlarge from 15 to 25 members. It will be the biggest ever increase in Europe’s size. It will reunify Europe after the travails of Communist dictatorship in Eastern and Central Europe. It is an historic event, one this British Government and the one before us have championed. Whatever the problems it poses, and we see that in the anxiety over prospective immigration, let us be in no doubt: the prospect of EU membership, together with the courage of the Governments concerned, is the primary reason why those countries have been able to reform their economies and politics so radically and so beneficially. Such change has been in the interests of all of Europe. I say unhesitatingly that enlargement is right for Europe and for Britain and we should support it.” (20.04.2004)

“keeps our ability to opt out of measures affecting our laws on asylum and immigration and extends that so that we cannot be obliged to cooperate on criminal law procedures where we do not want to do so......Among the many myths about the constitution that have been published over the last few months have been accusations that we would.......lose control of our borders....The new Europe of 450 million people is a success for Britain.....All that is what the opponents of this Treaty would put in jeopardy for the sake, not of any real British interest, but of a narrow
nationalism which no British government has ever espoused or should ever espouse if it has the true interests of the British people at heart.” (21.06.2004)

“there are issues to do with European-wide immigration and asylum where we need proper controls in Europe. So this, as I say, gives us the best of both worlds......Britain insisted, because we are an island nation, we insisted that we would retain complete control over our own borders, and would only participate in European-wide action where we chose to do so, in other words stronger than an opt-out, an opt-in, we have to opt-in. However, in the areas where we have decided to opt-in, for example returning failed asylum seekers to other parts of Europe......do we still retain the ability to decide our own border controls and the ability to decide absolutely, unequivocally, the sovereign right of this country, whether we take part in measures or not. And the answer to that is yes, we retain that absolutely, without any qualification at all.” (25.10.2004)

The above accounts propagated circles of disassociation between Britain and Europe, through control over borders and the opt-outs from Schengen. Account 21.06.2004 paradoxically critiqued “narrow nationalism” yet advocated a collective-nationalist preference for ‘our’ laws. There was an appeal to collective-nationalist attachments that emphasised the exclusivity of British laws in opposition to the EU. These appeals drew on fantasy based identifications that saw Britain literally as an island: “we are an island nation” (25.10.2004). The phrase that invoked collective memories of a past superiority that separated Britain from Europe, and sustained resistance to EU integration, the vision of ‘ever closer union’, for example in Blair’s remark that “what we want is a Europe of Nations, not a federal super state” (20.06.2003).
The emphasis on opt-outs widened circles of disassociation between Britain and the EU. This reduced relations with the EU to narrow cooperation on “terrorism, illegal immigration and organised crime” (17.12.2007; 28.11.2002), as well as more coercive measures on control of movement such as returning failed asylum seekers (25.10.2004) and the removal of non-economically active EU citizens (20.02.2008). The constant justification of Britain’s opt-outs to Schengen reflected the beliefs of established groups in Britain, who continued to cling onto symbols, beliefs and accounts of recent history that defined them as superior to their European neighbours.

Depictions of EU migrants became entrapped in the same fear-arousing constellations as other groups of migrant outsiders. Blair and Brown attempted to make a distinction between people movements within the EU (accepted, friendly), and people movements external to the EU (threatening). The criminalisation of migrant outsiders and objectified focus on asylum numbers blurred this distinction. Europeanised movement became more stigmatised, through the switch to numbers of net migration, and were further exacerbated by Britain’s collective-nationalist commitment to nationalised border control, including over European borders (20.02.2008; 26.03.2010). The desire to get the “best of both worlds” (25.10.2004) swung in favour of more immobile citoyen identifications that was reinforced by fears associated with the movement of migrant outsiders. This shift set the scene for resistance to EU migrants to become resistance to the EU project as a whole.

The restriction of relations with the EU to bilateral areas of cooperation on crime, terrorism and illegal immigration cultivated a consistent ignorance of broader supranational changes to diplomatic practices within in the EU. Daddow (2011) has remarked that Blair and Brown were never fully committed to the notion of ‘ever closer union’ as understood in Europe itself. Blair and Brown failed to recognise development of the EU’s “late sovereign diplomacy” where nationalised attachments are integrated into broader Europeanised attachments to the supranational institutions of the EU (Adler-Nissen 2009). The following accounts

103 Blair and Brown resisted joining the Euro, refusing to relinquish the monopolisation over forms of transferable currency.
demonstrated reductive relations with the EU through harmful depictions of migrant outsiders and to resistance the wider EU project in the form of the EU Commission.

“But we should stand up for the Commission. It plays an essential role. Along with the Court of Justice, it is the best guarantee of equality in the Union, ensuring that small countries or new Member States are not treated as second class members. And on enlargement, economic modernisation and CAP reform, the Commission has been a strong progressive force…….This will not, of course, affect the agreement Britain secured at Amsterdam in 1997 on our border controls. But it will mean integrated and effective action on issues to do with organised crime, drug dealing, asylum and immigration that affect all of Europe, cause huge distress and difficulty and cannot seriously be tackled by nations alone.” (28.11.2002)

“Now we have made sure that we protect through the protocol we negotiated in Amsterdam completely Britain's borders. That is secure. But there are areas in relation to asylum and home affairs policy where we may well want to move forward on a common European basis and where it is in our interests to have qualified majority voting. .......The changes that might justify a Referendum, for example if we were yielding up control of British foreign policy or defence policy - that was to become Commission, not inter-governmental, it was to be done in Brussels and not in Britain - that would be a fundamental constitutional change, but I don’t think there is any prospect of that being the case. I think we will win that argument within Europe.......Now on the asylum question, yes we do need to make sure that we are doing more on removals as well. And I would just point out
the fact that we are removing more failed asylum seekers than any other country in Europe, and what is more we are removing many more than we were several years ago. However, the absolute key to this, believe me, is bringing down the numbers of people who come in to claim asylum." (22.05.2003)

“I never thought the people in Europe necessarily want Europe to do less, sometimes they want Europe to do more. Illegal immigration is a very clear example of that. What they don't want is Europe, and in particular the European Commission, to be interfering unnecessarily in bits of their lives that they say look this is something we can regulate. And I think what is different, and extremely refreshing if I may say so, about this Commission and this Commission President, is that they are focusing on where the European Commission can add value to the European project, and that is what it should be.” (27.10.2005)

Each of the accounts above expressed more reductive comprehensions of relations with EU institutions, particularly the EU Commission. In account 28.11.2002, Blair voiced support for the EU Commission as “strong progressive force” that preserved more equal relations between EU members. Humanist-egalitarian support for the EU Commission shifted in favour of collective-nationalist assertions (28.11.2002; 22.05.2003). In account 22.05.2003, he floated the idea of a “Referendum” should the EU Commission assume foreign and defence policy functions. This reflected views from insecure sections of Britain’s party-government establishments that were sensitised to Britain’s reduced status in international society; they were highly suspicious of any policy that shifted powers from Britain to Brussels. Collective-nationalist attachments aroused greater suspicions and resistances to EU institutions. In the 27.10.2005 account, Blair condemned the EU Commission for needless intrusions into people’s lives. He only embraced the EU for coercive
cooperation against “illegal immigration”. Disassociations towards transnational migration overlapped with disassociations with the EU as a whole.

Conclusion

This chapter has evaluated the migration language of British Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown from 2001 to 2010. I reconstructed the societal processes that shaped modes of thinking and orientation in British society through an investigation of their speeches, interviews and press conferences.

I have argued that the language of Blair and Brown showed the development of greater socio-psychological fortifications. They verbalised more harmful interpretations of transnational migration. These depictions mobilised shared anxieties through the development of more reductive modes of thinking. Commodified understandings of migrant outsiders were intertwined with appeals to the collective-nationalist normative code. Transnational people movements became risks to established groups in Britain.

There was the development of more harmful risk orientations that sought to dominate understandings of economic migrants, asylum seekers and Europeanised movement. The criminalisation of migrant outsiders sustained the perpetuation risk narratives through the objectification of migrant outsiders and the development of fear-arousing constellations. Fears about healthcare, welfare, economy, crime and communal violence widened circles of disassociation, which stigmatised migrant outsiders and expanded forms of societal exclusion. British society was steered towards raising the barriers to societal inclusion, a process that was infused with more hostile understandings of the EU.

The next chapter will illustrate the deepening of socio-psychological fortifications in British society. The migration language of Blair and Brown set the tone for harmful depictions of migrant outsiders and the wider deterioration of relations with the EU. Their successors David Cameron and Theresa May consolidated and extended these societal developments.
Chapter 4.
An Investigation into the Major Public Migration Speeches by David Cameron (2010-2016) and Theresa May (2016-2017)

The last chapter evaluated the migration language of British Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, in the period between 2001 and 2010. This evaluation utilised a process and risk sociological approach developed in Chapters 1 and 2, to understand the development of shared anxieties, and reconstructed the societal processes that fortified British society. The language of Blair and Brown mobilised shared anxieties, through the commodification of relations between established groups and migrant outsiders. Their language circulated conflicting appeals to humanist-egalitarian and collective-nationalist normative codes. Attachments to the collective-nationalist normative code, cultivated more harmful catastrophic propagations of migrant outsiders, who were framed as risks to established groups in British society. The language of Blair and Brown dominated societal orientations through the criminalisation and objectification of migrant outsiders. These processes contributed to fear constellations and widening circles of disassociation, which disseminated more hostile relations with the EU.

My fourth chapter evaluates the migration language of British Prime Ministers David Cameron (2010-2016), and Theresa May (2016-2017). The sociological model for shared anxieties helps to grasp the continued blends of socio-psychological tensions during the period of British history from 2010 to 2017. The vocabulary of process and risk sociology with formulations of independence and power relations nexuses facilitates efforts to reconstruct the societal processes that shaped British society during this period, using material from Prime Ministerial speeches, interviews and press conferences. The statements of Cameron and May set the scene for the policies, practices and societal expectations that framed relations within and beyond British society.
Early in this period in British history, the Conservative Party represented by Cameron and May were in coalition with the Liberal-Democrats. From the evidence in Cameron and May’s speeches, the Liberal-Democrats did not exert a detectable moderating influence that has been claimed by leader Nick Clegg (2015), who argued that they “bring a heart to a Conservative Government”\(^{104}\). Clegg (2014) criticised Labour for the “obliterated trust in our immigration system”, and the Conservatives for having “quietly ditched their commitment to reduce net migration to tens of thousands\(^{105}\)” The Conservative Liberal Democrat Coalition government did not temper the harmful catastrophic representations of transnational movement into Britain, the change from Cameron to May showed no detectable shift of direction towards more inclusive societal openness.

I argue that the migration language of Prime Ministers Cameron and May consolidated societal fortifications in British society. Similar sets of socio-psychological tensions reconstructed from language of Blair and Brown continued into the vocabulary of Cameron and May. These processes included the commodification of societal relations and tensions between cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian and de-cosmopolitanised collective-nationalist normative codes, which framed the criminalisation and objectification of migrant outsiders.

The language of British Labour and Conservative party leaders showed similar articulations and propagations of shared anxieties in British society. It might be expected that there would be more distinctive disparities between the leaders from the major political parties. The language of Cameron and May showed greater fixations on societal welfare and relations with Europe. These preoccupations were more characteristic of established groups that support the Conservative party with blends of imperial aristocratic-bourgeois identifications.

The majority of the statements in this chapter are from Cameron, although May as Home Secretary was part of the same party government establishment. The change

\(^{104}\) This was spoken a day before the 2015 General Election when it appeared that neither Labour nor the Conservative would win a majority in the House of Commons (see Grice 2015).

\(^{105}\) This remark is misleading. The Conservative Party and the Prime Ministers in this phrase were obsessed with reducing numbers of net migration, see discussions later in this chapter.
to May, though marked by fewer public statements, saw no significant alterations of societal processes.

Cameron and May propagated more harmful catastrophic depictions of transnational migration that distorted comprehensions of European migration and contributed to the disorientation of British society from broader European society. The continued development of greater socio-psychological fortifications reduced the modes of thinking and narrowed the means of societal orientation. The language of Cameron and May raised the barriers to societal inclusion and widened forms of societal exclusion.

This chapter consists of two sections. The first section explains how the migration language of Cameron and May mobilised shared anxieties and fortified modes of thinking in British society. The second section explains how they dominated of societal orientations, and fortified British society.

**Shared Anxieties & Fortified Thinking by Cameron & May**

The following section illustrates the continuation of reductive modes of thinking in British society. Interpretations of ongoing interdependency crises portrayed by political leaders shaped societal conscience formations in Britain. Depictions of the wider financial crisis merged with concerns about communal violence, and amalgamated into representations the broader migration crisis. There was a more frenzied tension between the mobile techno-economic *bourgeois* and the immobile politico-economic *citoyen* identifications within the party-government establishment, represented by Cameron and May. This tension shaped commodified depictions of migrant outsiders. The balance between humanist-egalitarian and collective-nationalist normative codes swung to a more closed consciousness with consistent appeals to the collective-nationalist normative code and the protection of borders. Cameron and May became more reliant on insecure sections of the established and incited more fantasy-based understandings of migrant outsiders to reinforce their place in the balance of societal power. Migrant outsiders became viewed as risks to established sections of British society.
Interdependency Pressures & Societal Conscience Formation

Ongoing interpretations of global economic and communal violence concerns are evidence of how awareness of wider global interconnections affected the power relations within British society during this period. Economic concerns included the management of the Eurozone crisis as well as the ongoing repercussions of the Global Financial Crisis\(^{106}\). Communal violence concerns included the repercussions of the Arab Spring\(^{107}\), Libyan Civil War\(^{108}\) (and subsequent Western Intervention), and the Syrian Civil War\(^{109}\).

Cameron and May cultivated societal conscience formations around the awareness of interdependency pressures/risk shocks\(^{110}\) to maintain the authority of their party-government establishment. Globalised economic concerns and implicit apprehensions over transnational communal violence merged with concerns over transnational people movement in the following accounts.

“We are living in perilous \textbf{economic} times. Turn on the TV news and you see the return of a \textbf{crisis}\(^{111}\) that never really went away. Greece on the brink; the survival of the Euro in question. Faced with this, I have a clear task: to \textbf{keep Britain safe}……. First, we must continue to get to grips with the \textbf{deficit} and build recovery at home. Let’s be clear about what we inherited: an economy built on the worst deficit since the

\(^{106}\) See Beck and Grande’s (2007: 164) discussion of global financial risks. They remark that "the experience of interdependence and the realisation of self-endangerment combine to generate the perception that no country can evade and immunise itself from these civilisationally generated dangers".

\(^{107}\) See for example Anderson (2011).

\(^{108}\) See for example Adler-Nissen and Poulit (2014); Bellamy and Williams (2011).

\(^{109}\) See for example Carpenter (2013).

\(^{110}\) See Beck and Grande (2007: 163). It is arguable that lengthening chains of interdependence increase the likelihood for interconnected peoples to feel the reverberations of these same shocks (cf. McLuhan 2001 [1964]: 4-5, 26).

\(^{111}\) This refers to the ongoing the Eurozone sovereign and banking crisis and the effects of greater independencies through the movement of financial capital between states and banks (see Mody and Sandri 2012), reverberating from the 2007 global financial crisis. These interconnections extend further as Hanson and Gordon (2014: 1218) note the overlapping self-reinforcing combination of three crises challenging the EU: financial, institutional and demographic, the latter relates to the low birth rates and aging populations in Southern Europe requiring forms of immigration.
Second World War: the most leveraged banks; the most indebted households; one of the biggest housing booms; and unsustainable levels of public spending and immigration.” (17.05.2012)

“it is people embracing globalisation so enthusiastically that they actually lose sight of the national interest......Well this approach – largely pursued under the last government – it didn’t feel too good for ordinary people and, frankly, it didn’t do too much for our competitiveness either. We saw mass, uncontrolled immigration changing communities in a way people didn’t feel comfortable with, putting huge pressure on public services. We saw large bureaucracies like the EU having a huge impact on our way of life in a way that no one voted for, while at the same time burdening our businesses with red tape and regulation. We saw, fundamentally, a political class too easily seduced by the rewards of globalisation, and not alert enough to the risks.” (10.06.2013)

“We will also continue to work together in tackling the migration crisis in the Mediterranean. Italy has become the main arrival point for illegal migration into Europe, with over 180,000 people arriving in 2016. But this is not just a problem for Italy, it is a problem for us all. And we need to work together to find better solutions to the huge population movements we are seeing, so refugees don’t have to risk their lives on dangerous journeys and so we control the unmanageable economic migration that is

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112 US President Donald Trump made a similar remark during speech in Poland noting, “the steady creep of government bureaucracy that drains the vitality and wealth of the people” (CNN 2017).

113 This refers to the ongoing spurs of migration into Europe via the Mediterranean. By the end of 2015, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) reported that over a million refugees and irregular migrants had arrived in Europe (IOM 2015).
neither working for migrants nor for our own populations.”

(09.02.2017)

In each of these accounts Cameron and May emphasised interconnections between economic crises with the transnational movement of people. In accounts 17.05.2012 and 09.02.2017, Cameron and May broadcasted apprehensions about a renewed economic crisis in the Eurozone that were interwoven with concerns about people movement. For Cameron, transnational migration was an undue burden on communities “at a time when public finances are already under severe strain as a consequence of the financial crisis” (10.11.2015). May referenced the Mediterranean migration crisis, which developed through the movement of “refugees” fleeing violence. The implicit assumption was that people who flee communal violence may also bring communal violence and other harmful side effects/’problems’ to the places that they seek refuge.

Increased Commodification of Relations

Cameron and May represented the continuation of established bourgeois societal groupings that held a strong power ratio, and influenced the balance of power in British society. These groupings valued the movement of financial capital through mobile techno-economic bourgeois identifications. Cameron and May communicated techno-economic bourgeois identifications such as the salience of work, the creation of jobs and a consistent reverence of ‘the economy’ in the following accounts.

“Yes, some immigration is a good thing. It is right that we should attract the brightest and the best\textsuperscript{114} to Britain. We genuinely need foreign investors and influencers to come here. In the same way that many people take advantage of opportunities to work and study and live overseas, many of

\textsuperscript{114} The term “brightest and the best” has its origins in a hymn (often used as a Christmas carol) of the same name written by Anglican Bishop Reginald Heber in 1811 to be sung at Epiphany a Christian festival on the 6\textsuperscript{th} of January.
our own communities here have been enriched by the contribution of generations of migrants. **Our schools** and universities have some of the best teachers, researchers and students from all over the world and we should be proud of that. **Our hospitals** are full of talented doctors and nurses caring for the sick and vulnerable. Our high streets are home to **influencers** who are not just adding to the local economy but playing a vital part in local life. And yes, Britain will always be open to those who are seeking **asylum from persecution**. That says something very important about the kind of country we are and we should be proud of that too.” (10.10.2011a)

“So, let me put this very simply: we are rolling out **the red carpet** to those whose hard work and investment will create **new British jobs**, because we are in a global race for **our economic future**. And **the right sort of immigration** is not just good for Britain – it is, I would argue, essential. But we can't allow immigration to be a substitute for training our own workforce and giving them **incentives to work**. Our immigration policy can’t be a sort of add-on to our economic strategy; it's got to be a fundamental part of it.” (25.05.2013)

“Yes, the United Kingdom will be a fully independent, sovereign country, free to make our own decisions on a whole host of different issues such as how we choose to **control immigration**. But we still want to **trade freely** – in goods and services – with Europe. And the UK will continue to face similar challenges to our European neighbours. We will continue to share the same values. And so I want a mature, co-operative relationship with our European partners.” (21.10.2016)
The accounts above showed an increased commitment to the techno-economic bourgeois value of economic growth and competiveness. Immigration was valued so long as it financially enriches the established of Britain, although, there was slight recognition of the contribution of migrant outsiders to schools, universities and hospitals as well as an openness to asylum seekers (10.10.2011a).

In accounts 10.10.2011a and 25.05.2013, Cameron assumed that more financially wealthy migrants brought more acceptable sets of societal values, such as the commitment to ‘hard work’. He signified this desire through the phrase “brightest and the best” people with pre-existing high rank and status (10.10.2011a). People with high levels of financial capital are more valued, and more societally attractive compared with people with less financial capital. The abovementioned “red carpet” for financial investors become known as ‘golden visas’, where those with £2m in UK bonds or shares could remain indefinitely in the UK (Pegg 2017). Home Office guidance for Tier 1 Investor Visas outlines the same practice (2017 [2014]).

Accounts 25.05.2013 and 21.10.2016 showed a severe swing to immobile politico-economic citoyen identifications. Migration was accepted for the creation of “British jobs”, to train “[our] own workforce” (25.05.2013). In account 21.10.2016, May tried to unpick the EU’s four freedoms. She voiced acceptance of capital, goods and services movements but the rejection of people movement. ‘Freedom’ for Britain involved greater constraints on people movement.

The quotes also show more conflictual interdependencies between techno-economic bourgeois and politico-economic citoyen identifications. The techno-economic bourgeois identification focused on debt and deficit, reflecting concerns about the reduction of public capital spending. This was linked to alleged excesses of immigration and to lessen the power of large bureaucracies such as the EU whose regulations inhibited “our businesses” (17.05.2012; 10.06.2013). The politico-economic citoyen identification concentrated on the more catastrophic “risks” of globalisation, where mass immigration was blamed for the communal discomfort of “our own populations” and the pressurisation of public services (17.05.2012; 10.06.2013; 09.02.2017).
Cameron and May commodified migrant outsiders into harmless and harmful side effects. Migrant outsiders were depicted as investors, influencers, teachers, researchers, doctors, nurses, students, asylum seekers, refugees and economic migrants. They held relatively weaker societal power resources. In the following accounts, migrant outsiders were characterised as commodified harms to British society, as people who were putting pressure on public services, the cause/blame for changing socio-cultural fabrics and a threat to societal cohesion.

“But excessive immigration brings pressures, real pressures on our communities up and down the country. Pressures on schools, housing and healthcare and societal pressures too. When large numbers of people arrive in new neighbourhoods, perhaps not all able to speak the same language as those who live there, perhaps not always wanting to integrate, perhaps seeking simply to take advantage of our NHS, paid for by our taxpayers, there is a discomfort and tension in some of our communities. And crucially, while it is crude and wrong to say that immigrants come to Britain to take all our jobs, there’s no doubt that badly controlled immigration has compounded the failure of our welfare system and effectively allowed governments and employers to carry on with the waste of people stuck on welfare when they should be working. And there is also the concern that relatively uncontrolled immigration can hurt the low paid and the low skilled while the better off reap many of the benefits. So I think it’s absolutely right to address all of these concerns, because if people don’t feel that mainstream political parties understand these issues they will turn instead to those who seek to exploit these issues to create societal unrest.”

(10.10.2011b)
“So we can make an impact on European migration, and we need to. I think part of our problem has been, because our economy is now growing much faster than other European economies, many people are coming from Europe to work in Britain, because their economies aren’t creating jobs where our economy is creating jobs. So I think deal with the welfare tourism and we’ll deal with some of the problem of EU migration.” (30.07.2014)

“We’re ambitious for Britain to become the global go-to place for scientists, innovators and tech investors. We will continue to welcome the brightest and the best – but can only do so by bringing Immigration down to sustainable levels overall so we maintain public faith in the system.” (21.11.2016)

Each of these accounts verbalised a consciousness of harmful side effects brought by the movement of migrant outsiders. Cameron and May harmful images of outsiders who exploit institutions such as schools, housing, healthcare, and the economy (10.10.2011b; 30.07.2014). They cultivated strong suspicions about the presence of migrant outsiders in local communities. Migrant outsiders were stigmatised by negative presumptions about their capacities to integrate (10.10.2011; 21.11.2016). The repeated use of the possessive pronoun “our”: “our NHS”, “our taxpayers”, “our economy” became a form of disassociation, which limited the ways in which migrants could integrate into British society.

Normative Code Tensions Under Cameron and May

The commodification of migrant outsiders interconnected with power struggles between cosmopolitansised humanist-egalitarian and de-cosmopolitansised collective-nationalist normative codes within the language of British leaders. Cameron and May idealised both codes. Selective attachments to the humanist-egalitarian code in the form of compassion towards refugees did not moderate
wider, more prolonged fluctuations to the collective-nationalist normative code, which came to dominate societal orientations.

Attachments to the humanist-egalitarian code were expressed as an idealised belief in collective tolerance towards refugees. Britain is a tolerant society that should show compassion to refugees (10.10.2011a; 04.09.2015; 08.10.2014). There are appeals that embrace diverse forms of societal identifications in degrees of inclusiveness, which romanticised Britain as “one of the most open and cosmopolitan countries on the face of the earth. People from all over the world can find a community of their own right here in Britain” (10.11.2015).

Cameron and May used selective depictions of refugees to project an idealised image of Britain as open, tolerant society that accepted transnational people movements. In response to the ongoing Mediterranean migration crisis, they noted obligations to assist refugee outsiders, stating that Britain would accept refugees directly; “we have our programme of resettling people direct from the refugee camps” (18.03.2016; 26.06.2015; 04.09.2015; 22.01.2016; 09.02.2017). Britain’s approach in fact bypassed collective European cooperation on the migration crisis, stating that “the UK has been clear that we will not take part in any relocation scheme to move migrants who have already arrived across member states” (26.06.2015). Britain’s leaders continued to voice their commitment to refugees through the humanist-egalitarian code, but also resisted Europeanised collaboration and promoted greater ‘distance’ from Europe, in the following accounts:

“Britain has a moral responsibility to help refugees as we have done throughout our history. We are already are providing sanctuary and we will continue to do so. As the second largest bilateral donor to the crisis, we have provided over £900 million in aid to help those affected in Syria and the region.....No European country has done more than Britain in this regard. Were it not for that massive aid, the numbers making the perilous journey to Europe today would be even
higher. Now we have already accepted around 5,000 Syrians and have introduced a specific resettlement scheme, alongside those we already have, to help those Syrian refugees particularly at risk.....we will accept thousands more under these existing schemes and we keep them under review." (04.09.2015)

“Britain is an open and tolerant country. We will always want immigration, especially high-skilled immigration, we will always want immigration from Europe, and we will always welcome individual migrants as friends. But the message from the public before and during the referendum campaign was clear: Brexit must mean control of the number of people who come to Britain from Europe. And that is what we will deliver.” (17.01.2017)

“Immigration benefits Britain, but it needs to be controlled, it needs to be fair, and it needs to be centred around our national interest. That is what I want. And I want to tell you today why I care so passionately about getting this right, and getting the whole debate on immigration right in our country. When I think about what makes me proud to be British, yes, it’s our history, our values, our creativity, our compassion. But there is something else too. I am extremely proud that together we have built a successful, multi racial democracy. A country where, in 1 or 2 generations, people can come with nothing, and rise as high as their talent allows.” (28.11.2014)

Each of the accounts above articulated an idealised belief in the humanist-egalitarian code through relative openness to refugee outsiders. In accounts 04.09.2015 and 28.11.2014, Cameron stressed Britain’s responsibility to assist refugees. He gave a selective account of British history that fostered memories of past tolerance, which had facilitated the creation of a multi-racial democracy.
British leaders also propagated idealised identifications to a Britain that is superior to Europe. In accounts 17.01.2017 and 04.09.2015, May and Cameron distanced Britain from Europe, by speaking of an exclusive British kind of openness, friendship and tolerance. This shifted to an expression of control over the movement of people from Europe. The implication was that Britain is more tolerant, more efficient than Europe in the management of the migration crisis. The acceptance of refugees was justified by a position of nationalised strength, “the national interest” (28.11.2014; 10.11.2015). There is also a widened distinction from Europe, paralleled by a narrowed definition of openness: “we must help ensure that refugees claim asylum in the first safe country they reach”, countries that are not Britain (20.09.2016), and more specifically asylum to children and families (09.02.2017).

Cameron and May maintained shallow appeals to the humanist-egalitarian code to satisfy some sections of established groups like the Bishop of Dover (Sehmer 2015), while propagating collective-nationalist identifications incommensurable with any broader forms of attachment, which included links to Europe.

May infamously remarked that “if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere. You don’t understand what the very word ‘citizenship’ means” (05.10.2016). The remark had chilling echoes of the “rootless Jew” from 19th century anti-Semitic vocabulary and Josef Stalin’s nationalist purge of Jewish intellectuals and others associated with foreign influences during the late 1940s. These outsiders of Soviet society were stigmatised as “rootless cosmopolitans” (bezrodnye kosmopolity) (Adler 2016; Azadovskii and Egorov 2002: 74).

Fortified Modes of Thinking & Border Protection

In the Cameron-May era, suspicions of migrant outsiders again fortified British society. The Prime Ministers circulated bellicose projections of nationalised strength through border protection vocabulary (10.10.2011; 20.09.2016). This underpinned images of a vulnerable Britain that required strong borders to protect against mythologised fears of the “wave of migrants” crossing the Channel from
Calais (26.06.2015). Cameron and May aroused more insecure sections of established groups to believe that increased border controls would lead to more secure, and less vulnerable orientations within Britain. They remarked on the need for “stronger borders” (27.05.2016); to “strengthen those borders” (07.01.2016); on “a strong country with control over our borders and over our laws” (09.03.2017) as well as in the following accounts.

“The third issue is migration and the pressures of immigration and migration in Europe. Let me be clear again Britain is not in the Schengen Area. We're not going to be joining the Schengen Area. We have, by and large, proper and sustainable borders and I want us to have proper and sustainable border controls.....We want controlled migration in Europe and we want controlled migration, above all, in Britain.” (24.06.2011)

“A Britain that everyone is proud to call home. A place where reward follows effort; where if you put in, you get out. But it also means a country that is strong in the world – in control of its own destiny...and yes – that includes controlling immigration. To me, this is about working on all fronts. It’s about getting our own people fit to work. Fixing welfare – so a life on the dole is not an option. Fixing education – so we turn out young people with skills to do the jobs we are creating. And yes – we need controlled borders and an immigration system that puts the British people first. That’s why we've capped economic migration from outside the EU...shut down 700 bogus colleges – that were basically visa factories...kicked out people who don’t belong here, like Abu Qatada...and let’s hear it for the woman who made it happen: our crime-busting Home Secretary, Theresa May. But we know the bigger issue today is migration from within the EU” (01.10.2014)
“A future that sees us take back control of the things that matter to us – things like our national borders and immigration policy, and the way we decide and interpret our own laws – so that we are able to shape a better, more prosperous future for the working men and women of Britain.” (26.01.2017)

In the accounts above, Cameron and May equated open borders to societal vulnerabilities. They consistently defended and expressed nationalised attachments to the Schengen opt-out (24.06.2011; 12.12.2011; 09.05.2013; 25.10.2013; 12.11.2015; 07.01.2016). Each of the accounts stressed commitments to the collective nationalist normative code, with a noticeable shift from “sustainable borders” in 2011, to “strong borders” in 2016/17 (27.05.2016; 07.01.2016; 09.03.2017).

For Cameron and May, control over migration through border regulations became a key pillar of a nationalised strength and source of their legitimacy, which separated British society from wider European societies.

In account 26.01.2017, May noted the phrase “take back control”. This was a word for word repeat of the main slogan from the Leave campaign from the 2016 EU Referendum (see Cummings 2017). The slogan is notable for its appeal to more insecure sections of the established. It propagated ignorance that Britain already had control of its borders through the Schengen opt-out and the Le Touquet agreement with France. May’s distortion in account 26.01.2017 cannot be isolated to singular events in 2016/17. In 2011, Cameron used the phrase “reclaim our borders”, which even then misleadingly assumed that regulations over national borders have been lost (10.10.2011).
People Risks & Societal Vulnerabilities

Cameron and May became heavily reliant on the support of insecure sections of established groups for their continued hold the balance of societal power. This reliance is evidence of the way in which awareness of larger globalised webs of interdependencies affect smaller localised interdependencies. Risk characterisations migrant outsiders became enmeshed in localised power struggles.

Insecure sections of established groups (partial outsiders themselves) of British society were people who already held pre-existing concerns about schools, housing, healthcare, the economy and welfare. They were sensitive to any encroachment into these areas. The language of Cameron and May concentrated their concerns against migrant outsiders.

Cameron set one outsider group (insecure sections of established groups) against another outsider group (migrant outsiders). His form of societal ‘divide and conquer’ perpetuated a cycle of societal expectations around the protection of borders. He used popularised appeals that “It’s wrong to let our own people do nothing, with no purpose in their life, dependent on benefits. It’s wrong that we open our doors and communities to such rapid levels of immigration” (04.03.2014).

Cameron tried to secure his leadership by blaming his coalition partners, his predecessors (the Labour Party of Blair and Brown) and the EU. He blamed the Liberal Democrats for so called ‘moderate’ positions (Cutts and Russell 2015: 82, 83). This was exemplified by the remark that “I have been in a coalition government with a group of people who are not knowingly enthusiastic about controlling immigration.” (28.11.2014). Control over migration also became a way to blame his predecessors, for their “lack [of] control” of people coming to Britain. His speeches incited insecure members of the established to develop ‘high fantasy content’ images, which imagined the movement of migrant outsiders, as remarked in the following accounts.
“I think we have a very good coalition policy on immigration, which we are delivering and it is tough immigration control and it includes a cap on immigration that we’re delivering and I’m very positive about what we’re doing.....It’s an issue that I would like to see drop off the political agenda because I think when the public see proper immigration control in place they will stop worrying about that issue and they will turn their concerns to other issues and we can get back to the situation frankly that we had in the 1980s where it wasn’t an issue, it wasn’t a front-ranked political issue because immigration was at a reasonable level.” (21.06.2011)

“People have understandably become frustrated, and it boils down to 1 word: control.115 People want government to have control over the number of people coming here, and the circumstances in which they come, both from around the world and from within the European Union. They want control over who has the right to receive benefits and what is expected of them in return. They want to know that foreign criminals can be excluded, or if already here, removed. And they want us to manage carefully the pressure on our schools, on our hospitals, and on our housing. If we are to maintain this successful, open, meritocratic democracy that we treasure, we have to maintain faith in the government’s ability to control the rate at which people come to our country. And yet, in recent years, it has become clear that successive governments lack control. People want grip. I get that. I completely agree with that, and to respond to this view

115 The phrase “take back control” became the defining slogan of the Leave campaign for the 2016 EU Referendum (see Cummings 2017).
116 This mirrored almost exactly the words of Australian Prime Minister John Howard: “we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come” (28.10.2001), and will be further discussed in Chapter 5.
with complacency is both wrong and dangerous.” (28.11.2014)

“And of course the concerns about immigration and about welfare, which are really the number one concern for the British people, who want to see this properly and sensibly addressed in the European context. And I’m confident we can achieve these things. I’ve always said, if I was to achieve none of these things then I rule nothing out, and I meant what I said by that. But I expect and hope and believe that Europe can show the flexibility that when one of the larger countries, a big contributor, a major European player has some problems and issues, that those issues can be properly addressed. And I’m confident that they can.” (29.05.2015)

The accounts above showed more extravagant fantasies of the movement of people, in appeals to more fantastical imaginings of absolute societal control. Cameron verbalised broader public concerns, then channelled these vulnerabilities into depictions migrant outsiders, through negative terms such as worry, frustration, and concern. The 21.06.2011 account aroused fantastical desires to turn the clock back to an earlier stage in the development of British society. By the mentioning the 1980s, there is the mythologization of a time where the Conservatives held political office in Britain. Cameron cultivated an ignorance of interdependencies and the events that contributed to the current stage of development. His appeal to nostalgia, expressed a longing for a past that no longer exists (if it did at all). In convictions that British society can be returned to a pure naturalised condition, blocking any consideration of the repercussions of such efforts.117

Cameron expressed personal leadership vulnerabilities and those of his wider political party. Greater controls over people movement became a means of maintaining the societal status of the Conservative Party in government. As well as

117 The EU referendum campaign and ongoing aftermath is an example of this form of thinking.
sustaining Cameron's leadership of the Conservative party and his Prime Ministership. The 28.11.2014 account noted the desire to “maintain faith” in the capacity of the government, in the demand for adherence to the collective nationalist normative code and politico-economic _citoyen_ identification.

Migrant outsiders were interpreted as more harmful catastrophic risks. This understanding moved British society away from more detached reflections on how migrant outsiders came to risk their own lives, having made dangerous transnational crossings in the first place (09.02.2017). Risks of movement go both ways, the migrant outsider’s desire to move coalesced with harmful established group interpretations of that movement. Cameron highlighted “the _risk_ is again of a failed pariah state [Libya] festering on Europe’s southern _border_, threatening our security, _pushing people across the Mediterranean_ and creating a more _dangerous_ and _uncertain world for Britain_ and for all our allies” (11.03.2011). In the 11.03.2011 account, Cameron spoke of a hostile Southern European border due to a conflict that became the Libyan Civil War. There is an amalgamation of interconnected risk narratives about violent societal disintegration and large-scale people movement. This became part of the justification for NATO intervention and fed into misgivings about Europe and the abilities of the EU to protect its borders (12.11.2015). What emerged were more harmful catastrophic risk narratives of migrant outsiders that narrowed orientations in British society.

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118 Since the 2011 Western intervention, Libya has become the failed state that Cameron warned against, achieving exactly what he tried to avoid. A Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee report published in September 2016 notes bluntly that.

“By the summer of 2011, the limited intervention to protect civilians had drifted into an opportunistic policy of regime change. That policy was not underpinned by a strategy to support and shape post-Gaddafi Libya. The result was political and economic collapse, inter-militia and inter-tribal warfare, _humanitarian and migrant crises_, widespread _human rights violations_, the spread of Gaddafi regime weapons across the region and the _growth_ of _ISIL_ in North Africa.” (FAC 2016: 3)
Expansion of Fortified Orientations by Cameron & May

The following section illustrates the continued expansion of narrow societal orientations in British society. The migration language of the Cameron and May fortified British society. Harmful catastrophic depictions of ‘economic migrants’ expanded to the criminalisation of other groups of migrant outsiders such as asylum seekers and Europeanised movement. These harmful risk orientations dominated societal orientation. The criminalisation of migrant outsiders were interdependent with more masculinised orientations of toughness and the objectified reduction of net migration. Widening circles of disassociation propagated more suspicious risk narratives that legitimised the exclusion of migrant outsiders. Fears about healthcare, education, welfare dependency, marriage, terrorism, and Europe disseminated fear constellations that mythologised migrant outsiders and the abilities of Cameron and May themselves. This intensified a broader power struggle with the EU and cultivated greater socio-psychological fortifications. Harmful understandings of EU migrants and concerns about nationalised laws became a battleground for Britain’s increasing estrangement with Europe.

Harmless and Harmful Economic Movement

Classifications of ‘economic migrants’ oscillated between harmless safe and more harmful catastrophic risk orientations. Harmless safe economic migrants were described as “investors” 10.10.2011a; 21.11.2016). These were accepted with the presumption that greater financial capital equated to greater safety. High financial thresholds for acceptance into British society raised the barriers to societal inclusion. Hansen (2014: 200) notes that British immigration policy under New Labour consisted of two pillars: an openness towards economic migration together with restrictions on asylum seekers. The Conservative Party led by Cameron, “knocked one of these pillars out” (the first pillar) in efforts to fundamentally reduce economic migration, even if the economic benefits were recognised. However, it is arguable that the first pillar was not completely ‘knocked out’. It simply shifted towards lesser acceptance of economic migrants with less presumed wealth and
greater potential for harm to British society. Cameron and May embraced higher skilled economic movement and rejected lower skilled movement (see 10.10.2011; 17.01.2017), as shown in the following accounts.

“And as part of that package, I can announce today that we will create a new Entrepreneur Visa\textsuperscript{119}. These Entrepreneur Visas will mean that if you have a great business idea, and you receive serious investment from a leading investor, you are welcome to set up your business in our country. So as we act to bring net migration to Britain down to the tens of thousands, I want this message to be heard loud and clear the whole world over: In every classroom or laboratory where a bright idea is born, every boardroom where a business case is put together, if you’ve got an idea, if you want to create jobs, and if you have the ambition to build a world beating company here in the UK, We want you; we’ll make it easy for you; we’ll put out the red carpet for you. With our new Entrepreneur Visa we want the whole world to know that Britain wants to become the home of enterprise and the land of opportunity.” (04.11.2010)

“For those economic migrants seeking a better life, we will continue to work to break the link between getting on a boat and getting settlement in Europe, discouraging those who do not have a genuine claim from embarking on these perilous and sometimes lethal journeys. For those genuine refugees fleeing civil war, we will act with compassion and continue to provide sanctuary.” (04.09.2015).

\textsuperscript{119} This type of visa was recently promoted by Nicole Meyer to Chinese investors, sister to White House senior adviser Jared Kushner the son in law to US President Donald Trump (Rauhala and Wan 2017)
“In doing so, we should be clear that there is nothing wrong with the desire to migrate for a better life. And also that controlled, legal, safe, economic migration brings benefits to our economies. But countries have to be able to exercise control over their borders. The failure to do so erodes public confidence, fuels international crime, damages economies and reduces the resources for those who genuinely need protection and whose rights under the Refugee Convention should always be fulfilled. Second, we need to improve the ways we distinguish between refugees fleeing persecution and economic migrants. I believe we must ensure the existing convention and protocol are properly applied to provide protection to refugees and reduce the incentives for economic migrants to use illegal routes. This in turn will help us target support for those refugees who need it most and retain the support of our populations for doing so.” (20.09.2016)

The accounts above showed limited acceptance of economic migrant outsiders. In the 04.11.2010 account, Cameron assumed only high net worth individuals have the capacity for innovation and job creation. He channelled the attitudes of an insecure localised politico-economic citoyen establishment, which dismissed the capacities of migrant outsiders with lesser net financial worth. Cameron also blocked an appreciation of how immigrant entrepreneurs have positively contributed to the socio-cultural landscapes of localised communities, for example, through countering the deterioration of some urban environments and increasing access to healthy foods120 (Barrett et. al 2002; Schuch and Wang 2015; Khojasteh and Raja 2016).

Harmless safe depictions of acceptable rich economic migrants swung to more harmful catastrophic risk orientations. In account 04.09.2015, Cameron expressed

120 There is also the implicit positive long term effects on community health easing pressure on public health systems.
limited compassion towards even ‘genuine’ refugees. The prefix ‘genuine’ divided refugees between those that are honest and dishonest. Cameron’s linkage of economic migrants and boats clouded understandings that refugees also use the same medium of transport.

In account 20.09.2016, May articulated both harmless economic movement that is “controlled, legal, safe, economic migration” and harmful economic movement with the need to “reduce the incentives for economic migrants to use illegal routes”. Harmful economic migrants were blamed for the diminishing societal resources that could be devoted to refugees and fulfil obligations to the Refugee Convention. For May, control over borders equated greater societal safety from harmful criminal and economic movement (20.09.2016).

Criminalisation Process Invoked by Cameron and May

The language of Cameron and May criminalised the movement of migrant outsiders. They helped sustain harmful risk orientations that framed the movement of migrant outsiders as a threat to societal cohesion. From 2011 to the end of 2016, there were 143 separate pieces of new immigration legislation. Out of these, the two major pieces were the Immigration Act 2014 and the Immigration Act 2016. These made access to healthcare, bank accounts, driving licences, the ability to work, and even marriage conditional on a person’s immigration status (see also 28.11.2014). The acts introduced measures such as monetary fees and surcharges for immigration applicants (for non-EU citizens) to access services like the NHS. There were also penalties to other members of the established including landlords, who provide residential leases to people who do not have permission to remain in the UK. The wide scope of these regulations paralleled broader societal fears about these same areas.

Stricter regulations further isolated current migrant outsiders living in Britain, and narrowed both current and future societal opportunities. Cameron and May gave consistent articulations of what became known as the “hostile environment” immigration policy, which has more recently entangled people who moved to UK as
children\textsuperscript{121} in the 1950’s and the 1960s (Consterdine 2018; Warren 2018; Gentleman 2018). They circulated relations that reduced the minimal societal orientations required to live in British society and promoted a more precarious tight rope that at any time could result in the arrest, detention, and expulsion of migrant outsiders. In the following accounts, the criminalisation of ‘illegal’ migrant outsiders legitimised the pursuit of stricter societal regulations:

“We’ve also got to do much better on the final group I want to talk about today, which is illegal immigration. We’ve got to be much better at finding these people and getting them out of our country. We’ve already made some big changes, telling credit reference agencies about illegal immigrants so they can’t get easy access to credit. We’ve ensured the UK Border Agency and HMRC work more closely together to come down hard on rogue businesses which use illegal labour to evade tax and minimum wage laws, and we’re creating biometric residence permits which are just like a biometric passport to give employers much greater certainty over who they’re employing and their right to be in the country. A targeted campaign this summer has seen more than 600 operations and over 550 arrests. I want everyone in the country to help with this, including by reporting suspected illegal immigrants to our Border Agency through the Crimestoppers phone line or the Border Agency website. Together I do believe we can reclaim our borders and send illegal immigrants home. (10.10.2011)

“That starts with making Britain a less attractive place to come and work illegally. The truth is it has been too easy to work illegally and employ illegal workers here. So we’ll take a radical step – we’ll make illegal working a criminal offence in

\textsuperscript{121}The Windrush generation, taking the name from the arrival of the ship Empire Windrush on 22\textsuperscript{nd} of June 1948, which carried 492 migrants from Britain’s Caribbean colonies.
its own right. That means wages paid to illegal migrants will be seized as proceeds of crime and more businesses will be told when their workers’ visas expire, so if you’re involved in illegal working – employer or employee – you’re breaking the law.” (21.05.2015)

“The EU’s collective approach in the Eastern Mediterranean has delivered a significant reduction in the numbers arriving on that route. It shows that returning illegal economic migrants to where they come from does have a deterrent effect and helps to break the business model of the people smugglers and traffickers.” (28.07.2016)

Each of the accounts, articulated by Cameron and May propagated suspicious risk orientations in British society, through the criminalisation of migrant outsiders. These interpretations emboldened members of the established to be less trustful of migrant outsiders. Migrant outsiders were criminalised through the perceived inadequacies of current societal regulations (10.10.2011; 21.05.2015). In the 21.05.2015 account, Cameron coerced employers to become government enforcers against the criminal threat of “illegal migrants”, or face societal sanction themselves. These articulations narrowed circles of association and increased circles of disassociation with migrant outsiders. Cameron called for a purge of illegal migrants from Britain that reasserted the domination of established groups (10.10.2011). He reaffirmed collective-nationalist attachments to “reclaim our borders” and falsely assumed that border regulations had been lost. Migrant outsiders were trapped within “the prison of error of identity”, where illegal immigrants should be expelled and ‘sent home’ (see Beck 2006: 25; c.f. Rosenberg 2016). In 28.07.2016 account, May praised the deterrent effects of turning back “illegal economic migrants” in efforts to combat deviant behaviour such as people smuggling and trafficking.
Masculine Vulnerabilities Propagated by Cameron

Cameron cultivated masculinised orientations to justify harsher measures against migrant outsiders. He constantly repeated a desire for a “tough system” (19.02.2015), “one that doesn't just sound tough, but is tough” (10.10.2011), because “it is too easy to be an illegal migrant in Britain” (25.05.2013).

Cameron sought to sound and act ‘tough’ using bellicose language to satisfy other sections of the established groups. He expressed what Poynting and Donaldson (2005) have called the hegemonic masculinity of the ruling class: the set of beliefs that emphasised attachments towards masculine qualities of strength, toughness and shamefulness towards expressions of more feminine qualities of warmth and caring. This form of relations emerged from the particular societal dynamic of elite boarding schools and certain university colleges. It is described by George Orwell (2000) as “the pattern of school life — a continuous triumph of the strong over the weak. Virtue consisted in winning: it consisted in being bigger, stronger, handsomer, richer, more popular, more elegant, more unscrupulous than other people — in dominating them”. The following accounts showed how Cameron cultivated more masculinised orientations.

“There are some people who come here and they are not planning to work hard, they are planning to take advantage of the system……. We’ve got to make sure that the housing system, that we are not handing over houses to people who don’t have a right to be here; that the health system, we are

122 Masculinised beliefs are not limited to leaders from Britain and the Commonwealth. Dean (1998: 29) notes that US President “John F. Kennedy’s career was premised on an “ideology of masculinity”; he used this ideology to justify his claim to presidential power. Employing culturally resonant images derived from America’s republican heritage, Kennedy constructed an aristocratic persona embodying the virtues of the stoic warrior-intellectual”.

123 Cameron attended the prestigious Eton College

124 This is taken from the essay Such, Such Were the Joys, the full passage is worth citing in full. “That was the pattern of school life — a continuous triumph of the strong over the weak. Virtue consisted in winning: it consisted in being bigger, stronger, handsomer, richer, more popular, more elegant, more unscrupulous than other people — in dominating them, bullying them, making them suffer pain, making them look foolish, getting the better of them in every way. Life was hierarchical and whatever happened was right. There were the strong, who deserved to win and always did win, and there were the weak, who deserved to lose and always did lose, everlastingly.” (Orwell 2000)
not giving health treatments to people who don’t have the right to be here; that we’re not giving legal aid to people that don’t have the right to be here. So this government has an immigration policy that is for every single department to act – on housing, on health, on education, on legal aid – so that we are no longer a soft touch. We are doing that, we’ve got a big immigration bill going through parliament and I’m confident that by the end of this government, you’ll be able to look back and say, “There may not have sorted out the whole problem, but they’ve got a much tougher approach on immigration that’s fair and that backs people who want to work hard and get on”. (23.07.2013)

“tougher controls, tougher policing of illegal migrants, make sure that – one of the things I said yesterday: if you’re here illegally, you shouldn’t be able to get a bank account, you shouldn’t be able to get a driving licence, you shouldn’t be able to get a council house, you shouldn’t be able to use the health service without paying, all of these things. We need not just a strong border control, we need to make sure our country is there for our own people and for people who have a right to come here, not for people who have no right to be here and who come illegally.” (30.07.2014)

“we need to create the toughest possible system for dealing with abuse of free movement. That includes tougher and longer re-entry bans for fraudsters and people who collude in sham marriages. It means addressing the fact that it is easier for an EU citizen to bring a non-EU spouse to Britain than it is for a British citizen to do the same. It means stronger powers to deport criminals and stop them coming back, as well as preventing entry in the first place. And it means addressing ECJ judgments that have widened the scope of free
movement in a way that has made it more difficult to tackle this kind of abuse. But ultimately, if we are going to reduce the numbers coming here we need action that gives greater control of migration from the EU.” (10.11.2015)

Each of the accounts above demonstrated masculinised depictions of relations between established groups and migrant outsiders. There was also a shift to promoting crueller, more insensitive forms of depicting migrants. In accounts 23.07.2013 and 30.07.2014, Cameron discussed the intolerable presence of migrant outsiders: people that do not hold the same attitudes to ‘hard work’ and are plotting to exploit the goodwill and institutions of the established. The accounts expressed commodified understandings regarding the goodness of the established taxpayer, who contributed to societal goods such as the facilitation of everyday financial transactions, transport, societal housing, and healthcare. This characterisation was contrasted with the desire to deny the ‘illegal’ migrant outsider from accessing any of these functions, perpetuating their exclusion from British society.

The constant repetition of bellicose language circulated suspicious risk narratives that limited access to public services by migrant outsiders. This suspicion expanded into understandings of EU migration and the perceived abuse of Europeanised regulations on free movement. Cameron verbalised British perceptions of inferiority that EU citizens are more privileged than British citizens should they have a non-EU spouse (10.11.2015). He widened the perceived gap between European and British identifications, which became two mutually exclusive categories, Britain or Europe. The perceived abuse of Europeanised freer movement merged into a wider suspicion of supranational EU institutions, such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ). European institutions like the ECJ became threats to the power of Cameron and his party-government establishment, and obstacles to measures that purged Britain of abusive migrant outsiders.
Net Migration Target & Migrant Outsider Objectification

The focus on net migration objectified migrant outsiders. In the now infamous pledge to reduce net migration to the tens of thousands and to cap all forms of immigration into Britain (21.06.2011; 10.10.2011; 28.11.2014). Net migration

ten migrated almost every form human movement into and out of the UK, through the reductive dictum that less net migration is good, more net migration is bad.

For Cameron and May, the numerical symbolism of the net migration target circulated unrealistic expectations on their capacity to regulate the movement of migrant outsiders. Their language circulated double bind processes that entrapped themselves and their party-government establishment.

The net migration pledge became an objectified expression of assertive societal regulation that validated the harmfulness of migrant outsiders and provided the illusion that these harms could be prevented. They staked their reputation on the fulfilment of a fantastical goal. If they abandoned the pledge, the embarrassment would threaten their place in the balance of societal power. This demonstrated the influence of tabloid newspapers such as the Daily Mail and UKIP, which the advocated for the continuation of the pledge (Travis 2017). If they fulfilled the pledge, it would crash the economy (Travis 2017). The following accounts showed the more harmful objectification of migrant outsiders through the focus on numbers of net migration.

“Look, I basically agree with you. There are some benefits from being a country that can welcome people who want to come here and work hard, but I think over the last decade we’ve had an immigration policy that’s been completely lax.

125 It is conceivable that the focus on net migration could cultivate more constructive understandings of migrant outsiders, through broader awareness of the kinds of interdependent links shaping societal relations within and beyond British society.

126 During the 2017 election campaign May was reported to say that Brexit will help achieve the net migration target (Asthana 2017), which might be true if Brexit destroys Britain’s economy (Travis 2017)
I mean the figures are actually quite frightening. If you look at the period between the year 2000, the year 2010, we basically were having net migration into the UK – that’s the difference between the number of people going to live in Spain or somewhere else and the number coming in – net migration of 200,000 a year….We’ve still got more to do. The number of that net migration figure, that 200,000, we’ve got it down by over a third, but I want to see it come down faster. And we are going to keep taking all the actions necessary so that we make sure that’s the case.” (23.07.2013)

“So if we have proper immigration control, a proper skills and education policy, and welfare reform so that work pays, I believe we’ll see levels of migration fall, we’ll see net migration come back to the 10s of thousands, where it was in the 1980s, which also the benefit of immigration not being an issue in public life, which I would very much like that to be the case again.” (27.01.2014)

“Today, net migration into Britain is running at 330,000 a year. That means adding as many as 3.5 million people to our population across a decade. And that’s what the concern is about. It’s not a concern about race, or colour, or creed. It’s a concern about numbers and pressure. And it’s the British people’s number one concern. And I don’t think for one minute they’re being unreasonable having this concern, indeed I share this concern because the pressure on public services, the pressure on communities has been too great. Now, of course, we need to do more to control migration from outside the European Union, and we’re doing that. But we do need to look at the situation within the European Union. Now I want to be clear: I support the idea of free movement. Many British people take advantage of free movement to go and live
and work in other European countries. But I think where this has gone wrong is that the interaction of our welfare system with free movement has actually set up very large pressures on our country, and that is what needs to change.” (21.01.2016)

The objectified expressions of net migration disseminated imageries of abuse: the belief that migrant outsiders had abused established institutions. The 23.07.2013 account balanced a limited openness to people who "can work hard", yet predominantly spoke of the “frightening” scale of migration. These figures that justified a crusade to take “all actions necessary” to reduce numbers. Cameron cultivated more fearful understandings of migrant outsiders, whose presence was connected to deficiencies in welfare and education policy (23.07.2013; 27.01.2014). Net migration and the desire to return British society to the idealised conditions of the 1980s seemed to be a particular obsession for Cameron (27.01.2014). Control of numbers enhanced the power claims of the Cameron and May (who was Home Secretary under Cameron). (21.01.2016). Cameron and May framed the practice of net migration reduction as the only way to protect Britain and its beleaguered public services from threatening migrant outsiders. This measure sustained attachments to the collective-nationalist normative code and commitments to greater border protection regulations.

The language of Cameron and May facilitated a vortex of catastrophic risk orientations that came to stigmatise many forms of transnational movement into Britain. This also encompassed the movement of people from Europe, setting the scene for an almost inevitable confrontation with the EU. The focus on the net migration target became a fetish that twisted interpretations of European migrants. Fears over Europe came to the forefront amid the range of broader societal fears associated with migrant outsiders.

127 As noted in the following remark. “But our action to cut migration from outside the EU has not been enough to meet our target of cutting the overall numbers to the tens of thousands. The figures yesterday demonstrate that again. As we’ve reduced the numbers coming to the UK from outside the European Union, the numbers from inside the European Union have risen.” (28.11.2014)
Continuation of Fear Constellations

Migrant outsiders were stigmatised and scapegoated through connections with distinct yet often overlapping sets of societal fears. These fears were linked to areas that included healthcare, education, welfare dependency, family, terrorism and Europe. Cameron and May sustained a risk narrative marked by suspicion that justified the exclusion of migrant outsiders. For British leaders, migrant outsiders were convenient socio-political scapegoats for the anger, frustration and concerns of the insecure established about these six areas. Constant repetition of this web of fears left little room any alternative, less suspicious forms of thinking about transnational movement.

Fears about healthcare and the movement of people were aroused by strong attachments to the NHS. People living in highly developed societies that have a form of universal health care like the NHS in Britain, develop degrees of attachment, dependence, and orientation around such collective institutions. There are corresponding feelings of distress should the perception arise that the NHS is, and could be, harmed. Cameron manipulated powerful emotional attachments to the NHS. He incited suspicions that migrant outsiders were harming a ‘national’ societal institution with accentuated appeals to the collective-nationalist normative code, for example in repetitive descriptions of pressures on hospitals (see account 10.10.2011b; 28.11.2014; 09.12.2015). In the following account, he also cultivated an imagery of abuse through the notion of ‘health tourists’.

“Our National Health Service, our NHS, is one of this country’s greatest assets. And it’s right that when people come here legitimately, they should be able to use it. But we should be clear. What we have is a free national health service, not a free international health service. So, let me put it very simply: we’re going to get much better at proper reciprocal charging. Wherever we can claim back the cost of NHS care,
we will. If someone visiting the UK from another EEA\textsuperscript{128} country uses our NHS, then it is right that they or their government pay for it. British taxpayers should support British families and those who contribute to our economy. And for migrants from outside the EEA, we want to introduce stricter charging or a requirement for private health insurance to cover the costs of NHS care.” (25.05.2013)

In the account above, Cameron channelled collective-nationalist attachments to the NHS that saw non-EU migrants and EU migrants as a financial burdens to established groups in British society, which their own governments should pay for. He accentuated insecurities about the NHS, in the context of broader events such as the junior doctors strike of 2016 (Horton 2017) as well as ongoing funding cuts and efficiency savings (see BMA 2016). Doctors and nurses were enlisted to become immigration control agents\textsuperscript{129}. These measures twisted traditional societal reflections about the ongoing contribution of migrants to the development of the NHS (see Bivins 2015; Trewby 2017; O’Dowd 2017). Fears over the future of the NHS became fears about migrant outsiders, who became scapegoats for any perceived shortfalls.

Fears about the movement of people also affected education systems in two ways. The first fear about education was an unquantified belief that the movement of people pressurised primary and secondary schools (10.10.2011b; 28.11.2014; 09.12.2015; 17.01.2017). Cameron spoke about primary schools “where [a] dozen of languages are spoken, with only a small minority speaking English as their first language\textsuperscript{130}” (28.11.2014), as though British children would bear negative

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item European Economic Area
\item The BMA (2016: 11) has noted that “the option of further extending charges for overseas visitors and migrants who use the NHS, which is expected to save £500 million per year by 2017/18.40 The BMA is concerned that these changes could end up generating more costs than savings. Not only is it likely to cause confusion among patients, it will also require GPs and hospital doctors to spend more time on the paperwork and bureaucracy needed to regulate charges. Most importantly, no patient with a serious health need should be deterred from seeing a doctor, especially if their condition poses a public health risk”.  
\item To my recollection, Cameron has never visited a primary school in Wales that are bilingual in Welsh and English.
\end{enumerate}
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consequence from the sounds of languages other than English. For Cameron, those ‘other languages’ confirmed a lack of adherence to established group prioritisation of English as the primary mode of communication and as the means of societal integration.

The second fear involved the targeting of so-called “bogus colleges” (10.10.2011; 25.05.2013). It was a belief in widespread abuses within the tertiary education sector: “we put in place some restrictions so that students can come, but they must be genuine students to genuine universities. We’ve closed down dozens of bogus colleges” (05.04.2016). The fear of non-genuine students in British universities was further expressed in the following account:

“let’s keep hold of the good and positive immigration, people like yourself coming here, studying in university, wanting to work afterwards in a graduate job. Let’s keep that, but we must deal with the illegal immigration and with the bogus colleges which has brought forward the problem......we must try and keep control of what had become a very large industry of really almost quite illegal immigration, people coming over supposedly to study but actually to go into different parts of the labour market. So I think we can get this right, I really do, and I profoundly believe we can get the numbers to a place where people have much more confidence in the system than they do now.” (24.03.2011).

The account above placed suspicion on every international student studying in the UK (including the author himself) and reinforced collective-nationalist attachments to established tertiary education institutions. The references to “good and positive immigration” exemplified the habituated legacy of imperial colonisation processes,

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131 Noting the targeting of bogus colleges, Partos and Bale (2015: 174) remark that. “Nowhere is the mismatch between the Conservatives’ appreciation of the potential economic benefits of the influx of highly skilled, highly educated individuals, on the one hand, and their desire to respond to worries about numbers more generally, on the other, so glaring”.
where elite members of colonised peoples could experience and, ideally, become ‘civilised’ in the metropole. This positive understanding was clouded by the presumption that migrant outsiders were deceiving established education institutions and threatening a vulnerable labour market. It stigmatised migrant outsiders who have moved to Britain for education purposes, through the link to economic vulnerabilities. The focus on bogus colleges showed how education fears were subsumed within the objectified reduction of many forms of human movement into Britain. In 2012, London Metropolitan University was banned from accepting non-EU international students due the fact that a small minority of international students lacked adequate documentation (Meikle and Malik 2012). This extreme sanction prompted in the creation of a specific functionary within universities: the Compliance Officer whose role was to ensure the adherence to regulations prescribed by a government establishment highly suspicious of migrant outsiders.

Fears about welfare dependency and the movement of people were linked to the notion that migrant outsiders were burdens on scarce societal resources. Cameron manipulated attachments towards the distribution of welfare benefits. The consistent obsession over welfare by Cameron's party-government establishment turned a more humanitarian provision of assistance to others, into a collective-nationalist question of scarce societal resources. He increased the eligibility criteria for welfare benefits. This disciplined insecure sections of established groups, who are partial outsiders in the eyes of his party-government establishment due their dependence on social welfare. He also directed the discontent of insecure sections of the established onto harmful depictions of

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132 There is a 'sword of Damocles' hanging over every university in Britain: "We will revoke licences from colleges and businesses which fail to do enough to prevent large numbers of migrants that they sponsor overstaying their visas." (28.11.2014)

133 A University of Bath job advert from 2014 notes that purpose of the role is to ensure that the university maintains its status as a Highly Trusted Sponsor under Tier 4 of the Home Office’s Points Based System (PBS). The post-holder’s responsibility will be to ensure the University’s adherence to Home Office requirements and internal policies for the attendance monitoring of current students. S/he will also be expected to support a range of Home Office related work across other areas of the University, as directed by their line-manager.” (HR 2014).

134 This is what Andersen and Bjørklund have called "welfare state chauvinism" in their study of the far-right Progress parties in Denmark and Norway (1990: 212).

135 See Slater's account of the "myth of "Broken Britain" (2014)
migrant outsiders, (28.11.2014; 29.05.2015 see also 10.10.2011; 30.07.2014; 04.03.2014). Cameron stigmatised insecure sections of the established that were dependant on welfare and endowed them with undesirable qualities such as laziness and greediness, behaviour that closely resembled that of children with the same power disparities. His attempt to coerce insecure sections of the established ‘into work’ was enhanced by predatory depictions of migrant outsiders, as in the following account:

“And to get people back to work, we’ve also introduced a much **tougher** approach to **immigration**. Those who are starry-eyed about the benefits of globalisation refuse to see the link between **uncontrolled immigration and mass welfare dependency**. But when you had a welfare system that effectively allowed large numbers of British people to choose not to work\(^{136}\), and an **immigration system** that **encouraged people** from **across the world** to come here to work, the results were predictable.” (10.06.2013)

The account above bound fears about welfare dependence to harmful understandings of migrant outsiders. These depictions relied on what Slater (2014: 964) called the myth of a “Broken Britain” and mythologisation of societal catastrophe that “manufactured ignorance” of any alternative forms of welfare reform in Britain. He highlights the influence of the think tank Centre for Societal Justice (CSJ) founded by Conservative MP and former leader Ian Duncan Smith. The CSJ cultivated a reductive understanding of British society through references to “behavioural filters of family breakdown, out-of-wedlock, childbirth, worklessness, dependency, anti-societal behaviour, personal responsibility, addiction, and teenage pregnancies”. Insecure members of the established that were dependant, or may have been denied access to government assistance were persuaded to direct

\(^{136}\)This is a reference to workfare, a form of welfare reform implemented in the US inspired by the work of scholar Lawrence Mead, who according to Standing was enlisted as soon as the Conservatives took power (Standing 2010:143 cited in Slater 2014: 958). Mead’s work shows the persistence of a highly strict, austere form of thinking that can be traced back to English Puritans from the voyage of the Mayflower.
their frustrations onto fictitious portrayals of migrant outsiders, some of whom were transformed into benefit tourists preying on scarce societal resources of both work and welfare (20.10.2013; 13.12.2013; 27.02.2014; 27.06.2014; 30.07.2014). Stigmatised insecure sections of the established became stigmatisers themselves as Cameron emphasised established fears over welfare dependency, with migrant outsiders the convenient scapegoats.

Fears about family/household with the movement of people were also linked with concerns about the practice of forced marriages. The development of marriage as a societal institution formed part of the broader moulding of affects in what has become known as the household with demarcated spaces for familial and sexual relations between men and women (see Elias 2012a [1939]: 178-181). Evolving understandings of marriage illustrate the ongoing spurts and counter spurts of intersectional gender, colonial, race and class power relations. The conduct of forced marriage has connotations of unsuppressed violence and clashes with the desire for more equal power relations between men and women in societies like Britain. The term ‘forced’ undermines the values embedded in the term ‘marriage’, as a more freely chosen bond between two people motivated by forms of love.

Forced marriage became an exemplar of harmful behaviour committed by migrant outsiders. This reinforced broader efforts to restrict family migration that trapped both EU and non-EU movement (see Sirriyeh 2015; account 10.11.2015 mentioned earlier). Cameron’s language verbalised doubts about the marriages between migrant outsiders by dismissing those believed to be engaged in “sham marriages” (28.11.2014; 10.11.2015; 19.02.2016; 23.02.2016). Cameron bound established fears about the societally valued institution of marriage, onto suspicious impressions of migrant outsiders, as in following account.

137 See Owens (2015) for a discussion of oikonomia the language of household governance.
139 Marriage practices can include more than just feelings of romantic love, but also the desire for a “better life” and societal advancement, see Beck-Gernsheim (2011) who notes the shift towards more instrumentalised understandings of marriage.
“We’re also consulting on how to tackle abuse of the system to make sure that family migrants who come here are in a **genuine relationship** with their partner......Now, of course the most grotesque example of a relationship that isn’t genuine is a **forced marriage**, which is of course completely different from an arranged marriage where both partners consent, or a **sham marriage** where the aim is to circumvent immigration control or make a financial gain. **Forced marriage is little more than slavery**....Now those involved in this area – voluntary bodies and others – do warn that if you go straight to criminalisation of the whole edifice you could actually get less people coming forward because they don’t want to shop their parents effectively......So we’re saying here we’re going to criminalise anyone who breaches a forced marriages order.......so we make **forced marriages something** that simply doesn’t exist in the UK – and it shouldn’t. In a **civilised country in the 21st century**, it’s a completely unacceptable practice.” (10.10.2011)

The account above defended the criminalisation of forced marriage citing the humanist-egalitarian code through humanitarian desires to emancipate people from a practice “little more than slavery”\(^{140}\). These attachments swung to collective-nationalist attachments. Cameron idealised Britain as a “civilised country in the 21st century” that resisted harmful migrant outsiders engaged forced marriages through harsh societal sanctions. The criminal stigmatisation of forced marriage can further marginalise of already ostracised ethnic communities\(^ {141}\), obscuring the fact that the practice effects a broad range of societal groups (Chantler et. al. 2017: 599), as well as overlooking the power relations that unpin this coercive practice. It can also ignore the more active forms of resistance from women fleeing forced marriages and citing their resistance as part of their asylum claim (Honkala 2017: 181). Cameron helped maintain a suspicious risk narrative about migrant outsiders

\(^{140}\) See Linklater (2017: 251-264) on longstanding campaigns against the slave trade.

\(^{141}\) For example South Asian communities experiencing the projection of fears such as terrorism.
and the movement of their families through fears that those bounds are formed under false pretences.

Apprehensions about globalised violence and the movement of people interwove concerns over communal violence and the presence of migrant outsiders. Many members of British society have become accustomed to the absence of violence in their everyday lives, and react with shock and distress when made aware of unexpected extreme violence within and beyond Britain. More insecure members of British society seem highly attuned to incidences of transnational violence and prone to transferring violence fears into migrant fears. This has emerged in unexpected places for example in the case of Faizah Shaheen detained on a commercial aircraft for reading the book *Syria Speaks: Art and Culture from the Frontline* a collection work by over fifty Syrian artists and writers (Cain 2016). There were six notable occurrences of terrorist violence in Britain during this phase. Four examples of jihadist violence in London and Manchester (BBC 2014; Guardian Staff 2017; Ross 2017; Parveen 2017) and far-right violence with the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox and the case of mosque bomber Pavlo Lapsuyn (Cobain and Taylor 2016; BBC 2013). In all these incidents, the perpetrators were relative “outsiders” in relations with established groups in the UK (Dunning 2016: 41). Portrayals of migrant outsiders were easily entangled with the awareness of transitional violence, as in the following accounts:

“when a country like Somalia fractures and breaks, that affects us not just in the region, not just the terrorism threatened on our streets or the flows of mass immigration” (10.06.2013).

“Just as we need the United Nations to modernise to meet the challenges of terrorism in the 21st Century, so we also need to adapt if we are to fashion a truly global response to the

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142 The cover image was probably the trigger. It was a poster by the artists collective Alshaab alsori aref tarekh, depicting a covered face wielding a slingshot followed by Islamic calligraphy (see Halasa et. al. 2014).
The mass movements of people across the world and the implications this brings for security and human rights.”

(20.09.2016)

In both of these accounts, references to terrorism and migration co-exist in the same sentence. This connotation raised the possibility that migrant outsiders are harbingers of transnational violence. In account 10.06.2013, Cameron’s reference to “our streets” is particularly visceral, coming a month after the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby who was hacked to death on the streets of Woolwich, south London. Whether directly or indirectly the possibility of violence is related to allusions of “mass immigration”. In account 20.09.2016, May reinforced the objectification of migrant outsiders. It became conceivable that reductions in migration equated to reductions in terrorism, which would prevent more ‘violence on the streets’. What emerged was a brutalised image of migrant outsiders, who become scapegoats in the aftermath of violence.

Depictions of European migrants became infused with fears about a weak and fragile Europe. There were continuing references to nationalised fantasies of Britain as an island143, which cultivated an ignorance of the societal changes and thickening of the chains of interdependence that bound Britain with Europe. These fantastical depictions were enhanced by depictions of an insecure southern European border bringing “more terrorism, more immigration” (27.05.2011), as in the following account:

“And of course the war in Syria has unleashed a wave of migration towards Europe which we see night after night on our television screens. Britain has never joined the Schengen border-free zone, so we retain our border controls. This, and our geographical status as an island, means we are less directly affected than other European countries by this crisis. Our agreement with France, as a

143 Also see Simms (2016)
fellow EU member, means that our main border control with continental Europe effectively operates now at Calais, not Dover. And our decision to admit **20,000 Syrian refugees** from the camps was a **British national sovereign decision**.” (10.11.2015; 12.12.2011)

In the account above Cameron made a masculinised contrast between a strong Britain and a weak Europe. It speaks of unstable developments in international society with the repercussions of the Syrian Civil War through ‘waves’ of people. He portrayed the Schengen zone as a source of strong weakness that made European societies highly vulnerable to waves and ‘swarms’ of harmful transnational movement. This depiction of European weakness was contrasted with the declared strength of British society linked to the rejection of membership in the Schengen area and the supremacy of nationalised borders that extends into France. There were vague references to fears about a fragile Europe weakened by broader vulnerabilities such as the Euro-zone crisis. This widened circles of disassociation between Britain and Europe. The projection of a fragile Europe functioned in parallel with depictions of harmful Europeanised movement. European migrant outsiders were interpreted as catastrophic risks to established groups in Britain.

In similar ways to Blair, Cameron and May used aquatic metaphors that emphasised the onrushing pace and scale of harmful transnational movement. In phrases such as “waves of migration/immigration” (28.07.2010; 22.09.2011; 04.03.2014 26.06.2015); “flows of mass immigration” (10.06.2013; 28.05.2015; 29.05.2015; 09.02.2017); “largest wave of migration in our country’s history” (25.05.2013); “the demands of ever greater numbers flooding in” (10.10.2011). The last phrase from account 10.10.2011 simultaneously invoked a spiritualised onrushing force with visceral imaginings of drowning and predatory Viking-esque raiders seeking more plunder in destructive behaviour that impoverishes Britain.

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144 Again this another inversion that ignores the development of more equal power relation among European societies, by reinforcing attachments towards British nationalised supremacy.
In a Judeo-Christian influenced society like Britain, the consistent use of aquatic metaphors began to parallel a scene from the book of Genesis, with the Cameron acting out the role of Noah. At the height of the European migration crisis of 2015, Cameron and the then Foreign Secretary Phillip Hammond used the phases of ‘swarms’ and ‘marauders’ (BBC 2015a; BBC 2015b). Pasha (2017: 322) remarks that the language of ‘swarms’ demonstrates the refurbishment of “civilizational binaries” that test liberal notions of hospitality. When people movements are understood as mythical ‘floods’ and ‘swarms’. These interpretations can reduce societal restraints on behaviours such as violence and verbal abuse, contracting the space for emotive identification. References to the web of fears gave insecure sections of the established increased reasons to reject migrant outsiders.

Nationalised Laws: The Rejection of Europe

For Cameron and May, the EU became an adversarial threat to British society. There was a consistent targeting of EU migrants based on the fears about welfare dependency, education and healthcare (10.11.2015; 19.02.2016). Cameron remarked that “so I think deal with the welfare tourism and we’ll deal with some of the problem of EU migration” (30.07.2014); “around 40 percent of all recent European Economic Area migrants are supported by the UK benefits system” (10.11.2015). Both of these accounts channel “welfare chauvinistic” claims (a term coined by Andersen and Bjørklund 1990: 212). Cameron implied that Europeanised movement was a burden to the established of British society by siphoning societal resources that could be better spent on other more deserving members of the established groups. His assertion cultivated greater ignorance of points made by studies such as Dustmann and Frattini’s (2014: 596) analysis of fiscal impacts of immigration. This study noted how “immigrants who arrived since 2000, especially those from EEA countries, have – through their positive net fiscal contributions – helped to reduce the fiscal burden for native workers”. At the height of the surge in support for the Leave campaign during the 2016 EU Referendum, an adviser to Cameron was reported to have said that “I can’t believe people are really going to vote themselves poorer because they don’t like the Poles living next door,”
(McTague et al. 2016). Before the 2016 Referendum, Cameron gave people ample reasons to dislike ‘the Poles’ (from the EEA) living next door.

Cameron and May were blinded by belief in the superiority of Britain over Europe. Their collective-nationalist attachments intensified broader power struggles with the EU. These struggles culminated in ‘the four no’s’. No to closer integration, no to the Eurozone (as well as financial assistance countries with the Euro), no to EU rules/laws and no to Schengen. Each of these no’s represented idealised national symbols and attachments: an independent Britain, with the British pound as currency, governed by British/English laws, demarcated by British borders. “Out of the open borders. Out of the bailouts. Out of the euro. And out of all those schemes in which Britain wants no part.” (19.02.2016; 22.05.2015). Cameron articulated the threat that if Europe does not comply with British demands that are from a “major European player”, then it is possible that Britain would withdrawal from Europe (29.05.2015). He relied on the simultaneous sense of superiority over Europe and vulnerabilities about Europe.

This phase of British history also saw increased support for UKIP. Dennison and Goodwin (2015: 173, 183) have noted that leader Nigel Farage fused the desire to control immigration with questions about Britain’s EU membership, arguing that immigration could not be controlled unless Britain left the EU. The fusion of suspicions over migration and misgivings about Europe was not a unique quality of UKIP. It was only that Farage more explicitly placed migration and Europe at the forefront of his party’s bid for greater power, expressing more clearly, the desires embedded within the language of Cameron and May.

Vulnerabilities about national borders were interdependently bound up with vulnerabilities about “our laws” and the perceived superiority of legalised British societal controls. Reference to “our laws” became a symbol for expressions of collective attachment that was seemingly threatened by the presence of Europeanised societal regulations. Cameron set up a false disjuncture where British laws were deemed far superior to the European laws. In account 01.10.2014, Cameron used the problem of migration from the EU, as a foil to discuss the
regaining of lost nationalised attachments/powers from Europe. He voiced fears about the decline of British society, reinforced with the pledge of an in/out referendum, and interwoven with dissatisfaction of rulings made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This institution is separate from the ECJ, yet became understood as a threat to the exclusive nationalised authority of Britain’s Parliament. Cameron projected the superiority of nationalised values and rulings over those made by “judges in Strasbourg” (01.10.2014), because “not enough account is being taken of democratic decisions by national parliaments” (25.01.2012).

Cameron confused the distinctions between ECtHR in Strasbourg and the ECJ based in Luxemburg both of whom can be referred to as ‘the European Court’. This misunderstanding had wider consequences. It fuelled a growing separation between Britain and the EU. Cameron demonstrated an ignorance of Britain’s role in the ECtHR forgetting that there have been eight national judges from Britain on the ECtHR since 1959 (3 of whom were President), second only to the Netherlands. As well as an ignorance of post-war European history, Cameron gave limited reflections on Britain’s role in the creation of European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter the Convention), and the ECtHR (Simpson 2004; Bates 2010). Simpson (2004: 5) notes that “its adoption was seen as a feather in the cap of the Foreign Office, rather than as a weapon which might be directed against the United Kingdom”. The notion of the Convention as a weapon against Britain is exactly what Cameron seemed to believe or wanted others to believe.

The dispute with both the ECJ and ECtHR became entrapped in the masculinised and objectified vortex of harmful risk orientations that fuelled commitments to the collective-nationalist normative code. Cameron expressed the insecure belief that

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145 In a building designed by British architect Lord Richard Rogers.
146 The ECJ governs broader compliance, ensuring the consistency of interpretation of EU law and treaties across all EU members, including compliance with the principle of free movement (see account 10.11.2015). The ECtHR is bound to the Council of Europe which has 47 member states providing judgements on state and individual violations of civil and political rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights this includes both EU and non-EU citizens.
147 The Netherlands has had 9 judges, Denmark, Ireland, Luxemburg have all had 7 judges on the EHCJ since 1959.
features of the Convention were a threat to Britain from the ECtHR, for example, in challenges to Article 8 the right to family life. “We will extend our new policy of deport first, appeal later to cover all immigration appeals where a so-called right to family life is invoked” (28.11.2014). Another remark stated that. “If you read the European Convention on Human Rights it says nothing about deportation. It has been extended and expanded by judge after judge, lawyer after lawyer, and sometimes it is flying in the face of common sense” (17.12.2010). Rulings of the ECtHR offended Cameron’s nationalised attachments, because they did not assist his desire to reduce net migration and rid Britain of migrant outsiders whose presence was deemed unacceptable. Confusion about the ECtHR and antagonisms over its immigration rulings became bound to fears over Europe interwoven with stigmatisations of Europeanised movement as well as other the transnational movements of people.

Conclusion

British Prime Ministers from 2001 to 2017 propagated more closed socio-psychological fortifications, which accentuated the vulnerabilities of particular groups within British society.

As the years progressed, British leaders disseminated desires for harsher, more brutalised sanctions on the transnational movement of people. This vortex included refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, EU migrants and many shades of professionalised societal occupations. It is foreseeable that European citizens may become the targets of further stigmatisation, which, if unchecked raises the possibility of the loss of human life and property. There are possibilities that a post-Brexit UK may leave the Council of Europe if British leaders continue to express offence at the rulings of the ECtHR, rejecting its’ more open orientations and embracing further attachments to nationalised laws. The overall arc of development showed a British society that is less open and feels less secure. British Prime Ministers have circulated less open and less secure modes of thinking and orientations in the society they have led.
This chapter examined the migration language of British Prime Ministers David Cameron and Theresa May from 2010 to 2017. I investigated their speeches, interviews and press conferences.

I have argued that the language of Cameron and May expanded the socio-psychological fortifications in British society. They articulated a widening net of harmful catastrophic understandings of transnational movement. The reconstruction of the societal processes embedded in their language demonstrates the continued expansion of reductive modes of thinking that mobilised shared anxieties. Commodified depictions of migrant outsiders were interconnected with attachments to the collective-nationalist normative code. Migrant outsiders became characterised as risks to established sections of British society.

Societal orientations were dominated by more harmful risk orientations. Cameron and May criminalised migrant outsiders and cultivated more masculinised orientations, which sustained the reduction of net migration. Fears about healthcare, education, welfare dependency, marriage, terrorism, and Europe widened circles of disassociation, which legitimised the stigmatisation of migrant outsiders and further strained relations with the EU.

The next two chapters will evaluate the migration of language of Australian Prime Ministers John Howard, Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull. The language of British and Australian leaders from 2001 to 2017 showed the development of similar societal processes. As well as some differences bound to the distinctive state-formation processes experienced by British and Australian society. Chapter 5 and 6 utilise the same model for shared anxieties to illustrate the socio-psychological tensions in Australian society through formulations of interdependency and power relations nexuses developed by process and risk sociology in Chapters 1 and 2.
Chapter 5.
An Investigation into the Major Public Migration Speeches by John Howard (2001-2007) and Kevin Rudd (2007-2010)

The last two chapters reconstructed the societal processes in the migration language of British Prime Ministers Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Theresa May. These leaders spanned a period of British history from 2001 to 2017. This assessment used a process and risk sociological approach to understand the development of shared anxieties and the fortified societal orientations in British society. The language of British Prime Ministers mobilised shared anxieties, through the commodification of migrant outsiders and conflicting appeals to humanist-egalitarian and collective-nationalist normative codes. The greater swing to collective-nationalist attachments propagated the notion that migrant outsiders were harmful catastrophic risks to British society. British leaders dominated societal orientations through criminalised and objectified risk orientations of migrant outsiders. Broader societal fears widened circles of disassociation that stigmatised migrant outsiders and further separated relations with the EU.

My fifth chapter evaluates the migration language of Australian Prime Ministers John Howard (2001-2007) and Kevin Rudd (2007-2010). These leaders covered a period of Australian history from 2001 to 2010. My investigation further expands the model for shared anxieties developed in Chapters 1 and 2 to understand the socio-psychological tensions in Australian society. The vocabulary of process and risk sociology and model of independency and power relations nexuses enables the reconstruction of the societal processes affecting Australian society. This reconstructions uses evidence taken from the speeches, interviews and press conferences of Howard and Rudd.

The statements of Howard make up the majority of primary references in my investigation. He represented a conservative Coalition government that consisted
of the more urban Liberal Party and the mainly rural National Party (hereafter the Coalition). Rudd represented the Australian Labor\textsuperscript{148} Party. Despite his repeated claims of abolishing the ‘Pacific Solution’ undertaken by Howard that incarcerated the ‘problem’ of asylum seekers into detention centres at Nauru and Manus Island, in Papua New Guinea (14.10.2009a; 14.10.2009b). Rudd maintained a system for the mandatory detention of asylum seekers at a facility on Christmas Island, an Australian External Territory in the Indian Ocean 350km south of Java and Sumatra and 1,550km north-west of the closest point on the Australian mainland.

Howard and Rudd preserved a long-standing practice introduced by the Keating government in 1992, which enshrined the compulsory detention of people arriving in Australia without a visa. The Keating government turned the possibility\textsuperscript{149} of imprisonment because of insufficient travel papers into a reality\textsuperscript{150} (Betts 2003; Crock 1993). Successive Australian governments led by Howard and Rudd maintained a system of detaining people first, then processing their claims later, in isolated places far removed from major population centres on the east coast of mainland Australia. Their language widened circles of disassociation and set the tone for the policies, practices and societal expectations that moulded relations in Australian society.

I argue that the migration language of Prime Ministers Howard and Rudd fortified Australian society. More harmful interpretations of transnational movement circulated narrower forms of societal association and widened forms of disassociation in Australian society. The language and rhetorical performances of Australian leaders mobilised shared anxieties and fortified more reductive modes of thinking and narrow societal orientations, through more accentuated collective-nationalist attachments such as border protection, mandatory detention practices and expressions of wider established group fears in Australian society.

\textsuperscript{148} The Australian Labor Party chose the Americanised spelling to differentiate itself.
\textsuperscript{149} From the 1958 Migration Act.
\textsuperscript{150} Through the 1992 Migration Amendment Act.
When comparing language of British and Australian leaders, three sets of similarities and two sets of differences became apparent.

The first interconnection is that similar societal processes reconstructed from the migration language of British Prime Ministers were present in the language of Australian Prime Ministers. These included the commodification of migrant outsiders, pressures of cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian and de-cosmopolitanised collective-nationalist normative codes, which framed the development of criminalised and objectified risk orientations.

The second interconnection encompasses the particular pressures of leadership and wider societal coordination functions. British and Australian leaders practiced highly involved short-term styles of leadership that blamed, most notably members of the political opposition for the development of harmful transnational people movements in their respective societies. The material illustrates the high degrees of insecure orientations of the leaders themselves and their wider party-government establishment, which was amplified by their status as a coordinator of wider societal functions. They consistently attempted to redirect societal attachments towards themselves and away from other areas of society that resisted their policies against harmful migrant outsiders.

The third interconnection is that leaders in Britain and Australia confused the pursuit of narrower party political survival into efforts to maintain the existence wider society as a whole. This is one reason why the humanist-egalitarian code did not moderate or restrain persistent oscillations to the collective-nationalist code. This also highlights the continuing socio-emotive resonance of national symbols in these societies. How it is relatively easy to arouse public support through circulating nationalised attachments, yet maintaining that support meant escalating policies to validate their nationalist credentials. The fortified orientations propagated by British and Australian leaders left little room for deeper alternative attachments that did not aid their pursuit of party political survival. Material from their speeches and rhetorical performances showed no detectable reflection or contemplation that...
their practices may contribute to the same ‘problems’ of people movement that they are so determined to address.

The first difference was references in the material to the wider interdependencies from the regionalised contexts situating British and Australian society. This corresponds to the shifting power relations and forms of secure-insecure orientations between British and Australian societies their respective regions, Europe in the case of Britain and Asia in the case of Australia. State-societal formations and nationalised symbols that make up Britain and Australia emerged relatively intact from the major events of the 20th century most notably the Second World War. European societies and the societies of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific underwent wide reaching societal changes through processes and experiences for example of decolonisation, industrialisation and becoming the site of Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The migration representations from British leaders were more recognisably bound to the thickening interdependencies and power relations of Britain’s relationship with Europe. British leaders seemed to be unwilling and/or unable to grasp the societal changes in Europe. Most notably the sophisticated legal-constitutional development of the EU. They clung onto past images and symbols of nationalist power supremacy through a system of opt-outs, and when those were deemed insufficient alongside articulations of ‘the four no’s’ (see Chapter 4) ‘Brexit’ becomes the only option.

The migration representations of Australian leaders were less identifiably bound to the wider relations with Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Australia has no land border with Asia, unlike Britain and the Euro Tunnel with France. The ambiguous maritime boundaries that interconnected Australia with Southeast Asia and the South Pacific were interdependent with the maintenance of socio-psychological boundaries between Australia and its neighbours.

The development of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) with its emphasis on more fortified notions of national sovereignty that freed authoritarian
elites from internal and external challenges (see Davies 2018) has fed into the socio-psychological isolation and unawareness communicated in the language of Australian leaders. It is only through the brief moments of asylum seeker arrival that longstanding insecure orientations of established groups in Australia vis-à-vis Asia became apparent (Viviani 1996; Walker 1999; Walker and Sobocinska 2012 eds).

Where relations with Southeast Asia have been kept at a fluctuating distance. The insecure orientations of Australia’s party-government establishments have been more visible in the South Pacific, most notably through the ‘arc of instability’ thesis that saw unstable decolonised Pacific states as ‘risks’ to Australian society, prompting intervention for example in the form of RAMSI in the Solomon Islands and ongoing financial development assistance (Shibuya 2006; Wallis 2012). The growth of detention centres on Nauru and Manus Island illustrates the regional power differentials between Australia and its South Pacific neighbours, which maintains nationalised colonial Australian identifications.

The second difference was the particular stigmatisation of migrant outsiders. British leaders stigmatised migrant outsiders with more tangible sets of fears, linked to particular societal functions such as the provision of healthcare. Australian leaders stigmatised asylum seeker outsiders with less tangible societal fears, such as queue jumping from highly strict forms of organisation characteristic of immobile politico-economic settler citizen identifications.

This chapter consists of two sections. The first section explains the development of reductive modes of thinking in Australian society, through the mobilisation of shared anxieties. The second section explains the growth of narrow societal orientations, and the development of socio-psychological fortifications in Australian society.
Mobilisation of Shared Anxieties by Howard & Rudd

The following section illustrates the development of reductive modes of thinking in Australia. Open and closed attitudes to transnational migration have suffused the societal conscience formations of Australian society. Howard and Rudd directed the understandings of established groups with a combination of techno-economic bourgeois and politico-economic citoyen settler identifications, which commodified depictions of transnational outsiders. They gave superficial appeals that channelled the humanist-egalitarian code through references to Australia’s international humanitarian obligations to refugees. These attachments swung to the collective-nationalist code through commitments to border protection. Transnational outsiders were interpreted as more harmful catastrophic risks to insecure sections of established groups in Australian society.

Australian Societal Conscience Formation

Colonisation processes and people movements contextualised Australian societal conscience formations into the modern era. Manning (2013) writes that from the year 1700 through to the year 2000 there was the acceleration of voluntary and involuntary labour movement of people variously classified as slaves, convicts, workers, refugees. Australian state-society developed within this 200 year period from the colonial settlements of convicts and free settlers from the British Isles from 1788 onwards. Steady migration culminated in the federation of the Australian colonies in 1901. The descendants of these oldcomer groups became the nuclei of established groups in Australian society.

Colonial convict-settler established groups had a shallow awareness of how globalised interdependencies reciprocally affected localised interdependencies the high power ratio, which they held within Australian society.

The White Australia policy from 1901 to 1975 codified a particular balance of societal relations with a mainly Anglo-Celtic establishment at its apex followed by
non-British Europeans, non-Europeans and Indigenous Australians. It was “a nationalist doctrine which embodied Australia’s desire to maintain itself as a white, British nation” (Tavan 2004: 111).

The pursuit of attachments to Britain occurred through the exclusion of non-British people. Acts of violence and the regulations over violence contextualised established group relations with Indigenous Australians and other newcomers/outsiders, such as Chinese settlers in the goldfields of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland (Van Krieken 1999; McGowan 2004). The movement of Chinese settlers became the conduit for societal fears around the Australian continent’s vulnerability to re-colonisation by a rival imperial power, whether from Europe or Asia\(^\text{151}\).

From 1945 onwards, people movements (especially from post-war Europe) contributed to the gradual multiculturalisation of Australian conscience formation. Successive political establishments purposefully developed Australian society into an immigrant society (Jupp 2007). The White Australia Policy was slowly abolished through reforms in 1950’s and 1960’s and culminated with an official renunciation in the 1970s under the Whitlam government (Tavan 2004: 122). These reforms slowly lowered the degrees of overt discrimination towards the movement of non-Europeans, paralleling broader changes in international society\(^\text{152}\). Australian society changed from a white settler society with racist and isolationist identifications to a “more open society” (Castles 1992: 558-559).

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\(^{151}\) From the 1850s areas of the South Western Pacific became part of broader European colonisation processes, with a scramble for the South Pacific that in part mirrored the scramble for Africa. Throughout this period European states were taking possession of areas north of Australia, with France annexing New Caledonia in 1853, Germany annexing the north coast of New Guinea and the islands of New Britain and New Ireland in 1884, and Britain claiming Fiji in 1874, and the south coast of New Guinea (see Gordon 1945: 83-89).

Also see Griffiths’ (2012: 15) account of the fears held by pre-Federation Queensland elites about the potential colonisation of northern Australia by Chinese immigrants.

\(^{152}\) These shifts included the decolonisation of former European colonies in the Southeast Asia, the South Pacific and other areas of the world, with Australia granting independence to Papua New Guinea in 1975, a year that also saw the fall of Saigon and the end of the Vietnam War. There was also the desire for Australia to distance itself from societies such as Apartheid South Africa, to shake off the lingering image of white Australia or risk hampering business relations with both newly decolonised state-societies in the Asia Pacific and societies such as Japan and South Korea.
Repercussions from the Second World War challenged Australian attachments to Britain. Australian society became more Europeanised and Americanised with the movement of people from Greece, Italy and the Balkans. The movement of these ‘new’ European outsiders was soon replaced by people from places such as Indo-China (now Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) and Lebanon\textsuperscript{153} and the former Yugoslavia.

In reality, this new multicultural Australian society involved contradictions between open and closed attitudes. McMaster (2002: 279) notes the paradox of Australia: a multicultural nation formed by immigrant societal identifications with a legacy of racial exclusion. Anglo-Celtic Australians were asked to be more tolerant and adopt multicultural attitudes, while immigrant communities had to adopt “Australian values” (Viviani 1996: 145).

There were cooperation pressures from the webs of interdependence binding established Anglo-Celtic Australians with diverse outsiders. Gradually, concerns about population size and asylum seekers became the means for political leaders to address and incite fears of racial conflict, multiculturalism and community division (Jacobs 2015: 806; Devetak 2004: 103-104; Viviani 1996: 5; Burke 2008). The shift became visible in the mid-2000s, when Prime Minister John Howard remarked that “the dominant consideration must be the integration of people into the Australian family” (24.01.2007). His government indorsed a “retreat from multiculturalism” (Poynting and Mason 2008; Fozdar and Spittles 2009). Degrees of openness towards a multi-cultural Australia shifted towards a more closed consensus centred on a mono-cultural Australian society.

\textsuperscript{153} By the 1980s, “the Lebanese population in metropolitan Sydney has become one of the largest non-British immigrant groups”, this included 10,000 refugees from the Lebanese Civil War between 1975-1977 (Burnley 1982: 102-103).
Commodification & Established Outsider Relations

The migration language of Howard and Rudd represented established bourgeois (often white Australian) groupings with a high power ratio in Australian society. On the one hand, Australian leaders characterised the beliefs of a more globalised techno-economic ultra rich bourgeois established groups. On the other hand, their language signified more localised politico-economic convict-settler, and recently integrated immigrant settler established groups.

Like British leaders, Australian leaders commodified societal relations through relative openness to transnational movements of financial capital and people. This belief was distilled in Howard’s remark that Australia should “attract and retain our share of the best and brightest” (07.03.2007). The following accounts reveal the desire for people movement linked to the movement of financial capital:

“And I want to say there’s rarely been a time in the history of Australia when the prestige and the respect and the reputation that this country enjoys around the world has been higher. Our economic strength, our commitment to sound values in international relations, our determination to stand with other countries to liberate oppressed people.”

Take all of things together, Australia is very warmly regarded around the world at the present time. And one of the reasons, one of the main reasons why Australia is now so warmly regarded is that we made a decision as a nation some 50 years ago or more to open up our country to people from different parts of the world, to extend a hand of welcome to people from all around the world. And of all of the people that have come over that 50 to 60 year period to Australia, none has made a bigger contribution numerically and in other ways than have the Italians in Australia. I want to thank you all for that.” (01.06.2003)

154 This seems to be veiled reference to Australia’s involvement in the Iraq War that year.
“globalisation of course inevitably carries with it the free movement of people of talent and ability. And we now have an Australian diaspora of over a million, which for a nation of 20 million, is a very high percentage......But can I say that having a diaspora, given the history and the disposition of this country for its young as well as its not so young to go abroad to get experience and sometimes to make their fortune, you're always going to have a diaspora and I think that is a good thing......And I think we have to teach our young and our talented to be adaptable, not to be parochial and I think we've been very successful at it. So I would make a very, very strong plea in any discussion about the human capital aspect of globalisation for us all to embrace the notion of the mobility of talent around the world, it's part of globalisation and Australia can be both a contributor to and a beneficiary of that process.” (27.03.2006)

“since the war we have been a country which has encouraged people to come here from right across the world, including students, and it may be, to go back to the basis of your question, that having come here, picked up your qualification, the best thing that you decide to do and it may be in the interest of your country to spend a couple of years back home and then apply afresh to come here. In terms of the skills that are relevant to Australia, that will always be made independently by people looking at where our economy needs people for the next 5, 10, 15, 20 years and that skills profile changes from year to year.” (08.02.2010)

The accounts above demonstrated how established groups in Australian society perceived the value of financial capital bound to migration. These accounts expressed a shallow open consciousness of Australia's place in international
society. Openness to transnational movement was linked to gaining respect “around the world” over five to six decades, expressing nominal commitment to the humanist-egalitarian normative code (01.06.2003). Openness of markets equated to openness towards people. There was an appreciation of the benefits and contributions of the reciprocal free movement as people from Australia ventured to other areas of the world (27.03.2006). However, for inbound migrants there was the criterion “of talent”. Meritocratic criteria defined by a bourgeois establishment made openness to transnational movement conditional on the degree of talent held by particular individuals. Interpretations of the talent shifted according to the skills required by the economy (08.02.2010). Confidence in transnational movement was bound to established group confidence in economic growth and competiveness, raising the possibility that any perceived decline in the latter could affect attitudes towards the former.

Australian leaders commodified people movement into objects that not only should be organisable and controllable, but also at its extreme, treated as expendable. The commodification of people movement supported widening societal power differentials. In the language of Australian leaders, asylum seekers became tradable commodities in the form of a “refugee swap” with the US (18.04.2007). Towards the end of this phase under Rudd from 2008 to 2010, there is a shift towards more transient interpretations of transnational movement (08.02.2010). While in previous phases of Australian society, there was the assumption that outsiders could integrate and make their ‘home’ in Australia. This changed to the expectation that migrants should return to their ‘original home’, with reduced expectations of adaptation and settlement. Transnational outsiders ‘lost’ part of their value as commodities.

Howard and Rudd both portrayed immigrants along an open-ended spectrum that ranged from harmless to harmful, relative to the rest of Australia. Outsiders were defined by their economic value and relatively weaker power ratio in Australian society. Australia’s leaders ambiguously depicted transnational outsiders as not only harmless students, skilled migrants and refugees, but also as unauthorised
boat arrivals, illegal migrants and illegal asylum seekers. The addition of prefixes such as ‘genuine’ or ‘illegal’ presupposed their legitimacy and/or illegitimacy.

In the following accounts, Howard and Rudd articulated a sharp swing towards interpretations of harmful transnational outsiders, in particular the unexpected people movements of asylum seekers by boat. Depictions of these boat people outsiders were infused with broader societal insecurities.

“We are still a very welcoming, friendly country. We have a strong immigration program and we’ll continue that. **We’ll continue** to have a **humanitarian refugee program**. We certainly want to be quite clear though that **people** who are a **potential danger** to this country are kept out and that’s absolute and I think all Australians want that to occur. They don’t want to muck around on something like this, **anybody who is a potential danger should be kept out**. But equally people who want to make a contribution to Australia, wherever they come from, providing they fit the migration criteria they remain very welcome. We’re still a country that **needs immigrants**. And in all of these things, the most important thing to do is to keep a sense of balance and proportion. We have to be more vigilant, but we can't stop living our free life. We have to **keep out people** who are a **potential danger**, but we want to remain **open to people** who will make good citizens and that 99.9 per cent of people and welcome them.” (22.11.2002)

“Well where there has been abuse, that **abuse should be punished**, but you don’t close down the whole system because some individuals might abuse it, anymore than you, you know, change an education system because a few people might abuse it, or you walk away from the public hospital system. I mean we’ve got to have a **sense of proportion** in
these debates. Now we have a **shortage of skilled workers** in this country because the boom in the **economy** has run ahead of the number of skilled workers that are available. Now we are taking certain steps to alter that, but in the meantime there are gaps and we need to fill those gaps if we are to **maintain our productivity** and we fill those gaps by bringing in **skilled migrants from overseas**, and we do that **without discrimination**. But it does happen, that by far the largest source country for **skilled migrants**, and that's not surprising, is the **United Kingdom** because the language and the culture and the way of life and everything is **still so similar to ours** that it's easier to get skilled migrants with the right set of skills from that country. But we very happily take them from India and China because we do run a **non-discriminatory policy**, and the point needs to be made that if anybody is to be involved in a responsible debate about this issue, they should not misrepresent to the Australian community the sources from which our skilled migrants come.” (14.09.2006)

“The **freer movement** of goods, services, **people** and capital across borders has brought many great benefits. It has generated high rates of global growth. It has enhanced the prospects, in particular, of developing countries which have opened themselves to the international economy. The economic globalisation of recent decades has also brought more people around the world out of poverty more quickly than any other time in history. The challenges of economic globalisation, however, also need to be faced up to and their strategic consequences need to be addressed. The **illegal**
movement of people, drugs, weapons and capital across borders is accelerating.” (12.08.2008)

Each of these accounts revealed an understanding of transnational movement that sharply oscillated between harmless and harmful conceptions. In account 22.11.2002, Howard expressed an openness to migrant outsiders such as refugees and people who can contribute to Australian society becoming “good citizens” in the process. This contrasted against the need to exclude “anybody who is a potential danger”. In account 14.09.2006, Howard noted a minority of individuals abusing the immigration system along with a form of detached understanding of the kinds of ‘skilled’ movement necessary for economic growth and competiveness, with a preference for people from the United Kingdom with similar language and culture. However, this preference for certain skilled outsiders narrowly classified transnational movement according to strictly planned economistic criteria. Uncontrolled, unplanned movement was interpreted as harmful, for example in account 12.08.2008, where Rudd noted the acceleration of “illegal movement” across borders, and suggested it brought wider societal harms such as the consumption of illicit drugs and violence through the movement of weapons.

Tensions over Normative Codes in the Language of Howard and Rudd

Howard and Rudd idealised both cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian and decosmopolitanised collective-nationalist normative codes. The power struggles of these codes polarised Australian society, through ambiguous representations of transnational movement. Howard perceived the tensions as a reductive either/or judgement, where attachments to collective-nationalist code eclipsed the humanist-egalitarian code. Mentions of the latter code were self-referential detailing past openness and humaneness to refugees, while avoiding and dismissing present questions that challenged the detention and border practices and policies justified by the former code. Rudd attempted to balance to both codes, yet still swayed to the collective-nationalist code. In similar ways to British leaders, propagations of

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155 Rudd’s reference to the movement of weapons is particularly resonant because Australia has very strict laws on gun ownership.
humanist-egalitarian attachments did not moderate the greater circulations of collective nationalist attachments.


In proclaiming such commitment, Howard in particular distorted relations with international institutions, particularly the United Nations (UN). He rejected the conclusions of successive UN reports¹⁵⁶ in 2002 that criticised the continued detention of asylum seekers pursued by his party-government establishment. Howard’s rejection of both reports undermined these same globalised institutions. In the following accounts both Howard and Rudd verbalised superficial attachments to the humanist-egalitarian code:

“There is nothing we are doing that is in conflict with our obligations under international conventions. We in fact in the action we’ve taken to deter illegal immigration to Australia, the action we have taken has been humanitarian and consistent with our obligations and the men and women of the Australian Naval Forces in particular that have been involved in those actions have often put their own lives at risk in order to save the lives of many of the people who have sought to come to Australia. It is not an easy issue and it’s fairly simplistic to mouth an emotional criticism of what we are doing. I do ask those who criticise it, and I think the questioner is fairly critical of what my Government is doing, I

¹⁵⁶ One authored by former Indian Supreme Chief Justice, Rajendra Bhandari, working under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the other authored by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNHROHC 2002; UNESC 2002).
do ask them to bear in mind that every time an illegal arrival comes to any country which has a humanitarian off-shore refugee programme, then a place that might otherwise have been available to somebody who might be judged by international organisations as being more deserving of that place is lost.” (02.07.2002)

“It's called an orderly migration program and when you're dealing with questions of asylum seekers, having an orderly process there which deals with humanitarian considerations, and our obligations under the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. If you extend it out, it's having effective arrangements with so-called transit countries, like Malaysia and Indonesia. Effective also engagement with sources countries, in this case Iraq, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. You see, if you are dealing with this effectively, it is the entire, shall I say, spectrum form source country, transit country, people on the high seas, as well as then, proper processing arrangements and dealing with asylum seekers if they had established to have that status. And if they're not, they are illegal immigrants seeking to come here for economic reasons and they are sent back home. So you ask what success is, it's having effective measures at each stage along the way.” (22.10.2009a)

The accounts above argued that Australia fulfilled its “international obligations” endeavouring to satisfy attachments to the humanist-egalitarian code. In the 02.07.2002 account, Howard dismissed “emotional criticism” of his government. He stated that Australia acted in accordance with international obligations, which ensured places to ‘deserving refugees’. Obligations to “more deserving” refugees were being undermined by “illegal arrivals”. In account 22.10.2009, Rudd articulated this same premise that Australia maintained an “orderly process” to
manage asylum seekers in line with UNHCR obligations, but “illegal immigrants” moving for “economic reasons” should be deported.

Howard and Rudd’s superficial attachments to the humanist-egalitarian oscillated more towards the collective-nationalist code. The infamous phrase articulated by Howard of “we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come” (28.10.2001) encapsulated this shift. The remark was repeated in various shades throughout 2001 (06.09.2001; 02.11.2001; 05.11.2001; 06.11.2001). The phrase spoke of strong controls over the movement of people that harnessed the collective-nationalist normative code (see O’Doherty and Augoustinos. 2008: 577). It politicised the issue of border protection and facilitated the re-election of the Coalition in the federal election of 2001 (Marr and Wilkinson 2004). What is less often noted in references to the phrase “we will decide” is the sentence that preceded it, which showed the swing from humanist-egalitarian attachments: “we are a generous open hearted people taking more refugees on a per capita basis than any nation except Canada, we have a proud record of welcoming people from 140 different nations”.

The “we will decide” phrase was integrated into broader narratives of national insecurities (see Burke 2008), which contextualised conflicting perceptions over the we-identifications in Australian society. Depictions of transnational outsiders became an objectified means for short-term political dominance in Australia’s three year electoral cycle. The language of Howard and Rudd continued to oscillate between attachments to both collective-nationalist and humanist-egalitarian normative codes as seen in the following accounts.

“We’re a lot more open and less arbitrary than other countries and it’s one of the reasons why many people in this country get angry when the critics of the Government’s policy talk about how harsh and inhumane we are. I was constantly...

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157 This early articulation said “we are also going to assert the right as every country has the right to assert and that is to decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come.” (06.09.2001)
impressed by the number of people who expressed surprise to me when I was in Europe about how large our migration programme was for a country of our size. I mean we continue to take a lot of legal migrants, we continue to have a 12,000 person a year refugee programme. So people can’t point the finger at us and say we’re insensitive to letting new people into this country. But we insist on the right to require people to come here legally and that is what we’re upholding.” (19.07.2002)

“It's my experience in Government is that everybody has a special case in that you quote the example of somebody with particular skills, there may be somebody else who's come here illegally who's formed a liaison with people in the community or an individual - they come to the Government and say, well I've got a special case on emotional grounds and there's no end to it. You have to have a situation where we say to the world, this country will have a substantial migrant intake. This country will have a generous refugee programme, but this country will not allow people to come to Australia illegally and once you start breaking that policy down you will throw our immigration policy into chaos and you will undermine the integrity of a policy that has worked enormously to the benefit of Australia over a very long period of time.” (20.04.2004)

“Humanity consists in ensuring that all of our processes in Australia, on Christmas Island, and in the Indonesian archipelago and Malaysia and elsewhere are consistent with UNHCR processes. That’s why we have our approach. The previous government chose to flout that, and brought in instead the Pacific Solution. They had kids behind razor wire, they had a range of different interventions which were
designed for a **domestic political audience**, not in dealing in a manner which got the balance right between **tough** and **hardline on people smugglers** on the one hand and being balanced and **humane** and **fair** in dealing with **asylum seekers** on the other.” (22.10.2009a)

Howard and Rudd on the one hand idealised humanist-egalitarian attachments to a humane Australian society. On the other hand, they idealised collective-nationalist attachments in reaction against criticisms of harshness and inhumanity and emphasised the ‘right’ for controllable legal migration. In account 19.07.2002, Howard noted the anger felt by members of the established groups towards the “critics” of his migration programme and tried to counter these critiques through mentioning Australia’s refugee programme. Account 20.04.2004 cultivated an ignorance of the circumstances for illegal movement. Howard rejected emotive appeals towards transnational outsiders and gave idealised humanist-egalitarian references to Australia’s “generous refugee programme” and “substantial migrant intake”. Howard expressed a pernicious forecast of societal “chaos” should the government’s policy of rejecting ‘illegal’ immigrants be reversed.

In accounts 19.07.2002 and 20.04.2004, Howard verbalised a one way mirror of idealisations directed towards his party-government establishment. He delegitimised beliefs that did not conform to his attachments to the collective-nationalist code and questioned the humaneness of his government. Strong sensitivities to criticism corresponded with highly involved modes of thinking, where criticism was understood as a personal insult to himself and his party-government establishment.

Account 22.10.2009 shows how Rudd similarly made appeals to the same domestic political audience in order to criticise his opponents. These target audiences formed part of more insecure sections of the established groups more susceptible to appeals that emphasised collective-nationalist rejections of deviants such as people smugglers. To distance himself from Howard, Rudd still sought the support of more secure sections of the established who held greater humanist-egalitarian
attachments, uncomfortable with “kids behind razor wire” and subverting “UNHCR processes”. Still, from 2001 to 2010, the balance between ‘hardline and humane’ sections of the established groups twisted in favour of the former.

‘Lawless’ Borders and Border Protection

Howard and Rudd circulated reductive modes of thinking that fortified Australian society, through collective-nationalist attachments to border protection. The repetition of border protection language disseminated the notion of a ‘vulnerable’ and ‘lawless’ maritime frontier in the Southern Ocean requiring protection.

Howard and Rudd propagated ignorance of international societal regulations such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), such as Article 98, on the duty to rescue persons in distress (UN 1982). In doing so, they twisted public attention towards the domestic laws of Australia’s party-government establishment led by themselves and disregarded wider international laws. They maintained the superiority of Australian regulations over broader cosmopolitan regulations. Any perceived reduction of border protection measures induced a sense of alarm in more insecure members of the established, overtime these feelings became habituated in large sections of Australian society. This was particularly true under Rudd, who was repeatedly pushed by the media about the supposed failure of his immigration policy (25.02.2010; 25.03.2010).

Rudd was constrained by the mythologisation of Howard’s claim to have ‘stopped the boats’. In the year 2009 alone, there were 64 occasions where the phrase “border protection” was mentioned, either as questions to Rudd from the media, or in remarks by Rudd himself. This was a change from no references in 2008, and only 8 in 2010. For Howard, border protection was mentioned on 21 occasions in 2001, 13 occasions in 2002, none in 2003, 9 times in 2004, 2 occasions in 2005, 10 occasions in 2006 and once in 2007. Howard and Rudd consistently appealed to collective-nationalist attachments through references of border protection, as shown in the following accounts.
“we are in the process of maintaining the **integrity of a border protection system** and **people are trying to break it**, there are people in Australia who are political activists as well as lawyers and they’re trying to break it. And now we’re **not going to have it broken**. We’ll defend it in a **humane compassionate** fashion but people should understand that we do not intend to alter our policy.” (19.07.2002)

“we had a difficult **problem** to deal with, and we have tried to strike a balance between **sensitivity** and **the national interest** and the national interest is **certainly served** by this country continuing to have a **firm mandatory detention policy**. And whatever people may say about Nauru, we would never have stopped **the flood of boats coming to this country** if we had not amongst other things had **offshore processing**. Offshore processing, along with **turning the boats back** to the north of Australia, mandatory detention and the excision of islands from the migration zone, all of those things taken together **stopped the large number of boats coming** to this country and effectively provided that **protection for our borders**. So I continue to very strongly defend the offshore processing of unauthorised arrivals to Australia.” (20.06.2005)

“**My job....is to act in the national interest** and you’re going to have people who attack government decisions when it relates to border protection from the far Right, who presumably are arguing that we should return children to behind razor wire and people from the far Left who presumably argue that we shouldn’t have an orderly migration program at all, or no border protection regime at all. Our job is to conduct a tough, responsible, fair policy. **Hardline on people smugglers, humane on asylum**
Each the accounts above expressed attachments to the collective-nationalist code centred on the protection of Australia’s borders. In 19.07.2002 account, Howard attacked lawyers and political activists who in his eyes sought to break his border protection system. The 20.06.2005 account reaffirmed that mandatory detention fulfilled the “national interest” of Australian society as a whole. He and his policies defended Australia by stopping “the flood of boats” and secured the border.

In the 05.11.2009 account, Rudd depicted a precarious balance that is “hardline on people smugglers, humane on asylum seekers”, and emphasised fears about people smugglers subverting Australian society. Collective-nationalist commitments to border protection militarised the maritime space surrounding the Australian mainland. This spurred the pursuit of measures short of direct physical violence against boat people outsiders. Howard also rejected the creation of a demilitarised coastguard institution, by citing the need to avoid the backing of the Maritime Services Union and the dilution of military naval capabilities. This move further centralised party-government executive control over the maritime spaces beyond the Australian mainland (24.10.2001; 07.07.2003).

Transnational People Risks in the Language of Howard & Rudd

Howard and Rudd became more reliant on insecure sections of established groups to maintain their place in the balance of societal power in Australian society. Transnational outsiders became symbolic risks to Australian society, which illustrates the interdependencies of localised power struggles and globalised people movements.

Insecure sections of established groups were relative outsiders that were uncomfortable with changes in the socio-cultural fabrics of Australian society and more sensitive to any perceived encroachment by newcomer transnational outsiders. Insecure sections of established groups were more attracted to highly
strict forms of societal regulation, in order to ‘regain control over their lives’, and they were more prone to rejecting transnational outsiders that threatened their societal dominance.

Depictions of border protection propagated fantasies about spatial isolation and totalised safety from threats beyond Australian society. These fantasies fed into the desire for protectors willing to undertake ‘tough’ practices to safeguard Australian society, by disseminating more localised societal vulnerabilities. Writing in the mid-1990s Viviani (1996: 11) noted that the sensitivity of Australian politicians and bureaucrats to boat arrivals is “founded on fears about adverse public opinion”. The political survival of Australian leaders and those of their party-government establishment was conflated with the survival of Australian society as a whole.

Howard and Rudd’s party-government survival was bound to their perceived abilities to regulate people movement into Australia. Their personalised insecurities and those of their party-government establishment suffused into depictions of transnational outsiders, particularly people categorised as asylum seekers and refugees.

Howard’s language juxtaposed the projection of masculinised toughness by him and his Coalition government with the perceived weakness of the Opposition Labor Party on border protection issues (08.06.2002; 14.07.2004; 17.08.2004). He expressed this interpretation directly: “We won the last election\textsuperscript{158} because the Australian people felt we could run the economy better, we could lead the nation better at a time of international crisis and also that we were tough on border protection and the Labor Party was weak on border protection - that’s why we won the last election. It had precious little to do with children overboard\textsuperscript{159}” (17.08.2004).

\textsuperscript{158} The Australian Federal election of 2001
\textsuperscript{159} In late 2001, Howard and his ministers alleged that asylum seekers were deliberately throwing their children into the sea to elicit rescue. The Senate Report (Commonwealth of Australia 2002: xxi), investigating the ‘Children Overboard’ affair noted, “The peculiar sensitivity associated with the claim that children had been thrown overboard was that it was made at the beginning of and sustained throughout a Federal
Rudd also used references to ‘border protection’ to bolster his place in the balance of societal power noting how “neither Mr Turnbull nor the Liberals, despite criticising Government border protection policy, actually have a policy on border protection” (03.11.2009). He too appealed to and became reliant on insecure sections of the established, through masculinised appeals to toughness, even as he criticised his political opponents for their tendency to “whack the asylum seekers card” (22.10.2009; 14.10.2009), engaging in a “race to the bottom” (01.06.2010) and using a fear campaign (22.10.2009; 02.06.2010).

In the language of Rudd and Howard, migration became a risk to established groups in Australian society. Rudd provided the clearest articulation of transnational outsiders as risks. He noted the “risk of a large-scale influx of refugees from the region” (26.03.2008). Migrants were burdened with Australia’s insecurities about regional and global relations. In the space of three sentences, Rudd mentioned the “global rise of illegal immigration” from the Middle East, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, the rise of China and India, plus North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambitions, which resulted in “increased level of risk within our own region” (24.04.2009).

Howard implicitly used risk orientations to frame the movement of transnational outsiders. This form of framing is evident in remarks such as “we have to keep out people who are a potential danger” (22.11.2002). Howard noted his “heightened obligation to make absolutely certain who is coming to this country” (08.11.2001). He verbalised harmful images of transnational outsiders that reinforced the protective authority of his government and legitimised his interpretations through reference to the authority of Blair and Britain (08.11.2001). While Howard

II election campaign, during which ‘border protection’ and national security were key issues. That asylum seekers trying to enter Australia by boat were the kinds of people who would throw their children overboard was used by the Government to demonise them as part of the argument for the need for a ‘tough’ stand against external threats and in favour of ‘putting Australia’s interests first’.

It also singled out “deliberate deception motivated by political expedience” as factor in the children overboard claim.

160 Howard is referring to the following statement by Blair: “Here in this country and in other nations round the world, laws will be changed, not to deny basic liberties but to prevent their abuse and protect the most basic liberty of all: freedom from terror.”
rejected the direct link between “boat loads of people” and terrorism. He also cited Blair’s “new rules to ensure asylum is not a front for terrorist entry” (02.10.2001), and articulated more catastrophic risk narratives that people seeking to enter Australia via boat could be terrorists in the future.

Fortified Orientations Expressed by Howard & Rudd

The following section explains narrow societal orientations that fortified Australian society. Depictions of transnational outsiders swung between harmless skilled movement and more harmful catastrophic boat movement. More harmful risk orientations towards boat outsiders dominated societal orientations. The criminalisation boat outsiders was interdependent with more masculinised societal orientations that legitimised harsher regulations. There was also the objectification of boat people outsiders into numerical symbols that justified their exclusion. Fears about societal cohesion and people smugglers were reinforced by aquatic metaphors that mythologised both boat people outsiders and the capacities of Australian leaders themselves. Howard and Rudd circulated greater socio-psychological fortifications through collective-nationalist commitments to mandatory detention that distorted Australia’s regionalised relations.

Safe Skilled Migrants & Harmful Refugees

Understandings of transnational outsiders oscillated between harmless safe and more harmful catastrophic risk orientations. Howard and Rudd expressed characterisations of more acceptable skilled movement, and less acceptable refugee and asylum seeker movement.

The prefix ‘skilled’ was highly ambiguous. It reinforced the authority of Australian leaders to define what those skills were which determined the limits of inclusion. Skilled migration was relatively harmless because it presumed the movement of

New extradition laws will be introduced; new rules to ensure asylum is not a front for terrorist entry. This country is proud of its tradition in giving asylum to those fleeing tyranny. We will always do so. But we have a duty to protect the system from abuse.” (02.10.2001)
people of relatively equal societal status and/or more culturally compatible with Anglo-Celtic sections of established groups. Skilled movement was more accepted because of techno-economic *bourgeois* identifications that prioritised movement that appeared ordered, controllable and adjustable according to the demands of ‘the economy’. Openness towards skilled migration satisfied attachments to the humanist-egalitarian code. Howard articulated the belief that Australia is an open, tolerant society that has moved beyond a racialized past and adhered to non-discriminatory identifications (14.09.2006). The preference of ‘skills’ does not have an immediate racial undertone. The prefix reinforced the changing tone of power relations from racialized criteria to commodified meritocratic criteria, which defined the abilities of transnational outsiders to integrate into Australian society.

The preference for skilled movement obscured how Australian society has been dependant on unskilled movement. This also blocked understandings of how the ‘unskilled’ people can become skilled people, via the assistance of government and civil society, through sponsored vocational and tertiary education. For example in the 1950’s “Australia was actively recruiting millions of migrants from Europe, many of them unskilled workers and from countries previously regarded as beyond the pale in cultural and racial terms” (Tavan 2004: 114). Economic preferences towards skilled movement were linked to population pressures and demographic changes within Australian society such as an aging population. Particularly under Rudd, there was the desire for a “big Australia” where migration serves “economic circumstances” and can help maintain a young population (27.03.2008; 30.03.2008). Young mobile skilled migrants were more desirable because they could subsidise older more affluent immobile politico-economic *citoyen* settler sections of established groups.

Understandings of skilled movement displayed attachments to the collective-nationalist code and politico-economic *citoyen* settler identifications. The following accounts showed the interplay of perceived population pressures from techno-economic *citoyen* settler, and techno-economic *bourgeois* identifications.
“But when people talk about population policy they are really talking most of all I think about the size of the migrant intake. Now we have I believe restored the integrity of the immigration program. We have dramatically altered the balance, we have a lot more skilled migrants now and they are making a big contribution and I would see that process going on, and you will be aware that over the last several years we have modestly increased the intake each year and I’m certainly fully in support of that.” (01.08.2001)

“It's very interesting that the surveys that have been carried out over the past few years about attitudes to migration, they actually show that there’s more support for reasonable levels of immigration to Australia now than there was five or ten years ago. I think one of the reasons for that is they believe the immigration program, although its larger than it was a few years ago, is under control, and that we are deciding who comes to this country. We’re deciding to have a greater emphasis on skilled migration. We want people who will make an immediate contribution and through this country enable all people to feel that the immigration program is now being run in a well and truly effective fashion.” (28.07.2006)

“On the question of the immigration program, what the Immigration Minister Chris Evans has quite rightly done is calibrate, or adjust the skilled intake to the current state of the economy. And so the overall number of skilled migrants will be brought down and those numbers have been announced, because that is the right and responsible thing to do when the economy is under stress and under pressure.” (10.06.2009)
Each of the accounts above articulated established preferences towards skilled movement. Both politico-economic *citoyen* settler and techno-economic *bourgeois* identifications sustained beliefs that transnational movement into Australia must remain under the strict control of established groups. In accounts 01.08.2001 and 28.07.2006, Howard expressed short-term preferences for people pre-existing skill sets that give an instantaneous contribution to Australian society. He discouraged any form of patience for people who had to build those skills in Australia, because to train them would be an added 'cost' to Australian society.

Openness towards 'skilled' movement swung towards the collective-nationalist code that emphasised stringent degrees of selectivity on permissible people movement into Australia (28.07.2006). Towards the end of this phase in 2009-2010, there was evidence of the globalised infusion of broader economic insecurities from events such as Global Financial Crisis, which prompted a reduction of skilled movement to 'protect Australian jobs' (10.06.2009).

Howard and Rudd circulated more insecure interpretations of transnational movement that appeared to be uncontrollable and were deemed more unacceptable. They channelled beliefs of the insecure politico-economic *citoyen* settler establishment. There were developing risk narratives that limited acceptance and justified the rejection of migrant outsiders, who did not fit within established interpretations of safe skilled movement.

In the language of Howard and Rudd, ambiguous accounts of refugee movement swung towards more harmful catastrophic risk orientations. More controllable camp refugees were prioritised over less controllable boat refugees, for example in expressions by Howard such as “superior refugee claims get first chance. Because there are millions of people living in pitiful conditions in refugee camps who don’t have the money to buy a passage on a boat to Australia” (04.09.2001). Assistance to

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161 Haddad (2008: 59-60) notes “refugees are an inevitable if unintended consequence of the nation-state system; they are the result of erecting boundaries, attempting to assign all individuals to a territory within such boundaries, and then failing to ensure universal representation and protection".
camp refugees, who waited patiently\(^\text{162}\), indicated shallow attachments to the humanist-egalitarian code. The needs of camp refugees were more ‘authentic’ than boat refugees, who were stigmatised as ‘queue jumpers’.

The following accounts that detailed the distinctions between boat and camp refugees are from Howard’s speeches. Rudd shared the same sentiments: his response to a comment about queue jumping was to say “I get narky about it as well”\(^\text{163}\) (26.03.2010b; 02.07.2002; 08.07.2003).

“No I don’t for a moment play down the enormous problem the world has with refugees. There are over 20 million people who can be broadly classified as refugees around the world at the present time. And many of them are living in pitiful conditions in refugee camps and many of those people have a greater entitlement to come to this country as part of our refugee program than many of the people who are preyed upon by people smugglers and placed on boats to come to Australia. And that is one of the arguments that we have constantly advanced that the only way in which we can fairly deal with this problem is to have everybody assessed according to the same rules and in the same fashion so that the most necessitous cases are put at the front of the queue and the most necessitous cases are given the most immediate and the most compassionate response.” (06.09.2001)

\(^{162}\) Party-government establishments demand that societal welfare recipients show similar qualities, which confirms their lower status.

\(^{163}\) Responding to the following comment by David Koch, presenter of the morning television program Sunrise: "Alright, I don’t think anyone would argue that we shouldn’t be taking asylum seeker be taking asylum seekers, refugees - that’s our responsibility as a global citizen. But it is people jumping the queue, they’re taking the place of others who are doing it the right way. I reckon that’s what the average Australian gets narky about."
“No, quite the reverse because the really pathetic cases are people who are waiting years and years in refugees camps and for every person that gets to a refugee friendly country such as Australia illegally and takes a place away that might otherwise be available to a person in a refugee camp. That person in the refugee camp suffers. You have to remember that there’s only a limited capacity on the part of Australia to take refugees and if illegal arrivals bump places away from potentially legal arrivals, it is those potentially legal arrivals in refugee camps who suffer.” (20.04.2004)

“there is a fundamental principle involved here which has not been altered and that is that people who come here in an unauthorised fashion must expect a period of detention, and they must understand that they are coming ahead of people who seek to come here in an authorised way, and there are many people in refugee camps, children included, who, if others had not taken their places in the positions available for refugees coming to Australia, would have been here earlier. So that kind of argument can be advanced in relation to people whose opportunity has been denied” (20.06.2005)

In the accounts above, Howard verbalised associations towards camp refugees and disassociations from boat refugees. Humanist-egalitarian compassion was limited to camp refugees that “have a greater entitlement to come to this country” because of their purported longer experience of suffering, and were subject to careful selection as part of “our refugee program” (06.09.2001). Camp refugees were more desirable because of their demonstration of greater patience. In account (20.04.2004), acceptance of patient camp refugees “waiting for years” was underpinned by the notion of scarce societal resources, the “limited capacity” of

164 The interviewer asks “Does that reflect a lack of humanity though that you can’t..?” (20.04.2004)
Australian society that can only accommodate a limited number of refugees. The collective-nationalist notion of scarce societal resources justified the differentiation between legal authorised camp refugees, and illegal unauthorised boat refugees. The boat refugees were stigmatised as a passive victims of people smugglers (06.09.2001). They were also more active belligerents who had pushed ahead of the queue and committed an infringement that justified detention (20.06.2005).

Criminalisation Processes: The 3 D’s of Defend, Deter, Detain

The language of Howard and Rudd criminalised the movement of asylum seekers and refugee outsiders by boat into Australia. This narrowed circles of association towards legalised safe movement and widened circles of disassociation between established groups and boat people outsiders. They reinvigorated the longstanding three D’s of Australian societal regulation that criminalised boat outsiders: defend, deter and detain (McKiernan 1993).

Boat people outsiders justified sustained efforts to defend Australia by ‘stopping boats’ through martial force. The policy was to deter their movement through masculinised images of toughness, and to detain boat arrivals in offshore locations beyond the Australian mainland. Howard and Rudd legitimised their defence of Australia by imprisoning ‘lawbreakers’, and deterring those same outsiders through the threat and practice of incarceration.

Australian society maintains highly strict societal regulations and expectations for self-regulations. The habituated legacies of convict settlement have sensitised sections of Australian society to revulsions against harmful ‘illegal’ practices. These aversions are intensified in ongoing moments of alarm about boat asylum seekers, who are perceived to be people that do not abide by strict standards of self-discipline. The arrival of boat people outsiders into Australia via the ‘back door’ rather than the ‘front door’ of formal refugee camps perpetuated more coercive, stringent societal regulations. Jupp (2007: 43) notes that in 1990 boat arrivals of asylum seekers from Cambodia provoked the creation of the mandatory detention system first based in Port Hedland, a remote part of Western Australia. This system
would expand under Howard into the so-called ‘Pacific Solution’ that encompassed the offshore detention of boat people outsiders in places such as Narau, Manus Island in Papua New Guinea and Christmas Island.

Boat refugee outsiders were stigmatised as lawbreakers. The consistent repetition of the terms such as “illegal” as well as terms like “unauthorised boat arrivals”, orientated Australian leaders to think about more ingenious ways of prosecuting the deviance of boat people outsiders. In 2009, the phrase “illegal immigration” was mentioned 20 times by Rudd. During Howard’s Prime Ministership it was mentioned 10 times in 2001, 10 times in 2002, 2 times in 2003, 4 times in 2004 and 2005, none in 2006 and 4 times in 2007. The following accounts showed the persistent efforts by Howard and Rudd to criminalise boat people outsiders through the prefix “illegal”.

“There are other elements to national security. We’ve had quite a debate in this country over the last few months on the question of illegal immigration. I hold very strongly to the view that this country has an obligation as part of the international community to conduct a generous refugee program and we have done so to our credit now for some decades. We are one of only nine countries in the world that has a resettlement program and we take more refugees on a per capita basis than any country in the world accept Canada. But my friends we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come and we’ll decide that applying humane equitable principles and international refugee assessment. What is involved in this debate about asylum seekers is the proposition that some people have, namely if people can quite literally present themselves at Australia’s borders and demand entry no matter what the

\[165\] This includes 2 mentions of “illegal people movements”
"I don't want them [the children of asylum seekers] released in circumstances where it would undermine the effectiveness of the policy. I mean the thing that has got to be made constantly is that our policy has worked because the boats have stopped coming and we have stopped illegal immigration dead in its tracks. And, you know, to cut through all of this debate, all aspects of this issue of border protection, the one thing I say to your viewers is that our policy stopped illegal immigration to this country and I'm very proud of that. Now sure, we don't like having children in detention, and there's only a small number of children of boat people who are in custody, and in fact if their mothers would agree to the community arrangements that we want, my advice is that they wouldn't be in custody.” (24.08.2004)

“No we've had a very sober understanding of the global, let's call them push factors at work not just for Australia but countries right around the world in terms of the number of people, illegal people movements right around the world. Affecting countries in South East Asia, countries in Europe, now this is just the reality. Since then the Government has introduced hundreds of millions of dollars worth of new measures to work at country of origin, to work at our cop on the beat, the navy on the high seas and remember these vessels are being interdicted and they are being taken to Christmas Island for processing. And also a hardline system which says, if this is not a bona fide asylum seeker then they go back, go back to the country concerned." (01.07.2009)
In each of the accounts above, Howard and Rudd criminalised boat people outsiders using the stigmatising prefix of “illegal”. Howard implied that Australia was more secure through the rejection of asylum seekers (02.11.2001). The question of “illegal immigration” was escalated to an issue of national ‘security’. He declared that collective-nationalist claims were the only authority to define the “circumstances” for asylum seekers to enter Australia, and the application of “humane equitable principles” (02.11.2001). For Howard, boat people outsiders were catastrophic risks to Australian society that legitimised practices such as the continued detention of children, whose release was impermissible because it would weaken the effectiveness of his policy (24.08.2004). He drew satisfaction from his role in protecting Australian society from lawbreakers (24.08.2004). Rudd broadened the criminalisation of boat people outsiders to “illegal people movements” that affected countries in Southeast Asia and beyond (01.07.2009). He conjured up images of a lawless maritime frontier that demanded the reassertion of militarised naval vessels acting as constabularies to interdict harmful vessels towards Christmas Island (01.07.2009).

Images of Masculine Toughness by Howard & Rudd

Howard and Rudd expressed masculinised images to deter the movement of boat people outsiders, legitimising more coercive practices such as mandatory detention. Terms such as “tough” and “hardline” (17.08.2004; 18.04.2007; 13.10.2009; 22.10.2009a; 22.10.2009b), directed Australian society towards more brutalised understandings of boat people outsiders, who were understood through greater predatory connotations. This prompted articulations of collective-nationalist strength in a manner similar to the ways in which certain animal species physically inflated themselves to protect against predators.

Howard and Rudd amplified collective vulnerabilities and rejected counter efforts deemed to be ‘soft’. They embraced ‘harder’ practices to aimed to ‘deter’ potential ‘criminals’. The verbalisation of toughness appealed to insecure sections of the established. Sections that felt vulnerable to encroachments on limited sets of societal resources, and who were more susceptible to supporting measures that
reinforced commitments to the collective-nationalist code. The emphasis on strength was set against weakness, with strong resistance to any form of thought and practice that relaxed the stance of the government. For example, Howard remarked that “they do not want any weakening of mandatory detention, they do not want any weakening of our border protection policies” (17.06.2005). ‘They’ meant the sections of the established with greater attachments to hard measures and an aversion to soft measures, as shown in the following accounts.

“Now we are a humane country and we will always in relation to this issue, we will always act both legally and decently. We have sent a signal through what we did, in relation to the people on the Tampa, we have sent a signal that this country is no longer a country of easy destination or a soft touch for people smugglers. This will continue to be a difficult issue for our country but we have over the last several weeks by the actions that I have outlined we have presented to the world and to the people smugglers a clear message that we are not going to be a soft touch, we are going to continue to defend as every country has the right to defend the integrity of its borders, and we are also going to assert the right as every country has the right to assert and that is to decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come.” (06.09.2001)

“The issue that concerned rightly the Australian public three years ago was that this country was seen as a soft touch for people smugglers and illegal immigrants and we set about adopting a policy that stopped that and that policy was effectively opposed by the Labor Party, is still opposed by the Labor Party because of its muddled approach which basically invites people who want to come to this country illegally to be processed on the mainland. See, the great deterrent in our policy was when we took the stand three years ago to say,
you're not going to come to this country and be **processed on the mainland** and it was that policy and the boarder protection policies that we have enforced that **have turned the boats around.**” (14.07.2004)

“Our job is to conduct a **tough**, responsible, fair policy. **Hardline** on people smugglers, **humane** on asylum seekers. That’s what we’ve been doing since we formed government. That was the policy we took to the previous election. We’ve implemented each of the elements of that policy since the election. We’ve done so in relation to each of the challenges of border protection which have arisen over the last couple of years and we’ll continue to do so into the future.” (05.11.2009)

In each of the accounts above, Howard and Rudd articulated masculinised depictions of relations with boat people outsiders. The figure of the people smuggler fulfilled the role of a ‘predator’, which enabled Australian leaders to position themselves as the ‘tough’ defenders of Australian society. Howard expressed the notion of a vulnerable Australia that, through their traditional open values, was a “soft touch” to predatory people smugglers and demanded steps to “defend Australia” (06.09.2001; 14.07.2004). These steps included the processing of asylum claims offshore, away from a defenceless Australian mainland that deterred illegalised movement (14.07.2004). For Rudd, asylum seekers were assumed to be passive, childlike victims, lead astray by people smugglers. This passivity prompted “hardline” preventative measures against the latter and “humane” measures for the former (14.10.2009a; 14.10.2009b).

**Alarming Numbers of Boat Arrivals**

Howard and Rudd objectified transnational people movements into numerical symbols, which depicted both overall movements of people into Australia, as well as boat people outsiders into Australia.
Attempts to provide greater context to the movement of boat people outsiders were extremely rare throughout this period of Australian society from 2001-2010. Late in this period, there was an attempt by Rudd to provide more detached context. He noted the “global and regional security conditions” (12.05.2010; 26.03.2010a; 26.03.2010b; 25.02.2010) and explained how boat arrivals were a relatively small number of people, when understood in terms of Australia’s annual migration intake. For Rudd, the “historical context” of boat arrivals was a relatively small number in the thousands, which was eclipsed by Australia’s “annual permanent migration intake” quoted in the hundreds of thousands as “185,000” (03.04.2010).

Boat people outsiders became a quantifiable ‘problem’ through numerical depictions as numbers of boat arrivals. For a relatively small society on a large continent, such as Australia, numbers of boat arrivals in the thousands provoked alarm in insecure sections of established groups. The objectification of boat people outsiders perpetuated double bind processes. Greater numbers of boat arrivals were failures for the party-government establishment in power. Lesser numbers of boat arrivals were successes that legitimised the coercive practices of Australian leaders. Pressures exerted by political opponents, and the media contributed to an expanding vortex, where numbers of boat arrivals were bound to the imperative of party-political survival.

Objectified boat people outsiders became a dichotomous black and white ‘problem’ demanding forms of ‘solutions’ with very little room for any nuance or long-term reflections. The use of specific figures as well as more ambiguous terms such as “great build up” (06.11.2001) and number of arrivals (16.04.2002; 08.07.2003), transformed boat people outsiders into objectified ‘problems’ demanding ‘solutions’.

“I ask my critics to say to me and to tell the Australian people, you dismantle what is called the Pacific Solution, what is the alternative. The alternative is that you will be sending a signal, I mean if after everything that has happened if we
reverse policy that will be seen as a magnet, in current economic circumstances, to great and increasing numbers of people to endeavour to come to this country. And that will present an enormous difficulty for Australia.” (08.11.2001)

“We’re endeavouring as far as possible and consistent with the maintenance of a strong policy and consistent with deterring people from resuming the illegal boat trade, we’re trying to get people, children out of detention. But this policy of deterring people from trying to come here illegally has been a spectacular success. We don’t have boats arriving in Australia now. If you cast your mind back three years ago, they were coming on almost a weekly basis. And we have sent a very strong signal to the world that that would not be tolerated, and that involved the Pacific Solution, it involved the tough measures that we took, it involved as an element mandatory detention”. (06.07.2004)

“I just say this - the period of the Howard government, nearly 250 boats arrived on our shores bringing about 15,000 or almost 15,000 asylum seekers. The two years that we've been in Government we've had 37 or 39 boats arrive with about 1700 or 1800 people. This has been a problem in the past, it’s a problem today - it’ll be a problem in the future. The key is to have a balanced policy, one which is both tough but humane. That's our approach and we'll stick to it.” (22.10.2009a)

In each of the accounts above, numbers of boat arrivals were an objectified ‘problem’ for the established groups in Australian society. Howard’s references to “increasing numbers of people” propagated the image of a vulnerable Australia that was easy prey to predatory economic movement (08.11.2001). The phrase “coming on a weekly basis” circulated a sense of urgency that necessitated more coercive
practices, which included mandatory detention in the form of the “Pacific Solution” (06.07.2004; 08.11.2001). Rudd echoed Howard’s call from account 22.11.2002 for constant vigilance and alertness towards boat arrivals. Numbers of boat arrivals became a timeless “problem” for Australian society in the past, present and future. Even if the numbers decreased, there was still the need for a “tough but humane” policy (22.10.2009a).

Intangible Fear Constellations in Howard & Rudd’s Language

Boat outsiders were stigmatised with the more intangible imprecise fears of established groups in Australian society, which widened circles of disassociation. The language of Howard and Rudd cultivated suspicious risk narratives that made ‘boat people’ into ‘problems’ suffused with fears about cohesion and the specific mythologised threat from people smugglers. These fears justified the exclusion of boat people outsiders.

Concerns about societal cohesion and the movement of boat people outsiders were linked to an idealisation of societal solidarity. Cohesion fears were a bundled set of insecurities about the integrative capacities of transnational outsiders. The language of Howard showed consistent idealisations of highly stringent forms of societal controls over the movement of people into Australian society. He verbalised fears about cohesion linked to the movement of boat outsiders who in his view were insufficiently able to integrate in accordance with the values of established groups. Boat people outsiders were connected with fears about violence (08.11.2001) and ghettoisation: the violent splitting of Australian society along ethnic and racial lines. He contributed to a suspicious risk narrative that “if you don’t have a policy of mandatory detention then the illegal arrivals will simply melt into the community” (02.07.2002). Cohesion fears were consistently bound to harmful depictions of boat outsiders in the following statements.

“we’ve been prepared to defend the integrity of our borders
and to insist what is self-evidently true and that is that
every nation has the right to determine who comes to this
country and who lives here and we have also maintained that great self of cohesion and fairness within our community which has been a hallmark of this country down through the years.” (12.10.2002)

“This country is very proud of its history, we're very proud of what we all understand to be the traditional Australia, we're also though very proud of the fact that since World War II in particular we have accepted into our midst millions of people from different parts of the world and above everything else they have overwhelmingly become wonderful Australians and have made a wonderful contribution to the development of our country and part of the social cohesion that we now have is to continue to preserve that great tolerance.” (02.02.2004)

Each of the accounts above expressed cohesion fears. Collective-nationalist attachments to border protection practices preserved societal cohesion and defended Australia to maintain the “fairness’ enjoyed by localised communities (12.10.2002). For Howard, community fairness was fragile. He appealed to insecure sections of established groups with pre-existing vulnerabilities, and directed their concerns onto depictions of 'harmful' boatpeople outsiders, even though Australian society has accepted “millions of people from different parts of the world” (02.02.2004). There are limited degrees of acceptance offered to the ‘current’ movement of boat people outsiders because of their threat to the integrity of national borders and the societal cohesion behind those boundaries.

Fears about people smugglers with the movement of boat outsiders were linked established group fears of contact. People smugglers were depicted as mythical folk devils in the form of predators, pied pipers, and ‘vermin’. Firstly, people smugglers were predators that justified the protective measures proposed by Australian leaders to secure a vulnerable Australian society. Secondly, they were manipulative pied piper figures that seduced boat outsiders to become lawbreakers. Finally, they
were “vermin” that brought sickness and death (14.10.2009). The following accounts articulate fears about contact through depictions of people smugglers.

“may I say we’ve had the absolutely contemptible contribution of the Leader of the Opposition in the wake of that appalling human tragedy where something like 350 lives appear to have been lost when a vessel sank in Indonesian waters, probably containing people wanting to come to Australia. It sank in Indonesian waters, yet Mr Beazley has tried to exploit that human tragedy to score a cheap political point. He implied that that happened because of a failure of policy on our part. I think that is contemptible. It’s alright to attack your opponent on legitimate grounds but to try and score a cheap political point out of an immense human tragedy such as that I regard as completely contemptible. If anybody is to be blamed for that appalling tragedy it’s the people smugglers, not the Government of Australia, not the Government of Indonesia but the people smugglers. And for the alternative Prime Minister of Australia to try and score a cheap political out of that is as I say absolutely contemptible.” (23.10.2001)

“an issue where you have to balance the natural desire of everybody to administer the policy in a flexible, humane way, but also I believe the overwhelming view of the Australian community that this country should not again become a target for people smugglers.” (31.05.2005)

“Let me just conclude by making some remarks about people smugglers themselves. People smugglers are engaged in the world’s most evil trade and they should all rot in jail because they represent the absolute scum of the earth. We see this lowest form of human life at work in what we saw
on the high seas yesterday. That’s why this Government maintains its **hard line**, tough, targeted approach to maintaining border protection for Australia. And that’s why we have dedicated more resources to **combat people smuggling** than any other Government in Australian history.”  
(17.04.2009)

Howard and Rudd mixed fears about people smugglers with depictions of boat outsiders. People smugglers were blamed as the perpetrators for the deaths of boat people outsiders at sea. Howard absolved himself and the policies of his party-government establishment from responsibilities for these deaths and attacked his political opposition for suggesting otherwise (23.10.2001). People smugglers preyed on not just on asylum seekers but also on vulnerable ‘soft’ Australian society. Howard reduced humanist-egalitarian compassion towards boat outsiders into polarised questions of devotion to his party-government establishment. The harmfulness of people smugglers whose actions weakened Australian society (31.05.2005), fed into denouncements of humanist-egalitarian attachments towards boat people outsiders. Those attachments gave way to attachments to the collective-nationalist code.

Rudd also stigmatised people smugglers as the “the absolute scum of the earth” in practice of “the world’s most evil trade” (17.04.2009). The phrase “most evil trade” echoes historical efforts to combat human slave trading. Depictions of boat people themselves intermingled with fears about the evil practice of people smuggling. Contact with people smugglers stigmatised boat people outsiders and justified their exclusion from Australian society. They were portrayed as pawns in a mythical struggle between the ‘good’ Australian party-government establishment defending Australia from ‘bad’ people smugglers.

Howard used aquatic metaphors to mythologise the movement of boat people, and the capabilities of himself and his party-government, in similar practices to British leaders. His language showed parallel Judeo-Christian influences from British society. For Australian society, aquatic metaphors resonate because of ongoing
spatial identifications as an ‘island continent’. Phrases such as “outflow” (09.11.2009), “flood” (20.06.2005; 16.06.2006) and “flood of boats” (20.06.2005), depicted the movement of boat people in a spiritualised fashion. Like Cameron, Howard also acted out the role of Noah for Australian society.

Howard steered societal attachments to position himself as a defender of Australian society. He mythologised the “Pacific Solution” to the problem of boat people outsiders. This was sustained by idealised attachments as ‘protectors’ fulfilling collective-nationalist code, while maintaining selective, distorted attachments to the humanist-egalitarian code through insistence on the humaneness of his treatment of boat people. Howard remarked that “the core of the [asylum seeker] policy was to stop the boats coming and that policy has been an outstanding success” (14.07.2004). He also credited his “Pacific Solution” as the antidote to the problem of boat arrivals, who must be prevented from reaching a vulnerable Australian “mainland” (14.07.2004). Howard blocked perceptions of any other alternative pathways that did not endorse or justify his efforts to protect Australia, through coercive practices such as mandatory detention.

The “children overboard” story with the overt use of the aquatic term “overboard” epitomised and legitimised the stigmatisation of boat people. The so called ‘children overboard affair’ involved the misleading allegation by Howard and his ministers that asylum seekers had thrown their children into the ocean to elicit rescue. This accusation stigmatised boat people and helped the Coalition win the 2001 Federal Election. Howard noted that “genuine refugees don’t throw their children overboard. And that kind of emotional blackmail” (08.10.2001). This account continues as follows.

“Quite frankly Alan I don’t want in this country people who are prepared, if those reports are true, to throw their own children overboard. And that kind of emotional blackmail

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166 See Marr and Wilkinson (2004), and the report of the Senate Committee that investigated the Children Overboard Affair (Commonwealth of Australia 2002).

167 Howard explained that “On the 9th of October I received an ONA report that read in part as follows: Asylum seekers wearing life-jackets jumped into the sea and children were thrown in with them. Such tactics have previously been used elsewhere, for example, by people smugglers and Iraqi asylum seekers on boats intercepted by the Italian Navy.” (08.11.2001)
is very distressing, it must be very distressing for the sailors on the vessel, I feel for them, many of them young men and women confronting this kind of situation is very difficult and I thank them very warmly for the job that they’re doing on behalf of Australia. But we cannot allow ourselves to be intimidated by this. It’s a difficult issue. As of now the boat is being denied entry into Australian territorial waters and it’s at the border of what’s called the contiguous zone and I think I shall have to content myself at this stage in saying that various options are being explored.” (08.10.2001)

The account above accused boat outsiders of trying to emotionally “blackmail” the established groups in Australian society. The allegation that boat people were endangering the lives of their children to provoke rescue, confirmed their stigmatisation as evil lawbreakers. The children overboard story was linked to notions of responsible parentship and the idealisation of family groups. Howard appealed to societal revulsions against people/parents who would recklessly endanger the lives of their children. He propagated a myth that boat people outsiders were ‘bad’ parents. This resonated among sections of the insecure established about the decline of ‘the family’ as a form of societal organisation.

Detention Centres & the Regionalisation of Fears

For Howard and Rudd, the mandatory detention of boat people outsiders fulfilled the collective-nationalist attachments to defend Australia and deter future boat people from reaching Australia. The practice propagated greater socio-psychological fortifications in Australian society.

Howard and Rudd sustained widening circles of disassociation between established groups and boat people outsiders. Mandatory detention directed public associations towards the immediate satisfaction of collective-nationalist attachments, and symbolised commitments to border protection. Planned and practiced mandatory detention measures protected Australian society from the
harmful catastrophic movement of boat people outsiders. This practice fulfilled the mythologised status of Australian leaders as societal ‘protectors’. Boat people outsiders were expected to internalise the fear of incarceration. In the following accounts, Howard and Rudd advocated the mandatory detention of boat outsiders.

“I understand that living in a detention centre in Woomera is not as comfortable an existence as living in the community in Australia, I accept that but it also has to be said, again, that these people have come to Australia illegally and if we don’t have a detention system, which was introduced by the Labor Party when in Government 10 years ago and still more or less supported by the Labor Party when it suits them, when they think that might be the weight of public opinion, then unless we have a detention system our immigration control processes are going to break down.” (08.03.2002)

“Our position has not changed and it won’t change and that is that people who seek to come here in an unauthorised way face the prospect of mandatory detention, but we have introduced some changes which ensure that families with children will be looked after in community detention, in other words they won’t be in a detention centre, and we have also put in place an arrangement where if somebody has been in detention for two years, then the ombudsman can have a look at it and is entitled to make a recommendation to the minister. The minister is not forced to follow that recommendation, but that will certainly ensure far greater transparency, and far greater accountability of the system and I think that strikes a very good balance between the national need to prevent unauthorised arrival and the human responsibility and need to ensure that there’s total transparency.” (20.06.2005)
“Well the first thing Kerry is to ensure that we've got the effective interdiction of vessels that are seeking to bring asylum seekers from various parts of the world that they are properly processed through our mandatory detention centre on Christmas Island. And those who are not valid asylum seekers sent straight back home, and those who are determined to be asylum seekers with legitimate refugee claims are then appropriately resettled through the resettlement processes.” (22.10.2009a)

Each of the accounts above demonstrated continued support for the practice of mandatory detention, which legitimised intangible fears of boat people outsiders. For Australian leaders, the mandatory detention of asylum seekers continued to be an unquestionable societal regulation.

For Howard, the incarceration of asylum seekers was compassionate in accordance with attachments to both humanist-egalitarian and collective-nationalist codes. This came from “the national need” for the incarceration of boat people to deter the arrival of others, superficially upholding “human responsibility”, for example with the development of “community detention” for children and families (20.06.2005). His justification for mandatory detention was through the forecast of societal chaos: a breakdown of “our immigration control processes” should the practice be discontinued (08.03.2002). He used the possessive pronoun “our” to affirm attachments and commitments on different sides of Australian politics for the continuation of this practice (08.03.2002). Mandatory detention was an unquestionable, unchangeable societal practice (08.03.2002; 20.06.2005).

The accepted consensus behind the mandatory detention continued under Rudd. Towards the end of his Prime Ministership, public attention focused on the detention centre on Christmas Island. The speculation that the Christmas Island detention centre was nearing full capacity trigged fears about societal cohesion, should boat people outsiders be brought to the mainland (02.02.2010; 14.02.2010; 03.04.2010; 06.03.2010; 24.03.2010). Christmas Island became part of border the
militarisation of the maritime space around the Australian mainland that required the “interdiction of vessels” (22.10.2009a).

The language of Howard and Rudd distorted depictions of relations with Australia’s near neighbours, particularly Indonesia. Rudd highlighted the “risk of fragile states” referring to Australia’s near neighbours places such as the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste. He raised the “risk of refugee outflows” with negative consequences should Australia fail to act in “times of crisis” (04.12.2008). Relations with near neighbours narrowed to cooperation bound to the collective-nationalist defence of Australia against the mythologised movement of harmful boat outsiders. Howard remarked that his efforts not only required the militarised inception of boats, but also cooperation with “Indonesian authorities” (16.06.2006). Rudd also restricted relations with Indonesia to “cooperative efforts to deal with the scourge of people smugglers, as they represent the vilest form of people on the planet” (14.10.2009). Indonesia became understood as a bulwark against a mythical flood of boat arrivals and collaborator in the mythologised struggle against people smugglers. Howard and Rudd obscured deeper understandings Australia’s relations with near neighbours. In doing so they helped perpetuate longstanding insecure Australian imaginations about Asia (for example see Philpott 2001).

Conclusion

This chapter has evaluated the migration language of Australian Prime Ministers John Howard and Kevin Rudd from 2001 to 2010. I investigated their speeches, interviews and press conferences, which were part of the reconstruction of the societal processes that situated the modes of thinking and orientation in Australian society.

I have argued that Australian leaders disseminated modes of thinking and orientation that fortified Australian society, through more harmful interpretations of asylum seeker and refugee movements by boat. Howard and Rudd mobilised shared anxieties and propagated more reductive modes of thinking in Australian society. Commodified depictions of transnational outsiders were intermixed with
idealised attachment to humanist-egalitarian and collective-nationalist normative codes. Although Howard and Rudd showed some differences in approach, there was consistent movement towards a more closed consciousness underpinned by attachments to the collective-nationalist normative code and commitments to border protection. Transnational outsiders became risks to insecure sections of established groups in Australian society.

More harmful risk orientations dominated understandings of refugee and asylum seeker movement to Australia. The criminalisation of boat people outsiders cultivated more masculinised orientations that reinforced objectified understandings of boat arrivals. Fears about societal cohesion and people smugglers stigmatised boat people outsiders and legitimised their exclusion. The language of Howard and Rudd twisted Australia’s regionalised relations by prioritising collective-nationalist commitments to mandatory detention. These practices cultivated greater socio-psychological fortifications against the threat of incoming migrants, specifically boat people.

The next chapter will illustrate the expanded socio-psychological fortifications in Australian society. The migration language of Howard and Rudd set the tone for harmful depictions of asylum seeker and refugee outsiders and the distortion of Australian diplomacy. Their successors Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull strengthened and expanded these understandings of migrants as threats to Australia.
Chapter 6.


The last chapter evaluated the migration language of Australian Prime Ministers John Howard and Kevin Rudd during the period from 2001 to 2010. This employed a process and risk sociological approach to understand shared anxieties in Australian society. I reconstructed the societal processes that fortified Australian society. The language of Howard and Rudd mobilised shared anxieties through the commodification of relations between established groups and transnational outsiders and cultivated conflicting idealised attachments to humanist-egalitarian and collective-nationalist normative codes. Commitments to border protection underpinned the swing to the collective-nationalist normative code where transnational movement and in particular asylum seekers and refugees arriving in Australia by boat were seen as risks to established sections of Australian society. These processes contributed to widening circles of disassociation that legitimised the mandatory detention of boat outsiders and warped Australia’s regionalised relations.

2010 to 2017 was a tumultuous time in Australian politics and society. There were four Prime Ministers in 8 years: Julia Gillard, Kevin Rudd, Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull. 2013 saw 3 leaders in the space of 12 months, beginning with Gillard, then Rudd’s second term (lasting 2.5 months), and ending with the election of Abbott. Rudd is not addressed in this chapter, since his remarks were the focus of study in the preceding chapter.

Each of these leaders pursued more calculating ‘solutions’ to the ‘problems’ of boat people arrivals and the issue of border deaths on Australia’s maritime frontier (see Weber and Pickering 2014). According to data from the Australian Border Deaths Database there were 1,095\(^{168}\) deaths linked with Australia’s borders from 2010-2017 (B0b 2018), with 201 fatalities as the largest single loss of life, occurring off East Java on the 17\(^{th}\) of December 2011.

Gillard sought a more regionalised resolution dubbed the ‘Malaysia Solution’, under the auspices of a “Regional Cooperation Framework”, where boat people outsiders would have their asylum claims processed in Malaysia rather than Australia (25.07.2011). When the full bench of Australia’s High Court invalidated the Malaysia Solution (O’Sullivan 2011). She revived the Howard era ‘Pacific solution’ with detention centres on Manus Island, and Nauru, which were recast as “regional processing facilities” (08.09.2012).

Abbott pursued a less sanitised and more militarised outcomes with “Operation Sovereign Borders” that ’stopped the boats’ through “turning boats around” to Indonesia. Abbott’s language made it acceptable for the Australian Border Force (ABF) to conduct ‘Operation Fortitude’, the failed attempt on the 28\(^{th}\) of August 2015 to conduct on the spot visa checks at various locations around the Central Business District of Melbourne (Davey 2015). Although Turnbull’s language was less fervent than Abbott’s, he still sought his own ‘solution’ through a refugee swap deal with the United States (21.09.2016b), which rejected asylum seekers on Nauru and Manus Island, and accepted Central American refugees (21.09.2016b).

\(^{168}\) This figure is just below the number road fatalities experienced each year from 2010-2017. 2010 was the deadliest year on Australian roads with 1,353 fatalities.
The rapid changes in government from the Labor Party to Liberal Party, as well as Prime Ministers, did not result in any significant shifts in migration vocabulary. Each leader maintained the longstanding practices of Australian party-government establishments to defend, deter, and detain boat people outsiders. From 2010 to 2017, the mandatory detention of asylum seekers whether in onshore or offshore facilities continued throughout this period of Australian society.

There was in fact an intensification of harsher migration language. Abbott and Turnbull in particular blamed their predecessors Rudd and Gillard for the ‘migration problem’, while praising themselves and their party-government establishment. The statements from Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull propagated policies, practices and societal expectations within Australian society. Their language contextualised the relations of Australian society within wider international society.

I argue that the migration language of Prime Ministers Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull deepened the socio-psychological fortifications in Australian society. The societal processes found in the vocabulary of Howard and Rudd, continued and expanded into the vocabulary of Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull.

Australian leaders in this period demonstrated three similarities with British leaders. Firstly, there was the continued commodification of societal relations and stresses of cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian and de-cosmopolitanised collective-nationalist normative codes, which swayed the criminalisation and objectification of transnational outsiders. Secondly, material from Abbott and Turnbull in particular showed more involved short-term leadership styles that blamed their political opponents for making Australian society vulnerable to harmful transnational people movements. Thirdly, the prioritisation of party political survival favoured attachments to the collective nationalist code, which overshadowed humanist-egalitarian attachments.
There were also two key differences. Firstly, representations of migration by British leaders solely distorted relations with Europe, while Australian leaders in this period contributed to a wider distortion not only relations with regional neighbours in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, but also Europe. Secondly, Australian leaders displayed more extreme fixations on asylum seekers and refugees who arrived by boat, who were vilified through connections with people smugglers. The persistent language of protective borders and destructive boats raised the barriers of societal inclusion and widened the scale of societal exclusion. Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull circulated reductive modes of thinking and narrow societal orientations in Australian society.

This chapter consists of two sections. The first section shows the mobilisation of shared anxieties and ongoing dissemination of reductive modes of thinking in Australian society. The second section demonstrates the continuing fortification of Australian society through narrow societal orientations.

**Continued Mobilisation of Shared Anxieties in Australia**

The following section illustrates the perpetuation of reductive modes of thinking in Australian society. Continued tensions within multiculturalisation processes situated Australian conscience formation. Attitudes towards the transnational movement of people became increasingly strained through the contradictory identifications within established societal groups that commodified the movement of transnational outsiders. The language of Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull again displayed idealised struggles between humanist-egalitarian and collective-nationalist normative codes. The balance between these codes favoured the collective-nationalist code, which helped to characterise migrants as risks, and was sustained by commitments to secure the borders of Australian society.
Ongoing Multiculturalisation Processes

Tensions from multiculturalisation processes continued to situate Australian societal conscience formations. The awareness of wider globalised webs of interdependence affected localised power struggles around contemporary transnational people movements.

Australian leaders from 2010 to 2017 idealised their society as an open, welcoming society, which successfully balanced totalising assimilation, with the acceptance of cultural distinctiveness (the multiple cultures that have infused Australian society). They spoke with nostalgic reverence towards the contributions of post-1945 movements of people who have become part of established groups (19.09.2012; 28.06.2014; 19.03.2017; 22.03.2017). Gillard in particular highlighted her own personal experience of post-1945 movement stating that “I’m a migrant” (29.06.2010; 26.01.2011). In the following accounts, Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull idealised past movements of people into Australia.

“We’ve been a long-term welcoming country of new migrations. I mean I migrated to this country. Migration really built this nation post World War II and Australians are very conscious of that and very conscious and proud of having developed a multicultural, peaceful, successful society through migration.” (21.02.2011)

“We have had 7.5 million people arrive on these shores since the Second World War and 1.2 million arrive on these shores since 2000. It is at the core of our being and sense of self as Australians that we are an immigrant nation and we should be so proud of the fact that people all around the world look to us as a place that they might choose to live. We should be so proud of the fact that so many millions of people have voted with their feet for Australia. Now, I know that sometimes the number of migrants is a little scary to
those of us who have been here a little longer. There have been times in my life when I confess to feeling a little apprehensive about the pace of change, but the more you get to know migrants to this country the more you understand how keen they are to become Australian – yes, in their own way and yes at their own pace, but to become Australian as quickly as they can. They have come here not to change us, but to join us so that, the us, is a greater more diverse and richer us than it was before.”
(24.03.2014)

“Australia is one of the most successful multicultural societies in the world – from the oldest human cultures of our First Australians, to those people who come from almost every UN member state. Ours is indeed an immigration nation. More than a quarter of our people were born overseas. Australians are not defined by religion or race, we are defined by political values; a common commitment to democracy, freedom and the rule of law, underpinned and secured by mutual respect. These values drive our approach to migration. We invite 190,000 migrants each year to join our nation of 24 million. And our commitment to refugees is longstanding – our humanitarian resettlement program dates back to 1947. This has made Australians truly global citizens, connected by family, culture and language to people across the globe. These links drive economic development, trade and innovation. Australians are enriched by the cultural diversity of our community - we regard our people as our greatest assets and our unity in diversity, one of our greatest strengths.” (19.09.2016)

In the accounts above, Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull articulated beliefs that transnational people movements have made Australian society successful and
prosperous in the present. This did not extend to future movements. Each leader channelled collective attachments to an Australian society that has become “one of the most successful multicultural societies in the world”, a positive magnet for “people all around the world” and a “peaceful society” (19.09.2016; 24.03.2014; 21.02.2011).

Abbott and Turnbull expressed different interpretations of contemporary transnational migrants. Turnbull articulated the attitudes of more secure techno-economic bourgeois sections of established groups. He spoke of how “190,000 migrants each year” transformed Australians into global citizens highly interconnected through bonds of family, culture and language (19.09.2016).

On the other hand, Abbott channelled the beliefs of more insecure immobile politico-economic citoyen members of the established groups. The phrase “they have come here not to change us, but to join us”, expressed lingering attitudes of insecure Anglo-Celtic established groups resistant to societal diversifications, who sought comfort in a singular national identification. There was the implicit belief that newcomers must change “to become Australian as quickly as they can”, to join the unchanging oldcomers (also see 21.08.2014). He noted concerns of people “who have been here a little longer”, which implied the descendants of British settlers and convicts.

Commodification of Transnational People Movements

Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull verbalised the understandings of established ultra-commercial bourgeois societal groupings with a high power ratio in Australian society. These groupings commodified transnational people movements into objects that can be controlled and traded. Turnbull expressed the desire for "the brightest and best" (21.04.2017; 06.03.2017) people of the world with pre-existing status and financial capital that contributed to values such as ‘our economy’. He

\[169\] The phrase "a little longer" carries a British understatement in the sense that it excludes Indigenous Australians, who of course have been in Australia a lot longer.
mirrored formulations of this same phrase by Cameron (10.10.2011a), May (21.11.2016) and Howard (07.03.2007).

The Gillard to Turnbull years also saw an expansion of a more dominant national security establishment with coordinated bureaucratic functionaries. By the end of 2017, Australia experienced a period of sizeable bureaucratic reorganisation that saw the creation of a Home Affairs Ministry, which bound functionaries such as ASIO\(^{170}\), AFP\(^{171}\) and the ABF into a singular bureaucratic portfolio reporting directly to the Home Affairs Minister (18.07.2017). These groupings were highly sensitive to any form of transnational movement deemed harmful to Australian society.

The new national security establishment utilised a militarised vocabulary in relations with incoming migrants. This stressed the importance of politico-economic *citoyen* settler identifications, which divided societal relations into those that were threatening and non-threatening to the timeless value of ‘the nation’. The functions of the Home Affairs Minister incorporated societal regulations over transnational movement. Turnbull described the Home Affairs Minister as “the chief recruiter for Australia to get the best and brightest from the world and to make sure that the people we want to come into Australia come in, and those who we have not permitted to come in do not” (19.03.2017). The following accounts showed articulations of a bourgeois establishment and the creeping prominence of a national security establishment.

“We are seeing the century of growth and development in the Asian region, the economic weight of the globe moving to the region in which we live. The resources boom is a down payment on the prosperity that will flow during this century of change and, certainly, strong demand for Australia’s services, including high quality education services, will be a boom industry for us during this century of change. It is, therefore, good news for Australia that APEC is getting on

\(^{170}\) Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Australian equivalent to Britain’s MI5.  
\(^{171}\) Australian Federal Police
with the job of making sure that we can look forward to a future of greater mobility and exchange in education. I want to see more students from our region study in Australia. I want to see more Australian students go into the countries of our region and do some section of their education in the countries of our region.” (08.09.2012)

“Our Party went to the last election with a plan to build a strong, prosperous economy and a safe, secure Australia........For over seventy years, the Liberal Party has built modern Australia – not on ideology, but on backing hard working Australians – people prepared to have a go........If you’re a migrant who came the right way to build a better life for your children – we’re for you. .........Our party has been built by hundreds of thousands of men and women from all walks of life, from every nook and cranny under the Southern Cross. We believe in family, in community and that our nation’s greatest achievements come when our people are encouraged to have a go. We reflect the length and breadth of Australian life: young and old, rich and poor, farmer and suburbanite, indigenous and immigrant, tradies and nurses.” (27.06.2015)

“So the immigration program operates in our national interest, to support our economy......You know you’ve got to recognise that in a global economy, it’s important to be able to bring people in with skills from overseas, it’s important for Aussies to go and work overseas. I mean as you know, there’s well over a million Australians working overseas at any time. But at the same time we’ve got to make sure we put
Australian jobs first. That’s what I did when we abolished the 457 program, which was getting rorted.”
(31.08.2017)

Each of the accounts above discussed the importance of transnational people movements to the movement financial capital and skilled labour. In account 08.09.2012, Gillard characterised an Australian establishment increasingly more comfortable and accustomed to the movement of people from the Asian region. She expressed techno-economic bourgeois identifications that “the economic weight of the globe” is now closer to Australia creating a future of “greater demand” for desired movement through education exchanges and the growing demand for Australian service industries. In account 27.06.2015, Abbott noted an openness to migrant outsiders who come in “the right way to build a better life”. He assumed that there were wrong ways to enter, which would jeopardise the government’s “plan to build a strong, prosperous economy and a safe, secure Australia”.

There were growing expressions of more immobile politico-economic citoyen identifications. Turnbull noted how transnational movement must serve “our national interest” and support “our economy” (31.08.2017). Although he highlighted the importance for Australians to work overseas. He gave precedence to jobs for citizens over strangers. There was a growing inclination to ‘protect’ employment within Australia from transnational movement beyond, by putting “Australian jobs first”. Abbott and Turnbull revealed the development of national-militarised understandings that were less open to reciprocal exchanges of people and capital, more focused on one-way benefits to established groups in Australian society.

Australian leaders commodified migrants along a spectrum that swung from relatively harmless to relatively harmful. These outsiders were characterised by a lower power ratio. Harmless migrants included students from places such as Indonesia, China and India (03.11.2010; 11.04.2014; 25.05.2014; 05.09.2014),

172 A temporary skilled work visa where applicants could work in Australia for up to 4 years that was discontinued by Turnbull’s government.
more harmful migrants indicated refugees and asylum seekers, often with the prefix ‘illegal’ and specialised phrases like “unauthorised arrival”. The following accounts showed the continuation of more harmful interpretations of transnational movement, specifically the movement of asylum seekers and refugees arriving by boat.

“Today I am announcing steps to strengthen Australia’s border protection arrangements. I am setting out the long-term approach we will take to dealing with the pressure of unauthorised arrivals. We are taking these steps in response to the increase in unauthorised people movements in our region and around the world. I am also making the Government’s policy goal clear: it is to wreck the people-smuggling trade by removing the incentive for boats to leave their port of origin in the first place; to remove both the profitability of the trade and the danger of the voyage.”

(06.07.2010)

“This is the first boat which has got as close to success, if you like, as one has in many a long month. We are determined to respond to this one in ways which underline – underline – our absolute implacable opposition to people smuggling and our complete and utter determination to do whatever we legally can, whatever we morally and ethically can to stop the boats because every boat that comes is exposing its passengers to potentially lethal risk. Every boat that comes is encouraging people smugglers and their customers to think that there is an illegal way to Australia. Well, there's not. The message I repeat – the message I repeat – is that if you come to Australia illegally by boat you will never ever get permanent residency. So, if you want to come to this
country, **come the right way, not the wrong way**, because if you come the wrong way you will never stay here.”

(26.07.2014)

“It is a critically important strong message to send to the people smugglers. They must know that the door to Australia is closed to **those who seek to come here by boat** with a people smuggler. It is closed. **We accept thousands of refugees**, and we do so willingly, but we will not tolerate any repeat of the people smuggling ventures which resulted in over 1200 deaths at sea under the Labor Party and 50,000 unauthorised arrivals.”

(30.10.2016)

Each of the accounts understood the movement of asylum seekers and refugees arriving by boat as a commodified harm to Australian society. In account 06.07.2010, Gillard remarked that the globalised and regionalised “increase in unauthorised people movements” compelled efforts to “strengthen Australia’s border protection arrangements”. Australian leaders as a whole stigmatised boat outsiders, the “customers” of people smugglers engaged in a harmful illicit trade that in Abbott words exposed “passengers to potentially lethal risk” (26.07.2014). At the same time, Gillard, Abbott, and Turnbull emphasised humanist-egalitarian attachments that idealised their capacities to prevent fatalities that reduced the “profitability” of a dangerous trade.

Australian leaders maintained nominal degrees of openness towards refugees, as stressed by Turnbull in account 30.10.2016. The difference between the harmful boat outsiders and safe refugees is that the latter were more controllable and selectable, like any commodity, according to the tastes of the party-government establishment at the time. There was an expressed preference for Central American refugees in exchange for boat people from Nauru and Manus Island through a swap deal with the US (21.09.2016b), as well as the preference for refugees from Christian communities in Syria and Iraq (21.04.2017). The oscillating
interpretations of transnational movement between less harmful refugees and the more harmful boat movement represented competing idealisations between humanist-egalitarian and collective nationalist codes.

Normative Code Tensions of Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull

Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull idealised both cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian and de-cosmopolitanised collective-nationalist normative codes. The power struggles between these codes played out in their representations of migration. Superficial human-egalitarian attachments did not restrain persistent fluctuations to the collective-nationalist code.

They verbalised a relative commitment to the humanist-egalitarian normative code. The more positive articulations of “refugees” and refugee movement sustained collective idealisations of Australian society as a compassionate society. Australian leaders tied collective compassion to vague references towards upholding “our international obligations” and “legal obligations”, as well as indifferent mentions of the Refugee Convention. There was very little discussion on what those obligations and conventions actually entailed for the treatment of refugees (08.09.2012; 25.07.2014; 26.07.2014). Selective compassion was used to deflect criticism from sections of Australian and international society (Davidson 2018; Cody and Nawaz 2017). The degree of openness towards refugees was paradoxically conditional on widened circles of disassociation that enabled arbitrary selection by the government at the time. The term refugee was often modified with the prefix “genuine” (04.07.2010; 25.07.2011; 28.08.2012; 09.09.2012; 22.03.2014; 19.09.2016). Australian leaders preferred “genuine refugees” so long as they waited their turn, and were more open to camp refugees rather than boat refugees (07.09.2015; 10.07.2017).

All three Australian leaders channelled superficial human-egalitarian attachments through openness to refugee movement into more collective-nationalist attachments, as in the following accounts.
“The size of our humanitarian intake needs to be determined by the Australian government, we're a compassionate and generous people and we step up and do more than our fair share in terms of taking refugees from refugee camps around the world, so we do have an intake there.”  
(20.12.2010)

“I think Australians are pretty sick of being lectured to. I really think Australians are sick of being lectured to by the United Nations, particularly given that we have stopped the boats, and by stopping the boats we have ended the deaths at sea. The most humanitarian, the most decent, the most compassionate thing you can do is stop these boats because hundreds, we think about 1,200 in fact, drowned at sea during the flourishing of the people smuggling trade under the former government. So, the best thing you can do to uphold the universal decencies of mankind, the best thing that you can do to ensure that the best values of our world are realised is to stop the boats and that’s exactly what we have done. We have stopped the boats and I think the UN’s representatives would have a lot more credibility if they were to give some credit to the Australian Government for what we've been able to achieve in this area.”  
(09.03.2015)

“above all, the most compassionate thing we can do is keeping the boats stopped. The only policy - and we know this from experience, you may say we know it from bitter experience - the only policy that works is the strongest position on border security. That is very clear. So we are a compassionate nation, we bring in a lot of refugees, but we decide which refugees come here. We will not ever, as the Labor Party did, outsource our refugee policy to people
smugglers. That’s what Labor did and we paid a terrible price for it and above all, the 1,200 at least who drowned at sea, they paid a shocking price. They lost their lives because of people smugglers.” (20.09.2017)

Each of the accounts above displayed idealised commitments to the humanist-egalitarian code through openness to refugee outsiders. Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull said in melodramatic tones that “we’re a compassionate and generous people”, and “uphold the universal decencies of mankind”, making Australia “a compassionate nation” through the acceptance of refugees (20.12.2010; 09.03.2015; 20.09.2017). Australian leaders maintained more fantastical humanist-egalitarian idealisations of themselves and their party-government establishment. Their language showed consistent efforts to evade criticism from globalised institutions such as the UNHCR (2013), which have noted Australia’s inconsistencies with international human rights law (Davidson 2018; Cody and Nawaz 2017).

In accounts 09.03.2015 and 20.09.2017, Abbott and Turnbull distorted humanist-egalitarian compassion into a fig leaf justification for collective-nationalist attachments and militarised efforts towards the stopping of harmful boats. Abbott rejected criticism by asserting that “Australians are sick of being lectured to by the United Nations”, by implication delegitimising the authority of the United Nations, which questioned their treatment of boat people (09.03.2015).

Turnbull directed nationalised attachments towards his government and their prevention of deaths by drowning in Australian waters, but only through having “the strongest position on border security” (20.09.2017). ‘Protecting’ refugees became an expression collective-nationalist duty.
Border Worship in Fortified Australia

Constant emphasis on “the national interest” became a totalising ethos that legitimised the actions and behaviours of Australian leaders, and delegitimised criticism from other sections of Australian society. Transnational outsiders were expected to become part of “Team Australia” (21.08.2014; 18.12.2014; 24.05.2015), and to venerate “Australian values” (26.01.2011; 19.03.2017; 18.04.2017; 20.04.2017; 21.04.2017). Turnbull remarked that these included “rule of law, democracy, freedom, mutual respect, equality for men and women. These fundamental values are what make us Australian” (20.04.2017). Abbott and Turnbull overlooked the fact that the values they defined as uniquely “Australian” were found in a range of liberal-democratic societies. The projection of a singular nationalised attachment to ‘Australia’ was incommensurable and superior to any other forms of attachment.

Australian leaders displayed strident idealisations of national borders. They consistently reinforced a standard that all state-societies must have totalised control over their borders. Those societies that cannot control their borders catastrophically reduced their status in international society. The maintenance of borders was dependant on vulnerabilities within Australian society that necessitated the strengthening of boundaries beyond Australian society. The following accounts demonstrated collective-nationalist attachments to the preservation of borders, which encapsulated the stopping of boat outsiders.

“That there is nothing humane about a voyage across dangerous seas with the ever-present risk of death in leaky boats captained by people smugglers. That Australia’s basic decency does not accept the idea of punishing women and children by locking them up behind razor wire or ignoring people who are fleeing genocide, torture, and persecution; nor does it allow us to stand back and watch fellow human beings drown in the water, but equally there is nothing inconsistent between these decencies and our commitment to
secure borders and fair, orderly migration. The rule of law in a just society is part of what attracts so many people to Australia. It must be applied properly to those who seek asylum, just as it must be applied to all of us. That no-one should have an unfair advantage and be able to subvert orderly migration programs. That there should be no incentive for people smugglers to take even bigger risks with people's lives in the name of mercenary profits. That people smuggling is an evil trade to be punished.”

(06.07.2010)

“I said that we would stop the boats and I am not declaring victory, but my friends, we are stopping those boats. The most compassionate thing we could do coming into Government was to stop the boats, because not only does stopping the boats stop the Budget blowouts, not only does stopping the boats save billions in unnecessary future spending, but stopping the boats stops the deaths. That’s why the most decent and the most compassionate thing that this Government has done is to ensure that for more than six months now there has been no successful people smuggling venture to our country. We will never waver. We will never waver in our determination to stop the boats. We will never waver in our commitment to do what we have to do to stop the boats because we must have secure borders. The sign of a sovereign country is that it has secure borders. While we are stopping the boats, what’s the Labor Party doing? Well, the Labor Party, as we know, can never stop the boats because it is in alliance with The Greens and as far as The Greens are concerned, if you can get here, you can stay here. Well ladies and gentlemen, this is the problem: you just cannot trust the Labor Party with border security.”

(12.07.2014)
“In particular our strong border protection policies have ensured that Australians know once again......that it is only their Government which determines who comes to Australia.... Howard’s strong policies were dropped by Labor when they were elected in 2007 and over six years there were 50,000 unlawful arrivals and at least 1,200 deaths at sea........As Europe grapples today with unsustainable inflows of migrants and asylum seekers, the Australian experience offers both a cautionary tale and the seeds of a potential solution. The lesson is very clear: weak borders fragment social cohesion, drain public revenue, raise community concerns about national security, and ultimately undermine the consensus required to sustain high levels of immigration and indeed multiculturalism itself. Ultimately, division. In contrast, strong borders and retention of our sovereignty allow government to maintain public trust in community safety, respect for diversity and support for our immigration and humanitarian programs.” (10.07.2017)

Each of the accounts above discussed the importance of secure borders. In account 06.07.2010, Gillard channelled humanist-egalitarian notions of “basic decency”, and the refusal to not “stand back and watch fellow human beings drown”. This shifted to collective-nationalist notions of repelling any violation of “secure borders”. Boat people outsiders were stigmatised as people who could destabilise the values of fairness and organisation through links with the “evil trade” of people smuggling (06.07.2010).

In account 12.07.2014, Abbott twisted collective compassion to the stopping of boats as objects (not vessels with human beings) that appealed to techno-economic bourgeois identifications, prioritising economic growth. Stopping boats through securing borders became a totalising symbol of party-government establishment dominance in Australian society, hence “the sign of a sovereign country is that it has
secure borders” (12.07.2014). Abbott viciously stigmatised other established groups such as the Labor Party and the Greens for making Australian society more insecure through lack of devotion to border protection. These groups are presumed to place the relative independence of Australian state-society in peril.

Turnbull channelled the collective-nationalist code through depictions of harmful boat outsider movement and vociferous commitments to border protection. He condemned the Rudd and Gillard governments for abandoning “Howard’s strong [border protection] policies”, which resulted in “50,000 unlawful arrivals and at least 1,200 deaths at sea”. He not only further mythologised the policies from the Howard era of Australian society, but also implied that the Rudd and Gillard governments were solely responsible for bringing deaths to the boundaries of Australian society, and that only his Coalition government could protect Australia. Turnbull divided international society into strong and weak states: strong states have impermeable borders, and weak states have porous borders. Europe was condemned as a place of weak governments, and Australia was glorified as place of strong government. Turnbull invoked fears about loss of societal cohesion, control, scarcity of societal resource and death, through depictions of “unsustainable inflows of migrants and asylum seekers”.

Globalised People Risks

The narrow focus on borders and boats made Australian leaders more reliant on the support of insecure sections of established groups. The movement of boat people outsiders became symbols of global risks, which threaten localised power relations in Australian society.

Insecure sections of established groups were people who were uncomfortable with the diversification of Australian society, with pre-existing concerns over population growth, which may only be tangentially linked to the contemporary movement of newcomers into their communities. To them, Australian leaders presented highly-distorted depictions of transnational outsiders, particularly boat people outsiders, who were depicted using high fantasy content images. Refugees and asylum seekers
were misunderstood as representing the majority of movement to Australia when they were in fact the minority. The persistent focus on borders and boats disseminated a fictive cause and effect relationship: weak borders became a symbolised ‘cause’ of societal vulnerabilities.

Gillard recoiled against “a language of crisis” that sought “to mount those anxieties for political profit”, she still felt compelled to remark that “I do understand the anxiety and indeed fears that Australians have when they see boats, they see boats intercepted” (24.06.2010), without explaining what those fears were.

On the other hand, Abbott and Turnbull manufactured the notion of border chaos to reinforce their hold on the balance of societal power. Public confidence was bound to border protection. They consistently blamed their political opponents and idealised themselves as the rescuers of Australian society from the ‘mess’ of their opponents through their greater devotion to ‘border protection’. Their vocabulary displayed their personal vulnerabilities about sustaining public confidence and losing their status in Australian society (27.07.2015; 23.03.2016a; 21.09.2016a; 30.10.2016; 30.01.2017; 01.02.2017; 21.04.2017; 19.03.2017; 18.04.2017; 13.06.2017).

Transnational people movements were represented as risks to established sections of Australian society. The involved pursuit of public confidence insulated Australian leaders from awareness of the repercussions fostered by their publicised vocabulary. They concentrated on the short-term preservation of their own societal standing. In the following accounts, Australian leaders including Gillard took a populist approach and exploited harmful depictions of boat people and more broadly refugees to maintain the support of insecure sections of Australian society.

“Look, what I meant by those comments is I think on a debate like asylum seekers people should feel free to saw what they feel. And for people to say they're anxious about border security doesn't make them intolerant. It certainly doesn't make them a racist. It means that they're expressing a
genuine view that they're anxious about border security. Same token, people who express concern about children being in detention, that doesn’t mean they’re soft on border protection. It just means they’re expressing a real, human concern. So I’d like to sweep away any sense that people should close down any debate, including this debate, through a sense of self-censorship or political correctness. People should say what they feel. And my view is many people in the community feel anxious when they see asylum seeker boats. And obviously, we as a Government want to manage our borders.” (04.07.2010)

“I think it's very important that we carefully consider the security status of people, particularly people who are coming to us from difficult countries and with difficult backgrounds and claiming asylum. Now, you know, I don’t want to suggest that people who are coming to Australia under our various humanitarian programmes are security risks – I don’t. Nevertheless, it is important that if there are any doubts they are resolved. That’s why it’s so important that ASIO and our other agencies are allowed to do their work and this is why, under the former government, we were so concerned when there were suggestions that ASIO should be streamlining or short circuiting these processes. The important thing is to ensure that wherever there is a significant risk that people will do us harm, we take the appropriate action. The point I’ve been making all along is that we do have people in this country who are of considerable security concern. I mean, just to go through some of the figures, we’ve got about 70-odd Australians who are currently with terrorist groups in the Middle East. We’ve had upwards of 20 come back from serving with terrorist groups overseas. We’ve got at least 100 who are
supporting and funding these terrorist groups overseas. So, there are not thousands of people here, but there are certainly hundreds of people who are at least of potential interest to our security services and that’s as it should be given the reality of the world we live in.”

(17.12.2014)

“Now our success as a multicultural society is built on strong foundations, which include the confidence of the Australian people that their government and it alone, determines who comes to Australia. Uncontrolled irregular migration flows have posed an existential threat to many countries where as Honourable Members know they have fuelled anxiety and political disorder. Now our Government has secured Australia’s borders - there has not been a successful people smuggling expedition to Australia for 1052 days. And when we accept refugees into Australia - and we have one of the most generous humanitarian programs in the world - we take great care with security checks, as we have done with the 12,000 refugees from the Syrian conflict zone. Those checks are only possible if the Government determines which refugees are admitted and if the security of the border is not outsourced to people smugglers.”

(13.06.2017)

Each of the accounts above depicted the movement of transnational outsiders as potential risks to established groups in Australian society. In account 04.07.2010, Gillard bound the management of borders to anxiousness surrounding asylum seekers. She and her successors were fearful of any reduction in public confidence, because the perception that they could not protect the border would delegitimise their place in the balance societal power.
In account 17.12.2014, Abbott appealed to insecure sections of established groups sensitive to the presence of violence in their own lives. Harmful depictions of asylum seeker and refugee outsiders were linked with the flow of violence from the Middle East into Australia. This prompted increased security checks because of “a significant risk that people will do us harm” (17.12.2014).

Turnbull saw “uncontrolled irregular migration flows” as a static cause of public “anxiety and political disorder”, which in his view reinforced the need for highly strict controls on transnational movement (13.06.2017). Any perceived reduction of these controls undermined the “strong foundations” of Australia’s multicultural society (13.06.2017). Phrases such as “existential threat” disseminated collective-national idealisations for more totalised comprehensive border control.

Expansion of Fortified Orientations by Australian Leaders

The following section illustrates the continued expansion of narrow societal orientations that fortified Australian society. Depictions of transnational outsiders oscillated between safe skilled movement and more catastrophic boat and refugee movement. Societal orientations were dominated by more harmful risk orientations towards boat outsiders, who were criminalised through the prefix ‘illegal’ and vilified via associations with the practice of people smuggling. Boat people outsiders became objectified in the form of numbers of boat arrivals, deaths and wider references to immigration figures. Australian leaders expressed fear constellations about societal resources, transnational violence, cohesion, and death, which propagated risk orientations about boat people outsiders and mythologised their own capabilities. Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull galvanised greater socio-psychological fortifications through sustaining more authoritarian collective-nationalist practices of mandatory detention, and ‘the turn back’ of boat people outsiders. These have distorted both the regionalised and globalised relations of Australian society.
Acceptable Skilled Movement & Unacceptable Boat Movement

Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull all constructed narrow articulations of more acceptable skilled movement. These understandings favoured more politico-economic *citoyen* identifications that reduced the acceptance of other forms of movement such as family reunions and refugee movement. The culmination of this process was the abolition of the 4 year 457 skilled migration visa and the introduction of more temporary 2 year visas with tighter restrictions and a reduced list of occupations (18.04.2017). The change shows an established group desire to restrict opportunities to outsiders, which had the effect of decreasing the chances for them to settle in Australia. In the following accounts, Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull raised the barriers of acceptance into Australian society.

“In the modern age I think people recognise that we do need to continue to have some skilled migration come into the country to keep fuelling this wealth and this resources boom, but I also think Australians rightly ask themselves the question ‘how can it be that big mining companies in the North-West of this country are crying out for workers, where at the same time in the city of Perth in Western Australia we still have high youth unemployment?’ And they’re asking us to do better at making sure we’re skilling Australians and getting them into work and I’ve certainly indicated as Prime Minister that is a very big part of my vision for the future of this country, that we leverage this wealth to get more people into work with greater skills. Now we will still need skilled migration and we will still draw on it and it will be part of the mix, but we can’t use skilled migration as an excuse for leaving that teenager unemployed in Perth when he or she could have got a job.”

(21.02.2011)
“Look, the whole point of our labour market laws, the whole point of our immigration laws is to protect Australian jobs, and nothing changes with our 457 arrangements under this Free Trade Agreement\textsuperscript{173}. Nothing changes to our labour market laws under this agreement – nothing changes. That’s why people like Bob Carr say that this agreement is good for jobs – very good for jobs – and the Labor Party should stop telling xenophobic lies. They should stop telling racist lies about this agreement. They know it’s in Australia’s best interests. They absolutely know it’s in Australia’s best interests. They should stop playing politics with it, get on, back our future, back this export agreement.”

(03.09.2015)

“Our skilled visa program has allowed us to tap into the best and brightest minds around the world. More than 65 per cent of permanent visas accessed in 2015/16 were by skilled professionals who are now an integral part of our workforce. But migration must be in our national interest. And now that we are back in control, we can use it to bolster the workforce with the skills we need while making sure that vacancies are filled by Australians first. Australian jobs for Australians first. That must be the commitment, that must be the objective. That is our obligation. Now, Labor not only mishandled this aspect of migration, but under Bill Shorten as the employment minister it upended the usual practice and actually put foreign workers first.”

(19.03.2017)

\textsuperscript{173} The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement
Each of the accounts above gave narrow definitions of safe skilled movement. Australian leaders desired people with pre-existing rank and status that brought quantities of financial capital into Australia. Gillard remarked that the movement of skilled migrants was more acceptable because of their contribution to the “resource boom” (21.02.2011). Turnbull noted the continued attraction towards the “the best and brightest minds around the world” (19.03.2017).

Abbott and Turnbull contributed to the development of suspicious risk narratives about transitional movement. They articulated collective-nationalist desires to “protect Australian jobs” and popularised slogans that emphasised “Australian jobs for Australians first”. They also maintained the desire for greater financial capital through ‘free trade agreements (03.09.2015; 19.03.2017). In account 19.03.2017, Turnbull blamed his political opponents for putting “foreign workers first” and directed collective-nationalist attachments towards himself and his government (19.03.2017).

**Ongoing Criminalisation of Boat People**

Australian leaders propagated hyper-sensitisations to the movement of boat outsiders, which sustained harmful risk orientations. Their language criminalised boat people in two interconnected forms, by conscious use of the prefix ‘illegal’ and through vilification form their proximity to the practice of people smuggling.

Repeated use of the prefix “illegal” circulated double bind processes. The movement of boat outsiders validated images of a chaotic lawlessness maritime frontier. This in turn facilitated harsher measures to ‘restore order’ and directed societal attachments towards the leaders themselves and their party-government establishment.

Australian leaders supported more masculinised restoration of societal ‘order’ practices. Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull were united by the common desire for “tough border protection” and the admiration of ‘tough’ measures to protect borders (06.07.2010; 25.07.2011; 13.08.2012; 19.08.2012; 23.06.2014;

The criminalisation of boat outsiders through the prefix “illegal” alongside projections of masculinised strength were a persistent feature in the public statements by Australian leaders across this period174, as per the following accounts:

“To reiterate: I am committed to treating people with decency while they are in detention in Australia, but if people are not found to be refugees, I am committed to sending them home, and whilst ever boats are attempting to enter Australian waters there must be effective policing. We are successfully prosecuting dozens of people smugglers through our courts. We have successfully extradited alleged people smugglers from other countries. Since September 2008 we have made 149 arrests for offences related to people smuggling. 48 people have been convicted and a further 99 prosecutions are now underway in our courts. We are also investing in eight new patrol boats with improved surveillance and response capability - strengthening our Border Protection Command, which already has 18 vessels and 18 aircraft available for patrolling Australian waters all year round. We already have more assets deployed for this task than any other Australian Government has ever had. We ultimately destroy the illegal boats we intercept.”

(06.07.2010)

174 Although the years 2014 and 2015 showed a notable acceleration and deceleration of usage. There is scope for future research to understand the societal processes that shaped these 2 years in particular. 2014 alone saw 53 mentions of the combinations consisting of “illegal arrivals”, “illegal boats”, “illegally by boat”, “illegal people smuggling”, while 2015 saw 28 mentions.
“Can I repeat what has been the standard rule of this Government – we do not comment on operational matters on the water. We do not discuss things in ways which would give aid and comfort to the people smugglers. This has been an iron law of this Government and I’m certainly not going to change it today. What I am going to do is reiterate our absolute determination to ensure that people will not come to this country illegally by boat – they will not come to this country illegally by boat. And if any – by hook or by crook – actually get here, they will never get permanent residency in this country. Because as long as anyone thinks that by coming here by boat, they will get the great prize of permanent residency here in Australia, the evil, dangerous, deadly trade of people smuggling will continue and this Government will do everything we humanly can to stamp this trade out (21.07.2015).

“We175 discussed the importance of border security and the threat of illegal and irregular migration, and recognised that it is vital that every nation is able to control who comes across its borders. We discussed the very principles that I raised at the United Nations last year when I made the point there that our strong border protection - which the Coalition Government, under the leadership of PM Abbott in 2013, continued under my Government and enhanced under my Government - our strong border protection gives Australians confidence in the immigration system, gives them confidence in our humanitarian programs, underpins the commitment in our - the most successful multicultural society in the world.” (30.01.2017)

175 Referring to a telephone call with US President Donald Trump
Each of the accounts above used the prefix illegal to criminalise boat people outsiders. Gillard called for greater policing measures to destroy “illegal boats”, a practice similar to the seizure and obliteration of illicit narcotics. She also retained shallow humanist-egalitarian attachments to boat people in detention, reaffirming her obligations to treat possible refugees “with decency” (06.07.2010). Gillard contributed to the militarisation of Australia’s maritime frontier by “strengthening our Border Protection Command” (06.07.2010).

Depictions of illegal boat arrivals sustained harsher regulations to deny “permanent residency” in Australia. Abbott stated an “absolute determination” to ban the movement of boat arrivals, making out a mythical struggle against “the evil, dangerous, deadly trade of people smuggling” (21.07.2015). Turnbull similarly mentioned the “threat of illegal and irregular migration” that reinforced masculinised orientations to maintain “our strong border protection”. For Turnbull, the multicultural success of Australian society was jeopardised by the movement of boat arrivals. In account 30.01.2017, he fostered the fears of insecure sections of the established who were already doubtful of the ‘success’ of multicultural developments in Australian society. Boat outsiders became scapegoats for cases of ‘failed’ ethnic integration.

Vilification & the Mythologisation of People Smugglers

The second form of criminalisation was connected with people smuggling. This sustained more harmful risk orientations that vilified boat arrivals. The figure of the people smuggler resembled Sirens from Greek mythology, which lured migrants to detention and death with promises of permanent residency in Australia. The demonization of people smugglers turned boat outsiders and their aspirations into illicit ‘products’. Boat people outsiders became symbols of indeterminate societal catastrophe, which was only preventable through coercive practices such as mandatory detention.
Australian leaders orientated Australian society away from the more detached understandings of globalised transnational movement, and towards more involved insecure politico-economic citoyen settler identifications.

In accounts 06.07.2010 and 21.07.2015, Gillard and Abbott targeted people smugglers as the cause of harmful boat arrivals. Gillard highlighted the numbers of arrests, convictions and prosecutions for people smuggling. Abbott vilified people smuggling as an “evil, dangerous, deadly trade”. The threat of people smugglers supported idealised humanist-egalitarian attachments that “this Government will do everything we humanly can to stamp this trade out” (21.07.2015). The following accounts offer further evidence that Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull stigmatised boat outsiders through the vilified connection to people smuggling.

“I accept that this is a difficult problem, a global problem. We're seeing large numbers of people moving around the world, fleeing war, fleeing persecution, fleeing famine. Australia is one nation that sees people arrive on its doorstep, but look at the countries in Europe and the numbers that they face, America and the numbers that they face, the Canadians of course have started to deal with this problem too, in terms of boat arrivals. What we can do as a country is have strong border protection, strong laws on people smuggling, work with our regional neighbours on law enforcement, have mandatory detention. But I do want to do more than that, we want to achieve a Regional Protection Framework and a Regional Processing Centre, which would take out of the hands of people smugglers the very product they sell. Why would people move if from a Regional Processing Centre, if they got on a boat and were just returned to the Centre, that's what we are trying to achieve.” (16.12.2010)
“I want to make it absolutely crystal clear that no one who comes to Australia illegally by boat is ever going to get permanent residency of our country. That is an absolute commitment by this Government. **You come to Australia illegally by boat you will never get permanent residency** of our country. Our absolute determination is to **stop the boats** and thank God the boats are stopping, because if the boats **stop the deaths** stop as well. We stop the boats by denying to the people smugglers a **product to sell.** The **product** they are selling is **permanent residency** of Australia. Well, it’s off the table – now and forever.”

(11.09.2014)

“we have to send the most unequivocal message to the people smugglers - you cannot get into Australia. Now they still try from time to time and we've turned back over 30 boats over the last three years or so. They've been turned back during my prime ministership as you know. But if we were to start bringing asylum seekers who had come by boat into Australia, you would be **getting dozens and dozens of boats, building up to hundreds.** Believe me, people smuggling is a much bigger, more sophisticated, **more dangerous industry** now than it was even a few years ago. All of the connectivity and communications ability that the internet gives and smartphones give, have made it even more potent. So we have to be absolutely resolute. You cannot get to Australia with a people smuggler. We have **taken their product away** from them and **we will never give it back.**”

(15.09.2017)
Each of the accounts above criminalised the movement of boat outsiders through their connections with people smugglers. For Gillard, “boat arrivals” were an objectified “problem” and commodified ‘products’ that needed to be blocked from reaching the grasp of people smugglers. Boat arrivals as ‘problems’ demanded solutions that encompassed ever stricter measures through greater collective-nationalist attachments to “strong border protection and strong laws on people smuggling”.

Boat arrivals as ‘products’ were their presumed aspirations for “permanent residency” in Australian society. In accounts 11.09.2014 and 15.09.2017, Abbott and Turnbull eliminated the possibilities for boat outsiders to integrate with established groups in Australian society. Boat outsiders were expected to internalise their own exclusion by never attempting to reach Australia in the first place. Interpretations of boat arrivals were entrapped in a dichotomised black and white struggle between ‘responsible’ Australian leaders (Abbott and Turnbull) who prevented deaths at the frontier through stopping boats, and people smugglers who lead boat outsiders to their own destruction (11.09.2014). The focus on people smugglers absolved Abbott and Turnbull from humanist-egalitarian responsibilities towards boat people outsiders, although many boat arrivals may be refugees. The stigmatised connection of boat arrivals with people smugglers, cultivated ignorance that undermined humanist-egalitarian openness towards refugees. The threat of people smugglers was justification for collective-nationalist commitments to protect borders. Australian leaders painted images of lawlessness on the maritime boundaries of Australian society forewarned by the “dozens and dozens of boats, building up to hundreds” (15.09.2017).

Objectification: Boat Arrivals & Deaths

Numerical representations of boat movement can provide a more detached contextualised awareness of broader globalised webs of interdependence. These can help explain that boat arrivals remain a relatively small number understood in the broader context of Australia’s annual migration program, and that state-societies such as Pakistan, Lebanon and Turkey host the largest number of refugees (see UNHCR 2018). Greater numerical context could also promote deeper societal reflection on the forms of relations between Australian society and other large countries, for example, the state-societies in the Middle East that have experienced the consequences of Australian supported military intervention from the years 2001 onwards.

There was only one substantive attempt at greater contextualised understanding of transnational movement throughout this entire phase of Australian society. It was provided by Gillard as follows.

“the number of asylum seekers arriving by boat to Australia is very, very minor. It is less than 1.5 per cent of new migrants, and indeed it would take about 20 years to fill the great MCG176 with asylum seekers at present rates of arrival.... The total number of people accepted into Australia in 2009 as migrants under our refugee and humanitarian program, the total number accepted each year, is 13,750 people. This is a fraction of our annual migration intake. This number has remained stable for many years and does not increase, even when we face surges in boat arrivals. If more boats arrive, fewer people can be sponsored under a special humanitarian program. Fewer such people are sponsored, meaning the total numbers are unchanged. We should also understand that what drives the peaks and troughs in the numbers of boats trying to get to Australia has less to do with what we do here and more to do with the conditions people are escaping -

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176 MCG stands for the Melbourne Cricket Ground, a space that hosts a range of large sporting events, particularly cricket and AFL (Australian Rules Football).
conditions like war, genocide, imprisonment without trial, torture, harassment by authorities, the disappearance of family and friends and children, the growing up of people and whole families in refugee camps with no prospect of ever seeing their home again. And when conditions deteriorate in countries with sea routes to Australia, as they did between 1999 and 2001, more boats come - some 5,516 people came to our shores in 2001. But then, when conditions improved, as happened after 2001 with the downfall of the Taliban regime, fewer and fewer boats came. This ebb and flow has been evident since the time when Malcolm Fraser was our Prime Minister in the 1970s and the people arriving in boats were from Vietnam. (06.07.2010)

On the one hand account 06.07.2010 from Gillard, represented a rare occasion of more constructive detached understanding of transnational movement into Australia. She utilised a comparison with the Melbourne Cricket Ground, appealing to common attachments towards sports, something that has particular resonance in Australia. Gillard highlighted the kinds of societal circumstances that prompted large-scale people movement in the first place, such as the breakdown of human groups through mass violence and persecution.

On the other hand, Gillard emphasised more harmful risk orientations between the established groups and boat people outsider. Less boat arrivals were favoured over more boat arrivals. There was the commitment to the unchanging figure of accepting “13,750 people” as part of Australia’s special humanitarian program, which set up distinctions between boat outsiders and camp refugee outsiders. The commitment to the “13,750 people” figure reduced understandings of the “what drives the peaks and troughs in the numbers of boats” to an expendable figure and blocked understandings of changing societal conditions beyond Australian society. These might mean an adjustment of that figure. She limited interpretations of safe boat movement and widened interpretations for unsafe boat movement.
Abbott and Turnbull cultivated the misleading belief that refugee and asylum seeker movement was the largest form migration into Australia. This was perpetuated by statements such as, “Australia is a nation that has been built up on migration and a significant portion of that migration are humanitarian migrants or refugees. So the fact is, we are not only supporting the intake of refugees, we are increasing it.” (01.11.2016). According to the Home Affairs Department, Australia’s humanitarian intake totalled 17,555 places in 2015-16 (DIBP 2016), which is less than 10% of the yearly “welcome [off around 200,000 permanent migrants to join our 24 million”(21.09.2016a; 10.07.2017).

They also expanded definitions of harmful destructive transnational movement to all forms of movement into Australia. Like Cameron and May, Abbott and Turnbull used expressions of net migration, for example, Turnbull remarked that “under Labor net migration peaked at an unsustainable 315,000 migrants a year. It is now less than 200,000” (19.03.2017). He used the figure of net migration to blame the Labor Party for allowing uncontrollable levels of overall people movement. Turnbull directed public attachments toward himself and his government, through images of inherited border chaos from his predecessors.

Abbott and Turnbull substantiated the border chaos claim through two interlinked figures. The first was the figure of 50,000 boat outsiders/arrivals. The second was the figure of 1,200 deaths that was also expressed using the word “thousands” 177. The following accounts are examples of the objectification of boat arrivals that contributed to an imagery of border chaos.

“Because I'm not in the business of implicitly or explicitly giving information to people smugglers and I'm not in the business of watering down the border protection policies which have saved Australia from a border protection

catastrophe created by the former government. Now, let’s again go through the facts. Under the former government, we had almost a thousand boats. We had more than 50,000 illegal arrivals by boat. We had more than a thousand deaths at sea. In July of 2013, because of the catastrophic failure of the former government, people were arriving at the rate of 50,000 a year. People were arriving at Mediterranean levels, because of the disastrous border protection policies of the former government. We came in with the strongest possible mandate to do what was needed to protect our borders. We have done it, it’s worked, we are going to keep doing it because it needs to keep working.” (12.06.2015b)

“Under the Labor Party, their neglect of Australia’s borders saw 50,000 unauthorised arrivals, courtesy of the people smugglers, at least 1,200 deaths at sea and as a consequence, rendered the integrity of our borders, destroyed the credibility of our borders, our borders became porous under the Labor Party. The Coalition was elected in 2013 and we restored the integrity of our borders. Tony Abbott, Scott Morrison stopped the boats.” (19.11.2016)

The accounts above from Abbott and Turnbull showed the persistent use of figures such as 50,000 boat arrivals and the 1,200/1,000 deaths. They propagated imageries of border chaos, and mythologised their governments’ purported attempts at rescue. In this context, Abbott not only mobilised collective-nationalist attachments that he had “saved Australia from a border protection catastrophe created by the former government”, but also defended shallow humanist-egalitarian attachments, by arguing that the protection of borders had saved the lives of many boat arrivals.
For Abbott and Turnbull, Australian society was experiencing a crisis at its maritime frontier. The mention of “Mediterranean levels” implicitly linked images of the Mediterranean migration crisis effecting Europe, to the boat arrivals experienced by Australia (12.06.2015b). This demanded the reassertion of border protection measures fortified by collective-nationalist attachment that were seemingly disregarded by Rudd and Gillard, whose “neglect of Australia’s borders saw 50,000 unauthorised arrivals” and “1,200 deaths at sea” (19.11.2016; 12.06.2015 b).

Enduring Fear Constellations of Boat Outsiders

Abbott and Turnbull stigmatised boat outsiders with a range of overlapping societal fears. These included concerns over societal resources, returning “jihadists”/transnational violence, cohesion, and death. These fears gave insecure sections of the established reasons to reject boat people outsiders. Australian leaders from 2010 to 2017 circulated risk orientations that widened circles of disassociation between boat arrivals and established groups in Australian society.

Fears about societal resources and the movement of boat outsiders were linked to notions of financial sustainability. Abbott manipulated concerns about the economy and beliefs in the scarcity of fiscal resources. He often referred to “getting the Budget under control” in the same breath as border protection, and persistently reasserted established group controls over budgets and borders.

Abbott reiterated combinations of the following catchphrase: “we would stop the boats, we would scrap the carbon tax, we would build the roads of the 21st century and we would get the Budget back under control” (21.05.2014). The repetition of an electioneering slogan revealed Abbott’s party-political vulnerabilities. He amalgamated budget and border concerns, in phases such as gaining a “budget dividend” (19.06.2014; 04.05.2015) to prevent any further “border protection budget blowouts” (16.02.2014; 28.02.2014; 09.07.2014; 12.07.2014; 30.10.2016).

The hypocrisy of the phrase “border protection budget blowouts” is that it did not apply to Abbott’s own policies, which in 2016-2017 cost 4 billion Australian dollars (Karp 2018).

Abbott also the amplified belief that “the vast majority of the people coming to Australia illegally by boat were economic migrants” (22.03.2014). This latter term has parallels from the 20th century. The notion of economic refugees/migrants was first used to categorise Jews fleeing Germany in the 1930s, who were stigmatised as “Wirtschaftsemigranten” (Loescher 1996: 17). Boat outsiders were scapegoats for fears about the economic sustainability and the fiscal decline of Australian society.

Abbott and Turnbull expressed greater fears about returning “jihadists” and the movement of boat outsiders linked to concerns over transnational violence. Many sections of Australian society have become accustomed to the absence of violence in their everyday lives. Mentions by Turnbull of “the advantage of our island geography, our effective border protection and counter-terrorism agencies mean we have confidence that we know who is arriving” (23.03.2016a; also see 21.09.2016a), further enhanced attachments to the collective-nationalist normative code and established group dominations over violence. Abbott remarked that.

“We have for the last six months stopped illegal boats arriving in Australia and we are determined to be just as tough in stopping jihadists arriving in Australia. We’ve stopped the illegal boats, we will ensure that we stop the jihadists as well because the last thing we want is people who have been radicalised and militarised by experience with these al-Qaeda offshoots in the Middle East – the last thing we want is these people who have been radicalised and militarised returning to create mischief here in Australia.” (23.06.2014)

179 Also note Blair’s use of the term as highlighted in Chapter 5.
In account 23.06.2014, Abbott expanded border protection obligations to the realisation of societal protection against transnational violence. Abbott argued that having “stopped illegal boats” was sufficient to “stop the jihadists”. He circulated fears about the breakdown of established group dominations over violence, to reassert societal regulations “stripping citizenship from terrorists who are dual nationals” (24.06.2015). Boat people outsiders became brutalised carriers of violence, which confirmed their exclusion, and spurred pre-emptive measures such as mandatory detention.

The entanglement of fears about cohesion and the movement of boat outsiders were linked to the idealisation of stringent personal regulations. Australian leaders revealed implicit attachment to the legacy of an authoritarian convict settler society that practiced strict modes of societal orientation, with subsequent fears of disorientation.

Abbott and Turnbull propagated established group fears about the breakdown of cohesive societal ‘laws’ linked to the safeguarding of borders. They circulated continued ignorance of international societal regulations such as the Law of the Sea. Abbott accentuated fears about the breakdown of established ‘laws’ and orientations, via the imagery of “border protection disaster” (01.07.2014). Turnbull maintained distorted depictions of a lawlessness maritime frontier through his sycophantic commendation of Immigration Minister Peter Dutton for doing “an outstanding job in restoring and maintaining the rule of law on our borders” (27.07.2016a). Abbott and Turnbull upheld the misleading notion that the only societal regulations shaping maritime relations were the ‘laws’ crafted by themselves and their government. The belief that their predecessors had ‘lost control of the border’ and endangered Australian society, helped legitimise measures “do whatever is necessary to once more ensure that our borders and totally and fully secure” (28.02.2014).

Fears about death were linked with the movement of boat outsiders. Australian leaders equated the prevention of deaths at sea with measures against vilified people smugglers, who were blamed for bringing of death into Australian society,
as people “lost their lives because of people smugglers” (20.09.2017; 06.07.2010; 11.09.2014; 12.06.2015a; 12.06.2015b 19.11.2016). Abbott in particular, equated the arrival of boats, with the onset of death into Australian society. For the majority of groups in Australian society, death is not an everyday experience. When confronted with images of death at the maritime frontiers of society through mass media and the vocabulary of Australian leaders, there are fears about contact, in combinations of repulsions, indifference and voyeuristic fascination.

The persistent reference to border deaths Abbott sensitised Australian society to the presence of death on maritime frontiers. Struggles over the balance of societal power in Australian society were infused with necropolitics/nécropolitique obsessions over life and death. Abbott channelled necropolitical desires to prevent deaths at the frontier through the practice of turn backs, which showed the habituated legacy of his unfinished training as a Catholic priest by expressing theological obsessions over death and salvation:

“the only way to stop the deaths at sea is to stop the boats and that means – I have to say – turning boats around. Now, the Australian Government is prepared to turn boats around, we’ve been able to do it safely and effectively” (17.05.2015)

In account 17.05.2015, Abbott glorified the prevention of death, through ‘turning back the boats’. This practice ensured that deaths were better if they occurred elsewhere and worse if they happened within the boundaries of Australian society. The only deaths that mattered were those occurring in the purview of Australia’s party-government establishment, which might be blamed for those avoidable fatalities.

Abbott polarised Australian society, emphasising the divisions between the actions of his government and resistance by sections of Australian society. He and his government “want to keep life safe” (04.05.2015) by saving Australia from the

180 See Mbembe (2003).
menace of death. His opponents that include other members of established groups such as opposition parties, and “human rights lawyers” were purportedly in league with vilified people smugglers, jeopardising people’s lives (21.04.2015). Images of boat outsiders became stigmatised by a morbid obsession, a fear of contact with death that left no room for any diversification of understanding in a one-way mirror of attachments towards an increasingly national-militarised establishment assigned to the prevention of deaths on Australia’s maritime frontier.

There was the continuation of aquatic metaphors from Howard and Rudd years into the Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull phase of Australian society, which paralleled articulations by British leaders. All of these leaders fortified their societies to defend against mythologised transnational movement.

Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull noted the “surges in boat arrivals” (06.07.2010; also see 17.05.2015; 21.09.2016a; 21.04.2017) and the prevention of the “inflow” of people (09.07.2014; 13.06.2017; 10.07.2017). These harmful depictions simulated thoughts of societal drowning, a society whose institutions and capacities are on the verge of being submerged ‘under the water’ by transnational movement, which included “a humanitarian program that was swamped by these unauthorised arrivals” (30.10.2016).

More harmful catastrophic transnational movement was understood as a more supernatural ‘act of god’ in similar ways to depictions of natural disasters such as floods, bushfires, cyclones, and storms. Aquatic depictions of transnational movement escalated into understandings of impending societal calamity, Turnbull discussed the “‘the perfect storm' attacking Europe, where Daesh and others have successfully taken advantage of porous borders and uncontrolled humanitarian flows” (01.09.2016). The repetition of objectified boat arrivals and deaths enhanced notions of societal inundation and legitimatised practices such as mandatory detention and turn backs.

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Continuation of Mandatory Detention Practices

The vocabulary of Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull circulated societal orientations that fortified Australian society. The criminalisation and objectification of boat arrivals led to the continuation of mandatory detention, and from 2013 onwards, in the guise of “Operation Sovereign Borders”, the additional militarised pledge to turn the arrival of boats back/around (26.04.2011; 05.12.2014b). Collectively these practices formed part of totalising collective-nationalist attachments and commitments to border protection that perpetuated the stigmatisation of boat people outsiders as lawbreakers.

The practice of mandatory detention, whether onshore on the Australian mainland or on offshore locations such as Nauru and Manus Island confirmed the harmful stigmatisation of boat outsiders. Gillard explicitly remarked that “I am a very big supporter of mandatory detention. It is the right thing to do” (26.04.2011). The arrival of boat people outsiders perpetuated coercive practices that mirrored the imprisonment of people suspected of other illegalised activities, for example the trafficking of illicit narcotics or weapons. Abbott commended functionaries such as “Strategic Border Command.....who are keeping our borders secure, these are the people who are stopping the boats, stopping the guns and stopping the drugs” (25.03.2015). In the following accounts, commitments to mandatory detention illustrated continued idealisations from the humanist-egalitarian and collective-nationalist normative codes.

“As a nation we use a mandatory detention system for good reason, if people arrive unauthorised in our country then it is appropriate for us to take steps to detain people whilst we ascertain their identity, their health status, any security concerns and we work through whether or not they are a legitimate refugee for whom we should extend our compassion and concern. Mandatory detention is a longstanding Labor policy; it was introduced into Australia by a Labor Government for good reason. Of course when
people are in immigration detention, we seek to treat them in a fair and decent way and successive Ministers for Immigration under this Government, Minister Evans and now Minister Bowen, have worked hard to ensure that is the case.” (26.04.2011)

“The most humane, the most compassionate, the most decent thing you can do is stop the boats and a very important part of stopping the boats, as both sides of the Parliament now accept, is offshore processing at Nauru and at Manus. So, that’s exactly what’s happening. That’s what we’ll be continuing. Obviously, the Nauru camp is under the control of Nauruan Government officials, just as the Manus camp is under the control of PNG Government officials.....I’m confident that this Government has largely stopped the boats. I’m also confident that only this Government can keep them stopped because any other government, I suspect, would quickly succumb to the cries of the human rights lawyers and others and what that would mean, very quickly, is that the people smugglers would be back in business, the boats would start again and the drownings would start again. I’m determined to make sure that that doesn’t happen – full stop. My absolutely clear message to the people smugglers is we are more than a match for you. Our determination to save lives at sea is greater than your determination to profit from putting people's lives at risk. (21.04.2015)

Our ability to restore the integrity of our borders, to our ability to stop the people smuggling trade, has enabled us now not only to close 17 detention centres in Australia, not only to take the thousands of children out of detention that the Labor Party put into detention. But now to reach the new
arrangement with the United States that will offer resettlement in the United States to persons on Nauru and Manus, who are currently on Nauru and Manus. This is a one-off deal, a one-off opportunity. It applies only to refugees on the regional processing centres on Nauru and Manus. It is not available to anyone who seeks to come subsequently to Australia. The foundation of our multicultural society - the most successful in the world. The foundation of our generous humanitarian programs is secure borders. It is the security of those borders and the ability to ensure that it is the Australian Government, on behalf of the Australian people, that determines who comes to Australia. That is the foundation of our ability to be generous and compassionate to refugees.

(14.11.2016a)

Each of the accounts above expressed tacit support for the practice of mandatory detention. Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull showed idealised attachments to both humanist-egalitarian principles and the collective-nationalist code. Shallow references to humanist egalitarian “compassion” maintained the unequal power ratio between the established groups in Australian society and people boat outsiders.

In account 26.04.2011, Gillard remarked that compassion should only be extended to “legitimate” refugees that are defined as harmless. The presumption was that “unauthorised” arrivals were harmful catastrophic risks to established groups in Australian society that demanded their detention while still ensuring “fair and decent” treatment. Both Gillard and Abbott displayed superficial humanist-egalitarian attachments to saving the lives of boat people through offshore processing in Nauru and Manus Island (21.04.2015).

Humanist-egalitarian compassion to incarcerated boat arrivals were outweighed by collective-nationalist attachments to border protection and the struggle against the
people smugglers, which could not be undermined by the “cries of the human rights lawyers” (21.04.2015). Abbott threatened that should the resolve of his government become weakened, there was the increased possibility of more boats, and more deaths on Australia’s maritime frontier (21.04.2015).

In account 14.11.2016a, Turnbull’s commodified refugee swap with the United States expressed party-political survival and collective-nationalist idealisation of borders, rather than humanist-egalitarian compassion towards refugees. The struggle against people smugglers has become a conflict with no prospect of conclusion, so long as “the integrity of our borders” seems threatened (14.11.2016a), and unless Australian leaders reduce their sensitivity to the smallest degree of boat movement.

Militarisation: Distortion of Regionalised & Globalised Relations

The consistent idealisation of border protection empowered the militarisation of Australia’s maritime frontier, further politicising the Australian Defence Force (ADF). As well as integrating broader immigration functions into functionaries such as the Home Affairs Ministry. The militarisation of the maritime frontier appealed to the idealisation of the military by certain sections of established groups in Australian society and helped perpetuate the ‘Anzac myth’182. There was the appropriation and equation of nostalgic memorialised defences of Australia during the 20th century with contemporary efforts to protect borders. Abbott remarked how. “It is the Liberal Party that kept Australia strong by signing the ANZUS Treaty, by properly funding our defence force and by stopping the boats – not once but twice!” (28.06.2014).

Commitments to border protection justified the formation of a paramilitary organisation in the shape of the ABF. Australian leaders propagated the views of an emboldened national-security establishment that required “the legislation that they need to keep us safe” (25.06.2017), as well as the material means of carrying out

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that regulation through the acquisition of “border security aircraft” such as the P8A Poseidon aircraft (28.02.2014; 16.11.2016). Border Protection personnel that included the ADF and the ABF were persistently commended for keeping “Australia’s borders secure” (06.07.2010; 28.02.2014; 14.11.2016a). Even the title of “Border Force”, presumed a reassertion and projection of masculinised strength against indeterminate objects, reinforced by ABF officers being donned in military style uniforms with gold and black/dark navy buttoned coats, gold epaulets, gold badges, and trained in the use of force (Hasham 2015; Hartcher 2015).

Australian leaders, through their statements on asylum seekers and refugees disseminated the societal orientations that helped legitimise ‘Operation Fortitude’. Where ABF officers would be “speaking with any individual we cross paths with” seeking out those who had committed “visa fraud” (ABF 2015). This proceeding was cancelled as a result of strong societal resistance (ABC 2015). The original press release from the ABF demonstrates the growing criminalisation of transnational movement and greater controls over law enforcement functions, as “officers will for the first time join forces with a diverse team of transport and enforcement agencies to target crime in the Melbourne Central Business District” (ABF 2015). Even though Operation Fortitude was cancelled the insecure modes of thinking and orientation that legitimised its draconian practices continued through the Abbott and Turnbull phase of Australian society.

Australia’s regional neighbours were expected to feel the same vulnerabilities and harmful depictions of boat arrivals as the sections of the Australian established groups. The more unequal relations between Australia and its near neighbours contributed to the burden shifting of responsibilities towards migrants. Regionally, however, the ban on boat people from ever coming to Australia, even those found to be refugees (19.11.2016; 20.09.2017), shifted the burden for the resettlement of recognised refugees towards Australia’s less developed near neighbours. Abbott called Cambodia’s acceptance of refugees from Australian camps in Nauru a sign of “Cambodia’s readiness to be a good international citizen” (31.08.2015). In account
31.08.2015, he distorted understandings of good international citizenship by increasing the exclusiveness of Australian state-society, by urging another a state-society’s accept boat people outsiders that were unwanted by Australia. This reinforced the more exclusive, highly unequal power relations between Australia and Cambodia (also see 20.05.2014; 20.09.2017).

Australian leaders articulated a pernicious form of international friendship or alliance. There was the expectation that Indonesia, Cambodia and Papua New Guinea would join the struggle against people smugglers. Gillard and Abbott expressed the regionalised criminalisation of movement targeting people smuggling (03.11.2010; 07.07.2010a; 16.02.2014; 19.06.2014; 04.06.2014; 15.03.2015; 12.06.2015a). As well as support for the detention of asylum seekers in the form of a regional processing centre (07.07.2010b), all in the spirit of “fraternal support – of regional mateship” (21.02.2014; 14.06.2015).

Beyond Asia, Australian leaders stigmatised European states as exemplars of catastrophic outcomes that might be experienced by Australian society. Harmful depictions of the broader humanitarian crisis in the Middle East effecting Europe (04.09.2015; 06.09.2015; 10.09.2015), “that ISIL is using the refugee crisis to send operatives into Europe” (23.03.2016a), merged with beliefs that Australia was experiencing its own “border protection crisis” (05.12.2014b). European state-societies were “countries where governments have lost control of their borders and their migration system has got out of control” (19.03.2017).

For Turnbull, European state-societies failed their collective-nationalist obligations to border protection. Images of Europe became highly distorted by fears about transnational violence and cohesion. He circulated catastrophic imageries of Europe to act as exemplars of what should not happen to Australian society. This helped legitimise the fortification of societal orientations against globalised crises.

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183 This is defined by Linklater (1992: 27) as the “means of weakening the exclusionary character of the modern state and of overcoming an ancient tension between the rights of citizens and the duties to the rest of humanity”.

184 “terrorist attacks in Brussels remind us once again of the global threat of terrorism, the need to be vigilant at home, to maintain the security of our borders” (23.03.2016a).

185 “the Europeans regrettably lost control of their borders” (08.12.2016).
beyond, which reinforced the hold of Australian leaders on the balance of societal power within Australia.

Conclusion

Australian Prime Ministers from 2001 to 2017 exploited the societal vulnerabilities of insecure groups within Australian society. They propagated more closed socio-psychological fortifications. Harmful depictions of transnational movement, in particular the movement of boat outsiders circulated desires for more brutalised societal regulations. There were developing circumstances for people to be more fearful of each other, through widened circles of disassociation between established sections of Australian society and transnational outsiders.

It is foreseeable that the militarised regulation of boat people could also be applied to other societal outsider groups. Operation Fortitude offered a glimpse into the future of Australian society, where inspection, arrest and imprisonment are ordinary societal procedures faced by all members of society. The cumulative arc of development indicated an Australian society that is less open and feels less secure. Australian Prime Ministers have influenced the expansion of less open and less secure modes thinking and orientations in the society they have lead.

This chapter has examined the migration vocabulary of Australian Prime Ministers Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull from 2010 to 2017. I examined their speeches, interviews and press conferences and reconstructed the societal processes that have fortified the modes thinking and orientating in Australian society.

I have argued Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull verbalised more extreme obsessions about harmful catastrophic movements of boat outsiders that fortified Australian society. They mobilised shared anxieties and propagated more reductive modes of thinking. Commodified understandings of boat outsiders demonstrated the growing influence of a national-security establishment. Australian leaders cultivated more harmful destructive understandings of asylum seeker and refugee movement by
boat to Australia, which reinforced collective-nationalist attachments to stronger border protection. For Australian leaders asylum seekers and refugees became definite risks to established sections of Australian society.

More harmful risk orientations of asylum seekers and refugees dominated societal relations. Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull criminalised boat outsiders, and vilified them through their links to people smugglers. This reinforced the objectification of boat arrivals and the infusion of fears about societal resources, returning “jihadists”/transnational violence, cohesion, and death. These fears widened circles of disassociation that legitimised the stigmatisation of boat arrivals and distorted Australian diplomacy.

The conclusion of my thesis will recap the development of socio-psychological fortifications in British and Australian societies. I will also discuss the scope for further research into shared anxieties in liberal-democratic societies.
Conclusion

Political leaders in liberal-democratic societies are often torn between diverging sets of human attachments. Interpretations of transnational people movements have cultivated degrees of inclusive societal openness and exclusive societal closure. On the one hand, political leaders have directed their societies into more open societies, more comfortable with the movement people and exchanges of ideas, cultures and lifestyles. Transnational people movements have symbolised the possibilities for more multifaceted forms of human relations. This open outlook has fostered practices for greater societal inclusion of various human groups. On the other hand, political leaders have directed their societies into more closed societies, more hostile to the movement of people, ideas and lifestyles. Transnational people movements have symbolised the decline and destruction of particular societal relations and perpetuated stringent regulations. This closed outlook has cultivated practices aimed at greater societal exclusion of migrants and ‘foreigners’.

My thesis has investigated how political leaders in Britain and Australia have managed these conflicting trends, and the associated anxieties, through their depictions of transnational migration.

I have researched the speeches, interviews and press conferences of Prime Ministers in Britain and Australia from 2001 to 2017. The British example focused on Prime Ministers Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Theresa May. The Australian example concentrated on Prime Ministers John Howard, Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull.

I have argued that shared anxieties embedded in depictions of transnational movement have fortified the orientations in British and Australian society.

British and Australian leaders mobilised shared anxieties, in ambiguous interpretations of transnational movement, which contextualised the conscience formations in these societies. The language of leaders channelled the attitudes of
various established societal groups with conflicting techno-economic and politico-economic identifications. Transnational outsiders were commodified into harmful and harmless side effects. This process illustrated attachments to the humanist-egalitarian and collective-nationalist normative codes. British and Australian leaders propagated greater more idealised attachments towards the collective-nationalist code, sustained by commitments to border protection. They circulated the vulnerabilities of insecure sections of established groups, through harmful risk interpretations of transnational outsiders.

British and Australian leaders dominated societal orientations with more harmful risk orientations towards transnational outsiders. The movement of transnational outsiders became criminalised, masculinised, and objectified. British and Australian leaders circulated harmful risk orientations that helped widen circles of disassociation. Transnational outsiders were stigmatised with broader societal fears, which legitimised their exclusion. These leaders steered societal orientations that contributed to the estrangement of British relations with the EU, and the distortion of Australian diplomatic relations.

British and Australian Prime Ministers have propagated more reductive modes of thinking and narrow orientations, which have fortified these societies by raising the barriers to societal inclusion and widened forms of exclusion.

**Thesis Summary**

My thesis was divided into two parts. The first part built a sociological model for shared anxieties. Chapter 1 explained the model and vocabulary of process sociology. Chapter 2 explained the model and vocabulary of risk sociology. I argued that a synthesis of process and risk sociology expanded understandings of shared anxieties.

The second part of the thesis reconstructed the societal processes embedded within the migration speeches, interviews and press conferences of British and Australian Prime Ministers from 2001 to 2010, using the vocabularies of process and risk
sociology. This evidence substantiates the development of socio-psychological fortifications in British and Australian societies. Chapters 3 and 4 evaluated the migration language of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (2001-2010), and David Cameron and Theresa May (2010-2017). Chapters 5 and 6 assessed the migration of John Howard and Kevin Rudd (2001-2010), and Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull (2010-2017).

Contribution

My thesis has provided two interconnected contributions to understanding the sociological processes that situate relations in human societies. The first contribution developed a sociological model for shared anxieties. I synthesised the models and vocabularies of process sociology and risk sociology. The second contribution outlined the migration language representations that fortified British and Australian societies. These contributions expanded the literature of International Relations and Sociology, through more verifiable understandings of the societal processes contextualising relations in two state-societies. I have brought together understandings from process and risk sociology to broaden research into transnational migration within International Relations and wider Sociology and Societal Science.

The first contribution of my thesis developed a sociological model for understanding shared anxieties through a sophisticated synthesis of knowledge processes, interdependencies and power relations.

A synthesis of process and risk sociology provided a relational reconstructive model to understand shared anxieties through the interdependence of knowledge processes and corresponding power relations. Process models used an open people model that focused on webs of human interdependencies to understand how people form their most basic orientations through the involvement detachment balance, and changing power ratios. Risk models emphasised the awareness and unawareness of risks, the side effects from global interdependencies, and the power relations of risk consciousness.
Process and risk vocabularies offered complementary sets of expressions to conceptualise shared anxieties. Process sociology offered terms to understand the power struggles between secure and insecure sections of established groups in relations with outsider groups in the form of conflicting attachments to nation-state normative codes. These struggles contextualised the means societal orientation with the development of circles of association and disassociation, bound to certain established group fears and stigmatised depictions of outsider groups. Risk sociology presented terms to grasp the power struggles of cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitan movements. Cooperation pressures from experiences of globalised interdependencies circulated societal contestations over harmful catastrophic and harmless safe risks, which effected the societal management of fears.

The second contribution of my thesis, traced the migration language articulated by political leaders in Britain and Australia. The models and vocabulary of process and risk sociology offered a sophisticated power and interdependency method to reconstruct the societal processes implicit in the migration language of British and Australian leaders.

Three main similarities interconnected the material from British and Australian leaders.

Firstly, similar societal processes embedded in the migration language of British leaders appeared in the language of Australian leaders. These processes encompassed the commodification, criminalisation and objectification of transnational outsiders and the masculinisation of established group orientations. The commodification of transnational outsiders emphasised presumed harmfulness and/or harmlessness. This reflected established group preferences for ‘harmless’ people with extreme quantities of financial capital. Criminalisation processes sustained more harmful risk orientations towards particular groups of transnational outsiders. The objectification of transnational outsiders into numerical symbols confirmed the perceived threat of ‘illegitimate’ movement to societal cohesion and justified more brutalised regulations. British and Australian
leaders were entrapped in double bind processes that emphasised more masculinised characteristics of established group strength and over weakness.

Secondly, British and Australian Prime Ministers practiced highly involved short-term leadership styles, which blamed their political opponents for harmful transnational people movements into their respective societies. They attempted to redirect societal attachments towards themselves to manage their party-political insecure orientations. Thirdly, they prioritised and confused their party political survival for the survival of their society as a whole. Their propagation of collective-nationalist attachments and symbols such as border protection, became the means by which they secured their hold on the balance of societal power.

There were also two main differences between British and Australian leaders. The first difference was that for British leaders, relations with Europe came to dominate and distort their representations of transnational movement. Australian leaders shifted the responsibilities of managing boat arrivals onto less developed regional neighbours in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

The second difference was in the specific stigmatisation of transnational outsiders. British leaders used more precise sets of fears bound to the cohesive qualities of particular societal institutions such as healthcare. The stigmatisation of asylum seekers by Blair expanded over time, through his successors Brown, Cameron and May to European movement. Australian leaders focused on the boat arrivals of asylum seekers and refugees, and articulated less precise, more intangible fears such as the breakdown of societal cohesion. They channelled the idealised fears of established groups bound by stringent personal regulations. The habituated remnant from an authoritarian convict settler society. Both sets of leaders disseminated acceptance for more brutalised measures against boat people outsiders and European migrants.

The migration language of British and Australian Prime Ministers fortified their respective societies. They propagated socio-psychological fortifications that have increased the reasons for established groups to be more fearful of transnational
outsiders. This is setting the scene for more destructive human practices in British and Australian societies.

I have revealed the common patterns and sets of processes across two liberal-democratic societies in the period from 2001 to 2017. This opens the space for further studies into shared anxieties and the webs of human interdependencies binding collective experiences, identifications and associations.

Further Studies

This section explains the areas for further exploration to deepen and widen understandings of shared anxieties set out in the thesis, hereafter FSMSA (Fortified Societies. The Mobilisation of Shared Anxieties).

The first avenue deepens FSMSA using further documentary materials.

An extension of thesis would investigate the statements from Gillard, Rudd and Abbott from 2013 that were omitted from Chapter 6. This study would outline in miniature, the societal process from FSMSA. It would proceed in chronological order starting in January with Gillard, progressing to Rudd, then concluding with Abbott in December.

Another extension would explore the private remarks of British and Australian leaders from cabinet discussions that are currently under embargo. These documents would be available from 2032 onwards. The study would compare these private remarks with the public remarks detailed in FSMSA.

These two extensions would need to be combined with an investigation of how certain phrases from leaders were repeated in the public and private reports of functionaries and other Ministers, as well as newer mediums of public correspondence such as Twitter.
Further research will also need to explore the public remarks of other key members of the party-government establishments in Britain and Australia. As well as Prime Ministers across other thematic areas beyond migration, such as foreign policy, economic affairs and social welfare. This research would need to be repeated across other liberal-democratic societies in this same time period, for example France, Germany, Italy, the United States, Canada. South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Japan.

The purpose of these additional studies would be to build more variable webs of understanding that provides a more detailed picture of these societies across the time period surveyed.

The second avenue for further studies widens FSMSA through additional research collaboration with other areas of scholarship. This would expand the conceptualisations of shared anxieties, leadership, commodification objectification, criminalisation, and stigmatisation processes.

Understandings of shared anxieties would benefit from greater engagement with the psychologised research work of Kierkegaard and Freud. This cannot sacrifice the sociological commitment to understanding the development of human relations in the plural rather than the reductive singular. Some of the broader societal fears outlined in FSMSA, should be verifiable in clinical psychological studies of personal anxieties.

Understanding leadership and the societal steering functions of leaders would need to break the domination of management studies and public policy research. The focus of this sociological work would demythologise the functions of leadership and the mythical claims of leaders.

Understanding commodification and objectification processes would explore how some groups of people and interrelated practices become commodified/decommodified into tradeable objects overtime. These sociological studies would challenge the knowledge dominations of commerce and economic studies.
Understanding criminalisation processes would further investigate the sociological interdependencies of guilt, innocence and punishment. This study would focus on the long-term regulation of human desires and the development of sets of societal rules and laws often remarked in phrase such as ‘rule of law’. The study would break the knowledge dominations of criminology and legal studies for understanding the development of ‘rules’ within and between human societies, showing the codification processes that simulated emergence and habituation of collective-nationalist and humanist-egalitarian codes.

Understanding stigmatisation processes would expand the process and risk synthesis from FSMSA. This would integrate the work of Mary Douglas (1992), specifically, her essays on Risk and Blame and Witchcraft and Leprosy. The purpose of this refined synthesis would challenge the artificial divide between cultural theory and the conceptualisation of wider socio-historic developments. Douglas’s social anthropological approach to risk finds common cause with Elias and Beck’s critique of reductive knowledge processes. Her approach also rejects closed person understandings found in the social sciences: “the egocentric theoretical position of most psychology, economics, and cognitive science inhibits their understanding [of] collective behaviour” (1992: x).

Two final remarks on fortification processes in societies. First, the statements of British and Australian leaders between the years 2001 and 2017 appear to be similar to the more recent public statements by leaders such as Donald Trump in America, Victor Orban in Hungary, Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland, Sebastian Kurz in Austria and Matteo Salvini in Italy. Each of these leaders have guided their societies through idealised attachments to the collective-nationalist code and harmful risk orientations towards transnational outsiders. Each leader and their wider party-government establishment fortifies themselves and reduces the scope of societal cooperation.

British and Australian leaders have contributed the legitimisation more brutalised global practices against transnational outsiders. They have set the scene for the development of authoritarian democracies that are undermining both the EU and
broader international humanitarian conventions. At present, it is foreseeable that pernicious alliances between authoritarian democracies could develop into the future with destructive consequences for international humanitarian conventions within and between societies.

Second, the developments I have highlighted in FSMSA are changeable. Many groups of people within British and Australian societies would be happy with ongoing fortification processes. Other groups would experience resigned indifference. If your reaction to my study is to defortify these societies, or at least to reflect on the development of societal fortifications. Then I have succeeded in provoking degrees of catharsis, through the verifiable reconstruction of societal processes. Hopefully, I have opened constructive avenues for thinking and orientating that enable more tactful negotiations of shared anxieties in contemporary societal relations.
Appendix

This is a chronological list of all the speeches, interviews and press conferences from British and Australian Prime Ministers referenced in the thesis.

United Kingdom

Tony Blair (2001-2007)

2001


2002


274
2003


2004


2005


2006


2007


Gordon Brown

2007


2008


17.06.2008  Brown, Gordon. 2008. 'Speech on Security and Liberty Tuesday 17 June'. Accessed 18th of January 2017 Available at


2010


David Cameron

2010


2011


2012


2013


2014


2015


29.05.2015 Cameron, David. 2015. 'David Cameron and Angela Merkel in Berlin press conference Delivered on 29 May 2015'. Accessed 26th of May 2017 Available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160124220003/http


2016


Theresa May

2016


2017


Australia

John Howard

2001


2003


2004


2005


2006


2007


Kevin Rudd

2008


2009


2010


Julia Gillard

2010


2011


2012


Tony Abbott

2014


Malcolm Turnbull

2016


2017


337


Adler-Nissen, Rebecca and Vincent Pouliot. 2014. 'Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya'. European Journal of International Relations.


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Sirriyeh, Ala. 2015. 'All you need is love and £18,600': Class and the new UK family migration rules'. *Critical Social Policy* 35(2): 228-247.


Wouters, Cas. 2016. 'Functional Democratisation and Disintegration as Side-Effects of Differentiation and Integration Processes'. *Human Figurations* 5(2).

Young, Jock. 2003. 'To these Wet and Windy Shores: Recent Immigration Policy in the UK'. *Punishment & Society* 5(4): 449-462.
