Review article

After Hannibal and Scipio: The Spymasters of India and Pakistan reflect on years of conflict

R. Gerald Hughes and Ryan Shaffer


‘I sincerely hope that they (relations between India and Pakistan) will be friendly and cordial. We have a great deal to do, both states, and I think that we can be of use to each other (and to) the world.’ Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948).

‘Intelligence links between neighbours are obviously desirable. It is better to institutionalise them now, rather than trying to activate them in times of crisis (that is why they failed in [the terrorist attacks of] 26/11). In due course, both sides would understand the need for ‘open’ intelligence posts in diplomatic missions. In the meantime, petty harassment of each other’s officers and staff could end. Intelligence links can succeed where all others fail. What agencies can achieve is not at times even conceivable in political or diplomatic channels.’ A.S. Dulat and Asad Durrani.


In 193 BC the Roman general Scipio Africanus, who nine years earlier had effectively ended the Second Punic War by defeating Hannibal Barca at the Battle of Zama, was part of a delegation sent to settle a dispute with Antiochus III of Syria. Conversely, Hannibal, now a lonely figure in exile, had been acting as counsel to Antiochus III. Hannibal’s legend was such that the Syrians were willing to pay handsomely for his strategic insights, as war with Rome seemed ever more likely. In his Ab Urbe Condita, Titus Livius Patavinus (‘Livy’, 59 BC-AD 17) recorded the meeting between the two great generals at Ephesus after fate had, once again, thrown them together.
[Scipio] Africanus asked who Hannibal [Barca] thought had been the greatest general, and Hannibal replied that it was Alexander of Macedon, because with a small force he had defeated armies of immense proportions and penetrated to the ends of the earth, which human beings had never expected to visit. When Scipio then asked whom Hannibal would rank second, his answer was that it was Pyrrhus: it was he who first taught the technique of laying out a camp and, in addition, no one had selected his terrain and deployed his troops with more finesse. He also had a way of gaining men’s support, so that the peoples of Italy to be ruled by a foreign king than by the Roman people, despite the latter’s long hegemony in the land. Scipio went on to ask whom he considered third, and Hannibal replied that it was obviously Hannibal himself. Scipio burst into laughter, and retorted: ‘What would your answer be if you had defeated me?’. ‘In that case’, Hannibal replied, ‘I should have said that I was ahead of both Alexander and Pyrrhus, and all the other generals in the world.’

Whatever the accuracy of Livy’s account, the notion of former adversaries engaging in mutual reflection by means of post-conflict discourse is an appealing one and such conversations have often been the stuff of parlour games amongst scholars and intellectuals. (These are taken to their logical, and often perverse, extremes in on-line forums where hours of effort are expended on participants asking question such as ‘What would (Soviet) Marshal Georgi Zhukov and (German) Field Marshal Erich von Manstein have discussed had they met after the Second World War?’). But what we have here is, for those animated by a similarly-motivated curiosity, a rather remarkable piece of historical and intelligence literature. Given all of this, the bringing together of two former heads of the Indian and Pakistani intelligence services is inevitably going to result in what will be termed a ‘ground-breaking’ book. As one Indian reviewer noted recently:

Sometimes, books take on a life of their own because of the way they capture the zeitgeist or tap into a subject that is central to the lives of millions of people. In the case of The Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and the Illusion of Peace, it is a bit of both. Let’s face it, there will never be a dearth of books about India-Pakistan relations and a fascination for the subject among people of both countries. Even more so at a time when things seem to be going disastrously for the relations between New Delhi and Islamabad, given their failure to deal with the fallout of the 2008 Mumbai attacks and more recent incidents such as the terror attacks in Pathankot and Uri and the surgical strikes on the LoC. It is not surprising that The Spy Chronicles is the subject of so much attention. It is authored by two former intelligence chiefs – one from India and one from Pakistan - with a journalist moderating their discussions. The individuals are A.S. Dulat, Secretary of India’s Research and Analysis Wing (commonly known as RAW, but referred to within the Indian government as R&AW) from 1999 to 2000; Asad Durrani, Director-General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) from 1990 to 1991; and Indian journalist Aditya Sinha. Each former intelligence chief gained valuable insight by having served as head of his foreign intelligence services as well as domestic or military intelligence and in advisory or diplomatic positions. Indian journalist and writer Barkha Dutt wrote ‘the idea that the erstwhile captains of their
covert agencies should even talk amiably, leave alone co-author a book, is unimaginable.\textsuperscript{14} Yet, the reality is ISI and RAW intelligence heads have been meeting and writing together as part of a Track II (‘backchannel) diplomatic effort for years.\textsuperscript{15} Of note here is the Intelligence Dialogue, organised by Peter Jones of the University of Ottawa, which has featured Dulat and Durrani. This cooperative spirit has also seen the two intelligence chiefs jointly authored articles in 2011 and 2013.\textsuperscript{16} More recently, Dulat debated with Ehsan ul Haq, former Director-General of ISI from 2001 to 2004, publicly at the London School of Economics about intelligence services’ positive contributions.\textsuperscript{17} Figures such as Dulat and Durrani have long been shrouded in mystery and mired in controversy. This is hardly surprising as senior security officials from the Indian sub-continent and figures from the world of intelligence anywhere, will always arouse curiosity. From its inception, RAW has been criticised for its lack of accountability – to both the Indian parliament and the Indian people, which is reinforced by the fact that RAW reports only to the Indian prime minister. Those heading the RAW have, naturally, come under a great deal of scrutiny, and idiosyncratic eccentrics such as Dulat are the subject of a great deal of comment. In 2015, one Indian reviewer of a book of Dulat’s noted that

\begin{quote}
For years, Dulat was a mysterious character from a spy thriller, who seemed to be everywhere in Kashmir, trying to win over separatist leaders and elected officials for New Delhi. Unlike his peers, he had been a spy who used words and cash as weapons. He lured top militants into giving up arms. He charmed separatists with lofty promises of peace. Where words didn’t work, he used money to buy their loyalty.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

In his own country, Durrani is undoubtedly regarded as a more controversial figure than Dulat. This is due not least to the reputation of the ISI internationally: a few years ago Ali Dayan Hasan, a South Asian expert at Human Rights Watch, asserted that ‘the Pakistan army, through its intelligence agencies, is the principal abuser of human rights in Pakistan.’\textsuperscript{19} Such beliefs were reinforced by accusations, like those made by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1994, which posited that General Durrani and General Mirza Aslam Beg, the former Pakistani Chief of Staff, had sought to sell heroin in order to finance covert military operations in 1991. Durrani, by then Pakistan’s ambassador to Germany, denied this stating: ‘This is a preposterous thing for a former prime minister to say. I know nothing about it. We never ever talked on this subject at all.’\textsuperscript{20} By his own admission Durrani was certainly no angel, having acknowledged providing money to the parties ranged against Benazir Bhutto during the 1990\textsuperscript{21} and 1993 Pakistani general elections. In a BBC interview Durrani later recalled that ‘[a]fter seeing the period that she had ruled, I thought it would be better if the lady [i.e. Benazir Bhutto] did not come to power’.\textsuperscript{22} It is small wonder that we now have confirmation of the involvement of so many figures in the Pakistani military, political and intelligence elites in her assassination in December 2007.\textsuperscript{23} In her posthumously published book, Reconciliation, Benazir Bhutto named a man who she believed had tried to procure bombs for an unsuccessful attempt on her life in Karachi in October 2007:

\begin{quote}
I was informed of a meeting that had taken place in Lahore where the bomb blasts were planned … a bomb maker was needed for the bombs. Enter Qari Saiñullah Akhtar, a wanted terrorist who had tried to overthrow my second government. He had been extradited by the United Arab Emirates and was
languishing in the Karachi central jail ... The officials in Lahore had turned to Akhtar for help. His liaison with elements in the government was a radical who was asked to make the bombs and he himself asked for a fatwa making it legitimate to oblige. He got one.\textsuperscript{24}

Benazir Bhutto is but one of the countless victims of the endless wars, plots, terrorist outrages and intrigues in both Pakistan and India. Since 1947 relations between India and Pakistan have been complex and largely hostile. Indo-Pakistani affairs are often defined by the legacy of the violent partition of British India (which displaced up to 12.5 million people and saw the deaths of a million others); the endless conflict over the divided province of Kashmir; and the stasis imposed by military tension and arms racing between the two states.\textsuperscript{25} Shruti Kapila recently succinctly identified the results of all of this:

Since [1947] India and Pakistan have been to war four times. Hostility, and the spectre of nuclear war, still hang over the two neighbours.\textsuperscript{26} In this critical sense, Ambedkar’s faith in the idea of partition and Pakistan has certainly failed to bring about peaceful, if distant, relations. Nor has [Sir Cyril] Radcliffe’s boundary proved to be a stable line of demarcation. Ever since the initial war of 1948, Kashmir has remained in a permanent state of dispute. In 1947, instead of the strategic sense that today prevails over discussions on the province, Kashmir as a Muslim-majority province represented India’s claim and commitment to diversity. Not only has Pakistan laid claim to parts of it since then, today it is one of the most militarised zones in the world, with its citizens condemned to a hostage status between two belligerent and ideologically opposed neighbours.\textsuperscript{27}

Given all of this, it is hardly surprising that the diplomacy between New Delhi and Islamabad has been plagued by mutual hostility and suspicion for over seventy years now. Naturally, what we might term a long cold war between India and Pakistan has permeated both societies. And, given the nature of such conflicts, intelligence services have been very much at the fore in both states. There are innumerable examples here. For example: Islamabad has seen RAW as a key obstacle to its nuclear programme, and India’s diplomatic initiatives in Afghanistan have always been dismissed as a cover for RAW agents working to destabilize Pakistan. Pakistan has accused RAW of training and arming separatists in Pakistan’s Balochistan province along the Afghan border. RAW denies these charges, and in turn, accuses the ISI of sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir, of the July 2008 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul and of instigating the 26/11 attacks. Thus, the era and the events featured in \textit{The Spy Chronicles} demonstrate how the goals and efforts of the intelligence leaders can be politicised by other sectors of government, the body politic and society in both India and Pakistan. Durrani could not attend the book launch in New Delhi after being denied a visa by the Indian government so he sent a video message that was played at the event, giving ‘a very special thank[s] to the Indian deep state. By denying me the visa, they have saved me from the wrath of our hawks [in Pakistan]. They will be happy to know that I have not yet been cleared by the [Indian officials resident in the] South Block!’\textsuperscript{28} The Indian government was not the only one to react in such a fashion, however. The Pakistani authorities placed Durrani on the Exit Control
List, preventing him from leaving the country, and the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army initiated an inquiry. Indeed, publishing the book posed serious risks for the men and the consequences for Durrani are ongoing.

The book is not a narrative in one voice. Rather it is composed of hundreds of pages of dialogue between the two former intelligence chiefs. Drawn from four in-person conversations between the two men (that were hosted in Nepal, Thailand, and Turkey), Aditya Sinha explains the discussions ‘had a lot of spontaneity and the two former chiefs got into the spirit of each discussion’ and ‘I have tried to retain that tone in the manuscript’ (p. xiii). *The Spy Chronicles* comprises thirty-three chapters divided in seven parts with fully referenced meetings that centred on specific themes. There is a preface by Sinha about the book’s origins and the interview process, and an introduction by Dulat and Durrani with biographical details. Opening with the genesis of their relationship and the purpose of the book, Dulat and Durrani discuss their mutual respect and the difficulty they encountered in persuading governments to change policy to settle disputes, such as that over Kashmir. Next, Durrani explains how he ‘accidently’ joined Pakistan’s intelligence community by serving as an analyst then defence attaché under the administration of ISI, later getting promoted to lead Military Intelligence and subsequently ISI.

Dulat and Durrani’s exchanges are not only reminders of the long history of mutual enmity and suspicion between the Indian and Pakistani states, but also of the commonalities intelligence leaders share and of a desire for peace on all sides. It is notable that both intelligence services are presented in the same volume as ISI is often mentioned by domestic and international media, but RAW is more obscure despite being a key player in India’s national security. That said, RAW is proud of its record and is quick to claim its successes whenever possible. These include the following episodes since 1968.

- The creation of Bangladesh in 1971
- India’s growing influence in Afghanistan
- The northeast state of Sikkim’s accession to India in 1975
- The security of India’s nuclear programme
- The success of African liberation movements during the Cold War

*The Spy Chronicles* not only reveals differences and highlights the conflicts between the ISI and RAW, but also demonstrates cooperation between the opposing intelligence services. Notably, there is a discussion of the ‘rescue’ of Durrani’s son, Osman, who visited India in 2015 with a Pakistani passport, but his visa prevented his departure from an airport different from the one he arrived at. Needing help, Durrani called Dulat, who in turn ‘spoke to a former colleague in RAW’ and a friend from India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) who helped Osman navigate Indian bureaucracy and leave the country without incident (p. 17). Both Dulat and Durrani make comparisons and give appraisals of a number of different intelligence agencies across the globe. Dulat says, ‘if you took RAW and IB against the ISI or against Pakistan’s agencies, they are as good professionally’ (p. 38). Whereas, Durrani insists, ‘the best way to judge ISI was that during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, it got all the help from most of the big players in the West but allowed no interference in its role’ (p. 38). He also boasts: ‘Another accomplishment is none of our operators ever defected or was “caught on camera”’ (p. 38). As for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), both were critical with Durrani explaining, ‘I never rated CIA assessments
highly. Never. They don’t believe they have to carry out good assessments’ (p. 54). The thrust of US policy for the duration of the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-1989) was determined by US President Jimmy Carter in early 1980, when he initiated a program to arm the Mujahedeen through Pakistan’s ISI and secured a pledge from Saudi Arabia to match U.S. funding for this purpose. Pakistan’s president, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, skilfully managed to keep the profile of the CIA relatively low and he was, henceforth, seen as the champion of the downtrodden Muslim tribesmen of Afghanistan, with the ISI as the chief facilitators of the war against Godless communism.32 US support for the Mujahedeen accelerated under Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, at a final cost to the US of some $3 billion. The Soviets were unable to quell the insurgency and withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, precipitating the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself.33 In October 1983 a seminal National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was presented by the Director of the CIA, William J. Casey, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He observed that United States was struggling to develop a viable strategy to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan due to the lack of well-organised, indigenous single resistance force. The plain truth was that the ‘resistance [needed] more simultaneous uprisings of a large number of villages and tribes’. As it was ‘the insurgency could not continue [with] the present level of outside support’. It was important to note that ‘Overt Soviet pressure [on the resistance] could require [an] additional US response.’ There was considerable danger, however, that ‘Covert pressure, designed to weaken the military regime [in Kabul], could ultimately contribute to an unstable political situation in Pakistan.’34 John Prados, writing for the US National Security Archive in 2001, observed that the CIA ‘played a significant role in asserting U.S. influence in Afghanistan by funding military operations designed to frustrate the Soviet invasion of that country. CIA covert action worked through Pakistani intelligence services to reach Afghan rebel groups.’35

In the relationship between India and Pakistan events are inter-connected in a bewildering series of conflicts, alliances and networks. Pakistan's support of the Afghan-based Taliban, which included the provision of sanctuary (making the Taliban a major force in Pakistan), was actually primarily rooted in Islamabad’s hope of acquiring the whole of Kashmir – and thus expelling the Indian state from the province forever.36 This is notable as many Pakistanis consider the battle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to be the time when their country’s involvement with violent jihadism began. Pakistan’s president at the time, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, was particularly sympathetic to Deobandism,37 and instigated a national programme of ‘Islamisation’. Saudi Arabia provided staunch support for Pakistan in its long-standing dispute with India over Kashmir (a situation which the Saudis liken to that of Israel and the Palestinians).38 The links, connections and networks outlined in The Spy Chronicles are global. Duranni thus, for example, discusses Federal Republic of Germany’s Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND),39 arguing that ‘the German BND works methodically, seriously. Germans anyway are serious people. But their product is sometimes not up to the mark’ (p. 56).40 (Fortunately, such ‘pop’ psychology is rare in the volume). Commenting on the most dangerous area of Indo-Pakistani tension, Durrani and Dulat discuss terrorism. Pakistan has long been accused of being a sponsor of international terrorism (not least by India). Certainly, the ISI has been a long-time patron to international Mujahedeen forces, many of them Pakistan-based Sunni extremists, and there is even speculation that Islamabad may have facilitated rise of the ISIS. As ever in Pakistan, however, things are far from being black-and-white. Islamabad protests (correctly) that it, too, is itself a victim of terrorism.41 In The Spy Chronicles, Durrani repeatedly asserts that ISI ‘probably’ learned about Osama bin Laden’s location and ‘perhaps’ provided information to the United States for the US
SEAL Team Six raid in May 2011, but claimed ‘ignorance’ (p. 24). This contradicts statements by the leadership elites in Pakistan, such as that made by the then Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, when he denied the killing was a ‘joint [US-Pakistan] operation’. In addition, former senior intelligence officials, including Hamid Gul, ISI Director-General from 1987 to 1989, stated plainly that ‘It was quite surprising that [bin Laden] was in Pakistan.’

Durrani and Dulat also discuss long-standing Indian accusations that Islamabad arms and finances terrorist groups. Durrani responds to the notion that Kashmir is actually a burden for not just India, but Pakistan, explaining ‘we did not know how far it would go’ and ‘our challenge’ was keeping it from letting it ‘out of control’ (p. 39). Dulat says that India ‘saw the Kashmir development in 1989-90 as inspired, monitored and supported by Pakistan’ and it ‘went out of control’ to which Durrani replied, ‘On Kashmir I defer to my friend because of his knowledge and experience are more [sic]’ (p. 88). The two also share thoughts about Indian-Pakistan relations, noting the lasting effects of the Partition and the good points and strains of the bilateral ties, such as praising Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s vision and attempts to improve relations. They explore key personalities, history, missed opportunities and the current policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Durrani concludes, ‘If you move forward on Kashmir, then you are automatically moving forward on terrorism’ (p. 106). Cast in such a fashion, this resembles nothing so much as the strategy of ‘linkage’, once so beloved of the geopolitical vision of Henry Kissinger.

The two intelligence chiefs are careful, unsurprisingly, not to divulge any classified operations from their time as leaders of their respective agencies. However, that does not stop them from discussing intelligence tradecraft, which provides insight into methods. Regarding allegations that India uses its diplomatic missions for espionage, Durrani explains that ‘If Indian consulates are used, we’ll be happy’ because Pakistan ‘can keep track’ but, he claims, ‘espionage is usually not done from there’ (p. 195). This is an interesting statement as Pakistan has a well-documented history of heavy-handed tactics to ‘paralyse’ the Research and Analysis Wing ‘as far as embassy-based espionage was concerned.’ In fact, Maloy Krishna Dhar, a former Joint Director of India’s Intelligence Bureau, previously wrote that when Indian intelligence caught and expelled Pakistani intelligence officers based at diplomatic missions in India, ‘Pakistan always reacted with usual crudity and violence.’

Even more surprising is Dulat’s revelation that Indian intelligence’s ‘biggest failure against Pakistan is that we’ve not been able to turn around an ISI officer or have an ISI officer working for us ... [or, at least,] not to my knowledge, at a level where it counts’ (p. 39).

Dulat and Durrani also discuss ‘flashpoints’ and geopolitics. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks, Durrani explains, had negative consequences for Pakistan, but high domestic political costs prevent the militant leader Hafiz Saeed from being held criminally accountable, much to the fury of the Indian government. (In 2018, during an interview with newspaper Dawn, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif indirectly accepted Islamabad’s culpability for not preventing the Mumbai attacks). As for Kulbhushan Jadhav, the RAW officer arrested by Pakistan, Durrani argues usually one party announces ‘[y]ou can have your fellow back but we want both of ours’ and exchange intelligence officers (p. 190). Dulat responded that if was an Indian operation, it was conducted poorly and that ‘I’m always surprised when anybody says we are fanning discontent, or paying for it, or training terrorists’ because ‘I headed the RAW, and it didn’t happen in our time’ (p. 195). In terms of broader geopolitics, neither men believe the Trump administration will change United States foreign policy towards Afghanistan (although Durrani,
rather predictably, assesses that the US would favour India if it were a mediator over Kashmir). In truth, the testimony of both men tends to support Thomas Powers’ Chamberlainesque assertion of US involvement in the theatre. ‘Forty-plus years after our failure in Vietnam, the United States [of America] is again fighting an endless war in a faraway place against a culture and a people we don’t understand for political reasons that make sense in Washington, but nowhere else.’

In recent years reports from the sub-continent indicate that the traditionally intransigent Pakistani military now favours a détente with India as international isolation for Islamabad beckons. In an influential speech given in October 2017 the Pakistan army’s chief of staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, warned that regional tensions were causing economic difficulties for all. Cooperation was heralded as essential: ‘The region will sink or sail together. I want to convey to our neighbours to the east and to the west that our destinies are inextricably linked’. Bajwa went on to warn that ‘[w]e are making a deliberate and concerted effort to pacify the western border through a multitude of diplomatic, military and economic initiative’. This mean that Islamabad had ‘also expressed and demonstrated our genuine desire to have normal and peaceful relations with India, however, it takes two to tango.’

A year later Pakistan’s Information Minister Fawad Chaudhry said that ‘We want to move forward and we are trying our best to have good ties with all our neighbors, including India ... [and as] General Bajwa says, regions prosper, countries don’t. India cannot prosper by weakening Pakistan.’ And, by way of a conclusion on the progress of a tentative détente between the two states, Dulat and Durrani debate a path forward for India and Pakistan. In this section, they present separate lists of ideas, Durrani offering a ‘structured’ list of formal channels between government officials and Dulat calling for more people-to-people contact, trade and travel. Here Dulat argues that ‘[s]tructures have screwed us’ and the countries must ‘break the ice somewhere’ (p. 269). They also talk about institutionalizing India-Pakistan intelligence exchanges and making the station chiefs declared posts to facilitate interaction and meetings. Concluding the book, Dulat says ‘our main theme has been that India and Pakistan need to realise and get together because there is so much to be gained by understanding each other’ (p. 298).

In his Ab Urbe Condita Livy recorded the impact that Hannibal’s remarks to Scipio had made at the meeting in Ephesus in 193 BC. ‘The cryptic answer [to Scipio’s question] with its Punic ingenuity and [the] unexpected mode of flattery [employed by Hannibal] had a profound effect on Scipio, according to Claudius – Hannibal had set him apart from ordinary commanders as being of incalculable worth.’ Contemporary readers will no doubt find themselves at times as impressed when reading The Spy Chronicles. And, make no mistake about it, The Spy Chronicles is a must-read book for scholars of intelligence, security and politics in South Asia. Beyond some fascinating instances both of confirmation and of denial of intelligence service activity, the intelligence chiefs demonstrate their pragmatism towards their rivals. As one reviewer notes: ‘the sense of comradeship that seems to have formed between Dulat and Durrani, [makes them] come across as great raconteurs.’ For that same reviewer, the real strengths of the book lie in ‘their insights on the handling of Kashmir and other issues such as sharing of river waters and terrorism that are bedevilling India-Pakistan relations which should be the subject of dispassionate study for policy and decision-makers in New Delhi and Islamabad.’ Indeed, it seems to the case that
Durrani clearly appears not to be convinced that things could change under the current dispensation in New Delhi, including National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, while Dulat emerges as unusually optimistic about the chances of all or any form dialogue - be it between the two countries or between them and the Kashmiris. More than anything else, the most striking aspect of the book is the sense of hope that pervades many of the conversations between two deft practitioners of hard-nosed, cold-blooded analysis and espionage who, one would have thought, would be more willing to throw up their hands and walk away from it all, given the numerous ups and downs that have buffeted the relationship between India and Pakistan in recent years.53

The Spy Chronicles has a number of limitations. First, it does not ‘tell all.’ Those hoping to get details on specific operations or structures of clandestine networks will be disappointed. Second, the book’s design with hundreds of dialog transcript pages means there are many disparate ideas and shifts in thought, making it a valuable primary source document for specialists, but does not have a clear narrative, singular voice or the structure of an academic study. Third, Sinha hints that yet more discussions were not included, writing that when ‘the tape recorder’ was turned off after work ‘a few other retired spychiefs land in the room, their (lubricated) tongues loosen and the jokes begin to fly’ (p. 21). Fourthly, there are phrases throughout the book that are not translated into English, which can be frustrating for English-only readers. Nevertheless, it is a valuable work that provides insight into how South Asian intelligence leadership perceives and hopes to solve geopolitical issues. Having said all that, the two intelligence chiefs are walking a well-trodden path as regards Track II diplomacy in the relations between India and Pakistan. (For example: between April 28-30 2018, a team of Indian experts travelled to Islamabad and held discussions with their counterparts there on various aspects of bilateral ties).54 For several years, retired officers from both sides have been hawks in office and doves in retirement. Once out of power, however, these officers can no longer influence events. The Pakistan army’s repeated efforts to frustrate civilian governments look set to continue and the Indian government shows no sign of concrete movement towards rapprochement. It is a shame, but hardly surprising, that Durrani and Dulat did not feel able to express such mutual admiration when they were in office.

R. Gerald Hughes  
Centre for Intelligence and International Security Studies (CIISS)  
Aberystwyth University  
E-mail: rbh@aber.ac.uk

Ryan Shaffer  
Independent scholar  
E-mail: ShafferRyan9@gmail.com

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R. Gerald Hughes is Reader in Military History and Director of the Centre for Intelligence and International Security Studies at Aberystwyth University. He is the author The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (2014); and Britain, Germany and the Cold War: The Search for a European Détente, 1949-1967 (2007). A reviews editor of Intelligence and National Security, Hughes is the author of a large number of book chapters and articles, most recently: ‘Islam in South Asia: the Deobandis and the current state of Pakistan’, Intelligence and National Security; ‘‘Fear has large eyes’: The History of Intelligence in the Soviet Union’ in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies; and ‘Between Man and Nature: The Enduring Wisdom of Sir Halford J. Mackinder’ in the Journal of Strategic Studies. He is the

**Ryan Shaffer** is a writer and historian. He has a PhD in history and is a former postdoctoral fellow at the Institute for Global Studies at Stony Brook University in New York. Shaffer’s academic work focuses on Asian and European history with particular interest in extremism and political violence. Shaffer has published over 150 articles, reviews and chapters about European and South Asian politics in popular magazines and scholarly journals, including ‘Changes and Drivers in Contemporary Terrorism’, *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2018); and ‘Pan-European thought in British fascism: the International Third Position and the Alliance for Peace and Freedom’, *Patterns of Prejudice* (2018). He is the author of *Music, Youth and International Links in Post-War British Fascism: The Transformation of Extremism* (2017).

### Endnotes


2. The 26/11 terrorist attacks took place between 26 and 29 November 2008 in Mumbai, India. They were carried out by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based Islamic terrorist organization, carried out a series of 12 coordinated shooting and bombing attacks. In these attacks, 166 people were killed and over 300 were wounded. This proved to be a seismic event in history of terrorism in the sub-continent. As one commentator noted in the *New York Times*:

> There are nine bodies - all of them young men - that have been lying in a Mumbai hospital morgue since Nov. 29. They may be stranded there for a while because no local Muslim charity is willing to bury them in its cemetery. This is good news. The nine are the Pakistani Muslim terrorists who went on an utterly senseless killing rampage in Mumbai on 26/11 - India’s 9/11 - gunning down more than 170 people, including 33 Muslims, scores of Hindus, as well as Christians and Jews. It was killing for killing’s sake. They didn’t even bother to leave a note.


4. Hannibal Barca (247 BC-181/3 BC), attributed. Trans: ‘I will either find a way or make one’.


8. It has been noted that Livy’s writings contained elementary mistakes on military matters, clearly indicating that he had never served in the Roman army. Neither was Livy ever a senator – given his ‘minor but telling errors’ on the Senate - or the holder of any notable public office. He does, however, seem to have been of independent means and well-educated in philosophy and rhetoric. We have no way of knowing that the degree to which Livy knew exactly

9 In a similar vein, a recent edited volume employed a number of scholars to ‘interview’ a number of (dead) ‘great thinkers’. See Richard Ned Lebow, Peer Shouten, and Hidemi Suganami (eds), *Return of the Theorists: Dialogues with Great Thinkers in International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).


11 The Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW or RAW) is the foreign intelligence agency of India. It was established in 1968 following the intelligence failures of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, which had persuaded New Delhi to create an agency dedicated to foreign intelligence-gathering. On this agency, see the book by a former RAW operative: Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, *India’s External Intelligence: Secrets of Research and Analysis Wing RAW* (New Delhi: Manas, 2007). For a hostile, if not imperceptive study, see Rashid Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Saleem (eds), *RAW: Global and Regional Ambitions* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005).

12 The ISI is the largest of Pakistan’s five intelligence services. It is a controversial, sometimes rogue organization that Benazir Bhutto, the late Pakistani prime minister, once termed a ‘state within a state’ for its tendency to operate outside of the Pakistani government’s control. On the ISI, see Owen L. Sirrs, *Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert Action and Internal Operations* (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2017).

13 Barkha Dutt is the author of *This Unquiet Land: Stories from India’s Fault Lines* (New Delhi: Aleph, 2016).

15 Track II diplomacy is the practice of non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals. These are sometimes called ‘non-state actors’. (Track I diplomacy being official state diplomacy that proceeds through traditional government channels).


22 Waraich, ‘Pakistan’s spies elude its government’.


26 R&AW has maintained active collaboration with other intelligence agencies in various countries. Its contacts with FSB of Russia, Israel’s Mossad, the CIA and SIS have long been common knowledge, a common interest


39 Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), trans: ‘Federal Intelligence Service’.

40 The BND certainly found itself out-maneuvered by its East German enemies at crucial junctures in the Cold War. On this see, for instance, Ronny Heidenreich, Daniela Münkel and Elke Stadelmann-Wenz, Geheimdienstkrieg in Deutschland: Die Konfrontation von DDR-Staatssicherheit und Organisation Gehlen 1953 (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2016).

41 Bennett-Jones and R. Gerald Hughes ‘Islam in South Asia’, 461.

42 Asif Ali Zardari, ‘Pakistan did its part,’ Washington Post, 2 May 2011; Michael Burleigh, ‘How could our 'allies' have not known he was there?' Daily Mail (London), 3 May 2011.


46 Hafiz Muhammad Saeed (b. 1950) is a Pakistani Islamist militant, who co-founded Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and head of Jama’at-ud-Da’wah (JuD), a group that the United Nations (UN) has designated as a terrorist entity operating chiefly from Pakistan. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is one of the largest and most active Islamic terrorism militant organizations in South Asia, operating mainly from Pakistan. It was founded in 1987 by Hafiz Saeed, Abdullah Azzam and Zafar Iqbal in Afghanistan, with funding from Osama bin Laden.

47 In the wake of 26/11, the Indian government submitted a formal request to the UN Security Council to put the group Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Hafiz Muhammad Saeed on the list of individuals and organisations sanctioned by the

48 Cyril Almeida, ‘For Nawaz, it’s not over till it’s over’, *Dawn* (Karachi), 12 May 2018.


54 On optimistic recent indicators here, see Sachin Parashar, ‘India, Pakistan revive Track II diplomacy’, *The Times of India*, 1 May 2018.