DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed……………………………………

Date 10 September 2004

STATEMENT 1

This dissertation is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MScEcon International Politics (RT)

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Date 10 September 2004

STATEMENT 2

This dissertation is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged in explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

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I hereby give consent for my dissertation, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for interlibrary loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

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Date 10 September 2004
The far-flung overseas deployment of troops is one of the central charges laid against the United States by those critics who accuse the US of being a ‘new empire’. But while the US may be a global hegemon, it is far from being the only country to deploy troops on a global scale. Consider the developing world’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. UN data show that the number of contributors to peacekeeping has exploded from the Cold War figure of twenty six to 100 as of mid-2004, the overwhelming majority of them developing countries. So how are we to conceptualise such a significant deployment of peacekeepers from the developing world, in a unipolar international order? I broach this question by scrutinising a nascent trend of critical theoretical scholarship in ‘peace operations theory’ – the ‘next stage’ literature. Advancing a ‘subaltern realist’ perspective (Ayoob, 1997), in this dissertation I shall argue that since the end of the Cold War, the advance of the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ has increasingly called the legitimacy of the non-Western state into question. This political pressure has consequently compelled developing countries into demonstrating their ability to project the coercive power of the state across borders. This trend has, in turn, reinforced the militarisation of post Cold War international relations – a trend from which developing countries can only stand to lose in the long-term. This dissertation should be seen as taking a step towards our ability to theorise the diversification of peacekeeping contribution, and through this, the broader practices of cross-border interventions in contemporary world politics.
1. INTRODUCTION

Darfur: Restoring the Legitimacy of Intervention in World Politics

The unfolding crisis in the western Sudanese province of Darfur provides a tragic occasion on which to observe how practices of cross-border military intervention in world politics have been affected by the international acrimony over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Given the political and diplomatic fissures opened up by the war in Iraq, it is striking how rapidly a consensus has asserted itself across the political spectrum over the necessity of intervention in Sudan. Consider the British press. Writing in the Guardian under the headline ‘Enough imperial crusades’,\(^1\) post-structuralist thinker Peter Hallward casts a sceptical eye over the claims of defending the Sudanese refugees’ human rights, noting that Sudan was colonised in the nineteenth century under the moral banner of the ‘war against slavery’. Faced with this legacy of Western intervention however, Hallward’s solution to Sudan’s ills is ‘certainly not passive resignation’. Instead, Hallward advocates ‘fund[ing] the immediate and forceful deployment of African [Union] peacekeepers’, parallel to the Western promotion of the African Union (AU), to enable it to become ‘an effective and independent political actor, capable of brokering equitable political solutions to the long-standing conflicts that western intervention, almost always, has only helped provoke.’

In contrast to Hallward, the Conservative Party’s shadow foreign secretary, Michael Ancram insinuates in the Daily Telegraph that it was decolonisation rather than colonialism that is the historical source of Sudan’s problems.\(^2\) But Ancram, too, is unambiguous on the solution in the present: ‘an effective international peacekeeping military force … preferably African and controlled by the African Union, should be prepared … [Britain] and other G8 countries should provide funding, communications and logistical support … The [peacekeepers’] mandate must be robust and unequivocal.’ These sentiments are echoed in most major newspapers throughout the Western world: ‘The only dim light in this gloomy picture is the … AU … It has dispatched 150 (soon to be 300) troops to the region … and offered to send thousands more …’ noted the Washington Post.\(^3\) South Africa’s Cape Times also considered the AU troop deployments a ‘promising development’.\(^4\)

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1 Guardian, 18 August 2004
2 ‘Last year’, Ancram writes, ‘I was verbally assailed by a southern Sudanese in the bombed-out ruins of Rumbek, the capital of the south, for the “mess you left behind in 1956 which has led to all this”. (That year, Sudan, which had been under Anglo-Egyptian control since 1899, proclaimed itself an independent republic.) “While Darfur suffered, Blair’s government went on holiday”, 30 August 2004.
3 Cited in ‘The West must reassert pressure’ Guardian 25 August 2004
4 ‘Pressure needs to be put on the rebels’ Guardian 10 August 2004
If, as the *New York Times* would have it, ‘[t]he war in Iraq has hopelessly muddied the waters on the legitimacy of intervention,’ then judging by Darfur it seems that it has not thrown the question of the forcefulness of military intervention, nor indeed the fundamental legitimacy of military intervention itself, into doubt. Rather the post-Iraq question-mark is over who is doing the intervening. The deployment of UN-authorised African peacekeepers within Africa has been gathering pace for some time. As far back as November 1992, the UN Security Council retroactively authorised the intervention of Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces in to Liberia. In February 2004, AU ministers met to elect the fifteen members of the newly established AU ‘Security Council’. But what is of particular interest as regards the current crisis in Sudan is the fact that, across the political spectrum and throughout the world, African peacekeepers are being seen as necessary to restore legitimacy to the practice of intervention in world politics.

Taking the issue up on Peter Hallward’s terms, what is it then that distinguishes a ‘forceful’ and legitimate military intervention from the crude exercise of imperial power? Is it only the skin colour of the intervening troops that distinguishes a ‘forceful’ intervention – with Western diplomatic, financial, and military support – from an Anglo-American ‘imperial crusade’? Or is that interventions conducted by ‘indigenous’ forces are inherently more legitimate than interventions directly conducted by the great powers? How are we to conceptualise the deployment of African and other peacekeepers from the developing world, in an international order so clearly dominated by US power? These are some of the questions that I hope to broach and explore in this dissertation.

**Historical Perspective: Cross-border troop deployments by developing countries in the post Cold War era**

The US-led invasion of Iraq seems to have virtually institutionalised a new sub-discipline within International Relations (IR) – appropriately dubbed ‘American Empire studies’ by former Clinton administration official James Rubin. One distinct strand of this new ‘sub-discipline’ focuses in particular on US troop deployments across the globe. Chalmers Johnson, for example, author of *The Sorrows of Empire* (2004), argues that the diffuse US ‘empire of bases’ is the foundation of US global hegemony.

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6 ‘ECOMOG’ is the ‘Cease-fire Monitoring Group’ of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
7 ‘How to put the House in Order’ *Economist* 11 March 2004
But the US is far from being the only country to deploy its forces globally. Consider developing countries’ military deployments through the UN. According to the latest available data (July 2004), of the 58,756 UN peacekeepers\(^{10}\) deployed worldwide, approximately ninety three per cent (or 54,440 peacekeepers) are contributed from eighty two developing countries. The top ten contributors, who supply sixty two percent of the total (or 36,561 peacekeepers between them), are all developing countries. Nor do these figures include developing country contributions to non-UN operations, such as those conducted by ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Even peacekeeping operations\(^{11}\) conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – an alliance dominated by developed countries – encompasses developing country contributions from non-NATO, non-Partnership for Peace states as far afield as Argentina and Morocco.\(^{12}\)

The diversification of peacekeeping contributors to both UN and non-UN operations began with the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War corresponded with a frenetic proliferation of UN peacekeeping operations: the 1988-1993 period saw twenty new peacekeeping missions established – more than all the UN operations undertaken in the previous forty years (Bellamy et al., 2004:75). As UN operations expanded, so too did the organisation’s appetite for manpower – an appetite that was at least partially met by a dramatic diversification of peacekeeping contributors. The number of peacekeeping contributors exploded from the Cold War figure of twenty six contributing nations to seventy-six in 1994 – forty one of whom had never previously participated in such operations (Findlay, 1996:2). In the same period, another twenty-one states became first-time participants in peacekeeping operations beyond the UN aegis.\(^{13}\) Bobrow and Boyer (1997) further observe that while there were thirty two ‘activist’ contributors to peacekeeping during the 1945-1988 period, the figure for the 1988-1996 period is over double the Cold War figure, standing at forty four ‘activist’ contributors (‘activist’ defined as involvement in twenty percent or more of peacekeeping cases, in at least one period [1997:731]). Given that the overwhelming majority of the world’s states are developing countries, it is inevitable that such a dramatic and sustained diversification of peacekeeping contributors has drawn in so many developing states.

\(^{10}\) Throughout the dissertation, unless specified otherwise, I will operate with the UN definition of ‘peacekeepers’ as being either military troops, military observers and / or civilian police. See the Monthly Summary of Military and Civilian Police Contribution to United Nations Operations, made available online by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations: \(<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors>\) (hence forward the ‘UN Monthly Summary’).

\(^{11}\) The definition of ‘peacekeeping’ is a slippery issue that will be elaborated upon below in Chapter 2. Broadly speaking however, unless otherwise specified I will adopt Andersson’s definition of peacekeeping: ‘A UN authorised intervention conducted by military means under the auspices of the UN itself, a state, states or international organisations and in which there is no designated enemy.’ (Andersson, 2000:4)

\(^{12}\) See the ‘Stabilisation Force’ section of the NATO website: \(<http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/sfororg.htm>\).

\(^{13}\) Specifically, in the 1994 US-led multinational force in Haiti, and various OSCE, ECOWAS and CIS peacekeeping deployments (Findlay, 1996:6).
What is striking about this diversification of peacekeeping contributors is how enduring it has been beneath the ebb and flow of peacekeeping in the post Cold War era. Thus, while the numbers of UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide have fluctuated since the end of the Cold War, and while the contribution rankings have shuffled over the years, the overall diversity of contributors to peacekeeping has remained at a persistently higher level than during the Cold War. For example, in 1993, over 70,000 UN peacekeepers were deployed globally. But following the deaths of US troops in Somalia in 1993, and the widely-perceived failure of the UN to halt atrocities in the Rwandan and Bosnian civil wars in 1994, the number of UN peacekeepers dropped to 20,000 in 1996 (Bellamy et al., 2004:84). Yet the number of states contributing to peacekeeping operations in April 1997 (seventy one) was still not let less than the number of contributors as of 1993 (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997:731).

Bellamy et al. (2004) argue that the UN’s ‘retreat from peacekeeping’ in the 1996-1999 period was as dramatic as the transformation of peacekeeping in the 1988-1993 period (2004:84). Given that the post Cold War diversification of peacekeeping contributors weathered the hiatus period in UN peacekeeping of the mid-1990s, this suggests that the diversification of contributors is largely independent of both the political perceptions of UN peacekeeping in the post Cold War era, and the variability in the UN’s appetite for manpower. By focusing on the diversity of peacekeeping contribution, we see an underlying continuity to the role of peacekeeping in post Cold War international society, that otherwise might escape us were we to concentrate on the surface flux of UN operations alone.

The latest available data show that there are currently 100 contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. In other words, over half of the world’s states are currently contributing either military or police forces to operations abroad – in UN peacekeeping operations alone. If we disaggregate the developing world’s vast contribution to peacekeeping operations, we immediately see enormous variety between individual states’ contributions. These range from providing the core of major UN operations (e.g., Pakistan’s 3,854-strong contribution to the 9,831-strong UNAMSIL operation in Sierra Leone) to purely tokenistic contributions, such as a solitary Chinese policeman seconded to the UN-authorised, NATO-led International

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14 During mid-1994, for example, France and Britain ranked as the second and fourth largest contributing nations, respectively. Others among the 'top ten' contributors included Pakistan, India, Jordan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Egypt (Risse-Kappen, 1997:272).
15 See the UN Monthly Summary.
16 William Durch estimates that there were 50,000 troops deployed in non-UN peacekeeping operations at the end of 2002 (Durch, in Bellamy and Williams, 2004b:183)
17 See the UN Monthly Summary.
Stability Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{18} Such variety between various states’ contributions poses significant difficulties for analysts seeking to assess how the burden of contribution is distributed among states.\textsuperscript{19} Similarly, in terms of operational efficacy, doubtless the developing world’s contribution spans the gamut of military utility. Under-equipped personnel from developing countries are allegedly often the bane of UN peacekeeping, with the necessary logistics and equipment most often supplied by developed countries (Bellamy et al., 2004:52).

**Research Question and Methodology**

But it is more the international, political aspects of the generalised diversification of contributors to post Cold War peacekeeping that concerns us here, rather than the institutional details of particular peacekeeping operations, or the differences between particular states’ contributions. From this viewpoint, China’s symbolic one-man contribution to a NATO-led force in a country bordering the People’s Republic may be just as intriguing and revealing as Pakistan’s major troop deployment to an operation as far from Pakistan’s borders as UNAMSIL. That is to say, the key question concerning us here is: does the *quantitative* diversification in peacekeeping contributors, that has drawn in so many developing countries, signal any broader *qualitative* change in the fabric of international politics; and if so, what kind of a change?

This dissertation should thus be understood as taking a step towards our ability to theorise the diversification of peacekeeping contribution, and through this, the broader practices of cross-border interventions in contemporary world politics. No attempts have been made in the course of this dissertation to conduct a program of original fieldwork, nor to empirically test the claims advanced below, through, for example, a systematic case-study investigation based on secondary literature. Specific instances, historical and contemporary, of peacekeeping contribution will be alighted on throughout the text, though not in any systematic manner. Rather my engagement with empirical examples will be characterised, in the words of Hedley Bull, ‘by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgement’. Consequently any ‘general propositions’ thereby generated ‘cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative and inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origin’ (Bull, 1966: 361).

\textsuperscript{18} BBC News, 12 January 2004
\textsuperscript{19} As Andersson notes, ‘it is unreasonable to imply that a state participating in 15 operations, sending two observers to each, is a greater participant than a state participating in 10 operations and sending an average of 1,000 troops to each’ (2000:7).
This is not to take an epistemological position that denies the value of rigorous empirical research and case study analysis. The omission of any systematic empirical analysis in this dissertation has been partly dictated by the constraints of time and space, and partly by the lack of a sufficiently large body of secondary literature on individual countries’ peacekeeping contributions, that could be used to sustain systematic comparison across cases. Without rehearsing the musty methodological debates of the clash of the ‘behaviouralist’ and ‘classical’ schools, the international society approach has been chosen as the most appropriate, because the diffuse elements that this approach strives to capture – questions of international norms and legitimacy – are precisely what is lacking from the extant literature on peacekeeping contribution. In addressing this omission, the framework constructed below is trying to grasp what Bull termed the ‘play of international politics’ (Bull, 1966:368), the ‘quality it has of changing before our eyes and slipping between our fingers even as we try to categorise it’ – in other words, that putative qualitative transformation in international society that has corresponded with the diversification of peacekeeping contributors. By retaining this grasp of the dynamic and multifaceted nature of international politics, I hope to maintain an interpretive, humanist emphasis, that allows us, in Robert Jackson’s words, to gain ‘insight into the mentality of the [states]people involved and the circumstances in which they find themselves’ (2003:71). Thus the overall aim of this dissertation is to explore rather than to test, and to provide a basis for further research and discussion, rather than any robust empirical findings. The focus throughout the text will be on UN peacekeeping operations – partly because there is more literature on UN peacekeeping, but also because as Bellamy et al. observe ‘[a]lthough peacekeeping is an activity undertaken by many different actors, its history and development is intimately tied to the UN. Indeed, peacekeeping is often seen as synonymous with UN operations.’ (2004:45)

Throughout my research, a number of discrete bodies of literature have been engaged with – including the self-styled ‘Next Stage’ in ‘peace operations theory’, writings on humanitarian intervention and the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, security studies literature, and the literature on peacekeeping contribution. It is partly the paucity of the literature devoted to analysing peacekeeping contribution that has necessitated these forays into other spheres of thought in IR. None of these bodies of literature have, alas, been dealt with in anything approximating an exhaustive or comprehensive manner. And indeed there are other spheres of literature – notably constructivist analyses of the ‘national interest’ – that could be fruitfully engaged with to enrich the theoretical framework constructed below. Nonetheless, it is hoped that through probing the limits of these aforementioned writings, and through synthesising their various insights, a wide-ranging, but neither disjointed nor eclectic discussion of developing country contribution to peacekeeping operations has been created.
I have chosen to import a term from the field of security studies to describe the position being advanced in this dissertation; namely ‘subaltern realism’ – a combination originally formulated by Mohammed Ayoob (1997). Ayoob combines the Gramscian-inspired term ‘subaltern’ with the central precept of IR orthodoxy ‘realism’, to designate an approach to international politics that is simultaneously state- and power-centric (‘realist’) and focused on the concerns and circumstances of the majority of states – the developing countries, those that are ‘less powerful, and, therefore, of “inferior rank”, to quote the dictionary definition of subaltern’ (Ayoob, 1997:141). In this dissertation, I will expand on Ayoob’s designation ‘subaltern realism’ to further encompass a firmly egalitarian approach to international society that emphasises the necessity of formal sovereign equality as the organising principle of international relations.

Aims and Outline

The argument proceeds as follows. In the next chapter, I begin by providing a critical overview of the extant literature on contribution to peacekeeping. As shall become clear below, the major flaws of the extant literature are threefold: its frequently instrumental bent, its failure to properly integrate the international realm as a distinct sphere into its analysis, and its failure to explore how contribution to peacekeeping relates to the wider role of peacekeeping in global politics. In the third chapter, I move to contrast the limitations of this literature with the perspective provided in the nascent ‘Next Stage’ scholarship in ‘peace operations theory’. The critical theoretical ‘Next Stage’ literature supplies a powerful critique of the positivistic preoccupations and oftentimes sterile debates that have hitherto marred the study of peacekeeping. In advancing this critique, ‘Next Stage’ scholarship has explicitly sought to follow the methodological injunction of peacekeeping scholar Alan James, who has argued that the study of peacekeeping must begin by placing it ‘firmly in the context of international politics’ (James, in Bellamy, 2004:17). As the ‘Next Stage’ school has sought to diversify peacekeeping studies beyond its fixation with arid taxonomy and myopic analysis of peacekeeping operations themselves, it provides an invaluable point of departure for thinking about how the more extensive processes of global politics relate to states’ contribution to peacekeeping. However, while I welcome the ‘Next Stage’ literature for having reinvigorated scholarly analysis of peacekeeping, I also hope to deploy a ‘subaltern realist’ perspective to broach the limits of its critical theoretical method.
Having introduced the ‘Next Stage’ school, I then set up what I take to be its account of the role of peacekeeping in global politics – which I characterise as the ‘global riot control’ thesis. In brief, this thesis – chiefly represented by Michael Pugh’s (2004) work – draws on the political economy writings of Robert Cox and Mark Duffield to posit peacekeeping as the military containment of social instability in peripheral areas of the world economy (‘global riots’), that are fostered by the structural contradictions of global capitalism. This thesis has the intellectual benefits of both parsimony and elegance. However, I shall argue that while the ‘global riot control’ thesis is capable of grasping the military domination of peoples in the developing world, its world-systems-style analytical grid of ‘core’ versus ‘periphery’ crushes inter-state relations out of the analysis. Thus while it is capable of grasping the structural inequalities and economic inequities of the world order, the ‘global riot control’ thesis, and more broadly the ‘Next Stage’ school as a whole, is less capable of comprehending relations of inter-state domination. It is here that a ‘subaltern realist’, international society approach provides a necessary shift in focus.

My rejoinder to both the ‘Next Stage’ and the contribution literature is provided in the fourth chapter, where I analyse the impact of the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ on developing states. ‘Sovereignty as responsibility’ contends that an international consensus has solidified over the last decade that states are morally responsible for the preservation of minimum standards of human rights, both within and across state borders. I shall problematise this argument on the grounds that it obscures the shift in global power relations that has taken place in the post Cold War era. Drawing principally on the work of David Chandler (2002) and utilising the schema provided by Martin Wight in his celebrated 1966 essay ‘Why is there no International Theory?’ I shall argue that the end of the Cold War has witnessed a ‘re-enchantment of the international’.

Schematically put, the ‘re-enchantment of the international’ holds that with the dissolution of the USSR, the international realm has become more penetrable to Western power. Confronted with an ostensibly more pliant international realm, and with colossal economic and military resources at their disposal, Western state elites have been increasingly enticed into using the international realm as a haven from which they can transcend the outmoded programmes of traditional party politics, and project socially-cohering values in response to the atomisation of traditional political constituencies of left and right. This is the impulse, I argue, underlying Western states’ elevation of individual human rights over the rights of states. As the content of human rights is frequently established independently of the subjects of those rights, the broadening and deepening of the international framework of human rights has facilitated the extension of Western power over the developing world. With the
simultaneous demise of Soviet might and disenchantment of the domestic political sphere, the international realm no longer appears as the grim realm of ‘recurrence and repetition’, in Martin Wight’s words, but rather offers tantalising transformative possibilities to transcend political malaise within the West – hence ‘re-enchantment of the international’.

In as far as the ‘re-enchantment of the international’ corresponds with enhanced prospects for the projection of Western power, so the international realm has become disenchanted and less malleable for developing countries. From the subaltern realist perspective, the dissolution of Soviet power was concomitant with a significant restriction of developing countries’ possibilities for political and economic development independent of the Western orbit (Ayoob, 1995:passim). I examine the decline of unilateral military interventions by developing countries, and argue that this shows the developing world is largely unable to act beyond the remit of Western power. As Western states have sought to promote individual rights over the rights of states, this has entailed an externalisation of political accountability on the part of non-Western states. As the consolidation of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ has morally charged the hitherto neutral criteria of statehood (Chandler, 2002:136), non-Western states are increasingly pressed into practical demonstrations of state power in support of human rights. Thus it is the new world order, I argue, that has placed such a high political premium on the deployment of peacekeepers as a de facto criterion of ‘proper’ statehood.

If the moral authority of statehood is now to be held to account to an ‘international community’ rather than a domestic populace, this entails a haemorrhaging of legitimacy from the developing state – a political depletion that can only further weaken and destabilise already fragile countries. ‘Sovereignty as responsibility’, I argue, in the final analysis, entails sovereignty as irresponsibility to one’s own citizens. Moreover, the extent to which the moral authority of statehood is increasingly associated with coercive power, so the tendency is to intensify economic, technological and political inequalities in world politics. As the developing world’s odyssey in international politics has been defined by the struggle for equality (Ayoob, 1995) these are trends from which non-Western states can only lose out in the long run.

Finally, a note on the title of the dissertation. On 13 October 2003 Albanian television news broadcast part of the speech that Albanian defence minister Pandeli Majko gave to a seventy-one strong detachment of Albanian ‘peacekeepers’ who had volunteered to be deployed to southern Iraq as part of the multinational Coalition forces stationed there. The defence minister ‘stressed’ that in centuries past the ‘forefathers’ of these peacekeepers had once fought on those very same ‘plains of Karbala under the flag of a world empire’. Should
anyone have misconstrued which ‘world empire’ the defence minister was referring to, Majko further clarified that ‘our sons now take the hymn of their service to freedom in the new Iraq’. Presumably then, the ‘world empire’ that Majko was referring to was indeed the Ottoman Empire, that ran from modern-day Albania to modern-day Iraq; and the military forebears of today’s Albanian peacekeepers presumably the Ottoman ‘janissaries’ (originally yeni-çeri, or ‘new soldiers’) – an elite caste of Ottoman slave-troops forcibly recruited from the Christian youth of the Ottomans’ Balkan domains.

What made the plight of the janissaries poignant was the fact that they frequently returned to the Balkans as enforcers of the Sultan’s will over their own peoples. By supplementing and supporting the predatory instincts of Western states, I am arguing that developing country peacekeepers serve as the West’s *janissaries* for the post Cold War world. This is not to suggest that the ‘New World Order’ is a strategically-envisioned, monolithically-imposed ‘world empire’ that can spontaneously call up Third World armies to do its bidding. Rather, the point of the analogy is to underscore how, though their contribution to interventionist practices in world politics, the majority of the world’s states are serving to consolidate a world order detrimental to their own status.

By contributing to interventionism – as manifested by the diversification of peacekeeping contributors – developing countries are helping to consolidate a world wherein the moral authority of statehood derives from the demonstration of coercive power in the international sphere. Developing countries are thereby helping to establish a terrain on which they will always be of ‘inferior rank’. For if the cross-border demonstration of coercive power in the service of human rights now serves as a trapping of legitimate statehood, whatever symbolic authority such militarism confers, it can ultimately offer no more guarantee against external domination than any other trapping of statehood – such as a national airline or set of postage stamps. In the last instance, such a dubious criterion of ‘proper statehood’ is indicative of a world order where the strong – those most effective at projecting power across borders – can prey on the weak at will.

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20 In *South East Europe Security Monitor*, 14 October 2003 (henceforth ‘SEES Monitor’).
2. TRADITIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTION: Critical Literature Review

What are the extant arguments that seek to explain or account for states’ contribution to international peacekeeping operations? The first thing to note is that peacekeeping scholarship has largely focused its analytical energy on the dynamics of peacekeeping operations themselves, rather than on the anterior questions surrounding peacekeeping contributors. Consequently, the literature frequently treats contributions to peacekeeping operations as if they were simply ‘inputs’ seamlessly supplied by an ‘external international community’ (Li, 2003:2). If analysis of the issues surrounding contribution does take place, it is only rarely that ‘students of peace operations … raise their eyes much higher than the Security Council, whereas students of International Relations seldom question the impact that the practices of the states and international organisations they study has on the peace operations environment [and] the self-image of peacekeeping’ (Bellamy, 2004:18).

Of the literature that there is, it can be divided into two spheres: one sphere offers a wide range of specific factors – mostly in the realpolitik vein – that could potentially explain a state’s contribution to a specific peacekeeping operation and / or peacekeeping operations in general. The second sphere attempts to abstract from particular states’ ‘motives’ and foreign policy calculations, and suggest more general explanations underlying peacekeeping contribution.

Specific Explanations

In a 1996 SIPRI report Trevor Findlay presents a spectrum of possible ‘motives’ behind peacekeeping contribution, including: submission to diplomatic pressure; seeking to gain leverage in the UN; trading troops for hard-currency UN remuneration\(^2\) and / or the less tangible ‘rewards’ of amassing overseas experience and training; accumulating military equipment and technology by retaining the supplies provided; keeping the armed forces

\(^2\) The potential for peacekeeping operations to be profitable arises from the fact that since 1973 contributing governments are reimbursed at a flat rate for troop units supplied (Li, 2003:3). This means that states that supply expensive military equipment may receive as a little as one quarter of their costs, while poor countries sending ill-equipped forces could receive as much as 3.5 times their own expenditure (Durch, in Bellamy et al., 2004:52).
entangled in foreign operations rather than interfering in domestic politics; seeking to suppress the spread of regional instability; manoeuvring to secure a permanent seat on the Security Council in the expectation of post Cold War reform of the UN; as well as more abstract and ideational factors, such as the desire to demonstrate ‘good international citizenship’, seeking to garner international legitimacy, or contributing to peacekeeping as a component of a wider strategy of national integration in to international alliances and institutions (1996a:3-8).

While all of these suggestions are perfectly plausible ‘no systematic evidence from the empirical record is offered’ (Andersson, 2000:3). To be sure, some scholars have pursued some of these lines of inquiry in relation to specific countries, and a cursory examination of global media reports would provide strong, albeit anecdotal and unsystematic support for Findlay’s suggestions. But the fact remains that, in Andersson’s words, all such explanations offer little ‘viability in generalising across all states’ (2000:3), which is the one of the key aims of this dissertation.

One of the more imaginative empirical investigations of peacekeeping contribution is Peter Jakobsen’s (1996) analysis, where he sets out to assess the relative importance of a variety of factors in triggering post Cold War UN Chapter VII operations, namely, ‘the national interest’; the ‘CNN-effect’; the existence of a clear-cut legal case of massive humanitarian suffering; the chances of success; and the degree of domestic support. Jakobsen’s investigations of Chapter VII operations in Kuwait, northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti, lead him to conclude that the role of the ‘national interest’, at least as classically conceived, is largely insignificant; that the ‘CNN effect’ is salient in so far as it places ‘a conflict on the agenda’ (1996:213), and that broad domestic support is not a necessary criterion for a Chapter VII operation (1996:205).

Other analysts have tried to expand some of these specific factor explanations across states. Noting the association between the diversification of peacekeeping contribution and the widespread wave of post Cold War democratisation in the developing world, Velázquez (2002), for example, posits a ‘diversionary peace’ hypothesis: ‘in order to force potentially

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22 For example, Norden (1995) has explored the domestic political motivations underpinning Argentinean contribution to peacekeeping, while Scobell (1995) and Berman and Sams (1998) (cited in Li, 2003) have explored the financial motivations underpinning Fijian and poor African states’ peacekeeping contributions, respectively.
23 The BBC speculates, for example, that Ukraine is contributing over 1,000 troops to ‘stability operations’ in Iraq in order to recompense the US after Washington accused Kiev of supplying a sophisticated aircraft detection system to Baghdad in 2002 (BBC News, 7 August 2003). BBC correspondent Mark Doyle also noted more recently that China’s largest ever contribution to a peacekeeping operation (a 500-strong deployment to the UNAMIL UN operation in Liberia earlier this year), followed the new UN-backed government’s withdrawal of diplomatic recognition from Taiwan in favour of Beijing (BBC News, 20 January 2004).
24 Chapter VII is the chapter of the UN Charter that discusses coercive measures (either economic sanctions or military force) to deal with acts of aggression and ‘threats to international peace and security’.
reluctant militaries to respect the legal framework, the civilian government can choose to
deploy their armed forces far from the centre of political power … [B]y sending troops to far-
off destinations … the government can keep the army divided weak and relative to the
civilian government’ (2002:3). Velázquez suggests that this civil-military relations
framework might apply to ‘states that are coping with the processes of democratic
consolidation’ (ibid). Andersson (2000) has performed a similar analysis in quantitative
terms, corroborating a state’s contribution to peacekeeping with its degree of internal
democracy. Others (Blum, 2000) have sought to text the extent to which developing countries
contribute to peacekeeping operations for pecuniary reward.

Quite apart from the limited generalisability of such specific-factor explanations, a flaw
common to such approaches is that they tend to pre-suppose precisely what needs to be
explained, namely: why has international society come to attach some profound status to the
practice of contribution to peacekeeping? How does contribution to peacekeeping relate to
the wider role of peacekeeping in global politics? In the focus on how the internal
arrangements of states – whether civil-military relations (Velázquez, 2002), or the degree of
internal democracy (Andersson, 2000) – impacts on the international realm through
contribution to peacekeeping, the international sphere is expunged from the analysis.

Related to this flaw, and much like the wider field of peacekeeping studies as a whole, is the
distinctly instrumental flavour of this mode of analysis. That is to say, in corroborating a
state’s degree of democracy with its peacekeeping contribution, Andersson’s driving concern
is that ‘levels of participation not only determine whether peacekeeping operations occur at
all, but also bring consequences for any future operation, including the prospect for stand-by
arrangements and development of doctrine’ (2000:1). This instrumentality is also evident in
the ‘diversionary peace’ hypothesis: ‘lessons derived from Argentine and Brazilian
peacekeepers may provide policy prescriptions to decision-makers interested in diversionary
peace in the developing world’ (Velázquez, 2002:4). As Bellamy et al. (2004:14) note, the
policy-oriented, instrumental approach lends itself to taking peacekeeping as the self-evident
starting point of analysis, rather than problematising peacekeeping, and trying to immerse it
‘in the wider processes and structures of global politics’ and thereby retain a grasp of ‘the
crucial point’: ‘decisions about when to intervene, how to intervene and what resources to

25 For example, it is highly unlikely that profiteering could be generalised across major contributors as an explanation for their
peacekeeping contributions. In India’s and Pakistan’s cases, for example, any ‘profits’ would be minimal relative to overall
military expenditure (Li, 2003:3, see also Krishnasamy, 2002). In the case of ‘diversionary peace’, Li (2003) observes that in
some cases the terms may be reversed: it is arguable that participation in peacekeeping operations informed both the Ghanaian
and Fijian military’s seizures of power (Scobell and Hutchful, in Li, 2003:5).
employ in that intervention are unavoidably political, complex, multidimensional and contested’ (Bellamy et al., 2004:32).

**General Explanations**

As Andersson argues, ‘integrated analysis of participation among states is a neglected dimension of peacekeeping’ (2000:1), and the ‘literature concerned with more abstract and general factors affecting a state’s propensity to participate’ (2000:3) could almost be counted on the fingers of one hand. Both Neack (1995) and Bobrow and Boyer (1997) offer more-or-less realist analyses of peacekeeping contribution, arguing that contribution can be theorised through a national interest in maintaining the stability of the international order. While Neack presents this argument in more classical terms (great powers’ interests in maintaining the ‘international status quo’), Bobrow and Boyer analyse peacekeeping as the provision of an ‘international public good’ – security – by the great powers. However, while Bobrow and Boyer recognise the post Cold War diversification of peacekeeping contribution, both theirs and Neack’s realist focus leads them to concentrate on peacekeeping contribution in relation to great power interests, detracting from the generalisability of this framework to the majority of states.

While all three of these authors are keenly aware of the lack of theoretical generalisation in previous analysis, their own propositions are undermined by a number of methodological and theoretical failings. In methodological terms for example, Neack relies predominantly on Cold War data, thereby sidelining the significant transformations in peacekeeping of the Cold War era (Andersson, 2000:3). But the greatest failing of these realist explanations is their relative theoretical shallowness. As Andersson observes (2000:19), realist analysis has difficulty reconciling the fact that the financial costs incurred by rich contributing states are usually high, certain and immediate. By contrast, any realpolitik gains from peacekeeping operations are frequently uncertain, imprecise and in the distant future – hence it is unclear to what extent a sharply defined realpolitik calculus could lie behind every peacekeeping deployment. Bobrow and Boyer’s (1997) largely quantitative analysis leads them to conclude that post Cold War peacekeeping has witnessed a diversification of both contributors and ‘beneficiary states’. But, as Li scathingly remarks, this ultimately yields little more insight than could be ‘gleaned from the UN’s public relations material’ (2003:n3).

In terms of strengths, taken together the literature on peacekeeping contribution imparts some insights, and broadly serves the purpose of forcing peacekeeping scholarship to cast its net wider than the conduct of individual peacekeeping operations. But, as Li concludes after
having surveyed the literature, ‘despite the fact that such work transcends the limitations of policy-oriented studies and genuinely seeks to place peacekeeping within the scope of mainstream international relations scholarship, [the studies] are mostly descriptive, based on questionable methodologies, and weak in overall analytical power – in other words, they do not move the discussion very far beyond the literature they critique’ (2003:3).

More specifically, much like the literature that analyses contribution in specific terms, these general studies also share the flaw that they fail to consider the context of global politics, in which contribution to peacekeeping takes place. Noting that public political discourses use peacekeeping to refer to a wide variety of operations and tasks, and that peacekeeping operations have changed over time, Bellamy et al. note the difficulty that analysts of peacekeeping have in trying to chronologically classify peacekeeping in to Cold War and post Cold War eras, by reference to the conduct of the operations themselves. Bellamy et al. cite examples of the diversity of peacekeeping operations in the Cold War – specifically the singular UN ‘peace enforcement’ operation of the 1950-1953 Korean War, and the 1960-1964 ONUC intervention in Congo – that confronted situations resembling those confronted by UN forces in Bosnia or Somalia (2004:76-92). Similarly, Pakistan’s 1962-1963 UNTEA administration of West New Guinea, in advance of the colony’s transfer from Dutch to Indonesian sovereignty, foreshadows the UN’s assumption of plenary and administrative powers in the post Cold War era, such as the UNTAG (1989-1990) and UNTAC (1992-1993) operations in Namibia and Cambodia, respectively.

The point is, again, following James, to place peacekeeping ‘firmly in the context of international politics’. So, in the case of the Korean War, the balance of power within the UN as a whole enabled the US to use the UN essentially as a military alliance in pursuit of Washington’s objective of re-uniting the Korean peninsula by force. The context for understanding ONUC and UNTEA is decolonisation – the process that presaged the democratisation of power in the UN, away from the Western states on the Permanent Security Council to those in the General Assembly. The context of the ‘classic’ peacekeeping operation UNEF I (established to monitor Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire lines after the 1956 Suez War), was the diminished legitimacy attached to the use of Western power abroad.26

26 The then UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, had to reject a suggestion that British and French forces, who had colluded with the Israeli invasion, would become a UN force (Granatstein, in Neack, 1995: 189).
Similarly, the context for post Cold War peacekeeping is the era of the ‘New Interventionism’ (Chesterman, 2003), marked by the increasing proclivity to intervene on the part of Western states, the expanding role of the UN Security Council and broadening of the remit of the ‘international peace and security’ concerns under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As a species of outside intervention into a conflict, peacekeeping has to be considered alongside within this wider array of interventionist practices in the post Cold War era. This is not say that the international order over-determines individual peacekeeping operations. Bellamy et al. note that of the UN’s twenty new operations created from 1988 to 1993, fifteen were in the UNEF ‘traditional’ mode – that is, essentially an interpositionary role of supervising military withdrawals and / or monitoring ceasefire lines (2004:76). But the fact remains that the ‘starting point’ for the study of peacekeeping ‘should be an appreciation of its essentially contested nature and its underlying purposes rather than abstract ideas drawn in from conflict research or complex taxonomies derived from what peacekeepers do in the field’ (Bellamy et al., 2004:32). We shall now move to consider one thesis that seeks to specifically contextualise the role played by ‘peace operations’ in the global order.
3. ‘GLOBAL RIOT CONTROL’: 
Critical Theory and Peacekeeping

In commenting on Debrix’s poststructuralist analysis *Re-Envisioning Peacekeeping* (1999), Pugh notes the iconic role that the ubiquitous Blue Helmets have come to assume in the New World Order: ‘screens showing intervention forces standing around while refugees are pushing past or soldiers handing out rations in a disaster probably have a more important role in shaping perceptions than factors lacking in televisual appeal [e.g.,] [t]he terms of trade for agricultural exports’ (2003:109). Yet the movement of peacekeeping ‘from the periphery of world politics to a central position did not seem to produce a comparable shift of explicit theorisation’ (Pugh, 2003:107). Many scholars of peacekeeping have taken peacekeeping studies to task for its limited horizons – its descriptive and prescriptive, rather than analytical and theoretical focus; its preoccupation with operational inefficiencies, tactical considerations and mandate fulfilment; and a crippling fixation on barren typologies to categorise operations, with little attention to the global political processes within which such operations are embedded (Bellamy *et al*., 2004). All of these criticisms are in large part apposite to the literature that analyses contribution to peacekeeping.

Pugh declares that ‘filling’ the theory gap in peacekeeping analysis is ‘a chief purpose of the first issue of [the journal] *International Peacekeeping* in the next decade’, and notes that there are ‘signs of movement and extroversion in the study of peacekeeping / peace operations’ (2003:111). Pugh’s observation is confirmed by the increasingly diverse theoretical approaches being directed toward peacekeeping studies, extending to post-structuralist and neo-Gramscian analyses, such as those of François Debrix, Oliver Richmond and William I. Robinson. Pugh’s observation is probably most noticeably confirmed by the spring 2004 issue of *International Peacekeeping*, that sought to make a concerted effort to push the field forward by bundling a variety of recent analyses together, and dubbing them the ‘Next Stage’ in peace operations theory. This bold endeavour is self-consciously styled after Andrew Linklater’s celebrated 1992 *Millennium* article, ‘The Question of the ‘Next Stage’ in International Relations Theory’, that sought to mould IR following the sloughing-off of Cold War intellectual orthodoxies.

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27 See, *inter alia*, Paris (2000); Pugh (2003); Li (2003); Bellamy and Williams (2004a); Bellamy *et al.* (2004).
The ‘Next Stage’ in ‘Peace Operations Theory’

The exponents of ‘Next Stage’ thinking would like to see the same shift occur in peacekeeping scholarship that has occurred in the wider academic field of IR in the closing decades of the Cold War. While ‘Next Stage’ thinking embraces a wide variety of approaches, including critical theoretical, post-structuralist, feminist and human security concerns – my concern here is to engage principally with the critical theoretical aspect of ‘Next Stage’ scholarship. However, in so far as this dissertation embraces the same broadly sceptical approach introduced by ‘Next Stage’ thought, it too is part of the same intellectual endeavour.

While it would be unwise to impute too much coherence to such a fledgling and disparate approach, the ‘Next Stage’ is coherent in so far as its adopts Robert Cox’s slogan that ‘theory is always for someone or something’ – the celebrated call to recognise the political and social embeddedness of intellectual endeavour. Bellamy, for example, attempts to bifurcate peacekeeping scholarship through use of Cox’s problem-solving / critical theory distinction, wherein ‘problem-solving’ theory ‘takes the world as it finds it with the prevailing social and power relationships and institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’ (1981:127-128). Orthodox theory is, therefore, inherently conservative and status-quo oriented. In contrast, by contextualising orthodox theory through the exposure of the social basis of knowledge, the emphasis on contingency opens the possibility of change, and consequently of social and political transformation.

So how do these concerns affect the study of peacekeeping? According to Bellamy and Williams (2004a), this emphasis on the socially-constructed nature of international politics entails viewing international crises as ‘constructed, not discovered, and the relative significance attached to particular issues is shaped by factors such as ideology, material circumstances, epistemological assumptions and geographical location’ (2004a:8). The problem-solving approach by contrast, envisions intervention in world politics as a temporally bound, discrete act with a clear beginning and end. Consequently, ‘problem-solving theory’ is unable ‘to evaluate the extent to which dominant peacekeeping or peacemaking practices may actually help reproduce the social structures that cause violent conflict in the first place’ (Bellamy, 2004:18). Even more provocatively, Bellamy suggests that peacekeeping may simply be the militarisation of wider relations of interference in domestic societies: ‘[f]rom a critical perspective, the idea that peace operations are discrete activities implies that the intervening states and agencies were not already implicated in the crisis they are intervening in’ (2004:29).
Broadly speaking, the post-structuralist contribution to the ‘Next Stage’ literature has been to deliver the insight that peacekeeping operations attempt to reproduce international order rather than merely ameliorate crisis. For critical theorists like Pugh (2004), Bellamy and Williams (2004a, 2004b), they draw on political economy to delineate the contours of the international order that is being reproduced:

… the dominance of neo-liberal economic theories and the current regulation of the global economy (often along distinctly illiberal lines) has helped create particular types of war economies, political structures, ‘warlordism’ and weak states … peacekeepers themselves are also largely constituted by … elements of this broader context (Bellamy and Williams, 2004a:8).

Or, more pithily: ‘a critical agenda suggests that the problems that peacekeepers confront today are in no small part a reflection of global spending priorities’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2004b:200).

**Global Riot Control**

Pugh expands on how peacekeeping operations are embedded in the current global order. According to the ‘global riot control’ thesis, neoliberal capitalism bifurcates the world into a deeply inter-connected core of advanced capitalist states, and a vast and unstable ‘periphery’, unevenly integrated into the global economy, consisting of shadow economies and ‘pseudo state-polities’. This marginalized zone is governed by the ‘core’ from afar, through the projection of power in the form of sanctions regimes and NGO network assistance, establishing a ‘liberal peace’ – a distinct regime of ‘global governance’, composed of neoliberal market economies and political pluralism. However, when instability ruptures the ‘periphery’, increasingly aggressive and well-armed peacekeeping operations are deployed to suppress the problem. ‘Thus,’ Pugh writes, ‘modern versions of peacekeeping can be considered as forms of riot control directed against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace’ (2004:41). In this vein, Pugh notes that so-called ‘peace-support operations’ (the conventional term for heavily armed, generally non-UN peace operations, such as the NATO-led operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan) are conceptually conceived of as counter-insurgency operations, marking a fortuitous synthesis between liberal outrage against human rights abuses and an defence of global hierarchy (2004:40). Together with the economic restructuring undertaken by the international financial institutions (IFIs), peacekeeping and ‘neoliberal’ economics amount to a potent mixture of ‘poor relief and riot control’ (Pugh, 2004:46):
Soldiers and humanitarians are trouble-shooters of an international society that structures inequalities and fails to fulfil human needs. Significantly, too, they replicate the normative and ideological assumptions that enable dominant states to manage the system in their own image. (Pugh, 2004:54)

According to Pugh, in this world order, the discourse of humanitarianism plays numerous roles, functioning both to marginalize ‘structural injustices’, to charge Western public opinion for the ‘sacrifice’ of stabilising the ‘periphery’, and to legitimate a new self-other dichotomy for the post-Cold War world (2004:49-50).

**Evaluating ‘Global Riot Control’: The Aporia of Inter-state Relations**

In so far as the ‘Next Stage’ literature seeks to re-politicise peacekeeping studies through an attention to issues of ideology and power, it is to be warmly welcomed. In so far as the emphasis on the socially-constructed nature of peacekeeping helps to shift the focus away from the target of intervention to the wider international realm, it is also to be welcomed. In so far as the ‘Next Stage’ literature sees the deployment of peacekeeping forces as the sharp end of ‘wider relations of interference in domestic societies’, it provides an important corrective to the extant literature on intervention, that is frequently blind to the economic context of social conflict. Indeed, simply having consciously set out to introduce a new wariness and sceptical approach to the field is perhaps the single most important achievement of the ‘Next Stage’.

But, as Neack notes, ‘[c]xpanded scope or not, the UN cannot function without the voluntary compliance and full and committed participation of its members’ (emphasis added, 1995:181). To the extent that Pugh recognises ‘geographical burden-sharing’ within peace operations, he sees this as an attempt by the advanced economies to ease their financial burdens, and to avoid risking their soldiers’ lives (2004:45). In addition the practice of sub-contracting to ‘coalitions of the willing’ and regional security mechanisms also reflects the uneven processes of globalisation – that is, the growing inter-penetration within the core regions of the world economy, combined with the exclusion of the peripheral areas (Pugh, 2004:43-45).

But, as Neack intimates, the political agency of the participating states is omitted in the ‘global riot control’ thesis. I would suggest that this oversight is symptomatic of a more general lack in the thesis, and perhaps the ‘Next Stage’ literature as a whole: specifically, the inability to grasp the dynamics of inter-state relations. The end of the Cold War is noticeably
absent from an account that remains fixated on ‘neoliberal’ economic policies – though neoliberalism can be traced back to the early 1980s of the Thatcher and Reagan period. Consequently, ‘global riot control’ makes no effort to incorporate the shift in global relations of inter-state power that the demise of the Cold War brought about. This omission is perhaps most tellingly revealed in the very notion of ‘global riots’, evocatively connoting images of an undifferentiated, deracinated morass of humanity, with no states, political institutions, organisations, nor modes of collective political representation interceding between them on the one hand, and the IFIs and their enforcers, the Blue Helmets, on the other. The dramatic diversification of peacekeeping contribution sits ill at ease with claims that conceptualise peacekeeping as the military reflex of advanced economies to suppress the epiphenomenal manifestations of underlying structural contradictions. Thus, while global riot control is able to question inequalities between people in the ‘core’ and those in the marginalized areas of the global economy, it is unable to comment on patterns of inter-state domination.

Bellamy and Williams are ostensibly presenting a radical critique of peacekeeping operations as currently conceived, noting that a ‘critical agenda’ in peacekeeping must be sensitive to the dangers of ‘becoming a form of neo-imperialism’ (2004b:199) and should also include ‘advocating for more money to spent on medicines and alleviating malnutrition than on marines and mercenaries’:

Encouraging the redirection of resources from the military sector towards international development may help reduce the number of occasions that peacekeepers are required to engage in political fire-fighting or global riot control (2004b:200).

But for all the evocative language of ‘global riot control’, critical theory in peacekeeping has yet to problematise how the rights of individuals relate to state rights, or how the elevation of individual rights may undermine international order. In the image of deracinated, vulnerable humanity, it reproduces the central ideological precept for military intervention in the current period: the elevation of individual rights over the rights of states.

Indeed, Bellamy and Williams see the incorporation of the ICISS report’s conclusion *Responsibility to Protect*\(^28\) – that intervention should be predicated on the ‘responsibility to protect’ rather than the ‘right to intervene’ – as a crucial component of a critical agenda. This shift, they argue, recognises that individual rights and sovereignty are not diametrically opposed to each other, and that the historical construction of sovereignty is bound up with the

\(^28\) The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
evolution of individual rights. In short, Bellamy and Williams fully endorse ‘strengthening
the military might of the UN’ (2004b:190), conceding that ‘force may be necessary in
But the shift from the ‘right to intervene’ to a focus on the ‘responsibility to protect’ is not
without its dangers. As David Chandler notes, while the shift in language from rights to
responsibilities may bring the ‘victims of world politics’ to the fore (2004:63), it also shifts
the onus of justification in international law. Thus, while the UN Charter places the onus of
justification on those powers perpetrating an intervention, the ‘concept of “sovereignty as
responsibility” puts the burden of justification on the state intervened in to ‘substantiate its
“moral claim to be treated as legitimate’ (Chandler, 2004:65). The obliviousness to how the
promotion of individual rights exacerbates inter-state domination within world politics is no
small oversight, for as Neil Stammers observes ‘the imperative of action to defend human
rights ironically entails a realpolitik which is highly state-centric and, in fact, not only reflects
but also reinforces the highly uneven balance of existing power relations’ (Stammers, in

Through a critique of positivist methodology in peacekeeping, ‘Next Stage’ scholarship is
seeking to promote a more complex, inter-penetrated ontology as a basis for analysing
peacekeeping: ‘[c]ritical theories … recognise that interveners and recipients are bound
together by complex relationships that extend beyond the ostensible limits of the particular
intervention in question’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2004a:8). But this denser, ostensibly richer
ontology also relativises intervention – which is to say, it effectively places the peacekeeper’s
boots on the firmer ontological ground of ‘complex relationships’, rather than the more
tenuous, ‘positivistic’ ground of intervention as a discrete, singular act. The ontology of
‘complex relationships’ is the counterpart to promoting the ‘responsibility to protect’ over the
rights of states. Thus, for all its proclamation of the historical embeddedness of theory, the
‘Next Stage’ literature nonetheless seems oblivious to the fact that it is effectively serving to
chisel in philosophical stone a historically contingent set of global power relations that
emerged from the end of the Cold War. And it is to these that we must now turn.
One of the most innovative and refreshing aspects of the ‘Next Stage’ literature is its decisive refutation of what Bellamy dubbed ‘peacekeeping lore’, namely the notion that the end of the Cold War saw the emergence of an explosive ‘New World Disorder’, an image most memorably evoked in the lurid and crudely Malthusian language of Robert D. Kaplan (1994), but also supported in the pessimistic nostrums of realists such as John Mearsheimer (1990). Citing the work of Colin McInnes, Bellamy notes that in between 1986 and 1999, the number of conflicts in the world dropped from 25 to 15 (2004:28). Consequently the only ‘explosion’ was that of ‘peace operations and a broadening of their remits’ (ibid). Thus Bellamy argues that instead of attributing the increasing number and complexity of post Cold War peacekeeping to changes in the conflict areas themselves, analysts should focus on ‘push’ factors instead:

‘[T]he proliferation and increased complexity of peace operations was a product of changes in the self-perceptions of peacekeepers and dominant perspectives on the role of peacekeeping in global politics, not an explosion of new types of violence in the world’s trouble spots. As a result, the subject matter of peace operations is dictated by the interveners, not the targets’ (emphasis added; 2004:28).

What could such ‘push factors’ consist of? Jennifer Welsh has suggested that the search by Western states for new forms of political legitimacy and moral authority to replace the ideologically-driven agenda of the Cold War, is a key element underlying the interventions of the post Cold War period (Welsh, 2004a:2). Similarly, David Chandler (2002) has argued that what has given both form and content to this search for new modes of authority is the protracted crisis of legitimacy within the Western polity – a crisis that has been widely commented on elsewhere, but has attracted comparatively little comment in IR.29

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29 Drawing on the research of leading sociologists and political scientists, the Economist captured the basic elements of this political malaise that endured throughout the 1990s in what it dubbed the ‘mature democracies’:

In most of the mature democracies, the results [of opinion surveys] show a pattern of disillusionment with politicians … Surveys suggest that confidence in political institutions is in decline as well. In 11 out of 14 countries, for example, confidence in parliament has declined, with especially sharp falls in Canada, Germany, Britain, Sweden and the United States […] [T]he evidence of opinion surveys is reinforced by other trends. These include a decline both in the membership of political parties and in the proportion of people who turn out to vote … (“Is there a crisis?” July 15, 1999)
It is in this context, argues Chandler, that a premium has been placed on the ability of politicians to project unifying values that transcend the traditional, divisive ideologies of left and right, and thereby unify the politically-deracinated constituencies of left and right. It is this that, at least partially, makes the moralising claims of human rights so attractive:

In these days of increasing cynicism and doubt over government and politics at a domestic level, human rights promotion seems to be the one idea with the power to hold society together and point a way beyond the relativism and pessimism of our times (Chandler, 2002:63)

With the demise of Soviet power, the international realm suggests itself as a sphere that is far more malleable than the intractable social problems of the Western polity. This contrast between the humdrum sphere of domestic politics and the redemptive, morally-charged sphere of the international is contrasted by Chandler with subtle hilarity:

The contrast between the moral certainty possible in selected areas of foreign policy and the uncertainties of domestic policy making was unintentionally highlighted when President George Bush congratulated Tony Blair on his willingness to take a stand over Afghanistan and Iraq: ‘The thing I admire about this Prime Minister is that he doesn’t need a poll or a focus group to convince him of the difference between right or wrong.’ (emphasis added, Chandler, 2003:138-139).30

The reasons for the attraction of the international realm in this pursuit are, according to Chandler, twofold. Firstly, that the object of criticism is external – often a foreign government – allows for a Manichean, morally-charged ‘politics of condemnation’. Second, in the international sphere there are less formal mechanisms through which Western states can be held to account, offering the intensely tantalising prospect that credit can be claimed for positive outcomes, while negative outcomes can be blamed on factors beyond one’s control (2002:64-68). Or, as Furedi pithily observed in 1994: ‘failed politicians who are unable to solve the problems of inner-city London or downtown New York feel … much more comfortable with handling the situation in Mogadishu with a few helicopter gunships’ (1994:114).

30 It is important to note that Western states’ post Cold War foreign policies are not reducible to grubbing for votes. As Bellamy has pointed out ‘there is no evidence to suggest that Clinton lost a single vote because he chose not to prevent or halt the Rwandan genocide or that Clinton and Blair gained a single vote because of their activism over Kosovo (2002:131). The point is that this drive is more elemental than mere populism. Lacking any traditional infusion of legitimacy from the electorate entails that ‘the drive to pursue ethical adventures abroad is … directly related to … [a] … basic … instinct of the political establishment – the need for governing administrations to have a sense of self-identity, purpose and self-belief’ (Chandler, 2003:137).
The ‘Re-Enchantment of the International’ and the Third World

It is in this context that it is perhaps possible to speak of the terms of Martin Wight’s famous essay ‘Why is there no International Theory?’ (1966) being inversed. With the constriction of the political terrain between left and right and the advent of ‘Third Way’ social democracy, it is the domestic that has become the disenchanted realm, the recalcitrant sphere of ‘recurrence and repetition’. With the end of Soviet power, by contrast, the plasticity of the international sphere, for the powerful Western states at least, seems to offer the transformative possibilities for the construction of the ‘good life’. It this dual context – with the domestic realm disenchanted and the international realm re-enchanted – that has contributed to the theoretical effervescence of academic IR, and helped to consolidate ‘post-positivist’ approaches. Whereas ‘rationalist’ approaches emphasised the structural rigidity of the international realm, dominated by the operation of necessity and power, ‘perspectivist’ or ‘post-positivist’ theories have emphasised context, social construction and contingency – an agenda that directly reflects the ostensibly enhanced plasticity of the international realm following the implosion of Soviet power.

Ayoob once charged the discipline of security studies with being ‘ethnocentric’ for being unable to conceive of security except in terms of external threats. Consequently the discipline was oblivious to the security predicament of the majority of states in the Third World, whose institutional and ideological weakness made them vulnerable to internal security threats as much as external ones (Ayoob, 1991). The same charge could arguably be laid at the door of many ‘post-positivist’ approaches, including the ‘critical agenda’ of peacekeeping studies: critical theoretical approaches have been largely oblivious to how confined and restricted the international order has become for non-Western states, quite apart from economic inequalities of the global economy.

Sovereignty as Responsibility

What has facilitated the expansion of Western power in the post Cold War era has been the international broadening and deepening of the human rights framework – a phenomenon often discussed as the emergence of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. Conventionally, it is held that a series of military operations in the post Cold War era that have been explicitly supported by a humanitarian rationale, have juxtaposed sovereignty as authority (the legal right to supreme
control over territory) with the nascent ‘norm’ of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ (state respect for a minimal standard of human rights).

Ayoob argues quite effectively that ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ represents a resurrection of the ‘standards of civilization’ argument promulgated by imperialist powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that independence and non-intervention were only fit for states that had reached a certain standard of civilization and moral development (2002:83). Critical in this elevation of human rights within international society is the question of agency ‘because’, as Ayoob argues, ‘those who define human rights and decree that they have been violated also decide when and where intervention to protect such rights should and must take place’ (2002:81). As human rights tend to pre-suppose the diminished capacity of the subjects of those rights, this enshrines a degraded notion of political autonomy at the core of world politics. As the content of human rights is established independently of the capacity of the subjects of those rights, this contradiction is resolved by yoking in the agency of external power: ‘because the human subject is defined as being without autonomy, some external source has, of necessity, to be looked to’ (Chandler, 2002:109).

As the inner logic of human rights’ tends to prise apart the subject and agent of rights, in the context of global politics the elevation of human rights opens up a rift into which power inexorably creeps. Sympathetically scrutinising Ayoob’s work, Welsh argues that the problems raised by human rights include questions such as ‘[w]ho is it that decides when a state has not fulfilled its responsibilities and determines that only force can bring about its compliance … [W]ho should play the role of judge and enforcer in international society?’ (2004b:66-67). But the real problem is that these questions answer themselves: in the context of gross and massive human rights violations, the question of who is secondary to the moral imperative of action. And in the absence of world government, the imperative of action will inevitably be borne by those with the power to act. In other words, the powerful will always be able to assert themselves as the guardians of human rights over the claims of the actual subjects of human rights.

Nicholas Wheeler has forcefully argued against referring the rise of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ to shifting patterns of global domination. Wheeler argues that when the UN Security Council decided by ten votes with two abstentions on 5 April 1991, to dub the refugee crisis within Iraq as a threat to peace, ‘it is hard to resist the conclusion that the Council was – albeit tentatively – applying the principle of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ in its action …’ (2004:37). Moreover, when a 26 March 1999 draft Russian resolution demanding a halt to NATO’s onslaught on Yugoslavia was ‘comprehensively defeated by
twelve votes to three’, 31 Wheeler maintains that it is ‘problematic to explain the votes cast by Malaysia and Bahrain in terms of the operation of American hegemony as the Cuban ambassador argued. If this was the case, then why did Malaysia and Bahrain feel the need to make a public statement rather than remain silent, as was the case with other members like Brazil who also cast a vote against the Russian resolution? … The majority of Council members … rejected the Russian resolution because they accepted that NATO’s action was justifiable on humanitarian grounds.’ (2004:45).

Wheeler contends that the claim that humanitarian ideals have been pressed into the service of power does not sufficiently distinguish between power based on relations of domination and power based on ‘shared norms’, noting that ‘even repressive governments recognise the need to legitimate their actions as being in conformity with global humanitarian values’ (2004:39). Moreover, Wheeler points out that there is little evidence to show non-Western states being dragooned into compliance: ‘materialists could reply that power does not have to be used to be effective, but in the absence of any empirical evidence to support this claim, it remains a hypothesis that needs more rigorous testing. One important piece of evidence that refutes the materialist position is that had Western power been as omnipotent as they suggest, would Yemen and Zimbabwe have voted against Resolution 688 [5 April 1991]?’ (2004:39).

Methodologically-speaking, Wheeler is on dubious ground here, relying on a blithe positivism to demolish alternative interpretations. On the hand, Wheeler wants it both ways: votes cast both for and against ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ resolutions are taken as evidence confirming the predetermined conclusion, that power is exercised benignly rather than malignantly. But more significantly, the absence of any record of diplomatic arm-twisting in the minutes of UN Security Council meetings is not evidence that diplomatic arm-twisting – let alone hegemony – is not at work. A theoretical framework that is oblivious to the power implications of the end of bi-polarity is one that is oblivious to the major fact of international politics. Reflecting on E.H. Carr’s writings, Wheeler muses that ‘[a]lthough the strongest states are in a position to substitute brute power for legitimacy, what is surprising is how rarely this happens’ (2004:32). But when Carr argues that ‘supposedly absolute and universal principles … are but … the unconscious reflexions of … national interest at a particular time’ (Carr, in Wheeler, 2004:31), Carr is making the point that ‘brute power’ and legitimacy are more often coterminous than antagonistic facets of power.

31 The Russian resolution, supported by China, Belarus and India, was voted down by the five NATO states on the Council at the time (US, UK, France, Canada, the Netherlands) as well as Slovenia, Argentina Brazil, Bahrain, Bahrain, Malaysia, Gabon and Gambia. The Cuban ambassador to the UN subsequently denounced the vote as ‘shameful’, claiming that ‘never before has the unipolar order imposed by the USA been so obvious and so disturbing’ (S/PV.3989, in Wheeler, 2004:44).
Cross Border Interventions by Developing Countries and Western Power

Commenting on the famous 1986 Foreign Office legal brief that explicitly argued against humanitarian intervention, Holbrook argues that in the circumstances of the Cold War what vexed the Foreign Office was the possibility of opening up a legal breach for independent action on the part of developing states.\(^{32}\) In less than ten years however ‘less powerful states had lost their ability to act independently of Western interests. Saddam Hussein was to discover this when Iraqi tanks rolled into Kuwait in 1990 and provoked an international response, the likes of which had not been seen in previous decades’ (2002:142). As Holbrook argues, it is ‘now highly unlikely that states like India, Turkey, Indonesia, Vietnam and Tanzania could intervene militarily in other states, as they did in [the 1970s], unless they had prior Western support …. [now] only the NATO countries … have the political and military clout to utilise the newly claimed right [of humanitarian intervention]’ (2002:142).\(^{33}\) Wheeler is fond of citing India’s dismemberment of West and East Pakistan (1971), the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the 1979 Tanzanian invasion of Uganda as the Cold War precedents of humanitarian intervention (2002a; 2002b). But these examples inadvertently expose the flaws in Wheeler’s argument, for as Holbrook argues:

> Each of these interventions in the affairs of a neighbouring state showed that in the bipolar world of the Cold War it was possible for a state to use military force independently of Western interests. It was under those circumstances that the Foreign Office had reason to fear that a right of humanitarian intervention would have given less powerful states a lawful right to wage war. (2002:141-142)

If ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ was based on the ‘power of shared norms’, and moreover it if it was developing countries that were the harbingers of humanitarian responsibilities during the Cold War, it begs the question of why we have not seen more cases of unilateral intervention justified in humanitarian terms by developing countries in the post Cold War era. Even relatively powerful developing states, such as Russia and Nigeria, have tended to conduct regional military interventions through reliance on the legitimacy of regional organisation. The contrast between, say, the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda and the deployment of AU peacekeepers to Darfur is particularly striking. Tanzania was responding to repeated border raids by Ugandan forces (Chesterman, 2003:77); in other words, primarily out of self-defence. In Darfur, by contrast, the crisis has been consistently brought to the fore by Western diplomacy. As BBC correspondent Jill McGivering observed some months ago,

\(^{32}\) ‘[T]he scope for abusing such a right argues strongly against its creation’ (FCO, cited in Holbrook, 2002:140-141)

\(^{33}\) Holbrook is referring to India’s invasion of East Pakistan (1971); Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus (1974); Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor (1975); Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia (1978) and Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda (1979).
“[t]he United States has seemed determined to keep the crisis in … Darfur … high on the international agenda in recent weeks … [Colin Powell’s] stern rhetoric also signalled another plus point: in the midst of controversy over Iraq, Darfur is an issue on which the US can safely assume the moral high ground, with little international opposition.”34 The issue of AU peacekeepers has only come forward after a protracted process of Western-led diplomacy. The relative arbitrariness of settling on the Darfur crisis is underscored by an observation in the Economist: ‘a top Sudanese official admits, the few months of crisis in Darfur have tarnished the country’s image more than all the years of war in the south.’35 The marked absence of unilateral interventions suggests that developing countries’ ability to act beyond the remit of Western power is severely circumscribed. It is within this context – the inability to act beyond the interests of Western power – that the diversification of peacekeeping contribution must be understood. Ayoob has vigorously argued that ‘[a]n ineffective Security Council, as in the Cold War era, poses less threat to international society than does a Security Council that may routinely become an instrument of one great power or a concert of great powers to be used for their own ends’ (1995:127). The reality of such threats is confirmed by MacFarlane and Weiss:

In June 1994, for example, disparate interests resulted in separate [Security] Council decisions to authorise interventions by the French in Rwanda, the Americans in Haiti, and the Russians in Georgia. Each of the three permanent members traded its vote for the favoured intervention of the other in return for support of its own favoured operation (MacFarlane and Weiss, in Ayoob, 2002:87).

Problematising Sovereignty as Responsibility

There a number of corrosive elements to the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. Firstly, as Ayoob argues, the tendency of human rights militarism is to effectively bifurcate international society into two zones, the ‘zones of civilised and uncivilised states’ and to ‘legitimise predatory actions by the former against the latter’ (2002:84-85). As Benedict Kingsbury observes, what is particularly perverse about this bifurcation is:

[The]ory of liberal and non-liberal zones proposes differential treatment … The outcome seems likely to be the maintenance of a classificatory system which is itself both an explanation and a justification for those at the margins remaining there for generations (Kingsbury, in Ayoob, 2002:86)

34 ‘Why is the US focused on Sudan?’ BBC News, 15 July 2004
35 ‘Decision time in Sudan’, Economist 28 August 2004
Secondly, ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ is highly uneven in the burden of responsibility that it effectively distributes amongst states. Chandler notes that the ethereal nature of the discourse of human rights abuse is not accidental: ‘human rights abuse[s] … stand outside any social, economic or political context and could be applied to the ethnic cleansing of the Native Americans in the nineteenth century, to the Nazi Holocaust or civil strife in Sierra Leone’ (2002:225). That is to say that the insubstantial, de-contextualised nature of ‘human rights abuse’ allows the discourse to be applied to developing states without cognitive dissonance being perceived between the rubric of ‘human rights abuse’ and the fact of being developing states. Thus developing states’ claims to the right of non-intervention, as granted under the UN Charter, are put into question by virtue of their being poor, socially fractious and institutionally weak. This tacit – and oftentimes not-so-tacit – questioning of the developing state for being a developing state prompted the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, Sir Michael Somare, to criticise

the way foreign academics, journalists and governments try to determine the fate of small developing countries … The designation of the term ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ to a developing nation seems to us to be rather arbitrary. I am concerned there is no clear idea what constitutes a ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ state. Papua New Guinea itself has been designated a ‘weak state’ since about 1996 when these ideas came into prominence. The Solomon Island has now been designated as a ‘failed’ state. The current [2003 Australian-led] intervention was justified on this ground. (Somare, in Gourevitch, 2004:2-3).

Yet Papua New Guinea, as well as Tonga and Fiji, obliged by contributing to the 2,250 strong Australian-dominated intervention force sent in to the Solomon Islands in July 2003.36

This takes us to the third criticism of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. ‘Sovereignty as responsibility’ entails more than just a bifurcation of the international order – it also necessitates an externalisation of political accountability. If ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ has entailed that the ‘three traditional characteristics of a state … (territory, authority and population) have been supplemented by a fourth, respect for human rights’ (Chandler, 2004:65), then this also involves a shift in accountability, spelled out by ICISS report Responsibility to Protect: ‘sovereignty [now] means accountability to two separate constituencies: internally, to one’s own population; and internationally, to the community of responsible states’ (ICISS, in Chandler, 2004:65). But the idea of a relativised, qualified sovereignty is sheer sophistry, as Chandler points out, ‘a power which is ‘accountable’ to another, external body clearly lacks sovereign authority’ (2004:65). This externalisation of

36 BBC News, 24 July 2003
political accountability needs to be seen in the broader context, in which the accountability of the developing state has been gnawed away by a variety of factors – on the economic, policy-making and political fronts.

On the economic front, ‘[a]t the level of the non-Western state, the human rights approach facilitates external regulation by international institutions under the increasingly invasive policies of conditionality, which restrict democratic decision-making’ (Chandler, 2002:218). In legal terms, as Welsh has noted, the privileging of customary international law on military intervention over treaty law and convention, has eroded the basis of international law, mutual reciprocity, because reliance on customary law effectively entail that certain types of practice are privileged more than others, i.e., the actions of Western states versus the stated opposition of non-Western states (2004:55). The increasing promotion of customary law by particular states entails the erosion of universal principles; and ‘[i]f there are no principles to international law then international law readily accommodates to the actions of powerful states’ (Holbrook, 2002:143). Chandler follows this process through to its logical conclusion:

As the new forms of international law develop, there is a growing legal inequality between the more powerful states and the rest. Where international law is formally subordinate to domestic law in Western states, the opposite relationship is developing in the non-Western regions (2002:139-140).

In terms of the externalisation of political accountability, the tendency is to extricate political decision making from within developing societies, and orient them towards outwards, to the ‘community of responsible states’, in ICISS jargon. This is illustrated by the examples of the states of south eastern Europe, who present the striking contrast of increasingly involving themselves in peacekeeping, while themselves being occupied by multinational peacekeeping forces.

The Albanian defence minister Pandeli Majko’s speech to the Albanian peacekeepers being deployed to Iraq is particularly revealing in this regard:

By taking part in the coalition of the willing led by the United States and the United Kingdom … Albania [has] demonstrated that we were up to our duty. We demonstrated our progress from a country gripped by cyclic crises to a country that exports stability and offers means to guarantee stability, peace and security. 37

Events over the Albanian village of Lazarat on 18 August 2004 exposed the hollowness of these claims to ‘export’ peace and security, when police helicopters of the Italian ‘Interforze’

37 Emphasis added, SEES Monitor 14 October 2003
mission (stationed in Albania since 1997) injured Albanian villagers in an exchange of a fire. How a state can claim to ‘export peace and security’ when it is incapable of protecting its own citizens, and does not maintain the legal monopoly of force throughout its territory, is an inconsistency that the ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ argument fails to consider. Another example from the region comes from Serbia: ex-Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Živković was so eager to ingratiate himself with the White House during his official visit to the US in July 2003, that he offered 1,000 troops for peacekeeping operations in Iraq, without any prior consultation with the electorate, or concern for the illegality of such an offer under the Serbian constitution. The move caused even more controversy when it became apparent that the ‘peacekeepers’ would be drawn from among 2,000 elite troops dedicated to securing the border in Kosovo, where Albanian guerrilla forces continue to operate. In the final analysis, for poor and weak states ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ means irresponsibility to a state’s own citizens. The externalisation of political accountability entails that foreign policy is crafted without reference to the domestic political process – placing policy-making beyond the pale of democratic decision-making and accountability. In Bosnia Herzegovina, the government there is determined to submit a multiethnic contingent of de-mining personnel to the multinational force in Iraq, in spite of growing domestic opposition. As the Bosnian and Serbian examples indicate, crafting foreign policy with reference to the priorities of the ‘international community’ entails the suppression of domestic opposition.

38 On 28 March 1997 the Security Council authorised Italy to lead a ‘multinational protection force’ to quell domestic political instability in Albania that was seen as constituting ‘a threat to international peace and security’.
40 Economist 21 August 2004
41 SEES Monitor, 14 October 2003
42 SEES Monitor, 15 October 2004
5. CONCLUSION

Non-Western states in a Re-Enchanted International Realm

I have argued in this dissertation that, with the dissolution of the Cold War framework of international politics, developing states have come under siege on the political, economic, and legal fronts. In particular, through the elevation of the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, developing states have increasingly been politically re-oriented, away from their domestic citizens and towards international society. Ayoob has argued that ‘Third World state behaviour, whether at the individual or the collective level, is largely determined by the insecurity that is aggravated by the overwhelming feeling of vulnerability, if not impotence, among its state elites’ (1995:1). It is through this prism of vulnerability that we must view developing countries’ contribution to interventionist practices such as peacekeeping.

The elements of the vulnerability of non-Western states in the post Cold War era are many and varied. It is possible, for example, to read the ‘emergent norm’ of humanitarian intervention in a different light. Referring to the disintegration of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia, Ayoob observes that ‘the prompt admission of break-away states to the United Nations [has] sent the message to prospective Third World separatists that the international community is no longer committed to the maintenance of existing state boundaries’ (1995:174). Moreover, as Weiss et al. note ‘[in the 1990s] a state that was … contemplating action that might be found to be a threat to or breach of the peace had to deal with the possibility that the UN Security Council would find its action in violation of international law and therefore launch some coercive response’ (2004:337). This threat of military intervention was compounded by increasingly invasive bureaucratic regulation: ‘as a historical trend, the United Nations is supervising more rights in more states through more intrusive measures than ever before’ (Weiss et al., 2004:339).

Perhaps the most powerful way to illustrate the circumstances of non-Western states in the post Cold War period is through the words of Bosnian journalist Mufid Memija. Reflecting on his government’s desire to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq, Memija perceptively likened the global order to a Brezhnev Doctrine writ large over the developing world: ‘On the one hand, [Iraq] shows that the doctrine of limited sovereignty, known from the dark era of the
USSR, is again operating in international relations. On the other, this is very unpleasant proof of the subject-like mentality of our politicians.\textsuperscript{43}

Many commentators have noticed the irony that a Labour government has taken Britain to war more times in its two terms of office than previous British governments in the last fifty years (e.g., Kampfner, 2004). Chandler has also pointed out that it is liberals, social democrats and former Cold War peace activists that have taken over from conservatives as the leading exponents of military force in world affairs – Mary Kaldor and former Labour leader Michael Foot being notable examples (2002:157). The privileging of human rights concerns in world politics, Chandler grimly concludes, has helped to create an international order where conflict is more likely, peace negotiations may be undermined and ‘the “scourge of war” is no longer seen as the worst outcome of international policy’ (2002:166).

But, as I have been trying to convey in this dissertation, it is not merely the social democrats and leftists of Northern states who have contributed to this militarisation of international affairs. It is, for example, the leader of Brazil’s Workers’ Party, Luis Ignácio Lula de Silva (‘Lula’), who is responsible for Brazil’s largest military deployment abroad since 1945, namely Brazil’s 1,200-strong troop deployment to the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) earlier this year. Lula has sought to establish his international credentials through sponsoring the ‘World Social Forums’ of the anti-globalisation protestors and NGOs. Brazil also famously led the Southern states’ charge (the ‘Group of 21+) against Northern agricultural tariff barriers at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) talks in Cancún, Mexico in September 2003. But for all of Brazil’s self-styled role as spokesperson for the developing world, Lula has not let the outmoded politics of non-alignment (notably the practice of non-intervention) – restrict the development of a ‘muscular’ Brazilian foreign policy. As the Economist observed of Lula’s MINUSTAH contribution:

[i]t is a small force, but of huge symbolic significance … [Brazil] is playing a more active role across South America [and] seeking a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. “Brazil has begun to flex its muscles as a regional superpower,” says Miguel Díaz of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think-tank.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{43} SEES Monitor 24 July 2004
\textsuperscript{44} ‘Brazil’s foreign policy: A giant stirs’ 10 June 2004
In this dissertation I have sought to advance a ‘subaltern realist’ perspective on the diversification of contribution to peacekeeping – and by extension intervention – in international relations. I criticised the extant literature on peacekeeping contribution, noting in particular its failure to account for the international societal elements of peacekeeping, that are crucial mediating links in relating peacekeeping contribution to the wider role of peacekeeping in global politics. While welcoming the ‘Next Stage’ scholarship for suffusing analysis of peacekeeping with an intellectually-nourishing scepticism, I also took ‘Next Stage’ thinking to task for elevating structural inequalities at the expense of inter-state inequalities, and for failing to sufficiently problematise contemporary practices of intervention.

In advancing my own understanding of the diversification of peacekeeping contribution, I have argued that Western states have pioneered a new mode of international politics, whereby, for Western states the moral authority of statehood derives from the projection of unifying values abroad. For non-Western states, on the other hand, the moral authority of statehood is conferred by their actions in response to the pressures of the ‘international community’. As Western states have sought to re-mould the international realm to complement the imperative of domestic politics within their own states, the elevation of individual rights over the rights of states has tended to call into question the legitimacy of the non-Western state. This has, in turn, helped to institutionalise a shift in political accountability, away from the internal citizenry of the non-Western state, and outward toward the ‘international community’. This is the context, I have argued, in which developing countries’ contribution to peacekeeping operations needs to be seen: an attempt to re-establish the moral authority of statehood in the eyes of a transformed international society. A key element that united the various strands of this argument is the pivotal role played by the end of the Cold War in international politics, as the dissolution of Soviet power also sapped the power of developing states.

In closing, I will briefly overview the self-defeating aspects of these attempts by developing countries to bolster their legitimacy in the international realm at the expense of their domestic political sphere. As ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ has entailed the demonstration of coercive power in defence of human rights abroad, it has, I have argued, contributed to a militarisation of international affairs. By demanding the defence of human rights as a moral obligation beyond politics, it has placed a premium on the projection of coercive power across borders. The UN sought to establish a world where sovereignty was independent of the inequalities of power between states, but as Chandler argues ‘[t]he more the concept of human rights
militarism is allowed to gain legitimacy, the greater the inequalities become between the enforcing states and the rest of the world’ (2002:187). In Benedict Kingsbury’s words:

> The normative inhibitions associated with sovereignty moderate existing inequalities of power between states and provide a shield for weak states … These inequalities will become more pronounced if the universal normative understandings associated with sovereignty are discarded (Kingsbury, in Ayoob, 2002:83)

Developing states can never hope to outstrip the coercive power available to Western states. As the moral authority of non-Western sovereignty has increasingly been stripped of any notion of legal and political self-sufficiency independent of material capacity, so sovereignty has become increasingly concentrated into its most elemental form – that of coercive power.

14,684 words
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