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Religion Confronts Westphalian International Relations Theory
DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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STATEMENT 1

This work is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Where correction services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is clearly marked in a footnote(s).

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‘The word length of this dissertation is 14928’
Abstract: The global resurgence of religion confronts Westphalian International Relations (IR) with a fundamental challenge. Effectively, the rise of religious fundamentalism resurrects the important debate over the role religion should play in world politics, a debate long forgotten since the Treaty of Westphalia. Consequently, the epistemological and ontological controversies of the Protestant Reformation and the Age of Enlightenment are revived, leading to a thorough questioning of the secular, materialist and positivist assumptions at the heart of the field of IR (Part 1). Besides, fundamentalism represents a theoretical challenge. Effectively, its transnational and religious dimensions being hardly reconcilable with any one paradigm of the field of IR, it is essential to develop new interpretive categories and analytical frameworks for the incorporation of the phenomenon into the field. As such, an attempt is made at developing such a framework through a critique of Samuel Huntington’s the Clash of Civilizations (Part 2). Finally, the difficulties of mainstream IR in dealing with the revival of religious fundamentalism are further illustrated through a study of the impact of its Westphalian, secular, materialist, and positivist assumptions on our understanding of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism (Part 3). While the transnational and theological dimensions of fundamentalist terrorism can be accounted for by the framework developed in Part 2, the essentially intuitive nature of its religious dimension poses greater difficulties since reliant on an alternative source of knowledge and authority.
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Introduction:

The Resurgence of Religion¹:

The 20th century has witnessed the resurgence of religion on a global scale. What western scholars thought had been relegated to the private sphere of life was in fact becoming increasingly powerful in the public domain. This resurgence of religious movements was thought to be a reaction to modernity, democracy, liberal values like freedom, and critical enterprises like science. In the late 20th century, this religious revival took a radical turn in many parts of the world.

Theories were developed to explain the return of this long forgotten ‘opponent,’ namely religious fundamentalism.² The tendency was to categorise those fundamentalist movements as regressive, reactionary, traditional, as ‘disintegral tribalism,’ or ‘medieval fossils’ struggling for socio-economic change at the national level.³ But after the attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001, the extent of their adaptation to the modern world left academics doubtful about the previously-alleged backwardness.

Effectively, events such as the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the 9/11 attacks on American territory caught academics by surprise. At the heart of their surprise was their great difficulty to accept the fact that religious phenomena could have the power to defy not only local governments, but also the world’s only superpower on its own territory. This failure to understand the religious facet of world-shaking political events has been traced back to the

¹ The concept of religion will only be defined in the last section of this dissertation. As for now, it is sufficient to consider religion as the careful and scrupulous observation of ‘religious experiences.’ In turn, creeds are only codified and dogmatised forms of original religious experiences.

² The term ‘fundamentalism’ was coined in the early 20th century to designate a broad conservative movement within American Protestantism. In this dissertation, the concept is used in a cross-cultural sense so as to transcend the actual ‘fundamentalist’ movement and to allow for a better theorisation of a global phenomenon. For deeper considerations of the pros and cons of such a broadening, see Euben, R.L., Enemy in the mirror. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. pp.16-19.

positivist and materialist nature of the epistemological and ontological foundation of international relations theory.\textsuperscript{4}

Moreover, the idea that such a challenge could be mounted by a transnational non-state actor was quite bewildering. Effectively, the Realist domination of the field and its reliance on the state-centric Westphalian construction of international affairs led to the dismissal of the “political and economic significance of various non-state actors, independent of state control, such as transnational corporations and international organisations of miscellaneous kinds.”\textsuperscript{5} Consequently, the transnational dimension of the current global resurgence of religion was equally ignored.\textsuperscript{6}

Because the field of international relations (IR) has not been able to account for the revival of fundamentalist movements and because “the global resurgence of religion confronts IR theory with a theoretical challenge comparable to the end of the Cold War or the emergence of globalization,”\textsuperscript{7} it seems essential to consider the following research question: How could Westphalian International Relations theory confront the theoretical challenge mounted by the global resurgence of fundamentalism? If the resurgence of fundamentalism is to be confronted, we must go beyond the implicit assumption that religion does not require a reflection within IR theory\textsuperscript{8} and, as Goldstein and Keohane enjoin us, elaborate new interpretative categories and analytical frameworks so as to incorporate the religious and transnational dimensions of the phenomenon into the field of IR.\textsuperscript{9}


\textsuperscript{8} Ibid.

Structure of the Dissertation:

In the first part of this dissertation, I offer to review the central reasons behind IR’s difficulties in considering religious fundamentalism as a potentially important force in international affairs. As I will demonstrate, these difficulties are rooted in deeply seated epistemological and ontological assumptions that are at the heart of western modernity. I will come to the conclusion that these assumptions prevented the transnational and religious facets of the phenomenon under scrutiny from being explored.

Consequently, the second part of the dissertation will be concerned with incorporating the religious and transnational dimensions of fundamentalism into the field of IR through the elaboration of adequate interpretative categories and analytical frameworks. I offer to consider the strengths and weaknesses of one of the very few studies in the field of IR to treat the subject of culture, and indirectly of religion, from a theoretical standpoint. I will demonstrate that Samuel Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations* provides the seeds – and only the seeds - of an analytical framework that could allow for a comprehensive theorisation of the religious revival, respecting both the breadth and the nature of the phenomenon.

Finally, in the third part of this dissertation, I will consider the case of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. After having reviewed the extent to which Westphalian, positivist, and materialist assumptions outlined in Part 1 have tainted the study of the phenomenon, I will consider whether the theoretical model developed in Part 2 could provide a better account of the movement. Islamic terrorism represents one of the most recent challenges to Westphalian IR mounted by a religious and transnational non-state actor. Furthermore, being

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10 In this dissertation, modernity refers to “An intellectual tendency or social perspective characterized by departure from or repudiation of traditional ideas, doctrines, and cultural values in favour of contemporary or radical values and beliefs (chiefly those of scientific rationalism and liberalism).” *Oxford English Dictionary. Online Edition* at [http://oed.com](http://oed.com), s.v. ‘Modernity.’
the “most influential phenomenon of the start of the millennium,”\footnote{Weinberg, L. & Pedhazur, A. (eds.), \textit{Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism}. London: Frank Cass,} Islamic fundamentalist terrorism is significantly relevant to the subject treated in this dissertation.

I will come to the conclusion that while the transnational dimension of fundamentalism can be incorporated into the field of IR, the religious dimension poses greater difficulties. Effectively, the religious dimension of the phenomenon does not simply refer to some kind of connection to an institutionalised religion. Rather, what makes the movement religious is its reliance on an alternative source of knowledge for understanding the world that is different from reason and the senses. Ultimately, if the religious facet of fundamentalism is to be properly accounted for, our understanding of this alternative source of knowledge must be developed.
Part 1: The foundations of Westphalian IR theory

1. The foundations of IR:

Even though the 20th century witnessed the global resurgence of religion, western nations were far from being prepared to face the challenge mounted by the September, 11 attacks. As Fox and Sandler noted in *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, in the wake of 9/11,

Should policy makers have turned to the relevant academic disciplines, the situation was not much better. Despite Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* and Mark Juergensmeyer’s *The New Cold War*, the discipline of international relations was not ready for the inclusion of the religious variable into the contending paradigms in the discipline.12

In this first chapter, I offer to explore the central reasons behind the field’s unreadiness to incorporate the religious and transnational dimensions of fundamentalist movements. I will demonstrate that the inscription of the rejection of religion “in the genetic code of the discipline of International Relations”13 is due to (1) the ontology and epistemology of modernity, (2) the Enlightenment roots of western social sciences, and (3) the Westphalian foundation of the field of IR.

a. The Protestant Reformation (1517-1648):

The advancement of modernity and the religio-political upheavals that accompanied its spread and maturation can be traced back to 31 October 1517 when Martin Luther nailed his list of complaints about the Church on the door of the cathedral of Wittenberg.14 This seemingly insignificant event was to become the symbol of the genesis of a profound and fundamental transformation of Europe. Effectively, Luther’s complaints were the reflection of deeper and widespread social changes that proved radically challenging to the order of the

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Catholic Church. The Protestant Reformation that subsequently enflamed the European continent for over a century was to inaugurate a new ‘era.’

At the heart of the Reformation was the flourishing of a tremendous and all-pervading ‘rationalising force’ inherent to the Judeo-Christian tradition that would pave the way for the demythologisation of the world and the ‘modernisation’ of Christian societies. The rationalisation of all spheres of life would lead to the development of individualism, capitalism, and in a subsequent stage, the secularisation of European societies through the flourishing of religious pluralism.

In The Protestant Ethic and the Sprit of Capitalism, the German sociologist Max Weber addressed in great details the rationalising effects of Protestantism. Among the many features of the Reformation dealt with in his masterpiece, three central corollaries of this rationalisation of society are of particular importance to our subject. The first major innovation of Protestantism was the rejection of the ‘religious division of labour.’ i.e., the institution of religious professionals. From a dichotomous organisation that opposed a handful of professionals and virtuosi who placated God on behalf of the society to the religiously illiterate laity, Martin Luther preached a non-hierarchical organisation in which one would only be guided by one’s own interpretation of The Book. This atomised organisation favoured ‘the priesthood of all believers’ and individual ‘calling’ at the expenses of institutionalised piety. This, in turn, unintentionally paved the way for the development of religious pluralism.

The second major innovation of the Reformation was the abandonment of intense periodic purification in favour of a more regular religious and ethical life. During centuries,

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18 It is important to note that for Reformers, religious pluralism meant a de facto secularisation of all institutions controlled by the Catholic Church and the creation of a secular public order. Luther, M., ‘Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms and the Two Governments.’ In Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority. Hopfl (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
the Catholic Church developed a system in which sins could be forgiven by simply paying religious professionals to perform exercises such as prayers or Masses. From this cyclical purification that proved a major source of income for the Church but a mockery to morality, Reformers developed a linear and irreversible view of life in which the world had been set in motion by a watchmaker-God that had subsequently withdrew. Such conception of the world and God unintentionally encouraged people to understand life in terms of progress.¹⁹

A third major change brought about by the Reformation sprang from John Calvin’s notion of predestination.²⁰ Calvin argued that if God is all powerful and all-knowing, He must know before birth whether an individual will be saved or damned. As such, Calvinists came to the conclusion that those who enjoyed material success were those that would be saved since God would not allow sinners to prosper. Thus, if individuals followed their ‘calling’ and prospered, they could take their material success as a sign from God that they were part of the chosen ones.

Weber argued that the unintended consequences of concepts such as the atomisation of piety, progress, and the importance of material prosperity participated in the development of what he called ‘this-worldly ascetism.’ Religious persons no longer had to retreat from the world to live in accordance with God’s will but were led to behave in a pious manner in the material world.

Weber went on to argue that this ‘this-worldly ascetism’ was central to the development of European capitalism and its corresponding liberal ideology.²¹ Effectively, the removal of the Church as an authority between God and humans meant the development of a “laissez-faire religion”²² based on a voluntary principle, the very principle that formed the

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“metaphysical and ontological core of liberal thought.” Moreover, besides its contribution to the development of capitalism and liberalism, Protestant ‘this-worldly ascetism’ encouraged the critical use of reason for the continual improvement of material well-being and therefore the development of modern science.

To summarise, the Protestant Reformation was much more than a purely religious change. It sprang from localised shifts in values and led to fundamental changes in social structures, political organisations, trade, technology, and military might. From the shepherd flock guided by a religious hierarchy, traditions, and customs, Protestants created an order based on a voluntary principle rooted in rationality, progress and individualism. In turn, it accidentally paved the way to the development of capitalism, liberalism, modern science, and most importantly, the fragmentation and atomisation of the dominant Christian order in favour of religious pluralism.

The fragmentation of the Christian Church that had unified Europe for centuries gave birth to a century of bloodshed, massacres, and wars. The most important war since the Roman era, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), was to give birth to the central principles of an international order. The war was on the one hand religious and involved a struggle between Catholics, Calvinists, and Lutherans and on the other hand political and involved a struggle between the Vatican and local princes.

b. The Treaty of Westphalia, 1648:

The political dimension of the Thirty Years War found its fullest expression in the Peace of Westphalia that was concluded, after decades of an exhausting struggle, at

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25 This last aspect of the Reformation is far-reaching. Effectively, the atomisation of the Church meant that sectors such as health care, tax collection, and justice would increasingly be practiced by independent and lay professionals. Bruce, Op. Cit. pp.39-49.
Osnabrück for the Protestants and Münster for the Catholics. The treaty was the result of years of negotiations between all parties involved and marked “the rise of the modern international society” as well as the redefinition of the role of religion in European politics. The roots of the Westphalian Treaty were indisputably to be found in the Reformation and Protestantism’s intrinsic content that pointed to self-determination, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention. In Daniel Philpott’s words, “no Reformation, no Westphalia.”

Christendom and more generally religion came out of the Thirty Years War discredited. What were purported to be religious atrocities were so appalling that local princes did their best to marginalise and distance themselves from religion. While this was done out of self-interest in the acquirement of the Church’s power and riches, it was also the result of the development of a widespread liberal and Protestant presumption that peace and religious pluralism could only exist if religion was disciplined by a state. The medieval cosmology of a united Christian community would be undermined and religion would be privatised, marginalised and nationalised. The creation of a powerful territorial state would supply modern man with his basic material and spiritual needs, marginalising in turn religious primordial loyalties. Religious legitimacy would become supererogatory since the state would be legitimised through the ‘will of the people’ as well as liberal and democratic institutions based on the concept of social contract. To paraphrase Thomas Hobbes, God made space to the Great Leviathan, that mortal God to which modern man would owe his security and peace.

The religious discredit meant the need to rethink the foundation of the international order. The Treaty of Westphalia required all parties to recognize the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, by which each prince would have the right to determine the religion of his own state, i.e., the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio*. Consequently, it marked the beginning of the modern state-system since it enshrined the concepts of state sovereignty and non-intervention in positive international law and established fixed territorial boundaries for many states. It was agreed that the citizenries would be subjected first and foremost to the laws of their respective government rather than to those of neighbouring powers or to the transnational authority of the Catholic Church. As such, Westphalia was the “majestic portal which [led] from the old world into the new world.”

c. The Enlightenment (1648-1789):

The Reformation was followed by the Age of the Enlightenment, a major intellectual movement that would culminate in the American and French revolutions in 1776 and 1789 respectively. This great intellectual movement of Protestant inspiration was centrally concerned with the celebration of reason. In *An Answer to the Question: “What is Enlightenment?”* Immanuel Kant defined the movement, in 1794, as “man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity.” He argued that in this Age of Enlightenment, man was called

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35 It should be noted that the Treaty of Westphalia did not create sovereign states *ex nihilo*. Some sort of modern state had existed in previous centuries and its development can be traced back to 1500. Westphalia only extended and strengthened the status of the modern state. McClelland, J., *Op. Cit.* pp.278-293.
to throw off the shackles of alien guidance as these were detrimental to his “progress toward improvement” and away from barbarism (i.e., religion, tradition, customs…).40

The end of the Enlightenment witnessed the birth of the founder of sociology, Auguste Comte.41 The discipline of sociology emerged as a response to the challenge of modernity and the social changes that accompanied its advancement. Building on the Reformation and Enlightenment concepts of progress and rationalisation, classical sociologists, “consider[ing] themselves agents of enlightenment,”42 argued that western societies were emerging from the religious dogmas and superstitions of the ‘Dark Ages’ into the modern world in which commerce, sciences and technology would liberate humans. For Comte, the Law of Three Stages meant that every branch of knowledge would successively pass through three different stages: theological, metaphysical, and positive. Consequently, Comte argued that all societies would follow a similar pattern of transition away from the fictions of religion to finally culminate in a modern society “governed by industrial administrators and scientific moral guides.”43 However, as the Enlightenment and the discipline of sociology swept away clerical obscurantism and dogmatism, they “imposed [their] own restrictive prejudice on the scope and content of scholarship as on literature and the arts.”44 As such, the social sciences originated and participated in the very rejection of religion as an explanation of the world.

From this concise historical review of the foundations of western modernity, it is possible to discern the secular, liberal, and rationalist nature of the epistemological and ontological assumptions of the social sciences that would subsequently inform the development of IR. In the following sections, I offer to demonstrate how these assumptions

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40 Ibid. p.58. It should be noted that a reading of the Enlightenment as a radical break must be balanced by a consideration of the continuities between medieval and Enlightenment political thought. See Becker, C., The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932.
41 It may be of interest to the reader that Comte originally referred to sociology as ‘social physics.’
influenced the development of positivism and materialism, as well as the dominant tradition of the field of IR.

2. International Relations Theory:

a. Classical Realism:

The essence of the dominant tradition of the field of IR, Realism, can be boiled down to the idea that international relations are about sovereign “states pursuing interests defined in terms of power.” Realism’s emphasis on state sovereignty is undoubtedly rooted in the Westphalian conception of the international order and is accompanied by the ‘Westphalian presumption’ that religion is no longer supposed to play a role in international relations. States are independent and autonomous units that know no higher authority. Effectively, the transnational authority of the Church having withered away during the Reformation and the Enlightenment, states are said to live under anarchy.

The condition of anarchy leads states to pursue national security through the accumulation of power, most often defined in material terms (i.e., military, economic, population), but also defined in qualitative terms (the morale of a nation, strength of diplomacy and government…). However, anarchy does not mean complete chaos. The international system is also made up of positive norms and rules that states have agreed to uphold as long as their vital interests are not in jeopardy.

Undoubtedly, the impact of non-state actors is marginalised in the Realist tradition since they become illegitimate units in the Westphalian order. The transnational aspect of many actors, be they economic or religious, is thus dismissed as being subordinated to the power politics of states. Moreover, by focusing on military and economic power, the roles of ideational factors such as identities, ideas, and religion have been reduced to their existence as

aspects of state power, useful superstitions states could use to strengthen the national morale, maintain order, and gain legitimacy.48

However, it should be noted that the tradition of Classical Realism was influenced by the strong religious commitment of its supporters, at least until positivism and behaviouralism were to spread throughout the discipline of political sciences in the United States. Reinhold Niebuhr was himself a Lutheran theologian, and his work greatly influenced key realist scholars such as Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan (himself a Presbyterian), as well as “an entire post-war generation of scholars and politicians who made American foreign policy.”49 However, the Protestant convictions of Classical Realists have always remained subordinated to their public commitments to the Westphalian order, leaving religion as a private endeavour distinct from the realm of international relations.

Like Classical Realism, all other traditions of the field of IR, with the possible exception of postmodernism, are “wedded to a post-Enlightenment epistemology defined by the commitment to reading the political world as understandable, explicable, and knowable by way of human reason and methods,” 50 and as such can be criticised for failing to account for the transnational and religious dimensions of fundamentalist movements. Effectively, “such an epistemology at once determines how we come to know the world and constitutes the range of what is knowable.”51

Therefore, the mutual and exclusive commitment to secular ‘rationalism’52 of neorealism and neoliberalism or the economic monism and historical materialist foundations of Marxism have not allowed for religion to be treated as anything more than a dangerous

51 Ibid.
pathological irrationality or as the opiate of the masses.\textsuperscript{53} In a similar vein, the debate on transnationalism started by Keohane and Nye also failed to account for the specificity of religious movements by simply considering them in the same way as multinational corporations, i.e., as transnational actors.\textsuperscript{54} Likewise, by arguing that when ideas are engaging, they become ‘attitudinal capabilities’ that inform perceptions, popular beliefs and influence the behaviour of states, Joseph Nye reduced religion to the ‘soft power’\textsuperscript{55} of attractive ideas.

In all the above approaches, the substance of fundamentalism is ignored in favour of its function, and its religious dimension discarded so as to be incorporated within accepted rational categories. As will be demonstrated in Part 3 of this dissertation through a more detailed study of the shortcomings of interpretivist approaches, the impact of such a discarding on our understanding of fundamentalism cannot be underestimated.

b. The ‘Second Great Debate’:

In the 1960s, the positivist and behaviouralist trends that swayed through the field of political sciences in the United States had a great impact on the field of IR. The spread of quantitative methods led scholars to turn various factors in world politics into standardised measures so as to use statistical techniques to assess their dynamics. Consequently, scholars came only to consider the factors that could be easily interpreted and quantified. As such, religion being extremely difficult to understand and interpret into numeric terms, its study was left aside in favour of material factors such as GDP or military expenditure.\textsuperscript{56}

Besides, this behaviouralist turn was accompanied by two sets of assumptions that were part of the so-called second ‘Great Debate’ over theory and methods in the field of IR,

\textsuperscript{53} It should be noted that Marx’s conception of religion is quite sophisticated, defining religion as a means of expression in a world of alienation. Marx, K. & Engels, F., ‘ Contribution to the critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,’ in Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Vol.3. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975.

positivism and materialism. The triumph of a positivist approach meant the rejection of more traditional methods such as those of political philosophy and diplomatic history, as well as the demise of the Christian perspectives central to Classical Realism and the English School. On the one hand, Positivism implied naturalism - the application of the methods of natural sciences to the social world -, the existence of value-free knowledge and the existence of a real world ‘out there.’ On the other hand, materialism assumed that religion and other primordial loyalties were only effects of deeper material causes such as economic inequalities, modes of production or political oppression, and as such, unable to explain events such as the 9/11 attacks or the 7/7 bombings. In both cases religion was discarded, to the detriment of US foreign policy analysts of 1979 and 2001.

Effectively, the best example of the failure of materialist reductionism is to be found in the inability of US analysts to understand the nature of the Iranian revolution. The proposition of studying the religious dimension of the pre-1979 upheavals was vetoed at the CIA “on the grounds that it would amount to mere ‘sociology,’ a term used in intelligence circles to mean the time-wasting study of factors deemed politically irrelevant.” Consequently, what the revolutionaries proclaimed to be a religious movement was attributed by US analysts to the opposition to an autocratic regime, anger at the Shah’s corruption, or economic resentment due to widespread inequalities. However, as would later become clear, the new regime of Ayatollah Khomeini, was no more redistributive, and neither less autocratic nor corrupted. A central difference was religious.

60 Ibid. p.13.
3. Summary:

In this chapter, I demonstrated that the Protestant Reformation had a tremendous impact on Western thought by paving the way for the rise of capitalism, secularism, liberalism and the Treaty of Westphalia. The intellectual movement of the Enlightenment strengthened the Reformation’s influence on society and political processes and furthered the demise of religion as a central international actor. The rejection of religion as an explanatory framework for the world was accompanied by the birth of sociology and the scientific study of the impact of ‘modernisation’ on European societies. In turn, this socio-historical context influenced the study of international relations and the structuring of the field in the twentieth century. The deeply seated epistemological and ontological assumptions of modernity led to the field being overtly secular, positivist, and materialist, rejecting in turn the incorporation of religion as a potentially important factor in international relations.

Because the field of IR, and more specifically the Realist tradition, cannot account for the transnational and religious dimensions of the revival of fundamentalist movements, it seems essential to consider the following sub-question: How could the religious and transnational dimensions of fundamentalist movements be incorporated into the field of IR? Consequently, in the second part of this dissertation, I offer to consider the strengths and weaknesses of one of the very few studies that derogate to the general rule of IR discarding religion. We will see that Samuel Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations* provides the seeds of an analytical framework and interpretative categories that would allow for a comprehensive theorisation of the religious revival, respecting both the breadth and the nature of the phenomenon.
Part 2: A Civilisational Alternative to Westphalian IR Theory

In the first chapter, I arrived at a preliminary answer to our central research question. Effectively, I demonstrated that besides the need to transcend the implicit ‘Westphalian presumption’ that religion is no longer supposed to be part of international politics, if Westphalian IR theory is to confront the theoretical challenge mounted by the global resurgence of fundamentalism, it is essential to elaborate new interpretative categories and analytical frameworks so as to incorporate the religious and transnational dimensions of the phenomenon into the field of IR.

Therefore, the second part of the dissertation will be concerned with developing such categories and frameworks. More precisely, because the field of IR already possesses rudimentary theoretical frameworks, I offer to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the most debated pre-9/11 theoretical study to take into account religion and culture as powerful actors in international affairs. I hope to demonstrate that despite great abstractness and monolithism Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations provides the seeds of a framework that could allow for a comprehensive theorisation of the religious revival, respecting both the breadth and the nature of the phenomenon. However, because of methodological and ontological incoherence, I will come to the conclusion that it is essential to move away from Huntington’s conceptions of the state and civilisation to more diffuse entities developed in ‘institutional’ terms.

1. The Clash of Civilizations:
   a. Outline:

   The Clash of Civilizations has its origins in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article in which Huntington, drawing on the work of Bernard Lewis, made some stunning predictions about the post-Cold War order. His controversial article led to a vigorous debate in the field of
international politics. Criticisms were followed by Huntington’s response, ‘If not
Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the post-Cold War World’ in which he defended his case
by reminding his detractors that The Clash was only an attempt to develop elements of a post-
Cold War paradigm which could only be disproved by the creation of a better one. In 1996,
Huntington extended the original article into a book which has been extensively reviewed,
revealing a general scepticism among scholars.

Rooted in the uncertainty of the post-Cold War decade and developed as a backlash to
Francis Fukuyama’s triumphalist ‘End of History,’ The Clash attempts to lay down the
foundation of a ‘New World Order.’ Based on the analysis of two global processes,
Huntington argues that the bipolar world order has been replaced by a multi-civilisational
order. First, the global dynamics of modernisation and globalisation have weakened local
identities in favour of an increase in civilisational consciousness. Second, the failure of grand
ideologies such as communism and fascism has led to an ideological vacuum that was soon
filled by religion. As a result of these world dynamics, he argues that identities and loyalties
have been lifted from the local and state levels to the broader cultural entity of civilisation.

Huntington distinguishes seven and ‘possibly’ eight different civilisations which are
defined by common religion, history, language, customs, institutions, and most importantly
the subjective self-identification of people. Like nations, civilisations are imagined
communities conceived of as ‘sacred’ fraternities for which people are ready to sacrifice their
lives. In Huntington’s words, “[f]aith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify
with and what they will fight and die for.”

62 While Huntington describes seven and ‘possibly’ eight civilisations in his book, the map provided pp.26-27
divides the world into nine civilisations.
63 Huntington, S., ‘If not Civilizations, what? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War.’ Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, Iss.5
In this multi-civilisational world order, civilisations are supposed to ‘act’ through their influencing states, the latter being depicted, as in the Realist tradition, as power maximisers. As a result, conflicts become inter-civilisational and take place either between states along civilisational ‘fault-lines’ or between the cultural hegemons of each civilisation.

In relation to the academic context outlined in the first chapter, by arguing that patterns of conflict in the post-Cold War order will follow cultural lines, *The Clash of Civilizations* seems to provide a plausible alternative to the Westphalian construction of international affairs based on sovereign states pursuing their interests defined in terms of power. Consequently, Huntington’s paradigm might prove relatively adequate to incorporate the religious and transnational dimensions of fundamentalist movements into the field of IR.

Because of its unsettling nature, *The Clash* has been all too often dismissed without good reasons. Furthermore, Huntington’s prose being very seductive but ambiguous, he has often been misinterpreted. In the following section, I offer to consider some of the critiques most relevant to our subject.

### b. Quantitative objections to *The Clash*

The vigorous debate that followed the publication of *The Clash* had a strong quantitative dimension. Scholars tried to use - more or less satisfactorily – statistical tools to test Huntington’s central hypotheses. However, before looking at some of these studies in more details, it should be noted that many quantitative studies are ideologically tainted, methodologically flawed and sometimes contradictory. Besides, because of the difficulties associated with the quantification of religion, biases rooted in Westphalian, positivist, and materialist assumptions pervade many studies.

The ideological taint of most studies is best exemplified by Norris and Inglehart’s profoundly questionable results. Effectively, the two Harvard scholars found Muslims to be

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more supportive of democratic ideals than westerners. 87% of Muslims were found to be
convinced democrats, more than in any other civilisation. Likewise, the approval of
democratic ideals and democratic performances by Egyptians were found to be higher than
those of the peoples of Sweden, Switzerland or France!"65

Concerning methodological flaws, the most widespread bias pertains to the time span
under consideration. For example, Henderson and Tucker tested Huntington’s hypotheses on
the period 1816-1992 and Russett, O’Neal and Cox considered the period 1950-1992. How
could their study disprove the clash when Huntington himself restricted the applicability of
his thesis to the sole post-Cold War era and acknowledged the temporal validity of his
paradigm?66

Though many studies are flawed, more rigorous quantitative analyses come to a
similar conclusion: the clash is simply not taking place.67 While such a conclusion comes as
an easy argument for dismissing The Clash in its entirety, it should be strongly qualified.
Effectively, besides the facts that Huntington has many supporters68 and that some
quantitative studies prove some aspects of his paradigm,69 Weinberg and Eubanks’s research
on terrorism lends credit to Huntington’s paradigm. They argue that because of the
asymmetrical power relations, non-western civilisations can only resort to terrorism, and
quantitatively terrorism follows a civilisational pattern.70 Besides, Fox and Sandler
demonstrated that some features of the Clash are plausible from a western perspective since
the majority of the conflicts in which the West has been involved during and after the Cold

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65 Norris, P., and Inglehart, R., ‘Islam and the West: testing the clash of civilizations thesis.’ Harvard University
Faculty Research Working Papers Series, (April 2002).
Vol.41, Iss.3 (1997), pp.375-84.
69 Davis, D. and Moore, W., ‘Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior’,
War are civilisational and that post-Cold War conflicts involving the West are mainly with Islam.\textsuperscript{71}

While quantitative studies are often used to dismiss Huntington’s thesis out of hand, as we have seen, the complexity of the phenomenon cannot easily be quantified and except the chimerical nature of the clash, nothing can easily be deduced from statistical approaches. In such a context, it seems wiser to conclude that quantitative studies prove inconclusive. This is why we now turn to more qualitative critiques.

While Huntington’s \textit{The Clash of Civilizations} has been criticised on many fronts, many criticisms contradict one another.\textsuperscript{72} “It also should be pointed out that many who criticize Huntington […] can be accused of many of the same shortcomings.”\textsuperscript{73} However, a few critiques are worth taking seriously. In the following section, I offer to consider in more depths two fundamental shortcomings of his paradigm. While these do not prove fatal to the overall theory, a reframing of the debate would greatly strengthen the analysis.

c. Qualitative Challenges to The Clash:

Besides the facts that Huntington’s paradigm is sometimes self-contradictory and ignores important events in favour of carefully selected anecdotes,\textsuperscript{74} the strongest criticisms are methodological and theoretical. The first criticism has been mounted by Esposito and concerns the oversimplifying effects of the division of the world into civilisations. The second criticism springs from Huntington’s vague use of the central concepts of culture and religion.


\textsuperscript{71} Fox & Sandler, Op. Cit.

\textsuperscript{72} Huntington, S., \textit{The Clash of Civilizations?: the debate}. New York: Foreign Affairs, 1993. Especially the responses by Ajami and Anwar and Tipson.


i. Civilisations and Over-simplification

The first central weakness of Huntington’s paradigm concerns the nature of the
civilisational units and has been pinned down by John Esposito. In *The Islamic Threat: Myth
or Reality?* Esposito argues that:

Huntington accepts an outdated monolithic notion of civilization […] In
reality, civilizations, like countries, are complex, encompassing diverse
and often contradictory beliefs, values and forces that belie facile
generalizations. He fails to address seriously the great diversity and
differences […] that exist not only among but also within […] societies.  

However, this failure to address internal diversity results, to a certain extent, from a
methodological choice.

Effectively, first of all, the reader should keep in mind that *The Clash of Civilizations*
is a global paradigm and as such, because “local politics is the politics of ethnicity, [and] 
global politics is the politics of civilization,” Huntington’s study focuses on civilisational
struggles, leaving local and minor conflicts to political scientists such as John Esposito. 

Secondly, the global dimension of Huntington’s paradigm requires him to take a
holistic and nomothetic perspective, leading him in turn to downplay differences and focus on
similarities when exploring the world. Although such an approach has certain drawbacks, it
allows for the development of a theoretical ‘map’ that is more simple than the actual
‘territory’ but not too simple for understanding the world’s major events at the beginning of
the 21st century. However, while the above methodological considerations weaken Esposito’s
criticism, they do not prove that the map is not over-simplifying the ‘territory’ and that the
methodology is adequate.

Likewise, it is important to note that Huntington’s civilisations are not territorially
defined as many critiques assumed. Rather, “where once one’s identity was rooted in territory,
ethnicity and religious nationalism have become ‘de-territorialized’ to the point where

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adherents…identify with each other as much as, if not more than, they do with their fellow citizens of their national homeland.”

As a result, complex and pluralistic civilisational entities are turned into intellectual tools that can be usefully employed to understand global historical phenomena but which remain limited because of the level of abstraction at which they operate. Additionally, by moving away from geographically defined civilisations to entities couched in de-territorialized terms, civilisational analysis moves beyond extreme geographical monolithism while still providing a cultural map of the world order; a map that would have remained invisible had we taken an idiographic (i.e., Esposito’s) or statist approach.

ii. Civilisations: Culture or Religion?

The second criticism springs from the questionable interchangeability in Huntington’s use of two key concepts, religion and culture. As explained in the previous sections, Huntington’s paradigm is concerned with the exploration of cultural entities, and as such, it is not directly related to the phenomenon under scrutiny in this dissertation, religion. However, under close examination, The Clash might well be more about religion than about culture; the latter being used to refer to the former because of the inherent aversion to religion of the Westphalian presumption outlined in Part 1.

Even though civilisations are said to be cultural entities, throughout Huntington’s study, religion is considered as the principal dimension of civilisations. Huntington himself explicitly states that “religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations.” More importantly, of all the civilisations considered, only the existence of the African civilisation is qualified as a remote ‘possibility.’ The fact that Huntington qualifies the existence of the only

civilisation that is only based on fully non-religious identification may well imply that
religion is the foundational basis for his concept of civilisation.

Furthermore, this is to be contrasted to the fact that two civilisations bear the name of
their defining religion (Islamic and Hindu) and that concerning the Sinic civilisation,
Huntington notes that its religion, Confucianism, is its “major component.”80 Likewise,
concerning the Western civilisation, Huntington comes to a similar conclusion to that reached
in Part 1: the West is partly defined by ‘the effects of the Reformation and . . . [its] combined
Catholic and Protestant cultures.’81 Finally, the central differences between the Western
civilisation on the one hand and the Orthodox and Latin American civilisations on the other
are thought to be religious.82

The importance of religion is also considerable concerning the role it is believed to
play in the post-Cold War order. In a similar line to that of scholars such as Haynes,
Juergensmeyer, Saliyeh, and Schupe, Huntington argues that modernisation separated people
from their local identities and national loyalties, leaving religion as the only landmark for the
uprooted of modernity.83 Moreover, the ideological vacuum created by the demise of
communism and nationalism is also believed to have been filled by religion.84

Lastly, the importance of religion is quantitatively demonstrated by Fox. Besides the
fact that statistically religion and civilisations are closely related (more than 79% of
civilisational conflicts have a religious dimension and vice versa – lending credence to the
idea that Huntington’s concept of civilisation “is mostly a surrogate variable for religion”85),
religion seems to have a better explanatory power. Furthermore, more conflicts in the last two
decades have been religious than civilisational. As such, to emphasise religion at the expenses

80 Ibid. p.45.
81 Ibid. p.46.
82 Ibid. pp.45-46.
83 Ibid. pp.95-99.
85 Fox, J., ‘Clash of Civilizations or Clash of Religions: Which is a more Important Determinant of Ethnic
of culture would strengthen Huntington’s paradigm. As we will see in Part 3, by moving away from culture to religion, religious movements that are ‘acultural,’ such as Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, can be more adequately understood since traditions are no more superimposed on the movement.

In the second part of this chapter, through the development of a third central criticism, I offer to explore the central attraction of Huntington’s theoretical approach to religion based on the concept of civilisation. I will argue that despite abstractness and monolithism, a civilisational approach could potentially provide solid foundations for the incorporation of the religious and transnational dimensions of fundamentalism. However, I will demonstrate that because of methodological and ontological incoherence, it is essential to refine Huntington’s realist conceptions of the state and civilisation into more diffuse entities couched in institutional terms.

2. The Civilisational Alternative:

a. The state/civilisation relationship:

In the last sections of this paper, I am willing to explore the nature of Huntington’s civilisations and their hazy relationship to the state system. Effectively, to speak of civilisations in de-territorialized terms is to stress the political fragmentation of civilisational entities, and as such, to imply the impossibility for civilisations to behave “as historical actors in a unified and forceful fashion.”86 This led scholars like Senghass and Melleuish to wonder how civilisations could clash if they are not politically united.

In The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington rejects the above argument as it assumes that states and civilisations are of a similar nature, namely, that they assume a ‘rational actor’ status allowing them to fight wars or maintain order.87 Rather, Huntington conceives of

87 Huntington, S., Op. Cit. p.44.
civilisations as cultural and not political entities, suggesting that states and civilisations are symbiotically complementary and not duplicative. Accordingly, he argues that states will remain the principal political actors in international affairs, but that their interests will be increasingly shaped by civilisational factors.

As such, Huntington seems to assign states and civilisations different ‘spheres of existence,’ developing a model based on a civilisational and cultural structure combined with a statist political superstructure. Such a model seems to parallel Sorokin’s conception of civilisations as ‘ideational’ entities rooted in particular ‘mentalities of culture’ of which states are only the manifestations.88

However, the structure/superstructure model is not without concerns. Effectively, if civilisations are ideational entities which find their expression in states, how could we know whether a state’s action finds its roots in the cultural structure or solely in the political superstructure? How can we make sure that we do not superimpose on a given configuration of political, social, and economic phenomena civilisational roots that are not there?89

Accordingly, is Huntington’s methodology adequate to prove that a conflict is rooted in the civilisational structure and not simply in the political superstructure? Effectively, Huntington relies extensively on anecdotes and statements of political leaders to back up the existence of the civilisational structure. Yet, if states and civilisations are of a different nature, statements made by political leaders cannot be considered as being the direct reflection of the civilisational reality.

Consequently, Huntington is unable to offer an explanation (1) to bridge the ontological structure/superstructure divide, and consequently, (2) his methodology becomes inadequate to proving that a state’s behaviour is rooted in its civilisational structure. While Huntington does not provide any solution, other scholars have developed alternatives. In the

final section of this chapter, I offer to move beyond Huntington’s conceptions of the state and civilisation as outlined in The Clash and to explore two complementary alternatives which could provide stronger theoretical foundations for the inclusion of religion into IR.

b. Civilisational ‘Institutional Constellations’:

In Rethinking International Relations, Fred Halliday argues that the traditional conception of the state as a ‘territorial-national totality’ defined as “a territorial association of people recognised for purposes of law and diplomacy as a legally equal member of the system of states” precludes any analysis of the influence international factors may have over states.\(^90\) More precisely, and in relation to Huntington’s civilisational approach, the traditional conception of the state as sovereign precludes any consideration of the influence of the cultural or religious structure on the state political superstructure.\(^91\)

Alternatively, Halliday offers a more flexible conception of the state in terms of “coercive and administrative institutions, distinct from the broader political, social and national context in which it finds itself.”\(^92\) Such an approach enables us to move away from the state as an autonomous totality to a more diffuse conception couched in terms of the panoply of administrative institutions of a society. In turn, such definition allows us to consider the international dimension of the state.\(^93\)

A complementary alternative has been developed by sociologists of civilisations. Based on the Durkheimian conception of civilisation, Arnason and Delanty argue that a civilisation’s superstructural expression takes the form of ‘families of societies,’ that is, “socio-cultural frameworks within which smaller units can organize themselves in a more or


\(^{93}\)Ibid. pp.78-82, 106-107.
less autonomous fashion, and elaborate their variations on shared themes.”\textsuperscript{94} Accordingly, while civilisations may have a unitary ideational dimension, they may also take the geopolitical form of civilisational “institutional constellations.”\textsuperscript{95}

The relationship between Halliday’s conception of the state in terms of administrative institution and Arnason’s conception of civilisation as institutional constellation points to a way the structure/superstructure divide might be bridged. In turn, this might open a space for interpreting religious movements in non-statist terms while avoiding the extreme monolithism of Huntington’s civilisations.\textsuperscript{96}

3. Summary:

In this second chapter, building on the work of Samuel Huntington, I developed a framework sensitive to religion and transnationalism and yet complementary to the Westphalian state-system. Despite its many weaknesses, and the chimerical nature of the clash itself, \textit{The Clash of Civilizations} provided the seeds of a less monolithic and more religiously sensitive framework developed in terms of institutional constellations.

While Huntington’s civilisational entities proved useful to a certain extent, because of methodological and ontological reasons, I moved away from his realist conception of the state as a territorial-national sovereign totality and from the civilisation as an ideational monolithic unit to more diffuse conceptions of both entities developed in institutional terms. Consequently, a post-Huntingtonian civilisational approach may provide an adequate framework to incorporate the transnational and religious dimensions of resurging fundamentalist movements into the field of IR.

\textsuperscript{96} Huntington, S., \textit{Op. Cit.} pp.31-32, 56-78
In the third part of this dissertation, I will investigate the impact of the Westphalian, materialist, positivist, and secular assumptions outlined in Part 1 on our understanding of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. I will demonstrate that the above presumptions have tainted and distorted our appreciation of the movement. Consequently, I will consider how the civilisational framework developed in Part 2 could offer a more accurate depiction of Islamic terrorism. I will come to the conclusion that while this framework is useful to a certain extent, if religious phenomena are to be better understood, a more fundamental epistemological and ontological issue must be explored.
Part 3: Islamic Terror and the Westphalian Presumption

In the first part of this dissertation, I arrived at a preliminary answer to the question of how Westphalian International Relations Theory could confront the theoretical challenge mounted by the global resurgence of fundamentalism. Effectively, through a brief historical review of the foundation of the social sciences and of the field of IR, I demonstrated that the ‘Westphalian presumption’ as well as secular, positivist, and materialist assumptions hindered our understanding of the role of religion in international affairs. I concluded that if religious resurgence is to be confronted, it is essential to elaborate new interpretative categories and analytical frameworks so as to incorporate the religious and transnational dimensions of the phenomenon into the field of IR.

In the second part of the dissertation I attempted to develop such theoretical tools by building on the work of Samuel Huntington. I demonstrated that *The Clash of Civilizations* provides the seeds of a framework that could allow for a comprehensive theorisation of the religious revival, respecting both the breadth and the nature of the phenomenon.

Finally, in the third part of this dissertation, I offer to investigate the impact of the Westphalian, materialist, positivist, and secular assumptions outlined in Part 1 on our understanding of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. I will demonstrate that the above presumptions have tainted and distorted our appreciation of the movement.\(^97\) Being “the single most influential phenomenon of the start of the millennium,”\(^98\) Islamic fundamentalist terrorism is significantly relevant to the subject treated in this dissertation.

After a brief historical review of the rise of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, I will explore three central themes pertaining to its study: traditionalism, nationalism, and the

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implicit superiority of secular knowledge over faith. Whilst exploring each of these themes, I will consider the ways in which the framework developed in Part 2 could remedy the drawbacks of traditional Westphalian IR theory. I will come to the conclusion that while this framework is useful to a certain extent, it remains insufficient.

However, before going any further, it is essential to consider the following question: Why should Islamic fundamentalism be studied within a modern and Western-centric paradigm? After all, during its long history, Islam has fostered rich cultural and philosophical resources. Would it not be more appropriate to judge fundamentalism according to its own normative tradition rather than to turn to an exogenous construct, particularly given that modernity is “distinctively a western project”? This issue will implicitly be dealt with by arguing that Islamic fundamentalist terror is itself an ‘acultural’ expression of modernity.

1. Islamic Fundamentalism

   a. A brief Historical Review

   In the 1970s and 1980s, the world bore witness of the rise of political Islam promoted by a revolutionary self-proclaimed vanguard. The aim of political Islam was to re-create the Golden-Age of the first decade of Islam and supersede tribal, ethnic and national divides, the resilience of which was attributed to pre-Islamic ignorance (Jahiliyya) or to colonial policy and ‘alien innovations’ (Bid’ah). But Islamic fundamentalists started using concepts such as ‘sovereignty,’ ‘nation,’ and ‘civil society’ and aimed at creating an Islamic ‘state’ that would unite the global Muslim community, i.e. the Ummah. As such, they contributed to the development of the nation-state in the Middle East, and thus furthered, contrary to their avowed goals, the secularisation of politics.

In the 1990s, a ‘hyper-religious’ movement took over political Islam in reaction to the hyper-politicisation of the latter.\(^{102}\) This development into the resurgence of Islam entailed a radicalisation and a re-islamisation of the society as a prelude to the organic re-emergence of the Islamic rule. This was waged under the banner of what Olivier Roy calls ‘neo-fundamentalism.’\(^{103}\) Today, neo-fundamentalism is not a structured movement articulated around a coherent and unitary doctrine. Rather, it is a trend, a state of mind, a dogmatic relation to the fundamentals of religion, a new form of religiosity. Because of their literalist – yet selective - approach to the Holy Scriptures, neo-fundamentalists reject the idea of the multiplicity of Islam. By the same token, they consider themselves the only True Muslims.

b. Modernisation Theory and Globalisation in IR:

In the late 1980s, an increasing number of scholars turned to the globalisation paradigm to shed light on international politics. The process of globalisation, being an offshoot of and rooted in modernity, retains most of its characteristics.\(^{104}\) To the threefold foundation of modernity outlined by Max Weber (i.e., 1. Capitalism - the development of a new ethos of labour and a market-oriented social structure; 2. Rationalisation – secularisation, Westphalian state system, individualism; 3. Disenchantment – alienation, loss of confidence in the political process), the globalisation paradigm appends the notion of de-territorialisation.\(^{105}\) Effectively, peoples, societies, organisations and their actions are said to become more ‘global’ and more interconnected, leading the world to become a ‘single place’ through the challenging of time/space barriers by transport, communication technology, and medias.\(^{106}\)


\(^{103}\) The terms ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘neo-fundamentalism’ are used interchangeably. Talibans, Wahhabites, Salafists, are examples of neo-fundamentalist groups. They are neither unitary nor homogenous.


It is in such a theoretical framework that Islamic fundamentalist terrorism is commonly studied. Generally, fundamentalist phenomena are said to be “part of a larger phenomenon of anti-globalization and tension between the have and have-not nations.”\(^{107}\) In a similar vein, as a former State Department official put it, Islamic fundamentalism is said to be “a socio-political protest movement sugar-coated with religious pieties.”\(^{108}\) Effectively, the prevalent thesis states that because the world is ‘shrinking,’ cultures are being brought closer to one another, leading to an unavoidable corrosion of traditions, religions, and specific cultures. In order to stop this erosion, fundamentalists are ready to resort to violence and terrorism.\(^{109}\) In this regard, some see religious terrorism as a reactionary movement against global forces of cultural and economic change, a war between ‘MacWorld’ and ‘Jihad,’\(^ {110}\) ‘Lexus’ and the ‘Olive Tree,’\(^ {111}\) and a reaction to ‘coca-colonization.’ Some go as far as to argue that Islamic “terrorism should be seen as a strategic reaction to American power,”\(^ {112}\) reducing fundamentalist terrorism to a “near automata, angry blisters on the body politic reacting to socioeconomic irritants.”\(^ {113}\)

However, as we will see below, to assume that fundamentalism is a reaction to certain political or socioeconomic circumstances reinforces “the neglect of a fundamentalist system of ideas as a substantive vision for the world”\(^ {114}\) and only allows for scientific studies of the causes of fundamentalism. Besides, this ‘anti-fundamentalist’\(^ {115}\) approach is based on questionable assumptions rooted in the positivist, materialist and Westphalian biases outlined in Part 1. In the following sections, I will investigate the impact of these biases on our

understanding of the traditionalist, nationalist and religious dimensions of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.

2. Traditions, Culture and Individualism:

As explained in Part 1, the Protestant Reformation and the Age of Enlightenment developed in reaction to the oppressiveness of traditions and religious dogmas as these were thought to keep humans in a state of permanent immaturity and to impede their progress. As such, the development of the two intellectual movements was accompanied by the belief that a decrease in traditions and religion would be a necessary feature of any progress away from barbarism.

Concerning the study of Islamic fundamentalism, this belief still enjoys widespread support in that the call of Islamic fundamentalists for a strict return to the Koran and Sunnah leads many scholars to define the movement as inherently anti-modern and opposed to progress. Consequently, Islamic fundamentalists are commonly considered as regressive, reactionary, as ‘disintegral tribalism,’ or ‘medieval fossils.’ However, the sophisticated planning of the attacks on the Twin Towers may well point towards a different reality.

a. Islamic Fundamentalism and De-Territorialisation

In fact, Islamic fundamentalism is adapted to many dimensions of modernity. Effectively, first of all, Olivier Roy argues that Islamic neo-fundamentalism has learnt to cope with de-territorialisation - meaning the end of Dar-ul-Islam, as a geographical entity. As such, the success of neo-fundamentalism among quite different sociological milieus, from Taliban tribes to Saudi Arabian middle class, moving through suburbs of Western Europe, is

\[\text{Kant, I., } \text{Religion Within the Limits of reason Alone. London: The Open Court, 1934. p.ix.}\]

\[\text{Scruton, R., } \text{The West and The Rest: globalization and the terrorist threat. London: Continuum, 2002, p.103}\]

\[\text{Dar-ul-Islam, ‘the city of faith’ is opposed to Dar-ul-Harb or ‘city of war.’}\]
mainly due to what Roy calls "the plasticity of the neo-fundamentalist matrix." This plasticity is due to the two interwoven processes of de-contextualisation and deculturation.

Because fundamentalists praise the de-contextualisation of religious practices, they adapt themselves to the basic dimension of globalisation, that of turning "human behaviour into codes and patterns of consumption and communication disconnected from any specific culture." Secondly, because fundamentalists advocate deculturation, they make it possible to rebuild the Muslim Ummah on a purely religious basis; the latter identifying "itself across borders in terms of a global form of legitimacy." 

Because of this plasticity, neo-fundamentalists came to discard the past as being a form of ‘cultural’ Islam, hence “valorising the uprootedness of uprooted people.” In turn, such an historical attitude frees believers from the bonds of pristine societies, tribes and social status. As such, “Islamic fundamentalism is not, as some would argue, a neo-traditionalism, nor is it aimed at a re-traditionalisation of Islamic societies.” Rather neo-fundamentalism is adapted to globalisation; it has internalised and addressed the changing forms of religiosity by disembedding itself from particular societies and distancing itself from traditions.

However, it is often argued, and rightly so, that neo-fundamentalists are prone to imitate the Prophet on all matters, requiring all actions, attitudes, and behaviours to be referred to a religious norm. Islam becomes a ‘totalistic’ code and life a puritanical ritual. Such behaviour has often been assimilated with traditionalism, nostalgia for a ‘pure’ past, and a will to “return to Islam’s founding period 1,400 years ago.” Yet, it might be argued that such a return does not involve any cultural or social aspects, that it is a purely religious return to the essentials contained in the Koran and the Sunnah aiming at purifying Islam from

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120 Ibid. p.258.
subsequent accretions. As a result, Islamic fundamentalists are neither nostalgic nor backward-looking but simply acknowledging the ageless roots of their ‘Holy’ project.

b. Islamic Fundamentalism and Individualism

The second reason why neo-fundamentalists cannot be considered as anti-modern resides in their extreme emphasis on individualism. Effectively, Islamic fundamentalists advocate a total surrender of oneself to God and insist on personal faith and steadfastness. In Cronin’s words, one acts “directly or indirectly to please the perceived commands of a deity.” This implies a clear focus on individualism and individual interpretation of the scriptures. In this complete surrender to God, individual action takes precedence over the result and the intention over the nature of the act. For example, to undertake Jihad, becomes a spiritual end in itself and an ultimate proof of the reform of the self. Victory comes as a bonus, hence the tendency among young radicals towards martyrdom (Shaheed). In such a context, one is freed from the bonds of brotherhoods, religious institutions, traditions, and patriarchal notions of order.

By pretending to ignore the cultural context and by providing a code of conduct that functions in a similar manner in any part of the world, Islamic fundamentalism works along the same lines as globalisation – capitalism, individualisation, deculturation, and de-territorialisation. Besides, religious inspiration may well be a way of avoiding the disenchantment and the ‘iron cage’ aspect of modernity. Therefore, it seems more adequate to

128 For example, “Wahhabis…argued that whoever can read the Koran can judge for himself in matters of doctrine.” In Scruton, R., Op. Cit. p.111.
130 Taheri’s conception of victory concerning Islamic terrorism departs from Roy’s for he believes that “the enemy’s total annihilation” is the sole aim. In Taheri, A., Holy Terror: inside the world of Islamic terrorism. Bethesda: Adler & Adler. 1987. p.16.
conclude that the failure to grasp the nature of Islamic fundamentalism springs from questionable conceptions of modernity, progress, and religion that may well be informed by the secular, materialist, and positivist biases outlined in Part 1.

This aversion to religion and tradition could be remedied by the adoption of the analytical framework developed in Part 2. Effectively, by developing units that are religious by nature, the framework moves beyond the ‘Westphalian presumption’ that religion should no longer play any role in international affairs while refraining from imposing a set of cultural traditions on fundamentalism. As such, it respects the ‘acultural’ and anti-traditional nature of the movement.

3. Fundamentalism, Nationalism and the State

a. Fundamentalism and the pursuit of statehood

The second theme that is worth mentioning concerning the study of Islamic fundamentalism springs from the state-centricity of Westphalian IR. In a relatively recent article, Mary Kaldor argues that Islamic fundamentalists are ‘regressive’ because they “seek political power – [and the] control of the state.”\(^\text{132}\) Kaldor further asserts that

All these groups have what might be described as a modernist view of the state. They still believe in state sovereignty and reject the conditionality that has accompanied globalisation.\(^\text{133}\)

However, such a focus on statehood is hardly representative of the reality. Fundamentalists clearly reject any legitimacy not anchored in the Holy Scriptures, and such legitimacy is impossible to achieve for any kind of regime that is not in itself a fundamentalist one.\(^\text{134}\)

The unification of the *Ummah*, and the worldwide spread of the ‘True Faith’ are the alleged ultimate goals of Islamic neo-fundamentalists. Consequently, militants are not only in

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\(^\text{133}\) Ibid.

opposition to earthly state rulers, but also to the Westphalian state-system.\textsuperscript{135} As Gilles Kepel reminds us, “not all of the contemporary movements in religion […] have a short-term aim seizure of power and revolutionary transformation of society.”\textsuperscript{136} For example, Tablighis consider that “true religious faith can be maintained only in freedom from politics.”\textsuperscript{137} Concerning Al-Qaeda, Rohan Gunaratna reminds us that “Osama never interpreted Islam to assist a given political goal.”\textsuperscript{138}

Neo-fundamentalists advocate a strict implementation of the \textit{Shariah} (Islamic Law) with no concession to man-made laws. Therefore, they discard the state while sharing a modern ‘libertarian’\textsuperscript{139} view of it, pragmatically accepting it as a lesser evil.

The existence of the state is acceptable only if it serves the purposes of the Islamic community and its leaders are legitimate only as long as they uphold the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, in which case they are indeed forgiven for other errors or omissions.\textsuperscript{140}

Therefore, the Islamic state is only endowed of a moral and a theological character that is by no means rooted in some kind of popular self-determination. Kaldor’s misunderstanding of the aims of fundamentalist movements may well be the result of the superimposition of the Westphalian state-centric framework on the alleged aims of fundamentalists.

\textbf{b. Fundamentalism as ‘New nationalism’}

Similarly, in a more recent article, Mary Kaldor argues that the Islamic fundamentalist resurgence represents a type of regressive ‘new nationalism.’ She argues that the “ideologists of the movement evoke the ‘Islamic nation’ and the basic idea of uniting around a common

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\textsuperscript{140} Kepel, G., \textit{Op. Cit.}
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culture, Islam and a religious language, Arabic, is a nationalist idea.”

But can nationalism have its roots “in the transcendent and not in the soil?”

Effectively, the so-called ‘Islamic nation’ does not refer to an ethnic, territorial, or historical entity. Rather, it is a community of the faithful based on nothing but the recognition of the unity of God and that Muhammad is the Prophet. Secondly, as explained in the previous sections, fundamentalists reject culture as pre-Islamic ignorance (Jahiliyya). Finally, while God spoke Arabic in the 7th century, modern preachers use European languages to spread the Word. Therefore, it is wiser to conclude that Islamic neo-fundamentalism marks the death of nationalism rather than its revival and that this so-called ‘new nationalism’ springs from the superimposition of the Westphalian state-centric framework on Islamic fundamentalism.

As explained in Part 2, this superimposition of the Westphalian analytical framework on Islamic fundamentalism can be remedied through the adoption of a civilisational framework. Effectively, while states and nations are maladapted categories to the transnational and global nature of neo-fundamentalism, a focus on de-territorialized religious civilisational units allows for a proper incorporation of the breadth and nature of the movement into IR theory.

4. Fundamentalism and secular knowledge

a. Reason versus Intuition

Finally, the third theme that is worth mentioning concerning the study of Islamic fundamentalism concerns the alleged superiority of reason over faith. As explained in Part 1, because “reason is…only a phenomenon whose very existence requires its opposite to define itself against,” the Age of Enlightenment developed in opposition to a conception of the

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‘irrational’ defined in terms of servility to dogma, superstition, and religion. As such, to the blind acceptance of religious doctrines, philosophers opposed the universal and critical use of reason, taking the subsequent development of science and the great benefits it brought to mankind as proofs of the superiority of reason over religion.

The impact of this assumption on the study of Islamic fundamentalism led many scholars to assert that because of their public surrender to God and their reliance on religion as a source of knowledge, fundamentalists are “opposed to modernity.” The fact that Islamic fundamentalists claim that “sacred knowledge is the superior form of knowledge, and that there is a ‘correct’ interpretation of events given by God which cannot be contradicted by human reason,” led again Mary Kaldor to classify fundamentalists as ‘regressive.’ Effectively, the seemingly blind faith of fundamentalists is thought to correspond to an outdated approach to knowledge and truth, an approach that has been proved entirely wrong by the great advancement of reason and science.

However, Pitirim Sorokin argues that there are three complementary sources of knowledge: the senses, reason, and intuition, with “each source of knowledge [disclosing] some aspect of the manifold reality.” The current crisis, Sorokin would argue, is due to “the illusion that there can be only one valid system of truth” – that of secular reason for Westphalian IR, and that of faith and intuition for Islamic fundamentalists.

As explained in Part 1 and as we will see below, because of the commitment of Westphalian IR to secular reason, most theories discard the intuitive source of authority of

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147 Ibid., p. 103. It should be noted that no source of knowledge be it reason or intuition can guarantee the truth.
148 One of my working hypotheses is that Islamic fundamentalists do rely upon this alternative source of knowledge. However, this is a debatable issue that cannot be addressed in such a short piece of work. The writings of Ossama Bin Laden seem to show that he personally has access to it. Kepel, G., Al-Qaeda dans le Texte. Paris : PUF, 2005.
This discarding was explicitly advocated by Martin Wight on the ground that the reduction of religion to a rational and philosophical discourse would keep it from remaining "inchoate, invertebrate, given over to uncontrollable fancies and perilous imaginings." However, as Thouless argues, "acceptance of religious belief as revelation should [not] be condemned as irrational, although there are obvious difficulties in the rational communication of its authority to anyone not accepting the revelation."

Effectively, theological creeds are only expressions of a religious experience that Rudolph Otto "aptly termed the 'numinosum,' that is, a dynamic existence or effect, not caused by an arbitrary act of will, [...that] seizes and controls the human subject, which is always rather its victim than its creator. The numinosum is an involuntary condition of the subject, whatever its cause may be." It is this non-rational source of authority that lends credit to religious dogmas and leads fundamentalist groups to claim certainty. However, this experiential source being the only authority behind Islamic fundamentalists' motivations, it is rationally dismissed through Westphalian IR’s focus on theological creeds. How could religious movements be adequately understood if the very source of their worldview is dismissed as "old-fashioned mystical absurdities"? In the following sections, I offer to explore the implicit presence of this rejection of religious intuition in favour of secular reason in major interpretivist approaches to international affairs.

b. Constructivism and Post-modernism

Constructivism is a relatively recent approach in the field of IR and developed in opposition to structural realism by rejecting any autonomous role for structures of power,

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such as anarchy, in world affairs. Instead constructivists view international relations as growing from processes of identity and interest formation, the two most important factors in shaping the world order and the current condition of anarchy. In the words of Alexander Wendt, “if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure…Structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process…Anarchy is what states make of it.” As Fox and Sandler argue, constructivism, “for an approach that sees the Westphalian international system as the creation of man, the divine is in trouble.” Effectively, by arguing that “reality is not God-given or Nature-given, but human imposed,” constructivism implicitly rejects the intuitive source of religion through the development of a kind of ‘hyper-secularism.’

For example, in ‘Towards an International Political Theology,’ Vendulka Kubalkova, combines some sort of rationalism with the hyper-secular constructivist ontology of Paul Onuf that points to words, speech acts, and rules as the key ontological elements of human interaction and of the human view of the world. While mentioning faith and religious experiences as central to religion, Kubalkova is led by her constructivist ontology to boil down intuition to “individual emotions influencing choices as an integral part of the human process of reasoning.” Ultimately, the role of God is further degraded when reality is only in man’s mind and under the control of his reason.

While the dismissing of religion by constructivism is straight forward, the case of postmodernism is more complex. Effectively, even though most postmodernists also agree

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that “reality is not God-given or Nature-given, but human imposed,”\textsuperscript{159} scholars such as Foucault and Derrida have written extensively on religion and negative theology. Derrida himself knows “that in praying something happens...a therapy might be taking place...when I pray, I experience something strange.”\textsuperscript{160} Derrida accepts faith in and for itself and acknowledges the inadequacy of deconstruction in understanding it since “the experience of faith is something that exceeds language...ethics, politics and society.”\textsuperscript{161} Contrary to constructivism, postmodernism has the merit of acknowledging its limits and those of reason when it comes to religious faith.

While the Westphalian state-centricity limits our understanding of fundamentalism, the greatest challenge IR theory is facing is that of the inclusion of intuition as a valid and independent source of knowledge. This means that it will not be sufficient to incorporate religion into our existing concepts and frameworks, or to simply add religion as a variable under such categories as church attendance, beliefs in God, etc. Religion cannot be reduced to a belief system, an ideology,\textsuperscript{162} a dimension of identity, soft power, a constructed reality or a non-state actor as this would fail to “take account of the autonomous nature of the religious impulse.”\textsuperscript{163}

Effectively, such accounts identify soft power or ideology and Islamic fundamentalism as “functionally equivalent,” expressing by the same token “the fundamental assumption of the social sciences that they do not have to concern themselves with the substance of a historical and political phenomenon, such as religion...but only with the function it plays in

\textsuperscript{159} Vasquez, J., \textit{Op. Cit}
\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Ibid.} p.39.
society.”¹⁶⁴ As such, the raison d’être of fundamentalism is stripped off the religious intuition that sustains and inspires it, reducing in turn the study of fundamentalism to the political behaviour of its militants. Effectively, the problem with not accepting the substance of religion is that fundamentalist movements come to be “interpreted within the accepted framework of the social sciences as a return to ideology, and hence as irrational.”¹⁶⁵

While religion used to be explained away in terms of other social, or material reality through the use of social theories based on secular reason, this is no longer adequate as the exclusive use of secular rationality cannot be justified any longer. Secular reason does not provide an Archimedean standpoint from which intuitive and secular phenomena alike can be studied. This is why social theory cannot explain what it means to be an ‘infidel’ occupying the “land of the two holy places - the foundation of the house of Islam, the place of the revelation, the source of the message and the place of the noble Ka’ba, the Qiblah of all Muslims”¹⁶⁶ for these concepts come from a different source of knowledge altogether. It is only by accepting religion as a valid and independent source of knowledge that IR theory will be able to understand Islamic fundamentalism more fully.

5. Summary:

In this final part of the dissertation, I investigated the impact of the Westphalian, materialist, positivist, and secular assumptions outlined in Part 1 on our understanding of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Through the study of three central themes pertaining to its study, I demonstrated that the ontological assumptions of Westphalian IR theory have tainted our understanding of Islamic terrorism.

Firstly, I demonstrated that the widespread use of globalisation and modernisation paradigms led to the discarding of all that is religious as anti-modern and regressive. Even though Islamic fundamentalism has undergone processes of de-culturation and de-contextualisation, cultural traits and traditions were superimposed on the phenomenon. Secondly, I demonstrated that the classification of Islamic fundamentalism as a type of state-centric ‘new nationalism’ was the result of the superimposition of the Westphalian analytical framework on the movement rather than the reflection of the alleged goals of fundamentalists. Finally, I demonstrated that modernity is accompanied by the questionable assumption that secular reason is a source of knowledge inherently superior to religion, faith, and intuition.

Whilst exploring the central themes of modernisation theory and Westphalian state-centricity, I argued that the civilisational framework developed in Part 2 could remedy most of the drawbacks of Westphalian IR theory. However while the framework is useful to a certain extent, it remains insufficient. Effectively, if religion is to be properly accounted for, any framework must be accompanied by “discussions about the status of truth or the tension between politics and metaphysical conceptions” as well as a thorough understanding of both reason and religious intuition as valid sources of knowledge. This problematic intuitive dimension of religion could be introduced into IR within the frame of the third Great Debate.
Conclusion:

Because “the world today […] is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever,”¹⁶⁸ I attempted in this dissertation to explore the challenge the resurgence of religion poses to International Relations theory. In the first part of this dissertation, I reviewed the central reasons behind IR’s difficulties to consider religious fundamentalism as a potentially important force in world politics. I came to demonstrate that besides the need to transcend the implicit ‘Westphalian presumption,’ if IR theory is to confront the theoretical challenge mounted by the global resurgence of fundamentalism, it is essential to elaborate new interpretative categories and analytical frameworks so as to account for the religious and transnational dimensions of the phenomenon.

Consequently, in the second part of the dissertation, I attempted to develop such categories and frameworks by building on the work of Samuel Huntington. I demonstrated that The Clash of Civilizations provides the seeds – and only the seeds - of such a framework, allowing for a comprehensive theorisation of the religious revival, respecting both the breadth and the nature of the phenomenon.

In the final part of this dissertation, I investigated the impact of the Westphalian, materialist, positivist and secular assumptions outlined in Part 1 on our understanding of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. I demonstrated that the theoretical model developed in Part 2 is a step towards a better understanding of Islamic terrorism but ultimately remains insufficient. Effectively, while it provides an adequate account of the transnational dimension of Islamic fundamentalism, the civilisational framework remains unable to account for the intuitive substance of religion. In effect, what makes fundamentalism religious is its reliance on an alternative source of knowledge for understanding the world that is different from

If religion is to be properly accounted for, any framework must be accompanied by a thorough understanding of both reason and religious intuition as valid and independent sources of knowledge. Finally, I suggested that such an understanding could be developed within the frame of the third Great Debate.

In the light of this argumentation, it seems wiser to conclude that religious fundamentalism, through its affirmation of a different source of knowledge, is confronting IR scholars to fundamental ontological and epistemological issues. As such, Fox and Sandler are mistaken to believe that “eventually religion will find its rightful place in the discipline within the existing paradigms.”169 On the contrary, it seems more adequate to argue, though still premature, that “religion has the potential to revolutionise IR theory.”170

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