Phronetic Statebuilding

An Analytical Framework

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DECLARATION
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any other degree.

Signed...................................................... (Andreas Aagaard Nøhr)

Date......................................................

STATEMENT 1 This work is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Where correction services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is clearly marked in a footnote(s). Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

Signed...................................................... (Andreas Aagaard Nøhr)

Date......................................................
Abstract:

This dissertation aims to construct an analytical framework for international statebuilding. This framework is based on the reading of two interrelated themes. The first theme is *phronēsis* – practical wisdom on how to inquire and act on social problems; while the second theme is that of *parrhēsia* – the practice of truth-telling which involves an ontological commitment to the truth. Here, the question of what is good and bad for man in particular circumstances, takes predominance over theoretical concerns of social problems. Chapter one outlines the ideas of phronēsis, from Aristotle’s initial arguments to the later re-emergence and formulation as a social science ideal. The second chapter consists in a thorough reading of Michel Foucault’s lectures on *parrhēsia*. Here, the main argument is that while traditional political philosophy has been preoccupied with scrutinizing institutional frameworks, the secret of politics to the Ancient Greeks was to bring into play the ‘ethical difference’ in regards to the truth-telling of the political man indexed to the concrete exercise of power. Chapter three explores the synergies and similarities between *phronēsis* and *parrhēsia* and argues that they are mutually dependent, where after the chapter scrutinizing the relationship between parrhēsia and Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’. In chapter four, a genealogy of the statebuilding literature reveals that the statebuilding debate has been one between, on the one hand, those who emphasise the importance of decontextualised knowledge and institutional frameworks, and on the other hand, those who emphasise contextual knowledge and the importance of including ‘local elements’ in institutional design; neither of which is an emphasis on *phronēsis* and *parrhēsia*. Based on the newly constructed framework of *Phronetic Statebuilding*, the dissertation argues that the statebuilding literature has to move in the direction of *phronēsis* and *parrhēsia* if international efforts of statebuilding are to be successful.
Acknowledgements:

This dissertation, in exploring the linkage between two concepts – *phronésis* (practical wisdom) and *parrhésia* (the practice of truth-telling) – is entering uncharted academic territory. Although there has been written sufficiently on the concept of *phronésis*, the concept of *parrhésia* remains somewhat unexplored. Only Michel Foucault paid particular interest in the concept towards the end of his life. Taking such concepts into a well-defined context such as statebuilding, without proper grounding in broader debates, one will always run the risk of talking a language nobody understands. As such, I hope that the overall result will not be a somewhat overambitious masters dissertation. And consequently, the bulk of the dissertation will be about spelling out these concepts and the relation.

On a personal note, I am currently pursuing a Masters degree (MSc) in Development and International Relations at the University of Aalborg, Denmark, and a Masters degree (MscEcon) in International Relations at Aberystwyth University, Wales. For me to cope with the burden of writing two dissertations in that time period of roughly seven months, I have chosen to write them on the same topic. The solution, it seemed to me, was to write a highly theoretical piece in Aberystwyth while writing a more empirical oriented piece in Aalborg. Hence, this dissertation on *Phronetic Statebuilding* is mostly concerned with the broader theoretical concerns of statebuilding and therefore the evaluation of these ideas argued for in this dissertation will ultimately have to stand the test in the dissertation that will be written in Aalborg. I do not hope that this condition will influence the ideas and coherency of the dissertation for it is nonetheless written as a standalone piece.

A number of individuals were crucial for this dissertation to come into being. In that regard, I would like to thanks Simona Elena Rentea, Carl Death, and my supervisor Huw Lloyd Williams for their willingness to discuss my ideas and to challenge me to delve deeper into the linkages and synergies between *phronésis* and *parrhésia*. To some of my fellow students for the countless talks about the projects as a whole, I would like to thank Lucas Van Milders and Suzanne Klein Schaarsberg. To Lambros Alexandrou, especially for his insights in regards to *phronésis* and *parrhésia*. Finally, Marc Van Impe for having the time to proofread the whole dissertation. The responsibility for any errors or omissions in this dissertation remains mine alone.
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A Debate Caught Between Confidence and Despair

Two moods determine the attitude of our civilization to the social world: *confidence* in the power of reason, as represented by modern science, to solve the social problems of our age and *despair* at the ever renewed failure of scientific reason to solve them. Hans J. Morgenthau (1946)¹

By the end of the Cold War, the emergence of a new “liberal” epoch of international relations seemed imminent to the liberal democracies of the West. This newfound optimism regarding the international order was grounded on the basis of a *Zeitgeist* that was built upon the confidence in democracy, the rule of law, and the functioning of a liberal market economy. Looking at the Western liberal democracies, it was assumed that building functioning states could solve the problems of conflict-torn societies and failing governments; this policy response has been termed *statebuilding*. However, there has been a lack of success in international efforts to establish sustainable peace and liberal governments through the policy of statebuilding in large parts of the world. A lack, which has persistently been explained through a critical engagement of the framework of “liberal peace.”²

Accordingly, the academic debate has been divided between the all too well known dichotomy of “problem-solvers” and “critical theorists.”³ The “problem-solving” approaches study the success and failures of statebuilding operations, but have yet to find the “silver bullet” that will help them overcome their inescapable *despair*;

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³ This is the popular dichotomy established by Cox in Cox, R.W. (1981) ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10:2, pp. 126–155
while the “critical” approaches, it would seem, have fallen far more astray from their initial intent. David Chandler, dividing the critiques between radical “power-based” and policy “idea-based” critiques, the latter centred around the inevitable pitfall of western ideas and values, while the former targets western “hegemonic interests” or “power relations”, argues that what has been studied is a mirage. Inquiry has been concerned not with policy practice, but with the straw-man of Classical Liberalism. As such, this epistemological critique has been less concerned with the “experience” of statebuilding than with problematizing the ‘liberal’ assumptions of modernity. The result is that both power and idea based critiques end up arguing that the explanation for the problems of statebuilding is to be placed with the “non-liberal Other”, which is neither culturally nor politically responsive to liberal transformation. This amounts to what Chandler calls an “uncritical critique”: by offering a “critique” that aligns with the policy-makers’ diagnosis of the problem, and thus offers support and consolidation to policy-makers, the critique ends up being “apologia” rather than a radical critique.

The ‘liberal peace’ framework is characterized by confidence in reason and modern science and despair exemplified by divergent critiques of the ever-renewed failures of statebuilding. The roots of this despair do not simply arise out of the ontological gap between universal and particular, but rather out of the subject matter: studying human interaction unavoidably involves reflectivity, volition, and most of all power. Thus, between what Morgenthau would call our two moods of confidence and

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6 Ibid, pp. 145-155
despair; between the attempts of finding a ‘silver bullet’ and constructing a critique that not merely reaches the same conclusions as the policy-makers’, there arises a knowledge-gap in the statebuilding literature: *why, despite the substantial efforts of theorizing and critiquing, does the lack of success persist in international statebuilding efforts?* The scientism of the ‘liberal peace’ framework needs to be transcended conceptually – so too its apologetic critiques. It would seem that there is need for a new framework for conceptualizing not only how statebuilding can succeed, but also how this unhelpful dichotomy between ‘problem solving’ and ‘approaches critical’ approaches can be transcended. Social science is about critically engaging with existing practices while at the same time solving our social problems.

Meta-theoretical and philosophical at the outset, the aim of this dissertation is to develop such a framework for the study of the practice of international statebuilding. Methodologically, this framework will be constructed along the axis of two interrelated themes: The Aristotelian concept of *phronesis* – ‘practical wisdom’ on how to inquire and act on social problems in a particular context –, and the concept on which Foucault, in the last years his life, devoted a greater degree of attention: *parrhesia* – ‘a mode of being’ in which truth is tied to the ontological commitment of a subject uttering it. While both themes originate in Ancient Greek texts, and as such address the different problems of governing the city-state, the aim is not to resurrect the past, nor about what has been lost, but to investigate the past so in order to learn something about the present.

By exploring these two themes, I intend to construct, what Foucault terms, a “grid of analysis” – that is, a grid that makes an “analytic of power relations” possi-
ble. Accordingly, the grid will be made up of three poles, where both themes contribute components to each pole. Aristotle, in *The Nicomachean Ethics*, contrasted *phronésis* with two other types of intellectual virtues: *epistemé* and *techné*. Similarly, Foucault situates the notion of (political) *parrhésia* between the distinct problems of *politeia* and *dunesteia*. In each pole the two themes will possess similar qualities and share a degree of subject matter. The three poles are defined as *Phronésis/Parrhésia, Epistemé/Politeia, and Techné/Dunesteia*.

The dissertation is just as much a study of *phronésis* and *parrhésia* as it is of statebuilding. Chapter one will explore the theme of *phronésis*, from Aristotle’s initial formulations throughout its development in *retreat*, giving way to considerations in *epistemé* (the Aristotelian ban on ‘science of the singular’), and further to the contemporary representations of its *rediscovery* and renewed formulations in Bent Flyvbjerg’s argument for a phronetic social science. Chapter two will engage with Foucault’s lectures on *parrhésia*. First, I will expand on the general framing of Foucault’s intellectual project and the basic meanings of *parrhésia*. Before turning to the bulk of the chapter, which will deal with the political variant of *parrhésia*. Lastly, the crisis of political *parrhésia* throughout its transformation into philosophical *parrhésia* will be briefly discussed. Chapter three will attempt to co-align the two themes and discuss the synergies and similarities within them so as to end up with an analytical grid; even so, no attempt at reconciliation between *phronésis* and *parrhésia* will be made. On the basis of this newly constructed analytical grid, chapter four, will comprise a short genealogy of the statebuilding literature from the 90’s and onwards. Hopefully this will enable a critical understanding of where the international statebuilding project, in strictly academic terms, has stranded. It is argued that for

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statebuilding to be successful, the statebuilding literature has to move in the direction of *phronēsis* and *parrhēsia*. 
Phronésis: Real Social Science

In *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle sets out to answer the ethical question “what is good for man?”, first asked by Socrates and Plato. In contrast to them, however, Aristotle considered the study of ethics (as well as politics) to be practical, rather than theoretical: it is about ‘becoming’ and ‘being’ good, rather than knowing what it is to be good. Therefore inquiry starts with looking at what people are doing, rather than starting from universals. For Aristotle, *virtue* has to do with the proper functioning of a thing: i.e. an ear is only a functional ear in so far it can hear, because the function of the ear is to hear. Adopting this functionalistic view he reasoned that for humans this proper function was to be *eudaimonia*, usually translated as *happiness* or *wellbeing*. The topic of Aristotle’s ethics therefore is the question of how does humans become *eudaimonia* – the nature of happiness. Of particular interest to this dissertation, however, is Aristotle’s tripartite categorisation of the “intellectual virtues”: *epistemé*, *techné*, and *phronésis*, elaborated in Book IV. These three intellectual virtues will constitute the first theme of my analytical argument.

*Epistemé*, to Aristotle, is concerned with the universal, the invariable, and the context-independent. What is central is a general analytical rationality that is capable of demonstrating what is known. In other words, the production of knowledge, which is consistent in both, time and space. In this sense *epistemé* denotes a form of *know why* or *know that*; ergo, it is demonstrable and therefore eternal: “the object of scien-

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9 Thus, for Aristotle there is talk of the “ethical-political” – the study of one implies the study of the other. Richard Bernstein echoes Aristotle in arguing that; ”we cannot understand ethics without thinking through our political commitments and responsibilities.” see Bernstein, Richard (1985) *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press), p. 9
tific knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal [...] Induction introduces us to first principles and universals, while deduction starts from universals [...] Thus scientific knowledge is a demonstrative state (i.e., a state of mind capable of demonstrating what it knows).”11

(Continued from the previous page)

Epistemé is a very well known concept to us today, because it corresponds to our modern ideal of science, which has become dominant in our intellectual tradition. This is a result of its forefathers, Socrates and Plato, who can be said to have prioritized this type of intellectual virtue over others; even more so, if we emphasise their devotion to ideal theory. Socrates first introduced three criteria for ideal theory in the sense that it must be explicit, universal, and abstract. Descartes and Kant added two more: ideal theory must be discrete – it must rely on context-independent elements in its formulation – and systematic – it must constitute a whole or bounded realm where context-independent elements are related by rules or laws. Later, in the natural sciences, a sixth criterion was added: ideal theorizing must be complete which enables it to be predictive.12 Although the criteria are not fully reachable, it is this view of science that has helped epistemé become the most important intellectual virtue in Western societies.

In a sense techné represents the opposite of epistemé in that it is concerned with the particular, the variable and the context-dependent. In contrast to epistemé’s know that, techné denotes a form of know how – how to produce certain things or outcomes. Techné is concerned with “fabrication” (poiesis). Aristotle explains, contrasting techné and epistemé: “Every art is concerned with bringing something into being, and the practice of an art is the study of how to bring into being something that

11 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 148 [1139b]
is capable either of being or of not being [...] For it is not with things that are or come to be of necessity that art is concerned [this is the domain of epistemē] nor with natural objects (because these have their origin in themselves) [...] Art [...] operate[s] in the sphere of the variable.”13 As such, technē is an art or craft, where practical instrumental rationality is governed by a conscious goal – “the process bringing something into being” – without the consideration of whether or not to do so.

Whereas epistemē and technē have contemporary corresponding terms, phronēsis has none, but is usually translated as ‘prudence’, ‘practical common sense’, or ‘practical wisdom’.14 Phronēsis is different from the theoretical know that concern of epistemē and the technical know how of technē in that it is concerned with practical knowledge and practical ethics. Aristotle defines phronēsis as follows:

We may grasp the nature of [phronēsis] if we consider what sort of people we call prudent. Well, it is thought to be the mark of a prudent man to be able to deliberate rightly about what is good and advantageous [...] But nobody deliberates about things that are invariable [...] So [...] prudence cannot be science or art; not science [epistemē] because what can be done is a variable (it may be done in different ways, or not done at all), and not art [technē] because action and production are generically different. For production aims at an end other than itself; but this is impossible in the case of action, because the end is merely doing well. What remains, then, is that it is a true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man [...] We consider that this quality belongs to those who understand the management of households or states.15

In other words, Aristotle, by contrasting phronēsis with epistemē – being concerned with the particular and variable rather than universal and necessary – and with technē – being concerned with “action” rather than “production” (poiesis) –, shows a new starting point for analysis and the conduct of human affairs. Phronēsis is about the exploration of ethics and values because it considers “things that are good or bad for

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13 Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 149 [1140a]
14 However, ‘prudence’ does not capture the meaning that well, because it in modern English it has canonisations with circumspection, cautiousness, and to some extent passivity.
15 Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 150 [1140a-1140b]
man” as the departure for action. As such, Aristotle places *phronésis* at the intersection of the universal and the particular, and the general and the concrete. It necessitates consideration, judgment and experience. *Phronésis* can never be equated to *epistémē*, because it is knowledge about what the course of action is in particular circumstances (i.e. a sense of what is *ethically practical*), which cannot be reduced to general truths or universals. Universals, such as theoretical axioms, are to be considered in relation to the particular circumstances of the situation. Although *technē* and *phronésis* both involve skills and judgment, *phronésis* is not a higher form of *technē* in that it is about *value judgments*, not production. Furthermore, where experience in the case of *technē* is about rules – experience in the case of *phronésis* is about judgment.

Because *phronésis* in concerned with conduct and “conduct has its sphere in particular circumstances” the emphasis must be placed at the particular and the circumstantial. Aristotle explains that this is “why some people who do not possess theoretical knowledge are more effective in action […] than others who do possess it”, which is even more true if they have experience.16 *Phronésis* therefore most of all requires *experience*. Aristotle illustrates this with the unorthodox example of eating chicken. By contrasting one person who possesses abstract knowledge – that “light flesh foods are digestible and wholesome” – but who is unaware of “what kinds are light”, with another person “who knows that chicken is wholesome” and therefore is more likely to produce health.17 It important to acknowledge that *phronésis* does not shy away from theoretical knowledge and abstract principles, but there is, on the other hand, no substitute for worldly experience; one must get one’s hands dirty and not just read books. Aristotle clarifies this point by saying that “although [people] develop

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16 Ibid, p. 156 [1142a]
17 Ibid, p. 154 [1141b]
ability in geometry and mathematics and become wise in such matters, they are not thought to develop [phronésis].”

Furthermore, for Aristotle, it was the development of a society’s phronésis vis-à-vis its epistemé and techné that was the most important aspect of the political science. This is because phronésis is a balancing act between the universal and the particular with its own guiding question of what is good and bad for man at the centre of its deliberation in particular circumstances. In fact, a well-functioning society for Aristotle was dependent on the successful functioning of epistemé, techné, and phronésis. However, as the former two cannot manage themselves, Aristotle emphasised the role of phronésis claiming that “for the possession of the single virtue of [phronésis] will carry with it the possession of them all.”

I shall elaborate on the link between phronésis and political science in chapter three, when discussing phronésis in relation to parrhésia.

**Developments after Aristotle:**

Since Aristotle and the ancient Greeks a series of developments occurred in our way of thinking about knowledge. Of these, the most important was arguably in modernity. Thinkers, such as Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault, have examined the radical transformation in our understanding of ‘being’ that occurred in modernity. In this subject-centred understanding, which originated in Descartes and Kant, they note that Man objectifies everything, including himself. Here, Man becomes a theorized object, an epistemic object of which one can obtain universal knowledge. Consequently, this humanistic understanding of ‘being’ makes way for the domination of the instrumen-

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18 Ibid, pp. 155-156 [1142a]
19 Ibid, p. 166 [1145a]
tal rationalities of *epistemé* and *techné* while value rational concerns are more or less retracted form society.\(^{20}\)

This is reflected in the modern social sciences, where Max Weber was one of the first to study what could be called the “Rationalist Turn.”\(^{21}\) Weber examined what he termed *occidental* rationality – the “specific and peculiar rationalism” of the West – that limited the notion of rationality to an instrumental one.\(^{22}\) He found that, while instrumental rationality (*Wertrationalität*) had become the dominant way to understand humans and their world, value-rationality (*Zweckrationalität*) had faded into the background of social scientific inquiry. Here, Weber spoke of the “disenchantment of the world” in the sense that the consequences of the dominance of this instrumental rationality were the alienation and erosion of more traditional values.\(^{23}\)

While it might seem that elements of *phronésis* have long perished in our modern culture, the notion has proved more resilient than so. Hans J. Morgenthau was an extensive reader of Aristotle and exemplified elements of *phronésis* in his writings on international politics and diplomacy.\(^{24}\) However, the notion of *phronésis* remained somewhat *implicit* in his writing. With disciplines, such as economics, striving for the prestige of the epistemic natural sciences throughout the twentieths century, there now is a ‘phronetic turn’ underway in the social sciences.

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In his book *Making Social Science Matter*, Bent Flyvbjerg questions the validity and desirability of modelling the social science on *epistemic* natural sciences.\(^{25}\) While the natural sciences, given their subject matter, are successful as epistemic sciences – that is, by testing hypothesis, producing abstract principles and accurate predictions – the social sciences are not. This is because the social sciences study human interaction, which necessarily involves human consciousness, choice, power and reflexivity. They are better at producing situational knowledge that enables action in particular and contextual settings based on a deliberation of values and interests – i.e. *phronèsis*. Thus, whereas social sciences has contributed little in terms of being a stable and accumulating epistemic science, the natural sciences has added little to our reflexive analysis of interests, power and values: “[I]n their role as *phronèsis*, the social sciences are strongest where the natural sciences are weakest.”\(^{26}\) Flyvbjerg therefore argues for an alternative social science, which is based on *phronèsis* rather then *epistemé*.

While *phronèsis* in today’s society, in principle, would be capable of balancing instrumental and value rationality, it has noticeable difficulty in making itself effective in political reality. This is because it lacks the inclusion of power, as Richard Bernstein points out: “[N]o practical discussion is going to take place unless you understand the relevance of *phronèsis*. But no practical philosophy can be adequate for our time unless it confronts the analysis of power.”\(^{27}\) Thus it became Flyvbjerg’s aim to develop the Aristotle’s classic concept of *phronèsis* to incorporate mechanisms of power.\(^{28}\)

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\(^{26}\) Ibid, p. 3


\(^{28}\) Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter*, p. 55
Through an engagement with Nietzsche and Foucault’s ideas of genealogy as the methodology with which the *wirkliche Historie* (real history) of the social realm can be “written”, Flyvbjerg aims to study politics in terms of *Realpolitik* and rationality in terms of *Realrationalität* (real rationality). Differentiating between two approaches to power – that of “power as entity” and “power as force relation” –, Flyvbjerg prioritizes the latter Nietzschean-Foucauldian tradition over the former Weberian-Dahlian one.\(^\text{29}\) Maintaining that studying power in the contemporary world inevitably involves real people doing things to other people, the ‘power as entity’ tradition, although problematic, remains indispensable. Therefore, Flyvbjerg comes up with a compromise and asks, “what are the most immediate and most local power relations operating, and how do they operate?”\(^\text{30}\)

To Aristotle, the classic concept of phronēsis departed from a series of value rational questions. These questions are here supplemented with Flyvbjerg’s inclusion of questions of power (question two):

1. Where are we going?
2. Who wins and who loses; by which mechanisms of power?
3. Is this desirable?
4. What, if anything, can we do about it?\(^\text{31}\)

Doing social science in this manner is to do phronetic social science, or “*progressive phronesis,*” as Flyvbjerg calls it, to emphasise the contemporariness of the project.\(^\text{32}\)

In one of his last chapters – remaining in Aristotle’s tradition of ‘prioritising the particular’ – Flyvbjerg sketches out methodological guidelines for this reformed social science.\(^\text{33}\) First, phronetic social science focuses on values. As outlined by Aristotle the purpose of *phronēsis* is to balance instrumental rationality with value rationality

\(^{29}\) Ibid, p. 131  
\(^{30}\) Ibid, p. 123  
\(^{31}\) Ibid, p. 145  
\(^{33}\) Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter*, pp. 129-140
by applying situational ethics. In this commitment to contextualism, both foundationalism based in epistemé (universalism) and relativism based in techné (particularism) are rejected. Second, place power at the centre of analysis. With a Foucauldian conception of power, Flyvbjerg proposes a compromise of combining the Weberian question of “who governs?” with the Nietzschean question of “what ‘governmental rationalities’ are at work when those who govern govern?”

Third, Flyvbjerg argues for the importance for “getting close to reality.” To avoid the charge of irrelevance (the question of “so what?”) research should be based on the context that is studied. The researcher must be close to the practice that is studied, but at the same time keep his ethical distance. Fourth, emphasizing the little things. Phronetic studies begin with the little questions of empirical origin, which focus on the particulars before the general, as opposed to the type of inquiry, which has its outset in “big questions” and important issue. Fifth, looking at practice before discourse. The study of practical rationality and knowledge in the actions of everyday practices takes presidency over attention to discourse and theory – from the household to the complexity of international statebuilding. Sixth, the phronetic researcher studies cases and contexts. It is by focusing on case-studies, precedents and exemplars that the practical rationality and judgement of phronesis is best brought to light. Seventh, asking the question of “how” and doing narrative. Aimed at both understanding and explaining, phronetic research prioritises the dynamic question of “how” as opposed to the structural question of “why?” As such, a narrative constitutes an explanation.

Eight, linking agency and structure. Inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus” – “the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality” –,

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34 Ibid, p. 131
35 Ibid, p. 132
36 This point has been made independently of Flyvbjerg’s work, see for example: Suganami, Hidemi (2008) ‘Narrative Explanation and International Relations: Back to Basics’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies 37, pp. 327-356
phronetic social science attempts to transcend the dualisms of agent/structure and hermeneutics/structuralism. Rather than the two standing in an external relation to each other, it is emphasised that there is critical relation between both agents and structures where one is impossible to comprehend without simultaneously comprehending the other. Finally, doing dialogue with a polyphony of voices. Rejecting any claim to a final truth or authority (ultimate or verified knowledge), phronetic assertions are socially and inter-subjective conditioned. Thus, rather than producing theoretical knowledge about the social world, “the task of phronetic social science”, Flyvbjerg tells us, “is to clarify and deliberate about the problems and risks we face and to outline how things may be done differently, in full knowledge that we cannot and ultimate answers to these questions or even a single version of what the questions are.”

The confidence in an epistemic social science, and its ability to solve the social problems, has been dominant in the practise of international statebuilding efforts. Where the confidence in epistemic social science is based on its devotion to end results or output, phronesis is about process. Thus, phronetic social science offers no ‘silver bullets’, but rather a dialogical stance in which practical wisdom is applied to an ever-changing social context. This kind of ‘power research’ might not be quantifiable, but it nevertheless remains key to enhancing the practical wisdom with which statebuilding efforts ought to be guided. Thus, to conclude this chapter, the way out of the ever-renewed despair of the failure of scientific reasoning to solve the problems of

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38 Flyvbjerg, _Making Social Science Matter_, p. 140
international statebuilding is grounded on a move to *phronésis* and phronetic social science.

Nevertheless, Flyvbjerg takes certain aspects of *phronésis* as a given. While the proper functioning of social science might be envisioned as a critique and social commentary directed by a desire to clarify different values and interest in the public sphere, there is no direct link to how this leads to the activist type of scholarship Flyvbjerg seems to be committed to.\(^{40}\) In short, is *phronésis* an intellectual virtue, or is it more than that, a *practise*? A practice, that is, a particular way in which one conducts oneself as a social scientist. The question of practice and the relation of *phronésis* and power can only be discussed relative to the practice through which one makes one’s *phronésis* valid in social life.

Parrhésia: The Practice of Truth-telling

In the last years of his life, Michel Foucault held a series of lectures on Parrhésia, a concept that originated in Greco-Roman antiquity. Two were held at The Collège de France, titled The Government of Self and Others in 1982-1983 and The Courage of Truth in 1983-1984, with the addition of a third lecture series held at the University of California at Berkley in 1983, published as Fearless Speech.41

Foucault started his lectures by summarizing his general project as “a history of thought” by which he means the “focal points of experience” in “which forms of a possible knowledge (savoir), normative frameworks of behaviour for individuals, and potential modes of existence for possible subjects are linked together” comes into historical being.42 Foucault gives the example of madness, which he studies in The History of Madness. This first involved treating madness as a point from which a “body of knowledge” could be formed (knowledge); and then as a “set of norm”, first as norm corresponding to the phenomenon of madness and second how these norm deviated from normal individuals (power); and last how the experience of madness defined the constitution of the “subject’s modes of being”, that of the normal subject opposed to the mad subject (subjectivation).43 Roughly these constitute the Foucaultian triangle of knowledge, power, and subjectivation.

Foucault describes his general project as having studied all three poles as separate “genealogies.”44 Thus, first of all, it has entailed a detailed study of the different

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42 Foucault, The Government of Self and Others p. 3
‘forms of veridiction’. Rather than studying the substances of knowledge of different points in time, Foucault set out to study the different forms of knowledge constituted by the “discursive practices” which organize and gives the rules to a game of true and false.\(^{45}\) Second, it has entailed the study of ‘procedures of governmentality’. Rather than focusing on the institutions of power and their actions, Foucault wanted to study the “techniques and procedures” that constituted the strategic situation in which one attempt to conduct the conduct of others.\(^{46}\) Third, it involved ‘forms of subjectification’. Rather than a theory of the subject, Foucault studied the “different forms by which the individual is led to constitute him or herself as subject.”\(^{47}\) In fact, Foucault, in all the incidents, insisted on the impossibility of a theory of the subject, of power, and of knowledge.

The specific concern raised in the last lecture series involves one such “focal point of experience”, one such mode of being, namely parrhésia.\(^{48}\) “You can see” Foucault tells us, “that with parrhésia we have a notion which is situated at the meeting point of the obligation to speak the truth, procedures and techniques of govern-


mentality, and the constitution of the relationship to self.”49 Surely, the intention was to write a history of such a mode of being; as it appeared in Greco-Roman Antiquity and further on throughout its reappearance in Western history and though.

After Foucault’s ‘ethical turn’ in his writings on The History of Sexuality, the lectures at the Collège de France stand out because they yet again link êthos to the political – after they were spilt apart in late Roman society.50 This linking can be described as an “ethical politics” in which care of self and the relation to, or “government” of, others are strictly interrelated. In an interview, Foucault explained the crucial link drawn by the Greeks: “Ethos implies also a relation with others to the extent that care for self renders one competent to occupy a place in the city, in the community or in interindividual relationships which are proper – whether it be to exercise a magistracy or to have friendly relationships.”51 Indeed, rather than representing a retreat from the engagement with the problems of modernity, Foucault’s interest in parrhésia signifies a desire to confront modern political thought and philosophy. The basis for an ethical politics was not to be found in modernity. By re-functioning truth-telling as an important subject for contemporary political theory and philosophy Foucault was seeking a basis for his ethical politics project. Here, with a focus on the Greek’s problematization of truth-telling, or parrhésia, Foucault offers an alternative and heterodox reading of Ancient texts aimed at the problems of the present. Accordingly, in his first lecture series, The Government of Self and Others, Foucault studied the development from political parrhésia to philosophical parrhésia. The second, The Courage of Truth, was devoted mostly to philosophical parrhésia – or the tension be-

49 Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, p. 45
50 For the spilt of êthos and the political see especially Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Vol. III The Care for the Self, p. 84; for more on the ‘ethical turn’ (1976-1984) see for example, O’Leary, Timothy (2002) Foucault and the Art of Ethics (London and New York: Continuum)
tween Platonic and Cynic parrhésia – while the lectures given at Berkley were mostly concerned with detailing different aspects of parrhésia. Indeed, over the course of the three lecture series’, Foucault’s heterodox readings of Euripides’s Ion, Thucydides’ reconstructions of Pericles’s speeches before the Athenian assembly, Plato’s letters describing his political experiences in Syracuse, the figure of Socrates in the Apology and the Gorgias, the political writings of Plato and Aristotle in The Republic or Politics, and a whole range of different Greek tragedies, represents a major confrontation to modern political though and philosophy.

In methodological terms, Foucault was less interested in epistemological structures than what he called “alethurgic forms.”52 Where the study of epistemological structures are concerned with claims of knowledge – establishing if they were correct or not –, the study of ‘alethurgic’ forms is interested in “the production of truth or the act by which truth is manifested.”53 This is the approach taken by Foucault in his study of parrhésia: “My intention was not to deal with the problem of truth, but with the problem of truth-teller or truth-telling as an activity”, and he continues, “What I wanted to analyse was how the truth-teller’s role was variously problematized in Greek philosophy.”54 A comparison with the theme of phronésis is in order here. For in a way, this approach underpins the shift from Foucault’s early emphasis on épistemé, in The Order of Things, to techné – present in The Archaeology of Knowledge – that was directed from the standpoint of phronésis. In other words, Foucault has, in every instance, focussed his studies towards classical phronetic concerns such as goals, values, interests, and praxis.55

52 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, p. 3
53 Ibid, p. 3
54 Foucault, Fearless Speech, p. 169
55 Flyvbjerg, ‘Aristotle, Foucault, and Progressive Phronesis’, p. 18-20; or Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter, p. 111
The notion Parrhésia:

The word parrhésia is normally translated into English as ‘free speech’ – as in, speaking freely of being out spoken. Parrhésia therefore signifies a degree of ‘free-spokenness’ in one’s attitude towards others; the parrhesiastes is a person who uses parrhésia. But parrhésia also designates a form of, or the practice of, truth-telling. That is: truth-telling as virtue, in both political and moral terms. Not to reduce it to a technique or skill, like rhetoric, “parrhésia”, Foucault explains, “is a stance, a way of being which is akin to a virtue, a mode of action.”56 Because any such truth-telling requires the presence of an other, there is always a relationship of power between the subject who speaks the truth and the other. Thus, to Foucault there is a close link between truth and parrhésia in because “the role of this other is precisely to tell the truth, to tell the whole truth, or at any rate to tell all the truth that is necessary, and to tell it in a certain form which is precisely parresia.”57

According to Foucault, parrhésia has five characteristics: First, parrhésia is characterised by frankness. That is, the parrhesiastes says everything he has in mind and as such nothing goes unspoken, so that the audience can grasp precisely what the speaker has in mind. The parrhesiastes does this in a way so that he makes it clear that what is said is his own opinion and he does so without technical aids. In contrast again to rhetoric, Foucault explains: “Whereas rhetoric provides the speaker with technical devices to help him prevail upon the minds of his audience (regardless of the rhetorician's own opinion concerning what he says), in parrhésia, the parrhesiastes acts on other people's mind by showing them as directly as possible what he actually believes.”58

56 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, p. 14
57 Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, p. 43
58 Foucault, Fearless Speech, p. 12
Second, in *parrhésia*, the *parrhesiastes’s* relation to *truth* is very different to our modern way of understanding *truth* (in terms of proof); what could be called the Cartesian ‘mode of veridiction’. Foucault explains: “the *parrhesiastes* says what is true because he knows that it is true; and he knows that it is true because it is really true.”\(^{59}\) Hence, in a way, there is always “an exact coincidence between belief and truth”, Foucault elaborates.\(^{60}\) The only measure of truth in *parrhésia* would be the courage of the speaker, and therefore “what binds the speaker to the fact that what he says is the truth, and to the consequences which follow from the fact that he has told the truth.”\(^{61}\) Thus, there is a kind of ontological commitment on behalf of the speaker to which he is tied to the truth.

Consequently, third, *parrhésia* entails a degree of risk and danger and therefore requires *courage*. Contrasting *parrhésia* to other “discursive strategies” such as rational demonstration, persuasion, teaching, and debating, Foucault shows that what distinguishes *parrhésia* from all of them is the *risk of danger* inherent in *parrhésia*. Thus, to be a *parrhesiastes* requires the necessary courage to tell the truth, even if this means death. Foucault explains this by stating: “*Parrhésia*, then, is linked to courage in the face of danger: it demands the courage to speak the truth in spite of some danger.”\(^{62}\) Consequently, people with power can never speak truth in the *parrhesiatic* sense; it requires no courage to speak out from a position of power. Either to a tyrant or to the assembly, when one is being a *parrhesiastes* there is always a risk of danger, either in the form of humiliation, exile or death.

Fourth, *parrhésia* is a form of *criticism*. Because the danger or risk involved in *parrhésia* comes from the speaker confronting the other, or the interlocutor. Foucault

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59 Ibid, p. 14
60 Ibid, p. 14
61 Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, p. 56
62 Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, p. 16
therefore describes this relation as the “game of truth” between the two parties. Thus, parrhésia is a form of criticism because it is “either towards another or towards oneself, but always in a situation where the speaker or confessor is in a position of inferiority with respect to the interlocutor.” Foucault describes a criticism that comes from ‘below’ which is directed towards ‘above’. The parrhesiastes is less powerful than the one to which he speaks to. This is the situation in which the philosopher risks angering the tyrant by confronting him with his way of ruling.

Fifth, parrhésia is characterised by a sense of duty. That is, telling the truth is thought of as a duty: “No one forces him to speak; but he feels that it is his duty to do so.” Foucault distinguishes between whether or not one is “compelled” to speak the truth, i.e. under torture or in a trial, and the sort of voluntary confession of the truth that is inspired by a sense of moral obligation towards a friend (in a political situation such as the city state, or to a king). Parrhésia therefore requires freedom or in other words: abiding to a sense of duty under conditions of freedom. Summing these five characteristics up Foucault notes: “In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy.”

Towards a genealogy of parrhésia in ancient Greece:

In his 1983 lectures, Foucault for the most part studies parrhésia as a political virtue. Parrhésia evolves because of crisis from its democratic form, where one shows his courage by addressing the assembly, to an autocratic form, where true discourse in-

63 Ibid, p. 17-18
64 Ibid, p. 19
65 Ibid, pp. 19-20
stead is spoken to the king to help him direct his kingdom. Foucault study of political
*parrhesia* shows us, largely, that the Greek secret of politics, of the search for the best
regime, is concerned, not with constitutional frameworks, but in reconciling the prin-
ciple of ‘ethical difference’ with the problem of government of others. This ‘ethical
difference does not simply consist is excellent leaders or moral quality of individuals,
but in the process of constructing the relation to self on the basis of the difference of
truth. That is, the *truth as difference*, in reproaching others and the prevailing public
opinion in speaking the truth.

In his studies of Euripides’ *Ion* and Polybius’ texts, Foucault locates a “fund-
damental circularity” between *parrhesia* and *democracy* in that “for there to be de-
mocracy there must be *parrhesia*; for there to be *parrhesia* there must be democracy.”66 It is within this circularity that Foucault placed his analysis of political
*parrhesia*. Here, political *parrhesia* is the exercise of free speech operating within an
antagonistic structure of competing individuals, determining who is most fit to govern
based on the subject’s constitutive relation to the self and the relation to others. This
was to take charge of the city via the discourse of truth (or the practice of truth-
telling) – “*polei kai logō khrēstai*” – or according to Foucault: “What I think is asso-
ciated with the game of *parresia* is speaking the truth in order to direct the city, in a
position of superiority in which one is perpetually jousting with others.”67 Political
*parrhesia* is therefore rooted in what Foucault calls “politics as experience” – design-
nated by the Greek term *dunesteia* (which derives from *dunamis*: strength, power, or
the exercise of power), rather than any organizational or institutional framework –
termed *politeia* (the constitution). To bring this point home, Foucault formalised the

66 Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, p. 155
67 Ibid, p. 157
game of *parrhésia* into what he calls the “constitutive rectangle” of political *parrhésia*, which is stretched out between four conditions.

The first condition is the “formal condition of democracy”, or isēgoria – the constitution, the *politeia* – especially the constitutional condition which gives citizens the equal right to speak. Foucault describes us a whole series of problems associated with the *politeia*: What are the rights of the citizens? How decisions are to be taken? How power should be rightfully exercised? How leaders are appointed? Are all equally accountable to the law? All the different sets of formalities that is associated with configuring a constitution. In short, it is the problem of the framework for political action, of authority and legitimacy: Who is to rule? How should power be constituted? Who can speak in the assembly? Who has the right to vote and who does not? The problems of *politeia* are, in a way, very known to us because they are in a sense the basis of Western political thought. Political philosophy and political science has, to a large extend, been concerned with ideal social models of statehood, abstract models, and utopian theories regarding the best functioning model of the state in accordance with first principles. In this context, Foucault talked about a “morphological definition of democracy” in the sense that democracy is differentiated from monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy in so far that the people who govern it, as opposed to the characteristics and qualities that make democracy function well.

The second condition is the “de facto condition” or the concrete exercise of power (of *dunesteia*), where the ascendancy or superiority of some enables them to address others and speak the truth and to persuade them so that they, in effect, exercise command over them. Like *politeia*, there is a series of problems associated with *dunesteia*: The problem of how power is exercised, or the political game - “the game

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68 Ibid, pp. 173-174
69 Ibid, p. 150
70 Ibid, pp. 173-174
through which power is actually exercised in a democracy." They are the problems concerning the *procedures, techniques, and practices* of exercising power. In Greek society, contrary to the contemporary exercise of power, these are essentially limited to what Foucault called ‘true discourse’, which is only effective if it succeeds to *persuade*. Finally, *dunesteia* is “the problem of the nature of political man himself”, his *character, quality, and moral* conduct. It is especially his relationship to himself and to others, the people he is governing, which extremely important to Foucault. Furthermore, *dunesteia* is also the problem of the political game and, in the case of the individual, the political man who engages with it. This individual has to face politics in a particular way, which Foucault conceptualizes as the problem of politics in general: “[U]nderstood as a practice having to obey certain rules, indexed to truth in a particular way, and which involves a particular form of relationship to oneself and to others on the part of those who play this game.” In sum, this political game is characterized by an agonistic structure where the ascendancy of some over others allows them to persuade the city with their true discourse; and as such, *dunesteia* and the problems associated with it constitute as a “field of experience” as it concerns the individuals involved that have experience in such matters.

Now, the third and fourth conditions, as Foucault describes them, are a bit complicated because they each constitute a part of *parrhésia*, which solely is located within those who strive to be the *parrhesiastes* – the one who tells the truth. The third condition is the “truth condition” the speaker is bound to; those who hope to take charge of the city must make use of discourse, or the *logos*, the rational discourse, the

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71 Ibid, p. 158  
72 Ibid, p. 158  
73 Ibid, p. 158  
74 Ibid, p. 158
discourse of truth.\textsuperscript{75} The fourth condition is the “moral condition” of the speaker to this truth; in a democracy the practice of truth-telling is preconditioned by rivalry and confrontation, those striving to govern the city must demonstrate their courage.\textsuperscript{76} Here we have two of the characteristic described above – truth and risk – which tie the speaker ontologically to his true-discourse. Therefore, I would argue that, we should think of the two conditions as one. That is, they constitute parrhésia as practice, as an alethurgy form. “There is no exercise of power without something like an alethurgy”, Foucault tells us, but that alethurgy does not necessarily have to be in the form of courageous truth telling; people could be speaking (i.e. flattering) only to ensure their own gain.\textsuperscript{77} To borrow a phrase from Thomas Flynn, “all parrhesiasts are truth-tellers, but not all truth-tellers are parrhesiasts.”\textsuperscript{78}

By juxtaposing politeia (the formal conditions), dunesteia (the de facto conditions) and the truth and moral conditions, which linked together constitute parrhésia, we can construct an analytical grid for analysing the power relations of ancient Athenian democracy. This is what Foucault calls ‘politics’ as opposed to the ‘political’. By implication of “politics as experience”, a complex relation arises between the problems of the constitution, the problem of the concrete exercise of power, and the problems of the practice of telling the truth.\textsuperscript{79} Foucault explains:

\begin{quote}
[P]arresia is very precisely a notion which serves as the hinge between politeia and dunasteia, between the problem of the law and the constitution on the one hand, and the problem of the political game on the other. The place of parresia is defined and guaranteed by the politeia; but parresia, the truth-telling of the political man, is what ensures the appropriate game of politics. The importance of parresia, it seems to me, is found in this meeting point. At any rate, it seems to me that we find here the root of a problematic of a society’s immanent power
\end{quote}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{75} Ibid, p. 173
\bibitem{76} Ibid, p. 174
\bibitem{77} Foucault, \textit{The Courage of Truth}, p. 20
\bibitem{78} Flynn, ‘Foucault as Parrhesiast’, p 103
\bibitem{79} Foucault, \textit{The Government of Self and Others}, p. 159, also see p. 169
\end{thebibliography}
relations which, unlike the juridical-institutional system of that society, ensure that it is actually governed.\textsuperscript{80}

Foucault, here, is challenging the foundations of traditional political philosophy. This is because if the juridical-institutional system, the abstract models, the ideal social models, and utopian theories about the best functioning model of state are not what ‘ensures the appropriate game of politics’, then the tremendous efforts to develop these complex and sophisticated arguments for how the rule of men can \textit{be legitimate}, provide security and treat the subject \textit{justly} all seem to be set up around the wrong ‘condition’. If Foucault’s argument is correct, then the theories of the state proposed by Plato and in his tradition have been of questionable value. By linking the government of others to the self, to \textit{parrhésia}, and rooting \textit{parrhésia} in ‘politics as experience’, Foucault is able to show that, rather than the best regime-type (i.e. democracy), it is ‘the truth-telling of the political man’ that “ensures the appropriate game of politics … [and that the city] is actually governed.”\textsuperscript{81} By this standard, defining an optimal mechanism for the distributions of power of a society does not ensure its good governance; only the political man’s relation to the self and others is ultimately able to do so.

This is political \textit{parrhésia} as it is supposed to function and how functioned in Athenian democracy in a limited period of time. Foucault draws on the speeches of Pericles to give an example of what he calls “good parrhésia.”\textsuperscript{82} First exemplified in the study of \textit{The Tragedy of Orestes}, the characteristic of “good parrhésia” is a person who is “courageous” (\textit{andreios}), “irreproachable” (\textit{akeraios}), and “prudent” (he possesses \textit{phronésis}). The figure of Pericles, as described by Thucydides in his \textit{History of the Peloponnesians Wars}, was seen as such a person. In the speech before the war

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid, p. 159 (italic added)
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, p. 159
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid, p. 166, and 173-184
broke out, the Athenians called for assemblies so every citizen could make use of their right to speak (isēgoria), guaranteed to them by the democratic constitution (politeia). “Among the speakers was Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, the leading man of his time among the Athenians and the most powerful both in action and in debate” and thus made use of his experience and superiority to persuade and direct the Athenians. 83 Pericles’s speech started as follows: “‘Athenians,’ he said, ‘my views are the same as ever: I am against making any concessions to the Peloponnesians.’” 84 Presenting all of the characteristics of a parrhesiastes Pericles delivers his speech: Frankness in speaking his mind; tying himself to an ontological commitment to the truth; showing courage by facing the risk and dangers in speaking before the assembly; critically engaging with the consequences of the choice for war; and in doing this he is not motivated by personal gain but by duty. Here, the ascendancy of Pericles, his way of constituting himself in relation to himself and others, enabled him to establish a “parrhesiatic pact” between him and the people of Athens. 85

After the golden period of Athenian democracy, the period of Pericles and the Peloponnesian wars, the erosion of democratic parrhēsia began: “The bond between parresia and democracy is problematic, difficult, and dangerous. Democracy”, Foucault tells us, “is in the process of being overrun by a bad parresia.” 86 The democratic parrhēsia is facing a crisis and is being replaced by ‘bad parhēsia’. ‘Bad parrhēsia’ is spoken by demagogues who seeks to flatter the crowd; not true to its own principles it seeks persuasion (by rhetoric or appealing to passions) instead of frankness, to tell untruths instead of truths, personal safety over risk and courage, flattery instead of criticism, and self-interest instead of moral duty. This results in two major experienc-

84 Ibid, p. 118
85 Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, p. 177
86 Ibid, p. 168
es: First, the courage of the speaker is not respected, and it thus becomes too dangerous to show one’s courage in speaking the truth; risking death to exercise parrhésia would make for a short life in politics. More importantly, second, parrhésia in so far as it is understood as the right to speak (isēgoria) is dangerous for democracy. If anyone can say anything, even the very worst citizens – the bad, the immoral, the incompetence or ignorant – may take charge and govern the city with disastrous consequences. Hence, there is a kind of structural failure inherent in democracy, which is making room for bad parrhésia, resulting in the break-up of the ‘fundamental circularity’ between parrhésia and democracy.

Foucault examines two answers to this crisis: the “Platonic reversal” and the “Aristotelian hesitation.”

Aristotle was hesitant in the sense that to him, it was not a matter of the form of government but rather of whether whoever governed, did so in their own interest or for the best of the city. Where as to Plato, parrhésia quickly became a choice between either democracy or truth-telling. As freedom of speech increasingly was linked to the choice of bios (the way of one’s life), the focus of parrhésia shifted from the politeia and dunesteia to that of the psukhē (the soul). The individual soul and their ethos would was Plato’s be the concern of truth-telling. He therefore proposed a reversal of constituting parrhésia as the defining principle of politeia, while carefully excluding democracy (here as isēgoria and isonomia). To Foucault, these responses signified a change in the Greeks problematization of truth-telling, in other words; a transformation of political parrhésia was under way, from a “Periclean moment” of parrhésia to a “Socratic-Platonic moment”.

87 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, pp. 45-52
88 Ibid, p.48
89 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, pp. 45; and Foucault, Fearless Speech, pp. 75-88
As the *bios* came to be the centre, the choice of a way of life (the *ethos*, the way in which we are formed as moral subjects), political *parrhēsia* is problematized around the relation between the sovereign and his political advisors. Here, the advisors take on the role as the *parrhesiastes* in an effort to influence and form the sovereign’s *ethos*, so that he controls his kingdom in a non-abusive way. The sovereign therefore must be committed to play the *parrhesiastic* game and accept what the *parrhesiastes* tells him, even if the truth is critical or unpleasant. In this way the sovereign’s ethical relation to himself and others, which was the concern of those who took charge in democracy, is kept intact. More than that, by limiting the number of souls to which truth discourse is addressed, Plato argued, it becomes less complicated to establish ‘ethical difference’ in an autocracy than a democracy. He described in his VII letter how he carried out such an experiment in Syracuse acting as a political advisor to the new king Dionysius the Younger. As expected, however, it was a failure: Dionysius did not engage in a *parrhesiastic* pact and instead tried to have Plato killed. Autocratic *parrhēsia* too, remained a dangerous solution.

This represents a very heterodox reading of Plato, because it is not philosophising as systematizing the contents of knowledge (*mathēmata*), but rather as a practice, a mode of being (*askēsis*) that interested Foucault.91 Here, according to Foucault, philosophy finds its reality in an active confrontation with political power; it is not philosophy’s objective to test the truth of politics, but to test its own truths in politics. That is not to say, however, that the philosopher is a political actor. Philosophy has its own particular game to play in relation to politics, the game of ‘ethical differentia-

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91 Ibid, p. 219
tion’. In short, philosophical practice is characterized by its “restive exteriority” in which it brings ethical differentiation within the exercise of power into play.

In fact, this redefinition of Greek political thought, centred on ethical difference and the formation of the *ethos* of the individual soul, allows Foucault to re-approach the tradition of Western philosophy. Foucault notes, that this new problematization of *parrhésia* as a sort of transfiguration of the soul introduces three distinct and irreducible ‘realities’ or poles. Accordingly, Foucault explains how the ancient Greek philosophy saw the problems of governing others (the pole of *politeia* and the exercise of power) as rooted in an ethical transformation of the subject (the pole of ethos and the subject), which, in turn, is capable of bringing out the difference of truth in the relation to the self and (the pole of *alētheia*, truth and truth-telling). “This is the *parrhesiastic* discourse and standpoint in philosophy: it is the discourse of the irreducibility of truth, power, and *ethos*, and at the same time the discourse of their necessary relationship, of the impossibility of thinking truth (*alētheia*), power (*politeia*), and *ethos* without their essential, fundamental relationship to each other.”

Foucault here comes full circle with what he himself had started in the Foucauldian triangle of *knowledge, power, subjectification*.

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92 Ibid, pp. 228-230
93 Ibid, p. 351
94 Foucault, *The Courage of Truth*, pp. 65-69
95 Ibid, p. 68
96 Flynn, ‘Foucault as Parrhesiast’, p. 106
An Analytical Framework

In the last two chapters, the themes of *phronésis* and *parrhésia* have been discussed at length, in this chapter I wish to explore common grounds or synergies between the two themes and their respective sub categories. However, there will be no attempt at reconciliation as of yet. There are two instances where the two concepts convene. First, when Flyvbjerg argues for an activist social science that confronts praxis with its problematizations. Second, where Foucault studies the tragedy of Orestes and Thucydides’ description of Pericles; both Pericles and Orestes possess’ *phronésis* and make use of *parrhésia*. What emerges, I would argue, is a relation of mutual dependence between the *phronésis* and *parrhésia*. That is, on the one hand, for there to be good *parrhésia* there must be *phronésis*, the *parrhesiastes* must posses’ *phronésis*. Conversely, on the other, one needs *parrhésia* to make use of one’s *phronésis* in public. The opposite goes for the practice of bad truth-telling; the absence of *phronésis* – of, what is basically a bad, applied ethic –, the intellectual virtues or rather instrumental rationalities which are not fit to govern (*epistemé* and *techné*), take over.

Good *parrhésia* requires *phronésis*: playing the game of *parrhésia* requires experience; it requires a certain “feel for power games.”97 “The bond between parresia and democracy is problematic, difficult, and dangerous”, Foucault tells us, and therefore to make *parrhésia* function well in a democracy the *parrhesiastes* needs *phronésis* – the experience and “practical wisdom” on how to inquire and act on social problems in a particular context.98 More than that, they need a “reason capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man.”99 Pericles, Foucault notes, was known for his ability to reach a good balance between democracy and *parrhésia*.

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98 Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, p. 168
99 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 150 [1140b]
What is more, to make use of *phronésis* in navigating the dangers inherent to the relation between truth-telling and democracy.\(^{100}\)

In so far as *phronésis* is to be successful, it requires *parrhésia*; it needs to be practiced in the very relations of power that it deliberates. In a recent article, Chris Brown points out an interesting paradox between the possession of *phronésis* and the existence of ‘the Other’: “[E]xperience of the world is central to the exercise of practical reason, but attempts to ‘pull rank’ on the basis of such experience are self-defeating.”\(^{101}\) Hence, it might seem that *phronésis* and the choices it involves is always of good and ethical by nature. As it appears to Brown, “[w]isdom is not something that can be claimed for oneself – it has to be recognised by others.”\(^{102}\) While this remains somewhat of a problem for Aristotle, Flyvbjerg had shown that by adding questions of the exercise of power to the concept the problem could be overcome. In other words, choices can only be considered good or bad in relation to certain values and interests.\(^{103}\) To understand this relation better, we have to return to questions of power and the space within which one applies *phronésis*. Nothing in such situations could be more important that *parrhésia*, having the courage to confront power to speak one’s practical wisdom. Here, values and interest in the *ethical political* are linked to the care for the self and the relation to others; one can only take care for others if one takes care of oneself.

But then, what about the other aspects outlined with regard to *phronésis*, *epistémé* and *techné*; and to *parrhésia*, *politeia* and *dunesteia*? As discussed above, to Aristotle, *phronésis* is the most important of the intellectual virtues because it is neces-

\(^{100}\) Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, pp. 175-176
\(^{102}\) Ibid, p. 456
\(^{103}\) Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter*, p. 57
sary for the management of human affairs, and it therefore intersects with political science:

Political science and prudence [*phronésis*] are the same state of mind [but not identical: *phronésis* is also necessary for the management of the household or the individual] […] Prudence concerning the state has two aspects: one, which is controlling and directive, is legislative science; the other […] deals with particular circumstances […] [and] is practical and deliberative. 104

A closer look at Aristotle’s description of political science reveals an interesting correspondence or synergy between the concepts from the last two chapters; *epistemé*, *techné*, *politeia*, and *dunesteia*. The “legislative science” that Aristotle refers to is *politeia* which is concerned with the problem of different frameworks for political action or ‘who should rule?’, ‘how should power ideally be constituted?’, and so on. While the “other” that deals with “particular circumstances” is *dunesteia* or dealing with the problem of how power is exercised – “the game through which power is actually exercised in a democracy” –, the *procedures, techniques, and practices* of exercising power. 105 More than that, the types of intellectual virtue presumed to be appropriate for the study of each aspect appear to coincide. Of the latter (*dunesteia*), Aristotle says that it is “practical and deliberative”, comparing the persons that “take part in politics” to “artisans.” 106

Thus, concerned with the production of certain things and outcomes, the variable and the context-dependent, it is the *know how* of *techné* that is best suited for *dunesteia*. While the other aspect (*politeia*), that which is ‘controlling and directive’, is best studied by the *know why* or *know that* of *epistemé*; that universal, invariable, and context-independent knowledge which makes it possible to scrutinize and theorize power into constitutional settings. Based on these parallels and syn-

105 Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, p. 158
106 In this case quoted from another translation, to emphasise the political aspect, see: Aristotle (2009) *The Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by David Ross (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 109 [1141b]
ergies, we can very schematically conjugate *politeia* with *epistemē* – the constitutional and universal – and *dunesteia* with *technē* – the exercise of power and the particular.

However, as with a *parrhēsia* indexed to *dunesteia* – the game played by rivals each attempting to persuade with their truth-discourse –, *phronēsis* emphasises the particular, the contextual, and *experience*. Political science, therefore, can impossibly be practised as *epistemē* and with a focus on *politeia* alone. As such, the analytical framework, which I want to construct, must account for and emphasise these properties, i.e. the particular and contextual (see below). This is not to say, however, that these epistemic and constitutional aspects of political science are not extremely important. Without *politeia*, there would be no right to practice *parrhēsia*, and without *epistemē* there would no universal knowledge on how to construct a proper constitution.

![Diagram](Phronēsis-Parrhēsia - Epistemē-Politeia - Technē-Dunesteia)

However, as observed by Flyvbjerg, there has been a spilt in philosophy and political science between the two sides emphasised by Aristotle – between the universal and the particular: “One tradition, the dominant one, has developed from Plato via Hobbes and Kant to Habermas and other rationalist thinkers, emphasizing the [*epistemic* and *politeia*] […] The other [*technē* and the *dunesteia*] […] has developed via Machiavelli
to Nietzsche, and to Foucault in some interpretations.\textsuperscript{107} This same split reflects the choice of the object of study taken within these two traditions. For instance, where Hobbes sought to construct a theory of political power in \textit{Leviathan (epistemé)}, his concern was on how political power was deemed legitimate, or how it could be constituted rationally (\textit{politeia}).\textsuperscript{108} Machiavelli, on the other hand, was more interested in concrete exercise of power (\textit{dunesteia}), and the practical engagement of doing politics (\textit{techné}).\textsuperscript{109}

Rather than continue with a separation of the two traditions, we should strive for their reunion. Following Foucault, we cannot separate the analysis of the three poles; they remain \textit{necessarily correlated} while at the same time being \textit{definitely irreducible}. Thus, the aim here is not to shy away from epistemological social science and questions of the best institutional framework, but rather to re-approach them with a renewed goal of making them work for \textit{phronēsis} and \textit{parrhēsia}. That being said, a central point is still to be made; what power relations and mechanisms of power are relevant to the study of phronetic statebuilding?

\textbf{Parrhēsia and Governmentality:}

Foucault’s study of \textit{parrhēsia} has been called a study of ‘ancient governmentality’.\textsuperscript{110} As it appears, there is more common ground between these two concepts than Foucault perhaps would explicate in his lectures. For example, in his 2 February 1983 lecture, he stated: “The problems of governmentality in their specificity, […] appear and

\textsuperscript{107} Flyvbjerg, \textit{Making Social Science Matter}, p. 59
\textsuperscript{110} See, Foucault, \textit{The Government of Self and Others}, p. p. 377
are formulated for the first time around this notion of *parresia*.”\textsuperscript{111} Accordingly, there are grounds for scrutinizing the relation between governmentality and *parrhésia*.

The concept of governmentality was first developed in his lectures on *Securité, Territoire, Population*, where Foucault studied the emergence of *raison d’État*, in the seventeenth and eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{112} Here, Foucault discussed the process of the “governmentalization of the state” as a way of explaining how power relations had been tied to the central body of the state.\textsuperscript{113} By confronting the traditional sovereignty-oriented theorizing of power, Foucault argued that we are “under the spell of monarchy” and continued, “In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king.”\textsuperscript{114} Foucault was more interested in the mode of power that was decentralized and bottom-up as opposed to the centralized and top-down characteristics of sovereign power. This mode of power that was *productive*, it produced truths and reality and which rendered things thinkable. In short, modern power or “the power of rationality.”\textsuperscript{115} Through this approach, the study of governmentality, which has become an increasingly popular concept in the social sciences, became primarily concerned with liberalism and neoliberalism as regimes of power particular to the West.\textsuperscript{116} Nonetheless, despite all these contributions, there has been considerable con-

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid, p. 159

\textsuperscript{112} Governmentality is a neologism of governing (*gouverner*) and modes of thought (*mentalité*): governmentality (*la gouvernementalité*), see, Foucault, Security Territory Population, p. 96


\textsuperscript{115} The “rationality of power” is a phrase borrowed from Flyvbjerg to distinguish modern power from the old (sovereign power) “rationality of power”, see Flyvbjerg, Bent (1998) *Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice*, translated by Steven Sampson (Chicago: Chicago University Press)

fusion as to what the concept of governmentality actually contains – what counts as a governmental rationality and what does not? – and whether or not it can be applied in a global context.\(^{117}\)

However, studying governmentality as the ‘governmentalization of the state’ remains problematic. The concept of governmentality is broader than a particular mode of power. In *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault wrote: “We should [...] study power not on the basis of the primitive terms of the relationship, but *on the basis of the relationship itself*, to the extent that it is the relationship itself that determines the elements on which it bears.”\(^ {118}\) By this standard, the study of power (or governmentality), to the extent that one studies the ‘basis of the relationship itself’, cannot be deduced to a study of ‘modern power’ alone. “With the idea of governmentality,” Foucault explained, “I am aiming at the totality of practices, by which one can constitute, define, organize, instrumentalize the strategies which individuals in their liberty can have in regard to each other.”\(^ {119}\) Accordingly, governmentality, broadly defined as *power*, has more connotations with Heideggerian ‘Being’ than with a way of ruling that is unique to the advanced liberal democracies of the West. To borrow Hubert Dreyfus’s paraphrasing: “[P]ower is that on the basis of which human beings already understand each other”.\(^ {120}\) Consequently, a study of governmentality is not only limited to studying western societies, but with *any society*, because as Foucault maintained,

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\(^{118}\) Foucault, *Society must be Defended*, p. 265 (italic added)

\(^{119}\) Foucault, ‘The ethics of care for the self as a practice of freedom’, p. 19

\(^{120}\) Dreyfus, ‘Being and Power’, p. 5
“a society without power relations can only be an abstraction.” The possibility of a variety of different governmentalities, in that they constitute different strategies through which individuals within their liberty can utilize in relation to each other, must therefore be considered.

Some would argue that Foucault’s main scholarly contribution is to the study of ‘modern power’, but if we take a step back and consider his last lectures, this picture changes quite a bit. The study of governmentality, or governmental rationalities, is supposed to include all modes of power; be they exclusively sovereign or extensively bio-political. In fact, a complex relationship exists between the different modes of power: “[G]overnmentality is never singular and smooth, but always entangled in the complexities of places and scalar dynamics.” At the end of his lectures on biopolitics or bio-power, Foucault commented on the existence of multiple governmentalities:

You can see that in the modern world, in the world we have known since the nineteenth century, a series of governmental rationalities overlap, lean on each other, challenge each other, and struggle with each other: art of government according to truth, art of government according to the rationality of the sovereign state, and art of government according to the rationality of economic agents, and more generally, according to the rationality of the governed themselves.

Indeed, Foucault had not intended a study of governmentality that would only include modern forms of power. However, his different studies – of the psychiatric hospital or the prison – can be read as a specific strategy for singling out different modes of power, making them visible and problematizable.

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121 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, pp. 222-223
When reading Foucault it is easy to get the idea that the individual is banished, without the ability to affect the outcome of the strategic relations in which he is situated; only nothingness lies beyond the structures of power. This is true of much of the reading of governmentality; there is no possibility for the individual, or rather political subject, as they are constituted in the analysis, to go beyond the hegemonic structure of power and knowledge.\footnote{Chandler, ‘Globalising Foucault’, pp. 139-142} The autonomous individual of modernity is a myth. Yet, when Foucault stated in his lectures on parrhésia that “true discourse [parrhésia] … underpins the process of governmentality”, the political subject again becomes significant to the study of governmentality.\footnote{Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, p. 184}

Indeed, there appears to be a subject, albeit a differentiated one from classical political thought. “It seems to me”, Foucault said in an interview, “that the question of an ethical subject does not have much of a place in contemporary political thought.”\footnote{Foucault, ‘The ethics of care for the self as a practice of freedom’, p. 14} For where the theories of political power were based on a subject with natural rights, for instance in Hobbes’s and Rousseau’s work, Foucault, as we saw in his studies of parrhésia, constitutes the political subject as defined by the relation of the self to itself and to others; that is, an ethical political subject. Foucault had commented on this essential difference in The Hermeneutics of the Subject lecture series:

If we take the question of power, of political power, situating it in the more general question of governmentality understood as a strategic field of power relations in the broadest and not merely political sense of the term, if we understand by governmentality a strategic field of power relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility, then I do not think that reflection on this notion of governmentality can avoid passing through, theoretically and practically, the element of a subject defined by the relationship of self to self.\footnote{Foucault, Michel (2005) The Hermeneutics of the Subject – Lectures at the Collège De France, 1981-82, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 252}

This aspect of the interrelation between parrhésia and governmentality is important, because by pointing to the different governmental rationalities at play, we can see that
in different contexts, while some actors are trying to promote reason, others are blocking this type of cooperation – effectively forcing the ‘power of rationality’ (i.e. governmentality in the narrow reading) to fail.\textsuperscript{128} To a large extent, because of the emphasis on the ‘governmentalization of the state’, governmentality has almost solely been studied as a superstructure that directs every little minutiae of the world. The global bio-political or neo-liberal order that directs and arranges life in accordance with goals of normalization and optimization.\textsuperscript{129} Indeed, one is not a \textit{nominalist} if one studies power as something that can be conceptualized as essential and universal. Therefore, if we are to grasp the mechanisms of power – the governmental rationalities at play when those who govern really govern in context such as international politics and statebuilding, be they international or local actors –, we must insist on these mechanisms as being an \textit{empirical question}: how does the actors in particular context constitute themselves as political ethical subject? If not, we will be scrutinizing, yet again, the straw-man of Classical Liberalism. Our ideas and institutions might be liberal, but the world in its totality is not.

\textsuperscript{129} For an example see, Reid, Julian (2010) ‘The Biopolitization of Humanitarianism: From Saving Bare Life to Securing the Biohuman in Post-interventionary Societies’, \textit{Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding} 4:4, pp. 391-411; or for a broader review, see Merlingen, ‘Foucault and World Politics’, pp. 181-196
A Short Genealogy of the Statebuilding Literature

This chapter will provide a short genealogy of the statebuilding literature, by outlining the different problematizations of international statebuilding: First, what are their basic questions – questions of politeia, dunesteta, or parrhésia? Second, how do they go about addressing these questions – as epistemé, techné, or phronésis? Third, what do they understand to be the main mechanism of power? Fourth, in so far that they provide solutions, what is the nature of these – institutional, concrete exercise of power, or an ethical practice of truth-telling? In short, I will sketchily assess the statebuilding literature statebuilding through the analytical framework developed in the previous chapter. Accordingly, it is not the merit of their analysis that is important here, but rather where their writing is placed within the analytical grid; what kind of questions and problems are they addressing – and how do they go about answering them?

The Liberalization Moment:

By the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama, encapsulating the prevailing Zeitgeist, argued that, with the fall of USSR, the last major alternative to liberal democracy had disappeared, and therefore described liberal democracy as “the final form of human government.”\(^{130}\) Mankind had reached the end of (its political) history. Now, all that was left to do was for the remaining non-liberal states of the world to re-constitute themselves as liberal democracies, by liberalising their economies and implement democratic elections. This, however, remains a solution that is only observant of problems of politeia by assuming that once elections are held, the people in power will govern

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similarly to the way Western democracies are governed. The adequate game of politics is here ensured by the right politeia.

What critics and followers alike seem to forget, is that, as a piece of academic work, Fukuyama was interest in making a philosophical and abstract argument about the “universal history of mankind” – in the tradition of Hegel and Marx –, rather than an empirical reality of liberal democracies.\textsuperscript{131} In that sense, he was interested in epistemé and politeia, which of course had disastrous effects once the thesis, became implemented as policy; without an eye to the particular one is ill suited to govern. Fukuyama was aware of this as he stated: “there [will] be no further progress in the development of underlying principles and institutions, because all of the really big questions [have] been settled.”\textsuperscript{132} If anything, his thesis was an end of the history of thought, a teleological reading of history based on the “logic of modern natural science.”\textsuperscript{133} Democracy, to Fukuyama, remains a universal – eternal and pure –, not a particular practice or an applicable ethic. So too is the “last man” – an abstract and universal being, a construct of modern science. In sum, Fukuyama does not move beyond epistemic activity concerning the politeia, which creates a sterile, yet insightful examination of the universal and eternal.

\textit{The Institutionalization Moment:}

While Fukuyama might be right in claiming that epistemic activity concerning questions of politeia have reached its endpoint, the questions of the concrete exercise of power and the endless constitution of ethical subjects (parrhésia) had definitely not. The next ‘moment’ of international statebuilding was to engage with at least one of

\textsuperscript{131} Fukuyama, Francis (1992) \textit{The End of History and The Last Man} (London: Penguin Books), p. 51
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid, p. xii
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid, p. xv
these – the concrete exercise of power, the particular and differential. Yet, the solution posed had not moved away from themes of epistemé and politeia. Thus, with a focus on the dilemmas and contradictions inherent in statebuilding, operating with the right ‘footprint’, or whether or not interventions had been ‘too liberal’, was highly influenced by the uncertainties of the particular and concrete. Nevertheless, not to the extent that the solutions were to be found in problems of dunesteia, the epistemic tradition having confidence in our institutional frameworks still stood strong. While there still is confidence in the scientific method, despair is understood to be inevitable. This moment constitutes what could be called ‘the mainstream’ of the statebuilding literature.

In his book *At War’s End*, Roland Paris argues that state-builders have underestimated the destabilizing effects of rapid liberalization. Reforms aimed at marketization – moving towards a market based economy and the exclusion of government intervention in the economy – and democratization – promoting periodic and genuine elections and constraints on the exercise of governmental power – had at the time little success in establishing a lasting peace. Paris, therefore, questioned the assumptions of the ‘liberal peace thesis’ – the confidence in democracy and free markets by themselves would ensure stability and progress was flawed. He argued that in societies emerging from war or instability, rapid democratization or liberalization would more likely result in renewed competition and violence; a certain aspect of how societies function seemed to have been forgotten. Drawing on thinkers such as Locke,

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134 Chandler, ‘The Uncritical Critique’, p. 149
Kant, and Adam Smith, Paris argues that successful liberalization depends on the existence of functioning state institutions. The key to successful statebuilding, according to Paris, is therefore to institutionalize before liberalizing.\textsuperscript{137}

In what I, here, call the ‘institutionalization moment’, there is confidence in the belief that the search for the right \textit{politeia} will provide state-builders with a ‘silver-bullet’.\textsuperscript{138} Accordingly, in \textit{Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States}, James Fearon and David Laitin hold that institutional strengthening and construction is the only liable way for “political and economic progress of any kind” to be sustained.\textsuperscript{139} Likewise, Stephen Krasner recommends, “shared sovereignty” as a solution to the most fragile states.\textsuperscript{140} Building effective institutional frameworks for governments was the only, yet inadequate, way of securing lasting peace and security. Yet, another big concern of the ‘institutionalization moment’ is to dissect the various problems associated with ‘transitional administration’ – the inevitable tension of institutional frame-works that arise when the UN takes on the role as international administrator.\textsuperscript{141} If not for sheer \textit{confidence} in our knowledge about \textit{politeia}, Simon Chesterman’s sentiment, “Fail Again, Fail Better”, nonetheless seems like a fitting description for this moment of statebuilding.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid, pp. 179-211

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The Contextual Moment:

By the late 2000s, the literature has paid even more interest in the contextual and the particular circumstances under which statebuilding efforts are taking place; the problems of *dunesteia* become ever more important and epistemic approaches are seen as insufficient to construct the right institutional frameworks (*politeia*).

Contending that “external actors are not necessarily more powerful than local actors,” Ole Jacob Sending argues for the redirection of the scholarly focus to the contextual and local. Much of the literature, according to Sending, “hold as exogenous […] the interest, behaviour, and power of local actors” constitute an explanatory problem.\(^{143}\) Sending pays much attention to how the institution of sovereignty shapes the relationship between international and local actors. Here, “the ends and means of external actors are undermined by sovereignty, whereas key features of how local actors operate – for example, through patrimonial rule aimed at the ‘politics of survival’ – are not.”\(^{144}\) What is more, international actors fail in large because they adopt an “Archimedean interpretation of the liberal peacebuilding model,” which is constituted by its “substantive elements (free markets, rule of law in keeping with human rights, democratic elections)”, which, in turn, are seen to be “non-negotiable principles that, in a sense, stand outside history and above politics.”\(^{145}\) Thus, attempting to reconcile the universal ideals with the particular contexts of the intervened countries spells disaster. The *de facto* exercise of political power and practice, associated with patronage, undermine the formal conditions and make them inefficient. Based on this analysis,


\(^{144}\) Sending, ‘The Effects of Peacebuilding’, p. 62

Sending recommends that researchers should shift their focus to the “relationship and interaction between external and local actors” so as to better capture the clash between “governing logics.” This can effectively be seen as shifting towards an analysis of problems of *dunesteia* with the means of a contextual understanding of the particular mechanisms of power (*technē*).

Beyond this broader concern for the concrete exercise of power that the local elites enjoy, there is, in the contextual moment of problematization, also an interest in promoting a particular *politeia*. For example, in his book *Post-Liberal Peace: The Infrapolitics of Peacebuilding*, Oliver P. Richmond argues that a focus on ‘the everyday’ aspects of politics and society – where liberal and local modes of being meet – as the key to the successful establishment of a ‘post liberal-peace’ which recognises and respects *difference*. Likewise, Roger Mac Ginty argues for, what he calls, a “hybrid peace” – a way of “bringing the local back in.” In contrast to state-centric, or *politeia*-centered, solutions, which he describe as “technocratic” or “formulaic” interventions – which underline their epistemic emphasis –, the ‘hybrid peace’ arises from “variable geometry, or the sense that all the actors, institutions and ideas that combine to create peacebuilding are in permanent flux.” Similarly, Richmond talks about “blind spots” of the liberal-peace framework “caused [by their] problem-solving and epistemic frameworks.”

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146 Sending, ‘The Effects of Peacebuilding’, p. 63
questions of politeia, dunesteia, the context, and the particular remain firmly at the centre of these studies.

The Nominalist Moment:

In the late 2000s, some authors began to reemphasise epistemé and politeia. Fukuyama in The Origin of Political Order continues an epistemological search for “the biological foundations of politics” as to better understand the problems of politeia.151 To Fukuyama, the key to building successful states is hidden in abstract principles. Similarly Paris, while arguing that there is no realistic alternative to a liberal peace, signals a return to a world governed by traditional Westphalian states.152 The institutional moment is echoed, but with a greater emphasis on epistemé and a particular problematization of politeia.

In sharp contrast, David Chandler, in his book International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-liberal Governance, problematizes statebuilding as a “paradigm of international statebuilding” – the shared way “through which the world is understood and engaged.”153 Inheriting Foucault’s methodological nominalism – “instead of deducing concrete phenomena from universals, […] [we should] start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals through the grid of these practices” –, Chandler is interested in, in particular, how the Western way of approaching international statebuilding is formed as a governmentality. In doing so, he aims to

“understand [statebuilding] from the viewpoint of its practitioners and advocates: to understand it within its own terms.”

According to Chandler, a Kuhnian “paradigm shift” has occurred in our way of understanding the international and the state: “there is a different governmental rationality which gives policies and practices a different set of goal and frames of judgement.” This new governmentality, or paradigm (if we insist on Chandler’s terminology), is part of the neo-liberalist – or rather the neo-institutionalist – understanding of society, which is particularly related to the economic theorist Douglas C. North. In scrutinizing this new ‘paradigm’, Chandler draws heavily on Foucault’s findings in *The Birth of Biopolitics*. Here, Foucault found that, where the problem of liberalism is ‘how the market effectually could be regulated’, “the problem of neo-liberalism is rather how the overall exercise of political power can be modelled on the principles of a market economy.” The goal was to make governments follow a certain rationality of governing, rather than attempting to implement policies themselves. The central point, Foucault argued, was that “the rationality of the governed must serve as the regulating principle for the rationality of government.”

Taking up Foucault’s point about neo-liberal rule, Chandler identifies three shifts in the practice of international statebuilding that constitute this new paradigm: First, ‘difference’ is privileged over ‘universality’ – it is expected that there is a difference between the non-liberal other and the West. Second, ‘preventive intervention’ is privileged over ‘autonomy’ – the autonomy of non-liberal states is problematized so as to legitimize preventive intervention. Third, ‘governance’ is privileged over ‘gov-

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154 Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, p. 3; Chandler, *International Statebuilding*, p. 3 and 13
155 Chandler, *International Statebuilding*, p. 70
156 Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, p. 131
157 Ibid, p. 312
ernment’—the paradigm of international statebuilding frames the process of engagement as a question of *how* to govern, rather than who should govern.\(^{158}\)

**Towards Phronésis and Parrhésia:**

To summarize, we can now say that from a moment of liberalization characterised by confidence in the *epistemé* and *politeia* of the Western liberal democracies the statebuilding literature then moved on to a moment of institutionalization characterised by an increased awareness of the problems of *dunesteia*. Yet confidence in the *epistemé* and *politeia* of the West was seen a holding the solution. From here, the literature moved on to contextualism and localism, characterised by paying even greater attention to the problems of *dunesteia*, and, in so far that a *polieia* was possible, was arguments were to be founded on *dunesteia* and *techné*, and not *epistemé*. Finally, we have arrived at a moment of nominalism characterised by a study of statebuilding focusing on *techné*, but in so far as it constitutes an *epistemé* for its practitioners.

Neither *phronésis* nor *parrhésia* have been mentioned in this short genealogy. The reason for this is straightforward: So far, the main focus of the statebuilding literature has been on instrumental-rationalities (*epistemé* and *techné*), rather than value-rationality (*phronésis*). Equally, the attention has been directed not towards the mechanisms of how the truth is told (*parrhésia*), but rather on institutional frameworks and the problems of *politeia*, and how power is exercised as well as the problems of *dunesteia*. Thus posing the question, *where are we going with the study and practice of statebuilding?* It would seem, based on the previous chapters, that we are going in the wrong direction. Neither the instrumental-rationalities, nor their enlightenment of the two bodies of problems will enable us to perform better in statebuilding activities.

\(^{158}\) Chandler, *International Statebuilding*, pp. 188-195
There is need for both *phronésis* and *parrhésia* to ensure successful statebuilding. Thus, the suggestion is that this is the direction in which the academic debate should move.

The debate has not been totally absent of concerns for *phronésis* and *parrhésia*, however, but has remained to its margins. In *International Statebuilding*, for example, Chandler was only interested in describing a paradigm; there were no ethical considerations involved. These are left to the reader.\(^{159}\) Yet, when he describes the relationship between the international interveners and the society intervened upon, a constitution of an ethical subject of the internationals relation to the self and others starts to form through the paradigm of international statebuilding:

> The people and the elites of states and societies intervened upon are assumed to be incapable of bearing policy responsibility but at the same time the framework of statebuilding intervention deny capacity or policy responsibility to the international interveners themselves.\(^{160}\)

In his earlier work *Empire in Denial*, Chandler characterised this relations as one between an “Lévinasian Other” and a “Western Self”, of which the former legitimises the irresponsibility of the latter.\(^{161}\) Indeed, this is far from the establishment of a *parrhésietic* pact between the two parties: the West clearly has an apologetic approach in the paradigm of international statebuilding, but what about the society in which statebuilding takes place? At the risk of having an *omnipotent* view of the West, we ought also to ask: how do the people in power in these countries form themselves as ethical subject in relation to self and others?

In fact, the term ‘paradigm’ is highly problematic. Here, Chandlers vocabulary seem to be conflictive, because it is unclear whether we can substitute Kuhn’s concept of ‘paradigm’ with Foucault’s ‘governmentality’. In this regard, is there such a thing

\(^{159}\) Ibid, p. 13
\(^{160}\) Ibid, p. 15
as a paradigm in the social science?\textsuperscript{162} In other words: To what extend is there something as a \textit{shared} way of understanding, and to what extent does the social world remain a \textit{pluriverse}? In this sense, Chandler’s ‘international paradigm of statebuilding’ constitutes only one out of many ‘governmental rationalities’. This much is clear when the changing meaning of sovereignty is studied.\textsuperscript{163} In so far Chandler has studied the contents of the governmentality of international statebuilding, what Foucault had called, a “study of the rationalization of governmental practice in the exercise of political sovereignty” – its \textit{expression}, in the practice of truth-telling, is still left unstudied; the \textit{experiences} of statebuilding are more than their \textit{rationalization}.\textsuperscript{164}

In the beginning of the \textit{Biopolitics} lectures, Foucault pointed out that his interest was not in the concrete exercise of power: the “art of government” did not refer so much to the way “governors really governed.”\textsuperscript{165} The focus was not on the problems of \textit{dunesteia}, but on the “reasoned way of governing”, or the way in which government was reflected upon; the study of “government’s consciousness of itself.”\textsuperscript{166} \textit{This is where we differ}. By proposing something akin to \textit{Phronetic Statebuilding}, I am interested in the frictions of politics, the concrete exercise of power, in explaining where statebuilding theorizing goes wrong and where it can find grounding again. I would argue that, although Foucault does not use it \textit{as such}, his “politics as experience” allows for an analysis of this kind: to comprehend how governmental rationalities clash, overlap, and utilize each other in the concrete exercise of power. This, as I see it, does not conflict in any sense with his case studies of madness, sexuality or of the prison. In comparison, I would argue that Foucault chose these examples specifi-

\textsuperscript{162} For a discussion on applicability of the term ‘paradigm’ is social science, see for example, Rorty, Richard (1979) \textit{Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)


\textsuperscript{164} Foucault, \textit{The Birth of Biopolitics}, p. 2

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid, p. 2

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid, p. 3
cally to illustrate how modern power worked rather than to demonstrate how the tensions between different governmental rationalities played out in specific and limited historical contexts, such as urban development projects, welfare policy formulations or international statebuilding projects.
**Conclusion:**

This dissertation started out with the assertion that the practices and academic debates on international statebuilding had stranded between those who confidence in modern sciences to solve the problems of statebuilding and those who expressed despair at the ever renewed failure of such practices. The problem was framed as a problem of *why*, despite the efforts of both theorizing and critiquing, does the lack of success persist in statebuilding efforts? Taking a meta-theoretical or philosophical approach, the aim of this dissertation was, not to construct yet another theory of statebuilding within the framework of the ‘liberal peace’, but instead to develop an ‘analytical framework’ for the study of power relations in international statebuilding. Methodologically, this was done along the axis of the two interrelated themes of *phronésis* and *parrhésia*.

The first chapter sought to outline the Aristotelian concept of *phronésis*. Defined as ‘practical wisdom’ on how to inquire and act on social problems in a particular context, Aristotle claimed that in contrast to the intellectual virtues of *epistemé* and *techné*, *phronésis* was the only reason capable of guiding action. Directed by the question of what is good and bad for man in particular circumstances, *phronésis* is a balancing act between the universal represented by *epistemé* and the particular exemplified by *techné*. To Aristotle, *phronésis* is closely linked to political science and therefore, for a society to flourish – to be governed in a good way – it needs *phronésis*. Taking up these ideas, Flyvbjerg argued that the social sciences, rather than following the epistemic ideal of the natural sciences, should turn toward *phronésis*. The task was not to formulate theories about the social world, but to clarify and mediate the risks and dangers inherent in society, to explore how things could be done differently and in doing so to not proclaim any final legitimacy on either questions or answers. On this basis it was argued that the way out of the ever-renewed
despair of the failure of scientific reasoning to solve the problem of statebuilding was to approach statebuilding with the ideals of phronetic social science. Rather than ‘silver bullets’, phronetic statebuilding would offer a dialogical stance in which phronésis is applied to an ever-changing social context.

The second chapter engaged with Foucault’s studies on parrhésia, or the practice of truth-telling – ‘a mode of being’ in which truth is tied to the ontological commitment of a subject uttering it. Foucault’s in his study of political parrhésia finds that the Greek secret of politics was that the search for the best regime is rooted in reconciling the principle of ‘ethical difference’ with the problem of government of others. ‘Ethical difference’ however, was not understood as simply excellent leaders or moral quality of individuals, but in the process of constituting the relation to the self on the basis of the difference of truth. That is, the truth as difference in reproaching others and the prevailing public opinion in speaking the truth. When studying the Greek problematization of political truth-telling, Foucault found that individuals took charge of the city via the discourse of truth. Political parrhésia was the exercise of free speech operating within an antagonistic structure of competing individuals, determining who was most fit to govern based on the subject’s constitutive relation to the self and the relation to others. The truth-telling of the political man is therefore designated by what Foucault termed “politics as experience” – dunesteia, rather than any organizational or institutional framework (politeia). In contrast to traditional political philosophy, which had favoured politeia as the answer to how societies function well, Foucault argued that it is the truth-telling (parrhésia) of the political man indexed to the concrete exercise of power (dunesteia) was what ensured the adequate game of politics.
In order to construct an analytical framework the third chapter dealt with two separate issues. First, the linages and synergies between *phronésis* and *parrhésia* were explored. It was found that a relation of mutual dependence between *phronésis* and *parrhésia* existed. On the one hand, for there to be good *parrhésia*, the *parrhesiastes* must posses *phronésis*. On the other hand, *parrhésia* is required to make use of *phronésis*. After this discovery, an analytical framework was constructed around three separate poles: *Phronésis/Parrhésia, Epistemé/Politeia*, and *Techné/Dunesteia*. Second, the chapter dealt with mechanisms of power in exploring the links between ‘governmentality’ and *parrhésia*. Whilst urging for a broad conception of governmentality, it was argued that, if we are to grasp the mechanisms of power, we must insist on framing it as an *empirical question*. How do these actors constitute themselves as political and ethical subject and what are the governmentalities at play when those who govern govern (be they international or local actors), in the context of statebuilding?

Looking through the lens of this new framework, the statebuilding literature was exposed as a short genealogy in chapter four, which revealing that the scholarly efforts, so far, has been a debate between two perspectives. On the one hand, those who have confidence in epistemic knowledge of institutional frameworks, and on the other, those who sought to explain the failures of statebuilding by reference to the contextual and local. As a way out of this stranded debate, it was argued that by turning towards *phronésis* and *parrhésia* international statebuilding would have better chances at success.

As far as phronetic social science goes, however, two questions have been omitted: Is statebuilding, with its inherent inadequacies, desirable? And, what if anything can we do about it? As for the latter question, no concrete recommendations have been developed, other than what this dissertation has suggested by advertising
the need for *parrhésia* and *phronésis* in international statebuilding. The former question however, remains more complex. Are we assessing the failures of statebuilding or is it the broader question of the whole enterprise of statebuilding, as a policy, which is (un)desirable? This is more difficult to answer, as we ought to avoid idiosyncratic conclusions. Whereas the prevailing frameworks for thinking of international ethics – cosmopolitanism and communitarianism – are based on *a priori* proclamations about ethics, the ‘ethical political’ in *parrhésia* is about how one constitutes oneself in relation to self and others; and the ‘ethical practical’ in *phronésis* is based in a priority of the particular. Thus both aspects remain largely *a posteriori* and thereby challenge the dominant frameworks of conceptualising international ethics.
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