Introduction.

The Acholi population, who constitute the area often referred to as Acholi-land in northern Uganda, have been the most affected by the war waged over the past two decades by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). ‘Victims have had lips, hands and fingers cut off [and] some have been forced to slaughter their own parents, or drink the blood of those they have murdered. Several massacres of civilians have occurred, and hundreds of thousands of people are living in displacement camps, where conditions are often appalling. The scale of suffering is immense’ (Allen, 2006: 1). A heavy presence of international development and aid organisations have taken root predominantly in Gulu town, where the enormous food tents of the World Food Program stand out against the blue sky and the surrounding red dirt, and where the highly secured compounds of UNICEF, WHO and ILO evokes curiosity and interest over what lies beyond the towering walls and bolted entrance gates. During my visits to northern Uganda in 2006, the intensity of development organisations and their projects were not the only aspect of the landscape that caught my attention, the existence of a cultural institute, the Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA), home to the ‘Paramount Chief’ of Acholi also provoked curiosity. Its ‘re-establishment’ in 2000 with the support of international aid, and its stated objectives to ‘preserve Acholi culture’ in conjunction with achieving ‘gender mainstreaming’ (Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2005) indicated that its position as a ‘representative’ of the Acholi people (Justice and Reconciliation Project, 2007: 4) was inherently problematic.

In the light of the ‘failure of modern leadership’ in northern Uganda, the ‘uncritical enthusiasm for the revival of traditional leadership’ (Dolan, 2006b: 18) and the dominating presence of development organisations, the focus of this paper is found within the problematic of governance in northern Uganda. The driving question that will seek to be answered in response to the problematic asks to what extent, with what practices and to what effect development can be seen to function as an instrument of governance in northern Uganda. It is hoped that through the critique of development the systematic complexities that have brought KKA into being and maintain its increasing status as the voice of the Acholi, in the midst of a civil conflict, will be illuminated.
For many people, understanding African realities rests within the discipline of African Studies or the Development Studies industry, where empirical data, political science and development economics prevail. However, numerous authors (Escobar, 1984-1985; Abrahamsen, 2004; Simon and Narman 2004; Sharp and Briggs, 2006; Simon, 2006; Sylvester, 2006) have engaged in arguments for the use of postcolonial critiques as a means of providing ‘nuanced analyses of individual countries, agencies or projects and [to] highlight the interplay between metatheories and broad ideologies, particular discourses and concrete contextual applications’ (Simon, 2004: 23). Such valuable engagements by authors like Ferguson (1994), the contributors to Crush (1995), Moore (2000), Mitchell (2002) and Gould (2005) act to counter the widespread criticism which contends that ‘postcolonialists have great difficulty in embracing the concrete development aspirations of the poor in practice, despite their theoretical sophistication’ (Simon, 2004: 21). Indeed Sylvester agrees that finding useful intersections of development studies, as an applied social science, and postcolonial studies, as a non-applied field and associated with the humanities, ‘can be a challenge’ (2006: 66) particularly in the midst of ‘ongoing mistrust and exclusivity which seems to characterise the relationships between development studies and postcolonialism’ (Sharp and Briggs, 2006: 6). This paper, however, by offering a postcolonial critique of development and by engaging with context specific empirical material hopes to contribute to bridging this schism.

Undertaking the study within the rubric of postcolonialism, which is said to provide ‘theoretical and conceptual resources of particular pertinence to contemporary African politics,’ will enable the analysis to attend to the ‘relationship between power and knowledge-practices and institutions’ (Abrahamsen, 2003: 210) within the context of development in northern Uganda. One such conceptual resource relates to the understanding of development as a discourse, ‘as a historical construct that provides a space in which poor countries are known, specified, and intervened upon’ (Escobar, 1995: 45). Understanding development as a discourse allows the critique to go beyond the perception of development as a preordained coherent entity, and view it rather as constituted by relations of power that are ‘linked to knowledge in a way that through the politics of representation’ reveals a ‘particular way of seeing and acting upon the world that reflect not only the conditions they describe but also the constellations of social, economic and political forces at the time of their emergence’ (Abrahamsen, 2003: 203).
Speaking of development in terms of a system of relations or as a machine ‘that no one owns’ (Foucault, 1980: 157) reflects the understanding the critique takes towards power. Remaining within Foucault’s conceptualisations of discourse, power, knowledge and the subject, ‘power is no longer substantially identified with an individual who possess or exercises it by right of birth’ (ibid), rather ‘power exists only as exercised by some on others [and] only when it is put into action’ (Foucault, 1994a: 340). Importantly, also, this means that power is ‘not the renunciation of freedom,’ but in contrast is ‘exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are “free”’ (ibid, 340 anad 342). Within development, however, it can be observed acutely that within the field of power relations, despite freedom being an important element, ‘everyone doesn’t occupy the same position; certain positions perponderate and permit an effect of supremacy to be produced’ (Foucault, 1980: 157). The impact of development in northern Uganda thus will be shown to directly rely on and at the same time reconstitute relations of power with the effect of altering fields of possibilties.

Escobar has critiqued development with regards to its functioning as an ‘apparatus [that] came into existence roughly in the period 1945 to 1955 and has...successfully deployed a regime of government over the Third World, a “space for ‘subject peoples’” that ensures certain control over it’ (1995: 9). There has been a growing literature within poststructural critiques of development that have been moving towards a governance-focus and as such adopting Foucaults conceptualisation of power. Sending and Neumann have subsequently highlighted the importance of considering ‘how different types of actors and organisations fit into and correspond to a more general rationality of government’ (2006: 667) that effects the behaviour of, for example, NGO’s which can be seen to have ‘developed an impressive capacity for decoding the language of the project offers on hand’ and have learnt ‘to speak the global language of poverty and development, or at least the dialect taught by the latest development expert’ (De Hert, 2004: 877). Other authors, such as O’Malley (1996), Duffield (2001, 2007), Rankin (2001) and Abrahamsen (2001, 2004) to name a few, have engaged in critiques of development which through their focus on its mechanisms and technologies, substantiates the argument contending that ‘the networks of international aid are part of an emerging system of global governance’ (Duffield, 2001: 310).
In order for this paper to offer a postcolonial critique of development, with the governance of northern Uganda as the central problematic, the analysis will utilise the approach of governmentality that takes on a ‘broader understanding of the concept of government by including state and non-state actors as involved in government relationships’ (Foucault, in Rojas, 2004: 99). By mobilising governmentality the paper will be able to analyse development ‘as a domain of strategic relations focusing on the behaviour of the other or others, and employing various procedures and techniques according to the case, the institutional frameworks, social groups, and historical periods in which they develop’ (Foucault, 1994b: 88).

The three chapters of the paper will present the critique of development in northern Uganda by commencing with an exploration of how development can be viewed as functioning with a distinct governmental strategy. The Foucauldian conceptualisation of governmentality will be explicated, illustrating its socio-historical constitution within western European society and its relevance as an analytical tool for critiques of development. The chapter will discuss how the emerging discourses of good governance and sustainable development in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s instigated the assemblage of a regime of practices that gravitated around a strategy of empowerment. Development within northern Uganda can be seen as functioning through specific practices that constitute a regime of empowerment and which will be shown to be seeking the revivial of traditional leaders in order to reach a multitude of goals. An analytics of government will be mobilised in order to guide the analysis and enable the critique to illuminate fields of visibilities, forms of knowledge, technologies of government and forms of identity (Dean, 1999), and thus offer an insightful account of how the revival of traditional leaders in northern Uganda functions as an extension of government within development. The final chapter will draw upon the case study as it seeks to broaden the critique of development and embark on an exploration of how the governmentalisation of development, which relies inherently upon disciplinary practices of normalisation, impacts practices of freedom and possibilities of resistance.

The predominant intention of the critique is to shed light upon the ‘political technologies’ that intend to give shape to the reality of northern Uganda (Escobar, 1984-1985: 384) and by doing so impinge upon the freedom of those identified as traditional leaders, through forms of knowledge and power.
Chapter one.

Governmentality and Development.

‘Where states have been divided by ethnic conflict, have collapsed or failed internally, there is a role for global governance, in the shape of international agencies, to intervene to encourage (if not impose) norms and mechanisms that might prevent conflict from re-emerging or escalating further’ (Cochrane and Duffy, 2003: 218).

Practices within development seek the ‘protection and betterment’ (Duffield, 2007: 216) of billions of people across the world. Through projects that seek to build infrastructure, programmes to establish micro-credit groups or through support for peace and reconciliation initiatives, transformative and life changing effects incur for those deemed ‘beneficiaries’ of such action. Although in the ‘development encounter’ transformation may occur at all levels, it is widely accepted that the most significant are at the level of the targeted population and individual. Taking place within the milieu of rhetoric promising partnerships and participation, healthier lives and cultural freedoms, development projects and programmes often fall short of these resounding notions. Existing in relation to particular forms of knowledge and as such imbued with relations of power, pursuing goals of peace and security in northern Uganda, for example, becomes inherently problematic. As Rankin has demonstrated, through her critique of developments pursuit for greater economic and political freedom for women in India, there is a broader functioning ‘governmental strategy’ behind the micro credit campaign that claims to allow ‘for tens of millions of people to free themselves and their families from the vicious cycle of poverty’ (Rankin, 2006: 19). In both locales the political force, upon which the strategy relies, produces particular forms of subjectivity; in northern Uganda we can see the production of traditional leaders as responsible facilitators of development subprojects, and in India the ‘rational economic women’ as ‘responsible agent’ of her own well being (Rankin, 2006: 20). Interestingly

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1 I adopt this term ‘development encounter’ in order to differentiate my study from other poststructuralist work that often ignores the agency of local elites and target populations (Nustad, 2001: 485), which then implies a development intervention or imposition. In order for ambiguity and resistance to be accounted for within this study I therefore view development as an ‘encounter.’
the crucial mechanism for the political force is the technology of empowerment through which each subject becomes able to be directed, guided and thus governed. This paradox, containing the will to empower, at the moment fields of possibilities and limitations to freedom are drawn becomes a theme throughout this paper. Development is shown to govern through the very capacities of its subjects, as governmentality. This Foucauldian notion will be discussed imminently with reference to development in the hope of not only giving clarity to its meanings but also showing how development has come to be viewed in such terms. The chapter will include discussions of empowerment, here identified as a specific regime of practices within development. This will then lead into the case study in the subsequent chapter which will hone in on the specific practices of this regime in northern Uganda.

The act of government, as the exercise of power over a territory with the maintenance of the sovereign as its aim, differs from the art of government as political science, which has as its target and objective the welfare of the population (Foucault, 1991: 100). This art of government, emerging in sixteenth century western Europe, can be seen to employ tactics and techniques in order to create the appropriate disposition of things to ‘lead to an end that is “convenient” for each of the things that are to be governed’ (La Perriere quoted in Foucault, 1994a: 211). Statistics became the technique that revolutionised this form of governing, as the ‘state of government...no longer became defined by its territory, but by a mass: the mass of the population...with the territory...only in a sense as one of its components’ (Foucault, 1994a: 221). Irreducible to the model of the family and as the new focus of the economy ‘with its own regularities’ (Foucault, 2007: 104), the population, through statistics, became quantifiable, knowable, able to be acted upon and thus manageable. Since the eighteenth century the population has become a given entity and field of intervention, with ‘political economy as both a science and a technique of intervention’ (Foucault, 2007: 108). Although disciplinary institutions had been necessary for the organisation of the population prior to the emergence of this form of government, and became vital as the desire grew to manage the population beyond the level of a collective mass (Foucault, 2007: 197), still this transformation from the state of justice to the administrative state was the process that indicated the preminance of a new form of power: governmentality (ibid, 1994a: 220, 221). Also described as,
‘an ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit very complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle forms of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security’ (ibid).

In a triangular relationship with sovereign and disciplinary power then, governmentality becomes the description of a mode of power relations made possible through a heterogenous ensemble, as described above. However, the analytical process Foucault applied to understanding specifically the transformations of the modern state, have also been applied elsewhere when ‘investigating the practices of governing as an empirical phenomenon... [and] the rationality characteristic of the systematic thinking, reflection and knowledge that is integral to different modes of governing’ (Sending and Neumann, 2006: 657). This paper seeks to adopt such an approach where the paper will utilise governmentality as a lens through which to attend to the practices, understood simply as ‘fairly coherent sets of ways of going about doing things’ (Dean, 1999: 21), within the ensemble of development. By focusing on practices it is hoped that the study will challenge commonly held perceptions of development as a coherent entity, and affirm development as constituted by ‘divisions and distributions that are constructed, assembled, contested and transformed from multiple and heterogenous elements,’ (Dean, 1999: 26). In addition, the practices of development will be treated, not as ‘manifestations of a fundamental contradiction’ (Dean, 1999: 21), but rather as social, political and historical products of conditionality. It will be a question of analysing a “regime of practices,”

‘practices being understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken-for-granted meet and interconnect. To analyse “regimes of practices” means to analyse programs of conduct that have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done...and codifying effects regarding what is to be known’ (Foucault, 1994a: 225).

As practices of empowerment have been critiqued by many authors (Mohan and Stokke, 2000., Mercer, 2003., Herdt and Bastiaensen, 2003) as having altering and governing effects, through prescriptive and codifying techniques, this paper will view empowerment as a‘relatively stable field of correlation of visibilities, mentalities, technologies and agencies’ (Dean, 1999: 27). It
will view empowerment as a regime of practices and forming the object of the analytics of government in chapter two’s case study. Firstly, however, this chapter will turn to discuss the governmenalisation of development to enable the case study to be more effectively situated.

It has been said that ‘the processes and structures that underpin the modern state form, being the empirical basis of governmentality, [has] many parallels to the development sector’ (Lie, 2005: 15). Just as the survival of the state is understood as resting on its governmenalisation (Foucault, 1994a: 221) so too it could be said that development owes its latest reinvention and survival tactic to governmenalisation. The ‘tactics of government’ within development are ‘what make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competances...[of development] and what is not’ (Foucault, 1994a: 221). The World Bank plays a significant role in defining what these tactics will be and in the following address given by James Wolfenshon, then president of the World Bank, these become glaringly apparent. It is worth quoting a portion of this address:

‘It will take a willingness to reform systems of government, regulations, and institutions; it will take a strong support for building capacity. It will take having police forces that are no longer seen as agents of oppression rather than protection and security. It will take strong local institutions to bring government closer to the poor. It will take empowering local people to design and implement their own programs...Governance and capacity are key. With poverty reduction front and centre of our agenda, our work at the rockface must be governance, institutions, and capacity building’ (1999: 10, own emphasis).

Reading this extract, the average reader may find expressions such as ‘capacity building’ and ‘empowerment’ very familiar and reading a development document attending to issues of security may seem quite natural. Such rhetoric and parlance is of course broadcast beyond the board of governors at the World Bank and can be heard and read on any major development organisation’s advertisement and website. It can even be seen to have penetrated into the objectives of a local cultural institution in northern Uganda, of which will become more familiar throughout the case study. Terms such as capacity building, participation, empowerment,
transparancy and accountability litter the pages of its Strategic Plan 2005-2007. However, a genealogical approach to development highlights that notions of capacity building, partnerships, empowerment, and the redefining of ‘security as a development problem’ (Duffield, 2001:312) are not natural or neutral components of development but rather emerged as a result of the particular politico-economic climate in the late eighties and early nineties. Some of the events that contributed to the changes, and which have specific relevance to understanding development in northern Uganda, include the development impasse; caused by widespread disillusionment at the failure of Structural Adjustment Programs, the dramatic increase of intra-state conflict on the African continent and the growing critiques of development that were pushing for an alternative approach if not an overhaul of development. As Schuurman has written, ‘new discourses were developed according to an interplay of widely varying factors’ (1993: 204) one of which, the good governance discourse, emerged in the World Bank reports Sub-Saharan Africa, From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (1989) and Governance and Development (1992). Good governance, or democracy, was heralded as the answer to the ‘root cause of Africa’s development predicament’ and was seen as not only ‘desirable from a human rights perspective, but a necessary precondition for sustainable economic growth and prosperity’ (Abrahamsen, 2001: 25).

This new paradigm of good governance (Abrahamsen, 2001) within development signalled what seemed to be a success for the alternative development advocates who had been challenging the orthodox or mainstream approach to development, criticising it for being ‘elite driven or top-down...reliant on the application of modern science and technology, and [with] “expert knowledge” held outside of the society to which it was to be applied’ (Thomas, 2000: 34). This was about to change during the 1990’s, although not to the degree or with the effects many of the World Bank critics had hoped. Although promises of partnership and participation within the good governace discourse offered hope for beneficiary countries to have a say in policy development and implementation, at the same time the constructed ‘regimes of truth’ and representational practices promoted a particular ‘vision of development and democracy, while simultaneously marginalising alternative interpretations’ (Abrahamsen, 2001: 23). For the present study, the most significant shift in development embodied in the good governance discourse was the move towards viewing indigenous African values and institutions as possible

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2 This document is unpublished and was acquired from the cultural institute Ker Kwaro Acholi during the author’s fieldwork in northern Uganda during 2006.
supports of development (World Bank, 1989: 60) rather than as impediments to be discarded. ‘Each country’ the World Bank asserted ‘has to devise institutions which are consonant with its social values’ (World Bank, 1989: 60) so that development can be ‘rooted firmly in the societies concerned’ (World Bank, 1992: 12) and therefore change could become more effective and sustainable.

With democratisation increasingly becoming the logic of development and with its apparatus looking to utilise traditional values and institutions it is not suprising a host of authors (Dubios, 1991, O’Malley, 1996, Hendrie, 1997, Rankin, 2001, Thomas, 2001, Mercer, 2003, Abrahamsen, 2004, Sending and Neumann, 2006, Duffield, 2007) although vary in focus and emphasis, have produced critiques within the governmentality literature with the effect of illustrating how non-state actors carry out global-governance functions. A focus of many such studies have been towards partnerships as ‘techniques of cooperation and inclusion...that invoke specific technologies of global liberal governance which help produce modern, self-disciplined citizens and states that can be trusted to govern themselves according to liberal democratic norms’ (Abrahamsen, 2004: 1454). These technologies of agency and citizenship (Dean, 1999 and Cruikshank, 1999), that function as part of the practices of partnership, have been said to subjectivise indigenous people (amongst others) in order to transform their status (Dean, 1999 168) and bring them into a ‘contract of empowerment and normalisation’ (Mercer, 2003: 746). Concern for these effects have led Mercer (2003: 748) to call for closer attention to be payed to ‘exactly which NGO’s are empowered through the practice of partnership,’ and leads this paper to highlight in the case study the cultural institute of Ker Kwaro Acholi, in northern Uganda, as effect and instrument of the practices of empowerment.

As this chapter is addressing the governmentalisation of development, the merging of development and security in the past few decades becomes significant (Duffield, 2007, Abrahamsen, 2001, 2005). The emerging space of security-development has been seen to increase practices of government through techniques of partnership, that function within the ‘increased penetration of development organisations’ into ‘ineffective’ and ‘effective’ states (Duffield, 2007: 223). Here, Duffield writes, ‘populations are being reterritorialised through multiagency programmes’ or being governed through the ‘anarchic strategic complexes using
technologies of coherence...dispositions and administrative arrangements’ in the ‘interests of peace and stability’ (2007: 223) and to fulfill ‘a raft of different agendas’ (Waddell, 2006: 549).

As poverty has been represented as a global threat, its eradication is being sought through multiagency programmes, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy, within which security has been redefined as a development problem (Duffield, 2001: 312). Uganda has developed its Poverty Eradication Action Plan within this framework, although the ‘new conditionality’ attached has ‘established a moral leverage point via which non-state actors- self-proclaimed representatives of ‘civil society’- can justify their access to the epistemic community that frames public policy’ (Gould, 2005). Also, because the World Bank ‘indirectly defines policy and directly chooses which of the government policies to support’ (Lie, 2005: 15) it is in a position to alter conduct and influence decisions at the level of the local. As Duffield puts it, it enables the getting in the head to stay the hand (Duffield, 2001: 312).

Arguably, the present conditions of development signal increased ‘prospects of global management’ and the ‘reassertion of Western leadership’ (Darby, 2004: 8) despite its moves towards being ‘more pluralistic and less oppressive’ (Escobar, 1984: 439). It seems that, despite a ‘growing number of social movements’ using ‘local knowledge to shift the existing [development] architecture of power’ (ibid), continuities remain between ‘forms of colonial rule and...international development cooperation’, marking unequal power relations ‘between the west and the rest; first and third worlds’ (Kothari, 2006: 238). However, what can be seen as characteristic of the new era of development, causing a distinction from previous enterprises, is the rationality of liberalism. This principle of governmental reason ‘pegs the rationality of government, of the exercise of political power, to the freedom and interested rationality of the governed themselves’ (Foucault, 1991: 139). So rather than a ‘cultural invasion’ where ‘the invaders penetrate the cultural context of another group, and ignoring the potential of the latter they impose their own view of the world’ and ‘inhabiting the creativity of the invaded by curbing their expression’ (Friere, quoted in Leftwich 2000: 64), development ‘restructures the behaviour and practices of individuals and populations’ (Dubois, 1991: 10) by harnessing the potential of agency. This process of harnessing an individuals agency potentials can be seen to occur through the practices of empowerment, and makes empowerment the ‘normative correlate of the explanatory focus on agency’ (Dean, 1999: 67).
As the premise of empowerment rests on the potential for agency of the free subject, what must become visible for this field of practices to come into being is knowledge about ‘the local’ (Dean, 1999: 30). Where empowerment becomes the technique of governance within development, light is recast to fall upon the individual in their local and cultural setting and so make known not only who is to be empowered and governed, but in what ways. Through participatory practices of empowerment, that rely less on ‘outside agents,’ this process is enabled; although carries the dangerous effects of ‘valorsing local knowledge’ (Mohan and Stokke, 2000: 252). Mohan and Stokkes contend that the codifying of local knowledge privilages ‘certain interpretations of local needs’ and leaves untouched the wider processes, leading them to call for the examination of the ‘political use of the local by various actors’ (ibid: 254). Cruikshank also shares such concerns and has pointed to how the ‘will to empower,’ so prevalent in contemporary development practice, may be well intentioned but essentially is a ‘strategy for constituting and regulating the political subjectivities of the “empowered”’, and as a power relationship deserves careful scrutiny (1999: 68, 69). Indeed such analyses show how, with ‘the project donors being the “prime movers” in the aid chain,’ it is most likely that the poor will respond by adapting their needs to the supply on offer leading to “induced” rather than “real” local demand (De Hert and Bastiaensen, 2004: 877). In the same vein Schuurman has written that in order for ‘grassroots organisations in the South’ to keep the financial resources flowing ‘trigger-words’ are applied in project proposals, leading to ‘an internalisation of the donors discourse without either party realising it’ (Schuurman, 1993: 204). As will be seen in the case study of northern Uganda, the distorted effects of participatory practices show a ‘clear tendency towards over-representation by the better connected- and by definition less poor- local people’ (De Hert and Bastiaensen, 2004: 877, 878).

Increasingly, through practices of empowerment development is becoming able to influence behaviour and produce agents of change through the process of ‘governing at a distance’ (Rose, 1999). Interestingly, this process has been mobilised through the very critiques that question its capabilities of ‘doing harm as well as good’ (Duffield, 2001: 317). For it is within the process of the critique that aid agencies and NGO’s are brought into the ‘orbit of central calculation,’ (ibid) to be monitored, surveyed and subsequently acted upon. Performance measures through government audits are able to monitor conduct, acting in a surveillance capacity, ‘transforming that which is to be governed’ (Rose, 1999: 154) and ‘reshaping in their
own image that which it is to monitor’ (Abrahamsen, 2004: 1463). It can be seen then that empowerment constitutes the population and is the process that forms a systematic way of thinking about the population, bringing into being the ‘objectives to be sought’ (Dean, 1999: 67), and thus contributing to the governmentalisation of development. The overall objective being the ‘transition from powerlessness to full citizenship, from subjection to subjectivity’ (Cruikshank, 1999: 70). The case study will highlight how this process is playing out in Acholi-land, northern Uganda, where empowerment practices of capacity building and sensitisation are contributing to the production of new subjectivities amongst traditional leaders.

Although ‘the idea of empowering the disenfranchised, the marginal and the poor has had extremely positive connotations in recent political thought and action...and since the 1960’s [has been] compelling thinkers, activists and reformers in liberal-democratic countries’ (Dean, 1999: 67), Darby is correct to warn that ‘if the images projected look to the future, they also resonate with the past’ (2004: 8). Aiming to give a voice to the voiceless through participatory empowerment seems not to alter ‘power relationships in favour of the previously/still colonised,’ rather it has proven to be a means of readjustment that at its ‘very birth intended to sustain imperial power’ (Cooke, 2003: 59). The interesting critique by Cooke (2003) draws on the influential document The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1965) to illustrate the continuities and ties present day claims of a ‘new’ development architecture has with its not so distant past. Here the author of The Dual Mandate, Lord Lugard, is shown to have argued that co-option of native institutions and the positioning of the native chiefs within the apparatus of the administration was part of the necessary process of indirect colonial rule (Cooke, 2003: 49).

The current practices of reviving the cultural institute Ker Kwaro Acholi, in northern Uganda, and building the capacities of its traditional leaders, resonates with not only Lugard’s beliefs but also with the following extract taken from Africa View, published in 1931;

‘Indirect rule, in fact, means the employment of the existing institutions of the country for all possible purposes to which they are adequate, their general molding...by central government and of the guidance given by administrative officers, into channels of progressive change, and the encouragement within the widest limits of local traditions, local pride and local initiative, and so of the greatest possible freedom and variety of local development within the territory’ (Huxley, 1931: 103)
Although in the above extract indirect rule can be seen as being championed as that which may increase possibilities of freedom, Cooke has contended that it is underpinned by the belief that ‘it is the genius of our race to...govern’ (Lugard, 1965: 618, 619), and thus by racism (Cooke, 2003: 49). It may not be a surprise therefore that the effects of employing, molding and guiding traditional institutions and, in addition, inventing chiefs with administrative powers, has led to forms of decentralised despotism (Mamdani, 1996: 62). The invention of the paramount chief in Acholi-land (Allen, 2006) thus leads to questions pertaining to the possibilities of freedom of the Acholi people and therefore such concerns will be addressed in chapter three.

To summarise, this chapter has sought to clarify the Foucauldian understanding of governmentality, by first historically situating its emergence as a response to the problematic of population management predominantly in eighteenth century western Europe. Secondly, it was emphasised that, with population as its target, governmentality works as a form of power through an ensemble of institutions, procedures, calculations and tactics in order to bring about the desired conduct of those it governs for a multitude of goals. As this paper is concerned with the discourse of development, this chapter also sought to illustrate how developments ‘new’ architecture can be understood as an instrument of governance, as governmentality. Empowerment, discussed as a regime of practices, was shown to have emerged as a technique of development through the discourses of good governance and sustainable development. Functioning through these discourses, and being driven by a will to empower, the regime of empowerment was also shown to be part of a normative project of agency production.

The development-security nexus was discussed in order to situate the Poverty Reduction Strategy, that was shown to function as a liberal technology of security within development. The progression in development towards participatory measures and away from top-heavy policies was highlighted in the chapter in order to, not only illustrate the practices which characterise development as an instrument of governance, but also to draw continuities with colonial practices. This was so that emphasis could be placed on the maintenance of unequal relations of power between western institutions and the ‘beneficiaries’ of development. As will become evident from the subsequent case study, practices of empowerment within development in northern Uganda can be seen to be acting upon the population of Acholi to alter anew the balance of power, through support for peace processes and attempts to reconstruct the society.
(Duffield, 2007: 75). The approach adopted for the immanent analysis will enable the illumination of particular practices of empowerment, that I would argue are functioning to increase the capability of development to govern the Acholi population at a distance.
Chapter two.

Illuminating practices of empowerment in Acholi-land, northern Uganda.

‘In the apparatus of security... what is involved is precisely not taking either the point of view of what is prevented or the point of view of what is obligatory, but standing back sufficiently so that one can grasp the point at which things are taking place, whether or not they are desirable. This means trying to grasp them at the level of their nature, or let’s say...at the level of their effective reality’ (Foucault, 2007: 47).

As the twentieth century came to a close and the dawn of the new millennium cast its first light, northern Uganda continued to be ravaged by civil conflict. The accumulation of failed military insurgencies, failed peace talks and the mass movement of people into the Government established Internally Displaced People camps resulted in Jan Egeland, then UN’s under-secretary for humanitarian affairs, declaring northern Uganda ‘the biggest neglected humanitarian emergency in the world’ (Blair, 2004). In this climate of uncertainty and fear the Acholi witnessed the ‘revival’ of the ‘cultural institute’ Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA) (Rwot Acana II, 2005: 1). Since its ‘re-establishment’ in 1995 under the Government constitution, Articles 33 (6), 37, 178 and 246, that promoted culture for development, the KKA’s ‘revival’ in 2000 as a direct result of international support, has been ‘working hard to revive the Acholi culture as one of the ways to bring peace, promote harmonious relationships and sustainable development for the Acholi people’ (Rwot Acana II, 2005: 1).

Prior to embarking on the critique within this chapter a brief paragraph stipulating the institutional structure of KKA will commence, as this will allow for greater ease and clarity within the subsequent discussion. It must be noted, however, that the following synopsis of KKA is not claiming to be expressing historical fact, as the problematic of this paper is questioning the very nature of how the KKA has become constituted through the production of knowledge about Acholi culture and tradition.
The elected Paramount Chief, Rwot David Onen Acana II, heads the institution of KKA which is comprised of fifty traditional leaders, or Rwodi (Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2005: 3). The Rwodi, or Rwot in the singular, is the name given to male elders or ‘traditional chiefs,’ whilst female elders are known as Mego (Allen, 2006: 133, Baines, 2005: II). More specifically, in the glossary of a study conducted by the Justice and Reconciliation Project, based at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, the Rwot-Kalam or “men of the pen” refers to ‘educated men who replaced the Rwodi-mo under colonial administration’ and the Rwot-Mo (Rwodi-Mo pl.) refers to the hereditary, anointed Chief(s) in Acholi-land, responsible for political leadership at clan level’ (Liu Institute for Global Affairs, 2005: 144).

Having discussed in chapter one how development has moved towards alternative practices that are harnessing local agencies for development objectives, this chapter seeks to offer an empirical insight into this process unfolding in northern Uganda. For example, in 2003 the World Bank sought to implement its Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) upon two premises, firstly, ‘that development interventions would increase the potential for improves long term security’ (Robinson, 2007: 256) and secondly, ‘that communities are the best identifiers of their own needs’ (ibid: 270). This was also built upon the acknowledgment that ‘the limitations of a highly centralised top-down approach and central disbursement of resources...[and] the need to strengthen the capacity of local government [and] NGO’s...at an early stage of implementation’ (ibid: 258).

The practices that can be identified through the implementation of NUSAF, that constitute a regime of empowerment will become part of the following analysis. By mobilising an analytics of government, the critique will focus on empowerment as a regime of practices and seek to shed light on how, with what practices, is development governing the space of northern Uganda and thus working through the subjectivity of local organisations like KKA to achieve a multitude of goals.

The structure of the critique will draw on two ‘events’; firstly, the production of research by Dennis Pain and ACORD, and secondly, the revival of KKA. Both of these moments constitute, and are a result of, practices within the regime of empowerment. As the analytics of governement seeks to shed light on how the regime of practices of empowerment came into being and are maintained, ‘four, different, reciprically conditioning, yet relatively autonomous’ (Dean, 1999:
30) axes will guide the analysis, enabling the critique to address, firstly, *fields of visibilities*, in other words that which casts light upon northern Uganda in such a way that enables judgements to be made upon who and what should be governed? Secondly, *forms of knowledge*, that have informed and enabled the activity of governing through the regime of empowerment (Dean, 1999: 31). Thirdly, the axis of *technologies of government* will allow the analysis to begin to illustrate how particular programmes, that are attached to the regime of empowerment, condition governance and impose limits of possibilities (Dean, 1999: 31). Lastly, the practices of empowerment that function through *forms of identities* will give space for the analysis to discuss the strategic logic of the regime of empowerment, which is something that is distinct from ‘the programmes that attempt to invest them with particular purposes’ (Dean, 1999: 22).

It is intended that the critique will offer an interesting example of how development functions, through the regime of empowerment, as an instrument of governance in northern Uganda. Although the scope of this paper does not allow for a fully comprehensive critique of the regime of empowerment in northern Uganda, by focusing on the revival of traditional leadership, I seek to offer a relevant insight that traces links and illuminates the processes of governmentality.

**Publication of Dennis Pain’s report and the findings of ACORD.**

During the 1990’s the LRA’s activities were becoming heavily violent and targeted towards the Acholi people in the form of ‘mutilations and maiming, including the cutting of lips and noses and the use of padlocks to lock the mouths of people they thought might report them to the authorities’ (Dolan, 2000b: 5). The population of Acholi-land were becoming increasingly vulnerable to being abducted, raped, violated and murdered on a daily basis, with over 20,000 children reportedly being ‘abducted and forced into fighting and sexual slavery’ (Baines, 2005: iv). As the forming of the LRA is constitutive of past events dating back to at least the colonial period, by 1991 President Museveni (head of state since 1986) had become ‘irritated by the continuing insurgency’ and thus a four month, violent and brutal military operation, called Operation North, was instigated (Allen, 2006: 47). By 1996 the situation was worsening and so, with a failed military insurgency, failed peace talks in 1994 and a series of several large scale

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3 For a detailed and interesting account of Uganda’s history regarding war in northern Uganda see Behrend, H. (1999).
massacres, the Government adopted a strategy of ‘protected villages’, into which ‘the majority of the population moved either voluntarily or under force from the Government’ (Dolan, 2000b: 5).

In response to the degradation of quality of life in northern Uganda, the Acholi in the diaspora initiated Kacoke Madit (KM), a series of meetings held to raise awareness about the conflict and discuss possible means for its termination (Poblicks, 2002). Since its first meeting in London in 1997, KM has become a platform for Acholi voices to be heard, and has called on ‘relevant governments and international agencies to listen to those who remain in the line of fire’ (ibid).

As a consequence of KM’s initial meeting in April 1997, and seven months later, Bending of the Spears was published. Its author Dr Dennis Pain, a U.K Department for International Development social development advisor, had been commissioned by the conflict resolution organisation International Alert (Dolan, 2000b: 8) to ‘research the views of Acholi “opinion leaders” in Uganda about peace and reconciliation’ (Allen, 2006: 132). Self identified as ‘an international consultant familiar with Acholi from a lifetime of involvement in Uganda’ (Pain, 1997: 7) and described as a ‘passionate enthusiast of Acholi culture and a charasmatic Christian’ (Allen, 2006: 132) his report drew attention to, not only the strength of Acholi ‘grass-roots traditional structure of leaders,’ but also to the weakness of the ‘elected local councils introduced by the government’ (Pain, 1997: 39). The report was extensive, detailed and argued that the ‘armed conflict was eroding “Acholi culture” and that what was needed was a community-based approach drawing on Acholi values and institutions’ (Allen, 2006: 132). Two of the ‘considerations’ concluding the document expressed the belief that international donors and NGO’s should support traditional authorities, and that the Acholi people should be sensitised to the processes of reconciliation (Pain, 1997: 87 and 110).

The effect of Pain’s report seemed to cast light and shadows across northern Uganda, thrusting identified ‘traditional leaders,’ and particular ‘reconciliation rituals’ into a ‘visible field of social and political space’ (Dean, 1999:30) to be known, leaving more pale that which was not directly related to issues of conflict resolution, reconciliation, peace and, as could be expected with such security concerns, development. Pain’s report presented traditional leaders, Rowdi-mo, as having retained some ‘residual influence over cultural affairs’ in northern Uganda, despite the establishment of the Rowdi-kalam, and ‘particularly with regard to dispute settlement’ (Pain, 1997: 76). The traditional leaders were also said to have enabled ACORD to ‘achieve more’ in
northern Uganda during the 1980’s (ibid: 40). As Pain chose to highlight how traditional leaders had been used recently by government ministers ‘towards conflict resolution and promoting village level economic development respectively’ (Pain, 1997: 77), it could be said that Pain’s report relocated traditional leaders within a discursive field of development and security. The immediate effect was the commissioning of further research to build on Pain’s findings, funded by the Belgium government, carried out by ACORD4 and ‘catalysed by the then Minister of State for Northern Uganda, Hon. Owiny Dollo’ (Dolan, 2000b: 8). The objective of this research was to ‘identify “traditional chiefs” known as rwodi’ (Allen, 2006: 133) and understand how such traditional authorities could play a role in establishing reconciliation procedures that could be used to resolve the conflict (Pain, 1997: 87).

In contrast to Pain’s enthusiasm for the immediate support towards traditional leaders, ACORD’s findings expressed more caution (Allen, 2006: 148). Their findings concluded that traditional structures in northern Uganda were weak and fragmented with ‘widespread disagreement about who...the real traditional leaders’ are (Dolan, 2000a: 8). Crucially, however, although ACORD’s findings have been said to put into question Pain’s conclusions and methodology (see Allen, 2006: 148), I would argue that the assertions of the potential uses of traditional leaders to reach security and development goals (in Pain’s report) coupled with evidence in subsequent research of weakness and frustration attached to the role of leaders in general (Dolan, 2000a: 8) had a catalytic effect. Functioning within the discourse of development, a light had been cast that revealed traditional leaders in a particular way; as potential instruments of government, yet also weak and disempowered. This, I would argue, set in motion a machine of practices and processes in northern Uganda, which can be understood as the regime of empowerment. It could be said that both Pain’s report and the subsequent research by ACORD, productive of lines of visibility and as forms of knowledge and truth that produced and gave definition to the objects to be governed through empowerment, were necessary components, yet alone insufficient, for the enabling and shaping of the regime of empowerment in northern Uganda. The ‘truth’ produced by the development, conflict resolution and Acholi ‘experts’ of the research here discussed codified what could be known about the Acholi culture and traditional leaders, despite their difference of opinion, and defined a field of operation for the regime of practices of

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4 ACORD is an NGO that is said to have worked in northern Uganda with traditional leaders during the 1980’s (Pain, 1997: 40).
empowerment. This regime of practices was to revive or arguably reinvent the cultural institute KKA, introduced at the commencing of the chapter. The paper will now turn to argue that the KKA has become a potential extension of government within development through the process of its revival and the processes attached to its continual empowerment.

Revival of KKA and the utilisation of traditional leaders.

Since the ‘reinstallation’ of Ker Kwaro Acholi in 2000, its fifty ‘traditional leaders, together with their elders, women and youth leaders have set up the ‘Acholi Traditional Leaders Council’ which is now functional and is the highest governing council of the institution’ (Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2005: 3). The elected Paramount Chief, Rwot David Onen Acana II was crowned in 2005. The KKA Strategic Plan 2005-2007 cites numerous ‘facts’ about the Acholi regarding their origin, traditional rituals, political, economic and social organisation, although Escobar warns that one must be careful not to ‘valorise as innocent and “natural” an order produced by history...[as] these orders can also be interpreted in terms of specific effects of power and meaning. The “local”, moreover, is neither unconnected nor unconstructed’ (Escobar, 1995: 170). Indeed the language of the Strategic Plan 2005-2007 indicates KKA has effectively learnt ‘to speak the global language of poverty and development, or at least the dialect taught by the latest development expert’ (De Hert and Bastiaensen, 2004: 877). One problem identified with the practice of adapting needs to the supply on offer is an ‘induced’ instead of a ‘real’ expression of local demand (ibid).

Interestingly, there has been mounting literature expressing concerns about the questionable legitimacy of the revived traditional leaders and the ‘heavily inspired re-invention of tradition by discussions in the international conference circuit and amongst donor and NGO’s’ (Dolan, 2000b). Also, there is criticism against the ‘great deal of myth-making’ that surrounded the crowning of the paramount chief in 2005, as ‘for many Acholi people the setting up of a paramount chief is actually a violation of traditional customs’ (Allen, 2006: 149). Despite these controversies the KKA continues to be presented as the ‘representative of the Acholi people’ (Justice and Reconciliation Project, 2007: 4). As such the Paramount Chief has been received on visits to the USA as putting a ‘human face’ on the tragedy of ‘his people’ (Proffenberger, 2007),
which leads one to question beyond the problematic of legitimacy and truth, in the true/false sense of the term, and to ask what the process of reviving KKA *does* as part of the regime of empowerment and therefore as an instrument of development governmentality in northern Uganda. There are two functions that KKA carries out as set out in its *Strategic Plan 2005-2007*, that can be identified as firstly, the documentation of Acholi culture, and secondly, the capacity building of traditional leaders (2005). By focusing on both practices the critique can illuminate the process that conditions governance and sets the limits of possibilities, as well as the process that, not only works through individual and collective identity, but also tries to form identity (Dean, 1999: 31 and 32).

The KKA, in its *Strategic Plan*, stipulates its custodial position over Acholi cultural practices and traditions, as well as its ‘mission to promote, develop and preserve the culture of Acholi’ (Ker Kwaro, 2005: 13). It also plans to ‘cover the...key area’ of ‘documentation and communication’ of Acholi culture amongst its ‘strategic objectives’ (Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2005: 13). The Justice Reconciliation Project (JRP), at the Liu Institute, works in partnership with KKA and in 2005 produced a report that sought to ‘document existing practices of traditional justice...[and] to provide an initial assessment of whether or not traditional rituals and ceremonies could be further adapted in the context of the enduring 19-year old conflict’ (Baines, 2005: iv). Although the report states that KKA ‘remains weak after decades of conflict and colonial rule, and must still grapple with the challenge of representation and legitimacy’ (Baines, 2005: 73) it is evident in this quote that it doesn’t dispute claims about KKA’s traditional heritage. The partnership between KKA and the JRP, in their pursuit of documenting and codifying Acholi culture, could be said to be part of a technology of agency that imposes limits on fields of possibilities. For example, through the partnership between JRP and KKA, the KKA can be seen to be strengthened and gaining further legitimacy as the voice and representative of the Acholi, which then brings KKA into a space of not only empowerment but also disciplinary practices. For just at the moment KKA is empowered by being in a position to define a ‘code of the permitted and forbidden’ (Foucault, 2007: 46) in Acholi culture, not only are new relations of power constituted, but a path is also paved for the ‘systematic extension of surveillance and control’ (Bryant, 2003: 284) by external governing actors. The empowerment of KKA therefore, functions to absorb KKA into a coalition of forces that are responsible for designing the means and ends of enhanced capacity (Gould, 2005a) and thus ‘capacity enhancing interventions also
constitute the exercise of disciplinary power...of introducing standards of ‘proper behaviour’ (Gould, 2005a: 45), of normalising. This point will be returned to in chapter three, but in the broader context of harmonisation policies in development. For now, the analysis will continue with a critique of KKA’s role in the capacity building, or rather it could be said the normalising, of traditional leaders in Acholi-land, northern Uganda.

The focus of KKA’s Strategic Plan is stated to be the ‘Capacity Building for both the institution and the Rwodi’ as well as ‘Cultural Practices Promotion, Documentation and awareness creation especially amongst the youth’ (Rwot Acana II, 2005: 1). The KKA plans to implement such capacity building through the ‘training’ of the Rwodi on ‘leadership and management skills,...the operation of local government, and advocacy skills,...[and] on communication and networking skills,’ with the ‘vision’ of producing a ‘prosperous and culturally enlightened people with one identity’ (2005: 15 and 13). The JRP can also be seen as targeting traditional leaders, both ‘Elders, Mego and Rwodi,’ who are identified as needing ‘psycho-social training to improve their activities with formerly abducted persons,’ and who need assistance with record-keeping’ (Baines, 2005: 76). The practices of training traditional leaders seems to come in response to modifications that have been made to ‘ritual ceremonies,’ which are believed by JRP to be having ‘positive effects on the sensitization of the population’ (ibid: 73). However, although training programmes and sensitisation workshops, are presented as ‘technical transfers of knowledge and procedures, and as such an important part of development, it is important to recognise that they are also political interventions designed to produce particular...subjects’ (Abrahamsen, 2004: 1462). In this case, it could be said that the subject being produced is a hybrid of what is understood to be an essentialised Acholi identity, with ‘traits of modernization’ (Ker Kwaro, 2005: 11). KKA demonstrates through its Strategic Plan its willingness to embrace modernization concurrently with ‘Acholi cherished traditions/cultural practices’ (ibid: 11). New forms of identity are thus being reconstituted in Acholi-land and traditional leaders can be seen as the primary targets of these practices.

The regime of empowerment, and the practices identified here, can be seen as enabling the World Bank to implement its development programs, as it harnesses traditional leaders as ‘entry points’ for their ‘development interventions’ (Robinson, 2007: 263). Through its Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), implemented since 2003, the World Bank encourages
‘communities to get NGO’s and faith-based and traditional organisations (ethnic and cultural leaders and associations) to act as facilitators and advisors in designing and implementing subprojects’ (ibid: 269). Setting up this structure, whereby the World Bank has an indirect role in the implementation of development projects, allows for it to function behind a smokescreen that hides the power relations which ensure, to an extent, the objectives it seeks are being fulfilled. Sensitisation workshops with ‘local government officials, NGO’s and politicians to the approach and philosophy of NUSAF’ (ibid: 267) can be seen to act as technologies of government that has the effect of imposing limits over what it is possible for the recipients of the workshops to do regarding development programmes and projects. This is not, however, to imply that the recipients of the workshops passively internalise NUSAF’s philosophy, as strategies of resistance may be employed in a complex transaction between parties. This will be discussed further in the following, and final, chapter. However, the ‘guiding principles’ set out in KKA’s Strategic Plan,

- Promotes voluntarism and self-help
- Cooperation with central and local government
- Promote participation and empowerment; will power to advance together.
- Transparency and accountability
- Equal rights for all and equality between men and women’

(Ker Kwaro Acholi, 2005: 12).

can be seen to indicate, not only the internalisation of development’s norms and values, but also its position as an instrument and extension of government, through its own sensitising workshops that target ‘local leaders,’ ‘youth’ and ‘clan leaders’ (ibid: 13-15).

To conclude, within this case study the intention has been to mobilise an analytics of government in order to try and cast light upon the practices of empowerment that constitute the development encounter in northern Uganda. It is acknowledged that within the elusive complexities of the situation in northern Uganda, it is extremely difficult to provide relevant insight into the practices of empowerment without being in danger of drawing brusque conclusions. However, by attempting to remain focused upon the practices that firstly illuminated traditional leaders as disempowered, yet potential agents of governance, and secondly the practices that sought to harness the reconstituted subjectivities of the traditional leaders and utilise KKA as an extension of governance, it is hoped that a contribution has be
made to further the understanding of how development functions as a form of governance in Acholi-land, northern Uganda. As ‘one means of making intelligible regimes of government is to isolate their ultimate ends and their utopian goals’ (Dean, 1999: 33) the proceeding chapter will seek to open up the analysis and incorporate broader practices within development that signify the utopian goals of the regime of practices critiqued herein.
Chapter Three.

‘Freedom is inextricable from the imposition and exercise of constraints. Indeed the two are mutually related in an emerging structure of aid governmentality’ (Abrahamsen, 2004: 1464).

In chapter one, the discourses of sustainable development and good governance were shown to have become paradigmatic within development. Consequentially, techniques of partnership and participation came to constitute a regime of empowerment that, in northern Uganda, have arguably empowered and concurrently absorbed the KKA into the process of producing active and responsible traditional leaders who are able to act as facilitators and entry points for development programs. Also, the practices of documenting and disseminating Acholi culture, and acting as the representative of the Acholi, could be seen as part of a process of codifying a newly constituted Acholi identity. It was argued in chapter two, therefore, that development could be said to be impacting northern Uganda by altering social organisations and thus reconstituting relations of power through governmentality as a modality of power.

As governmentality presupposes the freedom of the subject, development exercised as governmentality cannot be accused of being completely controlling and rendering recipients as ‘pawns,’ despite practices of utilising traditional leaders as ‘entry points’ and facilitators of projects. Importantly, Kapoor reminds us that, ‘it does not necessarily mean they will conform to our expectations’ (Kapoor, 2005: 1219). It has also been illustrated that in any one moment normalising and empowering techniques occur, producing not only potential instruments of development and governance through which to penetrate the wider community, but also agents capable of resisting in a myriad of ways against exercises of power that may begin to close down lifestyles and individual identities (Brigg, 2002: 428). The incessant struggle between power and resistance, however, does not translate to clear demarcations between the governed and the governor; particularly at the level of NGO’s and the community. Attempting to make such
distinctions as a way of drawing powerful/powerless dichotomies from which to normatively criticise a given institution is therefore not a helpful line of enquiry and is being avoided in this study.

The inquiry of this paper has been focused upon *practices* that constitute development and more specifically, that constitute the regime of practices of empowerment. The case study identified, and sought to illuminate, a series of practices that produced particular ways of seeing and knowing, and functioned through different technologies and forms of identities. This chapter will now seek to broaden the analysis and return to the concept of governmentality, through attending to the framework of harmonisation policies in development. It will be demonstrated that these policies have significant disciplinary/normalising effects and as such impact possibilities of resistance and practices of freedom.

The Rome Declaration for Harmonisation, endorsed in 2003, was said to be an ‘important international effort to harmonise the operational policies, procedures, and practices of our institutions with those of partner country systems to improve the effectiveness of development assistance, and thereby contribute to meeting the Millennium Development Goals’ (OECD, 2003). Following from this in Paris 2005 ‘over a hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials’ adhered to and committed their countries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in harmonisation, alignment and managing aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators’ (OECD, 2000).

In response, Uganda established its Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS) that would ‘represent a significant step foward for harmonisation and the overall aid effectiveness agenda in Uganda’ (DFID, 2005: viii). In accord with the prevalent pro-poor agenda of the good governance and sustainability discourse, it is presented as the ‘natural next step to further enhance donor harmonisation’ and to provide an opportunity for partners, such as the World Bank and the U.K’s Department for International Development (DFID), to align behind the Government of Uganda’s (GoU) development programs within PEAP (DFID, 2005: vi). As the goals and objectives within PEAP are engendered through the World Bank’s requirement for all recipient countries to become responsible and to take ownership of a Poverty Reduction Strategy, this situates the World Bank in a position of being able to indirectly define policies, since it is the World Bank that ‘directly chooses which of the government policies to support’ (Lie, 2005: 15).
This relationship of power has led Mbilinyi to maintain that the harmonisation of aid has become a process whereby Bretton Woods institutions ‘are asserting ever more power over micro-policy as well as macro-policy at national level’ (quoted in Gould, 2005a: 19). As a result there can be seen a ‘diffusion of power away from the hegemonic structures of state power,’ which has become ‘one of the most salient features of the post-westphalian global order’ (Cochrane and Duffy, 2003: 216) and a ‘cornerstone of the new development partnership’ (Gould, 2005a: 21).

Also characteristic of the contemporary global order, and of relevance to the discussion on harmonisation, is the ‘mutual conditioning,’ discussed in chapter one, of development and security (Duffield, 2007: 1). Produced through the discourse of development and security, poverty is represented as a global threat, creating a means of government, or a ‘potent way of containing the most difficult sections of the population and improving all other sections’ (Procacci, 1991: 151). Evidence of this can be see through the UJAS that, in response to its obligation to support the fulfillment of the PEAP, it specifies a focus on promoting a resolution to the conflict in the north and fostering the social and economic development in the region’ (DFID, 2005: x). Thus, harmonisation, as a ‘liberal practice of governing the aid domain’ (Gould, 2005b: 65), becomes a ‘long term scenario’ maintained through the inculcated needs of ‘tackling the problems of ‘capacity’ and/or ‘governance’ which are perceived to ‘threaten volumes in aid disbursment’ (Gould, 2005a: 23). It can also be seen as part of the ‘increased levels of global control through standardisation, regulation, ordering and management’ (Cochrane, Duffy and Selby, 2003: 216).

As discussed in chapter one, although development is bound by the contemporary modality of power governmentality (Brigg, 2002: 426), one of the characteristic features of ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 1994a: 341) is its reliance upon ‘techniques of normalisation and consensus, as opposed to more overtly coercive forms of power’ (Abrahamsen, 2004: 1459).

What has been termed ‘postconditionality’ (Harrison, 2004) or more accurately, ‘new conditionality’ (Gould, 2005a), indicates the shift from conditionality through imposed adjustment, characteristic of Structural Adjustment Programs, to what can essentially be understood as a politics of intervention. The ever closer engagement between donors, recipient countries, institutions and even NGO’s as they are ‘brought into the orbit of central calculation’ (Duffield, 2001: 317), can be seen to have a distinct disciplinary and normalising effect, as it
operates through not excluding subjects or entities, but by ‘insiduously integrating them into the regime of power’ (Foucault, 1979: 141).

The technique of harmonisation thus creates dependent relationships between NGO’s and foreign donors, with the state becoming an ‘intermediary between the global and local’ (Cochrane and Duffy, 2003: 216). As was addressed and illustrated in chapter two, the dependent relationship of NGO’s, such as KKA, on external support has engendered the application of ‘trigger words in project proposals,’ that can also lead to the internalisation of the donors discourse without either party realising it’ (Shururman, 1993: 204). Viewing this in the framework of harmonisation and normalising practices, gives a broader picture of how development functions in a way that is able to alter the objectives and behaviour of local organisations such as KKA. This is in order to ‘improve the effectiveness of development assistance, and thereby contribute to meeting the Millennium Development Goals’ (OECD, 2003) and ‘to increase efforts in...managing aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators’ (OECD, 20005). Audits, ‘designed to engender new forms of conduct,’ have become the instruments that make it possible to monitor the progress of organisations such as KKA against MDG’s, although crucially the effect of this technology of ‘contemporary partnerships’ has the effect of reshaping ‘in their own image that which it is to monitor’ (Abrahamsen, 2004: 1483 and 1463). The opening pages of KKA’s Strategic Plan 2005-2007 tellingly indicates the extent to which it is being shaped by development as it recalls how ‘it took almost one year to harmonise all aspirations, views and ideas of many stakeholders’ and subsequently repeats its ‘working together’ partnership with central and local governments (2005: 1, 11). In addition, alongside KKA’s mission statement ‘to promote, develop and preserve the culture of Acholi,’ objectives of ‘gender mainstreaming’ feature. As this is a prolific notion of development spawned from the MDG’s, this may also indicate how KKA is internalising and being governed by external notions and forces.

Such normalising practices can lead to intensified fields of subjectivity (Dumm, 2002: 136), as seen for example with the constitution of traditional leaders as managers and facilitators of World Bank projects in northern Uganda. Within this realm of normalisation it has been said that a shift occurs, from the dominance of apparatuses of discipline towards apparatuses of security, with a ‘significant effect on practices of freedom’ (ibid:131). This effect on freedom comes from the
‘de-emphasis on the inculcation of individualising discipline and a new emphasis on the mass control of elements of behaviour. Normalisation as a strategy of security permits a withdrawal from the special interventions of discipline by striving to control population at large through monitoring, surveys and other indirect methods of identifying and establishing norms of behaviour’ (ibid).

To ensure that normalisation, as a strategy of security, does not become a strategy of domination through the ever intensified techniques that seek to ‘hold subjects in place,’ Foucault suggests the strategy of resistance (ibid: 136). Prior to discussing possible forms this strategy might take, it is important to premise the following discussion upon the understanding that ‘by definition’ strategies of resistance can only exist in the strategic field of power relations’ (Foucault, 1990: 95) which are exercised over the subject only insofar as they are “free” (Foucault, 1994a: 342). This presupposes therefore that practices of freedom, as resistance, are ‘not opposed to power’ but are in fact enabled by the presence of power’ (Dumm, 2002: 141). As such, strategies of resistance cannot seek to overcome power relations as ‘there is no possibility of a strategy of resistance overcoming power relations’ (Edkins and Pinfat, 2005: 5), rather, resistance can only ever have the effect of resituating power relations to ensure that there would be ‘minimum domination’ (Dumm, 2002: 141).

Resistance can thus take a multitude of forms and with varying effects, from small ‘acts’ with little consequence to ‘points of resistance’ that can come together to ‘form a dense web that seems to solidify...[and] lead to revolution’ (Edkins and Pinfat, 2005: 5). Regarding small and almost invisible acts of resistance, Hall interprets the ‘supposed passivity’ of the subaltern in terms of a ‘continuing presence,’ acting as a kind of ‘passive historical-cultural force’ yet constantly interrupting, limiting and disrupting everything else (Hall, quoted in Loomba, 1996: 140). Where intention is not visible within acts of resistance, often the goal is hidden in the pursuit of survival (Scott, 1985: 301), an often taken for granted quality for people whose survival is not at great risk on a daily basis. In this space, resistance may also take the form of ‘silent and anonymous acts of foot dragging and theft’ which challenges the definitions of resistance within the structure of domination which tends to view only more official acts, in the form of electoral activity and regulated protest, as resistance (Scott, 1985: 299). Definitions of resistance are thus contested, especially when practices of ‘pretence’ become the ‘dominant modality of transaction between state and society, or between rulers and those who are supposed
to obey’ (Mbembe, 2001: 129). Indeed Mbembe has said that the ‘interweaving of the implicit and explicit’ and the ‘practices of those who command and those who are assumed to obey are so entangled as to render both powerless’ (ibid: 133). This supports Darby’s claim that there is more ambiguity and fluidity about the process of domination and resistance than we often like to think (Darby, 2004: 31). However, the importance of resistance is paramount to questions of subjectivity and freedom and therefore not only must resistance ‘begin at the on going level of subjugation- at the level at which one finds domination of everyday life being practiced,’ but also it ‘must target certain unequal relations of power; it must target, among other things, the process of development’ (Dubois, 1991: 27 own emphasis added).

One strategy of resistance that may effectively challenge dominating processes of development involves ‘playing a certain game of truth’ (Foucault, 1994b: 295). By ‘game’ Foucault specifies its meaning as a ‘set of rules by which truth is produced’ and a ‘set of procedures that lead to a certain result, which, on the basis of its principles and rules of procedures, may be considered valid or invalid, winning or losing’ (ibid: 297). As development within this paper has been understood as a discourse, as ‘a system that allows the systematic creation of objects, concepts and strategies... [and] determines what can be thought and said’ it can also be understood to ‘set the rules of the game’ (Escobar, 1997: 87). In other words development determines ‘who can speak, from what points of view, with what authority, and according to what criteria of expertise; it sets the rules that must be followed for this or that problem, theory or object to emerge and be named, analysed, and eventually transformed into a policy or a plan’ (ibid).

The critique throughout the paper has sought to illuminate how the traditional leaders within Acholi culture have emerged according to particular voices and points of view being valorised, which subsequently brought into being particular subjectivities, namely the modernized/traditional leaders. With the good governance and sustainability discourses driving policies to seek more effective development practices through harmonisation techniques, the traditional leaders constituting KKA were shown to be in danger of becoming absorbed into development to the extent that threatens their possibilities of practicing freedom. Resistance therefore for the traditional leaders could consist of learning the rules of the game in order to try and resituate relations of power and so be able to ‘play the games of power with as little domination as possible’ (Foucault, 1994b: 298). As KKA may be understood as playing a pivotal
role in the process of government, it may ‘know better than many its inner logic and possible weaknesses’ (Bryant, 2002: 288) and so in the same moment when KKA is subjected to normalisation techniques and the internalisation of development’s truths, KKA could respond with its own discourse of truth about Acholi cultural traditions and the role of traditional leaders and utilise its empowered position as the ‘official’ cultural institute of Acholi culture. In the future, paradoxically, the possibilities of KKA exercising a counter-discourse against dominating practices looks to increase, as the United Nations advocates the utilisation of ‘African Traditional Institutions,’ for the progression of good governance and sustainable development (Economic Commission for Africa, 2007). Although the legitimacy of KKA as a representative of the Acholi has been questioned, and it has been argued that KKA is functioning as an instrument of governance, this does not detract from KKA’s empowered position to also resist the possibilities of development creating an ‘unjustified political situation’ (Foucault, 1994b: 295). The possibilities, however, of KKA exercising such power relies on relations of power remaining ‘mobile’ and ‘allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them’ (ibid: 283). When power relations become ‘blocked’ or ‘frozen’ then a ‘situation of domination’ is established (ibid) and on ethical grounds it is evident that this situation should be avoided.

KKA’s empowered position may thus be regarded as positive when understood in the light of how development is functioning in northern Uganda through governance techniques that can lead to situations of domination being ‘established and maintained’ (ibid: 299). Crucially, however, Foucault warns us that the Freedom as liberation, therefore, as the absense of, or overcoming of, domination cannot be viewed as creating a situation where there is no power exercised, for liberation indeed ‘paves the way for new power relationships’ (ibid: 284) as can be seen in the case regarding the empowerment of KKA within the wider Acholi community. Interestingly at the same moment that freedom is ‘positively required’ as an instrument of government (ibid, 1991: 139), so to resistance strategies must act ‘to control the new power relations’ (ibid, 1994b: 284). Resistance is thus as ubiquitous as power and becomes a necessary component of everyday life encounters, particularly within development.

To summarise, this chapter has sought to broaden the more specific critique in chapter two that focused on practices of empowerment as techniques of governing northern Uganda within development. One intention has been to illustrate the mutually conditioning relationship
between governmental and disciplinary exercises of power, through highlighting the overarching development policies that have distinct normalising effects and the practices of empowerment that are able to subsequently function through the reconstitution of subjectivities. As these normalising practices were shown to have a dangerous aspect with regards to how they are able to produce unequal relations of power that may result in states of domination, strategies of resistance were discussed. This was to enable the chapter to engage in an exploration that would touch upon an understanding of what the implications may be of the development encounter in northern Uganda, particularly with regards to the freedom of the traditional leaders that constitute KKA. The conclusion to the paper will now follow with an overall summary that seeks to draw together the main themes and points made within the study, and attend to the title question posed at the outset of the paper.
Conclusion.

This study has sought to attend to the question posed at the commencement of the paper, which contained three enquiries into the impact of development in northern Uganda. As a reminder, the totality of the question asked ‘To what extent, with what practices and with what effects can development be understood as governing northern Uganda?’

The paper then journeyed through three chapters that together sought to offer insights that would help answer the opening question. The purpose of chapter one was to clarify the use of the term governmentality within this paper and show how this conceptualisation, although initially used by Foucault to describe changes in western European society, has relevance and analytical use for critiques focused on the functioning of the discourse of development. The emergence of the good governance and sustainability discourses, that seemed to be a response to the impasse in development during the 1980s (Schuurman, 1993), and the merging of development and security, were discussed in order to be able to indicate the directionality of development and therefore shed light upon the rationality and logic that shaped practices of empowerment which flourished during this period and thus could be described as a regime of practices. The closing of chapter one hoped to illustrate how the governmentalisation of development, as a process of enabling development to alter the behaviour of ‘recipients,’ rests upon such a regime of empowerment, constituted by technologies of partnership and participation.

The paper then progressed to embark upon an analytics of government which was utilised in order to guide a critique of the regime of empowerment in northern Uganda. The practices of the regime of empowerment within development, became the focal point of the analysis as the title question provokes not an enquiry into development’s declared goals, but rather requires an analysis of what development ‘actually does and what interests are served by these practices’ (Abrahamsen, 2000: 138). It was shown that under a liberal governmentality particular practices of empowerment, that are in themselves exercises of power, sought to harness specific subjectivities in northern Uganda for the purpose of being able to influence the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 1994a: 341) through arranging ‘things in such and such a way that, through a certain number of means, [and so] such-and-such ends may be achieved’ (ibid: 211). In other
words the practices identified in chapter two, for example the production of research and thereby ‘truths’ about Acholi culture, brought ‘traditional leaders’ into a particular political space to be known and acted upon by academics, policy advisors and development agencies such as the World Bank. The critique demonstrated, through drawing upon the Strategic Plan of KKA and the World Bank’s NUSAf, that KKA and the traditional leaders can be seen as acting as, not only points of entry for the World Bank to implement its projects, but also as extensions of government targeting the wider Acholi community through, for example, sensitisation workshops.

These sensitisation workshops were demonstrated to act as a strategy of governance whereby the Acholi, and particularly the traditional leaders, were subject to techniques of normalisation and to the process of internalising the ‘global language of development’ (De Hert, 2004: 877). The multitude of convenient ends achieved through the practices highlighted in the case study, were shown to consist of not only development’s new capabilities of being able to penetrate the very attitudes and everyday practices of the Acholi community through KKA, but also of the empowerment experienced by KKA and the traditional leaders that was argued could open up new spaces for practices of freedom and possibilities of resistance.

The mutual conditionality between practices of empowerment and techniques of normalisation was demonstrated predominantly in chapter three, through an exploration that traced the links between harmonisation policies within development and the mobilisation of practices of empowerment. As stated in the introduction to the paper, the analysis has set out to distinguish itself from the body of post-development critiques that often render ‘beneficiaries’ of development as ‘passive bystanders’ (Kapoor, 2005: 1218) and therefore, in the light of the interplay between disciplinary and governmental exercises of power in northern Uganda, included a discussion of strategies of resistance. The critique comprising of the final chapter was understood to be necessary for understanding the effects development as governmentality may be having in northern Uganda. Following on from chapter two, that argued how KKA and the traditional leaders can be seen as functioning as an extension of government, the final chapter wanted to emphasise the ambiguity of their roles and assert that they are more than handmaidens to ‘that complex process encompassing control and resistance, subjugation and empowerment,’ namely governmentality (Bryant, 2002: 288). It was suggested within this discussion that a
strategy of resistance against the dominating and possible non-liberal practices of governmentality might be through the learning of the ‘rules’ of development in order to ‘play the game with as little domination as possible’ (Foucault, 1994b: 298) and in the hope of resituating relations of power in ones own favour.

However, although the resituating of relations of power may often be the ultimate goal of resistance strategies there will still always remain the struggle between power and resistance, domination and freedom, as it is impossible to be outside of relations of power (Walkowitz, in Loomba, 2005: 198). So, although KKA and the traditional leaders may be in a position to resist dominating practices of development, they are at the same time situated in a position of governing and thus pose the danger of practicing authoritarian rule, especially as the more freedom an actor experiences has been said to lead to an increase in the desire to want to control other’s conduct (Foucault, 1994b: 300).

The extent, therefore, that development is governing northern Uganda depends upon the complex interplay between power and resistance. As governmentality is premised upon altering the behaviour of a population indirectly, intermediaries are a necessary component for its ‘success.’ However, the ambiguity and fluidity that characterises intermediaries, such as KKA, can lead to resistance practices of evasion and pretence which, it could be said, make it impossible to measure the full extent of developments capacity to alter the attitudes of, and govern, the Acholi in northern Uganda. Despite this, the critique has sought to offer a valuable insight into how development as a discourse can be understood to be governing northern Uganda through specific practices, that have been shown to have potentially dangerous effects.

With the United Nations advocating further engagement with African Traditional Institutions on the grounds that they are seen to ‘play a vital role in development which at once enhances democracy and sustains good governance’ (Economic Commission for Africa, 2007: 34), further research and attention needs to be payed to the practices and processes within development that, as has been shown, have implications for the freedom of those same subjects whose problems development professes to redress. This paper hopes to have contributed to critiques that challenge ‘what is given, in the head as well as in reality’ (Porter, 1995: 63) and to the going beyond the ‘dead end’ of poststructural critique by engaging with the manifestations of development in the concrete encounter (Nustad, 1997: 487) of northern Uganda.
Bibliography.


