Religion and the Fabrication of Race
Pasha, Mustapha

Published in:
Millennium: Journal of International Studies
DOI:
10.1177/0305829817709083
Publication date:
2017
Citation for published version (APA):
Difference and Differentiation: Religion and the Fabrication of Race

Introduction

In his brilliant account of the role of Puritanism in the colonization of the Americas, Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra skilfully discerns the confluence of territorial and spiritual conquest. Puritan Conquistadors offers a breath-taking portrait of how religious impulses and the colonizing drive reinforce each other, shaping local, national, and transnational cultural zones. The question of difference, for Cañizares-Esguerra, involves the making of a cultural or racial Other as religiously-produced alterity, to be apprehended, managed, or eliminated within a determinate theological setting pitting the saved and the damned, the true adherents of the Redeemer against Satan’s steadfast disciples. On Cañizares-Esguerra’s vivid reading of colonial history it becomes apparent that it is religion that ultimately gives meaning to the fabrication of difference and differentiation in the colonial project. “The conquest of souls”, as Gruzinski also records in the context of sixteenth-century colonial Mexico, “was accompanied by a conquest of bodies designed to subject family, marriage, and intimate practices to the universal norms of the Church”. Religion and conquest were not only aligned in unholy harmony, but also unthinkable as separate domains requiring different logics. Similarly, as Winant emphatically puts it: “Yes, the Crusades and the Inquisition and the Mediterranean slave trade were important rehearsals for modern systems of racial differentiation”. With deep historical roots shaping the union of religion and colonial subjugation, “between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries intellectuals confronted race primarily as a theological problem”.

---

1 I am grateful to Ritu Vij and two anonymous reviewers for their excellent comments on the first iteration of this article. All errors are strictly mine. I also wish to acknowledge my deep gratitude to the Editors of Millennium (Ilaria Carrozza, Ida Danewid, and Evelyn Pauls) for their sustained support.


5 Colin Kidd, The Forging of Races: Race and Scripture in the Protestant Atlantic World, 1600-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 25. Kidd relies on the pervasive presence of race in the allegorical imagery of the scripture in his analysis. However, with the advent of Enlightenment rationality, religion and science forged an alliance in making intelligible “the troubling intellectual consequences which flowed from the discovery of the New World” (p. 61). The crucial effect of this alliance was the consolidation of the notion of difference marked by a superior Aryan race over “inferior” native races. Also germane to the discussion is Craig R. Prentiss, ed. Religion and the Creation of Race and Ethnicity: An Introduction (New York and London: New York University Press, 2003).
This article takes Puritan Conquistadors as a point of departure to question recent critiques of Eurocentrism in International Relations (IR) for silencing religion in favour of either culture or race. Religion is not entirely absent as a marker of Eurocentric differentiation of the Other in these critiques, but they speak primarily to the pre-Enlightenment colonial context. The relative silence on religion in extant critiques quite ironically draws from an apparent Eurocentric spatio-temporal horizon embedded in Enlightenment thinking. A crucial element of that horizon is a tacit acceptance of secularity as the ontological condition of differentiation, reflected in wholesale acknowledgement of the ascendancy of Scientific Racism and the displacement of religiosity. However, the presumption of secularity is equally questionable, disguising more than revealing the continued presence of religion—a point addressed in the next section.

Painted in broad strokes, this article seeks to provoke debate over the possibility of a more durable relation between religion and race than is usually acknowledged in critiques of Eurocentrism in IR. This strategy obviously carries the risk of collapsing various shades of critiques of Eurocentrism. However, that risk is mitigated by the intuition that most critiques of Eurocentrism in IR share an imagined secular limit, thwarting sustained investigation of the nexus between religion and race. Religiously-coded racialization rarely engages the post-Enlightenment context. Rather, Scientific Racism commonly is assigned a privileged role. The relation between religion and race is sequestered in the pre-Enlightenment past. With the arrival of the Enlightenment, Reason and Science are principally thought to provision criteria for classification and difference.

The present provocation to place extant critiques of Eurocentrism under scrutiny is designed to unsettle their normalization and uncritical embrace by the reigning orthodoxy, mostly as a safe supplement to mainstream IR. With renewed interest in the racialized character of IR theory,

---

6 “The relationship between the conquest of souls, conquest of bodies, and colonization of land”, as one reviewer correctly notes, “exceeds IR debates”. This important point is a key element in the discussion that follows regarding how this relationship has been interrogated, but especially silenced, in extant critiques of Eurocentrism in IR.

7 According to Goldschmidt: “The concept of race, in nearly all its forms, were inseparably tied to the religious identities and differences that had structured European society for centuries. The boundaries of Christendom shaped the boundaries of Whiteness, and longstanding perceptions of heathenism shaped emerging perceptions of racial difference. See “Introduction” in Henry Goldschmidt and Elizabeth McAlister, eds. Race, Nation, and Religion in the Americas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 12-13.

8 There are notable exceptions that either acknowledge religious or racial markers as subsequent discussion shows. However, it is the confluence of religion and race that typically escapes critiques of Eurocentrism.


especially on the heels of sustained postcolonial/Decolonial critique in the social sciences, the image of an amnesiac state of affairs concerning race may not be as pertinent today. However, the tendency to fold the specific character of racial or religious differentiation under a largely benign category of ‘Eurocentrism’ dilutes its effectivity. Disputations over broad or narrow understandings of Eurocentrism potentially distract analysis of the political effects of racialized imaginings and practice. In turn, these understandings themselves rest on a Eurocentric idea of modernity. Alternatively, a planetary conception of modernity would release a wider field of inquiry into the role of religion in human differentiation. IR is several steps apart from acquiring a planetary awareness, notwithstanding Western imaginings of Cosmopolitanism, which essentially depend on cultural hierarchies.

To anticipate, meditations on Eurocentrism archetypally advance a linear narrative without adequately acknowledging the pivotal role religion continues to play in classification. Rather, modern hierarchies on a global scale display undeniable entanglements religion enjoys with race. These entanglements, both historical and contemporary, are not too opaque to avert notice. The securitization of religious others; the demonization of immigrants from particular religious zones; the rise of populist nationalism principally directed at specific religious minorities; the assumed social disturbance arising from the presence of religiously-coded markers of appearance (headscarf or veil); or the alleged offence produced by aesthetic deviance (visible, for example, in the Swiss minaret controversy), clearly illustrate the difficulty of separating religious and racial markers of alterity. These entanglements are generally disguised in narratives of the civilizing process, which is ultimately a secularized version of Christian ascendancy and its global effects. On the historical ledger, an incessantly evolving relation between religion and race shapes spatio-temporal horizons, cognitive and geographical maps, as well as it conditions the substance of cultural encounters. The restricted cultural (Western) frames within IR largely succumb to disciplinary orthodoxies, failing to either account for the making of a differentiated world or its logic of differentiation.

The ensuing discussion is divided into three sections. Taking Puritan Conquistadors as a premise, the first section provides a brief engagement with the question of the centrality of religion to race. Section Two presents a summary of silences embedded in critiques of Eurocentrism in IR. The final section of the article identifies two parallel tracks in IR, both presumably critical, but avoiding a dialogical encounter with each other: Postcolonial/Decolonial thought and Postsecular thinking. If postcolonial/Decolonial thought is silent over the role of religion in consolidating racial hierarchies, postsecular thinking, in turn, elects to marginalize race. Needless to say the discussion in this section is merely suggestive, cognizant of the potential value of convergence to enrich understanding.

Entanglements

Before returning to Cañizares-Esguerra’s narrative, it is useful to separate two broad streams in which discussions of ‘religion’ has generally flown: essentialist and anti-essentialist. However, there are also several points of merger and contact, which obviates any self-contained register of meaning. In the first instance, according to Clifford Geertz religion is: “(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of


factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic”. On the other side, there is Talal Asad’s anti-essentialist view which rejects any ‘transhistorical’ definition of religion. As Asad stresses: “there cannot be a universal definition of religion, not because its constituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but that definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes”. Asad sees religion in its entirety as a Christian conception linked to the relationship between political power and the Christian Church. Throughout this article, Asad’s intuition is respected and a more dynamic conception of religion is entertained. Specifically, the term ‘religion’ is initially restricted to the Christian Faith in discussions of the connection with colonial modernity, but leaving open the option of understanding the relation between religion and race conceived within alternative cosmological worlds. Cañizares-Esguerra offers a superb illustration of competing cosmological imaginings, but mainly focuses on the Puritan religious frame and its restrictive cognitive field. The orientation towards ‘indiscriminate inclusion’ follows, underscoring a failure of (Hegelian) recognition in the colonial context.

Puritan discourses, Cañizares-Esguerra insists, present colonization as exorcism, preceding the orchestrated stage of spiritual gardening. Hence, the liberation of the native from the Devil would pave the way towards Salvation. Colonization is designed to repel Satan before the actual task of approaching Heaven can be consummated; the battle between Good and Evil lies at the root of the colonizing process and its elaborate rationalizations. In a secular world conditioned by Enlightenment fundamentalism, this characterization would appear anachronistic. For the actual makers of the colonial universe, however, any alternative mapping of the encounter with native Otherness would be unrecognizable. God’s word and work assume a unity that assigns sanctity to


15 This view is also shared by several other scholars in Timothy Fitzgerald, ed. Religion and the Secular: Historical and Colonial Formations (London: Equinox Publishing, 2007).


17 The rationale for the initial choice is to set parameters to this investigation, one that principally focuses on critiques of Eurocentrism in IR. The option of working with a more expansive notion of religion is also recognized. However, it is beyond the scope of this article to fully explore the implications of an expanded notion of religion.

18 I am grateful to one of the reviewers for this important insight.
human deeds. Both the scope and intensity of colonization become intelligible once that unity is grasped. Neither the idea of progress nor outright cultural disdain for the colonized matches the force religion supplies with its easy demarcation of the existential struggle for ultimate sovereignty over this world and the world beyond. Defining the struggle over souls and land is a question of God’s sovereignty, invested in missionaries and conquistadors in equal measure. There is no separation between material and spirit rationalizations, since what unites the colonial project is providential sanction.\textsuperscript{20} The native’s soul and skin are inseparable needing erasure or Salvation.\textsuperscript{21} It is the native’s religious otherness manifested in colour that repels the invader; the native readily fits the ‘savage slot’ supplied by scripture.\textsuperscript{22} Yet, the division between the races, as Bastide notes, has deeper roots:

[But] the greatest Christian two-part division is that of white and black. White is used to express the pure, while black expresses the diabolical. The conflict between Christ and Satan, the spiritual and the carnal, good and evil came finally to be expressed by the conflict between white and black, which synthesizes all the others. Even the blind, who know only night, think of a swarm of angels or of devils in association with white and black—for example, “a black soul,” “the blackness of an action,” “a dark deed,” “the innocent whiteness of the lily,” “the candor of a child,” “to bleach someone of a crime.” These are not merely adjectives and nouns. Whiteness brings to mind the light, ascension into the bright

\textsuperscript{19} In an iconoclastic analysis of the “encounter with the religious Other” in the study of religion, Cabezón identifies three stages. In Stage I (“They are not like us”) what is “most striking to Europeans is the sheer difference of the religious Other” as reflected “in the use of the nomenclature like “savagery,” “barbarism,” “sorcery,” “idolatry” and “heathenism” as appellations of the religious Other”. In Stage II (“They are like us, but we are rational”) “the term “religion” becomes universal”. However, “the West (and Christianity) are distinguished from others “in terms of rationality and systematicity” which is lacking in others. Finally, in Stage III (“They are like us, but….”) “Like religion, rationality eventually comes to be seen as ubiquitous”. The debate shifts to “whether other cultures possess something called “philosophy” or not”. José Ignacio Cabezón, “The Discipline and Its Other: The Dialectic of Alterity in the Study of Religion”, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 74, No. 1, On the Future of the Study of Religion in the Academy (March 2006): 23-24; 21-38.

\textsuperscript{20} Las Casas’s defence of ‘Indians’ against the conquistadors relies on this sanction. As O’Gorman notes: “Las Casas’ fundamental premise is the providential concept of history: God is the efficient and mediate cause, whereas man is the immediate and instrumental cause. Thus the discovery of America appears as the fulfilment of a divine plan which was carried out by a man chosen for the purpose”. See Edmundo O’Gorman, The Invention of America: An Inquiry into the Historical Nature of the New World and the Meaning of Its History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1961), p. 19. For Las Casas see Bartolomé de Las Casas, [1552] A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies, edited and translated by Nick Griffin with an introduction by Anthony Pagden (London: Penguin Books, 1992). Insufficiently acknowledged in affirmative interpretations of Las Casas, especially in IR, is his calamitous role in another sense. “By replacing their traditional belief system with the alien system of the occupying forces”, Castro notes, Las Casas “contributed to the destruction of the world as they knew it, instead of the creation of a better world, as many claim he did”. Daniel Castro, Another Face of Empire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 179.

\textsuperscript{21} According to Osborn: “Every race has a different kind of soul - by soul is meant the spiritual, intellectual and moral reaction to environment and to daily experience - and the soul of the race is reflected in the soul of the individual that belongs to it. The racial soul is the product of thousands or hundreds of thousands of years of past experience and reaction - it is the essence or distillation of the spiritual and moral life of the race”. H.F. Osborn, Man rises to Parnasus: Critical Epochs in the Prehistory of Man (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1917), p. 186.

realm, the immaculateness of virgin snow, the white dove of the Holy Spirit, and the transparency of limpid air; blackness suggest the infernal streams of the bowels of the earth, the pit of hell, the devil’s color.\(^{23}\)

Bastide’s analysis is noteworthy to warrant amplification. Not only does religion provide rationalization for slavery, in its name black skin is perceived as “a punishment from God”. In this context, the Biblical story of Cain (responsible for the murder of his own brother) is clearly used, as was the curse inflicted upon Ham, Noah’s son, charged with finding his father, Noah, in a drunken state.\(^{24}\) Bastide connects religious symbolism to colour in general, especially its deployment in medieval works of art. For instance, an association is drawn between the colour yellow and its signification with treason. This association worked its way into Western perceptions of Asians: “The color yellow, or at least a dull shade of yellow, has come to signify treason. When Westerners think of Asians, they unconsciously transpose this significance to them, converting them into a trait of ethnic psychology.”\(^{25}\) Bastide records “the progressive Aryanization of Christ in strict accordance with the logic of color symbolism”.\(^{26}\) This is a crucial element in the consolidation of the idea of a natural affinity between Christianity and Whiteness.\(^{27}\) The colour symbolism is a pivotal aspect of religious aesthetics:\(^{28}\)

The entire history of Western painting bears witness to the deliberate whitening or bleaching effort that changed Christ from a Semite to an Aryan person. The dark hair that Christ was thought to have had came [sic] to be rendered as very light-colored, and his dark black eyes as blue. It was necessary that this man, the incarnation of God, be as far removed as possible from everything that could suggest darkness or blackness, even indirectly. His hair and his beard were given the color of sunshine, the brightness of the light above, while his eyes retained the color of the sky from which he descended and to which he returned.\(^{29}\)


\(^{24}\) Ibid. p. 314.

\(^{25}\) Ibid.

\(^{26}\) Ibid. p. 315.


\(^{29}\) Bastide, op. cit. 315. Literary theorist Loomba offers a useful commentary on medieval texts. According to Loomba (2009): “Medieval texts often feature the conversion and consequent whitening of such folks: thus, upon conversion, black Moors fantastically become white, and unbelievers find their deformed offspring transformed, as in the thirteenth-century *Cursor Mundi* or the early-fourteenth-century *The King of Tars and the Soudan of Damas*. While such transformations can be legitimately interpreted as a sign of a somewhat fluid notion of identity, at another level they can also be seen to tighten the association of particular skin color and bodily attributes with particular faiths or moral qualities, which is a central feature of racial ideologies. The equation between a particular kind of body and a particular kind of religious belief is underlined when a black
In both Protestant and Catholic interpretations of Faith, Bastide contends, there is a broadly shared view of the “association of the color black with the devil and sin”. Puritanism both deepens and strengthens “the roots of symbolic association by arousing the idea that the contagiousness of color was associated with contagiousness of sin”. However, there is divergence between the two over the question of Salvation: “But the Protestant, feeling sure that his soul would go straight to hell, placed the bulwark of Puritanism between himself and the temptation of the woman with color-tinted skin”.30 The extended history of racism cannot be fully apprehended without acknowledging the nexus between the religiously-tainted idea of impurity and discrimination.31

Sin and sexuality are also inextricably linked on the cognitive register. Their nexus, however, provokes deeper questions concerning the difficulty of separating notions of purity from those of contagion. Despite the apparent disavowal of sexuality, its presence saturates religiosity.32 These questions shepherd inquiry into broader issues of the status of the “the body” in religion (notably in Christianity). Christian theology, for instance, takes the “body” as an essential site to advance the doctrine of Incarnation and an elaborate system of ideas built around it. Caroline Walker Bynum’s important intervention offers a powerful alternative to received notions of the primacy of the soul that has structured Western conceptions of individuality. As Bynum posits:

The idea of person, bequeathed by the Middle Ages to the modern world was not a concept of soul escaping body or soul using body; it was a concept of self in which physicality was integrally bound to sensation, emotion, reasoning, identity—and therefore finally to whatever one means by salvation….Person was not person without body, and body was carrier….of what we today call individuality.33

Perhaps, it is the association of the body with (religious) personhood that gives the notion of contagion which Bastide invokes, a durable quality in exclusionary practices which pervade

Muslim is depicted as being transformed into a white Christian. Indeed, it is often through such transformations that medieval texts imply that black and white cannot easily mingle”. Ania Loomba, “Race and the Possibilities of Comparative Critique”, New Literary History, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer 2009), p. 504; pp. 501-522.

Ibid. p. 319.


For example, Maerten van Heemskerck’s mystical paintings, Man of Sorrows’ (1520-1530), according to one reviewer, are illustrative of how purity is ‘something more practice-oriented and entangled what that which it disavows’. Christianity, ‘even in its most racialized form is never fully immunitary. It involves an exposure to the other, which, at its most violent becomes exterminatory’. Similarly, Achille Mbembe’s provocative reinterpretation of the carnal aspects within religiosity disrupt easy affinities between purity and conversion. See Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkeley & London: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 212-234. As Mbembe notes: “Even asceticism, an exercise supposed to allow desire to be mastered, and the flesh and its concupiscence mortified, does not escape the carnal”, p. 234, fn. 7. These examples can be read against the backdrop of Ashis Nandy’s classic formulation of the colonial encounter in The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,. 1983). Nandy’ refusal to countenance unidirectional accounts of the colonial impact remains iconoclastic.

contemporary politics. A curious part of Bastide’s analysis is its contemporary relevance, albeit in different ‘secular’ vernaculars of enunciation, but not entirely devoid of strong religious sentiment, imagery, and political intent. However, there are no simple pathways connecting notions of contagion to outright exclusion. The ambivalence within liberal contexts between claims of hospitality and the potential hazards of inviting radical alterity, for instance, complicates the storyline.

To return to the implications of Puritan Conquistadors, progress and other Enlightenment prejudices come much later once the spiritual ground has been cleared. The shift from Deity to the human travels numerous tortuous pathways before the ascendency of the Earth over Heaven can be realized. At best, the emergence and assumed triumph of humanity over the Divine remains a partial and incomplete narrative, frequently disavowed in the face of the return of binaries of the Good and Evil, reappearing in the sanitized language of civilization and its barbarous others. The conflict between cultural and racial others over territory, presumed pasts or expected futures, can now assume a secular form, stripped of metaphysical essences. Yet, the world of immanence remains ensnared in the unfinished affairs of transcendence. God and Satan refuse to be evacuated from a domain humans regard strictly as their own. In actuality, humans confirm their inability to be sovereign without divine (or satanic) aid and abetment.

Cañizares-Esguerra offers a stark corrective to extant methodological squabbles in IR; the staged battles between Realist theoretical convictions of durable human insecurities and Constructivist stories of interpretative reality; or scuffles over the primacy of ontology over epistemology or the other way around. More basic questions return that involve the fragile character of secular modernity, the continued relevance of binaries established in/by religion, but especially the

34 According to Winant: “World history has, arguably, been racialized at least since the rise of the modern world system; racial hierarchy remains global even in the postcolonial present; and popular concepts of race, however variegated, remain in general everyday use almost everywhere”, Winant, “Race and Race Theory”, op. cit. p. 170.

35 Bastide, op. cit. p. 319.

36 According to Buell, “Modern understandings of race as inherent and immutable have been used especially to differentiate Christians from Jews, and ethnicity still serves as the common shorthand for scholars to denote distinctions between these two categories. But this is not how early Christian texts use race. Instead, many early Christian texts depict Christians as members of a race and people, like Jews, so that “race” does not mark the dividing line between Jews and Christians”. Denise Kimber Buell, “Rethinking the Relevance of Race for Early Christian Self-Definition”, The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (2001), p. 450; 449-476.

37 To be certain, race thinking has never remained static. The point that is being stressed here is the continued entanglement between religion and race. According to Banton, for instance: “In the first half of the nineteenth century the framework within which scholars contemplated the interrelations of peoples was drawn from the Old Testament. The dominant view was that all peoples descended from Adam and Eve. The word “race” was used in what now seems a loose fashion to identify many different categories of humans. That some peoples were more technologically advanced than others was seen as the will of God, the consequence of environment, or the outcome of differences in their moral life/culture, as we would now say. As the study of man’s physical nature advanced, all this changed. The conviction grew that mankind had consisted originally of a limited number of independently created races of varying capacity and with distinctive abilities. Some mixing had occurred, but it still made sense to see each man or woman as the representative of a particular race”. Michael Banton, “1960: A Turning Point in the Study of Race Relations”, Daedalus, Vol. 103, No. 2 (1974), p. 32; 31-44. On Hannaford’s interpretation, racial thinking is unthinkable without conflation of the biological with the social. Ivan Hannaford, Race: The History of an Idea in the West (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996).
imbrication of difference with a religiously-authorized Otherness. The universe of modernity is enchanted after all, not with secular deities but with the real and spectral presence of religion. Reading critiques of Western IR through the prism of *Puritan Conquistadors* radically shifts the question of the substance of IR away from the obsessive hold of Hobbesian sovereignty or the imagined liberal intimations of cosmopolitanism back to the durable imaginaries of religion that are either consistently occluded in the established canon, or approached merely with feeble intent in critiques of Eurocentrism. The absence of religion in these critiques, as noted, serves as the core theme of this essay: the surprising omission or relative neglect of the salience of religion in *the production of racial Otherness*, not only in colonial space-time, but as a durable aspect of racialization in postcolonial contexts. Despite exhortations by notable scholars for discarding the language of race\(^{\text{38}}\), neither its cognitive grip nor practice in its shadow has departed from the social and cultural fields. Calls for ‘post-racial’ awareness closely trail the expectations of liberalism that seem increasingly frail with the barricades, not open doors, defining the zeitgeist of our times. The efficacy of religion for racial differentiation may not be apparent to IR, especially in a ‘secular age’\(^{\text{39}}\), but renewed emphasis on the convergence between religion and race can reveal a picture of *determinate* entanglements, inversions, mutual reinforcements, and authorizations. From the perspective of the colonized or postcolonial subjects, however, the so-called ‘secular age’ is always already the age of religious conversions and racial differentiation.\(^{\text{40}}\)

The refurbished language of civilizational binaries, moral panic linked to the ‘swarm’ of unwelcome migrants\(^{\text{41}}\), or the normalization of revulsion towards particular religious communities in the contemporary political context of resurgent provincialism, pose striking challenges to the claims of liberalism, notions of hospitality, and cosmopolitan imaginings.\(^{\text{42}}\) The merger of religion and race recognized primarily as a feature of colonial modernity appears to return with intensity in a world presumably more connected and better aware of diversity. The long history of anti-Semitism stresses the conjoining of race and religion,\(^{\text{43}}\) but also the difficulty of separating the two.


\(^{\text{39}}\) Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). A key point missed by many commentators of Taylor’s magisterial account is his insistence on seeing secularization as a process radically transforming theology, but invoking a ‘theological’ riposte.

\(^{\text{40}}\) This point is effectively conveyed by one of the reviewers.


\(^{\text{42}}\) “Contrary to the assertions of many analysts of new racisms”, Loomba notes, “it is not the case that religion is a preracial form of difference or the “latest” form of racism or the form of difference confined to the global South; rather religion has been crucial to the development of modern forms of racism all across the globe, and in ways that we need to engage today”. Loomba, “Race and the Possibilities of Comparative Critique”, p. 508.

Islamophobia offers a contemporary example. Admittedly, the religiously-imbued racial gaze does not simply go in one direction; it invariably produces its antithesis, perhaps not as ‘refined’ or as subtle on the ‘civilizational’ ladder of its hegemonic counterpart. Hence, the buttressing of subalternity even in the discursive realm of racialization: the racialized Other lacking the capacity to properly racialize.

The confluence of territorial and spiritual conquest also brings into focus how religious practice in its diverse expressions mediates, makes, and unmakes multiple worlds that escape the strictures of a Christian framework, but also conditions the colonizing impulse. Imbricated in the entanglements of religion and race are myriad forms of Christianity that draw inspiration from it, but also fundamentally deviate from the established script. An inclusive account of the heterodox character of entanglements would, therefore, encompass both the encounter narratives, but also the creative use and disavowal of Christianity in the colonial context. An exaggerated focus on Eurocentrism fails to illuminate the mobilizing role of religion in varied spatial and temporal terrains. A powerful example of transmutation can be found in Brazilian philosopher-anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s account of the Christian encounter with the Tupi-speaking people in Sixteenth Century Brazil. Conversion and reversion of Christianity was read as evidence of the native’s inconstancy.


45 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this important insight. The remaining part of this section relies heavily on this reviewer’s comments.

Religion conditions race and the colonial project; but it is also conditioned by colonial exigency. No fixity can be attributed to the relationship between the conquest of souls and the conquest of bodies or land. An instance of fluidity can be found in Conroy-Krutz’s superb account of missionaries in their encounter with the natives. Unable to reconcile the Christian belief in a universal human community with the dictates of racial supremacy, missionaries created a “hierarchy of heathenism” to make sense of a varied cultural world.47 Similarly, the dynamic nature of the colonial encounter48 in Africa become apparent where, as Mudimbe notes, “representations of religious systems bind, fuse or oppose each other in synthetic discourses which, at a different level, might transmute into metadiscourses, such as those represented by histories of Christianity and Islam”.49

Silences

What does the so-called return of religion in IR portend for race? A favourite staple of extant thinking about religion in IR is the notion of its “return from exile”.50 This idea is questionable. The ‘return’ narrative misguides understanding of the religiously textured character of IR. It unwittingly embraces the secularization thesis in its alleged desire for repudiating that thesis. As several key early 20th century political thinkers show, what appears as ‘secular’ is neither self-subsistent nor outside the religious.51 The ‘secular’ in one instance can be read as an extension of the ‘religious’. Alternatively, the ‘secular’ can be seen as a repressed version of the religious. Religion scarcely relinquishes its presence from the political field; it only assumes secularized forms of instantiation. Hence, it materializes on new registers of sovereignty, modern subjectivity, and political community. First, within modern international space, markers of difference take on the appearance of ‘imagined

missionary’s Christianity. In Brazil, on the other hand, the word of God was eagerly welcomed with one ear and negligently ignored with the other. Here, the enemy was not a different dogma, but an indifference to dogma, a refusal to choose. Inconstancy, disinterest, forgetfulness” (p. 4). For de Castro, “The inconstancy of the savage soul, in its moment of openness, is the expression of a mode of being where exchange rather than identity is the fundamental value to be sustained” (pp. 30-31).


48 The dynamic nature of the colonial encounter is best analyzed in Ashis Nandy’s classic formulation in The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism (New Delhi: Oxford University Press., 1983). Nandy’ refusal to countenance unidirectional accounts of the colonial impact remains iconoclastic.


communities of nation and nationalism; religion must compete with the imaginary identities bequeathed by nationalism. Secondly, modern subjects are political, not cultural or religious, constructs. Religious subjectivity cannot exist outside of the political. Hence, even with the rising tide of religious symbolism, there is a downgrading of alternative (religious) sources of the Self. Finally, the horizon of transcendence increasingly shows signs of entrapment within the spatio-temporal universe of immanence. God cannot be approached outside of politics, the State, and that realm of authorization the State produces. The secularized materialization of religion merely disguises religion’s clandestine, and increasingly not-so-clandestine, presence in social and political spheres.

Extant critique of Eurocentrism in IR, which progressively gains centre-stage as a part of normal science remarkably shows only marginal curiosity in religion as a crucial element in consolidating racial and cultural otherness. In the shadow of postcolonial/Decolonial thought, this neglect seems anomalous. Upon closer inspection, however, the silences become explicable. In part, religion is often collapsed under the capacious label of ‘culture’. The axiomatic Self/Other encounter between the colonizer and the colonized passes as a meeting of cultures, a hermeneutic exercise in mutual self-discovery. Indeed, if religion marks the initial point of contact, it quickly fades into insignificance once colonization has been consummated. Encounters between the conquistadors and the indigenous inhabitants in the Americas, for instance, present themselves as unequal cultural exchanges, not as clashes between two religious cosmologies committed to rival understandings of Divine Sovereignty. In other ‘critical’ accounts in IR, though, the incommensurable cosmological field is acknowledged, but it is swiftly displaced by question of Lockean notions of property, both ‘scientific’ and ‘unscientific’ biological theories of race, or the nature/culture divide separating the colonizer’s Cartesian cognitive universe from the assumed permeability of nature and culture in the native’s planetary imaginings.

Alternatively, if particular versions of the equation of Christianity and Whiteness are entertained, not merely as a feature of colonization, but as a more durable, if implicit, element in the constitution of racial hierarchization, analyses of contemporary worlds becomes thinkable. As noted, the recent upsurge in racialized markings of political discourse, the rise in perceived danger from particular religious others, and growing unease with the presence of religious alterity—in dress, soundscape, or architecture—mixes religious and racial anxieties. The language of (Western) civilization congeals the two sets of overlapping fears to generate ever more inhospitable ‘national’ spaces. Neither religion nor race can autonomously explain the current state of xenophobia permeating the political landscape.

The re-emergence of the language and politics of hate against the memory of twentieth-century horrors also seems incredulous in globalizing times. However, if the deeper well-springs of differentiation are recognized, the possibility of historical inversions can be appreciated. Similarly, reductionist accounts of race theorists that rely principally on the ‘colour line’ can be discounted in favour of explanations that permit the idea of convergences. In the present instance, a focus on the


confluence of religion and race can offer more determinate analyses of the pervasive appeal of both the language and politics of hate. A key element of convergence is the mythic character of political communities and its others. Religion resonates with the deeper structure of myth-making and its circulation over time. These processes inevitably involve sublation (aufheben). On this view, the dance between religion and race produces potent political effects.

To contextualize, a key implication of the arrival and consolidation of Enlightenment rationalism is the disentanglement of religion from racialization, which is essentially premised on theological grounds. Hence, the triumph of Reason is meant to liberate thought from the shackles of race thinking and racism drawn from religious edicts or their interpretation. As promised in the sanctified narrative of the Enlightenment, in time the expected detachment of race from religion would unavoidably happen. However, the secularization thesis rests on the contradictory notion of religion’s decline without abandoning fundamental religious understandings of ethics, morality, notions of right and wrong. Enlightenment preserves these basic ideas in the name of Reason.

Postcolonial/Decolonial thought has consistently shown that the hegemonic story does not turn out the way it is predestined, nor is it as idyllic as recounted by true devotees of the Enlightenment, both in the wider scholarly community, or its affiliates within (Western) IR. Not only does religion demonstrate resilience, the Enlightenment successfully funnelled race to newer depths. Race and race thinking morphs into science, buttressed by the idea of history, the newly assigned place of the European Man in history, the march of progress—from nature to consciousness or the Providential journey from Africa to Europe, and eventually the mission civilisatrice. The Enlightenment elevates race to becoming the essential marker of difference, truncating humanity on scientific lines. In the name of humanism, humanity is riven apart. Race disqualifies much of humanity, sending it to the lowlands of barbarism, savagery, or nature. Without consciousness or conscience, whole continents would now recede into historical oblivion. Yet, as a limit-figure of modern Europe, these ‘areas of darkness’ are also necessary for crystallizing ‘the West’. Differentiation displaces difference, setting up rigid hierarchies now confirmed by the sleight of fictitious ethnographic evidence, climatic and biological conjectures, or in refined philosophical mappings premised on the idea of history and the unstoppable voyage of consciousness to self-consciousness. ‘Paradoxical as may seem’, Frederickson notes, ‘the rejection of hierarchy as the governing principle of social and political organization, and its replacement by the aspiration for equality in this secularist world as well as in the eyes of God, had to occur before racism could come to full flower’.


55 The relation between myth and religion needs to be perceived in dynamic terms to avoid an essentialist reading. Both myth and religion are continuously reinterpreted. However, the parameters of reinterpretation are not entirely fluid; they need to confirm to recognizable rules in each cultural environment. See Peter Heehs, “Myth, History, and Theory”, History and Theory, Vol. 33, No. 1 (February 1994): 1-19. For a classic statement on myth, see Claude Lévi-Strauss, Myth and Meaning (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. Reprint of 1978 University of Toronto Press edition.


57 George Frederickson, Racism: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 47. For a comprehensive account of the historical trajectory of race, see Hannaford, Race, op. cit. The nexus between theology and race is superbly analyzed in Carter, Race, op. cit. Also see David Goldberg, ed. Anatomy of Racism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990.)
The retelling of the Enlightenment story continues to suffuse dominant versions of Western IR, displaying few signs of temperance. Assuming new forms, the Albatross easily passes from one discursive realm to the other: from mission civilisatrice to development, from natural hierarchy to civilizational particularism. The overt language of race may no longer circulate as freely in public or scholarly discourse, but the force of race thinking perseveres. In its generic simplicity, race thinking insistently highlights cultural deficiency as the master explanation of failed states, poverty and destitution, and political volatility in large swathes of the non-Western world. Implicitly, cultural deficiency in the non-West endorses European (now Western) exceptionalism and its cultural correlates. As Dubois stresses, there was ‘a complex and contradictory tangle of Enlightenment intellectual currents that both celebrated universality of the human race and put forth hierarchical and differentialist theories about different groups that are often of startling arrogance and racism’.  

With Enlightenment, as Buell notes, an inversion seems to have transpired in the relation between religion and race:

Modern notions of race as they emerged in Romanticism defined race as natural, heritable, and immutable; by the late nineteenth century, this organic understanding of race had been produced as objective, authoritative knowledge by the newly dominant disciplinary practices of the biological sciences. As the academic discipline of the comparative and historical study of religion emerged in the late nineteenth century, these understandings of race were used to define and classify religions, especially to mark the dividing line between “particular” and “universal” religions.

In place of “the Christian/not-Christian differentiation”, Buell notes, “alternative articulations of difference (especially biologically-based explanations)” emerged. Their principal purpose was “to justify slavery and the displacement of native peoples but also to restrict immigration”. A view shared by many other scholars of the downgrading of religiously-based racism, Buell sees the adoption of “scientific racism” by the end of the nineteenth century “as the dominant theoretical model of imagining human differences as natural and immutable”.

As a contested concept, ‘race’ is inseparable from the cognitive spaces produced in time. Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin offer a very useful characterization of the term: “‘Race’ is a term for the classification of human beings into physically, biologically and genetically distinct groups. The notion of race assumes, firstly, that humanity is divided into unchanging natural types, recognizable by physical features that are transmitted ‘through the blood’ and permit distinctions to be made between ‘pure’ and ‘mixed’ races. Furthermore, the term implies that the mental and moral behaviour of human beings, as well as individual personality, ideas and capacities, can be related to racial origin, and that knowledge of that origin provides a satisfactory account of the behaviour”. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, Post Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts (London and New York: Routledge, 2002[1998]), p. 198. Also see Cedric Dover, ‘Race: The Uses of the Word’, Man 95 (April 1951). For an analysis of race in contemporary politics, see Mike Cole, Racism: A Critical Analysis (London: Pluto Press, 2015). David N. Livingstone effectively tackles the question of racial classifications in “Cultural Politics and the Racial Cartographies of Human Origins”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 35, No. 2 (April 2010), pp. 204-221.


60 Ibid. p. 455.
Hence, the relation between religion and race is not unidirectional;\textsuperscript{61} inversions are possible with race conditioning religious differentiation. Hegemonic accounts of the Enlightenment affirm the secularization of consciousness in linear terms. Once released from spiritual bondage, the narrative proposes, humanity requires new standards of classification, differentiation, and measurement.\textsuperscript{62} Religion no longer supplies the rationale of separation; reason and its spatio-temporal framing do. The divide between Light and Darkness drawn in scripture and religious practice metamorphoses into Civilization and Barbarism, between those with history and self-consciousness and those without either history or consciousness. Enlightenment’s totem-pole requires no religious inscriptions. Yet, it is the Enlightenment that consolidates both the idea of race and rationalizes its uses in the service of differentiation and empire.\textsuperscript{63} The hegemonic account is resolute on an irreversible break between religious and secular worlds. This story is consecrated in the Westphalian myth with an endless supply of buyers in the Western IR community. Even those who serve as the vanguard of critique against IR’s multi-faceted Eurocentrism find few traces of religion in the fabrication of race. The critique of Westphalia or scientific racism escapes the crucial, ‘foundational’ role of religion in cartographies of difference.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{61} According to Long: “While the reformist structure of the Enlightenment had mounted a polemic against the divisive meaning of religion in Western culture and set forth alternate meanings for the understanding of the human, the same ideological structures through various intellectual strategies paved the ground for historical and evolutionary thinking, racial theories, and forms of color symbolism that made the economic and military conquest of various cultures and peoples justifiable and defensible”. Charles H. Long [1986], \textit{Significations: Signs, Symbols, and Images in the Interpretation of Religion} (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1995), p. 4. A major point in this outstanding book is not only the indivisibility of religion and race, but its presence in thinking itself.

\textsuperscript{62} As Augstein notes: “Nineteenth-century racial theory combines several elements: the first is the notion that mankind is divisible into a certain number of ‘races’ whose characteristics are fixed and defy modifying influences of external circumstances. Secondly, it contains the idea that the intellectual and moral capacities may be unevenly spread within the various human races. Thirdly, it advocates the notion that mental endowments are bound up with certain physiognomical specificities which, being defined as racial characteristics, are considered to reveal the inward nature of the individual or the population in question.” H.F. Augstein, ed., \textit{Race: The Origins of an Idea, 1760-1850} (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996), pp. ix-x.

\textsuperscript{63} Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, ed. \textit{Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader} (Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1997). According to Eze, “[T]he Enlightenment’s declaration of itself as “the Age of Reason” was predicated precisely upon the assumption that reason could historically only come to maturity in modern Europe, while the inhabitants of areas outside Europe, who were considered to be of non-European racial and cultural origins, were consistently described and theorized asrationally inferior and savage”, (p. 4). Also see Robert Bernasconi, ‘Who invented the Concept of Race? Kant’s Role in the Enlightenment Construction of Race’, in Robert Bernasconi (ed.), \textit{Race} (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 11-36; and Susan-Buck-Mors, \textit{Hegel, Haiti and Universal History} (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009). Buck-Morss’s monograph is an expanded version of the argument spelled out in her path-breaking article, “Hegel and Haiti”, \textit{Critical Inquiry}, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Summer 2000): 821-865.

\textsuperscript{64} Hobson’s far-reaching critique of Eurocentrism is silent on religion. A similar problem informs Vitalis’s important account. See John M. Hobson, \textit{The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics}, op. cit. Vitalis, \textit{White World Order, Black Power Politics}, op. cit.
Parallelism

Whilst the amnesia Krishna notes may not be as acute today with the rediscovery of race in Critical International Relations (IR), the new awareness still remains marginal to the discipline. Similarly, greater appreciation of the pervasiveness of religion in international life has dramatically changed the contours of engagement. To contextualize, until quite recently, IR theory has long harboured the conviction that with the Protestant compromise, religion would eventually abandon the (public) social, political, and cultural terrains and inhabit principally the private realm. Once enshrined solely within the European archive, the modularity of this compromise ensured global diffusion of its universal appeal. Those less enchanted with the Westphalian universal merely sanctioned the persistence of pre-modern pathology: material and cultural stagnation, bigotry and intolerance, and political immaturity.

The stubbornness of religion, it’s assumed resurfacing from deathly slumber, or worldwide resurgence, however, has largely exposed the fragile claims of the Enlightenment, but especially European particularism, including its limited appeal even within the European cultural sphere. Religion’s alleged resurrection in the political sphere has reopened the perceptual field to re-examination of IR’s Enlightenment inheritance. Yet, the confluence of religion and race in the postsecular setting still remains either poorly recognized or not adequately catechised in received accounts.

Critical IR has produced a sizeable archive of postcolonial/Decolonial thought, one that highlights Eurocentric impulses in theory and method. Critiques of Eurocentrism in Western IR continue to supply new pathways to probe the foundational myths of the discipline as a vital part of critical awareness. Recent work has also helped produce alternative historical trajectories suppressed in received accounts. On a separate footing, there is a growing repudiation of secularist Western framings of identity and politics. The apparent puzzle is the emergence of two parallel tracks that rarely show any signs of either merger or dialogue.

---

65 Krishna, “Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations”, op. cit.

66 Meditations of race are not a late arrival to theorizing in IR. In fact, they lie at its philosophical core. For a ground-breaking statement by one of Europe’s greatest philosophers, see Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* [1798], translated by Victor Lyle Dowdell (Southern Illinois University Press, 1996). For a sustained analysis of Kant’s association with European racism, see Bernasconi, ‘Who invented the Concept of Race?’ op. cit. Mark Larrimore, ‘Sublime Waste: Kant on the Destiny of the “Races”’, in Catherine Wilson ed., *Civilization and Oppression* (Calgary University Press, 1999), pp. 99-125. This is how Kant characterizes natives Americans in *Toward Perpetual Peace*, the sacred text for modern cosmopolitans: “That their temperament has not become entirely adequate to any climate can also be inferred from the fact that it is hard to find any other reason why this race, which is too weak for hard labour and too indifferent for industrious work, and which is incapable of any culture even though there are enough examples and encouragement in the vicinity [namely, the example set by the European colonial settlers], stands far below even the Negro, who occupies the lowest of all other levels which we have mentioned as racial differences” 8: 176. For a provocative reading of the location of the “negro” in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, see Ronald Judy, “Kant and the Negro”, *Surfaces*, Vol. 1, No. 8. [http://philosophy.eserver.org/judy-kant.pdf](http://philosophy.eserver.org/judy-kant.pdf) Accessed on 14 January 2017.

The first track, drawn from postcolonial/Decolonial thought, attempts to expose the Eurocentric character of the discipline. Critical interrogation provides an impressive inventory of silences and exclusions concerning either race or culture, or both, that underwrites disciplinary IR. Succumbing to poststructuralism or resisting its seductive appeal, postcolonial/Decolonial thought has produced sharp analyses of the complicity of knowledge and empire. The problem of difference in these accounts lies at the core of dismantling self-serving (and largely self-referential) theorizations of the international. The principal finding in postcolonial/Decolonial readings is the tenuous nature of theorization of difference. Failing to recognize coloniality or differentiation, hegemonic accounts merely recycle the “colonizer’s model of the world”, it presents modernity as European exceptionalism, divorced from world history and Europe’s colonial adventure.

A key problem with virtually all extant variants of critique of Eurocentrism in IR, however, is that they typically conflate culture and race. In general, culture and race tend to be used interchangeably, discounting not only analytical difference, but more significantly, their divergent, albeit overlapping, genealogies. The problem of conflation between culture and race is compounded by the silencing of religious difference, but also apathy towards the imbrication of religion in the constitution of (cultural or racial) difference. In sum, critics of disciplinary IR have largely unnoticed the interconnection between religion and race. In general, postcolonial critics see this interconnection principally as a feature of the pre-history of modernity. Enlightenment thinking discovers new philosophical principles, not religion, to rationalize Europe’s marginalization and dehumanization of difference. Paradoxically, critique of Enlightenment racism unsuspectingly embraces the underlying secularization narrative of modernity. On this view, religion seems to lose its grip in servicing exclusions with the advent of modernity. The possibility of inversion, as previously mentioned, is not entertained.

On an alternative reading, repudiation of the secularization thesis has already placed into doubt the assumed marginalization of religion under conditions of modernity in its early or late instantiations. In the contemporary national and international settings, particularly, the not-so-subtle racialization of religion is inseparable from religiously-coded differentiation most pervasive in the language of (Western) civilization. The latent secularity in postcolonial/Decolonial thought is intelligible on its contradictory relation to humanism. On the one hand, humanism (and the commitment to

---


68 Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference, op. cit.


70 This echoes Loomba’s caution: “Religious difference is understood to be rooted in culture, affiliated to discourses of faith and belief rather than those of the body, and therefore, at least theoretically, less rigid. But the history of racial formations testifies not to neat separation between these categories but to their deep interconnection; without such interconnection we cannot understand the very development of what is now referred to as “scientific” racism”. See, Loomba, “Race and the Possibilities of Comparative Critique”, op. cit. p.503.

71 As mentioned Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference; and Grovogui, “Come to Africa”, op. cit. are important exceptions.

universal equality) provides the justification for critique. It is the denial of co-evalness across races and cultures that diminishes humanity. Yet, on the other hand, “thicker” forms of identity often ensconced in (imagined or symbolic) religious identities are occluded in the humanist frame. Humanism renders all transcendental claims subordinate to the regime of immanence. Hence, the secular/religious divide reinforces differentiation. This is the unintended consequence of humanist belief. Convinced of its superior ethical horizon, humanism ends up accentuating division within humanity between those with Reason and others embracing Faith.

The second track, postsecular thinking, has a more recent timeline. Drawing mainly from philosophy, the ‘postsecular turn’ captures various strands of thought. Different variants of postsecular thinking serve as ciphers of a new variant of counter-Enlightenment, albeit, cognizant of wider cultural worlds outside Europe or the West. In part, postsecular thinking is a response to the apparently unexpected global reappearance of religion in the public sphere. Recognizing a secular bias in political thought, the language of the postsecular appeals to the need for re-problematizing religion. At a more basic level, however, postsecular thinking is a continuation of early twentieth-century secularism. The sources of humanism run deep, especially the theological notion of monogenesis, an idea that can also be interpreted effectively to condone conversion. As Loomba notes: “It is often suggested that it was the medieval and early modern belief in monogenesis—the notion that all human beings were, in the words of St. Augustine, “Adam’s progeny [protoplastos]”—that more readily admitted the possibility of the conversion of non-Christians to Christianity than the later theory of polygenesis, which was itself shaped in and through colonial history, especially the discovery of the New World, and that made possible the conception of different human groups as distinct species (504). Augustine writes: “If they be definable to be reasonable creatures and mortal, they must be acknowledged to be Adam’s issue.” St. Augustine, Of the Citie of God, trans. John Healey (London: George Eld, 1610), “Race and the Possibilities of Comparative Critique”, op. cit., pp. 580-582.

Desecularizing postcolonial/Decolonial thought, therefore, becomes undeniably a crucial step towards epistemic decolonization.


The literature on the so-called “return” of religion in IR is vast and growing. For some important contributions see John D. Carlson and Erik C. Owen, eds., The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003; Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Petito and Hatzopoulos, eds., Religion in International Relations, op. cit.; Scott Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2005). For an anticipation of this trend, see Peter L. Berger, Ed. The Desecularization of the
century debates over the character of modernity. A key element in those debates revolves around the ‘secularized’, not secular, character of political modernity. The presence of religion, on one side, is demonstrable in conceptions of sovereignty and authority or in notions of human rights, morality, and justifications for war. On the other side, political modernity represents a basic rupture from religion, attached to the flowering of Reason, not Faith. The postsecular turn, however, concerns not only the continued presence of religion, but its mutation, reflected in newer notions of the Self and society. On a postsecular reading, religion merely becomes another mode of being within a largely secular(ized) world.

In the sphere of IR theory, postsecular thinking stresses IR’s failure to acknowledge its religious origins or to adequately recognize religious phenomena without relying on the binary ‘religious-secular’ logic drawn from secularization theorists. Above all, postsecular theorizations turn the gaze towards the difficulty, if not impossibility, of purging religion from the social and political worlds. A key implication of recognizing religion as a durable feature of these worlds is the openness towards religious alterity. Tacitly rejecting the equation of modernity and secularism, recognition of religious difference afforded by postsecular sensitivity can expand the hermeneutic register without advancing cultural hierarchies. Yet, postsecular thinking has been largely trapped within (Western) cultural fetters, unable to acknowledge difference on its own terms. Furthermore, postsecular silence over the question of race impedes its appeal.

The two tracks identified above seem to demonstrate remarkable indifference towards each other. Hence, critiques of Eurocentrism rarely admit the presence of a robust postsecular world or its theorization. Similarly, postsecular warriors walk away from critics of Eurocentrism in IR with serene disregard. The postsecular turn’s obsessive regard for the religious is matched equally by its unawareness of questions of race or racialization. Acknowledgement of religious others or respect for persistent forms of religiosity within Europe appear to serve for them as an adequate surrogate for race. Unacknowledged in these (postsecular) formulations is the paternalistic gaze that inescapably informs theoretical encounters with difference. The relative simplicity with which the question of race is subsumed under the capacious category of the religious only confirms the persistent difficulty of examining race and religion in unison.

Conclusion

The persistence of durable forms of racial differentiation is a continuous reminder of colour-blindness in IR. Recent critiques of Eurocentrism in IR increasingly recognize not only the differentiated nature of the international, but of theory’s inability to escape its cultural constrictions. These constrictions are deeply embedded in ontological, epistemological, and


77 This sentiment is pronounced in the Charles Taylor’s, magisterial work, A Secular Age, op. cit.

78 This cultural shortcoming is noticeable in Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, op. cit. and his inability to step out of the confines of Western rationalism.

79 Alexander Anievas, Nivi Machanda, and Robbie Shilliam, eds. Race and Racism in International Relations, op. cit.

80 Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference, op. cit.
methodological assumptions of all versions of IR theory.\textsuperscript{81} As noted, awareness of Eurocentrism in IR increasingly serves as an acceptable supplement to received Orthodoxy without threatening the latter’s grip on theoretical practice. The normalization of critique is largely an inescapable feature of its self-referentiality and separation from politics.

In turn, critiques of the “secularization thesis” reflected both in the so-called “return” of religion and the postsecular turn have exposed the provincial character of IR theory. The persistent and pervasive existence of religious sensibilities within and across ‘national’ boundaries also exposes ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions of dominant versions of IR theory. These assumptions are usually read, either as the manifestation of the secular character of IR theory, or contrariwise as confirmation of an indelible imprint of the Protestant compromise (enshrined in the Westphalian myth in IR).

International practice, though, increasingly manifests the confluence of religion and race and the difficulty of separating the two in explaining processes of differentiation and exclusion. Without adequate recognition of religion in critiques of Eurocentrism and sufficient appreciation of race in postsecular theorization, the two frames of capture are likely to remain apart. In the first instance, critiques of Eurocentrism in IR cannot pretend to fully disown Enlightenment’s spatio-temporal horizon whilst wedded to its secular commitments. In the second instance, postsecular thinking risks reproducing its own version of Eurocentrism without recognizing race as a crucial marker of differentiation, not reducible to religious difference. A dialogical encounter and convergence between the two registers of critique can provide new openings for understanding.

\textsuperscript{81} Hobson, \textit{The European Conception of World Politics}, op. cit.