CHALLENGING VICTOR BIAS AND STATUS QUO BIAS IN REALIST ACCOUNTS OF SURRENDER

Re-Reading Three Cases of Surrender from the Peloponnesian War

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Summary

From a materialist realist perspective, when a state surrenders power preponderance considerations, that is a state’s relative weakness in terms of material power, should provide the bulk of the explanation for the surrender. Yet, weak states have surrendered quickly and slowly and on occasion have done so only to soon challenge their conquerors. This thesis is driven by a puzzle concerning whether material power and (actual or projected) victory in war can explain logics of surrender and, if not, what this may mean for our understanding of surrender, realism and IR more widely. This study focuses our attention on the fact that surrendering highlights that realism’s core assumption - that states seek survival - is in fact underspecified and problematic. On one hand, state survival seen as autonomy is theoretically paradoxical because in practice it can be easily sacrificed in some instances of surrender. On the other hand, survival as autonomy is underspecified since under different conditions it can be traded off at too high a price making state death and annihilation a real possibility. Recognition of this is evaded in standard realist approaches. This thesis develops a perspective on surrender which shares some aspects of a cost-benefit approach characteristic of realism, the Strategic Choice Approach (SCA), but innovates by not assuming an abstract view of rationality. Guided by SCA, this thesis problematises surrendering and seeks to explain surrendering from the actor’s own perspective. To explicate surrendering we concentrate on three case studies focused on analysis of surrendering in ancient Greece. The thesis argues that states’ logic of surrendering relates not only to appeasement and opportunistic bandwagoning but also to such non-realist reasons such as gratitude, seduction and recognition. If we do not start from realist assumptions, argued here to be characterised by victor bias and which lead to status quo bias, we can observe certain reasonable, ethically-inspired, and at the same time high-risk actions in the surrendering logics of states. The case studies of surrendering developed here explain both delayed and very fast surrendering and account for the surprising rise of instability in response to some surrenders. Overall, it demonstrates that non-material and psychological factors can over-ride concerns about physical security. This analysis of surrender highlights the potential weaknesses of realist theoretical assumptions when applied to study of surrender and demonstrates that close analysis of surrender logics allows us to better understand not only war and stability but also what is at stake in how we approach theorising IR.
For my family, my extended family, and Kiki
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close enough to warrant more questions. This was the raw material from which my doubts were built and my self-questioning about the limits of realist thinking was energised. This led me to wonder about why social classes manage to compromise domestically and agree to forge a state still divided by class and other conflicting interests. At the international level I wondered what would be the equivalent of this domestic political consideration. What kind of compromise states strike that is reminiscent of the stabilisation of class warfare in domestic politics? The elaboration of this idea came from yet another metaphor my Professor was using when he was teaching us European Integration. He was referring to states in the European Union as if they had committed ‘suicide’. This expression has never left me. I have been wondering about other types of ‘suicide’ ever since. Eventually, I began exploring cases of surrender. So, my undergraduate and graduate years have really been formative years and I owe that to this inspiring Professor.

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“[I]t is just as much in men's nature to rule those who submit to them, as it is to resist those who molest them”

Hermocrates (Thucydides, 4.61)
Introduction

The problem of survival\(^1\), according to Martin Wight, is the focus of the discipline of International Relations (IR) and there is perhaps no one more concerned about survival than those who surrender or are defeated in war (Wight, 1960). Whole civilisations rise and fall and war is the final arbiter between those who win and those who lose. War and war endings are paramount in the lives of nations and individuals, in the lives of those who reign victorious and those who suffer defeat. The study of war in IR has been at the epicentre of the discipline since its inception and the idea that “every war has a winner” and, hence, a loser too, is widely shared (Baldwin, 2013). Expressions that range from Pyrrhic victory to Carthaginian peace remind us of the importance of victory and surrender in the lives of peoples and states, and of how we categorise and understand events in history. The study of the causes of war in IR has been guided by a genuine and constant concern with war and the hope to avoid the disasters of conflicts, disasters which are felt by both victors and defeated.

Despite the undeniable connection between victory and defeat, between war and war termination and between winning and surrendering, the paucity of research on the topic of surrendering is remarkable\(^2\). This thesis explores how close the idea of surrendering is to its opposite idea: victory. People are interested in winning wars not losing wars. Yet, in order to win a war it must come to an end and one of the persistent contemporary problems is protracted wars. Wars are neither easy to end nor is the elimination of war in sight. In spite of elegies about the forthcoming ‘termination’ of war, the only terminations we keep seeing are these of some individual wars and not that of war itself (Coker, 2014a; Mueller, 2009). The study of war endings should take centre stage. The study of surrendering should not be abandoned to the study of the causes of war and the pursuit of victory. For as long as we pursue the ending of wars, a study of surrender is indispensable for the fundamental topic of IR, war.

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\(^1\) For a discussion of the survival assumption in IR see Howes work (Howes, 2003).

\(^2\) One of the few studies on surrendering is the edited volume on How Fighting Ends by Strachan and Afflerbach (Afflerbach & Strachan, 2012). However, this is a collection of historical studies and not and IR study.
The same limited scholarship on the topic of surrender is exemplified by political realism too despite its traditional interest in the analysis of war. It is indicative of realism’s research focus that for Morgenthau all research that was not at least indirectly related to the struggle for power and peace was trivial (Vasquez, 2004, p. 37; Morgenthau, 1975). Yet, the study of surrendering has been largely neglected. Realists have studied causes of war, hegemonic wars and the remaking of world orders, the relationship between polarity and war, alliances, the origins of major wars and the prevention of major wars but hardly surrendering per se (van Evera, 1999; Gilpin, 1981; Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987; Schweller, 1994; Rotberg & Rabb, 1988; Rotberg & Rabb, 1988). Realists have preferred, instead, to focus on the strategies of appeasement and bandwagoning rather than the study of surrendering in and of itself (Schweller, 1997, p. 928). Some pioneers like Thomas Schelling and Alexander George from a previous generation have made pertinent inroads by studying coercive bargaining but this is not identical to surrendering and does not aim to explain war termination outcomes and they did so from a rational perspective (Schelling, 1984; George, 1991; George, 1993; Art, 2003). Recently and mainly motivated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan some realists have studied how wars end but these studies are both limited in number and their concern is not identical with that of surrender (Rose, 2010).

Despite this interest in war termination, it is surprising that, in the field of IR, there has been limited discussion about the implications of thorough studies of war termination for realism as a theory. For instance, Gideon Rose seems to take for granted that neoclassical realism explains war termination well (Rose, 2010). Robert Art, in his concluding chapter of his edited volume The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, largely restates George’s past findings and does not investigate any broader theoretical implications for realism (Art, 2003). In contrast, this thesis has taken as its central research question a different concern: what

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3 Work on compellence does not focus on the end result of war. It is interesting because it emphasises strategic interactions as the strategic approach used here but, as Lebow argues, employs a restrictive rational amoral model of analysis and it has underdeveloped connections with IR theory (Lebow, 1996; Reich & Lebow, 2014, pp. 29-30). The seminal work here is Thomas Schelling’s 1966 volume Arms and Influence (Schelling, 1966, pp. 69-91). Compellence is the efforts to try and get another state to do something that it would not otherwise do by manipulating costs and benefits. This can include both diplomatic and military means. The higher the stakes the more difficult it is for compellence to succeed. However, strategic works that are influenced by Schelling are useful to explain some instances of war initiation, but, understandably given their research focus, “fall short of explaining the final outcome for most cases of asymmetric inter-state conflict” (Haun, 2015, p. 3). Moreover, such analyses have received wide criticism given the big literature on the related concept of deterrence. More importantly though, these studies are often useful as ‘how to’ guides for policy makers but ignore the implications for IR theory and for the broader foreign policy goals of states (Bratton, 2005, pp. 99, 115).
problems characterise neorealist and neoclassical realist attempts to explain surrender and how might we approach surrender?

The central argument of this thesis is that when we recognise some central problems in realist accounts of surrender, and adopt a wider perspective to study of surrender open to multiple factors affecting strategic decisions, we come to see that states surrender not only to guarantee physical survival but also a degree of recognition⁴. These two causes can work together or against each other and demonstrate the role of important dynamics that defy neorealist and neoclassical realist logics of surrender which rely on material power, fear and profit. Recognition in the case studies at hand depends on perceptions of justice and social identity which also depends on degree of attachment to a great power. Recognition also relates to social coherence and social mobilisation which affect the willingness and potential of resistance; that is, the calculus of power; a calculus that realism has largely neglected or perceived as more static than it is. Emotions beyond fear, realism’s fundamental emotion, also play a significant role in influencing the defending actor’s perceptions of recognition and its willingness for risk-taking.

This thesis then seeks to set out a new way of looking at surrender. Surrender is important because it gives a picture of what makes power effective or ‘convincing’. It highlights the importance of interactions in influencing risk-taking propensity and eventually outcomes even in life and death situations. Studying surrendering as a process, that is, bringing into consideration how past and present interactions drive current decisions, avoids a certain degree of presentism and elucidates the impact of psychological factors that relate both to the present situation as well as to the past. In other words, we should be concerned not predominantly with the uncertainty of future intentions⁵, as realists are, but also the impact of past interactions and how the present gives meaning to them. This contributes to analysis of surrender in general, analysis of realism, debates on classical realism and honour, dialogues on unipolarity, and discussions on contradictory ways of using Waltz’s theory and nature of theory in general.

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⁴ For a succinct analysis of recognition and what is at stake in the theoretical debates see Bartelson’s study on the three concepts of recognition (Bartelson, 2013). This thesis will elaborate on this concept in the last empirical chapter.

⁵ Dale Copeland has recently written, from a realist perspective, extensively about the uncertainty of future intentions (Copeland, 2000; Copeland, 2003; Copeland, 2011).
The Puzzle

Realists endorse the view that the powerful forge peace according to their interests, their rules, their institutions, and their justice. It is curious, however, that even though they expect force to be able to have such an effect, they at the same time moderate their claims. They say that power is not always absolutely effective. On one hand, realists seem to endorse their baseline argument about peace and power according to which power seems largely effective. On the other hand, in practice, they recommend, that it is not exactly like this. As will be explored in more detail in this thesis, it seems that realists believe in what Oliver Richmond calls “victor’s peace”. Even as they on occasion claim that force cannot achieve everything (Richmond, 2008, p. 40; Waltz, 1967, p. 227), it is unclear how well such a notion fits with realist theories, since realists also argue that legitimacy, authority or prestige are mere manifestations of material power (Gilpin, 1981, p. 35; Lebow, 2008, pp. 22-23). Prestige, for example, is “largely a function of economic and military capabilities, and achieved primarily through the successful use of power, and especially through victory in war” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 35). In other words, victor’s peace is shaped by nothing else than power and victory in war. Similarly, Waltz argues that in war “the external situation” is the one thing that dominates (Waltz, 1967, p. 201). It would not be illogical to expect that, just as in war the external situation dominates, so it does in unipolarity, with states bandwagoning with the powerful superpower. Indeed, realists have not shied away from reaching such conclusions. William Wohlforth “believes that the power preponderance of the United States will lead all states in the system to bandwagon with the unipole” (Monteiro, 2011/12, p. 39). For realists, the tendency to create order and peace and to have other states bandwagoning with the hegemon is merely a function of power or power and victory in war. In cases of war where the external situation dominates this is even more pronounced; that is, power and not authority is doing all or the bulk of the explanation.

While realism is a nuanced and diverse perspective, something which we are not able to fully explore in this thesis, our aim is to make a specific contribution to thinking about realism. Our aim is not to reject realism but to show that there is a kind of inconsistency between what realists argue theoretically and what they ‘preach’ practically. This is not the only criticism of realists’ internal contradictions regarding their view of international order and their views on how to attain it. For example, international historian Marc Trachtenberg has also highlighted
the ambiguity between realists’ belief in cut-throat policies due to the international system being the realm of power and their reliance on power for moderation for the same reason too (Trachtenberg, 2012, pp. 3-43; Trachtenberg, 2003). We make a related argument about realism’s victor bias but we do not aim, like Trachtenberg does, to solve this conundrum by objectifying the ‘right’ view of the international system. We suspect such a view is unobtainable. What we focus on here, and a claim we will unfold in chapter 1, *War, Surrender and Realism*, is that realism’s victor bias vis-à-vis its understanding of war and peace leads to a problematic approach for the study of surrender.

By victor bias we mean that realists judge what is prudent based on a consequentialist logic that favours great powers because they are materially powerful. They exclude authority and other forms of power from their purview and end up too close to a great-power-centric view of the world, portraying the weak either as impotent or as foolish. This is not far away from the mind-set of great powers. They try to dominate weaker states and expect them to be ‘prudent’ and ‘rational’ and surrender on the basis of the discrepancy in power between two parties. This would not be a problem if the world was full of cases like Melos in the Peloponnesian War; but states surrender for a variety of reasons, it seems, which realist logics are unable to grapple with.

The puzzle that drives this thesis is that, as we observe, the world is not full of cases like Melos, and, as a result, it seems that realism’s victor bias may be preventing realists from finding it worthwhile to study such cases of surrender in detail. Even though there are cases where states literally risk their survival, with different rates of success, realists have a limited interest in examining the implications of this for their theories despite the fact that survival is the fundamental assumption of their theories. This thesis doubts whether realists can understand surrender with the assumptions they come to it with; survival and victor’s peace, which both sustain victor bias. It sets out to investigate the problems that characterise realist attempts to explain surrender and how we might approach surrender in a better way, while being attuned to strategic reasoning. The argument at the end of this examination is that realists not only misunderstand what surrender is about but also war and international relations more generally.
Context of the Thesis in IR Literature

This thesis is positioned in the literature on realism in IR and is related with the broader literature on war, power and war termination. War and power, it is widely acknowledged, are an important focal point in IR analyses and in realism as well. In IR and in realism we have studied hegemonic wars, hegemonic transitions, causes of war, the stability of international systems but what seems to still elude us is the ending of wars and in particular surrender (Gilpin, 1988; Levy, 1985; Suganami, 1996; van Evera, 1999; Levy & Thompson, 2010; Deutsch & Singer, 1964; Rosecrance, 1966; Singer, et al., 1972; Waltz, 1979; Gillespie & Zinnes, 1982; Keohane, 1984; Wagner, 1993; Wohlfarth, 1999; Monteiro, 2011/12; Monteiro, 2014). Surrender is an important part of equations in understanding war, power, peace/stability and change in IR, it is argued here. Yet, for the large part it is neglected as a focus in IR.

This thesis acknowledges the expanding universe of innovative research questions posed by the war termination literature, takes stock of the importance of strategic interactions and of the complex nature of the relationship between the will of the combatants and political and military developments, and shares concerns about the dichotomous view of concepts such as victor/vanquished and victory/defeat (Goemans, 2000; Wagner, 2000; Reiter, 2009; Stanley, 2009; Weisiger, 2013).

That said, the important literature on war termination, as useful as it is, it is argued here that, not unlike realism, it suffers from a limited emphasis on the ‘will of the other’. While engagement with this literature, undertaken in chapter 1, demonstrates a varying acknowledgment of the complexity and importance of the ‘will of the other’ in conflict, it is shown in this thesis that non-material determinants receive reduced attention. A more systematic analysis of the will of the other as found in scholars like Coker and Coser is missing and Jervis’ related remark that the willingness of the other to bear pain is a paradoxical aspect of power remains underexplored in the academic literature (Coker, 1997; Coser, 1961; Jervis, 2011b, p. 408).

This study is interested in surrender but specifically with realist attempts to grapple with surrender as a process. The central puzzle that drives this thesis concerns whether material power and actual or projected victory in war can explain logics of surrender and, if not, what
this may mean for our understanding of surrender, realism and IR more widely. Chapter 1 explores the problems with realist approach to surrender and the realist concept of surrender will then be problematised in the case studies in order to avoid realism’s victor bias and to focus on the underestimated significance of the will of weak states and grasp logics of surrender. This research is problem-driven but seeks to make a theoretical contribution. The aim is to explain the case studies at hand and address the puzzle of whether realists can understand surrender with the assumptions they come to study of war with.

Critique of realism is no new thing in IR: realism has been much criticised in IR for its assumptions. Liberals argue that realism ignores the transformational impact of international institutions and see more opportunities for international cooperation (Jervis, 1999). Constructivists offer cogent criticisms but those who follow Wendt suffer from a kind of cultural determinism and those who criticise realism for being inimical to culture misunderstand Waltz and ignore more fertile routes for criticism (Goddard & Nexon, 2005). Feminists criticise realism’s view of power and of the state but they have largely distanced themselves from realism (Tickner, 1988).

This thesis concurs with them in that there are theoretical and assumption based problems in realism. However, the focus here is on contending with the theoretical and empirical problems specifically of realist attempts to deal with surrender, the logics of surrender. More specifically, this thesis attempts a compound criticism of realism that combines its view of peace, its view of power and authority, its view of power as domination, and its view of the other. Ultimately, it endeavors a composite appraisal of realism on its own fundamental problematique, “survival/war”, by focusing on what realism seems to marginalise rather unproblematically: the determinants of the will of the weak other beyond threats and opportunism and the ambiguity in the assumption of survival (Sterling-Folker, 2009, p. 110).

When it comes to winning, one needs to consider that one wins over another actor and not in the abstract. Winning always comes with an ‘object’; winning over this ‘other’. Arguably, it is this ‘other’ that needs to submit in order for the winning side to win. Despite Robert Jervis’ admonition that “[p]ower is subject to a limitation: success usually depends on others’ decisions”, realists seem to ignore the victor bias this thesis highlights and continue theorising like if it did not matter (Jervis, 2009b, p. 210). However, if making the enemy admit defeat is potentially a crucial determinant of victory beyond the impact of the effect of
material power and military victory in war, as this thesis argues, then realism’s victor bias obscures something possibly powerful: the effectiveness of victory, the success in imposing one’s will, the fragility of victory, factors that increase the possibility of recurring wars, and overall the effectiveness of material power. Therefore, examining the will of the other in cases of surrender represents a take on a series of consequential topics seen through the study of the puzzle of surrender. The study helps us define what can and cannot be achieved realistically in surrender and wherever the will of the other matters.

Given the lack of realist theories of surrender, the closest competing realist explanations are basically two theories of alliances. Walt’s Balance of Threat and Schweller’s Balance of Interest (Walt, 1987; Schweller, 1994). These two theories argue that states bandwagon either as a response to threat or for profit. Schweller makes the point that Walt’s view of bandwagoning is a form of strategic surrender or capitulation (Schweller, 1994, p. 79; Schweller, 1997, p. 928). Therefore, it is a suitable realist contender for a theory of surrender. Schweller’s theory, unlike Walt’s, argues that states bandwagon for profit and that this strategy is not a response to a threat. In this sense, it does not fit well with the puzzle of surrender. However, Schweller’s view is important because one could follow his logic and claim that a state faced with a threat and given an opportunity to bandwagon would do so out of a combination of fear and profit. His theory would explain the profit side of the ‘equation’. What is crucial here is to highlight and challenge the two basic realist drives for surrender: fear and profit.

This thesis’ emphasis to study surrender as a process permits us to hone in on strategic interactions and preferences and is in accordance with recent developments in realism that attribute causal role to beliefs and preferences (Rosecrance, 2001, pp. 153-154). We will deploy a Strategic Choice Approach (SCA) framework to the study of surrender. The SCA, detailed in chapter 2, is an approach which some realists use and is compatible with realism.

6 “Bandwagoning is the alliance equivalent of the domino theory in adversary relations” and it is also incorporated in Schweller’s theory and so we will focus only on bandwagoning (Snyder, 1991, p. 130; Schweller, 1994, pp. 98-99).
7 Schweller endorses Kecskemeti’s work comparing it to Walt’s appeasement but he makes the point in a footnote and does not engage in a theoretical analysis of Kecskemeti’s work that is more historical than theoretical (Schweller, 1997, p. 928; Kecskemeti, 1957).
8 Gideon Rose has also written an analysis of How Wars End but he relies, rather uncritically, on neoclassical realism to make his argument and so we will focus on the main theoretical argument provided by Schweller (Rose, 2010). Rose is the ‘godfather’ of neoclassical realism but his work on How Wars End is more of a theoretical application of neoclassical realism (Rose, 1998). Rose focuses on factors that shape the actions of decision-makers: power politics, internal factors, psychological factors (Rose, 2010, p. 5).
at large (Lake & Powell, 1999, pp. 4-5; Powell, 2003). In fact, according to Rosecrance, the recent progress in realists opening to approaches like SCA can allow realists now to offer explanations not just in like with ‘specific realism’ but also ‘generalist realism’. Generalist realists do not contradict specific realists but expand the range of outcomes they explicate. Therefore, rather than start from a perspective which is entirely antithetical to the realist approach, through adoption of the SCA we can remain open to recent advances in realist theory and to the importance of material factors, but am not led to assume their centrality. In this sense, the study of surrender as a process from a strategic perspective is a fair test for realism.

**Contribution to the Literature**

This thesis, while arising from the literature on realism in IR, also seeks to make contribution to a number of literatures. Primarily, it seeks to make a contribution to debates on realism, specifically neorealism and neoclassical realism⁹ and their analysis of surrender. These debates are surveyed in detail in chapter 1. This thesis seeks to show that current realist analyses, and historical analyses informed by realist victory assumptions, fail to explain cases of surrender adequately. This study highlights realism’s victor bias in its logic of history that links order, power and timing with realism’s own view of peace. This bias manifests itself in realism’s difficulty in explaining reasonable ethically inspired high-risk policies of weak states in their considerations of surrendering. The logic of such policies can create uncompromising resistance and delayed surrendering (case study 1), a domino effect that empowers one great power at the expense of another (case study 2) and when ignored challenge even the most secure victory and ensuing imposed order (case study 3), then realism’s victor bias is a flawed basis for practical advice for the use of force in war and peace. These policies can be a force of change, so, by lacking a more nuanced understanding, realism misses this force for change and has another status quo bias. In other words, this victor bias of realism represents a psychological bias of realist scholars that in certain cases makes them to expect less change. Once this bias becomes an unacknowledged theoretical assumption, it becomes an ideology and this is a problem.

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⁹ We sometimes use the term realism rather than neorealism and neoclassical realism as convenient shorthand but we are aware of the differences between these terms. We will be referring to realism broadly or to classical realism only in cases where we are explicit about it.
The question of surrendering is ultimately an issue of freedom and survival it is argued here. It is a question of tracing the relationship between ideas (freedom; whatever this may mean in different times and spaces\textsuperscript{10}) and material interests (survival defined as physical survival or autonomy). States confronted with the choice to surrender or not contemplate a real choice between surrendering and freedom. As Waltz has put it in Theory of International Politics, “[s]tates, like people, are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom. If freedom is wanted, insecurity must be accepted” (Waltz, 1979, p. 112). So, the issue of surrender is implicated in a fundamental concern of international politics: how can one strike the right balance between the two. Highlighting the determinants of the will of the ‘other’ to admit defeat and be willing to make peace contributes to this type of concerns and brings to the forth one connection between ideas and materiality.

It will be noted though in this thesis that in the above quote Waltz refers to insecurity rather than survival but this only serves to show how more important it is to examine a more fundamental issue than insecurity; survival. For neorealists and neoclassical realists “[s]urvival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals” and this includes security (Waltz, 1979, p. 91). The topic of surrender forces us to contemplate that states sometimes ponder the most existential question they can consider, whether they will survive or die; literally die. For neorealists and neoclassical realists, with the exception of Waltz\textsuperscript{11}, survival is synonymous to autonomy (Howes, 2003; Fazal, 2004; Haun, 2015). Surrendering is sometimes about autonomy but not always. Surrendering can put on the balance even the life of a state and its people. So, it is crucial to bring together insights from states’ decision to surrender leading them to death as well as cases of surrender that lead to a quick compromise. This can allow one to discern what realism obscures given its emphasis on survival as autonomy.

Surrender, in this thesis, is seen as a process and this helps one to contextualise it and better study the impact of relationships, as a constellation of history, threats and incentives, on the will of the weak state. The study of surrender by its essence is a study of threat but it leaves open the question of whether there is an element of consent in some cases that surrender was

\textsuperscript{10} In Coker’s words, “[w]e must recognize… that the freedom for which so many people over the centuries have been willing to fight is not necessarily one that fits our own understanding of the term: the freedom of autonomous individual” (Coker, 2010a, p. 30).

\textsuperscript{11} Waltz appears as an exception in principle but, as Howes argues, one can deduce from Waltz’s writings a more typical neorealist interpretation of survival synonymous to autonomy (Howes, 2003).
quick and, even in the absence of a ‘fifth column’, was followed by support towards the attacker. Therefore, some cases of surrender help us consider one of the difficult questions of IR according to Jervis; “[t]he problem of combining threats and promises [which] is crucial for both policy and theory [about which] we don’t have enough studies” (Wheeler, 2014, pp. 498-499).

Discerning logics of surrender and explaining states’ risk-proneness even in the face of imminent death or threatening and potentially devastating power preponderance is important because they help us grasp and potentially contribute to the evolving debate about unipolarity and minor states. In a seminal article about unipolarity followed by a monograph, Nuno Monteiro has argued that unipolarity is unstable and much less peaceful than initially conceived by emphasising the link between the strategy of the US and weak states (Monteiro, 2011/12; Monteiro, 2014). He contrasts his argument to that by William Wohlforth who expects the unipole to be “spared from any conflicts and major powers [to] become involved only in peripheral wars” (Monteiro, 2011/12, p. 37; Wohlforth, 1999; Wohlforth, 2012). For Monteiro, “a unipolar system is one that provides incentives for recurrent wars between the sole great power and recalcitrant minor powers, as well as occasional wars among major and minor powers” (Monteiro, 2011/12, p. 37). This is the central prediction of his theory which emphasises the importance of strategy and weak states. Understanding the level of risks weak states are willing to take even when confronted by a threatening preponderant power could possibly shed light in the conversation about unipolar politics by adding something that cannot be captured by neorealism’s fear and profit based worldview.

This study of surrender highlights the timing of surrender and acknowledges the role resistance plays and the conditions under which an actor is willing to give up or not. The linkage of these concepts could suggest broader implications for our study of international order. According to the great historian Michael Howard, “[t]here is no war without resistance, but without resistance, and the possibility of resistance, there is no international order” (Howard, 1991, p. 166). Realism’s victor bias diminishes the importance of the ‘resistance’ side of this argument. By bringing the weak state back in, to paraphrase Schweller, we may be able to eventually gain more insights about international order.

Admittedly our time is different from the time of ancient Greece that this thesis examines. However, the will of the other is a term that has heuristic value. We do not propose that one
should identify the will of the other across space and time in the same way. This would be ahistorical or even anti-historical. Thinking through the concept of the will of the other can help us generate fruitful insights. Understanding what drives the will of an actor in war in one era can be relevant today as well even if things change. One needs to draw the connections. For example, Clausewitz leaves room for elucidation on what leads to victory and determines the imposition of one’s will upon the enemy. Even though he initially focused on the psychological effects of battle in making the other admit defeat, late in his life he may have started reconsidering his position (Heuser, 2007a). In *On War*, Beatrice Heuser argues, “we… find in embryo the various elements of a concept which went beyond targeting the enemy army and aimed at changing the will of the enemy more generally” (Heuser, 2007a, p. 146). Heuser maintains that for the late Clausewitz imposing one’s will upon the enemy must have been “something larger and more encompassing than a mere military victory (remembering full well that even that is very hard to achieve)” (Heuser, 2007a, p. 159). This invites interpretation and historical investigation to elaborate on what affects the will of the other and what is its impact on victory and surrender.

Last but not least, focusing on surrender, a rare and extreme case of politics, helps us focus on the choices states make under high external pressure and analyse the margins of choice they perceive they have and what the subsequent implications may be. This can give us insights into the degrees of human freedom and the plasticity of human options. These options and their underlying logic are obscured by realism’s victor bias and its lack of adequate emphasis on the will of the ‘other’. This is not a minor issue. It can help us illuminate what William T.R. Fox called “the margin of manipulable choice” and ultimately make us re-examine the adequacy of realism’s monolithic view of peace as victor’s peace (Fox, 1985, p. 14). If by studying surrender we could have a better grasp of how to create political outcomes like surrender that are more stable and less contentious, then we may be able to avoid, delay or conclude faster some conflicts.

**A Brief Introduction to the Approach**

This study, to investigate the puzzle around realism and surrender, set out in chapter 1, examines the issue of surrender in the context of a) a general theoretical orientation which is open to realist logics of surrender but does not reduce surrender to power considerations:
Strategic Choice Approach (chapter 2); b) and three case studies (chapters 3-5) of surrender during the Peloponnesian War, studied famously by Thucydides and made reference to often in defence of realist arguments.

We seek to show, through a more open theoretical perspective, SCA, and a re-reading of historical sources, including Thucydides, that these cases instead should indicate to us that very different logics of surrender are present in these wars than those assumed by realists. Indeed, we argue that both more realistic (and yet less realist) interpretations of what took place here and what the strategic considerations were can be developed and that this also tells us some important things about the victor bias that ‘infects’ realist readings of surrender. Less material considerations also play a significant part.

In order to avoid privileging a priori material or non-material factors and in order not to use a starting point of analysis that is inimical to Realism, this thesis uses the Strategic Choice Approach (SCA) but modifies it by not assuming actors’ rationality. Scholars ranging from Schelling, Jervis, Powell and game theorists have been using this approach in its rational version and, according to Powell is compatible with neorealism (Powell, 2003). However, the rational version of the SCA puts at a disadvantage some processes and non-material factors such as reputation and has a hard time in explaining why actors may choose to change the ‘game’ they are playing (Stein, 1999). Also, in some of its versions it presupposes either the final outcomes or the values actors put on each outcome in advance. Overall, the rational SCA presupposes that a rational baseline argument in the abstract is the best starting point. The whole idea behind the application of the non-rational version of the SCA is to challenge the idea that such a baseline argument is appropriate even in cases of surrender and evaluate whether the non-rational SCA helps us to explain cases of surrender that are difficult cases for non-material factors better than the realist perspective that puts material survival and material factors at a premium.

The basis of the SCA is to analyse systematically the strategic setting in order to understand the choices actors make. A strategic setting is defined as “environments, disaggregated into a set of actions and an informational structure, and actors decomposed into preferences and beliefs” (Lake & Powell, 1999, p. 12). This approach emphasises contextualization highlighting the difference between the environment in which actors operate from their preferences which, according to Lake and Powell, gets confused in much of earlier IR work.
This is helpful because it does not get attached to problematic distinctions. It does not privilege one level of analysis and one type of actor and leaves it open to the researcher to make his or her judgment based on one’s historical analysis. It also emphasises interactions based on the belief that “[s]tudents of international relations, and of politics in general, are typically interested in explaining the choices of or decision of actors—be these actors states, national leaders, political parties, ethnic groups, military organizations, firms, or individuals” (Lake & Powell, 1999, p. 3). Interactions are important because they pinpoint the strategic aspect of politics putting the emphasis on choices which are often strategic. Strategic means that “each actor’s ability to further its ends depends on how other actors behave, and therefore each actor must take the actions of others into account” (Lake & Powell, 1999, p. 3).

Such an approach can be accused of a certain kind of presentism by focusing on decisions and strategic interactions which can be expedient and disadvantage more holistic analyses. Moreover, in its rational game theoretic version “[it] can get too removed from the world of actual decision-making and statecraft” and, according to Jervis, it may lead one “to think that what follows from the argument must be true” (Wheeler, 2014, p. 500). Again, as Jervis argues, this approach “points to the role of strategic interaction that is so central to IR and cuts across the second and third images; it even fits into some aspects of constructivism” (Wheeler, 2014, p. 500). The purpose of using the SCA from a non-rational perspective is to try to avoid such problems, be more open to ideational factors than the pure rational version of the SCA, while at the same time using a realist-friendly approach.

This emphasis on strategic interactions should not be confused with the use of game theory. “Game theory is a useful tool for analyzing strategic interaction, but”, as Baldwin opines, “the analysis of international strategic interaction is too important to be left to game theorists alone” (Baldwin, 2013; Lake & Powell, 1999, p. 6). Therefore, this thesis presents its historical case studies through the medium of a narrative.

Narration is important to historicise and reduce the danger of reifying concepts; hence trying to avoid, vacuous distinctions, false-dichotomies, and logical contradictions (Schroeder, 1994; Elman, et al., 1995). It is also an inclusive way of doing research because it does not prioritise any of the following factors: “chance coincidences and their impacts, the workings of relevant mechanistic processes, and relevant human acts, their sources and consequences”
This is even more important in war where studying the actors’ own rationale can help us keep together the element of politics in war. It is interesting to note that even though van Evera\textsuperscript{12}, in his important study of causes of war, emphasises the importance of material factors and de-emphasises politics this approach is problematic (van Evera, 1999). Clausewitz writes in book 8, “war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense” (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 252). Indeed, Richard Betts, in his critique of van Evera’s study of causes of war, centres on its “apolitical flavour” arguing that this is achieved through a misplacement of focus from the objectives of the combatants to perceptions of when conquest is ‘easy’ (Betts, 1999, p. 169).

Last but not least, this thesis’ emphasis on strategic interactions and preferences is in accordance with recent developments in realism that attribute causal role to beliefs and preferences (Rosecrance, 2001, pp. 153-154). Moreover, the SCA approach is not hostile to previous neorealist arguments that focus more on anarchy and the distribution of capabilities. Therefore, rather than start from a perspective which is entirely antithetical to the realist approach, through adoption of the SCA we can remain open to recent advances in realist theory and to the importance of material factors, but am not led to assume their centrality.

**Justification of Case Studies**

There are three core reasons for us to focus on three case studies from the Peloponnesian Wars. First, we wish to study cases which share a context, broadly, and all these cases do. The Peloponnesian Wars provide a rich ground for surrendering behavior and offer a number of cases which we can compare and contrast while keeping the general historical context constant. Second, these cases are important for Realism. They have been turned to by both realists and historians as cases which support the Realist materialist logic of behavior, even as, as will be seen, they do not provide fool-proof cases for this approach. They are then ‘hard cases’ of significance for realism. Third, the ancient Greek cases provide an interesting avenue into richer exploration of a core realist writer, Thucydides. His texts provide both the support for realists but also point towards the richer explanations developed here. As a result,

\textsuperscript{12} Admittedly, van Evera emphasises the offence/defence balance because he thinks it is more manipulable than politics. However, the broader Clausewitzian point about politics cannot be sidestepped so easily. For a critique of van Evera and the problem of disregarding politics see Betts’s review of van Evera’s *Causes of War* (Betts, 1999).
the ancient Greek cases not only provide a good context for study of surrender, but also allow us to reflect on the complexity of surrender as an issue for realist core texts, historically and theoretically. Therefore, while the thesis does not primarily aim to offer a contribution to analysis of Thucydides, it does offer insights as to how we read Thucydides, or any realist text and what we take from it.

A Note on Sources

Thucydides features heavily, although not exhaustively in this re-reading of the three cases. We are interested in case studies from the work of Thucydides because recent narratological studies and commentaries on Thucydides have drawn connections between how Thucydides structures and composes his narrative with considerations about truth and ethics in politics. These studies argue that Thucydides was himself interested in the question of truth, and how we read evidence, something which is an important theme in this work (Greenwood, 2006, pp. 57-82). Thucydides’ narrative is carefully constructed and worded in a way that its meaning is purposefully ambiguous. This ambiguity is what makes Thucydides fascinating reading: not because it is inconclusive but because it makes this difficulty of drawing conclusions a way of delivering his story. Such a view of Thucydides is compatible with a constructivist reading of his work. It also shows that we can write an excellent analysis of history, by endorsing ambiguity. This is linked to the idea that endorsing ambiguity in politics makes thinking about ethics more possible and more important. Xenophon, another source used here, does not provide all these nuances as Thucydides but his work is the continuation of Thucydides’ oeuvre, since he concludes the narrative of the Peloponnesian War in his Hellenica, and he is considered a good historical source. It is true that Xenophon has an acknowledged pro-Spartan bias but we try to limit its impact in our last case study’s argument by using secondary sources. While drawing on these primary sources, we also make use of the rich historical and historiographical writings on Peloponnesian war and Thucydides and Xenophon. We also make selected use of literature from philosophy, strategic studies, war studies, peace studies, literature studies, feminism, and sociology to help us attain a more holistic understanding of the various historical, theoretical and conceptual issues that arise. Overall, the sources we have used were mainly in English but we have also used some sources from Greek and French. Last but not least, in providing quotes
from the ancient Greek authors we have consulted different translations in Greek and English to get a better grasp of the different nuances in meaning.

The Central Argument Summarised, Caveats, Definitions and Road Map

The central argument of this thesis is that states surrender not only to guarantee physical survival but also a degree of recognition. The sense of recognition is influenced by the degree of attachment between a weak power and a great power, emotions like gratitude and seduction, the convincing framing of discourse, and perceptions of (in)justice and (dis)respect of one’s social identity. The pursuit of physical survival and recognition are two causes that can work together or against each other. Under the light of the aforementioned factors that influence the perception of recognition, the trade-offs between recognition and security can create important dynamics that defy neorealist and neoclassical realist accounts of surrender which rely on material power, fear and profit. Moreover, recognition can contribute to a sequence of events through social mobilisation or social coherence that generates relational power which increases the resolve of the weak and potentially their bargaining power; hence, illuminating how the weak can contribute to upsetting the status quo. This is also obscured by realism’s victor bias and materialism that largely equates authority to material power and victory in war.

This study discerns three logics of surrendering: 1) surrendering only if it does not betray the gratitude towards a patron great power; 2) surrendering due to seduction by the aggressive great power; 3) surrendering as long as it guarantees recognition by the aggressive great power (including both justice and social identity). These logics purport to explain a) the persistence of seemingly irrational resistance leading to delayed surrendering, and b) the decision for very quick surrendering. The decision to surrender is inadequately explained by a narrow focus on a material neorealist and neoclassical realist cost-benefit analysis with an emphasis on material power preponderance of the aggressor and presumed victor.

13 By seemingly irrational resistance we mean resistance beyond a point at which more cool-headed minds might discontinue.
These three logics of surrendering also help us explain the risk-propensity of states which significantly influences the timing and the degree of stability of surrendering. Each logic of surrendering reflects a state’s propensity for a) high-risk resistance before finally surrendering, b) risk-aversion leading to surrendering with no resistance, c) as well as post-surrendering instability. The timing of surrendering as well as the easiness of surrendering and its prospects for post-war stability and instability are important parts of any meaningful explanation of surrendering. These concerns resonate with the classical realists and still apt question posed by William Fox: “What keeps wars going and what finally makes them stop?” (Fox, 1970, p. 1).

In order to grasp these logics of surrendering we need to study the dynamic interplay between power and recognition and the various factors that influence this interaction. These factors are the degree of attachment\(^\text{14}\) to a great power influenced by gratitude and seduction, recognition defined as both justice and social identity, social mobilisation, and inspirational leadership. These factors are not randomly collected. They stimulate the willingness to resist or give up, to take high-risks or not, to accept defeat or not, to incite insurgency or not as well as the prospects for success of each choice. In other words, they make a difference between what is perceived as a worthy or a non-worthy cause or effort. They are crucial in making an actor seeing war and surrendering as a zero-sum game or as a positive-sum game and make the difference between cooperation and conflict and between coerced cooperation and consensual cooperation. Even in surrendering we can discern the element of consent in certain cases.

This thesis also suggests that realism has a victor bias which drives its account of war, peace, hegemony and surrendering and privileges material variables and a view of social identity less influenced by interactions and the social nature of reality and therefore more static than it really is. As a result, it cannot account for the dynamic processes of surrendering that this thesis explores and the non-material factors that are crucial in surrendering according to the aforementioned logics of surrendering.

This thesis proposes that this realist victor bias has important consequences for how realists and those who listen to their counsel see the world. It seems that the victor bias perpetuates as

\(^{14}\) Jennifer Mitzen provides a useful definition of attachment which depends upon the presupposition that a) “identities or types are constituted and sustained by social relationships rather than being intrinsic properties of the states themselves”, b) and “interaction over time transforms state identity and generates attachment” (Mitzen, 2006, p. 354).
a starting point of analysis a rather dichotomous view of victory/defeat removing agency from weak states simply because they lack material power or because they are defeated. It leads great powers to miscalculate and exaggerate their power and the effectiveness of their force in achieving political outcomes through war or coercion and it obscures the 'powers of the powerless'\textsuperscript{15} from the realist vision. It appears to reflect the consequentialist view of the powerful according to which resistance is futile due to lack of power by privileging material power and victory in war as the essence of authority and reduces the will of the 'other' to its material power or lack thereof. True as it sometimes be, as the Melians bitterly discovered, it is neither logically nor empirically sound because it ignores the importance of recognition and the dynamics it can create. As we will see, high-risk ethically inspired strategies emanating from concerns about recognition can not only endanger physical security but can also create relational power and even be at times effective.

The outcomes of such strategies can range from renegotiated terms of surrendering to qualitatively different international political outcomes. More specifically, whereas some realists reject the idea of hierarchy in IR and others see hegemony in material terms surrendering based on consent and seduction or resistance due to loyalty to an ally are evidence, as we will argue, of hierarchical relations based on social logics and not merely outcomes of dependence. Such a point also hints at a sociological reasoning for domino effects that privilege one great power at the expense of the other; a point which is excluded by the neorealists and neoclassical realists.

Last but not least, this thesis submits that the way neorealists and neoclassical realists have used Waltz’s theory of the international system is unwarranted and that were they to be consistent they would have to endorse heuristic and eclectic theorising. These realists take for granted Waltz’s theory of international politics as a first cut theory of foreign policy prioritising the balancing tendency as the normal tendency in international politics and then proceed in explaining anomalous cases. This is problematic because Waltz refers to the overall balancing tendencies prevailing in the system and not specifically in regional dynamics or in bilateral relations. Waltz’s assumptions, in particular the assumption of survival, cannot be used for quasi-deductive theories because Waltz’s theory is not such a

\textsuperscript{15} We borrow this term from Vaclav Havel’s 1979 eponymous essay that had a significant impact on Solidarity and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and which Berenice Carroll has elaborated in her analyses of the mystique of dominance and the cult of power (Havel, 1985; Carroll, 1980, p. 69; Carroll, 1972; Koslowski & Kratochwil, 1994, p. 229).
theory. Neorealists and neoclassical realists make the problematic theoretical move to add their quasi-deductive theories of foreign policy on Waltz’s theory which is a “radical anti-empiricist and anti-positivist theory” (Waever, 2009). One of the problems they now face is how to account for the multiple and contradictory meanings that survival takes for different states, which results in foreign policy explanations that cannot be accounted for by these realists. The addition of recognition as a crucial motive of states side by side with fear and profit creates dynamics that can come in contrast with logics of fear and profit. Recognition also highlights the importance of interactions and process and psychology even for the fundamental assumption of these realists; survival. In other words, survival cannot be accounted for in an objective way. Moreover, should they choose to include recognition as a motive in their theories, they cannot simply add it and continue doing business as usual. In such a case, they would need to add process variables in their theories. Doing so would force them though, to rely on Waltz in different ways since neither their theories nor Waltz’s theory includes process variables. Doing so would open the door for eclectic theorising and the creation of realist constructivisms, constructivist realisms and other variations which would make realism to become more realistic and less paradigmatic.

Realists should not be afraid of such a choice because they anyway apply their theories heuristically and not in a quasi-deductive manner as they wrongly claim (Humphreys, 2011). Such a move would bring more consistency in their theories by shaking the foundations they use; that is, their misplaced view of Waltz’s theory. It would highlight the importance of recognition and the psychological nature of interactions. It would challenge their victor bias and require research on relative power and the powers of the powerless. Lastly, it would require an increased focus on relationships which in turn would be, arguably, consistent with pragmatism and the practice turn in international politics (Bueger & Gadinger, 2015).

**Caveats**

This study is not focusing on wars of extermination. It is true that the defeated matter only when the victor allows this possibility. Broadening the margins of possibility by acting with resolve or by seeing war through the eyes of the enemy to attain a victory which leads to peace matters in limited wars because the opponent survives the day after but this is not the case with wars of annihilation. As Coker argues, “[v]ictory can only be won in spite of the defeated if, like the Greeks before Troy, there is only one end possible: total destruction”
(Coker, 2008, p. 160). Perhaps, Coker adds echoing Simone Weil, we will one day “learn not to admire force, hate the enemy or scorn the unfortunate, but act in such a way that our enemies can accept their defeat and find in their heart to live with us in peace” (Coker, 2008, p. 160). Perhaps this is a herculean task for the “crooked timber” humanity is made off but if such a possibility can be approximated, it can only be in limited wars and not wars of total destruction.

This study of surrender does not intend to project surrender as a moral act, to argue that the nation-state or the city-state is something inherently moral that we need to keep unchanged, or that the international order of states is a moral order (Ruggie, 1983; Jackson, 1990; Lyons & Mastanduno, 1995; Howes, 2003, p. 670). The point of this thesis is to examine the causes that underlie decisions to surrender and investigate surrender as a process in order to have a better grasp of aspects of the will of weak states. This thesis is agnostic to the issue of whether people should always resist or surrender. What is being argued is that there is more reality than the realist viewpoint permits us to see and that the consequences of this are important for surrender, its timing, the explanation of its process and, potentially, the stability of the day after.

This thesis also does not explicitly focus on the question of war: how we define war. This is not entirely irrelevant for the discussion here, and is partially touched upon below, but in order to proceed, the complexity of the question of ‘what is war?’ is put to one side. Instead, this thesis has drawn from the tensions in Clausewitz’s work and tries to use them as pointers in the analysis that follows the Strategic Choice Approach. This choice has been consciously made for three practical reasons. First of all, this study does not focus on the correct interpretation of Clausewitz’s meaning of war and victory. The debates among scholars like Huw Strachan, Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Beatrice Heuser, Martin van Creveld, and Mary Kaldor are highly informative (Strachan, 2007; Herberg-Rothe, 2007; Heuser, 2007a; van Creveld, 1991; Kaldor, 2013). They highlight the tensions that exist in Clausewitz and whether, for instance, we interpret the German word Politik in Clausewitz’s definition of war as policy or politics or whether we see Clausewitz’s view of victory pegged only to the battlefield or not (Strachan & Herberg-Rothe, 2007, p. 9). Ultimately though, On War remains an incomplete work and open to interpretation. So, rather than using Clausewitz’s On War as the basis of our approach, this thesis mines some of its insights and uses them as fitting in its own methodological approach. Second, the approach at hand, the Strategic
Choice Approach (SCA), is helpful because on one hand it provides a flexible framework of
analysis, which is not incompatible with Clausewitz, and on the other hand is central to the
realist debates that this thesis explores. The SCA offers a language to analyse the choices or
decisions of actors but is not a theory and is flexible to be used as a baseline for explorations.
The SCA, not unlike Clausewitz who emphasises the will of the enemy in his definition of war,
takes as its starting point that “the strategic choices actors make and the interaction of those
choices” are essential in the understanding of outcomes ranging from “the foreign policies of
individual states to international phenomena such as war” (Lake & Powell, 1999, pp. 3-4).
Third, Lebow has already offered a hermeneutic interpretation and re-appropriation of
Clausewitz in relation to classical realism and using Clausewitz as a starting point could have
been considered as stacking the tables against neorealism and neoclassical realism from the
outset of this investigation (Lebow, 2003).

There is also the literature on the “problem of Westphalia” or what Steven Krasner calls
organised hypocrisy (Krasner, 1995/96; Krasner, 1999; Osiander, 2001; Osiander, 2007;
Howes, 2003, p. 670). As interesting as such research may be in clarifying that the
Westphalian nation-state is an inaccurate ideal, it only complements the concerns of this
study. This study acknowledges that the world of independent or autonomous states is
imprecise. It takes stock of such insights and elaborates on the meaning of autonomy when
survival is endangered and discerns how states do trade-offs between survival and recognition
even when they have to confront the harsh dilemma of surrender. This analysis is then used to
offer a critique of realist accounts of surrender and of the assumptions of this theory in
general.

Definitions

Surrender is the capitulation after the cessation of hostilities or the realisation of one’s
weakness and straightforward submission in the face of military might. This corresponds to
the distinction between forced and unforced surrender. Forced surrender is when a state gives
up when it has decided that it is senseless to continue fighting and unforced surrender is when
a state gives up fighting when it is overwhelmed (Afflerbach & Strachan, 2012, p. 436). We

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16 From a realist perspective, talking about Westphalia does not exclude other types of 'states'. Realists, like
Waltz, Gilpin and others, do not limit their study to nation-states but include other types of 'states' such as city-
states, and empires (Gilpin, 1984, p. 290; Goddard & Nexon, 2005, p. 30). Realism’s core analytical unit is
“human collectives as a broad category” (Sterling-Folker, 2009, pp. 109-110).
will use surrender and its two subtypes interchangeably with ‘surrender’ being a convenient shorthand stipulating the ending of war when the belligerents agree, formally or informally, to stop fighting. We do not intend to explain specific forms of formal surrendering such as peace treaties.

As a working definition of the ideas of war and victory, we use Clausewitz’s contested definitions which we use as heuristic devices. The two definitions used from Clausewitz are a) “[w]ar is… an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 13); b) victory is “imposing one’s will upon the enemy and ‘persuading’ him through the use of force to desist from pursuing his opposed aims” (Heuser, 2007b, p. xxvi). What is interesting in those definitions is they do not foreclose theoretical and historical investigation since the will of the enemy and what affects it in victory are open to interpretation. So, we are interested in the unresolved tensions of these definitions and explore them through the SCA in the historical case studies that follow.

The view of surrender in ancient Greece and during the Peloponnesian War coheres with the aforementioned definition of surrender but was unashamedly brutal. Surrender during the Peloponnesian war was hardly bound by any effective rules. The vanquished were at the mercy of the victor and it was not uncommon practice to kill the male captives and enslave the women and children. Surrender in ancient Greece could lead to the extermination of the enemy with few if any qualms. This did not happen always and there was an incentive to shorten the fighting period by promising to the vanquished to spare their lives. This would be practiced sometimes but would ultimately depend on the will of the attacker. The Greeks did not have humanitarian limitations (Lanni, 2008). Josiah Ober has discerned twelve laws of war or common customs in ancient Greece for the period past the Homeric epics but argues they broke down after about 450, especially during the Peloponnesian War (Ober, 1996). During the Peloponnesian War some victories of annihilation did take place, such as against Melos, Plataea and Scione, but not all of them were of the same kind like the cases of Mytilene and Athens attest. Overall though, as Paul Cartledge says with regard to surrender, “there were in practice in ancient Greece very few and rather weak constraints upon indulgence in extremes of military anger and hatred, not stopping short of genocide, or at least ethnocide” (Cartledge, 2012, p. 21).
War in ancient Greece is a contested concept but not so much for the period of the Peloponnesian War during which limitations on war were in decline. These limitations or ‘quasi-laws’ of warfare were mostly “religious and based on custom and practice, rather than on creed or a fixed belief system” (Cartledge, 2012, p. 20). During the Peloponnesian War these social conventions started to gradually decline in importance. This is a point that both those who subscribe to the view of a purely agonal, ritualistic Greek warfare and those who disagree with it share (Krentz, 2002, p. 24). This thesis does not side with one or the other view in this broader debate.

This study acknowledges that the debate on the idea of agonistic warfare has elaborated two tendencies in Greek warfare that did not disappear during the Peloponnesian War. One tendency is that of a pitched infantry battle (Hanson, 1999). The other tendency is that of small-scale raids on agricultural settlements, border defence, ambushes and trickery. The ‘agonal’ view of war fought by a set of rules sees war as “a noble game” or a contest (Huizinga, 1949, p. 98). The other view embraces deceit and trickery. The agonal view of war “was always important for the Greeks, both as a military ideal and as a military practice” but, in Hans van Wees’ words, the “ferocious pursuit of profit and honour constantly strained against any [agonistic] restrictions and frequently drove the Greeks to the most uninhibited, destructive kind of ‘total’ warfare” (van Wees, 2004, p. 117). These two facets of Greek conflict have been described by Everett Wheeler as the “Achilles ethos” -fighting according to the warrior code of honour- and the “Odysseus ethos” which “asserts the superiority of trickery, deceit, indirect means, and the avoidance of pitched battle” (Wheeler, 1988, p. xiv). These two faces of war existed in ancient Greece and historiographers disagree about the legacy of these two aspects of war. The agonal face was the ideal influencing and being influenced by the rules of war but during the Peloponnesian war that this thesis examines its disputed dominance was in decline. This study puts to the side the question concerning the extent to which agonistic warfare was dominant in other periods of ancient Greece or not and when it was ‘invented’.

17 According to Hanson this decline started a generation earlier at the Persian Wars (Hanson, 1999, p. 241).
Roadmap

Chapter 1, *War, Surrender and Realism*, argues that realist assumptions about peace and structure lead to three particularly problematic assumptions in realist analysis of surrender: 1) they lead them to what we call victor bias in readings of surrender; 2) they lead them to ignore and try and sidestep a puzzle in realist theory on the assumption of survival; 3) they lead them to diminish the importance of weak states and their will even in cases of surrender where the weak power is confronted by threatening preponderant power. Therefore, we suspect (and test against empirics in chapters 3-5) misunderstandings of logics of surrender.

To gain a better sense of how and why surrender takes place, chapter 2, *Strategic Choice Approach, Surrender and Realism*, then develops an open theoretical orientation which allows us to study surrender in a realist-sympathetic strategic perspective but with a more open minded approach. It develops some key orientation points familiar to realist analysis without collapsing into victor bias. We need more open assumptions about strategic action to work with and SCA provides this. We also explain how we conduct the studies that follow and relate the SCA with recent advances in narratological studies of Thucydides who is one of the major primary sources of this thesis and of central importance to the tradition of realism.

Chapter 3, *The Surrender of Plataea: Gratitude as Cause*, argues that with the more open tools of analysis in hand, we can observe a new logic of surrender that realism does not capture. We argue that the Plataean logic of surrender consisted of two elements, an element of fear and an element of obligation towards its ‘patron’. The Plataean logic of surrender, we discern, permitted surrender only if it did not betray the sense of gratitude towards Athens. This led the Plataeans to reject all the generous terms of surrendering Sparta offered them, put great faith in a dubious Athenian offer for help, and surrender only in the very end when the population was dying from starvation. This logic of surrender highlights the existence of a hierarchical relation between Athens and Plataea which, as we argue, was based on a combined social and material logic. This social logic tied Plataea to its alliance with Athens even more strongly. It made the Plataeans averse to the idea of betraying Athens by surrendering to Sparta and also believe in the Athenian promises without any recorded domestic disagreements. This analysis which combines a social and a material logic cannot be accounted by realism’s focus on threat or fear of entrapment alone. The Plataean emotion
of gratitude towards Athens played a crucial role here regarding the Plataean resolve, the timing of the Plataean surrender and the Plataean unmitigated reliance in Athens even during their trial by Sparta. This *logic of surrender* that combines fear and gratitude explains better than realism the process, timing and decision of the Plataean surrender. In a sense this is a double type of fear: fear of the enemy and fear of disgrace for not being grateful to Athens. However, the second kind of fear is not a kind of fear realism accepts as significant to endanger one’s physical security.

Chapter 4, *The Surrender of Acanthus: Seduction as Cause*, maintains that with the use of non-rational SCA we can better observe reputational and domestic political dynamics and account for another non-realist logic of surrender. Acanthus surrendered to Sparta so quickly not only just out of fear but also out of seduction from Sparta. The distinguished behavior of the Spartan general Brasidas and his combination of threats with domestic political considerations and the projections of a vision of liberation was decisive. The way he framed the discourse convinced and inspired some of the Acanthians and did not upset those who were more fearful of his threats. As a result the domestic political landscape in Acanthus did not get polarised despite the social cleavage between democrats and oligarchs. This created a reputation for Brasidas and Sparta that set the foundation for both a military alliance with Acanthus in the subsequent expeditions and the beginning of a domino dynamic which was part of Brasidas plan and probably an Acanthian concern as well. This kind of surrendering, which was unforced or bloodless, was based on Brasidas’ diplomatic skills and the reputational dynamics he convincingly set forth. The outcome was the beginning of a domino process in the neighbouring city-states. Brasidas’ success was impressive. It could have tilted the balance of power and the outcome of the Peloponnesian War in favour of Sparta. Indeed, he had done so up to a certain extent until his death. However, his impact would have been limited had the Acanthians not have been seduced by his personality, concerns about their domestic politics, his vision, and his promises which, up to a point, he seemed to uphold. This *logic of surrender* that brought together both the element of fear and of seduction cannot be accounted by realism’s fear based or profit based historical worldview.

Chapter 5, *The Surrender of Athens: Power and Recognition as Necessary Causes*, upholds the idea that the study of surrender as a process with the method of non-rational SCA overcomes a problem in realist static conceptualisations of surrender, and delivers an account of non-realist logic of surrender. We separate between Surrender 1.0 and Surrender 2.0 which
took place within eight months after the initial surrender and which we consider as a continuation of the first one. This chapter argues that the Athenians had tacit bargaining power that the Spartans neglected and inadvertently brought to the fore with the outcome of having to confront an insurgency and provide better terms of surrender to the ones they had initially offered when Athens had surrendered unconditionally. This tacit bargaining power was not material power that the Athenians had all along. It was power that was created in action (and did not belong to any actor in particular) when a sequence of events, stimulated by injustice, disrespect towards the democratic ethos of the Athenians and inspirational leadership, led to the Athenian revolution, destabilisation of the regime that Sparta had imposed, and a military involvement of Sparta with the subsequent agreement for the restoration of democracy and Surrender 2.0. Realists who focus on material factors would focus only on Surrender 1.0 but in reality the two of them are connected and ignoring the underlying social dynamics and centrality of recognition, social mobilisation and leadership leads to a skewed understanding of surrender as a process and the degree of power that even the most powerless people may be able to retain tacitly and generate in action. The logic of surrender for the Athenians, even when they had surrendered unconditionally, was fear and expectation for some degree of recognition. In the absence of the second tacit element of the logic of surrender, the Spartans were prone to misunderstand the meaning of victory, the effectiveness of power, the impact of the will of the ‘other’ and the various dynamics that relate to recognition. The initial Spartan understanding of surrender was compatible with a realist analysis that starts with a victor bias and largely equates authority with power.

In the last chapter, Conclusion, we argue that with a more open mind we can observe new logics of surrender, which create important new reasons to avoid the tautological realist logic that weak states can hardly have any independent will because they are weak. We explore the broader implications of realism’s victor’s peace and realism’s reified view of survival not only for a study of surrender but for realist theory in general. We stress that these two realist assumptions reinforce each other and have a dual effect. They reproduce victor bias that discounts the will of weak states. This generates status quo bias. It also leads realism to a contradiction. Realism claims that states pursue their own worldviews but when it comes to weak states it seems to anticipate that they strive for survival seen as just autonomy. This is problematic. Even though realists on occasion argue for a peace of autonomous states and advocate great power moderation, this contradicts their own postulates; that is, great powers expand when they can in pursuit of their own worldviews and victor’s peace. This in practice
means that even a realist peace may encroach on the autonomy of weak states. Therefore, the realist assumption of survival as autonomy in a realist world is much more problematic than realists seem to acknowledge (Jervis, 1998, pp. 980-981). Not only is it ambiguous but it also contains both a descriptive and a prescriptive element\textsuperscript{18}. This is not unlike realist theory itself but it is much less acknowledged.

\textsuperscript{18} On the point that neorealism is both prescriptive and descriptive see Jervis’ argument in his \textit{Hans Morgenthau, Realism, and the Scientific Study of International Politics} and elsewhere in his work (Jervis, 1994, p. 859; Jervis, 1997, p. 118; Jervis, 1998, pp. 976, 980).
1. War, Surrender and Realism

Introduction

What made General Petraeus so famous was that he realised that no matter how many troops the US would send to Iraq, they would not make a lasting difference unless they could affect the local people’s own political calculations. This consideration would not have surprised Hermocrates, a general from the Peloponnesian War, that Thucydides has him say: “[I]t is just as much in men's nature to rule those who submit to them, as it is to resist those who molest them” (Thucydides, 4.61). This chapter addresses such practical considerations with regard to their theoretical implications for realism in IR.

This chapter explores the puzzle of surrender in relation to neorealism and neoclassical realism. It does so in the following order. First, it presents the puzzle of surrender and argues that realism comes with problematic assumptions which could lead it to problematic analyses of instances of surrender. We focus on two issues: realism’s view of peace that creates a victor bias and realism’s reified view of the assumption of survival that sustains the victor bias. Second, it presents the two competing realist explanations for surrender. Third, it offers an account of the war termination literature which, though not the focus of this research, is pertinent. Debates in this literature highlight that the central issue of this study, the will of the other, has been a contentious eminent issue. However, just like in realism, it has now been largely sidelined, which perhaps shows a broader recent tendency to pay less attention to a crucial factor in decisions of surrender; hence, encouraging our research. Last but not least, we show that realism enjoys a rather privileged status in IR as a theory of ‘war’ and that there is lack of critiques about realism and war which are not from the outset inimical to neorealism and neoclassical realism.

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19 For a penetrating study on the topic revolving around Gen. Petraeus see Linda Robinson’s book Tell Me How This Ends (Robinson, 2008).
20 All English quotations from Thucydides are from the Martin Hammond translation in Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War (Thucydides, 2009). The first part of all references to Thucydides refers to the book and the second part after the full stop refers to the paragraph; they are the same in all translations. For convenience and to avoid repetition, from now on, when citing Thucydides’ work, we will only cite the numbers of his book and paragraph and not his name.
The current chapter’s added value is that it does not just address the issue of victory and defeat in realism or its view of peace or its view of power in isolation. Instead, it attempts a compound critical appraisal of realism that combines its view of peace, its view of power and authority, its view of power as domination, its view of peace and justice and its view of the assumption of survival together. It does so by relating this assessment to realism’s view of the will of the other. Ultimately, it endeavours a composite appraisal of realism on its own fundamental problematique, survival/war, by focusing on what realism seems to exclude rather unproblematically: the determinants of the will of the weak other beyond threats and opportunism.

**The Puzzle of Surrender**

This section sets out the puzzle of surrender in realism. It wonders whether realists can understand surrender with the assumptions they have. It investigates what theoretical problems and inconsistencies characterize neorealist and neoclassical realist attempts to explain surrender. The emphasis on surrender leads us to highlight two problematic assumptions: realism’s *view of peace* and realism’s view of the assumption of *survival*. Realism’s view of peace, it is argued, is that of victor’s peace. It thus leads realism to have a victor bias that privileges the consequentialist logic of great powers, as realists see it, and marginalises the importance of the will of the weak other. Realism’s victor bias is further enhanced by realism’s view of survival as autonomy, which is what our empirical study of surrender investigates. We argue that the survival assumption in realism is also problematic. It removes the idea that weak states may wish to survive for any other reason but for autonomy or lack of extinction. Both victor’s peace and the assumption of survival in realism reinforce each other and support the victor bias; that is, realism’s tendency to largely undermine the importance of the will of the weak other.

For realists the will of the weak state in surrender focuses on survival and is largely linked to material power which by definition they lack. Realists, rather than wondering about the question of surrender, and variations in its empirical side, they sidestep the subject. Yet, variation in the timing, process and stability of instances of surrender is hard to explain as we will see in the cases studies. In fact, surrendering, according to Jack Donnelly, is interesting for realists just due to the accompanying savage self-interested violence (Donnelly, 2000, p.
Benjamin Frankel, for instance, who merely devotes two pages on the surrender of Plataea and Mytilene in the Peloponnesian War, argues that these cases clearly demonstrate that those who surrender are at the mercy of their captors, that justice is what is useful to the hegemon and that policy is dictated by self-interest and not magnanimity\(^{21}\) (Frankel, 1996, pp. 114-115).

The assumptions of victor’s peace and survival would appear to reduce realist interest on the topic of surrender and, it is argued, lead realism to problematic interpretations of instances of surrender, like the ones we analyse in the empirical chapters. These assumptions contribute to narrowing the scope of the broad question that General Petraeus was making: what can affect the local people’s own political calculations or, to put it in slightly different terms, what can affect an actor’s willingness to surrender and make peace. This may not be a small issue as realists seem to assume.

What is at stake with regard to the consideration about the will of the other, and in particular of the weak other that considers surrendering, is something that General Petraeus alluded to in the aforementioned comment of his and which Clausewitz has also touched on: the meaning of victory. What affects the political calculations of the local people, what affects one’s willingness to make peace, what affects the stability of the post-war outcome and the timing of the ending of wars is, arguably, one crucial factor: the will of the enemy to continue the struggle. For Clausewitz the most crucial thing to win a war is to impose one’s will over the enemy. This is not as straightforward as it seems. What makes the difference is how one can affect the will of the other. Is it mainly about material power or not? What makes the enemy admit defeat is the consequential issue. Clausewitz maintains that to defeat the enemy, one needs to attack the enemy’s centre of ‘gravity’ (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 242; Heuser, 2007b, pp. xxix-xxx). Clausewitz though is unclear about what the centre of ‘gravity’ is. Typically, Clausewitz is seen to regard the enemy’s centre of gravity in military terms focusing on the psychological impact of defeat in battle in bending the will of the opponent. However, Beatrice Heuser has also made the argument that another interpretation can be made according to which, late in his life, Clausewitz “realised that the centre of the enemy’s ‘gravity’ could be many different things—the enemy’s army, his capital, and the opinion of his people” (Heuser, 2007a, p. 161). Therefore, winning the war and winning the peace may

\(^{21}\) Reducing Thucydides’ oeuvre to the ability of force to devastate is quite an impoverished view of it (Coker, 2010a, p. 67).
not be synonymous with victory on the battlefield and investigating determinants of the will of the other could provide a fruitful exercise.

**Victor Bias**

This section presents realism’s victor bias, links it to the idea of the will of the other and hypothesises that such neglect leads to misunderstandings of logics of surrender. Overall, what realism’s victor bias seems to disregard is the importance of the will of the other in surrendering. This is important to acknowledge and address because as we will see in the following section it is perpetuated by realism’s assumption of survival.

In order to talk about realism’s victor bias we need to discuss realism’s view of peace. However, discerning realism’s view of peace is challenging. If we would look to find sources on neorealism’s and neoclassical realism’s take on peace that would be even more difficult. As Schweller indicates, “[a]side from a few brief remarks in the balance-of-power literature about” how the victorious powers should treat the defeated powers the issue “has gone largely untheorized (indeed unmentioned) within the discipline” (Schweller, 2001, pp. 161-162). So, trying to talk about victor bias we are actually tracing elements of neorealism’s and neoclassical realism’s language of peace and victory. We will approach the topic from four complementary angles: 1) peace, victory and power; 2) peace, victory and the shadow of the past; 3) peace, victory and justice; 4) peace, victory and the will of the other in contemporary realist analyses.

**Peace, Victory and Power**

Realism’s victor bias is not directly related to its view of great powers but the manifestation of its view of peace as victor’s peace. This seems to go hand in hand with realism endorsing a great-power-centric outlook of world politics most importantly evinced in its own version of consequentialist logic. This realist baseline argument sustains a discourse that is similar to the consequentialist view of great powers when they confront weak powers like Melos. For realists it does not make sense for any ‘Melos’ in the world not to submit and certainly this was also the Athenian viewpoint. This is not an indictment of realism per se but of its tendency to unnecessarily privilege this great-power-centric viewpoint. This is what we call victor bias which marginalises the importance of the will of the ‘other’ in having any
significant role beyond its cumulative material power. The will of the ‘other’ as a disposition or willingness to admit defeat or make peace does not seem to be acknowledged by realism. Realism’s consequentialist logic with its victor bias becomes apparent if we focus on its view of peace.

Realists view peace as the creation of the powerful. The realist view of peace is that the powerful forge peace according to their interests, rules, institutions, and justice. Realists believe in what Oliver Richmond calls victor’s peace (Richmond, 2008, p. 40). International order, the more usual realist term for peace, is based on “a balance-of-power or hegemonic system with international institutions, which”, Schweller remarks, “are always present in some form or another” (Schweller, 2001, p. 183). According to Gilpin, “international institutions emerge immediately after hegemonic wars to advance the interests of the most powerful state in the system” (Jervis, et al., 2002, p. 183; Gilpin, 1981). This view of peace, Richmond continues, is an “ontologically stable, in terms of representing an objective truth (plausible or not)”, view of peace, which for realists is a “zero-sum” kind of peace (Richmond, 2008, pp. 5, 41).

This realist zero-sum view of peace leads one to expect that in surrender what would primarily matter for states would be their survival and they would, therefore, give up the fighting effort and surrender in light of their own weakness when confronted by threatening preponderant power. This view of peace generates a clear distinction between victors and vanquished. The idea that 'every war has a winner', according to David Baldwin, “is deeply embedded in the literature on military force” and it is what this dichotomy reflects (Baldwin, 2013). For realists this clear distinction between winners and losers in peace is sustained by their view of victory which is a zero-sum victory.

The realist view of victory as a zero-sum game depends on war-winning power. This type of power, the type of power realists recognise, is the power that Mearsheimer sees as relevant to “conquering and controlling land” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 86). Baldwin calls this power zero-sum power (Baldwin, 2013). So, the ability to win is mediated through a war-winning power that is a zero-sum type of power. This is the type of power that creates peace for realists.

Paradoxically enough, realists attempt to moderate this position by showing an appreciation for material power’s limits. Waltz, for example, has remarked in *Theory of International*
Politics that “[s]trong states cannot do everything with their military forces, as Napoleon acutely realized; but they are able to do things that militarily weak states cannot do… Differences in strength do matter, although not for every conceivable purpose” (Waltz, 1979, pp. 189-190). Mearsheimer also expresses willingness for moderation. He has favoured a policy that did not make the US hated, did not incite anti-Americanism and instead nurtured the hearts and minds of the people whose states were being invaded (Mearsheimer, 2002). He admonished overreliance on military force to achieve ambitious goals and opined that the US could be stuck in Iraq and Afghanistan “for years to come, in fruitless pursuits of victory” (Mearsheimer, 2011, pp. 17-19).

However, despite such moderate claims, realists revert to their basic argument about peace when they discuss the basic determinants of order; force, victory in war and the external situation. For both Waltz and Gilpin power determines international order and prestige, authority or legitimacy is a mere manifestation of material power (Gilpin, 1981, p. 35; Lebow, 2008, pp. 22-23; Jervis, et al., 2002, p. 180). The potential importance of legitimacy appears immaterial being seen as what power generates by itself and especially after victory in war (Gilpin, 1981, p. 35). From this point of view, the idea of the weak state’s will is greatly diminished from realism’s purview since legitimacy is a function of power and power is what the strong possesses and yields. Moreover, realists perceive the external situation in war to dominate the calculations of states (Waltz, 1967, p. 201). In such a realist universe, the tendency to create order and peace is merely a function of power or power and victory in war. In cases of war where the external situation dominates, this is even more pronounced; that is, power and not authority is doing all or the bulk of the explanation.

This type of power associated with victor’s peace is central to how realists perceive international order which is another way of talking about peace. Even though Waltz argued that material power cannot achieve everything, he actually tilts closer to Gilpin than to what appears as a more nuanced view. For Waltz it seems that “war-winning ability is the unstated standard by which states are being ranked” and polarity is the most preeminent variable for Waltz’s analysis of international politics (Baldwin, 2013). Waltz asserts that ranking states requires ranking “them roughly by capability” (Waltz, 1979, p. 98). However, Waltz does not

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22 Initially Waltz argued that an international stable order and peace were the same but he later retracted and argued that international stable order can be associated by both peace and war (Waltz, 1993, p. 45). This does not change the idea though that peace is a view on order according to realists.
provide “any explicit standard for ‘scoring’ the capabilities of states. He does consider though, that force in international politics is not just the ultima ratio but the first and constant one (Waltz, 1979, p. 113). Given Waltz’s emphasis on force and ranking of great powers based on a scoring of their capabilities, “there is more than little reason to suspect that war-winning is the implicit standard being applied” (Baldwin, 2013). Waltz seems to acknowledge that material power can be problematic and provides a definition that is unusual and inconsistent with the rest of Theory of International Politics. Waltz asserts without argument that “an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him” (Waltz, 1979, p. 192). Yet, in just the next paragraph he is shifting stance and states that “the extent of one’s power cannot be inferred from the results one may or may not get”. So, for Waltz we can argue that he is inconsistent about the meaning of power but infer that the probable standard he uses for power is war-winning capability.

If Waltz is not entirely clear on this but tilts towards the material view of power to forge peace, other realists are explicit about their connection with the victor peace’s power, material power. For Mearsheimer power is “the material capabilities that a state controls” and the latent capabilities that can lead to material capabilities; that is, “armoured divisions and nuclear weapons” (Mearsheimer, 2013, pp. 72-73). Van Evera is also ultimately focusing on material power despite his efforts to change the definition of power (van Evera, 1999). On one hand for van Evera the offence-defence balance is about power to do what and just power as a conglomeration of material capabilities. However, as Betts remarks, van Evera subverts this notion by “admitting alliance shifts to the calculus” (Betts, 1999, p. 188). This is a legitimate move but it distances van Evera from his effort to offer a different view of power than the pure material version of it. It is true that a state’s defensive or offensive capability will increase if it acquires a new ally. Nonetheless, this is hard to calculate in some sort of pound-for-pound ratio as van Evera claims his theory is able to do with power. Therefore, we are back again to the idea that power is a measure of aggregate probability of combat success (Betts, 1999, p. 188). In other words, as Baldwin maintains, for realists military force is the measure of force and war-winning is what matters the most (Baldwin, 2013).

The realist view of peace, just like structural realists’ analyses, has an “apolitical flavour” (Betts, 1999, p. 169). War-winning power is central for realists because this is how they conceive of peace; as a zero-sum game. For realists to win in war and make the enemy surrender depends on material power, the type of power associated with victor’s peace.
Realists focus on power and downplay the importance of what is at stake. As Betts puts it pithily, for realists “conflict is more less a constant. Something always comes up to put countries in conflict” (Betts, 1999, p. 190). This is how peace is created for realists: through zero-sum power while downplaying the importance of the stakes.

What some realists primarily disagree about is their view on the effectiveness of power to justify differences in behaviour and interests and not what the stakes are. As both Snyder and Lieber agree, offensive and defensive realists disagree on the effectiveness of the offensive with Snyder positing the difference being as big as 10% (Snyder & Lieber, 2008). Schweller’s concern about the effectiveness of power is part of the same debate. His neoclassical argument focuses on interests and state coherence but ultimately revolves around the idea of a state’s ability for power extraction. Its baseline argument remains neorealist, since when a state approaches the ideal-typical unitary state, it follows neorealism’s logic (Nexon, 2009, p. 334). Waltz himself argues that the difference between offensive and defensive realists is that for offensive realism “more power is always better” (Waltz, 2004, p. 6). A major difference between defensive realists, offensive realists and neoclassical realists is their assumptions about the effectiveness of material power which becomes their main criterion to interpret the limits that the will of the ‘other’ may impose on the strong.

This mode of thinking creates a narrative of peace that establishes interests as power, material power; that is, zero-sum power. The actor exercises power to secure its interests which are treated, to use Jervis’ term, as unmoved movers (Lu & Labrosse, 2011, p. 29; Jervis, 2011a, p. 418). However, until these interests, defined as zero-sum power and with little interest in what is at stake and how it may change, are satisfied and threats have been negated, “the narrative of peace in realist versions of IR is extremely limited” (Richmond, 2008, p. 52). It is a narrative with its absolute end goal being “a victor’s peace in which all other actors are either subservient or are removed. Almost exclusively, the forces that are seen to drive world politics are destructive, self-interested, and also predictable” (Richmond, 2008, p. 52). In this kind of peace the will of the weak state, which we hypothesise that it plays a role in surrendering, largely vanishes out of the realist ‘sight’ which is being ‘saturated’ by the analysis of material power which secures victory and establishes peace.


**Peace, Victory and the Shadow of the Past**

According to the realist view of peace what matters for a state’s interests in utter defeat, like in the instances of surrender we examine, is its power and not its history. This is the logical conclusion of the focus on victor’s peace and the powerlessness of the weak state. With limited power, its interests should appear to have a future focused orientation based on the implications of its defeat and the establishment of victor’s peace. This does not mean that when a weak state becomes powerful, it will not attempt to change the status quo. On this we agree with realism.

However, what is problematic, as Coker argues, is conceiving “of peace that does not arise naturally out of the “historical experience of its members” (Coker, 2014a, p. 78). Yet, this seems to be doubly problematic in the way realism presents its view of peace. Firstly, victor’s peace is devoid of much history for the vanquished and relates to their defeated present. Secondly, the meaning of peace for the vanquished who have interests stems not from history but from the level of weakness in their present state. So, the peace they accept and the interests they forge seem more associated to their current weakness and to the imposed victor’s peace rather than their own history. Peace for the weak seems to be under the eclipse rather than the presence of much of their history.

The problem with peace that undervalues the importance of the past is that it privileges the hegemonic victor’s peace. For contemporary realists, such as Waltz or Mearsheimer, “peace is very limited, delineated by a natural confluence of interests” (Richmond, 2008, p. 11). However, for vanquished states their interests are largely shaped by the present and not the past. Realists seem to assume that victory in war will be a most vital factor in creating a sufficient confluence of interests at the expense of the impact of the past on interests. Not only do realists share the view of power as the war-winning power indicating the importance they ascribe on victory but also, in the absence of the end of war and the coming of permanent peace, they believe only in victor’s peace. However, this is not a neutral but a “simplistic, reductionist and hegemonic representation of the world, and of a victor’s peace” based on deflating the impact of the past on the present (Richmond, 2008, p. 53).

This is not to say that we know what the impact of the past on the present is. This is only to say that realists stack the deck against the past, privilege victor’s peace and undervalue the
potential importance of the will of the other to the extent it is influenced by the past. This discounting of the past is further and mutually reinforced by two realist methodological choices.

These methodological choices are the realist emphasis on the uncertainty about future intentions and the realist view on antecedent conditions. The first one highlights the inherent uncertainty of leaders in international politics about the future intentions of other states (Copeland, 2003, p. 43). Realists privilege this legitimate concern but in surrender states react differently to this conundrum despite facing a similarly threatening preponderant power. In Copeland stark terms, “present and past interaction is not the core issue; the potential of others to do harm in the future is. This means, among other things, that actors in anarchy must worry about exogenous decline in their material basis for survival, and the probability that the other will be aggressive after such decline” (Copeland, 2000, p. 205). Yet, in a footnote Copeland explains that this view presupposes rationality in order for states to calculate “probabilities\(^{23}\) of certain undesirable things coming to pass.” Even though we do not argue for the privileging of a theory that leads to mistakes, the rationality assumption is too restrictive. States may have non-rational determinants of their behaviour and as we will show in the cases studies of surrender, they can even be advantageous which is a possibility that Copeland excludes. So, this methodological choice by realists cannot a priori explain variation in instances of surrender, whether that is in its timing or its process, and appears more like a bet rather than a secure assumption.

The second methodological realist choice that contributes to devaluing the past and reinforcing the realist view of peace as victor’s peace is realism’s rather “hard and fast distinctions between antecedent conditions and behavioral outcomes” (Jervis, 1997, p. 58). This is a crucial contentious issue and which Jervis shares but not other realists like Schweller or Gilpin. The implication of this is that realists seem to “mistakenly view history in terms of discrete events rather than as path dependent, such that one events influences succeeding ones” (Jervis, et al., 2002, p. 182). So, with regard to peace realists view history as rather separate events dislodged from the potential impact of past events and what remains to make the difference is victory for the victors and defeat for the vanquished. This then also comes to reinforce the realist consequentialist logic that is not far removed from the

\(^{23}\) Italics in the original.
consequentialist logic of great powers about what they anticipate but also hope weak powers to do in peace and in (actual or projected\textsuperscript{24}) victory.

\textit{Peace, Victory and Justice}

Jervis is an exemplary realist that has offered nuanced analyses of international politics and has carved his individual path in IR. Yet, the ambiguity between the effects of material power on the weak other and of the will of the weak other as an independent factor is not absent even in some of his own work. According to Jervis, a realist sees justice as victor’s justice: “the strong do what they will” (Jervis, 2009b, p. 196).

This mind set with regard to the strong is a consistent view realists hold and reflects their distrust towards power and view of justice. Jervis is rightfully concerned about the durability of the international system in a world based on victor’s justice but he presents this issue as a somehow separate topic or a topic to be addressed separately (Jervis, 2009b, p. 197). Not only is this separation problematic but the focus on durability is challenging too. Realists are ambiguous about the meaning of system stability, how it relates to peace and how it can be achieved. So, Jervis here introduces a dependent variable, system stability, which realists disagree about how it fits in their theories (Monteiro, 2011/12, pp. 9-10; Jervis, 1997, pp. 94-102). Adding this consideration raises more questions than it clarifies. Also, including the concern for the durability of the international system as largely delinked from the baseline argument that the strong state imposes victor’s justice is ambiguous too. This becomes apparent in the subsequent argument Jervis makes. Jervis proceeds to articulate his arguments that a strong state’s successful fulfillment of its own goals depends on others endorsing them and being persuaded to do so (Jervis, 2009b, pp. 210-211). Now the original argument seems transformed. It seems as if other states matter marginally at the moment of creating order and victor’s peace but it also seems that at a later point, still organized by victor’s justice, they matter so much that they may even need persuading.

This ambiguity raises a question: why should a strong state be concerned about the will of another state, beyond its material power. According to realists, it appears that a concern for victor’s peace limits considerations for concerns for legitimacy and the will of the other. On

\textsuperscript{24} By actual victory we refer to the expected compliance of the weak power after defeat and by projected victory we refer to unforced surrender due to the realisation of one’s weakness.
the other hand, victor’s justice has the same effect but realists argue that it then may matter for a strong state to pay attention to the will of other states. It seems like there are two ways for a strong state to define and pursue its goals; one in the beginning of creation of order when only power and victory matters and another one later during which, depending on the goals it has set for itself, other states’ will and consent may begin to matter more than just the material power they possess. This argument seems equivocal. Victor’s justice depends on the strong state’s will but then if the strong state defines its interests as it pleases, then how different is this idea from the idea of victor’s peace. Why should a victor’s peace be indifferent to the will of the other and yet victor’s justice be at times concerned with the will of the other or even with persuading the other?

It is unclear then, why should a strong state, according to realism, act prudently if victor’s peace enables it to rule with disregard for the concept of authority, which is seen as merely an expression of material power and victor’s justice enables it to put into practice its ideals of victor’s peace; that is, define its goals with disregard for legitimacy. The point is not about the vanishing legitimacy but about the disappearance of a significant part of the will of the other from the realist worldview. In other words, a state in realism appears to have as much will as the power it possesses and if it possesses minimal power then it pretty much has ‘no’ will. The reason for this is that realists equate peace with victor’s peace and justice with victor’s justice. The realist paradox though is that realists ignore the previous point and prescribe policies that include even persuasion, policies which do not fully accord with the idea of victor’s justice. To put it in different terms, realists seem to equate the conditions of success with the conditions of success management and the conditions of success maintenance and at the same time they also seem to prescribe different policies for different periods.

This paradoxical realist thinking based on the idea of victor’s peace, which relies on material power and marginalizes the will of the other, is what we define as victor bias. It limits the importance of the will of the other to a mere function of material power. It a priori puts weak materially states not just at a disadvantaged position but, as this thesis will demonstrate, at an even worse position than they sometimes are. This obscures realists’ view of the effectiveness of power and the importance of weak states. This is what the case studies explore in chapters 3-5.
What the victor bias skews is the idea of prudential foreign policy. The victor bias leads realists to judge what is prudent based on a consequentialist logic that favours great powers because they are materially powerful. They exclude authority and other forms of power from their purview and end up too close to a great-power-centric view of the world portraying the weak either as impotent or as foolish. This is not far away from the mind set of great powers when they try to dominate weaker states and expect them to be ‘prudent’ and ‘rational’ and surrender by the sheer logic of the discrepancy of power between the two. This idea of victor’s peace is a composite term created by an idea of peace and an idea of how this peace is forged; material power. This view of peace explains how order is created and what creates and sustains order. Hardly anyone would disagree with this generic point. However, this thesis disagrees with how this perspective reconstructs a view of politics in which the will of the other largely disappears as an independent factor. This creates a biased rationale in the realist theory.

*Peace, Victory and Hearts and Minds*

Unlike their theoretical constructions, realists’ analyses often exemplify more nuances. Realists even talk about hearts and minds and moderation. This section touches upon two such recent analyses and addresses the consistency of calls for hearts and minds and moderation. It argues that they are expressing a malleable view of the importance of the will of the other, consistent with the realist victor bias, and partially inconsistent with realist premises and the realist view of peace.

John Mearsheimer, on the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan, wrote an article in *The National Interest* entitled “Hearts and Minds” (Mearsheimer, 2002). He favoured a ‘hearts and minds’ strategy only that his strategy had a very peculiar understanding of other peoples’ hearts and minds and his calls for moderation appear inconsistent with his own theory. His argument for ‘hearts and minds’ consists of four parts. The US should fight select terrorist groups and not all in order not to excite nationalist feelings. The US should lock up fissile material that terrorists pursue. The US should use intelligence, diplomacy and covert actions over military force against Al-Qaeda. Fourth, the US should adopt policies that ameliorate anti-Americanism in the Islamic world. Such policies, he adds indicatively, are changing containment policy in the Middle East, making a major effort to end the war between Israel and the Palestinians, toning down the US rhetoric about preemptive strikes (speak softly and
carry a big stick). These suggestions which consist of lowering the US military profile and improving US image, Mearsheimer concludes, will win ‘hearts and minds’. This is an interesting realist case for a realist peace attuned to ‘hearts and minds’.

Mearsheimer’s argument, as attractive as it may seem, reflects realism’s victor bias and is partially inconsistent with its own theoretical postulates and view of peace. The will of the other is largely malleable due to interests influenced by material power (victor’s peace’s power) and by a determinist view of nationalism. When Mearsheimer makes the harder case for the ‘hearts and minds’ approach his arguments remain problematic. When it comes to his suggestion that the US should improve its image by changing containment policy, he is actually referring to soft power as a cheaper version of hard power revealing an element of inconsistency with what we would, arguably, anticipate from a ‘hearts and minds’ approach (Boulding, 1970, p. 185). This is to be expected given the hypothesised limited emphasis of realism on the will of the other due to its victor bias. Also, when emphasising the importance of being decisive in resolving the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians he again appears inconsistent or hypocritical according to his own theoretical precepts about peace and order.

First of all, Mearsheimer’s use of nationalism in his argument is inconclusive and limited. He correctly pinpoints that occupation can increase nationalist feelings and resistance. However, this gives nationalism a rather determinist influence on a state’s behaviour and Mearsheimer does not further explore the issue. Why, for instance, did Japanese nationalism not lead to an outcome like in Afghanistan? Mearsheimer conveniently compares the US war in Afghanistan to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 80’s but not to the Japanese and German examples post World War II (Mearsheimer, 2002, p. 14). Similarly, states differ in their willingness to take pain (Jervis, 2011b, p. 408). Variations in this attribute cannot be explained away because nationalism incites resistance. Relatively, Mearsheimer seems to presume that as long as the US limits its interventions and returns to its base this will change the hearts and minds of peoples across the world. This can be so to some extent but there are two unexamined issues that Mearsheimer may be glossing over. From a practical point of view, it is uncertain what the impact of the US troops returning home will be in hearts and minds. This seems to presuppose that past US actions do not have much bearing. However, if
in the pursuit of victory the US acts brutally and barbarically\textsuperscript{25}, then one wonders if the impact on the US image will be as Mearsheimer envisages. Mearsheimer focuses more on the present and future part of the equation on intentions and leaves various disconcerting questions intact.

With regard to the change in containment policy and pressing for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Mearsheimer, as an advocate of structural realism, appears inconsistent and somehow hypocritical. He advocates the fixing of the US image which, presumably, is a version of soft power\textsuperscript{26} but this is odd for his theory that advocates expansionism and admits that great powers act hypocritically to get what they want. In other words, he claims that hearts and minds can change but argues otherwise theoretically. The elementary but deeply consequential factor in international politics, for Mearsheimer, is the uncertainty generated by international anarchy. This makes great powers maximize relative power in order to maximize security since they do not know how much security is enough (Mearsheimer, 2013). In this worldview, it is at least inconsistent to posit that some states will behave against one’s own theory’s precepts and start having a change of heart because of a great power’s actions. If we ask Mearsheimer about what affects the motivational structure of states, then we will go back to the issue of the irredeemable uncertainty caused by international anarchy and be also reminded of the stopping power of water that can make a great power appear less threatening (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 43, 114). Yet, the idea of uncertainty works against Mearsheimer’s idea that states could change their hearts and minds regarding their view of an offshore hegemon. More specifically, the stopping power of water is a perplexing and inadequate concept. Mearsheimer is unclear about the restraining effect that oceans can have. He does not explain why once the hegemonic state has crossed this barrier, and sent its troops away, it would not choose to remain offshore and keep expanding or intervening again (Posen, 2002). It is thus curious to theoretically expect, based on Mearsheimer’s own theory, that smaller states should change their view of the US, despite the hegemon having just intervened offshore and crossed the very water barrier that Mearsheimer considers a crucial source of restraint and security for great powers\textsuperscript{27}.

\textsuperscript{25} This is an interesting consideration since there is extant literature that makes this point; namely that states succeed in war when they act barbarically in the pursuit of victory (Arreguin-Toft, 2001; Merom, 2003). Posen also relates the issue to the effectiveness of power (Posen, 2002).

\textsuperscript{26} For soft power see Nye’s works and for a critical stance see Lebow’s argument in A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Nye, 2011; Lebow, 2008, p. 314).

\textsuperscript{27} Even though we are focusing on Mearsheimer who is writing explicitly on hearts and minds, this does not exclude defensive realists. They are very close theoretically actually. Defensive realists have stressed the
One might argue that Mearsheimer is making a consistent addition to his theoretical corpus by adding hearts and minds in his theoretical armour. However, should one go that far, then this would probably be overdrawn and verge on hypocrisy. Mearsheimer argues that “great powers should always act like good offensive realists” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 24). This means that in an uncertain world opportunities for expansionism should be seized. Yet, Mearsheimer is actually advocating restraint and a hearts and minds approach. As Posen puts it, “[s]uch restraint seems remarkably sagacious, indeed un-tragic, given offensive realism's predictions for the behavior of land powers” (Posen, 2002). In fact, from a realist standpoint such behaviour is actually deceptive rather than concerned with hearts and minds. As Schweller argues, for a hegemon to appear benign is a deceptive strategy (Schweller, 2001, p. 185). “[T]here is no international order that serves everyone's interests”, so, Schweller concludes, “any strategy-no matter how clever or well intentioned-that attempts to preserve American primacy is doomed to failure” (Schweller, 2001, p. 185). For realists therefore, acting on a ‘hearts and minds’ approach is a deceptive strategy that is not going to fool anyone.

Such a ‘hearts and minds’ approach that has a vestige of soft power does not characterise only Mearsheimer but is implied by another recent major realist work by Brooks and Wohlforth (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008). What is crucial in these accounts of ‘hearts and minds’ or of pro-restraint realism is that they seemingly emphasise the importance of the will of the other but in reality they do not go that far away from what victor’s bias would makes us expect realists to argue and they also remain inconsistent and incomplete. Jervis admits that what determines the intensity of states’ motivation is important and insufficiently explored (Jervis, 2011b, p. 409). If the state of the art in the discipline is at this point then we need much more effort to elaborate on what is inconsistent, unclear and problematic. This is why we should not accept realist calls for restraint at face value ignoring their victor bias background.

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similarity between the stopping power of water the offence/defence balance. As Posen remarks: “Mearsheimer’s account of the "stopping power of water" and its influence on the insular powers does suggest that physical facts may make a state feel relatively safe, with the result that it will compete with less energy, maybe less brutality, and perhaps with less self-destructiveness than will the land powers. If both observations are correct, then perhaps the divide between offensive and defensive realists is not really so great” (Posen, 2002). Moreover, even defensive realists’ distinction between status quo powers and revisionist power or security seekers and greedy states is not distancing them that far from offensive realists. Security seekers can also act expansively. As Jervis mentions, even “a state that wants to maintain or increase its security can believe that this requires it to expand at the expense of others” (Jervis, 2011a, p. 421).
Richard Ned Lebow, for example, commends Brooks and Wohlforth for not having a superficial view of soft power but this is too felicitous a remark provided Brook’s and Wohlforth’s overt optimism about the future of US revisionist hegemony. Lebow extols Brooks and Wohlforth for being among the few who appreciate that the debates about soft and hard power address only one component of political influence, control, and for warning against the use of power to make short-term gains at the expense of long-term interests” (Lebow, 2008, p. 314).

However, calls for moderation in a realist universe with a victor bias can be problematic. This does not mean they are wrong but that a commendation like Lebow’s may actually be overdrawn. From the viewpoint that stresses out victor bias in realism, it is not a significant jump, unlike what Jervis argues, for Brooks and Wohlforth to conclude that in the absence of material international restraints on US power and in the presence of a wise democracy promotion, the US “can reshape world politics as it pleases” (Jervis, 2009a, p. 220; Glaser, 2011, p. 138; Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008). If, as Lebow points out, “[t]o achieve or sustain hegemonia, capabilities must be used to the perceived benefit of allies and third parties to help reconcile them to their subordinate status”, then how can democracy promotion, no matter how wise it may be, square the ‘circle’ of democratising the other and reconciling it to its subordinate status? (Lebow, 2008, p. 314). How can one be democratised wisely if one does not want? To put it in terms of this thesis, what it seems that the two authors are saying is that in the absence of countervailing power, victor’s peace will dominate despite the will of the others. To put it in Thucydidean terms, these authors exemplify realism’s victor bias by thinking closer to the Athenian way in Melos rather than the Sicilian way as demonstrated by Hermocrates. As the epigraph of this thesis that contains Hermocrates’ words, the Sicilian general, says: “it is just as much in men's nature to rule those who submit to them, as it is to resist those who molest them” (Thucydides, 4.61). There is no reason to believe that this may not be the case even for the wisest democracy promotion. Moreover, Brooks and Wohlforth make this claim by jumping into this conclusion. As Jervis criticises them, it is one thing to

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28 Jervis acknowledges the jump but considers it significant.
argue “that others cannot restrain the United States” and another thing to conclude “that America can reshape world politics as it pleases” (Jervis, 2009a, p. 220). This is exactly the point that diminishes the importance of the will of the other and what we would expect from the impact of victor bias. In Hermocrates’ statement resistance as an expression of the will of the other takes centre stage. In realism what takes centre stage is its victor bias.

If making the enemy admit defeat is potentially a crucial determinant of victory beyond the impact of the effect of power and military victory in war, then realism’s victor bias obscures something possibly powerful: the effectiveness of victory, the success in imposing one’s will, the fragility of victory and the possibility of recurring wars, and overall the effectiveness of material power. Therefore, examining the will of the other in cases of surrender represents a take on a series of consequential topics seen through the study of a puzzle which represents in heightened form aspects of international politics and of the eternal struggle for power, war and peace. It helps us define what can and cannot be achieved realistically in surrender and wherever the will of the other matters.

In this section we have examined how realism’s view of peace creates a victor bias which discounts the importance of the will of the other as an independent factor. This is produced by realism’s view of peace as victor’s peace, by the type of power realists perceive as necessary for victory, by realists’ focus on the uncertainty of future intentions while downplaying the impact of the past, by realists’ view of justice as victor’s justice, and by having an instrumentalist view of hearts and minds that does not seem to really acknowledge the importance of the will of the other and sees it as more trusting and malleable than what realist theories themselves would actually lead us to expect. The next section argues that not only does realism’s view of peace downplays the importance of the will of the other but also realism’s view of the meaning of the assumption of survival. In this sense, both victor’s peace and the assumption of survival reinforce each other in producing and perpetuating the victor bias.

The Assumption of Survival

This section argues that if realism’s biased view of the will of the other produces significant explanatory lacunae, explored in chapters 3-5, then the implication is that neorealists and neoclassical realists misappropriate Waltz’s theory of international politics and perpetuate the
victor bias. They do so by reifying the assumption of survival in realism. This problem reveals how closely theoretical concepts can be imbricated with philosophy and reveals the limits of theorisation (Aron, 1978, p. 185).

The idea of realism’s victor bias challenges realism’s limited interest in the will of the other. Problematising the assumption of survival challenges realism’s foundational assumption and its ability to theorise based on this assumption. This thesis hypothesises and eventually demonstrates that the suspicion that realism discounts the independence of the will of the other is not only correct but also contradicts realism’s view of the assumption of survival which by and large signifies the state’s autonomy (Howes, 2003). This is crucial because it provides the rationale behind realist foreign policy theories and because whenever the assumption of survival has been challenged, the research output has been innovative.

The next sub-section will showcase the impact that the challenge of the assumption of survival had in offensive realism and in institutional theory. The aim is to suggest that challenging the assumption of survival not only is a legitimate concern with regard to surrender but also a concern that should perhaps have already been touched upon. It is puzzling that it has been left undertheorised, even though when it has been investigated with a different focus for offensive realists and institutional theorists, it has proven productive. The following sub-section will centre on the meaning of survival in realism and the distinction between Waltz’s view of survival and that of his disciples. It will then highlight that this is problematic for the way neorealists and neoclassical realists appropriate Waltz’s view of the international system in their theories of foreign policy and that this reinforces the victor bias and further undermines the importance of the will of the other. It will then conclude with suggesting that an appropriate way of addressing the puzzle of survival is through the non-rational strategic choice approach that is flexible enough to accommodate the concerns expressed here.

The Fruitfulness of Problematising the Assumption of Survival

Surrendering is one of the richest veins yet to be mined in IR. However, it has been touched upon in the literature in indirect ways since it pertains to the assumption of survival which is both the foundational assumption of realism and a core concern of states. We will mention
indicatively two literatures that came up with innovative research questions and explanations by challenging the assumption of survival.

Offensive realists have challenged defensive realists on the grounds of what motivates states. They challenged the assumption of survival and argued that great powers have at times put their survival at risk in their pursuit of expansionist goals. Randwall Schweller has criticised defensive realism for having a status quo bias and John Mearsheimer has criticised Waltz for offering a normative theory because he assumes states for being defensive positionalists (Schweller, 1996, p. 107; Mearsheimer, 2009, p. 243). So, challenging the assumption of survival, offensive realists were able to advance their research agenda and offer competing realist explanations (Snyder, 2002, p. 163).

Institutionalist theorists have challenged realism’s assumption of survival again on the grounds of what motivates states. The literature is vast and versatile but two arguments that challenge the meaning of survival offer explanations of international institutions and of the European Union (EU). Dustin Howes has argued that interpreting the meaning of survival in a different way provides fertile ground to “formulate an explanation for the willingness of states to cede autonomy to international institutions” (Howes, 2003). James Caporaso has reasoned that the member-states of the EU have created a constitutionalised order where some decisions of the EU’s decision-making bodies have an impact not just on states but directly on their citizens. This reduced sense of autonomy that could be called a kind of ‘suicide’ challenges the assumption of survival which, as realists perceive it, means autonomy (Fazal, 2004, p. 330). The way Caporaso begun his research was by challenging the clear hierarchy between domestic and international norms; hence, the autonomy and survival of states (Caporaso, 1997, p. 582). So, challenging the assumption of survival as a starting point of analysis has led to innovative research both inside and outside realism.

Giving a certain interpretation to the concept of survival or changing its meaning has had important implications for theorising IR. Disagreeing about concepts has far reaching consequences in the research that scholars conduct and is a very pragmatic concern. It is vital to appreciate that realists, having originally defined survival in a specific way, had in practice
precluded empirical investigation of the other research that has sprung out of challenging their view of survival\textsuperscript{29}.

\textit{Survival and Realist Theorisation}

This sub-section will now explain the meaning of survival in realism and the distinction between Waltz’s view of survival and that of its disciples. It will then highlight that this is problematic for the way neorealists and neoclassical realists appropriate Waltz’s view of the international system in their theories of foreign policy. It will then suggest possible implications from the challenge of the assumption of survival in realism; that is, the potential presence of hierarchal relations in anarchy and of logics of surrender that defy realism’s privileging of physical survival and autonomy. It will conclude with suggesting that an appropriate way of addressing the puzzle of survival is through the non-rational strategic choice approach that is flexible enough to accommodate the concerns expressed here.

Realism’s fundamental assumption is survival and it is part of its central problematique; survival/war (Sterling-Folker, 2009, p. 110). According to Waltz, “states (at least) seek security to the point of survival” (Waltz, 1979, pp. 91-92). Mearsheimer sees “great powers as concerned mainly with figuring out how to survive in a world” (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 18-22). Mearsheimer is not alone in challenging Waltz’s theory but, in challenging Waltz, scholars who follow on his footsteps do not reject the survival motive and actually reinforce belief in its reliability (Howes, 2003, pp. 675-676).

This is crucial because the idea that states choose to surrender generates a prima facie challenge to realism; states can choose to die. The very idea of states surrendering in war contradicts the very assumption of realism that states seek at minimum their survival conceived as autonomy. Waltz explains that “[t]he assumption [of survival] allows for the fact that no state always acts exclusively to ensure its survival. It allows for the fact that some states may persistently seek goals that they value more highly than survival; they may, for example, prefer amalgamation with other states to their own survival in form” (Waltz, 1979, p. 92). Howes though, remarks that a “minimalist definition of amalgamation… only implies the termination of state autonomy in foreign affairs” and suggests that “for Waltz, the loss of autonomy in foreign affairs is a sufficient condition for the “death” of a state” (Howes, 2003, pp. 675-676).

\textsuperscript{29} For the importance of this point see Baldwin’s take with regard to the assumption of security and Caporaso’s comment that alludes to this point (Baldwin, 1997, p. 25; Caporaso, 1997, p. 566).
In other words, with surrendering implying either annihilation of a state or the loss of autonomy in foreign policy, surrendering means loss of survival. For realists who follow Waltz on the meaning of survival, survival is indistinguishable from autonomy of the state.

Even Schweller who brings the revisionist state back in, a type of state that is willing to endanger its survival for expansionism, he is in principle in accord with Waltz’s view of survival for four reasons. First, the revisionist state is one type of state and only one. Not all states are revisionist states. Second, a revisionist state is not a weak state -like the states that end up surrendering in this thesis- but a powerful state (Schweller, 1996). Third, when Schweller explains neoclassical realism’s progressiveness he clarifies that he is “not abandoning Waltz’s insights about international structure and its consequences” but instead “neo-classical realists have added first and second image variables” (Schweller, 2003, p. 317). Schweller continues more emphatically: “[o]nly when behavior and outcomes deviate from these structural-systemic theories’ expectations should unit-level variables associated with neoclassical realism be added to these theories to explain why” (Schweller, 2003, p. 347). Fourth, his argument starts from the ideal unitary realist state which, when it approximates the ideal level of coherence, operates like a neorealist state (Schweller, 1994). So, even Schweller’s baseline argument remains neorealist: when a state approaches the ideal-typical unitary state, it follows neorealism’s logic (Nexon, 2009, p. 334).

Therefore, it is not only neorealists but also neoclassical realists who incorporate the view of survival as autonomy; thus, surrendering contradicts prima facie what they both share: the foundational assumption of survival as autonomy. Realists readily admit they start their analysis with structure but they do not rely solely on structure (Jervis, 2009b, p. 188). This thesis is not concerned with the theoretical explanations realists build on top of the structure of the international system but with their baseline argument. The problem lies with the idea that they can safely start theorising by relying on Waltz’s theory of international politics. Doing so perpetuates the contradiction between surrender and survival.

Even though Waltz has carved out some space to deflect such a criticism, other neorealists and neoclassical realists, whose theories are relevant to the study of surrender, cannot use the same strategy. The basic idea is that Waltz’s theory is a theory of international politics and not a theory of foreign policy and that it is an ideal type of theory using assumptions that are not accurate and do not need to be accurate reflections of reality (Waever, 2009). The fact
that Waltz’s theory is a theory of international politics means that he is concerned with tendencies at the system level which reproduce the nature of the system. Waltz explains a balancing tendency at the system level which perpetuates the basic components of the international system: anarchy, self-help, and same units. This though does not mean that there is uniformity in the system. In fact, his assumptions do not necessitate that anarchy, self-help and same units will dominate across the system. Waltz’s assumptions allow for states acting against what his assumptions and theory expect simply because the assumptions are useful for a theory of international politics but are not ‘built’ for a theory of foreign policy (Waltz, 1979, pp. 91-92; Waltz, 1996). So, what his theory describes is a balancing tendency at the system level which may not be reproduced at the level of foreign policy; hence, beginning theorising by expecting that all over the international system the basic expectation will be what Waltz’s theory expects is wrong. Waltz’s international system can be reproduced even if parts of the system operate against his assumptions or even against his theory’s logic. This does not create a problem for his theory of international politics but it creates for a theory of foreign policy. One may disagree with Waltz on various issues but it is crucial to acknowledge what his theory does and what it does not in order to judge it fairly. What it does is to explain international politics with assumptions that are not accurate representations of reality. However, unlike Waltz, his students use his assumptions as their baseline argument and they use them as accurate depictions of reality to produce theories of foreign policy; hence, the contrast between surrender and the assumption of survival affects their theories.

Neorealists and neoclassical realists by relying on Waltz for their theories of foreign policy take for granted Waltz’s theory and its problems from a foreign policy perspective. They consider Waltz’s theory as necessary for their theories but they do not test his theory. They only test their own theories because Waltz’s theory, and rightly so, “should not be held to a simple correlation standard” being as, Ole Waever, argues an anti-empiricist ideal type of theory (Waever, 2009, p. 214). Snyder and Christensen, for instance, claim they “hope to improve [Waltz’s theory’s] problem-solving utility rather than to address its deeper epistemological adequacy” (Christensen & Snyder, 1990, p. 137). However, what this thesis contends is not Waltz’s epistemological adequacy. Neorealists cannot deflect criticism about their incorporation of Waltz’s work so easily. The point is that one cannot add an ideal type of theory and a theory of foreign policy that relies on ascertaining correlations, then test the theory of foreign policy by testing the correlations and then claim to have tested, let alone improved, the problem-solving capacity of the ideal type theory that has not been tested in the
first place. This, as Waever argues, seems the general pattern (Waever, 2009, p. 214). So, by not testing Waltz’s theory, they incorporate Waltz’s theory’s flaws if seen as a theory of foreign policy and not as an ideal type of theory whose scope is international politics. Therefore, the basic contentious issue with neorealists and neoclassical realists remains: the idea of surrender conflicts with their assumption of survival.

This is problematic because it makes the assumption of survival appear as uncontentious which obscures opportunities for research on surrender and preserves the victor bias. Baselines arguments serve to show what should be expected to be found in history and what is problematic or anomalous in history. For example, Walt’s Balance of Threat theory is embedded in neorealism and informed theoretically by its scepticism about positive feedback emphasising stability (Keohane, 1988, p. 173; Walt, 1987). Schweller’s Balance of Interests theory explores what is anomalous in Waltz and examines historical cases “[o]nly when behavior and outcomes deviate from” Waltz’s theory (Schweller, 2003, p. 347). Both scholars use Waltz which shapes their expectations about what they should find and what they should not find in historical cases. When it comes to survival though, Waltz, seen as the backbone of a theory of foreign policy, expects states to pursue survival and does not see as anomalous that states surrender. Realists can claim that the states’ vital interest is their survival and they will pursue it in any possible way. However, this is problematic conceptually. It simply translates survival into vital interest which is tautological and does not do away with the conceptual conflict between survival and surrender. Realism does not clarify what is survival and what it stands for if it is to be traded off like in instances of surrender. Realism simply assumes survival is a vital interest in and of itself. In this sense, it precludes asking questions what is survival for. It excludes the question by assuming the answer: survival is the vital interest. However, to paraphrase David Baldwin if survival “competes with other goals for scarce resources, it must be distinguishable from, yet comparable with, such goals. This requires that the relative importance of [survival] be left open rather than built into the concept in terms of ‘vital interests’ or ‘core values’” (Baldwin, 1997, p. 24). And this is exactly the central research question of this thesis: why do states surrender and what does this mean for realism.

In practice, realists, by obscuring the contestability of the assumption of survival, evade contemplating its meaning, its implications and its value. More specifically, surrendering forces a state to weigh independence, political survival/autonomy and even physical survival
against other values but realists believe that states cannot value anything more than independence and political survival which suggests surrendering states have no choice. This permits neorealists and neoclassical realists to avoid thinking about a core political reality throughout history which is the realisation among leaders and societies that it might be better not to fight or to fight for reasons that realism does not account for.

Leaving the assumption of survival unchallenged means that realists theorise in a way that excludes the important question of survival which has conceptual and practical implications. It illustrates that realism obscures the possibility that other reasons may explain surrendering because it does not see anything problematic or worthwhile for theoretical investigation in the assumption of survival. Third, realism excludes thinking about non-realist reasons that may guide considerations of surrender because surrender is not seen as an essential research question. It is indicative that Frankel limits his consideration for surrender to the straightforward remark that those who surrender are at the mercy of their captors (Frankel, 1996, pp. 114-115). The theoretical purchase of surrender is undermined by realism’s view of the assumption of surrender and of the way realists use it in their theories by misappropriating Waltz’s theory.

Ultimately, what is at stake in problematising the assumption of survival and in considering realism’s victor bias is that they showcase how realism undermines interest in the study of surrender and the importance of the will of the other. Realism’s victor bias reinforces the belief that the will of the other is as important as one’s material weakness imposes and dependent on threats or opportunism. Realism does not consider the conflict between surrender and survival making itself averse to examining potential other realist or non-realist causes that would make a state to trade off or put at high risk survival for another good; reasons that may show some independence of will of the other. So, challenging victor bias and the assumption of survival serves to challenge realism’s limited appreciation of the will of the other that may play a more significant role in decisions to surrender than realists would be willing to admit.
Contending Realist Approaches Toward Surrender

Aside from a few brief remarks about how to treat defeated powers, the issue of surrender in IR “has gone largely untheorized (indeed unmentioned)” (Schweller, 2001, pp. 161-162). Given the lack of realist theories of surrender, the closest competing realist explanations are basically two theories of alliances. Walt’s Balance of Threat and Schweller’s Balance of Interest (Walt, 1987; Schweller, 1994). These two theories argue that states bandwagon either as a response to threat or for profit. Schweller makes the point that Walt’s view of bandwagoning is a form of strategic surrender or capitulation (Schweller, 1994, p. 79; Schweller, 1997, p. 928). Therefore, it is a suitable realist contender for a theory of surrender. Schweller’s theory, unlike Walt’s, argues that states bandwagon for profit and that this strategy is not a response to a threat. In this sense, it does not fit well with the puzzle of surrender. However, Schweller’s view is important because one could follow his logic and claim that a state faced with a threat and given an opportunity to bandwagon would do so out of a combination of fear and profit. His theory would explain the profit side of the ‘equation’.

Gideon Rose has also written an analysis of How Wars End but he relies, rather uncritically, on neoclassical realism to make his argument and so we will focus on the main theoretical argument provided by Schweller (Rose, 2010). What is crucial here is to highlight the two basic realist drives for surrender. These are fear and profit.

In the historical case studies we will show that these two drives are inadequate to explain the cases of surrender that this thesis examines. Realism’s victor bias sees a world in which authority is merely synonymous with power and the will of the other plays a minimal role sort of as a reaction to force and threats. This is basically Walt’s view. Schweller innovates by adding the drive of profit but again the other does not seem to have much independent will. Schweller merely pegs the will of the ‘other’ to the pursuit of material profit or to the naïveté of believing in propaganda (Schweller, 1994, pp. 92-99). Other drives for risk-prone behaviour are excluded. Therefore, realism sees a world in which the will of the ‘other’ plays

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30 “Bandwagoning is the alliance equivalent of the domino theory in adversary relations” and it is also incorporated in Schweller’s theory and so we will focus only on bandwagoning (Snyder, 1991, p. 130; Schweller, 1994, pp. 98-99).

31 Schweller endorses Keckesmeti’s work comparing it to Walt’s view of appeasement but he makes the point in a footnote and does not engage in a theoretical analysis of Keckesmeti’s work that is more historical than theoretical (Schweller, 1997, p. 928; Keckesmeti, 1957; Walt, 1987, p. 28).

32 Rose is the ‘godfather’ of neoclassical realism but his work on How Wars End is more of a theoretical application of neoclassical realism (Rose, 1998). Rose focuses on factors that shape the actions of decision-makers: power politics, internal factors, psychological factors (Rose, 2010, p. 5).
little independent role, a role that is limited to reacting to the threats of the powerful, naively believing in the ideas of the strong or opportunistically following a leading state for material profit.

Glenn Snyder’s work on alliances and bandwagoning could have been an alternative contending theory but he does not go far from Walt and follows the fundamental neorealist premises. Snyder has written about the fears of entrapment and abandonment in alliances; that is the fear that an ally is too important leading to an alliance of dependence or the fear that one is in a situation that is likely to be abandoned by one’s ally (Snyder, 1984). He also offers a more elaborate combination of the structure of the international system, alliance politics and strategy (Snyder, 1997; Snyder, 1996; Snyder, 1984; Snyder & Diesing, 1977). Still though, his work is limited by the neorealist worldview and premises. His world, just like Walt’s, is a fear based world. Alliances are responses to threats alone by definition. Even though Snyder criticised Walt for downplaying the importance of intentions or resolve, his emphasis on fear is still the fundamental aspect of his neorealist approach. The will of the other is rather limited and reactionary – a reaction to fear and pegged to material power. A more nuanced view that would be required to examine the potential impact of the will of the other in admitting defeat or being willing to make peace is beyond his neorealist purview. For example, the salience of alliances lies with their ability to act as greater deterrents from external attacks and offer a greater capability to defend oneself (Snyder, 1997, p. 44). So, he presents the deterrent impact that the will of the ‘other’ or the demonstration of its resolve may have. However, what remains out of sight, in both his work and in Walt’s, is what happens when one is confronted by preponderant power anyway and there is still variation to be explained in the observed behavioural outcomes (such as in instances of early or late surrendering, stable or unstable surrendering). One of his criticisms towards Walt is that he focuses too much on the power component of his theory and ignores the resolve or will aspect of his theory suggesting the idea of a balance of “intentions” or “resolve” (Snyder, 1991, pp. 126-127). His thinking is still limited to deterrence though and he quickly brings up a deterrence example. He suggests that threat can be deterred by projection of greater resolve which is ignored by Walt but which is not nuanced enough to grasp the complications of the vast asymmetry of conflict in the cases of surrender this thesis examines (Snyder, 1991, p. 127). So, his work does not go far from Walt’s, relies on the same neorealist fear based logic and does not adequately explain the variation in high-risk strategies of states confronted with existential threats as in cases of surrender where defeat or destruction are imminent.
Therefore, this thesis addresses Snyder’s insights about fears of entrapment and abandonment where applicable in the case studies of surrender investigated but its main focus remains Walt’s fear based work and Schweller’s profit based work.

So, what is missing from realism is a more nuanced view of the will of the other that is not just a reaction to fear or based on profit and opportunism, the typically\(^{33}\) realist drives, but also includes other factors that could affect a state’s willingness to make peace. Such factors or factors could potentially explain the variation in cases of surrender. Seeing surrender as a process and challenging realism’s assumptions of fear and profit and its victor bias could lead to more fine-grained understanding of the weak opponent’s will or drive, what triggers it, what placates it or what polarises it. It can provide a way of assessing whether realism’s assumptions are an obstacle to understanding the will of the other and the issues involved, which in this case is surrender.

**War Termination Literature and Victor Bias**

This section offers a brief survey of the relatable non-IR specialist literature, war termination literature, demonstrating that one of the contentious issues in it is the relative neglect of the significance of the will of the other; an issue which corresponds with realism’s victor bias that obscures aspects of the importance of the will of the other. Overall, the recent literature on war termination is dominated by the rational bargaining model of war which has deemphasised non-material determinants of the will of the other and stresses out issues such as elite interests and uncertainty, which are already familiar to realists. A blind spot of this literature, related to realism’s victor bias, is that it diminishes the difference between a hurtful stalemate or a state’s reduced uncertainty about the enforceability of an agreement or a state’s willingness to reduce its minimal war aims on one hand and a state’s willingness to make peace on the other hand.

What affects the will of the other is a crucial issue when it comes to the war termination literature\(^{34}\) as well but it has been understudied with the emphasis lately being given on

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\(^{33}\) Both Brooks and Lebow emphasise that for realism fear is the central motivation in international politics (Brooks, 1997; Lebow, 2008). Schweller does not reject that but adds the importance of profit.

\(^{34}\) We are following here the distinction in the literature provided by Henk Goemans in his *War & Punishment* (Goemans, 2000, pp. 4-11).
variations of the rational bargaining model of war. Wagner has emphasised the importance of seeing war as a bargaining process revealing the capabilities of the enemy and leading to adjustments of the preferences of the combatants (Wagner, 2000). Unlike Fearon Morrow and Powell, Wagner sees war as a bargaining game where a) the preferences of the opponents change throughout the war and the decision to terminate war is not based on preferences that existed prior to war but on those new preferences as shaped by the course of war b) and that the bargaining continues even after war has started (Wagner, 2000, p. 471; Fearon, 1995; Morrow, 1985; Powell, 1996). This is the baseline argument that this research tradition in war termination accepts. The literature is divided by those who research on the assumptions that the state is a unitary actor and those who see into the black box of the state. Dan Reiter makes the rational argument about the enforceability of agreements being crucial for concluding wars but he is unclear about how fighting is supposed to induce a solution (Reiter, 2009; Weisiger, 2013). In contrast, Elizabeth Stanley and Henk Goemans seek answers to the puzzle of how wars end by looking inside the state. Stanley highlights the importance of domestic politics and the impact of changing decision-makers who are willing to see the war under a different light and take decision that lead to war termination that the previous leaders were unwilling to take (Stanley, 2009). Goemans focuses on the gamble for survival of the decision-makers; that is, their concern for their survival in power and physically after the war (Goemans, 2000). Goemans too though, does not distinguish adequately “between a state’s willingness to reduce its minimal war aims and its willingness to make peace” (Lebow, 2001a, p. 373).

A crucial blind spot in this literature is that it does not adequately distinguish between the idea of what General Petraeus said about influencing the political calculations of the local

35 Geoffrey Blainey’s monumental work of course differs from the rational version of the bargaining model of war (Blainey, 1988). Blainey puts the emphasis on over-optimism about success in war whereas James Fearon highlights the importance of the rational bargaining model of war highlighting the challenge of not conveying one’s intentions effectively and the informational problem this creates. Fearon also highlights the importance of commitment, and/or issue indivisibility (Fearon, 1995).

36 This literature has other problems too. It treats the state or the leaders as ‘cold-hearted monsters’ and that it is less specified than it thinks. When Raymond Aron was discussing what is an international relations theory he argued persuasively that “we cannot endow the actors, either through the centuries or within a given system, with a single aim: the conscious or unconscious desire for a certain maximum gain” (Aron, 1978, p. 175). The idea of building a scientific model of war based on the idea that we know what all leaders in war aim at, even if this survival, is problematic or as Aron argued: “the doctrine, drawn from a simplified model and presuming that all actors have a single or ultimate goal, has no claim to validity or scientific accuracy” (Aron, 1978, p. 181). Moving from “the faulty traditional assumption of unitary actor states behaving as monstrès froids”, hegemonic in realist scholarship, claims Jacques E.C. Hymans, to the “even less defensible assumption that flesh-and-blood individual leaders behave as monstrès froids” is still problematic (italics in original) (Hymans, 2010, p. 462). Stanley’s argument about the importance of changing decision makers to bring war to an end, despite its merits,
people and the difference between willingness to reduce war aims and the willingness to make peace. The difference is about how much pain is an opponent willing to take. This affects the duration of war, the willingness to accept a compromise, the sustainability of the outcome, the interpretation of the relative strength of the opponents and the willingness to make peace. Some states may implement high-risk strategies but risk is an important factor since war itself is the greatest risk of all.

This relative neglect is perhaps very well exemplified by Goemans’ dichotomous view of the war termination literature (Goemans, 2000, pp. 4-11). Goemans is cautious enough to claim that any distinction in the literature is not going to be without its problems but it is still indicative of the aforementioned blind spot (Goemans, 2000, p. 4). One strand of the literature revolves around the idea that war ends when the vanquished quits. The other strand in the literature maintains that war is a bargaining game and war ends when both combatants prefer to stop fighting over continuing war. For Goemans, the difference is that the first argument pays special attention to the vanquished or as Calahan put it “war is pressed by the victor, but peace is made by the vanquished” whereas the second argument to how war as a bargaining process changes the prospects for victory leading states to change their war aims until they reach a point where agreement is possible.

Goemans’ work on war termination has been praised and it is indicative of the limited attention such scholars pay to what makes states be more willing to make peace. Things become clear when one focuses on what Goemans assumes regarding the first strand of the literature on war termination. The flaw he finds is that it assumes “that the stakes of the war suffers from a certain kind of underspecificity. The fact that when leaders change the willingness for compromise changes is not necessarily evidence that it is due to the leaders different thinking. The reason may reside not in domestic politics but in social politics if society has changed its mood and elected a politician who now favours the new political position.

37 Goemans gives a definition for resolve: “resolve is the total amount of resources one side is willing to expend for the issue” (italics in the original) (Goemans, 2000, p. 29). However, the definition seems to address on the materialist side of resolve which does not necessarily reflect all aspects of resolve since resolution or resistance may be delayed or build up gradually.

38 Some works along this line are Beer and Mayer 1986; Bennett and Stam 1996; Calahan 1944; Carroll 1980; Coser 1961; Hobbs 1979; Kecskemeti 1957; Klingberg 1966; Manwaring 1987; Randle 1973; Richardson 1960; Stam 1996; Timasheff 1965.


40 See Lebow’s book review and Dan Reiter’s comment in his book How Wars End (Lebow, 2001a; Reiter, 2009, p. 231).
are fixed” (Goemans, 2000, p. 6). In contrast, the flaw he identifies in the second argument is that it is underspecified and does not provide a mechanism that explains when a bargaining space opens up and neglects enforcement problems (Goemans, 2000, p. 9). Goemans, as we saw above, works within the second strand of the literature and, together with a younger generation of scholars, is trying to address the deficiencies in the explanations that rely on the bargaining model of war. When it comes to the first strand in the literature though, he is somehow unfair. Certainly, Coser says for example, “[a]greements as to goals and determination of outcome shorten the conflict. Once a goal has been reached by one of the parties and this accepted as a clue to the acceptance of defeat by the other, the conflict is ended. The more restricted the object of contention and the more visible for both parties the clues to victory, the higher the chances that the conflict be limited in time and extension” (Coser, 1961, p. 349). Yet, Coser also says that “understanding of those symbols which move men to accept compromise or even defeat [is] valuable” (Coser, 1961, p. 353). The idea of accepting a compromise means that a certain redefinition of goals due to the progress of war, which Coser finds crucial, means that the stakes of war do not remain constant for Coser as Goemans argues. In fact, if Coser and Lebow are right that the willingness to make peace varies, the proposition that Geomans downplays, then it is Geomans who sees the stakes of war as more fixed than they can be. The things that affect the willingness to make peace are at stake in war and paying less attention to them by privileging the rational bargaining model of war and its complementary arguments also exemplifies a tendency to see the stakes of war as more fixed than they can be. More importantly though, this epitomises the reason why the researchers in the second strand of the literature have downplayed the importance of asking the question what factors affect the duration of war and the stability of the war outcome. The reason is they tend to think that asking about what affects the willingness to make peace is a marginal issue; so marginal that other scholars who have thought about it have been pigeonholed in the camp of those who see the stakes of the war as fixed41.

When it comes to surrender the literature is even more limited. The most well-known study on strategic surrender dates back to 1957 in a RAND corporation study by Paul Kecskemeti that is currently, according to Google Scholar, cited by 223 researchers. The idea behind this

41 Geomans is careful to admit that “emotions and social norms may also sometimes play significant roles in decisions to end wars” but appreciating so does not change the fact that this issue may be more problematic than he indicates (Goemans, 2000, p. 13). Later on Geomans is clearer and states that “[d]omestic politics could also influence the expected utility for war, independent of the effect continued fighting has on the terms of settlements on offer, but, I expect, in only very rare and highly unusual circumstances” (Goemans, 2000, p. 50).
study is that the defeated tries to appease the enemy in order to survive, perhaps for some political concessions if it retains some bargaining power\textsuperscript{42}, and even in order to conserve strength and live to fight another day (Kecskemeti, 1957; Wagner, 2000, p. 478). The importance of political interactions at the end of a conflict is another point this study stresses\textsuperscript{43}.

The inadequacies of this work for a thesis that aims to link surrender and the theory of realism are significant. Kecskemeti’s study is more descriptive rather than theoretical (Reiter, 2009, p. 231). He does not aim to make a contribution to the IR literature. He is focusing narrowly on what makes the enemy accept surrender but excludes such questions as “why states decide to fight to the absolute end, why states negotiate to terminate wars short of strategic surrender” (Reiter, 2009, p. 231). Kecskemeti’s work also presents other challenges. In a later article on “Political Rationality in Ending War” he set forth the idea that war termination is linked to the “extent that a "convergent reorientation" of the basic political outlook of the adversaries takes place, as a result of which the controversial issues underlying the conflicts are liquidated” (Kecskemeti, 1970, p. 105). This idea links well with the aforementioned concern regarding the will of the enemy. However, like in his previous study, he presupposes who is going to be the victor of a war and claims that in a rational world there would be no wars (Kecskemeti, 1970, p. 115; Carroll, 1969, p. 304). He does not contemplate the idea that a rational world may be even bloodier with humans learning to kill more efficiently or being ruthlessly calculating and he seems to believe that war could ideally be eliminated by the mere force of reason\textsuperscript{44}. Another issue that is left unexamined is the importance of not only the “convergent reorientation” but also of how the process of war can exacerbate certain issues making this “convergent reorientation” even more difficult. The problem is that of underspecification but is quite important and definitely in need of further research regarding the will of the enemy and its impact on war termination and victory.

\textsuperscript{42} Werner has also produced a similar study based on a bargaining model of war (Werner, 1998). However, it assumes certainty about who will win and when the war will end (Wagner, 2000, p. 478). About the problems of offering deterministic hypotheses about who is going to be the winner see Carroll’s contribution (Carroll, 1980, p. 52; Carroll, 1969, p. 304).

\textsuperscript{43} Schweller cites Kecskemeti’s work comparing it to Walt’s view of appeasement but he pays no attention to the importance of interactions at the end of the conflict (Schweller, 1997, p. 928; Walt, 1987, p. 28). This is perhaps because this comment by Schweller is put in a footnote but it remains unclear what his view would be about the meaning of interactions in general and interactions before surrendering in particular.

\textsuperscript{44} For the opposite view see Coker’s work \textit{Can War be Eliminated?} (Coker, 2014a; Jervis, 2011b, p. 406).
Coser highlights this ambiguity very well with a quote from Clausewitz. Clausewitz argued that to make an opponent “comply with our will, we must place him in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice we demand” and Coser comments that “[t]his elegantly phrased dictum is, however, meaningless unless the criteria be specified that determine how the antagonist will in fact assess the situation” (Coser, 1961, pp. 349-350).

Kecskemeti in his study on Political Rationality in Ending War has specified two criteria: (1) whether the outcome can be reversed by renewed efforts, and (2) whether the "stake" is high enough to justify an attempt in this direction. This neat formulation still does not provide much guidance to practical issues. The first criterion is not so clear though. Kecskemeti admits that defenselessness is a relative criterion and also alludes to the idea that the belligerents may want to misrepresent their real strength; hence, leading war to continue between the rational point of termination according to Kecskemeti’s view. As for the second criterion it is still underspecified because it does not mention any potential critical factors like Coser’s view about being attuned to the importance of symbols of victory and defeat to war termination, Coker’s argument about examining each actor’s cost-benefit analysis by understanding the ends for which they are fighting, and Clausewitz’s more complicated view of politics (Coser, 1961; Coker, 1997; Herberg-Rothe, 2007). The criterion of convergent political reorientation takes different meaning depending on the politics of a given situation. Herberg-Rothe has convincingly unpacked the idea of “politik” in Clausewitz. He argues that Clausewitz has incorporated three views of politics in his theory of war. When Clausewitz argues that war is the continuation of “politik” by an admixture of other means he has in mind three different views of politics. These three views correspond to the formula or the wondrous trinity: violence, chance, and policy. His three views of politics vary depending on which aspect of the trinity is more dominant in each case and they are a) war as the politics of society, b) war as a struggle for survival, c) and war as policy (Herberg-Rothe, 2007, pp. 153-156). Last but not least, Kecskemeti diminishes the importance of wars to the bitter end because he believes that most wars are not such fights (Kecskemeti, 1970, p. 112). Yet, it is crucial to understand what makes people believe in such rhetoric and what makes people change their minds and see the world not like this. This, arguably, has to do with the willingness to admit defeat. Certainly though, it is worthwhile assessing which side does causality run; from realising that war is not so devastating and does not have to be a last-ditch effort or from losing the will to fight and then seeing reality as not a fight to the death.
Not only are Kecskemeti’s, Coser’s and Coker’s works very important, and I owe a significant debt to them, but the aforementioned under-specification, as exemplified by the analysis of Kecskemeti’s work, shows there is still room for further research on the topic. The will of the enemy seems to be underappreciated by the bargaining model of war literature as well as from realism and it even seems to be open for further elaboration in relation to the works of Coser, Kecskemeti and Coker. Coker encourages studying the importance of the variability of actors’ war ends because, as he argues, they can become such that feed off and sustain the war and may even end up having no interest in peace (Coker, 1997, pp. 626-628).

Another issue that comes out of Coker’s work is the lack of practical clarity of distinguishing between victors and vanquished. We have tried to show above that this is problematic in the current literature on war termination and in realism. The bargaining model of war seems to be largely interested in the termination of war but not the connection between its timing, duration and post-war stability. This literature, by downplaying the importance of the will of the enemy to admit defeat and make peace obscures these potential links. Similarly, realism with its victor bias is not interested in the study of surrender since authority is merely a matter of power and not of the will of the other. Yet, as Coker argues, it is often our own perceptions that misguide us. One such perception is that “[w]e still like to think of wars ending with peace treaties, frequently with a conference or congress which redraws the map, clearly delineating the victors from the vanquished” (Coker, 1997, p. 625). A corollary misguided belief of this imprudent view of victory and of the diminished interest in the study of the will of the other as the willingness to admit defeat is the lack of interest in analysing surrender. Even Kecskemeti, for example, does not find the issue important enough to analyse it, beyond his original and largely historical study, and evades it by saying that most wars are not wars of annihilation (Kecskemeti, 1970, p. 112).

**War and Realism’s IR Critics**

Despite the salience of the puzzle of surrender, realism enjoys a rather privileged status in IR as a theory of ‘war’. There is a no lack of critiques of realism and war from within IR which are not from the outset inimical to neorealism and neoclassical realism. The literature on war is voluminous with varying opinions on realism but even there we can find scholars of history and war that praise realism’s view of war. For instance, international historian Paul Schroeder
has cogently criticised neorealism’s view of peace but does not dispute neorealism’s view of war. In fact, according to Schroeder, realism, especially neorealism, “is a good theory for explaining war” (Schroeder & Trachtenberg, 1996, p. 308). This section aims at showing that even though realism has been criticised for many issues, the kind of critical appraisal this thesis aims to provide has been limited and has not been provided from a realist-friendly perspective that could enable a dialogue with realists and their international political considerations.

Students of politics and war in the discipline of IR are divided about their views of realism but even its critics concede much ground to realism’s view of war. Robert Keohane, despite the so-called neo-neo debate between neorealists and (neo)liberal institutionalists, rests his theory of international regimes on a modified version of Waltz’s structural realism (Keohane, 1993, pp. 528-530; Keohane & Lisa, 2003). Such a theory is important because it accompanies the argument that international institutions increase international cooperation, create more stakes in the contemporary international order, and diminish the possibility of war by promoting international stability (Keohane, 1993). Nevertheless, it leaves realism’s account of war untouched. Another contentious issue between realism and its critics is democratic peace and the argument that democracies are more peaceful than other political regimes especially in relation to other democracies. However, even Bruce Russett and John Oneal, pioneers in Democratic Peace Theory, accept much of neorealism’s view of the world focusing their dispute not on realist explanations of the past but on the peace of democracies (Russett & Oneal, 2001, p. 253; Layne, 1994). Alexander Wendt has produced an important theoretical constructivist work and distinguishes among three types of international systems depending on how cooperative or conflict-prone they are (Wendt, 1999). Each international system has its own culture of anarchy, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, unlike realism that sees anarchy as a constant aspect of the international system. Wendt’s theory tries to incorporate realism into a structural constructivist theory assigning to realism the Hobbesian logic of anarchy. Wendt’s view not only attempts to subsume realism but it is also guilty of structural determinism like Waltzian structuralism (Goddard & Nexon, 2005, pp. 45-46).

Realism’s view of war has been criticised by some important studies of war but they do not exclusively focus on surrender and they do not try to criticise realism from within. For instance, Vasquez has written *The War Puzzle* but its goal has been to show that realism is a degenerative research paradigm (Vasquez, 2009; Schweller, 1997). Lebow has authored the
impressive tome *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* but the goal has been to create a new grand theory (Lebow, 2008). Lebow’s studies have been helpful in broadening the scope of our thinking but this thesis is interested in a critique of neorealism and neoclassical realism rather than undertake the Olympian task of creating a new theoretical approach. Lebow’s *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders* is a significant work that engages with realism broadly but centres on offering Lebow’s own view of classical realism.

It is important to acknowledge the feminists’ criticisms of realism with its view of reality based on dichotomous concepts and its view of power. Berenice Carroll, whose work has influenced this thesis, has challenged the victory/defeat dichotomy and what she calls “the mystique of dominance” that surrounds the idea of victory\(^45\) (Carroll, 1980). This was a general critical outlook addressed within the context of the war termination literature and not towards realism per se. Ann Tickner drawing on Nancy Hartsock’s work has criticised the realist view of power for being of the type power-as-domination, a view of power linked to masculinity (Tickner, 1988, pp. 434, 438; Hartsock, 1983). A feminist perspective, even though one should not be restricted to feminism to make these criticisms, disapproves of dichotomous concepts such as the separation of moral command from political action and the autonomy of the political separated from the social or the private (Tickner, 1988, p. 438). Feminism, of course, has a broader critical outlook with regard to war that this thesis does not identify with; namely, that the state is an instrument of violence that protects and perpetuates masculinity and its related view of society which is then reproduced through war and the “war state” (Betty, 1993, pp. 12-13).

Unlike some of those critics, this thesis aims to both utilise a friendly methodology towards realism and at the same time challenge what some of these academics have ignored or accepted rather uncritically in neorealism and neoclassical realism; that is, its victor bias, its view of survival and the importance it ascribes to the will of the other in matters of life and death.

\(^45\) Another interested general point some feminists make is that “fundamental dichotomies are historically gender-coded and structurally oppositional, ‘adding women’ requires changing the meaning… of ‘given’ categories in Western thought and practice” (Peterson, 1992, p. 194). This can be linked to the idea of not only undermining the dichotomy victory/defeat but also emphasising the multiple meanings of these two terms and that challenging this dichotomy is very consequential. The idea of adding the will of the ‘other’ as something critical even in matters of life and death like in surrender is not just an optional extra but an important addition that, arguably, upsets realism’s view of power as a possession, view of peace, view of international order and view of theorising.
Conclusion

This chapter has argued that surrender has been neglected by realism and the reason for this is that realism underrates the importance of the will of the other which, we suspect, plays an important role in surrendering. We call this victor bias and we have argued that it stems from realism’s view of peace as victor’s peace and is reinforced by its view of survival as autonomy. Therefore, we suspect (and test against empirics in chapters 3-5) misunderstandings of logics of surrender.

After discerning realism’s view of peace and highlighting its contradictions vis-à-vis the will of the other and its calls for moderation or a ‘hearts and minds’ approach, we then problematised the assumption of survival. We argued that the assumption of survival currently understood in realism serves to undermine theoretical investigation of surrender and reinforce the victor bias by diminishing the potential importance of the will of the other. Realists avoid thinking through the inconsistency between survival and surrender and, as seen earlier, the potential importance of the variability in outcomes of surrender. They appear to presume that surrender has a limited theoretical purchase based on their view of the assumption of survival and their view of peace. For these reasons they seem unwilling to investigate what does not appear as problematic to them: surrender, survival, the will of the weak other. In this way both realist assumptions serve to avoid challenging the victor bias and scrutinise what could challenge it.

So, realists continue using the same drives, threat and profit, and theorising as usual, misusing Waltz as a baseline theory of foreign policy. However, as this thesis hypothesises and demonstrates, there are other logics of surrender and non-material factors that lead to the variability in outcomes of surrender and explain why states are willing to sacrifice or compromise their survival. This means that not specifying the concept of survival obfuscates what it may reveal. What it reveals is that the victor bias can and should be challenged and that saying that states seek their vital interests and that their vital interest is survival is problematic. This not only is tautological but also obscures the potential logics of surrender this thesis investigates.

This realist victor bias approach is also pertinent to the literature on war termination. We have seen that it has a wider impact on this literature, especially in recent decades. This thesis
acknowledged the expanding universe of innovative research questions posed by the aforementioned literature, took stock of the importance of strategic interactions and of the complex nature of the relationship between the will of the combatants and political and military developments, and shared concerns about the dichotomous view of concepts such as victor/vanquished and victory/defeat. However, this thesis remains ultimately puzzled by this reduced emphasis on the will of the other even in the broader context of the war termination literature. This observation may suggest that what appears as a realist victor bias may have broader consequences and sets out to investigate the realist bias with an even keener interest in the empirical chapters.

The following chapter examines the way in which we may develop a more open approach to study of surrender. We need to have an approach to start from which while attuning us to strategic calculations also maintains a more ‘open view’ as to factors which determine strategic thinking. We explore an orientation to the literature linked to SCA. This choice is made because it is part of the generalist approach to realism, as Rosecrance calls it, so it is friendly to realism at large. This approach, we argue, provides us with useful guiding principles and assumptions to work from as we try and find a path to a more nuanced analysis of surrender.
2. Strategic Choice Approach, Surrender and Realism

Introduction

To gain a better sense of how and why surrender takes place, this chapter now develops an open theoretical orientation which allows us to study surrender in a realist-sympathetic strategic perspective but with a more open minded approach. It develops some key orientation points familiar to realist analysis without collapsing into victor and status quo bias. We need more open assumptions about strategic action to work with and Strategic Choice Approach (SCA) provides this. We also explain how we conduct the studies that follow; that is, focusing on interactions and their varying effects and acknowledging the contingency of events and judgments in order not to reify what is historical and contingent. This open minded flexible approach permits us to investigate the potential impact of a gamut of factors related to reputation, recognition and emotions which could be crucial in discerning varying strategic logics and their impact on the will of the other.

To do so we present some key differences between the strategic choice approach based on the assumption of rationality and the version this thesis uses here which does not presuppose it and justify this choice by reference to the conflicting logics of the pursuit of security and the pursuit for recognition. The non-rational SCA embraces the ambiguity created by these two concepts which operate according to their own strategic logics. This chapter then proceeds in showing that the Thucydidean narrative also contains and embraces ambiguity which shows both the compatibility between the concerns presented here and the challenges presented by the historical record and also how Thucydides created an influential historical narrative of import by embracing rather than rejecting ambiguity. We then justify the choice of case studies in this thesis.
SCA: Assumptions, Limits & Prospects

The SCA is a strategic approach to studying international relations, compatible with realism and pays primary attention to the decisions of actors (Lake & Powell, 1999, pp. 4-5). The SCA is more than a language (applicable to many phenomena) and less than a full-blown theory (Stein, 1999, p. 228). This is good because it offers flexibility to the researcher and does not burden one with problematic assumptions like rigid dichotomies such as international relations and domestic politics. It emphasises the distinction between actors’ preferences and their environment. It focuses on informational structures. It “takes the interaction of two or more actors as the object to be analysed and seeks to explain how this interaction unfolds” (Lake & Powell, 1999, p. 4). It is agnostic with regard to the level of analysis problems and which are the most important actors in international politics, which vary depending on the nature of the strategic situation. This is a very pragmatic approach to theorising and one that allows the question at hand to shape the focus of the inquiry. However, it presupposes rationality which makes the SCA more determinate but less accurate (Stein, 1999). Moreover, the SCA has a future-oriented outlook and focusing on issues like reputations emanating from the past complicates a rational SCA model too much because it then has to grapple with two potentially opposing logics.

This thesis uses the strategic choice analysis in a general way as a baseline for its explorations. Where dealing with issues of reputation and emotions we have to rely more on a nuanced understanding of the historical context and the relationships of the actors between themselves and between other actors. This helps us understand what is at stake and how it is conceptualised by the actors and the extent to which a choice is malleable and is adjusted or the extent to which it is rigid.

What makes this thesis depart from the rational version of SCA is its consideration about the limits of rationality. Challenging the rationality assumption in models in the SCA is considered a potentially fruitful avenue even by scholars who have extensively engaged with it. According to Stein efforts to include the non-rational element of international relations may be what the vitality of the rational SCA depends on. However, he adds wistfully, the promise of such efforts is limited (Stein, 1999, p. 227). For the time being, Stein admits, “game-theoretic explanations of choice are inherently problematic in that they make
inappropriate assumptions about the capacity of individuals and groups to make rational individual and social choices” (Stein, 1999, p. 212).

In the next section we will elaborate on the ambiguity in IR that the SCA acknowledges and why dealing with the non-rational SCA is useful in order to embrace this ambiguity. The elements of ambiguity touched upon are: reputations, choice of games, conflicting strategic logics, conceptualisation, systems and emotions. As a result, it will be suggested that combining the non-rational SCA with a historical narrative explanation that historicises and contextualizes the actors’ choices and their environment is an appropriate way to deal with ambiguity by embracing it.

Non-Rational SCA: Embracing Ambiguity and Historical Narrative

Challenging the assumption of rationality in SCA permits us to explore rather than sidestep a series of challenges that confront both researchers and the actors during their strategic interactions. Doing away with the assumption of rationality permits us to grapple with the depth of uncertainty and ambiguity in our analyses. The non-rational SCA opts for embracing this ambiguity by incorporating factors like emotions and the possibility of strategic logics that conflict with each other; hence defeating the idea of a pure rational model and of the idea that we can unproblematically have a rational model with one logic. We examine the following challenges: the inherent ambiguity of constructing SCA models, how actors choose to change the game they play, the possibility of conflicting strategic logics, the level of interactions and their impact on the international system and the reification of concepts. It is crucial to have an open mind with regard to potential alternative strategic logics actors embrace and how these are informed by non-rational factors. It pertains to this thesis’ interest in the will of the other and what may give it more independence than presumed by realism.

The non-rational SCA is not interested in examining more factors to create a ‘laundry list’. Adding more variables and ambiguity is not a straightforward idea because addition, as if by default, could lead to better analyses. Such a choice entails a danger of avoiding conceptualisations and analytical thinking. However, we try to address this by eventually coming up with logics of surrender in the conclusion.
Moreover, offering explanations on the basis of SCA is an imprecise enterprise anyway and so it should not stop us including more factors if that could enable us to have a better grasp of the study at hand. As Stein puts it: “[c]onstructing models of strategic choice is an art rather than a science requiring scholars to make an array of choices about the nature of the actors, their preferences, their choices, their beliefs”, and the strategic environment in which they operate (Stein, 1999, p. 199). This thesis does not use a game theoretical model, nor does it need to use one to provide a strategic analysis (Baldwin, 2013). What this thesis acknowledges is that conceptualising strategic interactions is an inexact science. The way we conduct our analysis in the case studies is based on discerning the strategic environment in which actors operate and the strategic logic they use and justify why they do so and with what implications for surrender.

The problem with the rational version of the SCA is that it finds it hard to explain how actors decide to alter the games they play; that is, doing so without following the rules of the game they are playing. The difficulty is how to explain any extra rational logics that may lead to outcomes not included in what the game expects. So, a more open framework of analysis endorsing the non-rational element and the possibility for the presence of a rationality type excluded by the game being played holds the promise of embracing such issues and not seeing them as obstacles. For example, in the historical narratives it becomes apparent that framing the issue at hand and the impact of emotions play a crucial role in instances of surrendering by permitting interests to change and reputations to be created. This shows that strategic choices can be influenced by non-rational calculations.

The study of strategic choice is essential because it focuses on interactions which reveal how actors change their behaviour but its rational version is limited by assuming actors’ preferences. The non-rational SCA focuses on how interests and strategic logics may change in the process of strategic behaviour by the choices actors make as they interact with their environment. The study from the restricted rational vantage point can reify these potential changes by assuming the actors’ beliefs and preferences and excluding what is political and cultural (Lake & Powell, 1999, p. 17). As Jervis acknowledged in his article on realism and game theory the preferences and the values of actors change and exogenising this issue from our analyses comes “at the cost of drawing attention away from areas that may contain much of the explanatory ‘action’ in which we are interested” (Jervis, 1988, pp. 324-325). The SCA in general is helpful because it is flexible. The version of the SCA at hand that challenges the
assumption of rationality, and which for lack of a better name we have called non-rational SCA, is more flexible and can allow accounting for additional factors of potentially vital importance in cases of surrender and in understand the will of the other.

The focus of this thesis is the will of the other and how it affects choices about surrender. It is crucial to discern if the will of the other is at times driven by a different strategic logic than the one that drives a given strategic model a researcher has chosen to apply. Had we used the rational version of SCA we would be prejudging the rationale of the actors; a rationale that we do not know if it changes throughout the interactions or remains rigid. In other words, we need to examine the logic of the actors or if they have conflicting logics and how they resolve such a potential issue. It is better doing so than bypassing the issue. This can enable us to avoid reproducing what our theories’ own rationales expect or creating determinate models that are inaccurate and reify what matters (Stein, 1999). Being open to the presence of different strategic logics is crucial and an interesting challenge for researchers and practitioners.

The potential presence of different strategic logics challenges actors’ decision-making process and scholars efforts to attribute causality. For the actors themselves different strategic logics mean different ways of thinking and prioritising. For the researcher it means s/he has to be able to potentially apply different logics of inference to trace the different logics of actors; logics that may even be conflicting with each other. When “two or more modes of rationality [are] relevant to a single… decision” then “different evaluative criteria may yield conflicting results” (Willoughby & Thurmaier, 2001, p. 76). Different logics of inference can prioritise different types of rationalities. This requires an acknowledgment that there is no pre-determined answer or single logic of inference to guide the researcher. This further necessitates the application of judgement and leads us to use our framework of analysis and conceptualisations not in a strict deductive way but in a heuristic mode. This alerts one, as Aron would say, to “the limits that we can expect from theory [and] the need to base our generalisations on a deep familiarity with the contingencies of history” (Griffiths, 2008, p. 7). So, the non-rational SCA has a very precise view of the challenges the rational SCA faces and makes a conscious choice to avoid them by embracing the potential presence and ambiguity generated by multiple strategic logics.

46 Jack Levy devotes part of his Peace Science Society’s Presidential Address on the “single logic” of inference debate (Levy, 2008).
Indeed, in the case studies, examined in chapters 3-5, we will see different strategic logics unfolding. For instance, the citizens of Acanthus (chapter 4) decided to stop playing a zero-sum game with Brasidas, the leader of the Spartan attack, and instead played a cooperative positive-sum game and became seduced and followed him in his campaigns. The challenge posed by such a nuanced analysis is that we cannot know which strategic logic will dominate in advance and even though we know in hindsight we cannot be sure that the outcome was predetermined and unavoidable. Actions responsible according to a given strategic logic are bound to be irresponsible or ‘irrational’ according to a different logic. Designing rational models predetermining outcomes and dominant strategic logics may reify what is contingent, malleable and vital by misperceiving what is ‘irrational’. It is very hard to explain how the rules of one game incompatible with another game lead actors to play a different game, and as Stein has argued, this is one of the rational SCA’s weaknesses (Stein, 1999). The concern is not just about surrender the choice at the last moment but also about the interactions that lead to surrender, that is, surrender as a process, and getting the logic of it right.

This thesis will discern through the study of instances of surrender that there is no pure strategic logic. Instead, in all three case studies we have discerned an element of fear and an element of other emotions that are linked to the concept of recognition. Even though, we ultimately provide the link between these emotions and recognition at the conclusion of this thesis by reconceptualising our findings, it is the presence of these emotions, gratitude and seduction, that connote a different logic to the ones of fear and profit that realism embraces. Ultimately, the concern for recognition has its own strategic logic which at times can be at odds with the strategic logic of the pursuit of physical survival.

In all three case studies states are influenced by their pursuits of a level of recognition leading them to take high-risk choices. Had they only pursued their physical survival they would have had acted either differently or with a different rationale and different consequences. According to the strategic logic of recognition what is put first is whether the enemy proffers a level of recognition to the defendant or vanquished. According to the strategic logic of survival, priority is put on survival - recognition is an optional extra. In other words, guarantees by a significantly more powerful enemy that it would spare the lives of the leaders and the inhabitants in the vanquished state should be enough to lead to capitulation. This is not what we have detected in our case studies and even when capitulation takes place, it does
so, explicitly (chapter 4) or implicitly (chapter 5), on the basis of the logic of recognition in tandem with the logic of survival.

It is fundamental to emphasise that these two logics, logic of survival and logic of recognition are ideal types. It is more likely to find them fused together in real life in different proportions. States navigate their demands for recognition and security in different ways in different times and contexts. Doing so can at times facilitate surrender when the two logics go hand in hand but it can lead to conflict between the two when they pull towards opposite directions; that is surrender and resistance. This is the implication of having two different strategic logics motivating states to potentially act differently: they can work together or against each other.

The logic of recognition in particular bears a link with reputation and it is crucial to apply the non-rational SCA because the rational SCA cannot yet address such issues. According to Stein, “[c]oncepts such as resolution, conviction, stubbornness, stamina, and probity are all elements of reputation that cannot yet be addressed by game theory” (Stein, 1999, p. 227). These are topics which we hypothesise could be central to our case studies and some of them, it will be shown, indeed are. For example, the Plataeans (chapter 3) stubbornly remain loyal to Athens and resist Sparta because they feel gratitude to Athens and this is a feeling linked to the idea of recognition. They do not lose their resolution until the very end. Brasidas in Northern Greece (chapter 4) gains a reputation that follows him in his expeditions and after his death too. Brasidas is able to seduce the citizens of Acanthus by reframing surrendering from an issue of fear to an issue of recognition. In contrast, Archidamus fails to reframe the surrendering of the citizens of Plataea from an issue of recognition to an issue of fear and spends two years besieging Plataea. Jervis rightly maintains that "[r]esolve" is not a constant characteristic of the actor, but is sensitive to time and context” and discerning the impact of reputation and recognition on the willingness of the other to resist or give up is elemental (Jervis & Snyder, 1991, p. 43). So, issues that affect the will of the other or potentially affect the will of the other and will be examined, like reputation and recognition, are hard to be reconciled with the rational SCA and justify our choice for the non-rational SCA.

This ambiguity in international relations phenomena imposes limitations on our ability to construct deductive generalisations. There is a fundamental ambiguity in our field of study and we cannot shy away from it. Raymond Aron, for example, argues that no international
system has a mechanism guaranteed to restore equilibrium and that systems and social events are undefined in the epistemological sense (Aron, 1978, p. 175; MacIntyre, 1971, p. 269). Not only is international politics a system with ambiguity but this is an essential characteristic of the system. That we can neither grasp the whole of reality nor the role of accidents and events is but one of the lessons we learn from Aron’s treatises (Aron, 1958, pp. 38-39; Kolodziej, 1985, p. 9; Hoffmann, 1985, p. 27).

Unpredictability, MacIntyre reminds us, referring to Machiavelli, can never be “dethroned” (MacIntyre, 1971, p. 270). This relates to both the general uncertainty as well as to gradual or long-term changes which are products of events and series of historical interactions that scholars and even the actors themselves sometimes do not anticipate. A variety of feedback can lead to a change of the system or in the system. A consequence of this is that the chance element is inherent in international relations and not produced by just our misperception or limited grasp of all the variables of the system (Coker, 2010a, p. 250; MacIntyre, 1971, pp. 270-271).

Acknowledging ambiguity in IR is not a liability but an advantage. Reifying ambiguity, as the assumption of rationality seems to enable, is problematic. Banishing ambiguity is, arguably, impossible. Therefore, we need to acknowledge it, assess its importance, and see how it plays out in one’s analyses. Sometimes what is ambiguous and subjective is also vital. Whenever we justify our conclusions based on whether an actor’s intentions were honest or not or whether a certain course of action was effective because it was legitimate or just, or when we attribute blame (which is contentious and based on personal judgement), or when we adjudicate whether something was rational or irrational we always act as partisans of a certain policy rather than offering scientific objective knowledge (MacIntyre, 1971, pp. 275-276; Suganami, 1997; Dupuy, 1998, p. 113). This shows that we do not possess a neutral language.

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47 For the importance of chance in Thucydides see Monoson’s and Loriaux’s study (Monoson & Loriaux, 1998). For the importance of ambiguity in the context of international relations and anarchy see Jackson’s and Nexon’s fair summary of the disciplinary division lines on their discussion of Barkin’s book Realist Constructivism (Jackson, et al., 2004, p. 339).

48 Premeditation, recklessness, contributory negligence are all quasi-juridical judgments relating to quasi-juridical categories based on subjective judgments which continue to fuel historical disagreements and there is no objective way to settle them (Suganami, 1997, p. 416). Suganami makes such a point in his review of Kagan’s book On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (Suganami, 1997). Jervis makes a similar point when discussing causation, the intensification of the Cold war and the conflict in Ethiopia (Jervis, 2010).
However, it is indispensable that we embrace ambiguity and the subjectivity that accompanies it, if we want to grasp subjective factors that motivate the will of the other and are consequential for instances of surrender.

This then requires not the persistence in the idea of crafting an elusive unified model with contradictory logics but to tell a story; a narrativist explanation. A narrativist explanation of the process and of critical interactions allows us to incorporate insights from an array of different disciplines such as history, psychology and cultural studies and how they interact in non-rational strategic ways in the course of time. The strategic logic is something we cannot escape in the study of politics. Avoiding the strategic logic would be to reject the idea that beliefs matter causally, that actors reflect and that actors anticipate other actors’ reactions and adjust their behaviour (Jervis, 2006b; MacIntyre, 1971, p. 274). However, subsuming politics into a pure rational strategic logic is dubious and this is an issue this study challenges by investigating instances of surrender. It is not unreasonable to expect that qualitative changes in actors’ preferences; that is, changes in preferences over outcomes or even sometimes changes in preferences over strategies or in the values they uphold, often have mixed motives rather than just an instrumental strategic logic (Jervis, 1999, p. 51; Jervis, 1988). Such changes can take place in the course of an extended period of time making these changes not to conform to the original expectations of the actors (Jervis, 2000). In such a case, the SCA could still be useful but one would need to apply it by incorporating the possibility of long-term effects in the analysis. However, this would lead one to focus on reputational, emotional, and social factors. Incorporating these non-rational aspects of choices allows for the opportunity to further investigate such issues. The opposite could lead one to misunderstand preferences and causality in a given outcome.

Embracing these subjective factors requires that we tell a story in order to present our arguments in a way that makes the subjective element and its consequences meaningful and not as something that we can do without. This is how we will proceed in our historical chapters – by narrating and historicising. The process of interactions may lead to change in the strategic logic states follow. In such a case a different analysis is required to trace the

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49 Whenever we decide if something is just or whenever something could be perceived as just or legitimate by the opponent and therefore be, in the end, effective or when attributing blame, we make judgments of right and wrong. Far from representing judgments based on objective truth or pure reason they are not. To the extent that political science is a moral science in the way MacIntyre understands it, then Coker is deeply illuminating when he argues that our “judgements of right and wrong are just matters of sentiment which we project into the world and imagine constitute part of the fabric of reality” (MacIntyre, 1971, p. 277; Coker, 2014a, p. 83).
process of change and its rationale. This entails historical sensitivity to background conditions, judgment and eclecticism. It can be pursued by applying one’s theoretical framework heuristically and incorporating it in a narrative explanation. A narrative explanation is suitable because, if pursued flexibly and through an emphasis on strategic interactions, it then elucidates background conditions, chance coincidences, mechanistic forces in operation, and information about a variety of relevant human acts (Suganami, 2008, p. 347). These factors elucidate the specific path the narrative follows and help us avoid the danger of reifying concepts; hence avoiding vacuous distinctions, false-dichotomies, and logical contradictions (Elman, et al., 1995, p. 194).

This is of the essence because hardly any rational model can substitute this process. According to Mink, historical understanding is achieved through a type of judgement “which cannot be replaced by any analytic technique” (cited in Humphreys, 2011, p. 268). We need this judgment in order to avoid reifying the games actors play so that we can argue why they make certain choices or why they will as they will.

This thesis is interested in the will of the other and its impact on decisions of surrender and has chosen to investigate the meaning of such decisions for the actors in the Peloponnesian War in a way that is still meaningful today with regard to the potential impact of weak states in international relations and by criticising realism’s victor bias. It is through narrative, Coker expounds, “that events take on significance or become meaningful. Actions that are lived are meaningful for those who live them. Only actions that are narrated have value or convey lessons for those who have to rely on history as a guide” (Coker, 2008). Similarly, as Munz argues, if we want to be introduced to the past and talk about the past we first need to author it and transform it into history ready for close analysis (Munz, 1997, p. 852). This is why this thesis has chosen to tell three stories and provide a re-reading of Thucydides’ own narrative. Thucydides’ story had, arguably, a different meaning for his contemporaries than it has for us. To relate Thucydides’ history to our own times and our IR debates requires another narration. In the next section we explain why Thucydides is compatible with the non-rational SCA’s embrace of ambiguity and why recent developments in Thucydidean studies demonstrate a tendency towards this direction.
Thucydides and Ambiguity

Stories are important because we can learn from them. None the less, we need to try and be explicit in the story itself about the historiographical debates that exist and the contingency of our interpretations and political analyses. This is useful to fracture the truth value of the story, expose its ambiguity and make it a vehicle for further thought, just like Thucydides seems to have done. The alternative would be, as Paul Schroeder would put it, to go into history like a looter and mine it for historical truths and data to use in an unwarranted way for law-like generalisations that may obscure ambiguity in IR (Elman, et al., 1995, p. 194; Schroeder, 1994, p. 148). Thucydides, to whom this section is devoted, has been at the epicentre of much discussion in realism and about what type of realist he is (Doyle, 1990; Gilpin, 1984). Nevertheless, he is also the thinker that, according to recent narratological studies, embraces ambiguity in his own way. This is compatible with the pragmatic concerns of the SCA which is agnostic with regard to the level of analysis problem and which are the most important actors in international politics, which it perceives to vary depending on the nature of the strategic situation. The non-rational SCA expands the purview of this strategic approach to emphasise what may matter for the will of the other and decisions of surrender. Thucydides’ history is enabling us to study the well-crafted ambiguity of his writings and offer a re-reading using the SCA for the purpose of analysing instances of surrender.

For a long time Thucydides has been incorporated by realism in a straightforward way. Realists accept the argument of Book I at face value where Thucydides writes about the truest cause and appears unambiguous (Lebow, 1996). Gilpin finds it questionable to argue that realists today “know anything that Thucydides and his fifth century compatriots did not know about the behavior of states” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 227). He also argues that “[e]verything – well, almost everything – that the new realists find intriguing in the interaction of international economics and politics can be found in the History of the Peloponnesian War” (Gilpin, 1984, p. 293). In a similar vein, Thucydides, for Waltz, accounts for the “striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia” (Waltz, 1979, p. 66). Thucydides truly appears to realists to be the founding father of this research tradition. However, every tradition has an element of invention and realism’s ‘fatherhood’ has been put to closer scrutiny.
The position of Thucydides in realist discourse and the unambiguous realist interpretation of this great thinker has been challenged in IR in the past few decades both from within and from without. Lebow correctly distinguishes between ancient Greek hegemonia (legitimated leadership) and arkhe (control) (Lebow & Kelly, 2001). His view is well respected among classicists (Greenwood, 2011/2006, p. 34). He has also argued that Thucydides explores “the relationship between nomos (convention) and phusis (nature) and its implications for civilization” (Lebow, 2001b, p. 547). Similarly, Nancy Kokaz reasons that “political unity and the legitimate exercise of power can only be understood in light of the moral ideals upon which political institutions rested” (Kokaz, 2001, p. 93). Ahrensford has also pointed out a difference between Thucydides and traditional realism and neorealism: “He does support twentieth-century realists’ claims about the weakness of justice in international affairs and the dangers of moralism in foreign policy. Yet he doubts that realism can form the basis of a successful foreign policy because the human hopes and moral passions that realism opposes as unreasonable are indelible features of political life. Thucydides even suggests that the very attempt to conduct an unabashedly self-interested foreign policy inevitably risks provoking a self-destructive moralistic or religious backlash” (Ahrensford, 1997, p. 231; Lebow, 2003, p. 392). This deeper meaning ascribed to Thucydides is also shared by some historians. For instance, Victor Davis Hanson maintains that Thucydides is too great a historian to reduce war “down to perceptions about power and its manifestation” (cited in Coker, 2010a, p. 67). Josiah Ober has been explicit in drawing a fine distinction which exposes a certain ambiguity between the two faces or “voices” of Thucydides, Thucydides the theorist and Thucydides the historian. This round reading of Thucydides, Ober argues, is characterised by a theoretical optimism in potentially understanding state behaviour contrasted by an uncomfortable realisation by Thucydides the historian that we should be suspicious of democracy, ideology and elite leadership as well as of the human capacity to transcend ideology or to operate outside a set of non-rational values and norms (Ober, 2001, pp. 300-301).

One of the biggest challenges of acknowledging the ambiguous character of the Thucydidean narrative is that it reveals that the division between rationality and irrationality is always arbitrary\textsuperscript{50}. The issue is how do we make a conscious decision on this and then produce a coherent narrative. Thucydides did so by embracing this ambiguity. He used narrative techniques such as focusing on paradoxes including the big duel between ‘logos’ and

\textsuperscript{50} This is crucial in debates about surrendering.

This further justifies our ambitious choice to incorporate the ambiguous non-rational element of history in SCA to expand our viewpoint. Acknowledging and embracing this aspect of Thucydides is crucial, helpful and promising. The Thucydides of International Relations, argues Greenwood, is largely ignorant of that, and remains “western and Euro-American” (Greenwood, 2011/2006, p. 13). One way to read Thucydides “is not primarily as a synoptic historian who reveals the truest causes of the events he narrates, nor a systematic theorizer who articulates universal laws of power relations, nor a magisterial teacher who conclusively discloses the nature of political life” but as a literary mastermind (Mara, 2007). In that sense, unlike Gilpin’s aforementioned arguments, we can still learn from Thucydides (Gilpin, 1981, p. 227). In a sense, Thucydides has not yet said the last word as realists believe. In a similar vein, Ober projects Thucydides as a minimalist realist but as Polly Low pinpoints: “It might be objected that, once the existence of the ‘historical’ Thucydides is acknowledged, it undermines the Theoretical Thucydides and “his position as a guru of Realism (in any of its forms) needs some reconsideration” (Low, 2001; Ober, 2001). What comes out of this is that Thucydides’ relationship with realism is tenuous and that he still has many lessons to offer us depending on how we approach his history and writing style. A reading of Thucydides that combines “modern theories of literary criticism and narratology” is, according to Beard, the “Thucydides for tomorrow” and it is this Thucydides that we have also taken into consideration in this study (Beard, 2010).

What is unique about Thucydides, and often missed by scholars of International Relations, is that he is consistently inviting us to reflect by refraining from “offering a single authoritative account of events” (Morrison, 2006, p. 18). Thucydides, not the myth-maker but the genius narrator, challenges our understanding of events (Rood, 1998). Ober, concurring with Connor, notes that “literary qualities interact with substantive content to “mislead” and
ultimately to educate the reader” (Ober, 2001, p. 303; Connor, 1984; Coker, 2010a, pp. 63-76). Just like Plato’s dialogues engage their audiences, so does Thucydides’ history which is in a unique way “‘dialogic’ rather than ‘dogmatic’” (Morrison, 2006, p. 4; Nicolai, 2011; Morrison, 2006; Rengakos, 2006, p. 300). The non-rational SCA, in its search for competing strategic logics and emotions, encourages narrative explanation and dialogue between the narrative’s choice over the interpretation of subjective factors acknowledged as such and the reader. It does not suppress or obfuscate this choice and just like Thucydides, it is “good to think with” (Rhodes, 2011, p. 28).

Realists might contend that they are disinterested in this ambiguity and instead of reading Thucydides as both literature and history, they would rather read Thucydides only as history. However, this would be to miss the point. Trying to grasp Thucydides’ viewpoint and why he chose to narrate in the way he did is not independent of our understanding of his history. It is part of his history. In fact, according to Greenwood, Thucydides’ story is a historical artefact and trying to grasp how it was created is the first step towards understanding the meaning of Thucydides’ history (Greenwood, 2011/2006, p. 37; Rood, 1998, p. 9; Hornblower, 1987, p. 133). Text, subtext, and context are deliberately ‘shaped’ by Thucydides to reveal what happened in the Peloponnesian War, but equally importantly, they have also been designed as a pedagogic metanarrative commentary (Greenwood, 2011/2006, p. 41).

Acknowledging the Thucydidean ambiguity is liberating, didactic and permits us to better grasp what Thucydides is trying to do and what we can do with our own theoretical writings. Rather than focusing on unanswerable questions such as the true Thucydidean voice or the authenticity of the speeches in Thucydides, we can focus on what is answerable. Lebow argues that “[t]he speeches are also vehicles for moving thematically toward greater depth, compassion, and ethical sophistication” highlighting critical junctures and sometimes suggesting their contingency (Lebow, 2001b, p. 551). Although we agree with Lebow, Greenwood has further elaborated arguing that ‘Thucydides’ carefully scripted speeches (and

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51 This is innovative since scholars usually contrast Plato the idealist to Thucydides the realist or as a hagiography to Pericles. It also highlights that realists see Thucydides not only as a member of their invented tradition but also as a historian who proves the wisdom of Pericles. Morrison, among others, casts doubt on the last assertion. Thucydides’ history contains contradiction which cast Pericles under a less flattering light (Morrison, 2006, pp. 148-149; Monoson & Loriaux, 1998; Platias, 2010). This serves to show that whether we agree with Pericles’ strategy or not is crucial about how we interpret reality and Thucydides. Strategy though is contingent and paradoxical. Relying on such judgments reveals not the sound bases of our scientific knowledge but the opposite; its contingency and partisanship.
his careful description of his method)” aim not to reveal true causes, with which Lebow would probably not disagree, but “to raise questions about the very nature of “truth” in the construction of history” (Beard, 2010; Greenwood, 2006).

In this sense, Thucydides’ narrative is not final but open to interpretation endowing it with great heuristic value and revealing both his pragmatic approach and that his approach is compatible with the pragmatic nature of the SCA and especially of the non-rational SCA. The non-rational SCA does not aim and cannot aim at offering final interpretations and theorisations of events. It can aim though, just like Thucydides, to reveal the contingencies of historical events and of ‘truth’, provide conceptualisations, and offer a reading of history that includes subjective factors such as those that help determine the will of the other in cases of surrender. Pinpointing and not concealing this ambiguity in history and in analysis is didactic and has made Thucydides, the masterful narrator, so influential. Perhaps it would not be too eccentric to say that Thucydides has fathered us all, all of his readers, and not just realists.

Another pragmatic aspect of the SCA that is compatible with Thucydides and has benefited from his way of narrating without offering a final analysis is that of not prejudging which is the most important actor in a given historical puzzle. Thucydides’ gaze is not unitary but multiplicitous and this is vital. According to Greenwood, Thucydides composed his narrative offering a holistic projection of events which varied and was not constant. He allowed its reader to ‘see’ what was going on in the minds of various generals enabling us to simultaneously see what was going on at the same time in two different theatres of war just like as if we were watching the events in a screen with two live-feeds (Greenwood, 2011/2006, p. 39). So, Thucydides is offering us multiple points of view and multiple vantage points. In this way he is not obscuring one point of view and, instead, by juxtaposing one against the other, he sometimes ironises or problematises each other. This allows us not only to have a more holistic understanding but also to choose which the most important actors are in a given international political puzzle. This is what the pragmatic character of the SCA also highlights: that the important actors in IR vary according to the research question at hand and this requires a broad gaze, like Thucydides did, to inform this choice.

Another gift Thucydides provides us with is his blurring of the line between war and peace. This has inspired this study’s gaze to take a broader and longer view of surrender and study it as a process rather than just as a historical moment. Even surrender may have its own history.
This thesis is interested in examining surrender in this way. We aim at seeing surrender as both the ending of war and as the moment that peace begins. We cannot project these dividing lines by ourselves and escape imposing meaning on history. Nonetheless, we can, at least, ask questions that we posit are pertinent and could lead us to useful findings and examine the actors’ interactions. In this case, we investigate whether surrender has an impact on the immediate aftermath of war contributing to stability or instability and whether it is influenced by past political relations and history or if surrender as a decision depends entirely on the material realities of the moment. Thucydides has been a pioneer on this front as well. Not only did he broaden his gaze by including multiple viewpoints or theatres of war but he also achieved this by blurring the line between war and peace and bringing them in close contact to give another meaning to the Peloponnesian War – to actually transform the Peloponnesian wars into the Peloponnesian War. In book 5, paragraph 26, Thucydides argues lucidly that the Peloponnesian War lasted 27 years and that he has also chosen to include in this count the ten-year truce, the so called Peace of Nicias, which he coined the ‘uneasy truce’. So, for Thucydides war and peace evade easy categorisations. This has been useful for Thucydides work and he hope to show that it is also fruitful for the study of surrender at hand in the subsequent historical case studies.

Justification of Case Studies

There are four core reasons for us to focus on three case studies from the Peloponnesian Wars. They share the same historical context. They are ‘hard cases’ for realism. They are written by an author realists claim to be their intellectual ‘father’. Ancient Greeks had a high regard for freedom and independence.

First, we cannot study surrender out of context and thus need a context within to drill in to the specifics of logics of surrender. In this thesis, we wish to study cases which share a context, broadly, and all these cases do. The Peloponnesian Wars provide a rich ground for surrendering behavior and offer a number of cases which we can compare and contrast while keeping the general historical context constant. These cases of course are not representative
of war or surrender across time but re-reading them can, we wish to suggest here, offer insights as to where realist logics of surrender fail.

Second, these cases are important for realism. They have been turned to by both realists and historians as cases which support the Realist materialist logic of behavior, even as, as will be seen, they do not provide fool-proof cases for this approach. They are then ‘hard cases’ of significance for realism, but we wish to show here that they do not necessarily entail realist explanations but can be read in a different manner with regard to logics of surrender, a manner which shows to us also the flaws in realist readings and assumptions on surrender.

Third, the ancient Greek cases provide an interesting avenue into richer exploration of a core realist writer, Thucydides. His texts provide both the support for realists but also point towards the richer explanations developed here. As a result, the ancient Greek cases not only provide a good context for study of surrender, but also allow us to reflect on the complexity of surrender as an issue for realist core texts, historically and theoretically. Therefore, while the thesis does not primarily aim to offer a contribution to analysis of Thucydides, it does offer insights as to how we read Thucydides, or any realist text and what we take from it. This thesis also explores other historical texts around Thucydides and the Peloponnesian Wars.

Fourth, these cases are of interest because it is of interest to us that the Greeks valued their independence highly - just like we do today. The Greeks were often at war but one of their core values was freedom (Rhodes, 2009, p. 213). War was legitimate for the Greeks, just like it is today, for various reasons (Hanson, 1999, p. 18; Finley, 1985, pp. 71, 75). Nonetheless, just like in our contemporary world, they did seek freedom and valued freedom but, crucially, they did not always uphold this principle. ‘Why is this?’ we ask here with the hope that the study might also thus shed light on surrender more widely.

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52 Coker makes a broader point. He depicts freedom as its dialectical opposite which can be many things across time and space (Coker, 2010a, pp. 30-31). The opposite of freedom is tyrants, foreign tyranny, slavery (the greatest fear of ancient Greek women long before the idea of political freedom was established), religious and cultural disrespect etc (Bosanquet, 1970, p. 191; Pohlenz, 1966; Patterson, 1991, p. 86). The Western view of freedom is only one view on freedom and it did not come together at once as one encompassing notion of personal, political democratic and political independence freedom but it did come from ancient Greece. Freedom’s source lies not with human nature but with human history. As Nietzsche has argued only something which has no history is capable of being defined (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 53). The concern for freedom is universal but we should not confuse the idea of freedom with the idea of Western freedom.
Conclusion

In this chapter, we have focused on the methodology of this thesis. We have studied the benefits of using the SCA and why rejecting the assumption of rationality is helpful. We have found the assumption of rationality too constraining and obscuring factors that we hypothesised might be crucial for the study of surrender and that may have impact on the will of the other. Moreover, we examined Thucydides and his narrative style. We rely on recent narratological studies that represent the future of Thucydidean scholarship and which provide insights into how Thucydides embraces ambiguity in his narrative to make it richer. Even though some realists may find this ambiguity not to their taste, those realists we are willing to think in a strategic way, like the SCA does, should consider the benefits of such an approach. This Thucydidean approach is compatible with the pragmatic concerns of the non-rational SCA that includes subjective factors, explores and exposes the ambiguity of historiographical debates, includes different viewpoints without reducing them to one or another and presents itself not as the final answer to a given problem but as useful way of conceptualising a historical puzzle. In other words, it has both historical and heuristic value.

From the point of view of this analysis, Thucydides is particularly inspirational because he is even willing to blur the line between war and peace creating a conceptual ambiguity open for fruitful investigation. This study tries to grapple with this by studying surrender as a process. Seeing surrender as a process leads us to address an important line found in Thucydides’ history. It is a quote from one of the most important figures of the Greek historian’s narrative, Hermocrates. In book 4, Thucydides has Hermocrates, a great statesman himself, arguably even better than Pericles, stating: “For it is the nature of what is human to dominate everywhere anyone who yields and to ward off any one who attacks” (4.61)” (Connor, 1984, p. 152; Monoson & Loriaux, 1998, pp. 293-295). In the subsequent case studies we look at how these two tendencies interweave. We explore how weak or weakened defeated states navigate the distance between the pole of the fear of domination and the pole of the hope of resistance.
3. The Surrender of Plataea (431 BC): Gratitude as Cause

“Anyone who becomes immersed in international affairs soon realizes that no important issue exists in isolation; rarely is it only bilateral.”
Dwight D. Eisenhower

“Alliances and partnerships produce stability when they reflect realities and interests.”
Stephen Kinzer

“Alliances are first and foremost about confidence, trust, and protection.”
Yves Boyer

Introduction

In Aesop’s fable “The North Wind and the Sun”, “[t]he North Wind and the Sun were disputing which was the stronger, when a traveller came along wrapped in a warm cloak. They agreed that the one who first succeeded in making the traveller take his cloak off should be considered stronger than the other. Then the North Wind blew as hard as he could, but the more he blew the more closely did the traveller fold his cloak around him; and at last the North Wind gave up the attempt. Then the Sun shined out warmly, and immediately the

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traveller took off his cloak. And so the North Wind was obliged to confess that the Sun was the stronger of the two”. The moral of the story is that kindness effects more than severity or that persuasion is superior to force. Like every good story, it leaves something to the reader’s imagination and makes one contemplate. It also points us toward a direction: force or severity can increase our willingness to resist and kindness or persuasion can be “unexpectedly” successful. In a sense, such is the difference between the view that the people of Plataea surrendered to Sparta because Sparta was the all mighty enemy that managed to lead them to starvation and the view that the Spartans engaged in magisterial diplomacy to entice the Plataeans and that this could have been successful had it not been for the hardened hatred of the Plataeans toward Thebes and their loyalty and gratitude toward Athens.

The extraordinary position of Plataea was definitely precarious being attacked by an enemy, Sparta, and hoping for the promised support by a friend, the only other available great power, Athens. The Plataeans were definitely between a rock and a hard place. They could either surrender to their attackers, Sparta and Thebes, who could then renege on their promises and slaughter them or wait for Athens that had helped them preserve their independence for many years. If this situation does not constitute what Kagan states as the “helplessness of small states caught between great powers” then what else can it be (Kagan, 2005, p. 88; Crane, 1998, p. 74)? Moreover, as both Taylor and Kagan maintain, the Spartan surrendering proposals were, arguably, a “charade” and unworkable (Kagan, 2005, p. 87; Taylor, 2010, p. 96). The Plataeans relied on Athenian support because it was their ally and had promised to do so once in the beginning of the siege. One should not also forget that the Plataeans had sent their women and children to Athens for protection and this was a source of concern. Confronting Spartan coercion to surrender was perhaps a natural reaction. Plataea was caught in the middle and the Plataeans seemed damned if they surrendered and damned if they did not.

Despite the merits of this explanation, it does not adequately answer why the Plataeans, almost unanimously, remained loyal and united in favour of Athens up to the point of starvation, ignores the emotional aspect and social nature of the Athenian-Plataean alliance, and does not fully account for the alternative choices that Plataea chose not to consider. It also takes for granted Thucydides’ authoritative voice which can either be doubted or perceived as that of a misleading educator (Ober, 2001, p. 303).
Kagan relies in his view of the inevitability of the Plataean fate by discerning Thucydides’ point of view (Kagan, 2005, pp. 87-90). Taylor sees the Spartan proposals as hypocritical and Crane refers to a spreadsheet logic of great powers that allows for no creative ambiguity (Taylor, 2010; Crane, 2001). Cartledge, providing a generalisation about ancient Greek surrendering, maintains that Greek city-states surrendered when they were promised they would not be killed (Cartledge, 2012). Common to all these analyses is a view of the inevitability of the outcome of the Plataean siege. These readings ring, arguably, a realist bell. Frankel in a short reference to Plataea argues that those who surrender are at the mercy of their captors, that justice is what is useful to the hegemon and that policy is dictated by self-interest and not magnanimity (Frankel, 1996, pp. 114-115). These viewpoints presuppose an ability or attempt to accurately depict Thucydides’ voice and the lessons he wanted to teach us. However, understanding Thucydides’ voice still remains controversial among classicists (Beard, 2010). Among IR scholars though, such conclusions would not have been unheard of, had we used the theories of the balance of power or balance of threat or the alliance and adversary dilemma which emphasise anarchy, aggregate power and the prisoner dilemma (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987; Snyder, 1997).

However, the Thucydidean authority has been and can be doubted either for some inconsistencies or for its purposeful misleading narrative style. For instance, Thucydides seems biased in his assessment of the Spartan attitudes. When Thucydides claims that the Spartans try to make the Plataeans surrender in order to claim in a future peace treaty that the Plataeans changed sides voluntarily in order to allow the Spartans to claim Plataea for themselves, this refers to a treaty that really happened but which took place eight years later. Thucydides, in Hornblower’s pithy critique, could have known but not the Spartans in Plataea (Hornblower, 1991, p. 443). In fact, it is very likely that the Peloponnesians bypassed Attica and went to Plataea not because they were determined to follow any Theban requests and attack Plataea but because of the plague at Athens (Hanson, 1998, p. 134). If Thucydides can be wrong or purposefully misleading, then we do not have to accept either the Spartan assumed motivations or the inevitability version of the Plataeans’ destiny.

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56 Crane’s view is not a realist due to his articulation of hierarchical relations in anarchy and his emphasis on the future restoration(s) of the Plataeans’ city but his emphasis on the inevitability of the massacre in Plataea could be partly entertained by a realist hegemonic outlook.
The analysis in this thesis sheds different light in the causes of surrendering. We will show that the Plataeans were enticed by the Spartan proposals but that they found it very hard to accept them for their own perceptual and cultural reasons. They had a very tight alliance with Athens, which not only dated in the past but had created bonds of loyalty and gratitude that the Plataeans did not forget. The Plataeans also exacerbated their situation by killing the Theban prisoners of war and increasing their uncertainty about the Spartan intentions given that the Thebans were their allies. All this could have been overcome by negotiation but the Plataeans, until the very end, reaffirmed their privileged relation with Athens. Hardly their saving grace, the Plataeans, after two years of a ruthless siege, could not have expected much from the Spartans by claiming loyalty to the Spartan arch-rival. If indeed the Spartans were honest, and we have sound reasons to think so, in their surrendering proposals, then the Plataeans wasted their chance. Hatred towards the Thebans and their recklessness diminished their options and their sense of gratitude toward Athens made them not only to wait in vain but also to remain united in favour of Athens until the end. All this comes to show the importance emotions play in international politics as well as the double-edged “sword” of international norms. The surviving Plataeans were not abandoned but relocated to another city by Athens. Hardly the best scenario for the Plataeans, it shows, nevertheless, the ambiguous lessons Thucydides is still offering us and the more complicated international political landscape that can lead to the best or the worse of outcomes or, in certain cases, to both. Thucydides, in the siege of Plataea demonstrates not only the plight of power politics on weak states but the existence of hierarchical relations, the social nature of alliances, and the impact of emotions. A mere focus on power inequalities cannot account for all that.

Explaining the choices the Plataeans made and did not make and the causes leading to their surrendering and massacre provides insights about causality and the texture of international politics as well as how states sometimes navigate the troubled waters of independence and dependence. Far from being an old problem, Schroeder remarks, the effort “to reconcile the independence and security of smaller states with the inevitable determination of great powers to exercise influence beyond their borders and to protect their wider interests… are problems that statesmen still face every day, and presumably always will” (Schroeder, 1986, p. 26). Seen under this light the Plataeans are our contemporaries.

The Plataeans did not surrender easily. They were starved to submission. We argue that this was not a strategic necessity but a consequence of their decisions based on their historical
hostility to Thebes and loyalty to Athens in the context of the Spartan support to Thebes and the Plataean massacre of the Thebans in 431 BC. We will try to demonstrate this by making three moves. Firstly, we will explain that Plataean recklessness, fuelled by an excessive reliance on Athens, is responsible for making the Plataeans’ future decisions unnecessarily more difficult. Secondly, we will show that the Plataeans, despite their precarious position, had an alternative. Thirdly, we will depict the emotions of hatred and loyalty and how they affected the Plataeans’ high-risk decisions. The logic of surrendering that runs through this narrative is that the Plataeans were concerned not only about their physical survival but also about honouring their loyalty toward Athens which had a synergistic effect on their decisions. The Plataeans could hardly see themselves as separate from Athens and that made them opt for a high-risk policy and rely on Athens.

The Siege of Plataea

Part I: Before the Siege

The surrender of Plataea took place in the fateful year 427 but the events of the siege that culminated in the massacre of the people of Plataea have their origins in 431; at the moment when the precarious peace between Athens and Sparta erupted into the Peloponnesian War (431-404). It was then that Thebes, under the cover of darkness, had attempted to impose regime change in Plataea with the traitorous help of the local Plataean oligarchs. The desperate locals’ situation was ominous. They required a full reversal of fate and nothing less to survive. The Plataeans had to turn the tables on the Thebans and, indeed, it took a tour de force total mobilisation of their citizens culminating in the massacre of the Theban warriors and their leader to avert the Theban attack. It was in response to these events that the Spartan-led siege that started in 429 became a high possibility. The ensuing protracted siege lasted nearly two years. The war-hardened Plataeans -desperate but always loyal to Athens and their moral principles- surrendered in 427. They did so in the hope of meeting a different destiny to that of a cruel death. Death the Plataeans met but one wonders if their choice was an inescapable strategic reality or a death of their own making. The strong alliance between Athens and Plataea with its rich socio-historical background cast a long shadow on the events.

For convenience and aesthetic reasons we will omit the BC from any future dates.
and weighed the Plataean decisions down with their sense of gratitude and loyalty toward their alliance with Athens. Even when they were taking decisions of life and death, the Plataeans were not just considering about whether they should surrender or not but also to whom and from whom they would distance themselves. For that reason, it matters to re-evaluate the motives of the Plataean recalcitrance and eventual surrendering to Sparta.

Thebes, a powerful middle-power, ally of Sparta and old enemy of Plataea (a close Athenian ally) decided to dispatch a small expeditionary force of rather more than three hundred men to seize Plataea with the help of the perfidious Plataean oligarchic minority. They attempted to overthrow the democratic governance of Plataea and take over the city-state on a night in 431. A new regime in Plataea would be convenient for Thebes and would be easier to control. It would also be a great way to begin the anticipated Peloponnesian War. In fact, according to Thucydides this was the very beginning of the Peloponnesian War which did not stop until its end in 404 (2.1-2).

The Theban force entered the city-state of Plataea and was about to kill its democratic leaders, seize control and deliver it to the Plataean oligarchs. However, the Thebans, unlike the initial agreement with their co-conspirators (the Plataean oligarchs), attempted to reach a peaceful agreement and promised to not use any violence. They most likely, argues Kern, “envisioned a broad-based oligarchy incorporated into the Boeotian League rather than a narrow aristocracy” (Kern, 1999, p. 99). They must have “preferred a negotiated settlement that at least had the appearance of a voluntary act by Plataea” (Kern, 1999, p. 99). This decision reasonable as it seems was detrimental. As time went by the Plataeans realised how small the number of the Theban force was and, not wanting to defect from Athens as Thucydides informs us, decided to counter-attack with all their collective strength. The resistance was total. The attack is narrated by Thucydides in unprecedented terms describing a pan-Plataean insurgency which included even the women and the slaves. This is one of the few times Thucydides mentions women in his history, let alone women having a significant role: “the onslaught continued with a huge din, joined by the women and slaves shouting and screaming from the roofs and pelting them with stones and tiles” (2.4) (Hornblower, 1991, pp. 241-242; Loman, 2004, p. 42).

At this point Thucydides puts the emphasis on the Plataean loyalty to Athens and not just to the Theban threat. In fact, the Theban threat could have been mitigated at this stage given
their promises to the Plataeans not to use violence. Thucydides’ text reads: “However, somehow in the course of the negotiations they came to realize that the number of Thebans was not large, and they reckoned that if they set on them they could easily overpower them: the majority of the Plataeans had no wish to defect from Athens” (2.3). The final and explanatory part of this rather long Thucydidean sentence, under which the mobilisation capacity is subsumed, clearly refers to the Plataean loyalty to Athens. Neither a resource-extraction model nor a reliance on the balance of threat can capture this Thucydidean nuance (Taliaferro, 2006; Walt, 1987). Those readers who focus primarily on the first book of Thucydides’ history which mentions his famous phrase about the truest cause will be surprised to hear that. “Plataea's alliance with Athens”, Connor pinpoints, “and the close ties that bound the cities together are not mentioned” there (Connor, 1984, p. 52). This is “the first major indication of an omission in the elaborate calculus of power that was developed in the first book” (Connor, 1984, p. 53).

Neorealism that focuses on the elaborate but also misleading calculus of power of the first book has no room for hierarchical alliances of the Athenian-Plataean type. This is a strong alliance underpinned by long-standing social features and not just a reflection of a temporary constellation of interests. The alliance, Badian remarks, was an enhanced one and “the Plataeans had for many years been fellow citizens (or some such term) and then allies” (Badian, 1993, p. 123). The view of alliances as social institutions goes back to Liska and adds another interpretative element in our understanding of reality that we cannot omit without losing explanatory power (Keohane, 1988, p. 175; Liska, 1962, p. 61). Neorealism focuses on the maximisation of relative power or retention of power. This is the paradigmatic background of Walt’s Balance of Threat theory as well. When it comes to the issue of survival, realists look for the most effective strategy from the point of view of military force but they lack a language to understand things in a different way. It is by default rather than by analysis that a realist can be lead to believe that the Plataeans would not surrender. As Keohane remarks, the retention of power orientation generates a healthy scepticism regarding the “domino effect” or in this case surrendering (Keohane, 1988, p. 173). Jervis critically proceeds a step further. He argues that “a commitment can give a state additional reasons for coming to another’s aid by trying its reputation to doing so” but this is the most a realist can say beyond the view that “alliances merely affirm state interests rather than change them” (Jervis, 1997, p. 214). Even though Jervis goes on arguing that “a state’s interests are likely to change in a way that will bring it close to the other state”, he does so by detecting a different
Jervis downplays the importance of emotions when discussing this significant dynamic in alliances. He attributes it primarily to “actors’ calculations of power and interest”, and only secondarily – “sometimes supplemented” is the expression he uses – “by emotion” (Jervis, 1997, p. 214). The Plataeans’ moral obligation to honour their alliance with Athens is a pattern of thought that is detectable in the Plataeans throughout the Theban attack and the subsequent Spartan-Theban siege and negotiations.

Thucydides chose to add the sentence that “the majority of the Plataeans had no wish to defect from Athens” and instantly reveals the complexity of power relations in anarchy. This is not a random addition. For Thucydides this is important. The Plataean alliance with Athens roughly dated since 519 (Hornblower, 1991, p. 240; Bruce, 1968; Gomme, 1956, pp. 339-340). The Plataeans were basing their alliance on their joint efforts against the Persians in the battle of Marathon where they alone stood side by side with the Athenians, in the Athenian help to guarantee their independence from Thebes, and in the history of the battle of Plataea that ended with the defeat of the last Persian expedition to Greece (Crane, 2001). In the meantime, they had been offered a type of Athenian citizenship too. It is only after referring to the Plataean wishes and alluding to this bond with Athens, that Thucydides finally concludes, in the immediately following sentence, that the Plataeans “decided to make the attempt” and try to fend off the enemy (2.3). The Plataeans who made the calculations were apparently the democratic leaders who would have to surrender the city in the middle of the night and not the people. However, mobilising the people is both trickier and the key to this situation. Plataea is a city where the popular sentiment is clearly in favour of not severing their ties with Athens. This is an important factor which we will see how it plays out in other instances of surrendering as well. The number of the Theban force and the people’s mobilisation capacity are crucial in influencing the chances of successful resistance. Without the people’s clear identification with Athens, though, this mobilisation would have been impossible given the Theban lenient terms of surrendering. It is not the extraction capacity of the state that is crucial here but the reason behind the mobilisation; a reason that cannot be accounted by neither neorealism nor neoclassical realism. This puts proper emphasis on the

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58 For a more detailed account of the evolution of the Athenian-Plataean alliance see Badian’s essay “Plataea Between Athens and Sparta” (Badian, 1993, pp. 109-124).
59 For Schweller the crucial variable can be the coherence of the state and from there to end up in the same conclusion but not only he cannot account for the quality of the Athenian-Plataean alliance but he also treats this
role of people in such events which is ignored by both realism and theories of war termination that emphasise the elites’ gamble for survival, developments in domestic politics or the fear of lack of credible commitment (Goemans, 2000; Stanley, 2009; Reiter, 2009). That this is so is made clear by both Thucydides’ explanation and the unprecedented joint efforts of the men, women and even slaves of Plataea⁶⁰.

At no point between now and the end of the siege does Thucydides report any stasis, civil strife or disagreement among the Plataeans. This is remarkable. “No society is ever 100% committed to fight” but in the case of Plataea such was the loyalty towards Athens that the Theban mild terms of surrendering (in contrast to mass executions and slavery) did not take hold (Coker, 2014a, p. 8). The Theban idea to offer such terms of surrendering was not a bad idea in itself. It was ingenious. Similar surrendering terms were suggested and successfully employed by the Spartan commander Brasidas in Thrace to incite revolts in the Athenian empire. However, the Theban attack did not manage to either change the preferences of the Plataeans or, at least, to prevent those indifferent (if there were any in Plataea) from getting involved in the resistance. The oligarchs needed the Theban help but the democratic regime was both too popular and its citizens too committed to Athens (Losada, 1972, p. 61). The oligarchic conspirators of Plataea were, unlike in several other city-states, a minority and that undermined the success of the attempt for regime change. In other city-states, like in Corcyra, stasis (civil war or internal war) often led politicians to seek the help of one of the great powers of Hellas (Price, 2001). In other cases, foreign policy considerations are thought to have motivated internal quarrels and constitutional changes (Hornblower, 1991, p. 240). The Plataean oligarchs were both unpopular and interested in their own narrow self-interests. Were the oligarchs rather popular the outcome of the attack on Plataea would probably have been different but they were not. This goes to show not that the case of Plataea is unique but that even states which are like “the shrimp between two whales”, according to a Korean saying, are significantly influenced by their emotions and feelings of loyalty (Crane, 2001, p. 134).

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⁶⁰ On Thucydides’ treatment of women, see Schaps 1977; Schaps 1982; Wiedemann 1983; Harvey 1985; Loraux 1985; Cartledge 1993; Crane 1996; Loraux 2003; Tritle 2004, Loman 2004; Proulx 2008. Women in Thucydides are irrational marginal agents (Hornblower, 1991, pp. 241-242). However, according to Crane, Thucydides’ treatment of women represents a biased masculine vision of politics that “contributes to the larger project of reducing the world to individuals and states” (Crane, 1998, pp. 46, 59; Tickner, 1988). According to Loman cases like these signify the important role that women could and did play in defending towns (Loman, 2004, p. 42). According to Schaps, women in Plataea were no appeasers (Schaps, 1982, p. 194).
After all that, not only did the Theban attack fail but also ended in utter destruction. The Theban soldiers were killed and those who managed to survive in the streets or find refuge in a tower (that did not lead them outside the city walls as they were hoping) were also eventually slaughtered. The Plataeans had initially agreed to allow these prisoners of war (PoW) to surrender. That was an excellent move since one of the PoW was the expeditionary force’s leader, Eurymachos son of Leontiades, “one of the most influential men in Thebes” (2.2; Hornblower, 1991, pp. 240-241). The Plataeans could exchange the PoW for the promise of the advancing Theban army to not harm their remaining people or equipment outside the city walls, “as was bound to be the case when danger struck unexpectedly in peacetime” (2.5). The PoW epitomized a great bargaining chip.

Capturing 180 Thebans including their leader was no small thing. It was a great feat that the Plataeans achieved thanks to their boldness and common loyalty to Athens. When the Athenians, a few years later, in 425, captured the 292 Spartans in Sphacteria, they were emboldened and renewed their aggressiveness and then used the PoW to even seal the Peace of Nicias with Sparta four years later. Indeed, the Plataeans, as expected, started negotiating an agreement with the Thebans when they arrived outside their walls. Nevertheless, once they managed to bring “inside all that was out in the country, [they] immediately put the prisoners to death… including Eurymachus, the agent with whom the traitors had dealt” (2.5). Unlike the Athenians, the Plataeans squandered their good fortune at a moment’s notice. From the point of view of the Plataeans such a decision can be understood given their excessive reliance on Athens but this was also fateful. For a weak state to waste such an unexpected chance to acquire abundant bargaining leverage was reckless if not foolish. Weak states need all the chance they can get. The ancient Greeks would undoubtedly have called that hubris and it certainly narrowed the Plataeans’ future options and made their future more precarious rather than safer.

This was a decision made in cold blood after the conduct of negotiations and not in the heat of the moment. It cannot be explained by the mere enmity between the two cities but it did fuel and intensify their enmity at a crucial moment; the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. The incident of the killing of the PoW did not go uncontested. It became an open wound in the relations between Plataea and Thebes. The two peoples had different views on the events and whether the agreement about the PoW was reached or not or who violated it. The truth is
unclear but perhaps this is also the point Thucydides is trying to make by leaving the incident seem ambiguous. The important thing is that it did happen. Thucydides leaves the moral question of who was responsible unanswered. He does so probably purposefully in order to devalue the importance of the answer; and reminds us of a Herodotean style (the historian he is trying to overcome) by citing the opinions of the two different peoples (Hornblower, 1991, p. 242). Once the PoW were killed the wheel of history took its course and the popular images left their indelible mark on the subsequent events. Popular images held by people in regard with other cities, Rood points out, is important and often affects their foreign policies (Rood, 2006, p. 246). The two diverging popular opinions here (and later in the Plataean debate in front of the Spartan judges) “emphasise the hostility of Plataea and Thebes”.

The Plataeans’ recklessness shows that they had no willingness for reconciliation. They must have believed that they could always rely on the Athenian support. This perception enabled them to be ruthless and irresponsible regarding the Theban PoW. They even probably thought that inviting Athens' support was a “game changing” move and that it would be the only thing that mattered. Any potential confrontation with Sparta in the future would require the support of Athens anyway; with or without PoW. Perhaps they were not much troubled to contemplate that the killings wasted their bargaining leverage, severed any channels of communication with the Thebans and ensured future retaliation. Given that Thebes was an ally of Sparta and the Peloponnesian War was just beginning though, the Plataean action embodied a severe risk. A Spartan attack was to be expected since the Theban attack on Plataea had violated the peace between Athens and Sparta and the Thebans would exert high pressure on the Spartans for retaliation. Thucydides counts the attack to Plataea as the first act of the Peloponnesian War and the Spartan attack did follow and did lead to the siege of Plataea which culminated in the eventual surrendering. During the first Peloponnesian War (460-445) the Plataeans managed to retain their independence from Thebes thanks to Athens. However, this time things were different. They needed all the bargaining power they could get but they squandered it all with one brazen act. The Plataeans this time had it coming: they used their alliance with Athens not for good but to take a high-risk decision that wouldloom in the background of the future events.

The Plataeans were overconfident and wrong to take the risky decision to kill the PoW. Athens had lost the first Peloponnesian War. Its outcome had led to the acknowledgement of Sparta being the land power of Hellas and Athens being the sea power of Hellas. The Spartan
phalanx had no match. When the Plataeans killed the Theban PoW not only did they create further resentment to the historical enmity of Thebes with them but they also removed any factors that could have restrained the Thebans. It was not difficult to imagine that Thebes, a significant ally of Sparta, would request the Spartan help and Sparta would respond. This made the possibility of a Spartan intervention a certainty. If the Plataeans had one good chance for a safer future by using the PoW, like Athens would later use the Spartan PoW from Sphacteria, they lost it. This automatically diminished the possibilities of any future negotiations with the Thebans (or rather their continuation), and their potential confidence in appeasing the Spartans should it prove necessary. The Plataeans could not think of themselves separate from Athens, to which they remained unwaveringly loyal till the very end, and made their future options more difficult.

Killing the PoW was a turning point which made the Plataeans to further connect their fate to Athens’ attitudes. It added rigidity rather than flexibility in their foreign policy. Other cities during the Peloponnesian War were eager to change sides or did so out of convenience but not Plataea. The Plataeans created with their actions a willing dependency. The Athenians, after having received the Plataean emissaries, wanted them to keep the PoW alive until they decided what to do with them; but that was not an option anymore. The decision of the Plataeans to kill them had created a new reality. By reducing flexibility from their foreign policy they linked their fate to Athens even more tightly and as a result further connected their common enemies, the Thebans and the Spartans. The Plataeans, by acting like that, were seeking every short-term advantage at the expense of making the “game of power politics” to be played really hard (Jervis, 1997, p. 239). The Thebans had no reason to show any restraint now – except in the case the Spartans themselves would have willed so. This is what Jervis calls as the polarisation of the international system “as alliances spread consistency throughout it” (Jervis, 1997, p. 213). The Plataean decision started having such an effect and would be completed by the upcoming collapse of the negotiations with Sparta. Jervis rightly observes that the international structure does not determine and “the external environment is rarely so compelling as to obviate the need for difficult judgments and choices” and that including “patterns of interests and alignment possibilities” in our analysis is necessary in order “to develop a full picture of behaviour in a system” (Jervis, 1997, p. 204). The Plataeans by killing the PoW were in both accounts (patterns of interests and alignment possibilities) polarising the international system without realising that the primary victim of such a situation would be themselves; “the shrimp between the two whales”.

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The news of the Theban attack reached Athens quickly after the Plataeans had dispatched two messengers. The Athenians “immediately arrested all Boeotians\(^{61}\) in Attica and sent a herald to Plataea with instructions to tell the Plataeans to do nothing drastic in regard to the Theban prisoners until they themselves had come to a decision about them” (2.6). However, once they realised that they had already been killed, “the Athenians marched to Plataea, brought in supplies of food, and left a garrison installed, and evacuated the least fit of the men together with the women and children” (2.6). Everybody was preparing for the upcoming attack and Athens through these actions showcases Athenian involvement in Plataea’s defense. All these can be seen as an expression of solidarity (Zumbrunnen, 2008, p. 167). Not all allies used to act like that. It was not common to move one’s citizens to another city which also demonstrates the high trust the Plataeans placed on the Athenians (Taylor, 2010; Wiedemann, 1983, p. 164). This move further linked the fates of Plataea and Athens together. This would, arguably, been impossible had Athens not been such a close ally of Plataea. This posed further restrictions on the Plataeans’ ability to manoeuvre when they were later bargaining their surrendering with the Spartans. In a sense, what appears as an expression of Athenian solidarity is, at the same time, an outcome of the strong Athenian-Plataean alliance and a reflection of Plataean self-binding\(^{62}\) which shapes their preferences over outcomes and makes such an Athenian decision desirable. A more precarious alliance would have perceived the evacuation of citizens of one city to another as a potential liability should the course of events change. Ironically, this is exactly what happened in the case of Plataea and with this second critical decision, after the killing of the PoW, the Plataeans further sealed their fate by further reducing their ability to to bargain with the Spartans. Delinking the Athenian-Plataean connection was becoming increasingly difficult for as long as the alliance and social bond between Athens and Plataea were never questioned. The two perilous Plataean decisions taken with this mind-set made that potentiality even more distant. Thucydides at no point does he present the Plataeans having any second thoughts or disagreements. No wonder their reactions to all Spartan offers to surrender were practically negative: they had put themselves in harm’s way. Even in this dangerous situation though, the Plataeans’ room for choice had still not vanished.

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\(^{61}\) Boeotians are the citizens of the Boeotia region. Thebes was the leading power of Boeotia.

Part II: The Siege

The much anticipated Spartan attack took place in the third year of the Peloponnesian War and the second year of the plague in Athens, in 429 (2.71). The Plataeans realised that the arrival of Sparta together with their greatest enemy, Thebes, aimed at their subjection and dispatched emissaries to ask them to respect their independence. They reminded the Spartans of the Plataean service in the Persian Wars and contribution to the cause of the liberation of Hellas from the Persians as well as their ancestors’ oaths to guarantee the Plataean independence. Nevertheless, this argument was inadequate. The Spartans were there to support their ally. Had the Plataean oligarchs previously succeeded in implementing the peaceful regime change, Thebes would have ceased being an enemy and would be an ally. In fact, according to Losada, it made sense to ally with Thebes and the Boeotian Confederacy. Plataea was close to Thebes and “separated from Athens by the mountainous chain of Cithaeron and Parnes” (Losada, 1972, p. 62). When the war would break out the lands outside the walls, belonging to the rich oligarchs, would undoubtedly suffer from plunder and destruction, typical of Greek warfare (Wees, 2004, pp. 121-126; Hanson, 1999, pp. 287-320). Moreover, sending an Athenian force would be difficult and require a change in the Periclean policy of fighting a defensive war behind the Athenian walls while conducting a naval war of attrition (Taylor, 2010, pp. 50-53; Platias, 2010, pp. 85-138; Beard, 2010). In terms of security and the “national interest” an alliance with Thebes made some sense. In contrast, expecting Athenian help could be seen as an unreliable hope. Yet, the Plataeans chose to honour their alliance with the Athenians and rely on them in every turn of their precarious future as it was unfolding before their walls.

First, the Spartans proposed to the Plataeans to join them against the Athenians or to remain neutral. However, as we previously saw, the Plataeans’ women and children were already in Athens. They were also afraid the Athenians may intervene when the Peloponnesians would withdraw and come and “countermand their neutrality, or the Thebans, covered by the agreement to give access to both sides, might make a further attempt to seize the city” (2.72). The Plataeans rejected this proposal and said “they could not possible do as he [the Spartan king Archidamus] proposed without the approval of the Athenians” (2.72).

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63 The Athenians had made one land expedition in the course of the Peloponnesian War up to that point but that was rather an exception. It is doubtful how much the Plataeans could rely on that. Paul Kern mentions this expedition (Kern, 1999).
Kagan follows strictly this Thucydidean explanation for the Plataean response (Kagan, 2005, p. 88). Nonetheless, nothing would have stopped the Plataeans, once the Spartans had left, to either change their minds regarding neutrality or when eventually the Athenians would appear to plead mercy and blame their weakness for their decision to accept the Spartan offer. Besides, this is what they later and less convincingly did in front of the Spartan judges in their effort to justify their alliance with Athens. The Plataeans chose not to make use of any of the two options of either living to fight another day or accepting their weakness and appease the strong and become neutral. These strategies must have been precarious but they represented strategies of appeasement that were not unprecedented in Hellas (Romilly, 2008)\textsuperscript{64}.

Both Kagan and Taylor echo the Plataean concerns that their neutrality could not be respected because they had to accept equal access to the belligerents (Kagan, 2005, p. 88; Taylor, 2010, pp. 95-96). However, this was not necessary. Bauslaugh reports that there is “plenty of evidence that neutrals could refuse to admit belligerents within their walls without forfeiting neutral status” and he refers to examples even from the Peloponnesian War (Bauslaugh, 1991, p. 129). He also adds that “Archidamus' proposal contained nothing more than normal diplomatic language”. The Plataeans need not take issue with Archidamus’ initial proposal and so is true for Kagan and Taylor.

The Spartan king and military leader Archidamus did not stop his efforts for a peaceful settlement and tried to reassure the Plataeans with another proposal. He suggested that the Plataeans could move away wherever they wanted if they surrendered their city to the Spartans for the duration of the war who would use it, keep it safe and pay them a return. The Plataeans responded with a request for a truce to go to Athens and ask for permission. Archidamus agreed to grant the Plataeans their request.

This Plataean decision though, is another lost opportunity to avoid the siege and a gamble to let the Athenians decide in their place instead of surrendering and presenting the Athenians with a fait accompli. At no point is there any indication by Thucydides that the Plataeans had any disagreement about what to do. It is the Plataean decision to relinquish their right to

\textsuperscript{64} For a different opinion emphasising the Plataean conundrum as the lack of choice that minor powers have see Macleod on the Plataean Debate (Macleod, 1977, p. 231).
decide for themselves and their unity behind this choice that we see as the curious event rather than how workable the Archidamian proposal was. The Athenian concerns for prestige strongly advised against letting Plataea give up the alliance because it would give the wrong signal to other allies and possibly encourage defections (Bauslaugh, 1991, p. 132). Once Athens would have rejected the Plataean surrender the Plataeans were more than likely to obey. Nevertheless, had they not asked for permission from Athens in the first place they could have claimed that they were forced by their weakness and they could, on one hand, ask for pity from their best ally and, on the other hand, would not have disobeyed any orders; hence, would not have alienated their ally. They would also still be useful to the Athenian cause as soldiers.

Kagan and Taylor do not consider the lack of disagreement among the Plataeans regarding their responses and privilege the idea that “Archidamus makes [his proposal] in part because it provides the pretence, when the Plataeans refuse, that the Plataeans are being unreasonable, and so mitigates the impiety of the Spartans’ attack (Taylor, 2010, p. 96; Kagan, 1974, p. 105). However, by undermining the credibility of the proposal, they both neglect Archidamus’ historical role in the Peloponnesian War. They both see his proposal as deceitful. Taylor specifies that it is vague and “wholly unworkable” (Taylor, 2010, pp. 95-96). They both seem to dismiss Archidamus’ offer too easily. Archidamus is not just any Spartan king. He is one of the great figures of the Peloponnesian War who represents moderation and efforts for conciliation. Archidamus is a cautious leader who had warned against overconfidence the Spartans when they were debating the decision to go to war with Athens. He is also presented by Thucydides as “the representative of the noble tradition of a vanishing past, [pointing] to the moral aspects of the fight, to the ideals of dike and doxa (11,2), to the righteousness of [the Spartan] cause, and to the importance of the ensuing sympathies of the Hellenic world” (Wassermann, 1953, p. 198). Archidamus is one of the exceptional Spartan leaders who aim to avoid violence and win over Athens’ allies. Brasidas is such a similar figure whom Wasserman characterises as “rejuvenated and modernized Archidamus” (Wassermann, 1953, p. 198). His later successes in the northern part of the Athenian Empire damaged Athens’ power significantly and we will examine them in the following case studies. Archidamus is too credible a personality and not a war hawk in order to reject his proposals’ honesty. Gomme considers the Spartan proposal as generous (Gomme, 1956; Romilly, 1962). It would have been unreasonable to expect at this stage of negotiations a fully planned out and calculated proposal instead of an indication of intentions.
What we know is that the Plataeans did not take the risk to negotiate the proposal on their own. The Spartans would have been well served by a speedy surrender instead of a lengthy, costly and full of hardships siege and it would have been doubtful whether they would renege on their proposition to let the Plataeans move away. What the Plataeans chose to do was to ask for the Athenian permission to surrender. The fact that the Plataean Dialogue in front of the Spartan judges afterwards is a sham does not mean that Archidamus would have permitted that to happen had he reached an agreement with the Plataeans. Two years of siege and no effective argument in defense of the Plataeans must have weighted the Spartan decision down with too many grievances to act in any other way.

Initially though, it seems that Archidamus was honest in his intentions and we have every reason to believe that he could have handled well any Theban reactions. The Spartans had shown multiple times that they were willing to take decisions that were not always popular among their allies. They did so at the end of the Peloponnesian War when they did not raze Athens to the ground and they did so previously with the Peace of Nicias that left the Thebans dissatisfied again. However, the Thebans had no other ally to ally with. Athens was an alternative but their hatred and conflicting interests with Athens prohibited such a choice. The alliance between Sparta and Thebes did not dictate the Spartan policy as Thucydides seems to believe when in a moment of anachronism attributes to the Spartans motives related to a treaty that really happened but which took place eight years later. Thucydides could have known but not the Spartans in Plataea (Hornblower, 1991, p. 443). If we believe that Archidamus proposals were honest, then it seems like Archidamus was seeking a middle way trying not to upset his ally and not to ignore his oaths while defending the Spartan rhetoric of being the liberator of Hellas.

According to Bauslaugh the Spartans were willing to attack Plataea in deference to Thebes but were also very much concerned about religious scruples (3.68; Bauslaugh, 1991, p. 131). It is hard to reject some of the Spartan concerns. Their behaviour shows that they really tried to reconcile both of their aforementioned motivations. Since the Spartans had once sworn not to invade Plataea unjustly, it was important to Archidamus to shift responsibility for the attack in 429 onto the Plataeans (2. 71). His offer of neutrality served this purpose admirably because it allowed the Spartans to maintain the appearance of acting justly (2.74). In fact, Morrison maintains that “Archidamus shows his skills as a negotiator by avoiding the appearance of forcing the Plataeans into accepting or rejecting a narrow range of demands”
For Pelling, Archidamus “astutely tries to negotiate a settlement; and the Plataeans are clearly tempted” (Pelling, 1991, p. 130). Even Kagan himself claims at a later passage that Archidamus’ proposals were “reasonable” (Kagan, 2005, p. 114). And not only that but also Archidamus’ proposal to Plataea to join him or remain neutrals was “a common diplomatic strategy” both before the siege of Plataea and after (Bauslaugh, 1991, p. 167).

The Plataean resistance made the Spartans suffer a long siege which made the future surrendering negotiations, a year and a half later, a travesty (3.68). Considering Archidamus’ last proposal seriously was one more bargaining move that the Plataeans did not utilise. This option, given the Plataeans’ desperate position, was counterproductive. Even if it was unclear where they would go after evacuating their city, it was still better than death and slavery.

Martha Taylor further argues that the Spartan offer was unreliable because the Plataeans had no real alternative (Taylor, 2010, pp. 95-96). She is not convinced by the vagueness of the logistics of the proposal, the lack of discussion regarding which side would the Plataean warriors serve in the future, and the fact that the Plataeans had not many alternative places to seek refuge after leaving their city. However, the Plataeans had the alternative of the worst possible choice: die for their city or stay alive wherever that may be. It was not much of a choice but the Plataeans were in a very bad situation. The life of refugees in Ancient Greece was terrible with the exception of populations who were fortunate enough to be hosted by a friendly and hospitable community or of people who had personal friends in other cities (Wees, 2004, p. 149). Athens was one such option for the Plataeans in any case. The two cities had strong historical bonds and the Plataeans could rely on Athens as well as provide their service as soldiers. If things went wrong with Athens it would not have been unprecedented for a refugee population to be scattered as smaller or larger groups instead of going to one place altogether. As van Wees notes, “the human cost of war was greatest in sieges, which not only took the highest toll in dead and wounded and prisoners executed or enslaved, but often also created huge numbers of refugees” (Wees, 2004, p. 149). People who were not killed by the besiegers were a known problem in Ancient Greece but it was a problem exactly because some people ended up living as refugees instead of dying. Moreover, surrendering and moving away from their city was not an unprecedented choice either. In 429, the Potidaeans who were in a similar position did exactly that. After a long siege, their wives, children and auxiliary troops were allowed (by the Athenian besiegers) to
leave the city in freedom and go anywhere they wished. These terms of surrendering may not be great according to contemporary standards, but at the time were considered to be so lenient that they even caused complaints in Athens (2.70). Kagan also maintains that the Archidamian proposal was a charade because “once the city was in Peloponnesian hands the Thebans would never permit its restoration” (Kagan, 2005, p. 88). This is a reasonable point and indeed after the city was captured it was later razed to the ground. Nonetheless, even relying on the Spartan promises may have been a better option for the Plataeans than taking the risk of the siege and dying. Both Kagan and Taylor argue that the choices available for the Plataeans were really bad. This is indubitable. However, what was first and foremost at stake was the Plataeans’ lives. As long as the Archidamian proposal gave the Plataean citizens a window of opportunity to hope to live, then it was a good one.

The Plataeans seem tempted by Archidamus proposal but eventually stubbornly fail to reap its potential benefits. They remain reliable Athenian allies, do not consider how unreliable the potential Athenian help is, and instead request for Athenian permission. The Plataean decision, in essence, gave the Athenians the right to choose in their place. In the most critical decision they had to take, they surrendered their right to decide for their fate to Athens. Thucydides highlights the ambiguity of Athenian motivations in two ways. He first does not mention any deliberation in Athens and restrains himself to recording the report of a Plataean herald passing the Athenian promise for help. “That Thucydides thus has us view Athenian action from a greater distance”, points Zumbrunnen, “only heightens the sense of Athenian single-mindedness, of a sort of action that is unified” (Zumbrunnen, 2008, p. 168). However, it simultaneously demonstrates the absence of deliberation in democratic Athens and keeps the Athenian motives uncertain. The fact that Thucydides does not report any “clash of rival parties over how to respond to the Plataeans’ question” also casts doubt on Kagan’s claim that the Athenian reaction was due to a temporary ascendance of the “war party” in Athenian politics (Zumbrunnen, 2008, p. 168). The lack of clarity regarding Athenian motives becomes further apparent by the consistent absence of any reference to the Athenians throughout the rest of the Plataean siege. This Athenian silence, maintains Zumbrunnen, “results in a ceding of control over the meaning and implications of the Athenians’ actions” (Zumbrunnen, 2008,

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65 For seven more cases of evacuation of children and women see Weidemann on Thucydides and women (Wiedemann, 1983, p. 164).

66 For the point that the ancient Greeks surrendered when they were promised to have their lives spared see Cartledge’s study of surrendering in ancient Greece (Cartledge, 2012).
p. 178). This makes it both possible and necessary for the Plataeans “to create and act on their own understandings of Athenian action” (Zumbrunnen, 2008, p. 178). In the end, the Plataeans’ initial two actions, killing the Theban PoW and giving their women and children to Athens, combined with the Athenian promises for help reinforce a Plataean understanding of Athenian motives which is not unsettled not even after their lack of intervention in the protracted Plataean siege.

The Plataeans failed to calculate the benefit of not asking for permission because they were prone to believe that Athens, given their close relationship, would support them in the best possible way. This cuts to the heart of the issue of alliances. How much reliable is an alliance? How much credible are an ally’s commitments? Obviously, for the Plataeans, given their past history and close connection with Athens, the answer was “very credible”. But this needed not be the case. By the time the Plataeans had negotiated with the Spartans, Athens had lost part of its power. The Thebans were a good match for the Athenians after the plague which carried off perhaps one third of their population. Kagan makes the further point that the Plataeans were hoping that the Athenians would allow some arrangement with the Spartans, since their city could not be rescued without a hoplite battle, which Athens could not win (Kagan, 2005, p. 87). What the Plataean attitude demonstrates is that, far from that, the Plataeans were prepared to accept the Athenian choice and stay loyal even if that meant to remain besieged. The Plataeans probably thought that asking help from Athens, as they were used to do, was the best choice they had while being simultaneously in accordance with their sense of gratitude toward their historical benefactors. In 429 though, the strategic environment had changed. Athens was fighting a defensive war behind its city walls and had lost a significant part of its population.

The impact of the Plataeans’ gratitude and emotions of loyalty toward Athens should not be seen in a deterministic sense but in context. We cannot prejudge their impact or act like Sophocles’ Ajax in his famous “Deception Speech” who treats his reconciliation with his enemies with actual disdain for making him unfaithful to his emotions (Crane, 1990, p. 95). If that was the case then emotions would remain unchanging throughout our lives and, worse than that, would represent another zero-sum game. Of course this is a potential case and then we can end up having tragic outcomes like in the case of Ajax. Ajax deceives the chorus of the tragedy into believing that he has accepted his fate only to commit suicide unable to escape from his self-perceived degraded and intolerable plight that a prudential act of
reconciliation makes him feel. This is the material tragedy is made of and tragic unending conflicts recur in international politics when one feeling of resentment leads to another. In such cases there is no room for prudential politics since the actors cannot overcome their mind-sets. From this standpoint the real challenge is emotional.

These tragic outcomes could be overcome if the actors start perceiving the costs of their actions and intransigence as prohibitive or if a qualitative change takes place. In the first case, even costly actions may fail to convince actors to change their mind; just like in the case of Plataea. In the second case, one needs to transcend a certain mind-set and the associated emotions. “The American-inspired ‘win, win’ expresses this badly”, argues Galtung, “because it doesn’t point to the jump in the transcendence and to a qualitatively new reality” (Galtung, 2004, p. 161).

This emphasis on the potential for transcendence is something that is missing even from insightful studies of alliances. In both *Alliance Politics* and *Conflict Among Nations* Snyder’s starting point is a neorealist framework which underscores solid identities and interests, and aggregate capability (Snyder, 1997; Snyder & Diesing, 1977). Neorealism posits national interests influenced by the calculus of material power and an often tragic view of politics. Changes in preferences or in preferences over strategies cannot be understood but in terms of the distribution of relative power which is either explicit in Waltz or lurks in the background in other neorealists’ and neoclassical realists’ work. This is what Jervis refers to as “revealed preferences” and “can be used only when preferences are stable and consistent” (Jervis, 1988, p. 323). In the process of a negotiation they can change or they may be required to change - at least in the sense of changing preferences over strategies. This creates a difficulty in Snyder when he tries to explain how the Prisonner’s Dilemma game changes into a sequential game since he relies on the neorealist framework. This change in the game does happen, as he contends, in the process of bargaining through threatening, assessing and accommodating. However, even this explanation is incomplete. It presupposes the decision of the actors themselves to change the game they think they are playing.

The participants need to change the game in the process of bargaining but this also indicates the necessity to overcome the “other” orientation which is fundamental in the

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67 For a parallel discussion see Coker’s discussion of geopolitics in his concise *Can War Be Eliminated?* (Coker, 2014a, p. 66).
conceptualisation of alliances in Snyder and, arguably, of politics in neorealism. If “alliances are aimed at states outside their own membership” and this is what distinguishes them from other institutions then how can enemies reconcile (Snyder, 1997, p. 4)? Starting from such a premise, including the realist viewpoint on the anarchy problematique and the material focus of realist explanations, one wonders how could neorealists explain the Plataean decision to surrender, its timing and the reasons for which it took place.

A neorealist analysis which excludes emotions leads us back to Ajax again. If Ajax wants to reconcile with his “bitterest enemies, then he should limit both his anger and his affections (678-83), for today's friend is tomorrow's enemy. Surrender would, in such a context, debase friendship” (Crane, 1990, p. 95). This leads us to an impossible conclusion. If friendship exists, then reconciliation is impossible or if reconciliation is possible then it can only rest on the lack of anger and affections. Of course the point here is that Ajax is a tragic hero and like every tragic hero is inclined almost inevitably to follow his passion excessively until he meets his punishment. Tragedy is the outcome of hubris for ancient Greeks. This does not encompass all of our existence. Even the Greeks had many types of theatrical work. Neorealists endorse, arguably, an anthropology of humans as rational atomistic calculating automata driven by fear and their relative power and devoid of other emotions. Unlike this viewpoint though, we notice that feelings of gratitude and loyalty are part of hierarchical relations and can have significantly impact in defining international political outcomes.

What we observe in the case of Plataea is the Plataeans’ difficulty to supersede their friendship with Athens. According to Crane “Thucydides presents a world similar to that which Ajax rejects, for, in Thucydides, as in the Ajax, friendship has strict limits. But where time in the Ajax converts friendship into enmity and enmity into friendship, the constraints in Thucydides are different” (Crane, 1998). Crane contrasts Sophokles’ view of change to that of Thucydides’. Change in Sophokles is “a diachronic process that transforms friendship and enmity over time” unlike Thucydides’ perspective which according to Crane is more synchronic: “friendship is possible or impossible at any given time depending upon the relative power of two parties” (Crane, 1998). This is one reading of Thucydides but neglects

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68 Admittedly this is more pronounced in offensive realism rather than defensive realism but their common conceptualisation of the international system leads to the same conclusion even if they disagree on secondary assumptions such as the effectiveness of the use of power.

69 This comes in contrast with Crane’s understanding of Thucydides that “Charis in its narrow sense of gratitude and earned loyalty is ultimately less powerful than fear” (Crane, 1998).
Zumbrunnen’s point about the irreducible uncertainty that characterises the Athenian intentions regarding the siege of Plataea and the long shadow this casts on our understanding of the it (Zumbrunnen, 2008, p. 178). If Thucydides wanted us to extract one unambiguous lesson would not have constructed his narrative with the inclusion of ambiguity by repeatedly keeping the Athenian people silent in his history of the Plataean question.

In fact, Thucydides can be seen as using both approaches towards time: the synchronic and the diachronic or else the tragic and the transcending. In the first case, one is bound to emphasise the helplessness of weak states when caught between great powers and the tragic consequences of abiding by norms and conventions. In the second case, our perspective broadens in time and acknowledges the nearly a hundred years of Plataean alliance and independence thanks to the Athenians, the importance of the international convention of friendship among city-states that makes such a type of alliance possible and the ensuing restoration of the Plataeans in a city of their own and the granting of full citizenship by the Athenians. Perceiving this understandings of time as opposites is too stark a distinction. Instead, it is preferable to grasp them as two ends of a continuum. We believe that Thucydides does not make a choice but lets the reader make his/her own choice as the events unfold and through omissions, inclusions and delayed references. No relationship is without troubles but a strong relationship or institution or alliance can withstand many problems up to the breaking point of course. However, the breaking point is an idea not a fixed point. Politics is not physics. We only know the breaking point ex post facto. Everything breaks when it breaks. It would be absurd to claim the opposite. As Jervis puts it, “the common argument that institutions do not matter because states ignore them “when push comes to shove” and vital interests are at stake” has limitations (Jervis, 1997, p. 54). Although the statement is correct, he continues, “it misses the role institutions can play in shaping interests and seeing that push does not come to shove” (Jervis, 1997, p. 54). In the case of Plataea we see that city-states can not only do that but also take excessive risks even when the push comes to shove due to the social embeddedness of an alliance and the emotional investment involved.

This calls for a reversal in the logic of Snyder’s alliance and adversary dilemma in alliance politics in certain cases. According to Snyder’s studies when the alliance dilemma is low the

70 Referring to international friendship van Wees notes that to neglect the importance of gratitude is to neglect that Athens “‘treated exceptional loyalty in its allies as a favour or “benefaction“, and rewarded it with special honours, including Athenian citizenship”’ (Wees, 2004, p. 12). Even though this was not a panacea, as the Plataeans had discovered, it was nevertheless a real practice.
adversary dilemma is high (Snyder, 1997; Snyder, 1984). In other words, when an ally is not afraid of abandonment from the ally, then the allies might have different policy preferences toward the adversary but this disagreement does not affect the stability of the alliance. In the case of Plataea the logic is not the same. Thucydides does not record at any point the Plataeans ever to be worried about Athenian abandonment. However, if the Spartans had managed to make the Plataeans bridge the gap between their preferences, then this could even mean the breach of the alliance with Athens. Snyder’s view excludes such an outcome; in fact, in his analysis, the unravelling of an alliance in a bipolar international system is more likely when the fear of abandonment is high, not low. This is understandable given the “other orientation” of the alliance dilemma and its state-centrism. The “other orientation” sees the adversary as the foundational purpose of the alliance and limits the possibilities for reconciliation since that would seize the alliance. Moreover, allying with an adversary can also serve to manage conflicting interests (Weitsman, 1997; Schroeder, 1976). Snyder can admit to these two logics but only ex post facto and by using his theory heuristically. An explanation based on a strict adherence to his theory and “the analytical distinctions he makes between adversaries and allies and between common and conflicting interests” would not be compatible (Weitsman, 1998, p. 367). In the case of Plataea the fear of abandonment was low but also the adversary dilemma was low and the Plataeans remained loyal to Athens until the end. This case study demonstrates that a focus on capability aggregation and elites or the state as an actor can be misleading. Emotions are doing much of the explanatory work here and we cannot fully account for them without a full appreciation of the historical conditions and evolution of Plataea and its alliance with Athens and the people’s feeling of gratitude. Phrases such as “the more firmly a state is committed to defend its ally, the less influence it will have in intra-alliance bargaining” are as good as they can get but they are tautologies (Snyder, 1997, p. 199). The case of Plataea counterintuitively demonstrates the opposite; namely that, the more firmly an ally is committed to defend its ally, the more influence it will have in intra-alliance bargaining. In the case of Plataea the more firmly Athens was committed to defend Plataea, the more determined Plataea was to honour the alliance. The crucial difference stems from the causality. The cause of this dynamic is not just a power calculus but a logic of appropriateness cultivated for years, embedded on social facts, tried in the battlefield and enabled by the international norm of friendship. However, one needs to go beyond the materialist power aggregation logic of neorealist alliances and its state-centrism that ignores the impact of people and of their emotions.
Taylor has explained very clearly how much close to the Athenians the Plataeans were feeling. The Plataeans not only claimed shared citizenship with Athens but, at the crucial moment of the negotiations with Sparta, they also asked the Athenians to surrender and move into their city. This willingness to ask for permission from Athens to leave their city is not a traditional Greek attitude and highlights that the Plataeans shared part of the Athenian mindset. This is not a minor issue and it can neither be grasped by an emphasis on the calculus of power or a short-term horizon. Taylor’s interpretation is that the Plataeans had an Athenian mind-set because they had a flexible perception of their city not tied to their territory and claiming citizenship in another city (Athens) confirmed exactly this argument (Taylor, 2010, p. 102). For Taylor the Plataean attitude reveals not just any close connection with Athens but a strong connection (Taylor, 2010, p. 102). That is the reason why the Thebans would later accuse the Plataeans of being “atticisers” like if that was an infectious disease that influences city-states to follow Athens (3.64-65). This made Plataean assertions to their honoured alliance with Athens even more dangerous. Apart from the emotional loyalty to Athens, the Plataeans had their consciousness influenced too. This shows that the emotional attachment of the Plataeans coexisted or cultivated a change in consciousness in the Plataeans. Such a consciousness is over the long run the cheapest and most secure form of influence, Jervis maintains and the Plataeans remind us (Jervis, 2009b, pp. 192-193).

The Athenians’ response to the Plataean request for permission to surrender and move into Athens was negative. Athens asked the Plataeans to honour their alliance oaths and reassured them that the Athenian army would come to their support (Taylor, 2010, p. 88). After that the Plataeans were “determined not to desert the Athenians” and answered to king Archidamus “that it was impossible for them to accede to the Spartan proposal” (2.74). Even at this critical point for their survival the Plataeans insisted on relying on the language of honour and loyalty which bound them to the Athenians. They decided, according to Hammond’s translation, not to “desert” the Athenians. The verb “desert” is a verb which shows strong commitment but perhaps there is an even stronger meaning in the original word used by Thucydides. According to Hobbes’ translation, the Plataeans did not want to “betray” Athens. This verb may better convey the Plataean conundrum and Thucydidean meaning (Thucydides, 1975, p. 154). Moreover, according to Venizelos’ translation the same verb is

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71 They may have even been unwilling to help. Later, Thucydides reports that “[w]hen the Mytilenaeans and Salaethus arrived in Athens, the Athenians immediately put Salaethus to death, despite his various proposals which included the offer to secure the Peloponnesian withdrawal from Plataea, still then under siege” (3.36).
rendered as “disloyal” which is closer to Hobbes’ interpretation, rather than Hammond’s translation; again indicating the strong pro-Athenian Plataean attitude and commitment (Thucydides, 2005, pp. 154-155). The Spartans, after being informed of the Plataean decision, realised that there was no further point for negotiations and started the siege.

This choice of the Plataeans made Sparta their enemy even though it was not necessary. Up to that point Sparta and Plataea were negotiating under pressure. Pious Sparta was trying to satisfy Thebes, its ally, without betraying the oath it gave after the Persian Wars to protect Plataea. Plataea was trying not to betray Athens while trying to discern which Spartan terms were affordable. The situation was fluid and Archidamus was trying to offer good terms of surrendering. He seems, as Wasserman puts it, to be trying “to settle the matter of [Plataea’s] loyalty to Athens through an arrangement without resorting to violence” (Wassermann, 1953, p. 198). Plataea’s choice makes Sparta commence the military operations and according to the Plataeans themselves become an enemy. Still though, the Plataeans when they later address the Spartan judges claim that “[t]o punish your enemies would be justified: but we are not enemies — we are supporters who were forced into the war on the other side” (3.58). The Spartan offers were not the offers of an enemy and the Plataean choice was between honouring their promises to the Greeks and their promises to Athens. Paula Debnar claims that Archidamus “genuinely tries to help [the Plataeans] reconcile the conflicting demands of their oaths to the Greeks and to the Athenians” (Debnar, 2001, p. 101). From this point onwards both sides are engaging in a prolonged and tough siege that drains resources, men and energy and is bound to harden the Spartan disposition.

Thucydides provides us with a detailed description of the siege and the determination of the Plataeans to withstand and undermine all Spartan efforts to take their city. Eventually though, and after a sortie during which nearly half the Plataeans escaped, 212, the remaining population of Plataea surrendered, that is, no less than 200 Plataeans and 25 Athenians (3.20-24; 3.52). They did so when they were on the brink of starvation (3.52). They then came to an agreement with the Spartan commander. The Spartans proposed to the Plataeans that “if they were prepared to hand over the city to the Spartans voluntarily and submit to the

72 At this point, Thucydides objectivity and impartiality regarding the Spartan commander’s motivations and orders he had received from Sparta are doubted. It is doubtful that Thucydides had inside knowledge of these issues mentioned in 3.52. Hornblower argues that Thucydides’ speculations are presented as facts (Hornblower, 1991, p. 443). Moreover, Thucydides himself later mentions “the difficulty of penetrating the political secrets of Sparta” (Hornblower, 1991, p. 242; 5.68).
decision of Spartan judges, there would be punishment for the guilty but nobody would be treated unjustly" (3.52). The Plataeans agreed and surrendered the city. What followed is the Plataean dialogue where the Plataeans and Thebans presented their cases in front of the Spartan judges. The first argued about why the Plataeans should have their lives spared and the second why they thought otherwise.

**Part III: The Plataean Surrender**

In this dialogue the Plataeans defend themselves by demonstrating, among other things, their close link with the Athenians and that this is a significant reason why the Spartans should spare their lives. The Plataeans repeat that it would be “dishonourable to desert them” and state the reasons: “these were people who had done us a good service, had admitted us at our request to their alliance, and had given us a share in their citizenship” (3.55). At this point, the Plataeans try to have it the easy way. After mentioning how much they have been benefited by the Athenians they try to disclaim any responsibility for their actions. They pinpoint that “[i]t was to be expected, then, that we would welcome and accept their instructions. In the authority which you two powers exercise over your allies, the responsibility for anything done wrong lies with those who lead away from the right course, not those who follow” (3.55). “The Plataeans claim to be allies and fellow citizens with the Athenians” (Taylor, 2010, p. 98; Hornblower, 1991, pp. 449-450). They almost present themselves as indistinguishable from the Athenians, rather than mere allies, given their shared citizenship. The Plataeans try to simultaneously portray themselves as both having good reasons to feel gratitude toward the Athenians and as bearing no responsibility for their actions deriving from this alliance. As Hornblower and Macleod highlight, they are “trying to have it both ways: they have just claimed credit for their loyalty to Athens but now seek to excuse themselves by the plea of ‘higher authority’” (Hornblower, 1991, p. 450). This was hardly their saving grace.

This kind of argumentative dissonance was easily picked up and countered by the Thebans who undermined it. The Thebans accepted the close connection between Athens and Plataea and called them fellow travellers (3.64). To make things worse, the Thebans blamed the

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73 According to Hornblower this citizenship is an honorary citizenship (Hornblower, 1991, p. 450). The Plataeans that survived in Athens managed to earn a full citizenship after the fall of Plataea.
Plataeans of “atticism” (3.64-65). This is a Theban neologism reminiscent of the word “medism”, that is, siding with the Persians in the Persian Wars (Taylor, 2010, p. 99). In this way they equated Athens with Persia the enslaver of Greece. The Plataeans automatically were presented as the fellow travellers of enslavers and in fact as voluntary ones given the Plataean self-proclamations of their close link with Athens and shared citizenship. The Plataeans, in Zumbrunnen’s elegant formulation, “willingly followed Athens, willingly resisted, willingly fought the Peloponnesian allies” (Zumbrunnen, 2008, p. 174). Therefore, the Plataeans’ “isolation now is also of their own making”, the Thebans retort, “for by their own choice they rejected the better allies” (3.67).

The Plataeans had found it hard to be disloyal to the Athenians and had wanted to consult them at the most critical junctures despite the fact that they never delivered anything more than the initial help. In the end, this also portrayed the Plataeans as nearly indistinguishable from the Athenians hardly helping their case for pity (Zumbrunnen, 2008, p. 174). In this sense the Plataeans remained Athenians until the very end. However, in this way they appeared more hostile to the Spartans. They were not just Athenian allies but “atticisers”, as the Thebans called them. They represented more than an enemy or a smaller power caught in the middle. They came to signify “the Athenian manner of life, its ideas (these two elements strikingly represented in the institution of democracy) and the fear that those ideas composed a system that was incorrigibly expansionist (even subversive)” (Cogan, 1981, p. 72; Taylor, 2010, pp. 99-100). More than an enemy the Spartans were fighting a subversive idea: atticism. By honouring Athens until they exhausted themselves, the Plataeans showcased how much infected they were by atticism.

Jonathan Price picks up this point and claims that the Plataeans are both contradictory and consistent at the same time (Price, 2001, p. 165). They are contradictory because they do not realise that by claiming to honour their alliance with Athens they are asking from Sparta two things. First, to spare them their lives by respecting their close ties with Sparta’s worst enemy, Athens. Secondly, to leave them alone be loyal to Athens (Bauslaugh, 1991, p. 157). The Plataeans do not resort to promises of neutrality or that they had no choice in their defense in front of the Spartans. They claim that they did the honourable thing. But this was a different world. Sparta and Athens were no longer in peace and claims to loyalty were interpreted as loyalty to Athens, the enslaver of Greeks in contrast to Sparta the self-proclaimed liberator of Greece. In other words, “honoring the debt to Athens was less
important than opposing Athenian aggression against other Greek states (63.3-4)” (Bauslaugh, 1991, p. 130). Price maintains that this contradiction does make sense in the context of the Plataean mindset.

The Plataean mindset is explained by themselves. They were close allies of Athens for protection, benefit and gratitude (Price, 2001, p. 165). We have no reason not to believe the Plataeans because all their actions from the reckless massacre of the Thebans, to the request for permission to surrender from Athens, to their defense in front of the Spartan judges to spare them their lives because they were doing the honourable thing demonstrate this point. There is no contradiction if the world is viewed through Plataean eyes (Price, 2001, p. 113). Moreover, despite the dangerous situation the Plataeans were, we hear of no internal domestic political or social division. Both the elite and the people remained loyal to Athens at every turn of the events. This consistent lack of differentiation among the Plataeans can only be understood by a strong feeling of gratitude shared among the Plataeans which is not shared necessarily by any pair of allies. In the case of Mytilene when the Athenian siege was starving the Mytilenians and testing their ability to endure starvation, the people revolted against the elite once they got weapons in their hands and surrendered to Athens. In Plataea nowhere do we see this kind of attitude. In fact, at some point the Plataeans even preferred to attempt not to surrender peacefully but instead, attempt a dangerous escape.

The Plataeans, in their effort to eschew any responsibility for their actions, further emphasised their association with Athens – one could even say, their lethal association. They pointed out that they “chose an alliance of honour with the Athenians above an alliance of convenience with you [the Spartans]” (3.56). As admirable an argument this may be, it also demonstrates that they had a choice: a choice that they undermined, did not explore and did not consider seriously. The Plataeans appealed to the Spartans to not punish them and clarified that they were not enemies but in fact they were “supporters who were forced into the war on the other side” (3.58). If this is not doublespeak then it is at least contradictory (Macleod, 1977, p. 230). Within a few moments the Plataeans had claimed to honour Sparta’s enemies as well as that they were not Sparta’s enemies because they were forced into the war by Sparta’s enemy, Athens, which they thought deserved their honourable respect. But as the Thebans said, they followed Athens in previous wars and helped it build its empire that enslaved Hellas voluntarily. By pushing the moral argument for pity they appeared more
hostile and alien to the Spartans. Most of the things the Plataeans said confirmed their voluntary, enduring and influential close relationship with Athens.

In the end, the Spartan judges condemned all the Plataeans (3.68). If there was a chance of mercy before the siege, it had then vanished. After more than two years of siege the Spartans had finally Plataea in their hands. This was a siege they pursued very energetically and was characterised by the use of many innovative siege tactics and counter-tactics (2.75-78; 3.20-24; Kern, 1999, pp. 89-134). Not only the Plataean attitude and Theban influence but also the lengthy time the siege had taken must have frustrated the Spartans. That typically increased the chances of a brutal sack in revenge for hardships (Sidebottom, 2004, p. 94; Kern, 1999, p. 149; Rawlings, 2007, pp. 129, 140; Hanson, 2009). The Spartans killed all the men, making no exceptions and sold the women as slaves (3.68).

**Conclusion**

In advancing the claim that Plataea surrendered both because it reached the point of starvation and the impact of its privileged alliance with Athens, this thesis maintains that both causes are indispensable. What is crucial is to understand why surrendering came about, its timing and the events that led to it. Privileging only the material explanation that surrendering occurred when the Plataeans run out of food serves only to misrepresent the plight of the Plataeans and their history – both distant and contemporary. The current analysis of surrendering demonstrates that the material -physical survival- and ideational -loyalty to the benefactor Athens- reasons are conjoined and reflect the Plataean logic of surrendering: surrendering due to starvation and because the state they relied on for foreign intervention did not come to their aid. To put it in a characteristic Aronian formulation: betrayal impossible, surrendering improbable.

The reader may wonder why we are presenting the Plataean surrender in relation to gratitude and not recognition. The reason is that Thucydides included this concept and this reflects the contemporary language and practice. So, staying loyal to Thucydides’ terminology, served to

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74 Record emphasises that “Davids” often beat “Goliaths” when they receive outside help (Record, 2007). Such is the case of Plataea but in the inverse. The reasons that explain why foreign intervention did not take place also explain why it was a possibility too: the tight Athenian-Plataean alliance and the Plataeans’ feeling of gratitude toward Athens.
help us focus on the actors’ own perspective and own rationality. Yet, now we can draw more explicitly the link between gratitude and recognition. Even though we will explore the concept of recognition explicitly in the final empirical chapter, we would just like to pinpoint a relation between gratitude and recognition, since our argument relates to what affects the will of the other beyond its concern for physical survival and not to articulate a causal explanation between recognition and its manifestations.

The idea behind the concept of gratitude is that it recognises certain obligations to a benefactor. Such obligations need not be strict or require enforcement. There are weaker ways of upholding the beneficiary responsible such as with a reactive attitude, like resentment (Darwall, 2012). However, resentment can be part of a recognition relation. “When we express and direct our resentment or indignation at a norm violator”, Margaret Walker points out, “we demand some rectifying response from the one who is perceived as out of bounds” (Walker, 2006, p. 26). In the case of Plataea the international norm was that of international friendship between Athens and Plataea. “[R]esentment both expresses a sense of wrong and”, Walker crucially notes, “calls out to others for recognition and a reparative response”75 (Walker, 2006, p. 136). So, gratitude is the product of a recognition relationship that creates certain expectations or obligations. Yet, one does not need to assume a deterministic relationship between obligations and gratitude. Considerations of gratitude, according to McConnell, can be grounded on the claim that some beneficiaries have some obligations of gratitude to the benefactor (McConnell, 1993, p. 207). The cognitive and affective elements of gratefulness cannot be strictly obligatory because actors do not have direct control over their beliefs and feelings (McConnell, 1993, p. 83; Camenisch, 1981, p. 11). The cognitive and affective aspect of gratitude, though, is crucial. They relate to the beneficiary having received previous benefits and having socio-cultural reasons that affect one’s beliefs and feelings76. These aspects correspond to the nature of the relationship between Athens and Plataea. Athens was providing successful military protection to Plataea for over a century and the socio-cultural bond between the two countries seems to have been forged through such acts as the honourary citizenship the Athenians had offered to the Plataeans. So, gratitude is a manifestation of recognition and our argument is that the

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75 Similarly, Darwall remarks, resentment presents another actor with a reason “whose validity depends on presupposed authority and accountability relations between” actors (Darwall, 2006, p. 8).

76 Affect also relates to the unconscious which makes it pertinent to cultural and socio-historical arguments about the impact of history on people’s psychology. For the distinction between emotions and affect see Roach’s analysis of affective values (Roach, 2016).
Plataean logic of surrender was to surrender out of fear for as long as they did not betray the recognition relationship they had with Athens towards which they felt gratitude. This is why betrayal ought to have had felt impossible, and surrendering improbable. The Plataeans wanted to survive but were finding it hard to imagine a reality in which they would have betrayed Athens.

In the remaining concluding section, we will pinpoint that emotions enhance historical ambiguity and impact on the effects of alliances and that ignoring the social aspect of alliances leads realists to a status quo bias. We will also highlight that focusing on the qualities of historical relations between states helps us contextualise and a) understand some implications of state weakness for the international system; b) and avoid mischaracterising as irrational any kind of emotional decision-making by the sheer fact that it is emotional.

Emotions add to the ambiguity of history and the effects of alliances. They can have deep and unintended consequences which are unaccounted by a materialist outlook. Their magnitude could not have been foreseen by Athens and Plataea when they first became allies. Alliances can have a strong social basis which is not captured by realism’s materialism and emphasis on aggregate power and revealed preferences, which depend on its view of the anarchy problematique, the distribution of power and the belief in the lack of hierarchy in anarchy or the materialist understanding of hierarchy (Jervis, 1988). In contrast, even an alliance can serve an ideational purpose for a state if it becomes embedded in a relationship of recognition. Thucydides enables us to grasp this by bringing under scrutiny “collective desires, fears, hopes, and sympathies” (Visvardi, 2012). This is best exemplified in how the Plataeans handled reality when confronted by Archidamus’ magisterial diplomacy and Athens’ unforthcoming promised help. Thucydides’ record shows that the Plataeans were unwavering in their loyalty and trust toward Athens despite their misfortune. This made them take the risky strategy of delaying surrender as much as they could even though this was increasing the chances of Sparta razing their city to the ground and killing them. This extra layer of ambiguity based on the social foundation of alliances proved hard to dethrone. Plataea remained a rather homogeneous and coherent society in its gratitude toward Athens in the face of adversity.

Ignoring the social aspect of alliances leads to a status quo bias. Neorealism and neoclassical realists focus on the fear and profit side of alliances but disregard the more important if more
elusive role of alliances: their ability to shape a state’s preferences (Jervis, et al., 2002, p. 174). What realists downplay is how things can change over time and that such a change may make alliances ‘sticky’ not because “they keep their shape for a while before yielding to external pressures” but because they may have affected their members’ preferences in the meantime (Jervis, et al., 2002, p. 174). The Plataean unyieldingness near the point of starvation was neither dispositional nor inevitable. It was related to both the benefits of the alliance and the social connection developed between the two city-states. The unyieldingness that led to the polarisation of the regional international system was partly the outcome not of the alliance in and of itself but of its particular qualities as well. Ignoring this leads realists to ignore a determinant of a polarised international system, which then is prone to international conflict and change; thus, realists are liable to status quo bias.

We should not jump to conclusions about what weakness means and its implications for international relations. Materialist realist analyses tend to privilege the view of the “helplessness of small states caught between great powers” (Kagan, 2005, p. 88). However, in the surrender of Plataea, Thucydides did not just explain the problem of weakness in the Peloponnesian War but also the stratification of ancient Greece in hierarchic relations and how the two interacted. Moreover, taking a broader outlook, weak states sometimes do have a special role in international systems; a role which cannot be conveyed by a mere account of their weakness (Schroeder, 1998). To have had stopped our explanation at a materialistic analysis, would have led us to misunderstand how surrender unfolded, its timing and logic due to our limited understanding of weakness in IR.

An ahistorical realist outlook could easily mischaracterise, like Frankel does, the Plataeans’ surrendering as a lamentable incident or criticise the Plataeans for remaining foolishly loyal to the Athenians until the end (Frankel, 1996, pp. 114-115). The Plataean delayed surrender, we have argued, was due to their gratitude toward Athens. This is a different type of rationality that does not exist in realism and a realist would consider such a viewpoint as irrational. Realists exclude emotions from their purview but this merely betrays their own ‘rational’ or ‘scientific’ credentials, which, just like ideas or emotions, can also be misleading. The Plataeans were prone to act emotionally because of the relationship they had with Athens and their common history. Crane summarises the Plataean position in the following way: “[i]f you punish men for being loyal to their friends, you undermine the complex interdependencies that hold the Greek world together” (Crane, 2001, p. 148).
Without grasping the context of a historical situation we are likely to misunderstand situations due to the different sensibilities of our theoretical frameworks to the relationships that uphold such situations.

The Plataean surrender does not simply show the impact of emotions, the social aspect of alliances or the failure of coercion or how vain diplomatic efforts and “carrots”. Rather, it indicates how vain ‘carrots and sticks’ or a ‘hearts and minds’ approach can be when confronted by an opponent determined to delay surrender as much as possible. Determination in ancient Greek sieges was a function of loyalty, endurance and grain (Connor, 1984, p. 149). The Plataeans only managed to surrender when they ran out of the third. In the next case study, we will examine not how magisterial diplomacy fails but how it does succeed in co-opting another city-state leading to quick surrender.

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Crane remarks that “[c]onfronted with imminent execution, the Plataeans make their friendship with Athens a cornerstone of their defense” (Crane, 2001, p. 147).
4. The Surrender of Acanthus (424 BC):
Seduction as Cause

Romans did not prefer to be feared than to be loved and cherished\textsuperscript{78}

\textit{Cicero (De Officiis II, 8, 26)}

Preamble

Beware of Greeks bearing gifts is the age old motto and the cunning gift was no other than the aptly called Trojan Horse. However, the Greeks did not bear gifts only for the Trojans. They bore ‘gifts’ even for wars among themselves as the story of the surrender of Acanthus shows. The Trojan horse of the Peloponnesian War, at least for realists and the Athenians, is the renowned Spartan officer Brasidas who seduced the city-state of Acanthus -and many more after it- to surrender. When the Greeks, according to myth, left the Trojan Horse for the Trojans to bring it inside their city, they set the wheels in motion. This was a winning move. Likewise, Brasidas set in motion such a crucial move during the Peloponnesian War and changed its course in Northern Greece and nearly changed its overall outcome too\textsuperscript{79}. It only makes one wonder why ‘Trojan Horses’ manage to be so successful time and time again.

Beautiful appearances and fine-sounding names, to use a Thucydidean expression, can be used for convenience or when power is in short supply. We all tell similar stories whether we caution our children not to accept gifts from strangers or when Shakespeare writes that all that glitters is not gold. Popular wisdom even before realism cautions us against deceitful appearances but adds that this is just a possibility: appearances \textit{can} be deceitful.

\textsuperscript{78} Rough translation of “metui quam cari esse et diligi de officiis” (de Romilly, 2007 [1977], p. 106).
\textsuperscript{79} Hornblower points out that the Spartans lost “the battle of the hearts and minds” and this is why they lost the Ten Years War” which ended with the Peace of Nicias (Hornblower, 1996, p. 121). Brasidas tried to change that but he was eventually unable to do so.
In a similar vein, what Thucydides appears to be telling us, is that Brasidas lied and intimidated the city-states he coerced but not entirely. Realists seem to only focus on fear and coercion. They seize this slice of reality and monopolise it and then essentialise it, which then, like every monopoly, produces ‘market’ distortions in the marketplace of ideas. They forget that Thucydides’ integrity made him go beyond this description. The great ancient historian adds that the city-states that surrendered to Brasidas did so because they were also seduced by his words. Realists believe in fear based worlds (Lebow, 2008; Brooks, 1997). They dismiss rather than wonder why Thucydides included both fear and seduction as his causes behind the surrender of Acanthus. Similarly, it is not uncommon even among historians to characterise Brasidas as a hypocrite, the city-states that bought into his lies as gullible and seduction as propaganda. Brasidas the seducer is bound to be the Trojan Horse or, to mix metaphors, the pied pan piper. It seems like for these analysts, fear, the only ‘genuine’ emotion between the two, always trumps seduction even though the cities may have acted otherwise. As Aron would say, this view of reality approaches ideology.

Realists with their narrow time-frame can perceive the surrender of Acanthus as the outcome of effective propaganda; that is, a mistake or a confirmation of the idea that the weak submit. The moment Brasidas threatens to destroy the vineyards of the citizens of Acanthus, they reconsider their attitude. In a similar vein, Frankel argues in reference to two other city-states, Plataea and Mytilene, that “policy is dictated by self-interest and not magnanimity” (Frankel, 1996, pp. 114-115). Brasidas’ fine-sounding names of coming as the liberator of Hellas are dismissed (Burns, 2011). The city-states who bought into Brasidas’ rhetoric did a mistake. This fits well with the realist paradigm.

Realism reifies human psychology including reason and excluding emotions only to see them as something degenerate. Realism’s focus on material power excludes immaterial factors or subordinates them to material power (Forde, 1995). Realism’s prudence is its Achilles heel. Realism tries to protect humans from hypocrisy but in that it protects us from the best in ourselves too. According to Nye, “[a]cting and leadership have a great deal in common” (Nye, 2008, p. 71). They both require emotional intelligence and discipline. Realism cannot account for Brasidas’ seductive leadership and ability to keep the domestic peace in Acanthus, for his string of successes in Northern Greece, for what led Brasidas to wisely adjust his message from city-state to city-state to incorporate local peculiarities and for why he was so admired across Greece even after his death.
Romilly, from a historian’s standpoint, has written an essay which is historically informed and offers an account of the contingencies of the events but her point boils down to the fact, if it is a fact, just like realism, that the cities were not really seduced by Brasidas; they were overpowered and when it comes to that no true motives can be discerned (Romilly, 2008). This is like that famous scene in various movies when the criminal is telling the good guy to dance or he’ll shoot. The victim does dance but we all know that he is not really enjoying it. Alternatively, in Allison’s unforgiving wording, Brasidas’ rhetorical justification is a “marvellous bit of Spartan roguery” and “a worthy match for the Athenians on Melos” (Allison, 1997, p. 177). Unfortunately, things get more complicated once we consider the tremendous fame that Brasidas accumulated due to his campaign, the degree of feasibility of his achievements and the role of Brasidas’ character in all that.

What is common in both historical and IR approaches like the above is that the overall outcome of the analysis is a patronising view of the weak that did a mistake due to so-called naïve miscalculations or because they had no choice. All agency is taken away from small states and the actions of theirs that do not fit the scientific narrative are given less attention. Romilly, for instance, clearly states that we cannot discern the true motives of small city-states in Northern Greece because of Brasidas’ power preponderance or pressure (Romilly, 2008, p. 280). Similarly, throughout both war and peace, small city-states in ancient Greece are constantly under pressure by great powers. The overall image that comes out of this is, unmistakably, one where the weak do not really play a role in international politics. This is the great-power-centric chessboard of realism where one can only ‘see’ great powers.

The city of Acanthus that surrenders to Brasidas does so out of a combination of fear and seduction and does that in the context of Brasidas’ moral discourse and reasonable short-term and medium-term promises. The change from short-termism to this more expansive framework of analysis is not unique to Acanthus. It is a distinct possibility in international politics that we can discern in Thucydides. Monoson and Loriaux, for example, make the point that for Thucydides moral conduct makes prudent action possible (Monoson & Loriaux, 1998). Hermocrates for instance manages to thwart the first Athenian campaign to Sicily by

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80 Byman and Waxman make a similar point regarding compellence and deterrence pointing out that discerning the enemy’s intentions is always speculative and inherently opaque (Byman & Waxman, 2000, p. 7).
forging cohesion among Sicilian city-states despite their problems. Melos’s destruction, in contrast, demonstrates what the failure of moral conduct leads to.

The case of Acanthus also demonstrates the combined force of three factors: seduction, reputation, character. Hornblower makes the point that as Thucydides’ narrative unfolds, his emphasis on moral character increases. Thucydides’ emphasis on character is not a random choice. It serves a purpose. It reveals his “belief that ‘individual human action can change the course of history’” (Monoson & Loriaux, 1998, p. 293; Hornblower, 1987, p. 146; Kauppi, 1991). Despite Brasidas’ misgivings, his moral character is laudable and inspiring. He manages to build his reputation and policies based on this character demonstrating to the city-states his self-restraint and his ability to liberate them and protect them from Athens and create the appropriate momentum in order to make this more effective. His critics that accuse him of misleading the city-states in Northern Greece ignore that Brasidas’ premature death and not his misplaced policies may be the cause of the unfortunate end of his efforts. We aim to show that all these aspects of Brasidas’ character and policies combined with the issues of contemporary concern in the city-states enabled this strategy to materialise beyond what fear would have succeeded.

Brasidas’ seduction was based on honour and fear but did not rely on fear to frame the surrendering discourse into an honour discourse. He did not just say that he would liberate Acanthus and they surrendered. His rhetoric was not just clever but also based on important themes. He relied on three issues. First, the issue of the liberation of Greek city-states from the tyrannical Athenian Empire which was the cloak that Sparta vested itself from the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Secondly, the city-states wanted freedom. Thirdly, Brasidas followed through with largely consistent actions and oratory while showing respect for the city-states, their concerns and their domestic politics trying to forge cohesion. Yes, these cities were coerced but they were also inspired to follow Brasidas’ lead for a common cause. His success was such that he was named the founder of one of these cities, Amphipolis, while another one treated him with the honours of an athlete, Scione, whereas other ones, far removed in time and space, even after his death, still revered him. Romilly

believes that all this was just Brasidas’ bait to entice the cities that naively listened to his seductive words.

Brasidas was an honourable officer, a real warrior that talked to the hearts and minds of the cities he enlisted to the cause and he knew how to do that in order to bear fruits. Brasidas is teaching us a lesson about how relationships can be forged when oratory is based on the right words even if sometimes momentum is required to match the words with success. The key here is inspiration and one finds inspiration and reasonable hope in an honour discourse and not in a fear discourse. It is unfair to call Brasidas’ rhetoric propaganda and denigrate his character. This is often done through the confusion of what self-interest means. An honour discourse is as based on self-interest as a fear based discourse. The framing changes but not disinterestedly. This is crucial for strategy.

Brasidas was both a military officer as well as, in essence, a politician and this cannot ring truer than as an echo of the Clausewitzian mind-set. Clausewitz and Brasidas understood the relationship between war and politics based on the trinity - reason, chance, emotion- and not just on pure reason and fear. Brasidas, the effective officer and the inspirational orator, found a way to attract the city-states of Thrace in Northern Greece and was in a unique position to undermine the flanks of the Athenian Empire. What Brasidas did can be replicated even today.

This is the story of the first city-state to be seduced by Brasidas, the story of the famous speech Brasidas gave to the city of Acanthus and the interplay of reasons that both actors, Brasidas and the Acanthians, were considering before deciding. Thucydides is too succinct when explaining the rationale behind Acanthus’ decision to surrender. Thucydides had already provided the context of this decision throughout his narrative. We aim to present this with the analytical help of concepts that will unpack the importance of seduction in international politics relating it to Brasidas; character, the Acanthians’ fears and hopes and the important nexus of reframing an issue and one’s reputation. Brasidas, with his actions managed to put in track the overcoming of the most challenging dichotomy of all; that is, the dichotomy between victor and vanquished. His achievement allowed the possibility of change and the accumulation of political and military momentum. The Acanthians were seduced from Brasidas and for a good reason. Threat was part of his plan but seduction was his really big plan which we are about to unpack. As Westlake rightly puts it, Brasidas “intended to win
the confidence of other cities where revolt might be contemplated” (Westlake, 1962, p. 284). This is why we still remember the surrender of Acanthus to Brasidas. This is why we still remember the historic year 424 BC, the seventh year of the Peloponnesian War and the third year after the fall of Plataea.

**Part I: Historical Context**

The gates of Acanthus opened and Brasidas, the brave Spartan general, entered the city alone as prearranged. Other Hellenic cities had seen foreign armies before. They were usually sneaking in under cover of darkness or taking them by storm. The Acanthians just waited for Brasidas to cross the city’s gates and talk to them in their agora while his army awaited outside. There was nothing ordinary in this development and nothing ordinary came out of it. It was one of those great moments of historical change with deceivingly humble beginnings. Brasidas’ walk into the city was about to make history. But for Acanthus and Brasidas, the Peloponnesian War would have evolved in a different direction. Now, students of Thucydides remember Acanthus as the first of many cities that surrendered to Sparta or straightforwardly defected from Athens. Brasidas is memorable for the honourable military commander he was, the man who single-handedly incited a political revolution in Northern Greece striking a blow not in the heart but in one of the most strategic regions of the Athenian Empire. Thrace was for the Athenian Empire similar to what the ‘Middle East’ is today for the U.S.: important for its natural resources and a crucial strategic region due to its location or role in the imperial system. Acanthus is remembered as the first city-state to be seduced by Brasidas but certainly not the last one.

Acanthus was a prosperous city that lived off its rich vineyards in the region of Chalcidice in the North of Greece between Macedonia and Thrace. It benefited from the rich soil of the area which is suitable for wine making and has secured Northern Greece’s reputation for wine-making up to the present. Its history goes back to the 7th century BC when the Aegean island of Andros, having become sufficiently wealthy itself, started colonising the region and established a number of city-states (4.84). Andros itself was an important maritime centre and one of the earliest examples of fortification in Greece. Acanthus, unlike many other Greek

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82 The authorial study on money and the Peloponnesian War remains the one by Kallet-Marx (Kallet-Marx, 1993).
city-states of the time, had also built city walls and could protect itself from enemy troops. Other fellow colonies from Andros were Stagirus, Aristotle’s birthplace, Argilus, Sane and Torone all of which, except for Sane, would also surrender to Brasidas (Hornblower & Spawforth, 1996, p. 275). Acanthus was located near the narrowest point of the Akte prong of Chalcidice (currently an important centre of Christian Orthodox monasticism and known as Mt. Athos) and thus close to the canal dug in 480 BC on the orders of Xerxes I of Persia. Acanthus like other cities of the Chalcidice peninsula had been forced to follow Xerxes I during the Persian Wars but later joined the Delian League and became subjects of imperial Athens paying a normal tribute of three talents (Hornblower & Spawforth, 1996, p. 275). It was also near the city-state of Amphipolis, an important power base of Athens and a strategic point for Athenian access to its grain supply from the Black Sea, which Brasidas managed to seduce shortly after Acanthus’ surrender.

Acanthus remained subordinate to Athens until Brasidas’ arrival. Brasidas’ seductive words and threats, so Thucydides tells us, convinced the citizens to follow him (4.88). Unlike Acanthus, other city-states of Chalcidice had already revolted from Athens in 432/1, established a common capital and created the Chalcidic League, the most interesting specimen of ancient federalism (Hornblower & Spawforth, 1996, pp. 2, 315). In fact, it was citizens of the Chalcidic Confederacy and some disaffected citizens of Acanthus, probably members of the oligarchic faction, alongside the kingdom of Macedonia that invited Brasidas to Northern Greece to support their revolt. Perdiccas, the king of Macedonia, wanted Spartan support against a local enemy, Arrhabaeus, king of a neighbouring people, the Lyncestian Macedonians and backing against Athens that he had reasons not to trust despite their concurrent alliance (4.79-4.83).

The decision to request for Brasidas to lead the effort of their liberation from Athens was a stroke of genius. Brasidas was not an ordinary military man. He was the man who would get the job done. He was one of the most memorable characters of Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War and his fate is indelibly intertwined with his most famous, yet last, expedition; the one in Northern Greece.

Brasidas’ enduring eminence is well documented and justified not only by Thucydides but also by the likes of Xenophon, Plutarch and Rousseau. One could not have found a more enviable cohort of admirers by any count. For Thucydides Brasidas was the fateful general
against whom he lost Amphipolis and as a result the Athenians condemned the now reputable historian to a life in exile during which he wrote his masterpiece. For Xenophon Brasidas was an archetypical Spartan. For Rousseau Brasidas was one of the great ancient generals worthy of memorialising in his work. Plutarch alludes to Brasidas’ larger than life character with a telling short story: ‘Brasidas caught a mouse among some dry figs, and, getting bitten, let it go. Then, turning to those who were present, he said, “There is nothing so small that it cannot save its life, if it has the courage to defend itself against those who would lay hand on it”’ (Plutarch, 1931, p. 123).

Courage, daring and fighting against the odds would also be Brasidas’ legacy to posterity. This was the basis for everything he would achieve in Northern Greece. Brasidas was a force to be reckoned with for his enemies and a source of inspiration for his followers. Courage, Brasidas’ virtue, according to Aristotle, “lies in a mean between cowardice, which is a deficiency, and rash boldness” (Lear, 2008, p. 109).

When the Chalcidians and oligarchic Acanthians asked for Spartan help, and in particular Brasidas’ leadership in their effort to defect from Athens, Brasidas already had an enviable reputation. At Sparta, Thucydides remarks, “he had a reputation for getting things done, whatever the need” (4.81). Brasidas put all this reputation to the test by taking his chances. His status would only augment from then on but not before travelling across most of mainland Greece and trying to seduce the cities of a region far apart from Sparta, with which he had no naval access and which were part of the Athenian Empire. Moreover, he would have to face cities divided at various degrees between two factions: the oligarchic faction and the democratic faction. The Acanthians that had invited him were no exception.

The social division of city-states in Classical Greece between democrats and oligarchs was a grim reality each city had to take into account for both its domestic and international politics.

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83 Aristotle, according to Jonathan Lear, “did not confront the problem that different historical epochs might impose different requirements on what states of the soul could count as courage” (Lear, 2008, p. 108). The Peloponnesian War had been such a period of change in which the whole of Hellas for Thucydides was in state of stasis and in which social conventions and laws of war started deteriorating dramatically (Price, 2001, pp. 73-78; Ober, 1996). Athens, for its enemies, was seen as an enemy of Hellas much alike Persia (Price, 2001, pp. 127-189). Thus the conception of courage we shall employ follows Jonathan Lear who for such reasons extends it slightly beyond Aristotle (Lear, 2008, p. 108). In the situation under consideration the deficiency might be what Thucydides was criticising Sparta for, conservativism, —which is what characterised the non-Brasidas-like Spartans—and the excess might be Spartan self-aggrandisement of the Athenian style in Melos which Brasidas avoided. “One can allow”, Jonathan Lear adds, “the content of courage to shift while nevertheless continuing to locate it in a matrix of excess and defect” (Lear, 2008, p. 109).

84 He was not a loner, Hornblower tells us, but he was significantly cut off from Sparta (5.12-13; Hornblower, 1996, p. 269).
This has been an oft-cited social and political predicament that could lead city-states to instability, hatred, and even stasis or civil war and foreign intervention – not necessarily in this order. One of Thucydides’ most memorable passages of this quandary is the description of the civil war in Corcyra85 (3.70-3.83). The cruelty of internecine conflict is depicted in all of its appalling details. Whole families turn on each other, friends kill friends, relatives kill relatives. The Corcyraeans literally butchered their enemies and their enemies were their brothers, their neighbours, their friends. Opposing factions emboldened by the prospects of foreign intervention became increasingly cruel toward each other. Killing or sending political opponents in exile was not uncommon in ancient Greece. War also disrupted normal human commerce and made citizens desperate because it took away the easy supply of daily wants (Monoson & Loriaux, 1998, p. 290). Words that used to connect citizens took on a different meaning. Sincere good naturedness was laughed out of court. Trust was vanishing. Courage referred to actions that benefitted the party and not the city. During civil war words retained their agreed-upon meaning but the value assigned to them, that is, how their meanings were enacted in society, changed (Price, 2001, p. 41). Thucydides characterised the situation as one in which actors were unable to practice any measure of hesitation, moderation, and practical intelligence (3.82). The conditions of rational, deliberate, prudent action were disrupted and moderates were eliminated (Monoson & Loriaux, 1998, p. 290).

This morbid domestic political uncertainty in Acanthus and other city-states of the North is what Brasidas, a man of honour and reputation for decisive and important action, would be measured against. Moreover, the international situation also looked uninviting. The kingdom of Macedonia, a formal ally of Athens had asked for Spartan help but its loyalty could prove fickle. Trying to enlist many city-states of Northern Greece which were still subordinate to Athens and many of them democracies themselves was an open question that largely depended on Brasidas’ success and how welcomed he and his army would be.

To aid him to his cause Brasidas brought along 1,700 hoplites; hardly a tremendous army. His army consisted of 700 helots (a type of slaves in Sparta), 1,000 non-helots and one Spartan: Brasidas himself (4.78; 4.80). The non-helots were mercenaries drawn from the Peloponnese and many of them probably Corinthians (Hornblower, 1996, pp. 239, 257).

85 Contemporary Corfu.
This is a strange Spartan decision given the strategic situation. The Spartans had suffered losses. Two hundred and ninety two Spartans were captured. The Athenians built a fortress in Pylos at the Peloponnese. They installed a garrison and they launched raids instigating the desertion of numerous helots. Helots were dangerous for Sparta and the fear of their revolt was an important domestic political factor for Spartan politics then and throughout the centuries (4.80). Opening another theatre of war in the Athenian flanks would take some heat off the Peloponnesians and put the pressure back to Athens. There was clearly the need for some initiative and to get rid of some helots\footnote{For a synopsis of the general problem with helots in Sparta see a good summary in the \textit{World History of Warfare} (Archer, et al., 2002, p. 63). For a discussion regarding the importance of the Spartan prisoners vis a vis the general dissatisfaction with the progress of war in Sparta see Hornblower’s commentary (Hornblower, 1996, p. 110; Westlake, 1974).}. Still, Brasidas’ army was definitely limited.

The number of troops and its relation to victory though, can be misleading. The Athenian failure in Sicily took place despite the immense number of troops the Athenians had committed to that campaign. Nicias had tried to intimidate the Athenians by requesting for more troops and he ended up with all of the troops he asked for only to become the general who would send them to their death.

Brasidas was definitely more successful than Nicias in this respect. However, it is unclear why Sparta did not commit more troops of its own. It is a matter of speculation whether the reason was pragmatic or disbelief in Brasidas’ goal. Should the last reason be the real one, then it comes in contrast with the needs of the cities in the North of Greece. Yet, Brasidas’ strategy and ingenuity could have been a game changer. We cannot be entirely sure about how much independent minded Brasidas was in relation to Spartan wills and politics having Thucydides as our only source. We get a glimpse of his character from Thucydides’ remarks though and we also know that he was one of the greatest generals of the Peloponnesian War. He would prove this both in battles and in decisive speeches - like the ‘blueprint’ speech of Acanthus.

\textbf{Part II: The Speech}

In the hot Greek summer, with the grapes ready for harvest, Brasidas arrives in front of the sealed walls of Acanthus. The gates, instead of opening wide to welcome him remain shut
and the people inside is divided between those inviting him and the “people at large”; apparently the democrats. Like in so many other cities, Acanthus was also divided between democrats and oligarchs. This could make for an explosive situation that could range from the takeover of power by one political faction at the expense of the other with the help of the intervening foreign power to exile. A large part of the Acanthians was facing a life and death dilemma: to let Brasidas and his army in or keep him out with the danger that he would destroy their crops. Brasidas, aware of the conundrum, proposed to come inside alone and give a speech before the Acanthians decided. And so it happened.

Brasidas’ speech is magisterial and Thucydides’ remark has been often discussed: “he was not a bad speaker, for a Spartan” (4.84). Brasidas first apologised for not being able to come to liberate the Greeks earlier. He then expressed his surprise for the Acanthians’ reluctance to welcome him mentioning that he was under the impression that they were already his allies in spirit. He then warned them that resistance could have dire consequences because there is a broader issue at hand. Resistance to Brasidas from such a notable city would imply that there was something wrong with the freedom he was bringing or that he could not protect them from any Athenian offensive. He then mentioned some of his military achievements. Subsequently, Brasidas pointed out he had “bound the authorities at Sparta by the most solemn oaths to guarantee the autonomy of any people [he would] bring over to alliance with [them]” (4.86). He also clarified that he was not trying to trick them into an alliance and then force them to fight his wars but only to liberate them from Athenian slavery (4.86). He then attempted to placate the fears of those who were afraid of retaliations from the opposite political faction should they allow the Spartans to enter into the city. He also emphasised that this behaviour coincides with Sparta’s interest and they should believe him and take him up on his word. He then threatened them again that he cannot leave them “sympathetic but not committed to our side”. Their alliance with Athens not only hurt Sparta because they paid tribute to Athens but it also frustrates the efforts of the rest of the Greeks for autonomy and would prejudice them against the Spartans. He then concludes with a summary of the call for liberation and a caution for retribution.
Part III: Analysing the Speech: Two Themes and a Framework

The speech appears to revolve around two main themes: liberation and violence. This is Hornblower’s view but the distinction between the two is drawn two starkly (Hornblower, 1996, p. 285). This distinction does not fully account for Brasidas’ attraction and seduction. It downplays the power of seduction that Brasidas managed to use for his cause, why the Acanthians due to their identity and Brasidas’ moderation, inspiration and reassurances were able to be seduced. Acanthus was not strongly associated with Athens, as we have seen with Plataea, and Brasidas created a discourse that empathised with the Acanthians’ fears and hopes and was consistent with his actions and character.

We take a processual analysis of politics rather than a static one focusing only on the there and then of the speech. We contextualise the speech based on the significance of what it reveals, its implications and its consistency with the Acanthians’ and Brasidas’ actions. In this case study we see again the limits of leader-centric approaches to war termination, the problems of endorsing dichotomous variables to analyse domestic politics like neo-classical realists do substituting one evil -the state as a black box- with another one - static default lines between social groups. Emotions and arguments as part of a consistent honour based discourse can change a fear based discourse and permit surrendering to the aggressor, maintain the domestic peace and create increasingly loyal followers. Not only is fear not sufficient to build a theory of international politics but, more importantly, fluctuations in fear and smart diplomacy permit the transformation of a fear discourse into alliance with loyalty. More crucially, this can happen even in times of crises and war and constitutes a hard case for the efficacy of this argument.

Following Hornblower’s division of the speech between the two themes of liberation and violence makes the distinction too abstract, stark and in certain respects counterproductive. This obscures the argument we will make. We will argue that framing the argument can be as important as the argument itself and that this is what drives Brasidas’ complementary arguments that elaborate on the theme of liberation. He could, instead, have covered the same topic far more succinctly. Framing arguments may be an abstract idea but can be as important as the solid argument itself. It is what permits the potential of a seductive argument, or soft

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87 Recognition is related to honour, so an honour based discourse includes relations of recognition.
power as Nye would call it, to become real seduction and attraction. In this sense power is not the property of Brasidas but depends on how he frames the argument to make it consistent and on the Acanthians’ contemporary state of politics. In the end, we will also make the point that not only is power better seen as relational but that it can be useful to see it as the dependent variable (Caporaso & Haggard, 1989). Seen from this perspective, we can understand Brasidas’ strategy, Brasidas’ effectiveness and the Acanthians’ willingness to support him.

Expanding the dichotomy to include the importance of framing the arguments helps us draw comparisons. Should we follow the distinction between the two themes, then this can make the Athenian foreign policy in Melos appear comparable with the one by Brasidas. Similarly, Hornblower, despite his reservations, draws comparisons between Brasidas’ speech and propaganda - an approach to be found in Romilly and to be expected by realists too (Hornblower, 1996, p. 277; Romilly, 2008). Romilly calls Brasidas’ liberation theme his ‘bait’.

More specifically, this dichotomous viewpoint essentially lumps together the case of Sparta in Acanthus with that of Sparta in Rhodes and Athens in Melos. Sparta in Rhodes, according to Romilly, essentially promised the citizens their lives and they returned to their city and allied with Sparta against Athens (Romilly, 2008). However, no one remembers the Spartan general like we recall Brasidas. We do though remember the Athenians in Melos in 416 BC but we evoke them for different reasons. The Athenians not only failed to persuade the Melians but their discourse is notorious for its amorality and self-aggrandisement. They did not mention anything about liberation but they did mention that they would spare the Melians’ lives and that nothing would change apart from their subjection to the Athenian Empire which would just require that they paid a tribute.

**Part IV: The Speech’s Appeal**

The similarity due to the mild conditions of surrendering, we would argue, ends here. The Athenians in Melos, unlike Brasidas, had justified their actions based on the idea that there is a law of nature according to which one rules whatever one can rule. In this vein, “[t]he "law" that power rules the relations of states”, Forde rightly highlights, is “a principle that lies at the
heart of all realism, classical, modern, and contemporary [pointing] to expansion constrained only by the limits of one's own power, or by countervailing outside power” (Forde, 1995, p. 158). Brasidas’ attitude and character included a series of other arguments that managed to frame the liberation argument differently and made it seductive, restrained and effective to convince the Acanthians. This does not mean that we should forget his threats but that there is no politics without threats.

Thucydides himself emphasises Brasidas’ fame for being reasonable and moderate linking it to his appeal. Of course there were cities that “were betrayed to him and captured” (4.81). However, Brasidas did try to live up to his fame like in the case of the major city of Amphipolis where according to Westlake he delayed the attack in order to avoid violence hoping to encourage more revolts (Westlake, 1962, p. 284). He did the same thing with Acanthus where he aimed from the very beginning at inducing it to surrender without the use of any violence at all.

When Thucydides seems to be making the link between Brasidas’ character and politics and his appeal to the city-states this is something consequential. Thucydides remarks that Brasidas appeared reasonable and moderate (4.81). This point should not be dismissed as merely Thucydides’ presentation of what other city-states believed but not himself. As Hornblower admits, there is “a residue of Thucydides’ judgement [in this assessment], some favourable, some not” and this is crucial when talking about Brasidas whom Thucydides seems to respected and even admired (Hornblower, 1996, p. 121).

We believe that this statement serves a dual goal. It enables Thucydides to criticise Brasidas after he fails in accomplishing his goal of liberating Greece and dies two years later, in 422 BC, which is a typical criticism of Brasidas and the attainability of his goals (Burns, 2011). This, we will try to challenge in the next sections. It also serves to criticise realism by showing the enormous potential and impact of Brasidas’ project in such a short period of time. This is the broader point that follows if we accept the premises of the first point.

Brasidas, as comes out of his speech in Acanthus, is a respectful person who emphasised that liberation with Sparta was the ‘wave of the future’ and pointed out that he could provide security. He also encouraged non-sectarian domestic political identities demonstrating not just moderation but also self-restraint. It was within this context that the theme of liberation
became more convincing being associated with self-restraint, self-binding, respect and protection as well as freedom. This is why the citizens of Acanthus were seduced and bought into the idea of liberation he was offering.

Equally crucial is that the Acanthians were not like the Plataeans; hence, enabling Brasidas’ attractive argument of liberation to become seductive. Seduction is not a one-way street but a two-way relationship. Someone attracts and someone gets seduced and the outcome is what we call seduction. The Plataeans had a special relationship with Athens based on their history and societal connections and remained loyal to Athens until the end. They were tied with a bond of honour and gratitude to Athens. Such a strong connection between Acanthus and Athens did not exist. The Acanthians’ identity was not linked to Athens like in the case of the Plataeans; hence, enabling Brasidas to seduce them. The task at hand was not as immense as Archidamus’ in Plataea but was one that necessitated a genius like Brasidas to create a visionary discourse of honour.

The presence of a systemic cleavage between liberation and subjugation to Athens in the ancient Greek international system was important but insufficient on its own to effect change. To put it in IR terms, a system’s structure, following Jervis’ view, “includes the pattern of interests and alignment possibilities as well as the distribution of capabilities” (Jervis, 1997, p. 204). In other words, the systemic cleavage liberation/slavery could create a pattern of interests, could be appropriated, could lead to change of alignments. All these were possible and a source from which Brasidas draw inspiration and latent power. Yet, this was not enough for him and for the Acanthians to effect change.

Brasidas includes in his speech a series of meaningful rhetorical moves which cover crucial issues and give a powerful intimation of his character and reliability such as his respectful attitude. He refrains from emphasising power politics and he talks with the Acanthians as with equals. Both sides are serving a higher purpose; the liberation of Hellas. In a sense, both of them have no choice than to serve this purpose. The language of the Melian Dialogue, of amoral politics and of the Athenian celebration of their own power is absent here. This enables Brasidas to reliably support the honour based discourse of the liberation of the Greeks that he is advancing. Brasidas’ discourse is conciliatory and promotes the pan-
Hellenic anti-Athenian ideal tout court. Much of what he says serves this purpose. This is how he manages to translate the fear of the Acanthians into seduction. In order to seduce, he shows that he does not buy into a narrative of Spartan self-aggrandisement.

It is these various arguments combined that give force to his speech, make Brasidas appear exceptional and make his influence successful. One way of showing this is by being willing to take risks. He does not wish to take the city by storm or by betrayal and factional hatred which makes him vulnerable to the citizens’ decision. He shows empathy and a consistent care about all the things that all the Acanthians worry about. He promises to stand by moderation in domestic politics rather than sectarianism. He reassures everybody’s security against each other’s factions. This shows a spirit of impartiality (Hornblower, 1996, p. 87). He also promises security from any Athenian offensives. Moreover, he demonstrates not only that he can do that because he did that in a previous confrontation but that he represents the ‘wave of the future’ which will amass the power of the Greeks against Athens; hence, making his promises further reliable. He shows he is a winner and a man of action by saying that he took excessive risks passing through Thessaly which was a land that foreign armies could not cross easily without permission by the locals. Even this presentation of himself serves to show how credible his promises are and how determined he is. He both shows a glimpse of his character by showing his determination to stay the course and his willingness to take risks which is required to win battles. Every piece of the puzzle that Brasidas constructs enables the Acanthians to buy into the ideal of liberation from Athens with the help of Brasidas. Brasidas is being bound by the promise of liberation and is receiving the honour of being the leader in this worthy cause. This is the successful reframing of a fear based discourse into an honour based discourse.

Therefore, Brasidas presents himself not only as the liberator but as someone who is respectful (he does not talk amorally), impartial (guarantees the continuity of domestic politics as they are with no persecutions), honourable (made Sparta vow it will preserve the autonomy of those who will surrender), promising (he will not stop before helping Greeks be free again) and effective (guarantees security).
Part V: The Response to the Speech

The Acanthians listened carefully to what Brasidas had to say and offer and then deliberated in an exceptional way. Thucydides, with his famous terseness, describes the follow up to the speech as following: “Such was the extent of Brasidas’ speech. The Acanthians debated long, with much said on either side, and then took a secret vote. Influenced both by the seduction of Brasidas’ offer and by fear for their crop, they decided by a majority to secede from Athens. They made Brasidas pledge fidelity to the oaths sworn by the Spartan authorities when they sent him out, guaranteeing the autonomy of any people he brought over as allies, and with that pledge given they admitted his army. Not long afterwards Stagirus too, a colony of Andros, joined the revolt. These were the events of this summer” (4.88).

At that moment the Acanthians had taken the first decision to see Brasidas not as the spectre haunting them and Northern Greece but as the bringer of hope; a hope that had teeth, and was reasonable and determined. What the Acanthians saw unfolding before their eyes was more than someone who was promising to liberate them. He was someone who was brave and made himself vulnerable in order to succeed in the pursuit of their common cause. This demonstrated both respect towards the Acanthians and confidence in Brasidas’ goal and chances. Brasidas enters the city alone. Brasidas promises domestic peace. Brasidas pursues their consent, endorsement and support. Sending the democrats in exile or permitting their killing by the oligarchs would be the easy option that he eschews. Had he taken matters to his own hands and enforced his view securely by the use of force, he would not have exhibited self-restraint. Had the domestic peace broken down, his military success would have been jeopardised. Self-restraint leads to vulnerability but vulnerability does not lead to weakness. It leads to strength. Everything he is doing is consistent with his strategy of inciting revolutions across Northern Greece. He is willing to do so despite the associated risks.

These choices do not exist in a vacuum but are part and parcel of the ethics that Brasidas would need to demonstrate and the Acanthians must have been quick to appreciate because he presented a consistent narrative. A good narrative for Nye is a great source of soft power and the first rule of a good narrative is to “show, not tell” (Nye, 2008, p. 73). Brasidas showed ethical conviction and followed through on his goal of liberating Greeks. At the same time he did not shy away from the will to exercise force in order to demonstrate his ethical
responsibility to achieve this goal. The overall context though, was that of the general who cuts the chains of slavery. Brasidas would seem to be combining, a daunting task by itself, the two ethical virtues that Weber called the ethic of responsibility (an action is given meaning only as a cause of an effect) and the ethic of conviction (an action is chosen as long as it is related to ultimate values) (Weber, 1903-06 [1975], p. 192)\(^89\). Navigating a course of action that combined these two types of ethic required brilliant statesmanship. Brasidas’ actions and rhetoric indicate that he had come up with a pragmatic combination of these two ideal types of ethic. He showed himself to have approximated to being a first-rate diplomat and general.

The fact that the Acanthians appear to have been seduced shows that Brasidas’ ethical behaviour was appreciated as such rather than as propaganda or as convenient rhetoric. This seems genuine since, as we have seen, the Acanthians retained their domestic peace and, as we will see in the next section, Acanthus showed increasing commitment to Brasidas and so did other city-states.

The portrayal of expedience, which overrides ethics, as decisive in international relations is reductive and this is one more case in point taken from Thucydides’ history (Christ, 2012, p. 121). Brasidas presents an honour discourse based on the ‘philosophy of choice’. Wolfers maintains there is no philosophy of necessity but only a philosophy of choice. A philosophy of necessity entertains the view that external factors affect decision-makers. A philosophy of choice is “‘bound to be ethical’ since [c]hoice presupposes freedom to decide what goals to pursue and what means to use in accordance with one's desires and convictions” (Wolfers, cited in Ahrensford, 1997, p. 242). Brasidas appears to have made this choice and adjusted his goals and carried through with the appropriate ethical stance in both in his speech and in his subsequent actions. It was Brasidas’ ability to override the philosophy of necessity that signalled to the Acanthians that he was reliable enough.

Still, the Acanthians would have plenty of reasons to be afraid of Brasidas even from the perspective of an honour based discourse. Brasidas was faced with a difficult task – even an impossible one for another general. Honour based worlds are not necessarily a better

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89 For the analysis of these two types of ethics with regard to international relations and the foreign policies of the EU and the US, see Coker’s writings on the future of transatlantic relations (Coker, 2006, pp. 68-69; Coker, 2003, p. 62).
alternative. They have their own rules and complications and can be prone to revenge and violence. Brasidas avoids the pitfall of alarming the Acanthians to this by demonstrating self-restraint and respect towards all the citizens and all the factions of the city. He also does so by proclaiming to guarantee their security against any Athenian offensives.

The Acanthians would have probably debated the credibility of this commitment after he had finished his speech but Brasidas must have been cognizant enough of this. He had demarcated the basic parameters of the security guarantee Sparta offered. His willingness to secure the freedom of the Greeks and his readiness to take risks served to demonstrate this. He acted accordingly when he crossed the pro-Athenian region of Thessaly to reach Northern Greece and he was determined to continue down the road of his proclamations90. These additional arguments frame the overall theme of liberation and are compatible with Brasidas’ ethics which are both goal-oriented and success-oriented. The Acanthians saw that what gave strength to Brasidas was his ethics. His ethics empowered him and the Acanthians would not have failed to understand that it was highly likely that the rest of the Greeks would think similarly and follow him.

The Acanthians would not have missed Brasidas’ ambitious pragmatism. Brasidas became even more convincing when he argued that the Acanthians should believe him because it was in Sparta’s self-interest to liberate the Greeks and that he had committed the Spartan authorities to respect the autonomy of the liberated Greek city-states. Brasidas did not sound like a naïve idealist but as someone who finds a way to mediate between what he believes and what he needs. Spartan self-aggrandisement, just like Athens did with Melos or for honour based reasons as Cleon attempted in the Mytilenian debate, would endanger Brasidas’ strategy of seducing Acanthus and stimulating the momentum for more revolts from the Athenian Empire across the North of Greece.

In the Mytilenian Debate in 427 BC, three years earlier, the Athenian statesman and general Cleon had advanced the view that for reasons of honour and justice the Athenians must put to death all the Mytilenian men and enslave the women and children for revolting. In that case,

90 Thessaly was not an impossible obstacle but it was a significant one. As Hornblower argues, Brasidas was not entirely cut off from Sparta but, as Thucydides shows in a later passage, a less determined and committed general was not willing to cross Thessaly (Hornblower, 1996, pp. 269, 457; 5.13).
Diodotus was the moderate orator proposing a policy based on instrumental rationality rather than one in defence of the Empires’ honour and reputation à la Cleon (3.39; Wees, 2004).

What Brasidas had said mattered both for the present and the future because it set the standard based on which he would be evaluated by the citizens’ of Acanthus and other city-states as well as future scholars. As it seems, based on his own remarkable fame during his lifetime as well as after his death, he had retained a significant appeal. Brasidas’ Acanthus speech had provided the ‘blueprint’ of what he was expected to do next and what he would not do in the pursuit of the liberation of Hellas from Athens. This is the point of relating the speech and self-restraint. The speech and Brasidas actions as were known at the time had shown that Brasidas was sticking to his discourse. Sticking to a discourse or keeping to the script can be a source of self-binding, a source of trustworthiness and a reason for self-restraint (Jervis, 1999, pp. 55-57; Michaels, 2010; Crawford, 2002).

Brasidas accomplished all three but his legacy has been corrupted by his untimely death. This has enabled students of history and politics to raise various issues and concerns against Brasidas and the city-states that followed him. Like a great leader that had impact on people’s politics and hearts, he was bound to be challenged. We will now evaluate competing arguments regarding Brasidas’ legacy and the Acanthian decision to surrender and follow Brasidas. We will demonstrate that we can make a case to both reclaim Brasidas’ fame and justify the political rationality of the Acanthian people.

**Part VI: The Speech’s Legacy: Illusions and Realities**

**Part VIa) The Historical Record**

Brasidas started changing the political landscape in Northern Greece and had he been more successful and of course alive, it is possible that he would have continued to increase his influence. The Acanthians themselves, in utter defiance of Athens, have inscribed their loyalty to Brasidas for posterity by dedicating a treasury at Delphi: “Brasidas and the Acanthians (sc. dedicated this treasury) from (sc. the spoils of) the Athenians”. The specific reference to Brasidas by name (rather than just the name of the people of the city-state) in the dedicatory inscription, Currie highlights, “was an exceptional honour” (Currie, 2005). This
treasury is evidence of the extraordinary level of pre-eminence at a cult-level that select individuals could reach in ancient Greece. Brasidas was one of those rare personalities. Sears sees this dedication as a powerful Acanthian statement towards Athens presenting Brasidas publicly as the champion of their freedom against Athens (Sears, 2016). This is utter provocation. The Acanthians showed their solidarity with Brasidas by not hedging. Instead, they provoked. Moreover, one cannot miss the irony that Sears’ argument reveals. Brasidas’ honour was typical of ancient Greek tyrants but had eclipsed by that time. Its resurgence further emphasises the Acanthians’ view of Athens as a tyranny; the coercive democracy. Brasidas’ choice to keep the domestic peace and be the champion of the liberation of Acanthus and the Greeks appears to have acquired an increasing force in both military terms and in symbolism.

Acanthus was not the only city that treated Brasidas with astonishing veneration. Brasidas, by the time of the Acanthian inscription, was no stranger to special honours. Scione had already welcomed Brasidas, its liberator, as a victorious athlete. This honour may even have had religious overtones (4.120-121). After his victory and death from a lethal injury at the battle of Amphipolis, the city gave Brasidas a posthumous cult, among other honours, and even erected monuments in his name treating him as its founder (5.11; Sears, 2013, p. 219; Hornblower, 1996, pp. 449-456).

Brasidas’ fame, respect and profound admiration was matched by his military successes. Thucydides remarks that Stagirus joined the revolt but he strategically places this addition to the narrative in the same paragraph where he tells of the decision of the Acanthians to surrender. Kagan comments that Stagirus’ rebellion “established momentum for the Spartan cause” (Kagan, 2005, p. 173). Argilus declared its rebellion from Athens quite soon. Amphipolis, a major city, fell soon after. Immediately after the surrender of Amphipolis more city-states were to follow: Myrcinus, Galespus, Oesyne and most of the cities of the Acte peninsula. Among those cities Torone was another eminent city-state to surrender. Scione and Mende revolted too and showed their determination by doing so even after the truce signed between Athens and Sparta in 423 BC. Brasidas did not lose the opportunity and welcomed their decision.

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91 Keating and Ruzicka emphasise the importance of not hedging as a criterion in discerning trusting relationships (Keating & Ruzicka, 2014).
Brasidas’ decision to welcome the revolts after the signing of the truce indicates his more radical views in contrast to the official Spartan ones. Such decisions have fuelled the criticisms that Brasidas’ plans were rash, egotistical and unattainable. Thucydides remarks in 4.108 points out that the city-states that followed Brasidas overestimated the Spartan power and underestimated the Athenian power. Kagan makes the point that Brasidas wanted victory, not peace, contrary to the wishes of the Spartan regime (Kagan, 2005, p. 179). With Sparta not sending reinforcements to Brasidas, as he had asked, it would be too difficult for his plans to have any realistic prospects of success. Sparta had suffered having 292 Spartans in Athens as prisoners of war after the surrender in the island of Sphacteria and seems to have been willing to bid for peace rather than continue the war. Brasidas character was also unlikely for a Spartan. Not only did Thucydides present him as a good orator but he was also characterised for his boldness and rapid actions in contrast to the national character of Sparta as initially presented by Thucydides.

Brasidas’ determination and reliability to pursue the liberation of the Greeks have also been challenged. Brasidas has left the Chalcidice peninsula at a critical moment to support the Macedonian king, Perdiccas, only to leave his flanks exposed to the Athenians who, quite alarmed by his successes, were on their way to recapture their lost cities. Indeed, this was the reason why not only he did not capture Potidaea, a major Athenian naval base in Chalcidice, but in the meantime lost Mende to the Athenian general Nicias. Quite alarmingly, the Mendian democrats had refused to fight demonstrating how fragile the domestic peace that Brasidas had forged could be. Brasidas’ alliance with the king of Macedonia also crumbled as they quarrelled during the military campaign leading Perdiccas to then ally with Athens. To make things worse, Sparta sent an army to pass through Thessaly and reach Brasidas but eventually the army thought the effort too difficult and returned home. The only ones to make it to Brasidas were three generals who were of an opposing Spartan political faction that, unlike Brasidas, was bidding for peace. Two of these generals were also meant to become governors of Amphipolis and Torone only to discredit Brasidas’ proclamations to the local city-states for liberation and autonomy. With Sparta willing to sue for peace, Brasidas was in an unfavourable position to materialise his plans and despite all that he still welcomed the revolts of Scione and Mende after the truce between Athens and Sparta displaying, arguably, reckless behaviour.
By the summer of 422 BC, two years down the line of Brasidas’ campaign in Northern Greece, Cleon arrived in the scene to alter the course of events. The Athenians had lost patience with the Spartans that had not disavowed Brasidas and sent Cleon in the North to get the job done. Indeed, he did so up to a point. Cleon first captured Torone, the chief Spartan base in the area. He failed to capture Stagirus but he succeeded in storming Galespus. He subsequently managed to recover many other cities in the region. Diplomatically he reinforced his position by allying with the king of Macedonia, Perdiccas and the Thracian king of the Odomantians, Polles.

The final act for the two protagonists at the stage of Northern Greece was meant to be written outside Amphipolis. The battle of Amphipolis killed the two hawks of the Peloponnesian War. These two highly influential men who dominated the fourth book of Thucydides’ history met their destiny in this crucial battle. Cleon had the military superiority and was expecting military support from his allies, the king of Macedonia and the king of the Odomantians, and Brasidas had his strategic genius. The battle of Amphipolis that ensued exemplified once more Brasidas magisterial military abilities. Once more, he managed to turn the tide of events and win an unexpected victory against a cautious opponent. Moreover, not only did he win but the victory was overwhelming with about 600 Athenians dead and merely seven Spartan casualties. However, among these casualties were both generals: Brasidas and Cleon.

With Brasidas dead, an exceptional general, a bewildering opponent, an ambitious personality, an enticing orator and a war-hardened Spartan soldier not afraid of the continuation of war for victory, probably aware of his role in history and unique among his compatriots in many respects, the time for his reassessment has now arrived.

**Part VIb) Brasidas Redux: Nemesis of Pride or Tragic Heroism?**

Brasidas’ fame, effectiveness, and potential alongside the reasonableness of the city-states that followed him have suffered a blow in recent decades. A restricted sense of time, an often unacknowledged adherence to the criterion of success based on historical success and a devaluation of the complexity of both his character and the military situation in Northern Greece have enabled this approach. In light of the emphasis we place on emotions and
reputation and the processual view of history, we offer a reassessment of Brasidas’ actions and the Acanthians’ choices.

One way to make this distinction is between seeing Brasidas as the victim of Nemesis or tragedy. Nemesis is the goddess of divine retribution for those individuals that have exemplified excessive pride. Certainly Brasidas was ambitious and successful. However, we would argue that he is a rather tragic figure; a courageous general that confronted his destiny face to face and did not back down. It is only suiting that death for such a personality came amidst battle. The face of battle was what made Brasidas who he is but Brasidas was more than that. Brasidas is remembered as a general, as a politician and as an orator. He commanded armies. He projected the political plan of the liberation of Northern Greece. He stirred high passions among the city-states he seduced with his oratory. Brasidas was close to being the “true human being capable of having a ‘vocation for politics’, as Weber would put it, combining a will for the virtuous and a skill for success (Weber, 1994, p. 368). Consequentialism and deontology were combined in this unique individual and how could it be otherwise. He had embodied Clausewitz’s trinity: the pathos of the people that he streamlined, the chance of the general that he mastered, and the reason of the politician that he put forward. His death was a death of tragic proportions.

The basic criticisms we will confront are three. Brasidas’ strategy was the only reasonable choice; Brasidas was a liar; Brasidas could not sustain success. What is strange though is that, despite all the aforementioned reversal of fate, Brasidas remained famous even after his death. Thucydides seems to criticise Brasidas but at the same time he provides an extensive analysis of his character. This characterology unlike, the description of Cleon, is largely positive. It is Thucydides’ emphasis on character that is the elephant in the room and not Brasidas’ failures. As Hornblower puts it, “[t]here is nothing like this successful centrality of one individual anywhere else in Thucydides” (Hornblower, 1996, p. 43). Brasidas untimely death is crucial because, we would argue, he had the potential to change the course of events both due to his character and the complexity of events at that time. In this sense, Brasidas was not a victim of overstretched ambitions, a victim of Nemesis, but a tragic hero. Had he lived, he would have continued, arguably, being a hero.

Brasidas is judged rather unfairly because he died. The ancient Greeks used to compare him with Achilles. Judging someone invariably by his success is an inadequate criterion.
Bosworth claims that “the fine promises of Brasidas had brought utter ruin in two short years” (Bosworth, 1993, p. 37). As true as this may be, it only came about after Brasidas’ death and the Spartan abandonment of pursuing a sphere of influence in Northern Greece (Hornblower, 1996, p. 481).

The historiographical emphasis on judging success by success is often coupled by the scientist’s concern for the shadow of the future. Focusing on success forces us to focus only on what happened in history and not on what could have happened. The crucial thing is not just whether one event would have finished in one way or another –such as Brasidas’ death– but the repercussions of this event for the future. Focusing on what did take place is like focusing on the future from only one perspective. However, the future always remains unfathomable because we ignore what could have taken place in the historical future had the historical past been different. The same is true when trying to discern the future from the vantage point of the present. Therefore, judging success by success is like posing the problematique of the shadow of the future in different terms.

Leaders are uncertain about future intentions of other leaders and, as Copeland summarises the realist position, “[i]t is this uncertainty that states have about the present and especially the future intentions of others that makes the levels and trends of relative power such critical causal variables for realists” (Copeland, 2003 , p. 434). This is an appraisal of versions of neorealism based on the problem of future intentions. Copeland rightly stresses that “[s]tate uncertainty about both present and future intentions underpins the realist concept of the security dilemma” (Copeland, 2003 , p. 434). He quibbles with Glaser about the importance of the uncertainty of future intentions. Glaser argues from a rational point of view that uncertainty does not predispose states to act competitively but his view, as he admits, is static (Glaser, 2010). The malleability of the future is critical in offensive realism’s view of the world through the lens of the worst-case assumption. However, this is both its source of strength and weakness (Copeland, 2011, p. 446; Jervis, 1999; Snyder & Lieber, 2008). Copeland is rightly critical of Glaser’s problematic rational standpoint that relegates any behaviour that does not conform with the theory to the ‘hell’ of irrationality rather than acknowledging alternative views of rationality actors may have. Copeland proposes a dynamic theory of systemic realism suggesting the future character of an actor to be included in such an alternative rationalist theory.
The problem with this realist position is that it, once more, like defensive realists do, relies on a hidden constructivist variable about what type an actor is (Katzenstein & Sil, 2008). Neorealism’s materialism and rationalism ignores emotions and the difference they can make in history and in this sense both Glaser and Copeland see reality more static than it, arguably, is.

The problem of the future intentions is one that cannot be addressed in the abstract but only contextually and relationally. Keating and Ruzicka argue that the existence of trusting relationships can be recognised but demands “an observation of long-term ideational as well as material processes” (Keating & Ruzicka, 2014, p. 770). Trust makes the difference about relationships but talking about trust in the abstract would be one more way to recycle the form of the old argument between absolute and relative gains. It makes more sense to talk about the trustworthiness of an actor in relation to another actor on certain issues (O'Neill, 2002). This is why raising the issue of relationships is crucial and with this we return back to Brasidas’ impact and potential.

Brasidas was trying to create a relationship between the city-states of Northern Greece and Sparta as their liberator. Spartan influence under Brasidas’ command in the North had surged immensely. Even after his death, Thucydides remarks, perhaps ironically, that people thought that Spartans were like Brasidas (4.81).

Thucydides himself leaves open the possibility of what would have happened in the future had Brasidas been alive. He mentions early on in the narrative that Brasidas’ successes gave “the Spartans the ability to bargain at will (as they subsequently did) in any mutual return and recovery of places won or lost, and to reduce the pressure of war on the Peloponnese” (4.81). The sentence into brackets creates certain ambivalence. Thucydides admits he could not have known what the Spartans wanted at the time or what would have happened had Brasidas not been killed in Amphipolis.

In short, an emphasis on judging success and intentions based on successful outcomes has three effects. First of all, it parallels the realist argument that because we cannot discern future intentions any evidence of future change of mind-set confirms this dictum rather than a change in circumstances like the consequence of Brasidas’ death. Secondly, it dismisses inconclusive efforts to construct international relationships, like Brasidas did, by
presupposing that their failure was not the outcome of contingencies but predetermined. Thirdly, it leads one to interpret intentions of the past according to the success of outcomes. In other words, Brasidas’ death and the Spartan policy away from Brasidas’ strategy is seen to mean that Brasidas was either a hypocrite or that Sparta would have never supported his campaign any more. The issue is not about counterfactuals and what could have happened but about interpreting actions and contextualising their meaning and the first concept to suffer from such a viewpoint is the idea of inter-state relationships.

What Thucydides often emphasises and Brasidas exemplifies is the effort to build and construct inter-city-state relationships. The creation of relationships is what can change regional international anarchy into hierarchy and this is what Brasidas does masterfully with his army and oratory. It is within this context that we can appreciate the importance of Brasidas’ power and ethics as well as purported trustworthiness. Brasidas is attractive and manages to seduce his audiences and create loyal followers.

Thucydides, as his narrative progresses, puts behind him the abstract ideas of the beginning of the first book about truest causes and gradually focuses more on the development of relationships and characters such as Brasidas (Westlake, 1968; Hornblower, 2010; Ober, 2001). Rather than imposing the ideology of power or a deterministic view of history on his work, Thucydides focuses on “the details of particular events and the development of specific relationships” (Morley, 2012). Rather than focusing on the ‘omnipotent’ realist narrow self-interest, Thucydides presented a more complex and fluid reality. One of our preeminent contemporary strategists, Lawrence Freedman, remarks that in Thucydides’ history “political leaders were addressing a range of actors… realizing that new combinations could create new forms of advantage and disadvantage” (Freedman, 2013, p. 31). Such a factor was the creation of a new relationship that Brasidas attempted with the Northern Greeks. The point though is that these relationships were possible because national characters and identities were not fixed -actor types as realists would put it- but fluid. In fact, one way to view the Peloponnesian War is as a clash of efforts for collective identification (Jansson, 1997). Brasidas certainly did that by inciting revolts in Chalcidice and seducing the citizens to the point of glorifying him as a hero.

The emphasis on characters, turning-points and relationships gives us licence to see history as open-ended. Not only, as Hornblower makes the point, Thucydides presents Brasidas as a
hero for both historical and literary reasons but also because it provides an opportunity to contrast between two different views of history and of his history of the Peloponnesian War (Hornblower, 1996, p. 39). For Hornblower, Thucydides’ Brasidas is described in epic terms and this gave the ancient historian the opportunity to unfold his talent in writing in this style. On the other hand, Thucydides’ emphasis on Brasidas’ fame, the inconclusiveness of his political and military project and Thucydides’ contrasting opinions in 4.81 and in 1.108 permit us to see Brasidas as the man who did not do the job because he did not have time.

Just like we do not know the outcome of a relationship until the end, so we do not know the outcome of history until we reach its end. The study of relationships requires this understanding. It is compatible with a heuristic understanding of theory and the emphasis on turning points and characters and how they affect historical processes to the extent that they affect relationships. Thucydides does not close possibilities for change but explores them. This makes him, as Peter Handke, the Austrian novelist, portrays him, a ‘peace-promoting’ writer (Morley, 2012).

This is the difference between realism’s prescriptive and descriptive dimensions. Realism’s static description of reality transforms its description into prescription. Thucydides’ emphasis on historical contingencies and the impact of ethics in changing a fear based discourse into an honour based discourse as Brasidas does makes a different case. It is the quintessential point behind the idea of heuristics and eclecticism. Cynicism neglects meaningful relationships. Emotions reject pure rationality and emphasise the possibility of constructing hierarchical or trusting relationships.

This emphasis on ethics and morality in Thucydides is often contrasted with Thucydides the author of realpolitik. However, Thucydides the historian who highlights the potential for constructing relationships is the writer who focuses on processes. Therefore, there is another way of seeing this contrast in Thucydides as that between a static and a processual view of history in which emotions and discourse play a role in creating hierarchical or trusting relationships and augmenting one’s power through alliances due to a non-purely realist logic.

This aspect of reality has a social logic. This is reflected on Brasidas’ attempts to make his audiences entrust him with their liberation and with his efforts to become their hero, their champion, their leader. The Princeton scholar Ober makes a similar point about the whole of
Thucydides oeuvre when he concludes that the Athenian scholar forces us to study the world of social relations and politics and the word of speech and reception in order to explain the course of history (Ober, 2001, p. 299). As Hobson and Sharman argue, hierarchies pertain to a social logic -even though non-exclusively (Hobson & Sharman, 2005). Brasidas’ story exemplifies the correlation between the social and material logic. His attractiveness became seduction, his seduction lead to increased followers and that lead to the increase of his power. All that started with Brasidas’ army outside the gates of Acanthus and a threat. However, it is hardly imaginable that only this would have allowed him to achieve the degree of fame, loyalty and veneration. The emotional appeal, oratorical skills and implementation of his political project that are associated with him are of utmost importance too. Thucydides, the terse historian has spent a lot of chapters on these issues to be irrelevant or of secondary importance. It was within the purview of a social logic that Brasidas managed to achieve greatness and win the loyalty of the city-states that followed him. As the German sociologist Niklas Luhman has put it, “whoever wants to win trust must take part in social life and be in a position to build the expectations of others into his own self-identification” (cited in Hosking, 2012, p. 22). Brasidas projected an honourable character and the people he liberated did identify with him and did worship him. It is a pity that Brasidas’ effort was cut short by his untimely death before we could see what else he could have achieved.

Three important issues remain to be addressed regarding Brasidas’ legacy and whether the Acanthians had a good reason to be seduced or if it was all propaganda. We will address each issue separately in the following four sub-sections. The first regards the issue of Brasidas’ strategic choices, the second refers to the importance of changing discourse rather than just the agenda, the third one discusses the accusation regarding Brasidas’ honesty and the fourth one concludes with the criticism that Brasidas was imprudent and, hence, bound to have his project punished by Nemesis.

**Part VIb) Brasidas’ Choices**

Burns claims that Sparta sent Brasidas to wage a war of liberation on his own not before the war effort had taken a dramatic turn making Brasidas’ goal appear as a desperate Spartan effort to turn the tide (Burns, 2011, p. 513). Such an argument interprets Brasidas’ actions as a necessity and renders his actions devoid of much of their agency. In other words, Brasidas
was predetermined to act largely as he had acted because it was necessary. The fact that something may have been required does not make it necessary. In fact, this viewpoint which is compatible with the propaganda criticism of Brasidas -he tricked them because he had to-is problematic. It ignores that Thucydides does not express such a clear-cut view and that other generals could have acted unlike Brasidas because they might have had a different understanding of strategy, tactics and politics.

Early in the Peloponnesian war, in 427 BC, when the Spartans had sent general Alcidas to support the Mytilenean revolt, he faced similar circumstances but chose to act unlike Brasidas. He sailed slowly towards Mytilene to the point that the Athenians managed to induce its surrendering in the meantime. Teutiaplus, a man from Elis, suggested a surprise attack against the Athenians in Mytilene then, that they were least likely to expect it. Alcidas did not act upon this proposal. People from the Ionian cities at the eastern coast of the Aegean Sea urged him to capture one city and use it as a base to instigate revolts across the coastline. They also added that “there was also reason to think that Pissouthnes”, the Persian Satrap, “could be persuaded to join their side” but he dismissed this suggestion too (3.31). Alcidas avoided taking risks. Alcidas did not take advantage of the momentary opportunity in Mytilene. Alcidas did not consider the chance to ride the wave of the liberation of Greece and create an anti-Athenian momentum in Ionia. Alcidas did not consider the possibility of using an alliance with a local Satrape to unsettle the Athenian rule. If the last option may have been incompatible with the Spartan cause for the liberation of Greece, all the rest was. Alcidas not only exemplified the opposite understanding of strategy than Brasidas but he also tactically created a strategic blunder by slaughtering all the men from cities under Athenian rule and creating a bad reputation for Sparta. In fact, as a deputation from Samos told him “if he carried on like this, he would turn few enemies into friends and many more friends into enemies” (3.32).

The way of pursuing the war and the capturing of city-states, therefore, was pretty much an unsettled matter. What Alcidas did is what Brasidas chose not to do. In addition, Thucydides does not state that Sparta waged a war of liberation but a war in support of the Athenian allies’ secession. More specifically, he notes, “the Spartans thought that the best way of distracting them was to retaliate by sending troops to their disaffected allies, especially as the allies were inviting Spartan support with a view to secession” (4.80). There is no evidence of such an unavoidable commitment to their liberation as Burns makes it look like.
Whether Sparta had committed to the disaffected Athenian allies’ liberation is open to debate but there are reasons to believe that to the extent that this may have been so, it was not for the reasons Burns gives. Burns suggests that it was the circumstances that forced Sparta to take this decision. Hornblower, on the other hand, argues convincingly that the Spartans under the influence of Brasidas committed to such a policy with vows with which he bound the local authorities (Hornblower, 1996, p. 50). These are the vows Brasidas mentioned in the speech to Acanthus. This attests to Brasidas’ agency rather than the view that his strategy was somehow predestined. To put it differently, Brasidas could have pursued the war by taking cities through treason and dividing their population in order to rule them based on loyal cooperative elites or slaughter those who resisted like Alcidas had done and use a self-aggrandising rhetoric like the one the Athenians would later use in Melos. Nevertheless, he chose not do so.

Another issue that points towards the direction of Brasidas’ agency is that he had been able to avoid seemingly tactical mistakes with grave strategic repercussions. Brasidas had the abilities of a politician, an orator and a general and he was attuned to his audiences’ sensitivities and the demands of the cause he was supporting. Another general could have committed tactical mistakes that could prove to be strategic blunders. The events in Mende under the command of Polydamidas come easily to mind. Brasidas was campaigning with the king of Macedonia for the second time against king Arrhabaeus in Lyncus. Brasidas was aware that the Athenians would sooner or later arrive and left officer Polydamidas in charge of the city of Mende. One simple political error cost Polydamidas the city. When a Mendian democrat shouted that “he was not going out and had no cause to make war… Polydamidas grabbed him by the arm and pulled him about” (4.130). As a result of this, “the democrats immediately took up their weapons and turned in fury on the Peloponnesians and the opposite party in league with them” (4.130). Brasidas due to his character as well as his political and strategic perspicacity is unlikely to have acted like this.

Brasidas rather than being bestowed his strategy of choice; he created it thanks to his strategic astuteness and emotional intelligence (EI). Brasidas’ attractiveness became seduction because he managed to successfully commit the Acanthians to change their discourse of fear to one of honour and liberation. This is not just a sort of agenda setting and agenda framing that a view of seduction à la soft power emphasises (Nye, 2011, p. 21). It
goes beyond this in the sense that it affects the principles and logic of the relationship between the actors – in this case between Brasidas and Acanthus. From enemies they became close allies. Brasidas’ plan required good emotional intelligence on his part and it was this rather than some purported predestination that made him successful.

In “The Powers to Lead” Nye argues that leadership, the kind of which Brasidas embodied, requires emotional discipline (Nye, 2008, p. 71). Such a discipline permits one to empathise with the other’s concerns, show self-restraint and be able to do so in the long-term. Emotions are part of a psychological dimension of reality but seeing them as important as reason and as conducive to both negative and positive results is distinct. Prudent foreign policy depends on them. Even though classical realists talk of prudence their prudence does not emphasise psychology, as Leng argues; hence, not even EI (Leng, 1993, p. 190). Leng considers the combination of “realist and psychological considerations in crisis bargaining” as crucial for the effectiveness of some strategies (Leng, 1993, p. 190). To this we should add EI. White’s realistic empathy approach to conflict and negotiation makes a step in this direction (White, 1991; White, 1986). Research based on case studies shows that empathic emotions appear to be activated by perspective taking “and mediate its effect on conflict behavior” (Betancourt, 2004). In fact, as Crawford argues, empathy is a potential antidote to fear (Crawford, 2014).

An emphasis on EI goes beyond a mere combinatorial approach on the connection between realism and psychology. Accepting the idea of EI implies the endorsement of a hybrid view of rationality and emotions in politics. This hybrid view of reason/emotions necessitates drawing connections between emotions and non-realist concepts such as change in discourse.

The point of mentioning emotional intelligence is that it calibrated Brasidas’ choices and ability to induce discourse change and appear seductive. For Freedman a higher degree of EI is linked to increased cooperation whereas those with a ‘Machiavellian’ intelligence are so naturally manipulative that are “apparently incapable of dealing with other people on any other basis” (Freedman, 2013, p. 599).

It is unfair to claim that Brasidas’ politics and strategy were largely predetermined. A good strategy puts the available means in good use to achieve the ends one wills. EI is one of the means Brasidas had at his disposal and influenced his ability to follow his strategy and give it a long-term dimension. His ability to adjust the speech he delivered in Acanthus to the
peculiarities of the other cities and his ability to successfully keep the domestic peace by inspiring city-states to follow him united and not split between opposing political factions serves to show the close connection between attentiveness to audiences 92 and upholding the domestic peace. Hornblower compares Brasidas’ speech or his “periodically adjusted manifesto” with that of a modern politician that adjusts his “blueprint” speech from one city to another (Hornblower, 1996, p. 49). Despite the contemporary negative connotations regarding such an activity by a politician, it further demonstrates Brasidas’ ability to forge a strategy sensitive towards audience effects 93.

If Brasidas’ strategy was indeed influenced by sensitivity to audience effects, then this should be reflected on his record. In the following subsection we argue that his reputation makes the case that he rose up to his proclamations up to a point. Therefore, we can perceive the Acanthians’ decision to follow him as reasonable; hence, disentangling seduction from mere propaganda and retaining the dual logic of surrendering -seduction and threat- that Thucydides attributed to the Acanthians.

Part VIbii) Brasidas the Hypocrite: Lies and Imperialism?

There is a passage in Thucydides that is critical of both Brasidas and the city-states that followed him based on vague hope and for overestimating Spartan power and underestimating Athenian power (4.108). This forms the basis of the criticisms launched at Brasidas. His failures to defend all the city-states he liberated and the tragic end of the city of Scione are seen as a rather bleak legacy. They are starkly contrasted with what Bosworth calls the ‘humanitarian aspect’ of the Athenian attitude in Melos (Bosworth, 1993). Moreover, Brasidas’ ambitions are at times interpreted as the pursuit of personal imperialism or of Spartan imperialism. He is also seen as a loner who acts against the wills of Sparta only to bring peril to the cities he liberated. The evidence is rather inconclusive and the fact that Brasidas died rather soon, does not help either. However, there are ample elements in Thucydides’ narrative that support the claim that these attacks are overstated. The attribution of imperialist motives to Brasidas is quite premature and unsafe. Sparta’s attitude towards

92 Debnar has written an excellent study of speeches and audiences in Thucydides’ Spartan debates (Debnar, 2001).
93 Burns, even though critical of Brasidas, makes a similar point contra Rood (Burns, 2011, p. 510; Rood, 1998, p. 70).
Brasidas is better described as tendentious instead of consistent. Brasidas seems to be unable to avoid his critics’ criticisms since he is being accused of both for being reckless and for shying away from helping the city-states he had liberated when the military odds were unfavourable to him.

A first point of departure our assessment of Brasidas’ genuineness is to examine why Thucydides presents Brasidas under a negative light in chapter 4.108 but under a rather positive light in chapter 4.81. In 4.108 Thucydides seems to be suggesting that Brasidas lied to Acanthus and the other city-states he seduced and that they believed in unreasonable hope. In short his words were empty promises and propaganda and Brasidas was a plausible liar (4.108; Hornblower, 1996, p. 56). However, earlier in the fourth book Thucydides praises Brasidas for being a man of rapid action who impressed the cities with his reasonable and moderate approach showing honourable conduct and intelligence (4.81). Brunt refers to this as Brasidas’ eulogy and Hornblower as Brasidas’ aristeia (excellence) (Brunt, 1965, p. 276; Hornblower, 1996, pp. 38-61). Hornblower sides with the view that despite what Thucydides writes in 4.81, what he writes in 4.108 is bluntly unfavourable and we do not need to assume any contradiction between the two passages or incomplete revisions. It is possible that Thucydides presents Brasidas in 4.81 in a certain way as the starting point of the narrative and then differently in 4.108 because, presumably we will now have the chance to evaluate him. Andrewes, on the other hand, believes that the narrative after the Spartan failure in Pylos disintegrates and that the two chapters are “not fully co-ordinated” and that this is an indication of incompleteness (cited in Hornblower, 1996, pp. 16, 121).

However, another way to understand this contradiction is to just see it as such; a contradiction on purpose. It is reasonable to expect Thucydides to have done so as a narrative technique. Bosworth in the “The Humanitarian Aspect of the Melian Dialogue” takes another view. He draws our attention to the comparison between Melos and the cities of Northern Greece and particularly of Scione that was devastated. Naïve hope led the Melians to resist. Naïve hope led the Northerners to revolt. Thucydides though is famous for incorporating paradoxes in his work and one of these is that between reason and unreason or ‘logos’ and ‘paralogos’ (Pothou, 2011; Coker, 2010a, pp. 63-76, 257; Lebow, 2001b, p. 557; Monoson & Loriaux, 1998). Thucydides does not presuppose a pre-critical idea of reason and this allows his readers to make up their own minds even when his authorial ‘voice’ makes a short appearance. Instead, he emphasises the contingency of reality and the interconnections
between rationality and irrationality (Pothou, 2011, p. 277). This represents one of his work’s advantages.

History is not neat and what Thucydides is writing is history and contradictions and paradoxes have a place there. Realists are prone to argue that statesmen should not be held to the same moral standards as individuals. According to Monoson and Loriaux though, it is reasonable to suggest that Thucydides’ work makes the point that when the norms of moral conduct are disrupted that states and individuals find it next to impossible to chart a prudent course of action (Monoson & Loriaux, 1998). Whatever Thucydides’ view on the matter may have been, we have no reason to choose for him. It simply does not matter. What matters is that from a heuristic vantage point it makes sense to say that both logics are part of reality. If Thucydides’ history is indeed a tragedy in prose or, at least, if Hermocrates rather than Pericles is the ideal prudential leader, then Thucydides has definitely made this point (Coker, 2010a, pp. 63-76; Monoson & Loriaux, 1998, pp. 294-295). If Thucydides’ oeuvre shows that when people miscalculate, they suffer, then he has also made this point, as Bosworth has demonstrated (Bosworth, 1993). It is incisive thought to approach the word ‘miscalculated’ with caution because we know when someone has miscalculated only after the fact and never in advance.

Given that we do not know in advance the outcome of future events, then we can only speculate about them. As we will argue in the final subsection, there was reason for both Brasidas and the Acanthians to be hopeful. Suffice to say now that for both of them to have had been justifiably hopeful, one should presuppose the importance of chance events and opinion in history and this is definitely something we have seen in Thucydides’ narrative. The incorporation of speeches in his narrative demonstrates the ambiguous dimension of decisions and outcomes such as the decision over the punishment of the Mytileneans who were saved by the skin of their teeth due to a last minute second vote over the same matter by the Athenians.

The incorporation of speeches in the narrative demonstrates the importance of opinion in Thucydides par excellence. A case in point is exactly the history of the Acanthians and

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94 This interpretation of Thucydides has been challenged but Hornblower provides further support for this case. In his third tome of his monumental Commentary on Thucydides, he discusses epigraphical problems and suggests that Thucydides suppressed evidence with the intent to “present a bleak and dramatic as possible picture of the cool reception given to the Athenian fleet in 415” (Hornblower, 2008, p. 416).
Brasidas. When Thucydides in 4.81 and in other chapters keeps emphasising the impression that Brasidas’ name was eliciting to people at the time and even to people after his death, Thucydides is not just making pointless remarks. This is the point. Even Hornblower supposes that the point is that because Brasidas’ “perceived justice and moderation were what gave rise to pro-Spartan factions” (Hornblower, 1996, p. 270). This is the point because this is how Brasidas was accumulating power. He was creating momentum based on close relationships with his allies. ‘Thucydides Histor’, as Ober labels this aspect of Thucydides, emphasises the importance of social relations in the unfolding of history (Ober, 2001, p. 299). The point is consequential and Hume even made it into a principle of government: “It is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular” (Hume, 1987, p. 32).

In short, Thucydides’ emphasis on contingencies, chance factors and the impetus that the audiences’ opinion, that is, the citizens’, can generate prevent us, when combined with the open-ended meaning of history, from adjudicating over what Thucydides really meant. Perhaps this was a point he wanted to make. In other words, Thucydides does not aim to provide certain descriptions of events as “normative descriptions of the universal nature of human society or inter-state relations” (Morley, 2012, p. 44). The fact that he offers such aphorisms can very well serve as rules of thumbs and heuristic devices. The fact that he is ambiguous regarding Brasidas and offers him high praise should force us to see reason in reality and not cast reality according to abstract reason’s edicts (or one’s theory of choice). Had Brasidas died later and received Spartan reinforcements he may have succeeded in many more of his goals.

Brasidas never received reinforcements from Sparta though, and this is one of the criticisms against him for being a liar and consciously generating misguided expectations to the Acanthians as well as the other city-states. Burns reproaches Brasidas for lacking the strength to curtail his ambitions despite his knowledge of Sparta’s reservations and Thucydides informs us of Sparta’s lack of support of Brasidas’ military plans as well as jealousy towards him and a preference for peace-making (Burns, 2011, p. 518). More specifically, in chapter 4.108 we find out that when Brasidas asked for reinforcements, Spartans did not support his request. Similarly, in 4.132 we learn that the Lacedaemon Ischagoras was about to bring an army overland to reinforce Brasidas but found it too difficult to cross Thessaly and did not
even try to do so. In 5.12 we become aware of another Spartan general, Rhamphias, who fails to support Brasidas’ plans once he hears news of the general’s death. Three times Brasidas did not get his reinforcements and two times Sparta attempted.

Hornblower though excuses Brasidas and is convincing when he claims that the “realities of Spartan decision-making are arcane to us”; thus, suggesting that “the best approaches are those which allow for tensions and indecision” (Hornblower, 1996, p. 53). We cannot presume that the Spartan position would have been the same, had Brasidas been alive and successful. Kagan opines that had Brasidas “lived, the war in the north would have continued, and his death was a serious set-back for those who wanted to fight on to victory” (Kagan, 2005, p. 187). In fact, Hornblower highlights that “the Spartans were happy to take their cue from Brasidas when territorial gains were in question” (Hornblower, 1996, pp. 53-53). This is not to reveal cynicism on their part. Actually, some tension in their decisions is really apparent and probably what Brasidas aimed at exploiting. When Rhamphias abandons the effort to support Brasidas, he does so not because he did not want to but because he deemed the plans impractical without Brasidas alive (5.12). Undoubtedly though, as Gomme remarks, an element of a lack of determination still remains (Gomme, 1956, p. 657; Westlake, 1980, p. 336). Earlier on, in Scione, the Spartans were happy to listen to Brasidas and include this city-state in their sphere of influence despite the fact that it had revolted after the signing of the truce between Athens and Sparta that prevented the acknowledgment of revolts after the signing of the truce. Another case in point showing congruence between Sparta and Brasidas is the oaths with which he has bound the Spartan authorities in order to respect the autonomy of the Greeks he liberates and which he mentioned in the speech in Acanthus and Thucydides later confirms with his narrative (Hornblower, 1996).

Therefore, we have reasons to believe that Thucydides had not condemned Brasidas as a liar - a plausible liar as Hornblower puts it (Hornblower, 1996, p. 56). Moreover, Thucydides’ remarks on important personalities of his History are indeed at times open to multiple interpretations. A case in point is Thucydides’ positive assessment of Nicias after the destruction of the whole Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily under his command that nearly brought Athens to its knees. This Hornblower calls deliberate ambiguity (Hornblower, 2010). The fact that Thucydides is critical of Brasidas becomes crucial only in light of the outcome of Brasidas’ attempts which unravelled after his death and the repercussions for his allies such as Scione. Thucydides though seems to accept Brasidas’ moderation as a genuine
trait of his character (Hornblower, 1996, p. 56). We need to take this seriously because it seems plausible. Brasidas or a subordinate officer close to him seems to have been among the informants from whom Thucydides derived material for his History (Westlake, 1980).

Brasidas is further accused of being deceptive and a liar with regards to his misrepresentation of his military record to the Acanthians, and his failure to protect Mende and Scione from the Athenian counter-offensive (Burns, 2011, p. 520). These accusations are overdrawn because they try to impose an impossible standard on Brasidas. On one hand Burns accuses Brasidas of being a self-conscious hypocrite for pursuing a plan against Sparta’s wishes and on the other hand protests that he acted like a hypocrite by not abiding to his plan (Burns, 2011, pp. 519-520). It is hard to see Brasidas under any good light from such a negative criticism which goes far beyond whatever Thucydides may have had intended.

When Brasidas mentions to the Acanthians that the Athenians did not confront his army in Megara this is certainly a deception. The army he had at Megara was larger and he conceals the fact that he also chose not to engage in battle with the Athenians. His strategy though deserves merit for successfully frustrating the Athenian attack. The fact of his deception is a thorny issue. However, we need to bear in mind that Brasidas was implementing a high-risk plan that required a degree of coherence, consent and determination on the part of his allies in order to work. He knew from his fettle-hardened experience that a good general can use a little deception to win a war. Brasidas knew how to take advantage of enemy mistakes in war. He explicitly makes the point before the battle of Amphipolis to his soldiers in the last speech of his life (5.9). He was peddling his story to the Acanthians with the self-assurance not of the charlatan but of the confident general who knows how to win battles even with inferior numbers due to his superior strategies; and he did exactly so in Amphipolis only to be stopped by death.

With regards to his inability to protect Mende Bosworth offers a scathing critique attributing the pursuit of glory to Brasidas for joining in the king of Macedonia in an expansionist campaign of the latter (Bosworth, 1993, p. 37; Hornblower, 1996, p. 52). However, Kagan’s view seems rather plausible. Kagan makes the point that since the king of Macedonia was providing one third of Brasidas’ army’s supplies, Brasidas had actually no real choice but to go in his support (Kagan, 2005, p. 179). Moreover, Thucydides points out that Brasidas did
not want to continue the fight after a certain point and that he wanted to return back to Mende as soon as possible because he was expecting the Athenian attack (4.124).

With regards to Mende and Scione Bosworth claims that Brasidas abandoned them to their fate but the record is mixed (Bosworth, 1993, p. 37). Thucydides himself tells us that Brasidas wanted but could not save Mende at the time because he reckoned it was impossible to cross over to Pallene, the westernmost of the three peninsulas of Chalcidice, and take over Potidaea that was under Athenian control and was laying between Brasidas on one side and Mende and Scione on the other side (4.129). Again we need to bear in mind the contingency of the events. Had Polydamidas, the Spartan general in charge of the Mendian defense, not acted brutally towards that Mendian democrat and retained the peace among his ranks Brasidas might have been able to intervene. To make matters worse, Spartan reinforcements had never arrived to support Brasidas and after Brasidas’ ties with the king of Macedonia were severed, it must have been critical for the whole campaign that Brasidas was prepared for what the probable renewed alliance of Perdiccas, the king of Macedonia, with Athens would bring. Moreover, Brasidas did try to take over Potidaea later but he was foiled (4.135).

Lastly, Brasidas is also being compared with an imperialist or a wannabe king. As much interest as such speculations may incite, they remain speculative in nature and we cannot adjudicate between claims of what Brasidas would have done had he not died so soon and had Sparta supported him more. When the Spartan Ischagoras brings young Spartans to become governors of the cities that Brasidas liberated we cannot miss the irony with regards to the proclamation of the liberation of the Greeks. When Brasidas handpicks Clearidas to be governor of Amphipolis and Pasitelidas to be governor of Torone we cannot assume that this was Brasidas’ independent choice. The fact that Clearidas continues Brasidas’ legacy of un-Spartan independence of thought shows that they were men of Brasidas’ influence (Westlake, 1980, pp. 337-338; Cartledge, 1987, p. 92). Choosing though does not mean he would have chosen to do so independently. Brasidas had no reason to severe his ties with Sparta and reject a direct order. This would have been self-defeating. Westlake also highlights that Thucydides’ brief reference to the purpose of Ischagoras’ commission “may well reflect Brasidas’ resentment at the curtailment of his freedom to develop his own plans” (Westlake, 1980, p. 334). Even though these appointments bring to memory the post-Peloponnesian-War imperial Spartan system of appointing harmosts (governors), this remark only gives license to Andrewes to relate it with a tendency in the Spartan political system for imperialism but
nothing more (Andrewes, 1978; Hornblower, 1996, p. 409; Debnar, 2001). Judging Brasidas’ motives from this conjecture can only be seen as an insecure assumption.

Part Viii Brasidas the Imprudent General?

There is a lingering sense of criticism in Thucydides that creates an inconsistent image of Brasidas between the successful and inspirational general that changed the course and prospects of the Peloponnesian War in northern Greece and Brasidas the reckless general who based his strategy on unfounded hope and which led to his demise and the reversal of fate to many of the cities he had liberated. Thucydides does not resolve this contrasting image. It is up to his readers to resolve it or rather attempt to do so. Brasidas’ personality not only is narrated in an inconclusive way by Thucydides himself but, in fact, Brasidas’ critics offer him even more masks to ‘wear’. In two recent articles from Heilke (2004) and Burns (2011) Brasidas is presented in two different ways and faulted for two different things (Heilke, 2004; Burns, 2011). Heilke sees a realist Brasidas that simply miscalculated and failed whereas Burns sees a Brasidas that is not realist enough like the Athenians in Melos. We suggest that the problem with Brasidas is the authors’ interpretation of courage and hope in a time of change. War necessitated a change of attitudes and Brasidas was the ultimate personification of this change that war generates as the great historical movement, as Thucydides characterises it. What the authors fail to appreciate is that in changing circumstances so does the requirements for courage and the meaning of courage. This simply means that for Sparta to have won the war at that time it needed to have a different mind-set and a different strategy, which it recognised and reluctantly discovered in the face of Brasidas and the city-states he seduced starting from Acanthus.

Unlike both Heilke and Burns the problem with Brasidas was neither his lack of moderation nor rash boldness based on unreasonable hope. What they both fail to grasp was that Brasidas was trying to change the course of war and even the societies he was contacting and his own society too. When Heilke claims that had Brasidas had better knowledge of Sparta’s intentions he would have acted moderately is probably as misguided as Burns’ position (Heilke, 2004, pp. 132-133). Burns rightly criticises Heilke for confusing the contemporary sense of realist self-interest with Brasidas’ self-sacrificing courageous life (Burns, 2011, pp. 509-510). Burns though omits to say that sacrificing for a higher cause is not an unusual thing
to do. For instance, this willingness to sacrifice for a higher purpose is an aspect of nationalism, warrior ethos and even terrorism past and present (Coker, 2007; Coker, 2009, p. 42, 43, 45, 50; Coker, 2010, p. 50). He presents Brasidas as a relic of the past before proceeding to downplay his courageous character by saying it is incompatible with Aristotle.

Burns founds his case against Brasidas’ reliability in a contrast between courage with reason. Should we follow his logic we will discover one more reason why the city-states were duped but his logic is assuming more than he can defend. Reason, Burns argues, following Aristotle, supposedly helps one seek peace based on an amoral view of justice while courage -as one’s primary virtue- means that courage is an end in itself and will eventually lead to one’s demise (Burns, 2011, p. 511). On the contrary, seeing courage as a means to a further end is compatible with Aristotle. Rabieh points out that for Aristotle “[c]ourage and war ought to be the means to serious peacetime activity” (Rabieh, 2015, p. 510). Therefore, what actually is doing all the explanation for Burns is not his ancient Greek view of courage but his view on justice. Burns fails, like Heilke, to interpret the ancient Greeks on their own terms by superimposing his own view of justice to interpret Thucydides and the protagonists of his History. Rather than imposing our own sense of justice on the actors of history though, it would be better to leave these philosophical aporias unanswered because, being aporias, they can never be resolved. In fact, it is worse to make an unjustified choice according to which prudence equals reasonable amoral justice.

In fact, Brasidas’ whole campaign is relying on an idea of justice that even Burns himself acknowledges by calling him a genuine would-be-liberator. The problem then arises from the context. Perhaps, Burns is writing from the risk-averse vantage point of an individual of the twentieth century. The question of how much risk-taking genuine courage justifies is open to interpretation according to context. The Peloponnesian War at the time required a Brasidas and if Brasidas did not exist, Sparta would have to invent him. Weirdly enough, though, Brasidas needed or even tried to change Sparta itself but his life run out too soon.

Brasidas’ death and Spartan reluctance to support his plan after his death incline the student of history to be negatively predisposed towards Brasidas’ effectiveness. Perhaps a suitable example is to compare him with Nicias that seems to fit Burns’ version of courage. Burns

95 For a different opinion to Burns’ which is linking prudence in Thucydides with morality see Monoson and Loriaux on the topic (Monoson & Loriaux, 1998).
echoes the idea that too many risks lead to over-extension or to Nemesis. However, one can never know in advance how many risks one should take. In our risk-averse Western societies it is easy to make this argument but it does not make it right. Nicias for example was also a brave general who fought many battles. Nicias’ view of courage is presumably different from the apparently more risky one that Brasidas endorses with his bold and risky acts. When in Plato’s Laches Socrates asks Nicias his opinion about what is courage, Nicias ends up saying that courage is a kind of wisdom about how one can avoid all evils; hence, a means to an end and plausibly involving “as little risk to oneself as possible” (Rabieh, 2015, p. 510). If we compare Nicias’ theory with Nicias’ life, we will see that when Nicias put his reasonable theoretical view of courage into practice, he ended up being a fearful general that his fears led him to indecisiveness. In contrast, Brasidas, the man of rapid action, as Thucydides characterises him did not face this problem. Attitudes toward risk vary and should vary from time to time and from personality to personality. It is scholars ourselves that tend to confuse them with ideas about ideal risk propensity.

The time when Brasidas becomes prominent in Thucydides’ Book IV, is the time when Sparta is losing the war and needs to do something. What was required then was a personality that would try to change the tide of war with hope not with fear. Both fear and hope can be excessive and cause distortions to our judgement (Rabieh, 2015, p. 510). The point is that we cannot judge a moment that requires hopeful action to generate success with a moment that requires more timid risks.

This was the time for change because for as long as Sparta was acting like Sparta, it was generals like Alcidas that were launching its expeditions with no success. In fact, Alcidas, acting very un-Brasidas-like, managed to alienate Spartan allies and potential allies in the Aegena see, lose the opportunity to liberate Mytilene, and undermined the effort to liberate the Greeks in Asia Minor at a time when they were ready to welcome him. How much damage this had created in Sparta’s proclaimed goal of the liberation of the Greeks we cannot tell. What we do know though, is that Brasidas at the very beginning of his speech in Acanthus apologised for arriving only in the seventh year of the war to liberate the Greeks in northern Greece. Hornblower also conjectures that perhaps it was so late that not even Brasidas could change the time (Hornblower, 1996, p. 113).
What is crucial is the interaction between Sparta and the rest of the city-states across the ancient Greek world. For Brasidas to have been successful he would have to achieve two goals rather than one. He would have to steer the city-states away from Athens and sign them up to the cause of their liberation and at the same time persist in this goal and try to change the moderate Spartan culture. When Heilke says that Brasidas lacked the Spartan virtue of moderation, he simply misses the point that this was his enemy and even Sparta’s enemy (Heilke, 2004, pp. 127, 128, 131). Sparta only won the war when it started adjusting and learnt to act differently. It did so with the alliance with Persia, the building of a navy in the Aegean Sea and bringing the war in Athens’ backyard and the construction of a permanent fortress outside Athens itself. If Sparta managed to do so at the end of the Peloponnesian War, this simply shows how long it took it to learn to adjust. In contrast, Brasidas had already learned that to win the war, Sparta had to act very differently. His cause for the liberation of the Greeks would undermine Arthenian revenues, encourage more revolts and threaten Athens’ crucial grain supply from the Black Sea close to northern Greece. This strategic plan is as inconceivable as the idea that Sparta could defeat Athens in a naval battle. This becomes a problem though only if we keep seeing the Peloponnesian War from the vantage point of its beginning when Pericles had said he was only afraid of the Athenians’ own mistake and not the opponent. Actually, he should have been afraid of his opponents too because it was un-Spartan like individuals like Brasidas and eventually Admiral Lysander that ‘stole’ the victory from Athens.

It is important to highlight though, that the fact that there were more than one un-Spartan like Spartans comes to show, that we should not essentialise the distinction. Before Brasidas, there was Pausanias. After Brasidas was Clearidas; the handpicked by Brasidas regent of Amphipolis. Afterwards came the bane of Athens, Lysander. As different as these personalities were, they were united by the fact of being more expansionist and less moderate in their goals than the typical way that Thucydides makes us think of Sparta (Andrewes, 1978; Hornblower, 1996).

It is true that we cannot know if Sparta could change or how much it could change given that it was not very supportive of Brasidas. Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that this was a plausible motivation to attribute to Brasidas. First of all, Brasidas mentions to the Acanthians that he had “bound the authorities at Sparta by the most solemn oaths to guarantee the autonomy of any people I bring over to alliance with us” (4.86). For Brasidas to
be able to have committed Sparta with such oaths, he must have had considerable influence and “enormous prestige” (Hornblower, 1996, p. 51). “Countries that do not adapt to change tend to perish”, Coker stresses and this is what Sparta needed: to change (Coker, 2008, p. 16). If there was a man to streamline change in Sparta at the time, then this was Brasidas. Moreover, Sparta was happy to accept Scione when Brasidas had won it over and one does not know what would have happened had Brasidas stayed alive for longer. Success breeds success they say and this may have been what Brasidas was hoping to achieve to induce Sparta to clearly endorse his policy and back him up.

The kind of adjustment that is required when countries are in dire straits is often underestimated and compared with normal notions of politics or politics for normal times but this is highly problematic. “At a time of radical historical change”, Lear makes it abundantly clear, “the concept of courage will itself require new forms” (Lear, 2008, p. 118). Brasidas’ courage should be seen as based on a kind of reasonable radical hope justified by the military situation and feasible due to his honourable character.

When traditional concepts of Spartan life were not serving it well enough, it was time for an imaginative reconceptualization of courage. Brasidas had a different vision to lead Sparta to victory and that required a reimagining of Spartan self-interest by reimagining the notion of courage as one that rather than moderate was becoming more risk-prone. This was not time for generals like Alcidas but for Spartans like Brasidas. This would bring Sparta closer to victory. This radical hope though did not mean abandoning the Spartan way of life. It was exactly one competitive way to defend the Spartan way of life even if by adjusting it. The road to change was passing through Brasidas’ influence. He was not alone. He was a ‘stream’ in Spartan political life that he needed to make it run deeper. Success would make more Spartans see the benefits of Brasidas’ way of thinking. Obviously, this would not come easily and there were Spartans that were even jealous of him. War and time though can change things especially if they are accompanied by military success and an inspirational personality.

Seen under this more appropriately contextualised light, Brasidas’ policy appears reasonable. No one would object that “[b]old acts that derive merely from optimism are not themselves courageous” (Lear, 2008, p. 112). However, and here is the rub, “in times of radical historical change”, and the Peloponnesian War was definitely such a time for both Thucydides and ourselves, “there may be demands made on a courageous person that outstrip traditional
training and traditional patterns of character-formation” (Lear, 2008, p. 124). In fact, “[o]ne might need a kind of psychological flexibility that goes beyond anything the culture was trying to instill when it taught the flexibilities of courage” (Lear, 2008, p. 124).

Besides the alternatives of freedom and slavery or freedom and death, there is a third one embodied in Brasidas. Brasidas showed the way of creative adaptation. This was not an easy road to take. It requires psychological changes, courage, practical reasoning, hope and an adjusted sense of identity. Brasidas’ version of courage was more risk prone than the traditional Spartan virtue of moderation, it was practical in the sense of Brasidas’ military successes and was linked to an adjusted sense of identity; that is, Sparta taking the risk of becoming the leader of the effort to liberate Hellas not just in words but in action. Brasidas the man of rapid action, as Thucydides calls him, was not a lesser characterisation for Brasidas but the most appropriate one for a time of radical change.

It was this kind of courage, identity and hope exemplified by Brasidas that not only Sparta needed but that also inspired the city-states that followed him, generated momentum and made Sparta for the first time during the first ten years of the Peloponnesian War to be ahead of the game and hopeful.

Courage is crucial for two reasons. On one hand, Brasidas’ courage led to his victorious battles and increased his personal prestige in his birthplace, Sparta. On the other hand, as MacIntyre stresses, courage is a necessary quality to sustain a city (cited in Burns, 2011, p. 508). Following through the ideal of the liberation of Greece from Athens enabled Brasidas to become more reliable by becoming more inspirational. Sparta had things to look forward from Brasidas and so did the rest of the Greeks in northern Greece. What was also required was for both the Spartans and the rest of the Greeks in the north to follow Brasidas’ way of thinking and that was only reasonable to hope and attempt within this framework of risk-prone courage sustained by an identity that respected and promoted the liberation of the Greeks. If Sparta did not succeed in adjusting to war as quickly as Brasidas did, this does not mean the Greeks in the north of Hellas did not start doing so. In fact, Brasidas’ strategy was ideal in inducing this kind of change in the north and he had the psychology and courage to attempt to do so effectively. It is the critics of Brasidas themselves who underestimate the aforementioned logic and the way Brasidas was able to soar up his military power and prospects.
Brasidas’ courage relied on the hope that he could create a domino effect in northern Greece with one defection after the other and loyal allies to follow him and support his military expedition. What he needed was to put his money where his mouth was, so to speak, even though Sparta, famous for its frugal lifestyle, had not issued any practical currency by that time.

Brasidas’ effort had to confront one of Greece’s most difficult problems, the social division between democrats and oligarchs. The way he dealt with, through seduction and moderation, shows his ability to act effectively. Keeping the domestic peace in the liberated cities was essential but the easiest thing to do would have been to incite revolts and have the oligarchs rule on his behalf. However, this would neither serve the liberation manifesto nor its prospects for critically undermining Athens and turning the tides of war in favour of Sparta as the leader of the free world. Therefore, the attitudes of the people in the cities he liberated would unavoidably have to play an important role in his plans.

Romilly too claims that people were important but she subverts their importance by focusing only on pressure, circumstances and opportunity rather than seduction and their will for liberty (Romilly, 2008, p. 282). She argues that people would react not only to pressure but also to others’ ability to win them over but this winning over is a transactional or instrumental kind of winning over (Romilly, 2008, p. 279).

The seduction of people matters even if not all of them were seduced or rather especially for this reason. As Romilly admits, the success of one political faction or another in taking over their state depended on “a more indifferent or more reasonable mob” (Romilly, 2008, p. 282). This also means that Brasidas’ effort to keep the domestic peace between oligarchs and democrats depended on the disposition of the mob which could be placated, inspired or enraged. For as long as Brasidas managed to inspire a part of the population, retain the support of another part and placate those who were initially reluctant to accept him, he could be successful. All he needed was to project a credible image and continuing successes in the battlefield. This could not only sustain his level of support but also embolden it and expand it. Domestically that amounted to a processual revolution by gradually changing the dynamics between domestic actors and Brasidas. This is the point about inspiration and courage. If Brasidas hadn’t died two years later he could have retained and increased his support in the
cities and the number of the cities that was following him and then the Acanthians would have been definitely justified in their actions to have been seduced by Brasidas.

From seduction it is a small leap to mobilisation. The more consistent Brasidas’s actions and Brasidas’ narrative became in the dealings with the other cities, the stronger he became. The stronger he became the more credible he became. The more he achieved, the more seductive his goal and his personality became.

The Acanthians may not have been aware of what lied ahead of them but this was exactly the approach taken by Brasidas at that point in time which prevented domestic instability and civil war. What the Acanthians could see was the power of Brasidas’ attraction and this forged a deep admiration for Brasidas which made them and other cities, as Thucydides informs us, to become positively predisposed towards Sparta and in fact to do so even long after Brasidas death and even in places far away from northern Greece (4.81). Such was the force of Brasidas’ seduction.

One mechanism that becomes crucial if we think in terms of seduction is this of popular mobilisation. According to Nexon the degree of homogeneity and network density among actors contributes to or fragments collective mobilisation (Nexon, 2009, p. 48). Nexon creates four combinations as ideal-types and he makes the point that “[e]ach of these contexts produces different collective-action dynamics” (Nexon, 2009, p. 48). And here is the rub. The Acanthians who were seduced, and we do not have to assume that they were all seduced or equally seduced, bought into the idea of such a pattern. Seduction increases one’s identification with the ‘other’, in this case Brasidas. Also, the more committed Brasidas was, the more people would and did mobilise for him. The more Brasidas succeeded, the more people were following him. The difference in the case of Brasidas is that his seductiveness increased people’s identification with him and Sparta, facilitating the creation of an identity connection among the city-states and him. This creates increased homogenisation and more chances for sustained mobilisation. This thinking requires a processual understanding of politics which is missing from realism but which is present in both Nexon’s view of politics and probably in some of the Acanthians views who believed Brasidas.

To conclude with, Brasidas was not an imprudent general. Brasidas was the general that Sparta and Greece needed but could not have. Sparta’s radical crisis and Brasidas’ radical
hope, liberation vision and reimagined courage were a good match. Unfortunately, for all his personal hopes and the hopes of the Greeks of the north, Sparta was too slow to adjust. It would have to fight for another twenty years before it managed to change its strategy successfully. Brasidas’ seductiveness should be remembered as Sparta’s great lost opportunity to turn the tides of the Peloponnesian War.

Conclusion

Brasidas was the great risk-taker and the great seducer. Seduction led to positive feedback. Brasidas was able to overcome the fear based discourse of the Acanthians who were facing, literally, an enemy at the gates. After Brasidas’ speech and the Acanthian deliberations the discourse changed to an honour based one. Brasidas from enemy became leader with obligations and followers. Stagirus and many more city-states followed creating a momentum. This momentum was crucial and was as important for the liberation of the Greeks as for Sparta’s benefit and for Brasidas’ military success and vision. Brasidas would have never achieved all that without the support of the people that he mobilised to the common cause. Brasidas tried to overcome the dichotomy oligarchs/democrats and cultivated non-sectarian identities. Not only did he act in a transformational way but his thinking was genuinely transformed in relation to the stereotypical Spartan of the time. The Acanthians on their part experienced the performance of a speech in accordance with Brasidas’ personality and military genius. Brasidas’ offer was attractive enough and the Acanthians are justifiable for having permitted themselves to be seduced.

Gomme wonders why did Brasidas “made elaborate excuses for what would seem to us to be the ordinary operations of war” (Gomme, 1956, p. 555). The answer is because this was the only way for his vision to work. Seduction was a two way street. Brasidas was an unusual Spartan that set his foot to change the face of Greece. The Greeks needed that face and they were seduced. Brasidas’ face resonated with his character and the lessons of the war at the time.

The lessons of war for Brasidas seem to have revolved around the effective, bold and inspirational combined use of force and diplomacy to alter the status quo and win the war. Brasidas used his political acumen to offer a sense of recognition to the Acanthians and use
his courageous character to both inspire them to follow him and to fear him. Recognition in the international realm is the recognition of another’s social and cultural identity and as we will see more extensively in the next case study, it is related to a feeling of justice and identity (Honneth, 2008; Bartelson, 2013).

It was these concerns that allowed Brasidas to change the fear based discourse into an honour based discourse by putting front and centre the idea of recognition. Brasidas’ domestic political consideration for the political fractions in Acanthus, his inspirational speech, his goal of the liberation of the Greeks and his projecting himself as an important figure in Sparta and as a man of honour who keeps his word and has a reputation for successful actions made the Acanthians remove their reluctance to surrender and ally with Brasidas. This kind of discourse that recognised the weak other state supported Brasidas’ vision and reinforced his forces and his ability to materialise his plans.

It also strengthened his reputation which helped him challenge the status quo. His increasing influence empowered him across Northern Greece. Acanthus was the first important city-state to surrender to Brasidas that surrendered on the basis of a strategy that combined military force and recognition and in a sense set the tone. More city-states followed suit in a domino effect that was accompanied not only by military alliances but also by admiration for Brasidas. Brasidas relied on his ability to discern what mattered even for weaker states, restrain himself from self-aggrandisement activities and inspire to such an extent that the outcome of his actions was the generation of relationships based on recognition. This seduced Acanthus and eventually much of Northern Greece to openly support Brasidas and participate in generating a reputation for this remarkable general rather than merely surrendering out of fear or opportunism as realists would have us expect.

When Thucydides says that the Acanthians surrendered because they were fearful and seduced, he is right. This was their logic of surrendering: fear and seduction based on recognition. But we need to pay more attention to the seduction side of the argument. Seduction was as consequential a cause, if not more, than the fear of threat. Seduction permitted Brasidas to increase his power. Seduction is a power-generating cause. To understand its effect, it is useful to see power as a dependent variable. If we see power as only the ability of Brasidas to make credible threats, then we are back where we started – in the ‘safety’ of realism’s cynicism. Brasidas teaches us the power of seduction and the
Acanthians teach us that this cause exists and can be powerful. They had good reasons to be seduced. In Brasidas’ face Thucydides conjured up more than a hero. He conjured up the existential nature of war in an honour based discourse and the transformative capacity of a leader that had a distinct identity that helped him achieve his military and political vision up to the moment he met death.
5. The Surrender of Athens (404-403 BC): Power and Recognition as Necessary Causes

You said: ‘I’ll go to another land, I’ll go to another sea. Another city will be found, a better one than this. My every effort is doomed by destiny and my heart—like a dead man—lies buried. How long will my mind languish in such decay? Wherever I turn my eyes, wherever I look, the blackened ruins of my life I see here, where so many years I’ve lived and wasted and ruined.’

Any new lands you will not find; you will find no other seas. This city will be following you. In the same streets you’ll wander. And in the same neighbourhoods you’ll age, and in these same houses you will grow grey. Always in this same city you’ll arrive. For elsewhere—do not hope—there is no ship for you, there is no road. Just as you’ve wasted your life here, In this tiny niche, in the entire world you’ve ruined it. (The City, by C. P. Cavafy)

“it was not an easy task to terminate the liberty of the Athenian people almost exactly a hundred years after the deposition of the tyrants, when they had been… free of subjection to anyone else”

(Thucydides 8.68)
Surrendering 1.0 and Surrendering 2.0: An Introduction to Athenian Defeat

At the end of the Peloponnesian War, when Athens suffered its most humiliating and destructive defeat of its existence, Sparta, like a typical neorealist or neo-classical realist, largely ignored social realities and social dynamics and mistakenly believed that life in Athens could and would return to normality and the imposed terms of surrendering would be followed. It was the terms of surrendering that were challenged despite the immense power preponderance of Sparta and the utter military defeat, ‘de-democratification’, compellence by terror, disarmament and presence of a Spartan garrison in Athens. Material power is the element of realists’ victor’s peace and should be at its best in explaining their logic of history in international politics after complete defeat. Yet, as it happened in Athens, political considerations of recognition, which consisted of a fight for justice due to cruelty and arousal of identity politics due to disregard of local political traditions, entered the interpretation of the meaning of victory soon after. Therefore, not even utter victory can ever be unproblematic a concept for a materialist analysis. Acknowledging this creates analytical problems for realists who attempt to exclude such considerations in order to theorise in a scientific, value-free and ‘realistic’ way based on the idea that material power is the ultima ratio in international politics (Waltz, 1979, p. 113; Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 55-56).96

Our argument is that inspirational leadership in the name of a legitimate cause can lead to social mobilisation and the undertaking of high-risk actions even by weak and defeated people able to redefine the meaning and consequences of surrendering at the expense of the victorious power. This is not a reductionist argument about the primacy of individuals and first image explanations. This is an argument about the contingent importance of leadership in making the most of perceived discontent. In order to inspire resistance, there must be a serious cause for resistance. A good leader is like a surfer who feels that the next wave is going to be the right wave. Of course the surfer does not create the wave but the leader has both the feel of the discontent and by choosing to ride the ‘wave’ of discontent, helps create the ‘wave’. This is a similar causal logic to the one Brasidas employed in the previous case.

96 MacIntyre convincingly remarks that legitimacy, which is another way to express the lack of recognition, should not be confused with the acceptability of institutions because this excludes a priori the idea that justice does not matter (MacIntyre, 1971, p. 278). What we are arguing here is that both justice and identity matter and in fact identity as something variable and lived rather than constant or with an essence. We do not feel the need to theoretically prioritise one at the expense of the other.
study. Brasidas appealed to an ethical cause, liberation from Athens, which inspired people, and also paid attention to domestic politics creating a sense of legitimate leadership and just arrangements. These issues allowed him to seduce the Acanthians and then inspire and mobilise not only them but also other city-states creating a domino effect that increased Brasidas’ power. In Athens the opposite happened. Unjust arrangements and disjuncture from local political traditions empowered a domino of effective resistance harnessed by spirited leadership.

In the first two case studies we have tried to show how psychology influences the decision for delayed surrendering and the decision for quick surrendering. In this case study, we try to show that the psychology of the other affects even the post-conflict period. It seems that realism, by accepting the idea of victor’s peace and reifying the assumption of survival which affects what states fight for is erasing ethics and psychology from power and as a basis of order. It is, thus led to unjustly de-link the pre-war period, war-time period and post-war period from each other.

What springs out of the past such as the dead, ideas, feelings, certain relationships, the immaterial or as we will see here the psychological need for recognition and the concomitant heroic deeds that are able to inspire resistance to misrecognition do not register in the realist mind-set but only perhaps as an afterthought. This view of time is strangely restricted. A subjective psychological view of time can explain the motivations people may hold and why they would be willing to sacrifice themselves just like the Athenians in 404-403 were willing to do so in the name of recognition. The past or an illusion of it, no less real, is with us or is us, now and always, through the meaning we give to it.

Realists exclude reasons that pertain to history and psychology and affect social mobilisation such as recognition which is crucial in the unfolding of events in this case study. Realists omit recognition both from the structure of the international system which is based on material power and from their theories of foreign policy. They omit recognition from their theories of foreign policy because they are based on the structure of the international system and because they reify the meaning of the assumption of survival which, as Howes argues, for realists means autonomy (Howes, 2003). Social mobilisation, as we will see, is related to recognition and can be inspired by courageous leaders supporting ethical causes of common concern and, as a result, can generate new power in action. Social mobilisation is one of the
powers of the powerless (Carroll, 1980, p. 69; Carroll, 1972, pp. 607-614). However, this view of power is power as dependent variable depending on recognition. Yet, for realists, recognition is absent from their purview and as a result externalise a factor that is crucial for change.

In the previous case study Brasidas created hierarchical international relations and in this case study stability of defeat is challenged. Waltz excludes hierarchy by and large from the anarchical framework and stability is neorealism’s fetish concept. Moreover, the scepticism towards bandwagoning relies on the default logic of neorealism that excludes recognition (Keohane, 1988). This realist logic creates certain expectations which seem to lead realist scholars to question and research international phenomena only when they do not conform with the logic of the international system. Yet, this logic is flawed because it misidentifies what matters even in moment zero, the moment of utter defeat and destruction: recognition. To put it in different words, the idea of the structure of the international system in neorealism and neo-classical realism creates a standard of what is normal. However, we do not see the power of the powerless being any less normal in reality. We are able to infer so by identifying the importance of recognition and how it affects the strategic logic of actors and increase their ability to gain what they seek. In the case of Athens, it was able to remove the oligarchic puppet regime and induce Sparta to make a compromise and accept regime change and return to democracy. Realism’s exclusion of recognition from its historical worldview makes it ipso facto blind to these processes and outcomes. In this case study power is also the outgrowth of recognition and realism does not recognise this possibility neither in how effective it can be nor on how reasonable and normal it can be.

The problem with neorealism and neo-classical realism is that they cannot account for this logic that links social mobilisation, recognition and new power in action due to their victor bias that translates into a material power-centrism and a status quo bias. This bias stems from their view of peace that is intertwined with their endorsement of material power as a possession of a state rather than as a relationship of influence (Baldwin, 2013). This makes it possible for realists to justify why they ignore the other and its social reality: because it does not fit to their concept of peace and power.

The revisionism of a weak or weakened defeated state for ethical reasons in the pursuit of recognition involving high-risks does not register for these types of realism. Defensive
Realists are sceptical towards expansionism. They have a status quo bias believing, as Keohane put it, that “nothing succeeds like success” (Keohane, 1988; Schweller, 1996). Offensive Realists like Mearsheimer adhere to the core principle of relative power maximisation but this idea depends on a cost-benefit analysis (Mearsheimer, 2001). Yet, this is also based on the material version of power as an independent variable separated from recognition. Neo-classical realists like Schweller add expansionism to offset neorealism’s status quo bias focusing on great powers’ revisionist goals and aspirations and to lesser powers’ opportunism (Schweller, 1994).

Power and recognition cannot be separated not even in utter defeat. When Sparta committed this mistake, the Athenians were able to take a high-risk path and adjust the outcome of war. Recognition is an ethical concept but a very practical and consequential one and crucially able to reverse the meaning of victory and defeat. Realists by largely excluding ethics from power see recognition as largely a function of power and unrelated to identity and justice. Not only is this materialist view of power the other side of victor bias, the view that the victor imposes its peace by and large, but also if realists would want to view power in a relational sense, they would then have to incorporate recognition as crucial from the very beginning of theorisation in order to exclude the victor bias from their theories.

This is not to say that recognition or ethics equal raw power. The theoretical perceptions of realists serve to obfuscate the insight that it is inadequate to simply acknowledge that the power of the powerless is difficult to calculate. The realist separation of ethics from power emphasises the unpredictability of the power of the powerless rather than the sources of its systematic reproduction, such as the concept of recognition, and potentiality under certain conditions. This downgrading reinforces a realist great-power centric view of the world that appears to consider the resistance of the weak futile or irrational or unlikely and contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy of potential resentment, recourse to war and resistance.

Surrendering is the moment zero of political order. If material power realities and victory, sort of eliminating the defeated, cannot produce victor’s peace by themselves, like in the case of Athens after the end of the Peloponnesian War, without accounting for what the defeated can accept, then this casts doubts on the very idea of victor’s peace itself. Realists, instead of accepting the ambiguity, that even in utter defeat the defeated state’s preferences matter, they
seem to reify it. They favour a material view of power in which legitimacy or prestige\textsuperscript{97} is merely a manifestation of power and; thus, largely discard the will of the weak other and start theorising about the international system and international politics from there. This realist high-risk blind spot is a status-quo bias realists share because they have a victor bias similar to the Spartan mind-set at the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War. The realist victor bias dampens realists’ sensitivity to the historical and cultural setting and reflexes of a society and this is essential both to explain history and provide prudent advice about decisions to go to war, how to conduct war and what to do the day after war.

**Summary of the Historical Argument**

In Andrea Alciato’s Emblemata, the magnificent work of the Renaissance Italian jurist, writer and humanist steeped in classical culture, the Athenians crowned Thrasybulus with an olive garland. Thrasybulus is the inspirational courageous Athenian general who led the successful Athenian revolution that saved the city from the Thirty Tyrants. Thrasybulus had distinguished himself during the Peloponnesian War but had been sent into exile by the Thirty Tyrants after the end of the Athenian defeat by Sparta in 404. Thrasybulus was a prominent democrat and a great general and this did not fly well with the new oligarchic regime, the Thirty Tyrants, who were imposed by Sparta as part of the unconditional surrender of Athens. It was during the immediate first year after the war that Thrasybulus had to leave his city, wait for an opportunity to show his democratic credentials again and save his city from the usurpers of power. In a sense, the war was not really over for as long as the Thirty Tyrants were still in power damaging the city, democracy itself and the people’s democratic ethos.

It was this ethical relationship between the city and the democratic ethos, between the city and the citizen Thrasybulus that incentivised him to lead an effort to recover the city with literally just a bunch of other exiles fuelled by sheer belief. This belief consisted of three components: a) faith in the illegitimacy of the Thirty Tyrants which was also reinforced by the increasing domestic hostility towards them; b) the perceived legitimacy of Thrasybulus’ actions; and c) the expectation that Thrasybulus’ plan would attract support. In other words,

\textsuperscript{97} As Gilpin makes clear, for example, prestige is “largely a function of economic and military capabilities, and achieved primarily through the successful use of power, and especially through victory in war” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 35).
this high-risk plan against a ruthless regime of terror under the auspices and support of Sparta in the immediate aftermath of utter defeat and unconditional surrender appeared in the minds of its protagonists as a reasonable thing to do. However, it is not caprice that binds people together but what the city means to its citizens. For ancient Greeks in particular it was in the city that one could attain what Aristotle called the ‘good life’ and the ‘good life’ was the ethical life as it was given its meaning by the city’s ethos. The relationship between the individual and the city is not just about where one is born but where one’s identity is forged (Coker, 2014a, pp. 80-81).

If it was left to realists the only explanation we would get would be that the time came for more power to overthrow less power. Any variation of this realist theme in its neorealistic or neo-classical version will keep stumbling upon the real face of Athens at the time. The golden era of Pericles was replaced by this: defeat in the worst ancient Greek war; great war casualties; a city decimated by hunger; many prisoners of war released with one hand cut98; a reign of terror; a new political regime supported by Sparta; demolition of the city’s defensive walls; destruction of the city’s navy but for twelve ships; surrendering of all the democratic citizens’ arms to the oligarchs, and of course unconditional surrender to Sparta just a year earlier.

Overall, we show that the Athenian will for recognition was never abandoned and when the new puppet regime in Athens showed that it had no intention of upholding its promises to follow the Athenian political traditions, the result was the triggering of resistance out of nowhere that forced Sparta to re-evaluate its decision for the imposition and support of the puppet regime.

We argue that there is nothing unpredictable in the Athenian case unless one endorses the flawed neorealist or neoclassical realist logic of history with its embedded status quo bias against high-risk policies by weak states like the Athenian toppling of its imposed political regime against the wishes of Sparta. This argument is not about domestic politics but about why the war ended when it ended and in the way it ended. To put it in different terms, realists’ victor-biased logic predisposes them to only see Surrendering 1.0 but the Athenians

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98 For an analysis of the Aegospotami battle and the potential repercussion of the Spartan cruelty see Barry Strauss’ Aegospotami Reconsidered (Strauss, 1983, pp. 34-35).
based on an ethical and courageous logic, similar to that by Brasidas in the previous chapter, were willing to raise the stakes and fight again for Surrendering 2.0.

Roadmap

In what follows we present the meaning of recognition in the sub-section Prolegomena, and in the subsequent sub-sections we analyse the spurious circumstances that followed the first year after the surrendering of Athens. We argue that these events cannot be separated from the official moment of surrendering. They actually define the meaning of surrendering and explain the sequence of events. These events after the official end of the Peloponnesian War and the characteristics of the Athenians society, we contend, are able to determine even the meaning of unconditional surrendering.

We will present this historical case study in a combination of historical narrative and analysis by presenting how one of the tragic protagonists of this era, Theramenes, perceived the unfolding of the events and how indeed they materialised through a tracing of the strategic actions and the strategic logic of the actions of the other protagonist of this era, Thrasybulus, who would live to survive and liberate the city of Athens from one of the most hateful conditions of unconditional surrendering at the time; the death of democracy itself. We will also examine the viewpoints of these two personalities by interjecting analysis of the historical events in order to give the historical background to the reader and the strategic stakes and chances while also adding analytical remarks from an IR point of view. We do this by pegging the rationales of these two personalities to the social realities in Athens and how they unfold, react and interact with themselves and the behaviour of Sparta.

Prolegomena: The Road to Recognition is a Path to New Force for the Powerless

In 404, twenty-seven long years after the beginning of the Peloponnesian War Athens is left bereft. Its sons are decimated. Its prisoners of war are back with one hand cut by the notorious Spartan naval general Lysander, the architect of the final Spartan victory in Aegospotami on modern time Dardanelles in Turkey. The city itself stinks from the people
who are falling down because they are too weak to survive hunger that the Spartan siege has caused. The glorious 5th century, the saga of Pericles, the Golden Age of Athens has come to an end. The Parthenon is still intact, but the city itself is in no better position than the Parthenon of today with its half-destroyed roof, its missing caryatids and forcefully removed pediments. When the exhausted Athenian citizens finally decide to surrender despite all the previous equivocations and indecisiveness, it does not come as a surprise. What comes as a surprise is that just a year later all this was to change not by a magic wand, not by some irresistible historical force, not by some scientific law but by the sheer inexhaustible power of the powerless which is able to reinvent itself in times of great difficulty when ethics, inspiration and social mobilisation combine in high-risk effective attitudes. The lack of justice and recognition of the democratic ethos of the Athenians is key to understanding the illegitimacy of the puppet regime Sparta imposed on Athens as part of surrendering. In this part of the chapter we will introduce the idea of recognition (a way of describing honour as we will explain below) and how it relates to this case study.

The protagonists of this case study who all have something to say or express about recognition are Critias, Theramenes, Thrasybulus and the Athenian people’s fluctuating sense of recognition itself. Critias is one of the most ruthless leading oligarchs of the puppet regime Sparta imposed on Athens after its defeat. Theramenes is one of the rather moderate ruling oligarchic leaders who openly disagrees with Critias to its own detriment. He makes a prescient if prophetic sounding political analysis of what is going to happen just before he dies. Thrasybulus, present in Critias’ and Theramenes’ minds for different reasons, is the liberator-to-be of Athens. The Athenian people’s sense of recognition is the force that whoever is attuned to it can achieve great deeds for a price in blood.

This case study shows the rationality, reasonableness and conditions of success of high-risk policies like the one some Athenians under Thrasybulus followed. Such a policy challenged the unconditional surrendering of Athens to Sparta through civil war and a military confrontation with Sparta itself within a year and led to the successful toping of the Spartan imposed oligarchic regime with the Spartan consent.

Had Sparta recognised the pitfalls of the lack of recognition, it may have had acted wisely. Instead, it had thought that victory was enough – the rest, stability and legitimation, would come. Yet, there comes a day when people have to say the great Yes or the great No, as the
great Cavafy wrote, and the Spartans and Athenian oligarchs made this choice a bit easier for the Athenians. Quite a few Athenians took the great risk of joining the revolution, but it was a risk with a meaning: some risks, the right ones, are worth taking even if they may weigh one down for all his life, as the poet also mentions.99

In other words, the war is not over until it is over. Who calls the shots is not the powerful victor alone but, significantly enough, the vanquished through its sense of self-worth and whether this is recognised enough by the winner. It is this sense of worthiness that is able to reassert itself as the unnamed condition of even unconditional surrendering. In short, surrendering could not really take hold in Athens until Athens would either be ‘purified’ from Democrats in a massacre of genocidal proportions as the new political regime seemed to have been poised to do or until Sparta acknowledged that the Athenians for as long as they were still alive they would be restless until they regained what not even their decimated bodies had neglected: a sense of respectful freedom no matter how it could be materialised under those conditions. This respect was recognition for who the Athenians believed they were and for a sense of justice.

Recognition in the international realm is the recognition of another’s social and cultural identity (Honneth, 2008; Bartelson, 2013). In this case study recognition is a feeling of justice and identity that the Athenians expect from the Spartans. This goes beyond the mere recognition of rights. It is related to the idea of honour but is not identical. In a relationship of honour there is a mutual recognition of states’ position in the hierarchy of status. Recognition here is ethical and refers to the acknowledgement of who the other is. The theoretical presupposition is that this matters for people who strive for this recognition even at the expense of their physical survival. Lebow, and he has been inspirational, usually focuses on great power relations which leads him to emphasise the tragic view of politics due to competition for standing (Lebow, 2008). Instead, we concentrate on the relation between great power and weak power; that is, on unequal relations of recognition. We emphasise what makes unequal relationships acceptable from the point of view of the weak and relate it to our realist critique of victor’s peace and the assumption of survival.

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99 The poem is ‘Che fece... Il Gran Rifiuto”.
Recognition has been argued to be necessary for jointly identifying the most efficient solution to a common problem (Bartelson, 2013). What we show is that its absence is both a problem for the attacker and an opportunity for the defeated allowing one to traverse through a path that is able to generate new power. Whether recognition stems from issues of justice or identity is an interesting academic debate but matters little here. In this case study both aspects of recognition are involved and this is what we will show.

Recognition not only solves problems but its lack can create both hatred and resistance towards the victorious party and collective mobilisation opportunities for the weak and the defeated. When both consequences of the lack of recognition are combined what they create is a considerable problem even for the victorious power. This non-material ethical analysis is rather unacknowledged by realism, as we will argue below, and often ignored by great powers like Sparta, as we will see.

Focusing on recognition helps one anticipate not the future but a serious source of problems and a way to avert them: through recognition. Misrecognition often creates such a problem. The victory-centric outlook of the realists and the Spartans is vulnerable to such challenges which can lead to disorder and then a new order. Coriolanus Snow, from the novel made into movie Hunger Games, has put it ably: a little hope is effective, a lot of hope is dangerous. The pursuit of recognition and its lack is what drove the Athenian revolution. Hope, Snow goes on, is the only thing stronger than fear. It is this belief in the mutual need for recognition that made Athenians hopeful and contributed to the social mobilisation of those who joined the resistance. The presence of a courageous inspirational personality to drive history forward is necessary too. In the Hunger Games this face was Katniss Everdeen: the face of the resistance. Similarly, in ancient Athens this face was the war-hardened Athenian general Thrasybulus, which the oligarchs had sent to exile after the termination of democracy, only to find him in front of them spearheading armed democrats who had in their minds the cruelty of the oligarchs and their disregard for the Athenian democratic ethos.

This recognition is not only about who is number one as Lebow’s primary emphasis in his Cultural Theory of International Politics is (Shilliam, 2009; Hymans, 2010; Lebow, 2008). Recognition here is about what is one’s sense of self-worth even if one is to be acknowledged as an underdog. This kind of demand survives even after defeat and gives meaning to victory if victory is to last. It is of a social nature and needs to be further explored from the
underdog’s perspective to further clarify hierarchical relationships of authority. It is like a bright constellation in the sky guiding people to the right action, to what the city demands or what people feel their own worth is.

Recognition existed in ancient Greece in the sense of honour. Honour, Lebow tells us, was about international and domestic hierarchy (Lebow, 2008). It was about roles in society and international society. However, he concedes that there is more than that. Typical examples are tragedies like Antigone that is torn between public and private ethics: the first representing the order of things and the second representing personal honour to do what she thinks is right at the expense of public dishonour for disobeying her king. Her role as a sister and her role as a citizen were in conflict and she preferred her personal integrity. She chose to recognise herself as the sister of her dead brother. This conflict between ethics is conflict between roles and between types of honour. Another case in point is the death of Socrates who died respecting the decision of Athens to kill him. He accepted his role in the society even though he never stopped challenging it: not the least by endorsing his death. Honour, Gray argues, is dual in scope and meaning. It is both a sentimental internal to the individual conviction of self-worth and inner freedom as well as one’s reputation which depends on evaluation by others (Gray, 1980, p. 154).

Certainly modernity is known for accentuating the problem between private and public recognition. Yet, the challenge of reconciling personal and public honour and its tragic dimension was known to the ancient Greeks too. Tragedy presented such dilemmas vividly. One of tragedy’s political and educational purposes was to present to the Athenians their own inadequacies and predicaments emanating from their ethos and their international and domestic political decisions (Chou, 2012; Frost, 2003; Lebow, 2007a, pp. 405-411). As a result, for Chou, it made popular democracy effective and, for Frost, it enabled the Athenians to see ethical dilemmas clearly and to consider possible transformations (Chou, 2012; Frost, 2003).

At the end of the war, which is what concerns us here, the argument is related to unequal recognition and in particular how unequal it is going to be rather than which state is going to be number one. Public and private recognition can create a dynamic social structure that holds both inner (private) and outer (public) conceptions of honour and recognition in a fruitful interplay (Gray, 1980, p. 155). Recognition is crucial not only for international
hierarchy but also for how this hierarchy is being run. In a sense, the weak have a potentially powerful veto regarding not who the powerful is but what the powerful can expect based on the weak’s expectations for recognition. Only then can honour, as the concept linked to the status of the great power, promote social order and be acceptable by weak states. These states’ concern is not to become great powers. They cannot. Their concern is recognition for who they are and this concern exists despite any defeat and despite any level of defeat as the Athenians proved between their first and second surrendering to Sparta in 404-403.

This is not to say either that the weak control the actions of the powerful or that the victorious have no choice. They do have a choice. They can kill everybody. They can exterminate a whole population. They can discontinue the story of a whole culture from the annals of history. However, not all of them choose to do so. Why they make one or the other choice is a different research question. No matter how interesting it is, we are focused on cases that the winners choose not to exterminate the defeated party.

What the Athenian oligarchs who confronted the democratic revolution had not realised was that, just like with war, there are two basic types of peace: ‘wilderness’ and peace with honour (Coker, 2010a, p. 117-128). The first type of peace is a peace like the one the oligarchs were imposing on the Athenians by killing indiscriminately, mercilessly and with no real accountability. The second type of peace relies on sophrosunē and restraint. Sophrosunē is what the ancient Greeks called the restraint imposed on desires by reason is; the antidote to hubris (Lebow 2007, 411). It also relies on recognition of the other and who the other is. This makes it social rather than tyrannical (Gray, 1980, p. 155). The same goes for the Balance of Power. It can arise from both types of peace but the social facet of reality will still require recognition in the second type of peace.

Ethical recognition matters because it is necessary and not an optional extra due to its practical implications. In this case study the practical implication is that it provides the basis for the generation of new power that upsets the order that Sparta imposed on Athens at the end of war. So, the ethical is practical and is present even when order begins. Sparta’s support for the cruel and largely un-Athenian oligarchic regime created hatred. This gradually led to the Athenian revolution that channelled Athenian resistance, passions and courage against the oligarchs and the Spartan guard that was supporting them. The Athenian revolution, ethically inspired by misrecognition of a large part of the Athenian people, was
instrumental in undermining the oligarchic regime and convincing Sparta that it would be in its interest to support the democrats rather than the oligarchs.

There are two types of recognition relationships here. The first is the one between Athens and Sparta and the other between oligarchs and democrats in Athens. The two relationships are interrelated because they depend on who Sparta supports to be in government at any point in time. In other words, the oligarchs’ actions first and the democrats’ actions then reflect on the type of recognition Sparta exhibits towards Athens.

This avoids the conservativism hidden in the state-centric view of recognition that Bartelson criticises (2013, pp. 124-127). Had the oligarchs prevailed, then their version of recognition would have been conservative and nothing would have changed from the imposed order. Since the democrats prevailed, transformation ensued as part of recognition. In a sense, the return to democracy was still conservative recognition. However, as we will see, what was born after the civil war was not the same democratic regime like the one that the oligarchs had terminated. It was a hybrid one. Even though Athens as a city-state is the focus here, Athens was not of one mind. Even though, there were different social groups prevailing at each time, it does not mean that one needs to endorse the usual purist state-centric view of recognition that favours one group, supposedly the more representative of the state. Change can be real change and not state-centrism or group-centrism that largely negates concessions to the other side a priori. The post-civil war reconciliation among Athenians in what came to be known as the first amnesty in recorded human history is illustrative of this process which was sparked due to misrecognition and, arguably, endured due to recognition as the basis of a new agreement.

The stability of outcomes; the wisdom of policies; the political leaders’ fame endures as much as what they create and recognition plays a significant part here. It is not enough, like realists presuppose, to recognise that the other exists. This is what Bartelson calls “epistemic recognition”: the recognition of categories (Bartelson, 2013, p. 108). Who the other is depends on who the other morally is. This is a deeper sense of recognition and matters in cases like the surrendering of Athens to Sparta crucially. It is through the social facet of reality and recognition that power as dependent variable can be created and change even unconditional surrendering.
What we are arguing is that recognition not only matters for people all the time but that it can also create new power and change events. Not only misrecognition can lead to resistance but it can also reinforce it too. In scientific terms, recognition is about agency. It is not just about the agency of dying for an idea and gaining freedom or fame but also about increasing the possibilities of success of agency. It pertains to the concepts of challenge as well as transformation.

From Surrendering 1.0 to Surrendering 2.0 what took place was a challenge to the outcome of the Peloponnesian War and a transformation of the political regime and the society in Athens. This is what set limits to what could take place after the war and what not or at what cost. These possibilities can only be imaginable by someone attuned to the idea of recognition of the ‘other’ as a moral concept.

When all else fails and the war is over, it is not magic that changes things but humans themselves who want to be recognised not out of sheer folly or caprice but out of a social logic that contradicts the impositions of their powerlessness by predictably generating unpredictable power. Misrecognition due to cruelty and disregard of the importance the Athenians attributed to their democratic ethos tilted the balance. Thrasybulus served his role in inspiring people to come to his aid to restore democracy in Athens and a sense of recognition to its citizens.

**Critias: End of an Era (Getting it Wrong: the Paradox of Realist Power)**

“Critias… replied that it was impossible for people who wanted to gain power not to put out of the way those who were best able to thwart them. “But if”’, he said, “merely because we are thirty and not one, you imagine that it is any the less necessary for us to keep a close watch over this government, just as one would if it were an absolute monarchy, you are foolish.”

(Xenophon 2.3.16)

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100 We are referring here to the impact of the Athenian amnesty of 403 following the democratic restoration.
The tragicomedy Sisyphus Fragment, which seems to contain an atheistic argument, has two potential fathers. The first is the noted tragedian Euripides. The second one is the other noted tragedian, Critias. Critias was an Athenian aristocrat, relative of Plato, openly anti-democratic, exiled by democracy, and the fiercest tyrant that ruled Athens from 404-403. The above abstract is part of a dialogue between Critias and Theramenes, the two Athenian leaders of the oligarchic regime, the later called Thirty Tyrants, Sparta imposed on Athens in 404.

When Critias was making these remarks on the aftermath of the Athenian surrender the oligarchic rule was uncontested and no subversive movements were on site. Just a few months later oligarchy was toppled. This part of Athenian history shows not, in our opinion, that a strong democracy never dies. It does show though, that there is something in people, a kind of demand that we cannot quantify but we can observe. This is a longing for recognition that makes demands on people to uphold it even after utter defeat and an internationally imposed political regime by Sparta. It is this successful resistance of democracy against the double pressure from both the oligarchs and Sparta to terminate democracy in Athens at the aftermath of what was close to an annihilating defeat that is the most surprising.

Critias’ logic is similar to that of an offensive realist that recommends the maximisation of relative power (Mearsheimer, 2001). Such a comparison is suitable and fruitful. It is able to demonstrate how the offensive realist logic of power plays out even in domestic politics which is supposed to be inapplicable but at the time was comparable. At the time the Athenian oligarchs were treating the democrats not just as another social group but rather as another state. Athens under the rule of the Thirty Tyrants was similar to international politics because of domestic political fragmentation and polarisation. This political fragmentation and polarisation was not natural. It was the outcome of the oligarchs’ policies that pursued the maximisation of their power and increasingly isolated and estranged those who did not support them and even those who were neutral. The pursuit of the maximisation of relative power can create counter-vailing forces and lead to what has been coined as offensive realism’s self-fulfilling prophecies. Critias’ logic is illustrative of this pitfall and demonstrates that following the offensive realist logic not even surrendering can be secure. In fact, surrendering can thus be rendered insecure leading in surrendering 2.0 by having Sparta accepting Athenian terms too.
The quote at the beginning of this section is from a dialogue that Xenophon, the main historian of this period, cites between Critias and Theramenes. These two were the leading figures of the Thirty Tyrants that dominated politics with their leadership in the beginning of their rule and their disunion at the end of their rule (Krentz, 1982).

They were both interested in the perpetuation of their rule and concerned with the preservation of their power. Critias had even mentioned that Theramenes, in the beginning of the oligarchic rule, was in favour of those labelled sycophantic citizens and scoundrels. It was later that they broke ranks and took their separate ways. It was their disagreement over policy that brought disunion and not vice versa.

Their concern for policy was their concern about primacy and how to retain it. The rift in the oligarchic ranks appeared within a few months of increasing arrests and expanding numbers of reasons for arrests that Critias was advocating and succeeded in pursuing. Theramenes was the courageous leader that put himself in the line of fire only to bitterly pay for it not long after. Theramenes did so not out of religious love, altruistic care or idealism. Unlike Critias, he was alarmed that the pursuit of primacy in this way was self-defeating and would bring the oligarchic rule down soon.

Critias wished to do away with all obstacles to his power. He orchestrated the murders of a huge number of potential dangerous and influential citizens that did not appear to succumb to his power. Some others he forced them into exile and out of his way. He even asked from the Spartans and from General Lysander in particular, the General who had supported the transition to oligarchy in Athens and in many other Greek city-states after the end of the Peloponnesian War, for a Spartan garrison to help the oligarchs with the ‘task’ at hand. In fact, he even promised the Spartans that he would maintain the garrison at the oligarchs’ own charge. And so it happened. This concern for primacy is a familiar realist concern but has a paradoxical trait too.

Critias was cruel but his rationale is a realist one. Critias, like Mearsheimer, Waltz and all realists, believes that power is the ultima ratio of politics. What Critias aims is to secure his power by using his power. He aims at eliminating enough democrats in order not to have his
political regime challenged. What he is advocating in the above quote is nothing else but perpetual hegemony by making sure no rivals rise to challenge the oligarchs’ rule.

This is a familiar concern in international politics. It is the concern about primacy. A leaked Pentagon plan from 1992 stated the following: that the US strategy “must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor” (Jervis, 1993, p. 54). International primacy is important, Huntington argues, to insure one’s security, promote one’s interests, and shape the international environment in ways that will reflect one’s interests and values (Huntington, 1993, p. 70). Both practically and theoretically primacy is of utmost importance and it was what Critias was pursuing in a domestic environment that permitted him to do so.

In fact, not only the domestic environment after the defeat of Athens was permissive of such a policy but Critias enhanced this. Athens after the defeat had lost its navy but for twelve ships. This was important because the navy was where the poor citizens were being employed and it was these citizens that were in favour of the expansion of the democratic franchise to the poor since they were the poor and were fighting the naval battles. In fact, when in 411 another oligarchic coup took over in Athens, it was the democratic navy that had stationed in Samos alongside the other hero of the Peloponnesian War, the exiled until then Alcibiades, that saved democracy in Athens. The potential counterbalancing influence of the navy, just like the navy itself, had vanished from Athens at the time. Many soldiers were also dead. The puppet regime had the blessings of mighty and victorious Sparta which gave it the psychological advantage over the democrats and the option to ask for Spartan help at any point (as it did). The oligarchs then killed or exiled citizens that they considered a potential enemy to their rule. As if this was not enough, Critias and the oligarchs confiscated the remaining weapons of all citizens that were not their declared supporters. The city was more undefended than ever.

All this reveals a paradox of power and of Critias thinking. The increase of power can lead to its demise. This was what Critias critic and eventual adversary, Theramenes, managed to perceive. In a domestic environment that, power-wise, was so secure, the pursuit of more power advantage seems odd. Yet, Theramenes warned that “we are undertaking, in my opinion, two absolutely inconsistent things,-to rig up our government on the basis of force and at the same time to make it weaker than its subjects” (2.3.19). It is not that Critias is
It is that he finds such an argument inconsequential: his view is that force and what the victor wants to impose through it will ultimately prevail.

Critias’ argument is compatible with the pursuit of power, the maximisation of relative power and the idea that power is the ultima ratio which, like the victor’s peace, ignores or undervalues the importance of legitimacy and recognition. His is a very realist world and mind-set. Theramenes with the same concern about primacy is oddly still concerned about legitimacy. However, the argument we will see in the next section goes beyond what Critias can think. The next argument is about legitimacy and recognition and does not pertain to the logic of material power and the view that one can impose its own terms on the defeated side. Whether the defeated side is a state or another political faction does not matter here because in this case study they coincide since the oligarchs are the stewards’ of Athens’ defeat.

The logic of power as the ultima ratio can only entertain the idea that only power can upset power not legitimacy and it is there where the two oligarchs collide. Prima facie Critias seems to be right since he has amassed all the power he wants; hence, legitimacy and recognition do not appear to matter whatsoever. Critias and the oligarchs have maximised their relative power like good offensive realists. They also pursued their primacy which is a realist concern. They also have the power preponderance and domestic hegemony to do so rather safely and with the blessings and support of Sparta and the challenge of its legitimacy does not seem to be able to upset all that. This last logic is also the equivalent logic of the power preponderance school of realism (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2005). Yet, not only Theramenes expounds a different logic but he is the one who is ultimately right. He is the one who announces, so to speak, the end of an era; Critias era, and Critias does not believe him to his peril. Critias inadvertently leads Athenian Surrendering 1.0 to Surrendering 2.0 and it is Theramenes who understands why.

**Theramenes: End of an Era (Getting it Right: from ‘Realism’ to Realism)**

“Theramenes spoke again, saying that unless they admitted an adequate number of citizens into partnership with them in the
management of affairs, it would be impossible for the oligarchy to endure.”
(Xenophon 2.3.19)

“So they bade Theramenes also to seize anyone he pleased; and he replied: ‘But it is not honourable, as it seems to me… Are not such acts altogether more unjust than theirs were?’”
(Xenophon 2.3.22)

It is perhaps the fate of some people to always live between Clashing Rocks. Jason and the Argonauts defeated the so-called Symplegades in their perilous trip but not all are as lucky. The extraordinary trip of the Argonauts can at times represent the lives of certain people. Betrayed by friends and distrusted by opponents, Theramenes lived such a life; a life of his own making. He died in the pursuit of his truth and despite his intellect he was in the end not appreciated but treated like a treacherous Cassandra; prophet of bad omens in which no one believes. His ‘prophecy’, as summarised in the above quotes, was that the oligarchic injustice and neglect for the Athenian democratic ethos was wrong and would lead to the termination of oligarchy just like oligarchy had terminated democracy. And so it did happen and the first victim was none else but Theramenes himself.

One way to see this disagreement between Critias and Theramenes is in terms of the logic of the balance of threat and argue that the oligarchs were increasingly threatening towards the democrats and that moderation would have saved the day. This standpoint would emphasise the importance of actions and the beliefs they generate with the goal being not to make power appear threatening. The cost-benefit calculations regarding the decision to appease or bandwagon the dominant power is based on perceptions of threat (Walt, 1987).

This explanation though is inadequate for two reasons. First of all, the oligarchs were operating under license by the Spartans and the Spartan all too real threat was ever present and constant. Secondly, the Athenians did not revolt because they perceived the oligarchs or the Spartans as more threatening but because, as Theramenes argued, lack of recognition of the Athenian democratic ethos and injustice led to the revolt.
Theramenes was no stranger to this kind of arguments and calculations. He was an adept politician with a history of working with both oligarchs and democrats and having a pragmatic view of oligarchy focusing on how he could make it survive. Back in 411, at the time of the oligarchic coup in Athens, Theramenes was again present in regime change and a leading oligarchic figure. Once more he foresaw the perilous path that oligarchy in Athens was taking and disagreed with his “fellow travellers”. The outcome was to lead the effort of replacing oligarchy with a regime that was closer to democracy and with a bigger franchise. Theramenes seems to have had a knack for this kind of political judgements but unfortunately for him this time was not his time.

When the oligarchs started killing people under false pretexts, confiscating properties for similar reasons and sending people into exile to avoid having opponents domestically Theramenes realised that this was a dangerous behaviour. His argument was not that the oligarchs were not moderate enough but that they were creating the conditions for their demise. The citizens would hate them and those in exile would seize the opportunity and bring about a revolt. One of those in exile was Thrasybulus.

Yet, the other oligarchs and Critias first and foremost could not see that. Critias would justify his reasoning by drawing the distinction between oligarchs and democrats as starkly -and self-servingly- as possibly. He argued that the people will never become friends of the Spartans that saved us whereas the oligarchs would for ever be loyal to them. This served as his justification to then claim that this why whoever is an enemy of oligarchy should be killed. The only thing he did not say was: why not kill them all. But he was close to that.

Critias is making here a rhetorical point which we should take with a pinch of salt but which reveals his faith in power as what creates order. It also discloses a very realist fear he probably harboured; namely, that one can never trust the democrats and that once they had more power, they would do the same to the oligarchs.

For Critias such a mind-set was perhaps justified having suffered a life in exile by the democrats. However, for Theramenes who had managed to navigate the transition from oligarchy to a broader based political regime in Athens in 411 this was far from its pragmatic rationale where compromises were feasible.
Broadly speaking though, if we contrast Critias’ thinking with Walt’s propagation of moderation, we see another paradox of power in realist theorising. Trachtenberg argues pointedly that realists seem to have a negative view of power as something that incites balancing and yet what they advise is moderation which is logically the opposite; namely, that even though power is inherently threatening it can be made to be seen as not (Trachtenberg, 2003). From Critias standpoint moderation does not make sense.

Theramenes, the more pragmatist though, does not propagate moderation for the sake of a diminished perception of threat but because it is unjust and disrespectful towards the Athenian democratic ethos. He is able to think so because like a good pragmatist he believes in what works rather than what is ideally best. In fact, at some point he claims openly in a public speech in the agora of ancient Athens, that he was always opposed to those who thought of oligarchy as imperfect for as long as the tyranny of a few people had not been imposed. Tyranny for the Athenians with a history of tyrannicide which gave birth to their democracy was not just a matter of injustice but also what was against their democratic ethos. Theramenes was attuned to these social, psychological and historical realities and Athenian sensitivities. He thought of them as important even in utter defeat and democratic peril.

In the penultimate speech of his life, Theramenes elaborates on this type of thinking. Oligarchic cruelty and injustice has increased those hostile to their rule and a significant number of their potential leaders is sent into exile able to lead a revolt. His words were the following: “when I saw that many in the city were becoming hostile to this government and that many were becoming exiles, it did not seem to me best to banish either Thrasybulus or Anytus or Alcibiades; for I knew that by such measures the opposition would be made strong, if once the commons should acquire capable leaders and if those who wished to be leaders should find a multitude of supporters” (Xenophon 2.3.42).

However, this was not all. Theramenes continued arguing that those in exile now believe that they have allies everywhere. If they believe so, then this is so because they assume that the oligarchs are doing something they do not like and all citizens of Athens know very well that the Athenians have a history of democratic ethos that the oligarchs now betray. In fact, even the oligarchs, not oblivious to this, had, in the beginning, promised they would rule according to the traditions of Athens. This had left significant room for political interpretation of the meaning of this concept but it did neither express license to kill nor license to do whatever
the oligarchs wanted. If there was any kind of behaviour that the democrats in exile would deem sufficient to help them garner support then, we think, this would be what the oligarchs were doing. In fact, this is not our point but Theramenes’ argument: “And if it is not evident in any other way that what I say is true, look at the matter in this way: do you suppose that Thrasybulus and Anytus and the other exiles would prefer to have us follow here the policy which I am urging by word, or the policy which these men are carrying out in deed? For my part, I fancy that now they believe every spot is full of allies, while if the best element in the state were friendly to us, they would count it difficult even to set foot anywhere in the land!” (Xenophon 2.3.44)

What Theramenes had realised was the social and psychological realities in Athens were as important for the maintenance of the oligarchic rule. Defeat or no defeat these realities had not changed even though as we will see had to and did adjust. Theramenes’ concise arguments perceived that power alone and domestic hegemony, even under the aegis of Sparta, could not secure on their own the meaning of surrendering at any point. The anti-democratic policy, which increasingly resembled genocide, was deeply problematic and counter-productive.

The only way for the oligarchic regime to remain in life would be to become popular. This was Theramenes’ goal but also the opposite goal of Critias and his other fellow oligarchs and their cronies. Oligarchy had a long pedigree in ancient Greece and in certain times and places proved even popular when aligned with populism and the satisfaction of popular demands. There was some room for leeway but the oligarchs eschewed this and created a self-fulfilling prophecy of their demise. Critias, as mentioned above, had even said that they could never become friends with the democrats or the democrats with the Spartans. What mattered for him was who had the power, whose interests were aligned with whose, and that the oligarchs remained aligned with Sparta. In fact, this was Sparta’s choice itself, since one of its central demands of the unconditional surrendering of Athens was regime change. What neither the oligarchs -sort of Theramenes- nor the Spartans realised was that even in utter defeat, the meaning of surrendering could not be simply imposed by the power of arms or even a puppet regime. Instead, it also required some degree of recognition of the ‘other’; that is, of the democrats and their sensitivities.
These sensitivities, hidden from the idea of a victor’s peace and realism’s victory-centrism, were at the forefront of the Athenians and served as the basis of Theramenes’ wise counsel. Theramenes was able to predict the end of the oligarchs’ era and even who would bring it about. One of the names he had mentioned in his final speeches was Thrasybulus who is the protagonist of the next section. Theramenes himself, though, would never come to see Thrasybulus in action being accused, betrayed, and killed by his co-conspirators who did not like his views, distrusted him and eventually thought of him as dangerous. Theramenes, like Socrates but less of the sage-like figure of the old philosopher, died also a bitter death drinking hemlock and betrayed by his own people. He predicted the end of an era and died because he anticipated it.

The Reckoning: Thrasybulus, Social Mobilisation, Surrendering 2.0

Thrasybulus enters this section to trigger the democratic Athenian revolt building on the political climate of hostility and disrespect that had affected Athens. This was a successful insurrection that the oligarchs -except for Thrasymachus who is now dead- did not expect. The oligarchs with Spartan help had tried to secure both Sparta’s firm grip on Athens and their own hegemonic position in Athenian domestic politics. Yet, the potential democratic strategic choice for revolution that Thrasymachus had pinpointed and was afraid would bring the oligarchs’ demise was true. Thrasybulus set it in motion. Thrasybulus is the trigger of all this at the back of oligarchic disrespect of the Athenians. His courageous leadership, not for the first time in his life, turned the tides in Athenian history in favour of democracy. Such was the effectiveness of his actions that the Spartans eventually sided with him and the democrats granting a major concession to his political faction: Surrendering 2.0 under democratic rule.

Thrasybulus was an avowed democrat who was attuned to the importance of democracy to the Athenians. When the oligarchs forced him into exile he did not give up. He waited for the situation in Athens to deteriorate so that he could bring democracy back ‘home’. He was attuned to the crucial role that the Athenian democratic ethos played in the Athenians’ lives. He did not favour the moderate exercise of power by an oligarchy. He craved what the Athenians wanted: the democratic ethos of a democracy.
Thrasybulus knew the importance of this full well. His own life embodied the contrast between oligarchy and democracy in Athens and he knew both its meaning and implications. In biographical terms, Thrasybulus was not simply an astute believer in the merits of democracy, but also an influential citizen coming out of a rich family and yet a supporter of Athenian democracy. This would bring him in conflict with many prosperous Athenian citizens who were traditionally in favour of an oligarchic regime rather than democracy. The first time this happened was in 411 and the second time was in 404-403.

Shortly after the Athenian defeat in the military expedition in Sicily (415-413), Athens had another oligarchic coup. Democracy in Athens at the time had suffered a major blow. The defeat was a major military and financial destruction. It was during this negative period that the oligarchs in Athens openly tried to subvert democracy. It was not that they liked democracy when it was winning but they tolerated it because living in an imperial city-state that provided security and increased international commerce had its advantages. The rich commercial Athenian class faired very well. After Sicily though, the time was ripe to settle old scores with a coup. The oligarchs terminated democracy in 411 and instituted a narrow based oligarchy. This was known as The Four Hundred.

Thrasybulus would come out of this experience as an efficient and pragmatist leader who was instrumental in the return of democracy in Athens. At the time the Athenian fleet was stationed in Samos but the oligarchic coup failed to take hold among the ranks of the fleet. Instead, it was thwarted and Thrasybulus was among the democratic leaders and elected generals of the navy. His involvement was crucial in securing the return of Alcibiades, the seeking of Persian financial support through the help of Alcibiades and the termination of the coup in Athens.

Thrasybulus’s involvement in all this gives away the impression that his belief in democracy was pragmatic rather than dogmatic. He was an astute democrat but not fearful of concessions for democracy’s sake. His reliance on Alcibiades makes this apparent. Alcibiades wanted to help the Athenian fleet to overturn the coup in Athens but initially wanted the return to an oligarchy. This would serve him well personally. He was in exile

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101 Historians disagree about Thrasybulus’ initial role here and whether he supported oligarchy in the beginning or not but this does not change his contribution to the fall of oligarchy (Kagan, 2005, p. 385; Buck, 1998, pp. 27-28).
from Athens since the beginning of the Sicilian expedition, when he had fled his trial. His only way to come back home safe was for a constitutional change that would make his return legal. He had also asserted he could deliver Persian money if there was a regime change in Athens because the Persian king would then trust Athens more. Alcibiades was overstating his case about his ability to garner the Persian money but the situation about what the new political regime in Athens would be was unclear. Eventually, the view that dominated among the Athenian fleet in Samos was for a return to non-democracy. This meant that both the oligarchic coup and any other oligarchy would be unacceptable. This though was a concession because the return to mass democracy would not be full blown. Thrasybulus acted like a good pragmatist and favoured from the beginning this choice that could secure the return of Alcibiades, hopefully Persian support, overthrow the oligarchs in Athens and help Athens win the Peloponnesian War (Kagan, 1987, p. 115).

This experience of Thrasybulus must have had a great impact on him and on his fame. He at once became aware of how to successfully negotiate between what he may have wanted and what was acceptable by the many in a given strategic situation for the benefit of their city-state.

The second time that an oligarchic coup was imposed on Athens, Thrasybulus already knew what to do. He had been there before. This time the strategic situation was more difficult with Sparta overshadowing Athenian political realities but the Athenian people would soon have had enough of the oligarchic disrespect, cruelty and injustices. Thrasybulus waited in Thebes in exile seeing the number of people fleeing Athens for their own security increase and what he perceived as hostility towards the oligarchs increase. Less than a decade ago, he had an important experience of how much Athenians were able to take and how pragmatic they could be in the face of adversity. This must have had served him well. Like in 411, Thrasybulus came to lead the effort of the return to democracy. This time though, reality was more dramatic and he needed to, arguably, take higher risks. This time he would put his life on the line of fire against two enemies: the oligarchs and the Spartans. And so he did with seventy soldiers!

This is what it took to overthrow Athenian oligarchy: a determined general and seventy soldiers. The Athenian frustration had increased. Thrasybulus was relying on this rather than his meagre force. The seventy soon became 700 and then more than 1,000. This exponential
increase was huge. It represented an increase of 700% and then on top of it another increase of 50% percent. For a small force of 70 exiles to be able to incite such huge numbers of support amidst something more than the sheer material power of the seventy must be at work. What was working was Thrasybulus ‘bet’.

Thrasybulus’ ‘bet’ or calculated risk, as both Xenophon tells us and Theramenes had forewarned the oligarchs, relied on what attitude he expected to have been able to inspire in the Athenians. What he relied on was that the oligarchs had frustrated the democrats and that the more they were doing so, the more they nurtured Thrasybulus’ ambitious plan. The oligarchs with their actions had frustrated the Athenian democratic ethos and sense of justice. This made imaginable the expectation that the Athenians in Athens would not support the oligarchs and the Athenians in exile would support the revolution. The terror campaign of the oligarchs was failing. Their exercise of power despite the seeming lack of resistance did not work. It was about to backfire because it made the citizens believe they could mobilise in large numbers. Thrasybulus’ time waiting in Thebes for the perfect opportunity did not go to waste. This was the moment.

Thrasybulus was the fuse that lit the revolution and his courageous risky attitude was essential. However, neither the Athenian will for recognition nor Thrasybulus’ role should be prioritised here. They were both essential. One needs both the powder keg and the fuse to make an explosion.

Social movements’ theory can be helpful here to give us an abstract understanding of what took place in Athens. As Charles Tilly argues, democratic social movements require four necessary elements to win public support: worthiness, numbers, commitment, and unity (Tilly, 2005, pp. 215-225). In other words, the participants should live up to public standards of virtue, many people to participate in the movement, the participants to display a willingness to make personal sacrifices for their cause, and to have a clear set of demands. Such a theoretical viewpoint makes the distance between 403BC and 2015 appear small. The only thing missing initially was the numbers. The participants had a virtuous cause, the restitution of democracy, and their leader was a respected democrat with proved pro-democratic credentials. Both Thrasybulus and his initial unit of seventy exiles were clearly making a statement about their determination and willingness to take on the fight against
The fight against oligarchy was by itself one clear demand. The missing numbers though did not prove a problem.

Numbers increased because the Athenians knew that they could only get their lost recognition by fighting their way back to it and, crucially enough, they had come to expect it. Nexon here, with some debt to Tilly as well, is very helpful having argued that there is a relationship between identity-based pathways for collective mobilisation and the density of social ties among the participants (Nexon, 2009, pp. 48-51). The stronger these are the more effective and sustainable the mobilisation is. The common identity cause was present and was triggered by the oligarchic disrespect. The network density of the exiles was more difficult to organise but Thrasybulus and his comrades’ courage served as a call for action. This would feel all the more reliable not because there were seventy soldiers but because people believed more would join.

Thrasybulus had taken shelter in Thebes for the period of his exile and the Theban leader, Ismenias, welcomed him and supported him but this was not the crucial factor. The crucial factor was the social mobilisation. Thebes did not and would not openly defy Sparta despite being resentful of Sparta’s disregard for its demands. Ironically enough, one of Thebes’ demands after the Peloponnesian war was the destruction of Athens. Sparta for reasons that a balance of power theorist would expect chose not to destroy Athens. They claimed not to want to destroy Athens because it had helped the Greeks defeat Persia in the Persian Wars (Xenophon 2.2.20). Probably though, they thought that eliminating Athens would better serve Thebes and Corinth rather than Sparta itself because Athens could counterbalance the power of neighbouring Thebes and Corinth (Cartledge, 2012, p. 27). The survival of Athens would preserve the regional balance of power and that would be beneficial for Sparta. Moreover, a subdued Athens would follow Sparta in its campaigns as had been mentioned in the terms of surrendering. Sparta was still very powerful and Thebes did not want to clearly challenge it. It was rather “cool” toward Sparta (Buck, 1998, p. 68). Theban support to Thrasybulus was useful but limited.

Balance of Power theorists like Waltz may ignore the importance of this crucial development but it shows that a balance of power, whether between states or within states -even an
unequal equilibrium of power- may ultimately rely on social foundations for its stability\textsuperscript{102}. This is crucial because it contradicts the core wager of balance of power theory; namely, that “systemic balances of power represent some kind of natural tendency of international politics” (Nexon, 2009, p. 335). The democratic Athenians, living in a doubly self-help system, domestically and internationally, chose -contra structural realism’s logic- not to “place power-political considerations before other considerations” and risked falling by the wayside which in their case was risking their death (Nexon, 2009, p. 336). Yet, they succeeded and they achieved that through what arose in Athenian politics.

What arose in Athenian politics was “contentious politics” and their nature was social. The domestic political order was contested. The increased oligarchic repression became an opportunity rather than merely a threat. The whole political situation with Thrasybulus actions became an opportunity and empowered the democratic Athenians. However, this power was external to them. They did not possess it. It was created through social action and it was in action that this power existed. They people did not own it. This thinking pattern does not fit a realist mind-set. As Sidney Tarrow argues about contentious politics, “[c]hanging opportunities and constraints… provide the openings that lead resource-poor actors to engage in contentious politics” (Tarrow, 1998, p. 20). The Athenians were resource-poor actors, yet, when they mobilised created power and were able to defeat the oligarchs and rehabilitate democracy.

Nothing happened immediately and nothing was certain. Neither the sustainability of the social mobilisation was certain nor was its successful outcome unavoidable. This analysis provides some cues or a heuristic conceptual framework of analysis that focuses on how in a given strategic environment and in changing strategic opportunities the actors by thinking and acting strategically can change outcomes and the environment itself by creating power in action despite being resource-poor actors.

The fact that resource-poor actors like the Athenian exiles can create power in action through mobilisation is challenging for realism for another reason. Neo-classical realists have challenged Balance of Power theory by rejecting the idea of the idea of the state as a black box and focusing on the problematic idea of the constant mobilisation capacity of the state;

\textsuperscript{102} For a very good analysis on the Balance of Power (BoP) see Daniel Nexon’s tripartite distinction of the BoP leading him to challenge realism’s hegemonic position as a theory because of the BoP (Nexon, 2009).
that is, that it can mobilise all the power it has (Rose, 1998; Schweller, 2006). A focus on the internal dynamics of states is different from what the Athenians achieved. Thinking about why the Athenian state was not able to mobilise as much power as it could is a different question from the question of how did the democrats manage to create power and defeat the oligarchs. The first question is concerned about how the state can make more efficient use of material power whereas the other question concerns how resource-poor actors can upset the political arrangements of resource-rich actors. In the first question the importance of recognition can be explained away by realists if they simply claim that state authorities may seem to be paying attention to recognition but they are simply acting egoistically, self-interestedly and manipulatively rather than believing that recognition has any inherent quality. The second question sees recognition as an important concept on its own being an ethical concept that is able to inspire people and lead them to take high-risk actions.

The democrats in exile did take such high-risk actions in their fight for democracy. They did not shy away from confronting the thirty Tyrants with their 3,000 hoplites and the Athenian cavalry even though they were just seventy. A storm averted the battle but in the meantime the exiles increased in numbers. Reinforced in numbers they were able to mobilise 700 men but still fighting the well-armed Spartan garrison and part of the Athenian cavalry was a big task. A brilliant surprise attack orchestrated by Thrasybulus succeeded in catching the enemy force ill-prepared and rout it while killing more than 120 Spartans. Soon after the 700 became more than 1,000 and a skirmish followed. Subsequently, the rebels chose a better strategic position and, vastly outnumbered by 5 to 1, they fought both the Thirty Tyrants and the Spartan garrison and found their way to victory again (Buck, 1998, pp. 77-79).

The Athenian oligarchs then called for Sparta’s help. Lysander was sent to help restore order and he went to Athens determined to subdue the restless Athenian democrats. However, the Spartan king, Pausanias, was worried by Lysander’s increasing domestic influence and by the possibility that his potential victory in Athens could garner him significant influence over Athenian politics. Lysander was the general who had defeated Athens in the last battle of the Peloponnesian War at Aegospotamoi, dictated the terms of surrendering and was highly regarded and prominent in Sparta despite not being a king. Lysander was also famous for having had hand-picked local boards of ten, the so called “decarchies”, in Greek city-states to control them. These were the unpopular puppet regimes, like the Thirty Tyrants in Athens, which Sparta had imposed in its effort to maintain its hegemony after its victory in the
Peloponnesian War (Meiggs, 1975, p. 401; Hamilton, 1970). Pausanias had sufficient reasons to be alarmed by Lysander’s fame and managed to convince three out of the five Spartan leaders of the council of ephors to let him lead the military campaign. Indeed, he led the expeditionary force but his policy goals opposed those of Lysander’s though not openly (Kagan, 1969, p. 29). Eventually, he managed to defeat the rebels and pursue his goal.

Domestic politics in Athens and the Athenian rebellion conspired to an unexpected outcome and democracy was being reinstated this time by the help of Spartan hands. After the Spartan victory Pausanias, who, as Xenophon comments approvingly, did not get angry at the rebels, who caused him so much trouble with their rebellion and with their fighting during the battle, arranged for an agreement. He “sent secretly and instructed the men in Piraeus to send ambassadors to him and the ephors who were with him, telling them also what proposals these ambassadors should offer; and they obeyed him” (Xenophon 2.4.35). Eventually, the Spartans decided in favour of reconciliation and favoured a democratic regime with Thrasybulus being at the time becoming a leading figure.

It is reasonable for a realist to retort that the crucial factor here is the divided Spartan domestic politics and one would justly wonder so. Nevertheless, this is only a partial explanation and does not grasp the importance of the Athenian achievement. Whether the Spartans reinstated the thirty with their brutal politics or not they would still have to confront the issue of reconciliation. The Thirty Tyrants’ reign of terror did not work. More terror would not change the problems that arose out of the repression of the Athenian democrats. The only solution out of it would be to kill them all, send them into exile or keep suppressing every revolt until they become so scared and so resentful that they would ever hateful of the Spartans. Realists, and wisely so, do not support a policy of hatred. Moreover, such a move would eventually turn out to be counter-productive since a weakened Athens would serve less as an ally to Sparta’s imperial plans. Theramenes had previously stated so clearly:

“we ought not to make the state weak; for I saw that, in preserving us, the purpose of the Lacedaemonians had not been that we might become few in number and unable to do them any service; for if this had been what they desired, it was within their power, by keeping up the pressure of famine a little while longer, to leave not a single man alive” (Xenophon 2.3.42).
So, an illegitimate domestic order under more and more killings and pressure could easily end up destroying or weakening Athens so much that it could not serve the Spartans any longer. And this is what the Spartan realist original calculations had tried to avert even at the expense of confronting their own allies, Thebes and Corinth.

This may also sound like a matter of using the right amount of force in order to avert a state of terror. Waltz argues for instance that the difference between offensive and defensive realists is about the amount of requisite force in foreign policy and the preference over offensive or defensive strategies (Waltz, 2004, p. 6).

However, this would still ignore the importance of the social dynamics of the situation. In cases like surrendering the conqueror can face a dilemma about how to handle the situation and there is no way out of it by just choosing how much power to apply discarding or downplaying the importance of social dynamics. A decisive and powerful strategy like Lysander’s cannot avoid these problems. A more compromising approach still does not eschew these problems. Both Theramenes and Pausanias realised that. The first realised that the only way for the oligarchs to retain their power was to become more legitimate and bring their regime closer to democracy by making it more broadly based. Pausanias realised that reconciliation in Athens would best serve Spartan interests.

This is the famous dilemma between an easy surrender and the conqueror’s ability to control the defeated. The more force the conqueror applies through a divide-and-conquer strategy the more inefficient its rule becomes. The very act of domestic political fragmentation helps decide the outcome of war, just like in the logic of bandwagoning in countries with fragmented elites as in Schweller’s theory of bandwagoning, and as the Athenians did with the rise of the oligarchs (Schweller, 1994). However, this ignores some social dynamics: “[f]ostering disunity in the defeated enemy, disrupting the social fabric so as to fragment the united will to resist can have the undesired consequence of reducing the effectiveness of coercion. If those in a position to respond to coercion are insensitive to the cries of those to whom it is applied, which is more likely when fragmentation occurs, then coercion fails” (Kaplan, 1980, p. 79). Schweller’s logic in his argument about bandwagoning also ignores this by presenting a static theory of the state that misses such dynamics that can lead to the mobilisation of people and the generation of power that they do not own. The fact that he is building on Waltz’s structural argument does not help his logic avoid this problem. There is
no easy way to achieve maximum acquiescence at minimal cost as any victor wants (Kaplan, 1980, p. 79). What needs to be adjusted is the logic of the victor’s peace. Even in utter defeat, some degree of legitimation and how one handles issues of recognition as they arise can become crucial.

Recognition may be confused with material interest but we should be careful and avoid such misunderstanding of the significance of the concept. Those in exile would definitely want to get their houses back and their lives back. However, if they cared about their lives, then it did not make sense to endanger their life in order to regain it. They endangered their lives for their social identity. Thrasybulus serving as the fuse in social mobilisation did not serve to alleviate the risks and fears of the Athenians who were about to face the possibility of dying fighting. He served to inspire a worthy death for a worthy cause. As Tilly says, social mobilisation also requires the participants to display a willingness to make personal sacrifices for their cause.

Moreover, the Athenians who fought and bled for the return of democracy to Athens appear to have done so out of a genuine democratic ethos. Such feelings existed even among the Athenians within Athens even though they were more afraid. Xenophon brings this to the surface with another insightful comment of his. At a moment during the civil war the Thirty Tyrants feel insecure after having lost a battle against the rebels and try to secure their grip on power. They decide to take more repressive measures and start arresting citizens they had included in a black list. Xenophon remarks that those citizens who were only concerned about their narrow self-interest were not bothered (Xenophon 2.4.10). Obviously, for the others this was important and it was these others that were anti-oligarchic or hostile to oligarchs or appeared to be neutral.

This democratic ethos was critical both during the civil war and when the democrats won and voted for an amnesty. Recognition is not a factor that matters only temporarily and that is why it needs to be taken into account in a holistic analysis. The case for the amnesty illustrates this point. Amnesty in Greek literally means to not remember (Cartledge, 2012, p. 28; Carawan, 2006). The Athenians chose to not remember so that the victors would forget.

103 Wolpert compares the Corcyraean civil war’s cruelty to highlight the difference with the Athenian civil war’s amnesty. He argues that “as Corcyra shows, pragmatic considerations do not always lead a people to choose the
victory and the losers would not become resentful (Wolpert, 2002; Dorjahn, 1946). Their concern was their whole city; the city as a democracy. This all-encompassing care for the city was not an easy ‘pill’ to swallow. It was not uncommon in ancient Greece for a civil war to lead to a massacre (Raaflaub, 1997). In fact, the oligarchs were close to acting like this toward the democrats during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants and post-civil-war retributions were not unimaginable. Cartledge estimates they had killed between 1,200-1,500 in a population of just 20,000 which is a bit less than 10% of the city’s citizens (Cartledge, 2012, p. 28). Of course the Spartan influence played a restraining role here. The Spartans favoured what the ancient Greeks called a moderate democracy rather than the radical mass democracy with the expanded Athenian franchise of the 5th century BC. However, even this democracy had to rely not just on the fear of the Spartans but also on the democratic ethos of the Athenians which appears to have come out stronger out of this ordeal.

One does not need to endorse a mono-causal explanation for surrendering or for the amnesty. Material factors and concerns, for example for one’s life and house, do not exclude the impact of concerns for social identity and justice (Ober, 2002). They were all crucial. We need to remember though that recognition was both an important factor on its own and work in progress. The concern for recognition and its benefits was something that the Athenians would cultivate for decades based on the agreed amnesty (Xenophon 2.4.38, 2.4.43). It was this that sustained their democracy alive in the tumultuous years preceding the Macedonian conquest (Cartledge, 2012, p. 28). We are simply saying that democracy is a work in progress104 and the reason why the Athenians were so good at it was that they acted according to this democratic ethos. It was not easy as we know from studies of the judicial life in Athens and the contents of the litigations where grievances from the oligarchic period and the civil war would resurface but they would be put under a lid and be restricted to only civil courts and would not violate the general amnesty (Loraux, 2002). The pursuit of recognition is a constant but it is also a work in progress amenable to transformations and compromises just like it happened with the amnesty and just like it happened with the less radical Athenian course of action that best serves its interests... The Athenians could have simply dismissed pragmatic considerations in order to obtain private satisfaction for past grievances.” (Wolpert, 2002, p.xii).

104 One does not need to posit a stable essence of democracy. Part of democracy’s potential vitality is its ability to adjust and change. Ober has argued about how to criticise democracy and how important it is for democracy to undertake actual revisions (Ober, 1994). So, pragmatic revisions rather than being seen as a problem, they represent an element of strength for democracy.
democracy that both the Spartans and the Athenians accepted in a mutual compromise that led to Surrendering 2.0.

**Conclusion**

What the Athenians achieved represents not only a historical challenge to hegemons as an example of what the weak can achieve but also to realists who ignore the implications and logic of the Athenian success. We are not challenging realism on the familiar ground of its lack of predictive capacity. We contest neorealism’s victor biased logic of history and its bias against the variable of recognition. The Athenian logic of surrender was not just for survival, as it is for realists. The Athenian logic of surrender risked survival in the pursuit of a degree of recognition.

Recognition that leads to social mobilisation due to inspirational leadership creates new power and represents a logic that due to realism’s victor bias is exogenous to the structure of the international system, its logic of history its view of the assumption of survival. The actors who may suffer from realism’s lack of consideration of the possibility of the logic of surrender that combines survival and recognition are those that have less or little material power, the only variable that Waltz allows to vary in his structure of the international system. So, if Waltz owes something to this material bias that stems from its only view of power and peace, victor’s peace, is a bias against weak states that can successfully challenge powerful states and succeed in their demands. This affects Waltz in an ambiguous way but affects crucially those we transform Waltz’s theory of international politics as the basis for a theory of foreign policy and reify both its view of peace and its view of survival.

We have made this case based on three reasons. First of all, the Athenian democrats and Athens itself did not fall by the wayside, so this logic of surrender is consequential. Secondly, this logic led from Surrendering 1.0 to Surrendering 2.0, which was the stable one, and shows that anarchy is not necessarily reproduced by anarchy, as it does in Waltz, but by recognition too (Goddard & Nexon, 2005, p. 32). Thirdly, this causal logic challenges two Waltzian assumptions; namely that authority matters marginally and that authority ‘quickly reduces to particular expression of capability’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 88). This logic of surrender relies on recognition which took away authority from the oligarchs and the Spartans that did not
recognise the democrats and gave authority to the revolutionaries helping them to both mobilise and create new power. This logic helped the weak Athenian democrats. The only people who are worse off to get advice from realism in such a case are the weak willing to take risks on the back of their defeat and their enemy’s victory in the name of non-material goals on the basis of non-material variables.

The challenge addressed to neorealism stands even for neo-classical realism that builds on Waltz’s theory and considers itself as progressive (Schweller, 2003; Schweller, 1997). The victor bias makes both neorealism and neo-classical realism averse to consider two of the connections between Surrendering 1.0 and Surrendering 2.0: social dynamics and time.

The first connection obscured is the social dynamics that link Surrendering 1.0 and Surrendering 2.0. Schweller has compared strategic surrendering to bandwagoning and we take this as license to engage with his work on bandwagoning (Schweller, 1997, p. 928). The problem is not that he ignores the importance of recognition. One could add it as a variable. The problem is that the pursuit of recognition challenges the victor bias through its dynamic rather than static social impact vis-à-vis the polarisation of domestic politics and the mobilisation of the democrats. Two things come out of this. Firstly, as we saw above, recognition through the facilitation of social mobilisation is responsible for the generation of new power and the victory of the resource-poor rebels. Secondly, it demonstrates the pitfalls of reifying variables such as the domestic political fragmentation that in practice can be dynamic and fluid but which in Schweller’s theory of bandwagoning is dichotomous\(^{105}\) (Schweller, 1994). Critias, for instance, wanted to subdue his fellow citizens through terror but ended up polarising his society. It was not the fragmentation of domestic politics that caused this but Critias’ indifference to the importance of recognition. A static view of politics based on dichotomous domestic political variables cannot accommodate the dynamic nature of recognition. Without recognising ‘recognition’, the status quo tendency of realism’s victor bias makes it hard to connect the dots between Surrendering 1.0 and Surrendering 2.0.

When Rathbun argues that particular paradigms do not own domestic politics and ideas, asserting instead that each paradigm has access to these variables but must make them their

\(^{105}\) Nexon and Pouliot analyse such a point about how impoverished an analysis of variables is when they are devoid of process. They echo Elias and argue that ‘[t]he “reduction of processes to static conditions,” such as the tendency to “say ‘the wind is blowing’, as if the wind were actually a thing at rest which, at a given point in time, begins to move and blow”’ (Nexon & Pouliot, 2013, p. 342).
own, he is correct but he echoes an old debate (Rathbun, 2008). The challenge we present here is that neoclassical realism, and we take Schweller to be a key figure, inherits neorealism’s victor bias both because it uses Waltz as the starting point of its analysis and because of the way it thinks about variables and their dynamics. The logic of surrender we inferred from this case study relates to how power is created, which variables and reasons are pertinent, what can affect the effectiveness of action inspired by the logic of surrender. It also affects the regional balance of power and the stability and meaning of surrendering. Yet, these are unrecognisable to realism if it continues theorising with a victor bias and reify the assumption of survival as mere autonomy. Realists are interested in security but they cannot account for the Athenian case in a way consistent with their theories.

The second connection obscured by realism’s victor bias is that the time lapse between the two instances of surrendering should not be a warrant for an a priori rigid periodisation. Time does not only separate. It connects too. This realist periodisation makes the social dynamics linked to recognition be less obvious because it predisposes one to study the two instances of surrendering as separate and not seek their connections. Both instances of surrendering are connected representing the end of one and the same war. In fact, their chronological distance is far shorter than the time it took for Wold War One to reignite into what is called World War Two but which has also been perceived as just one war, another thirty years war. The Athenian case is an exemplar of how some events are connected. It is a subjective and not objective research decision to study them as separate. For Athens it did not take eleven years for the run up to Surrendering 2.0. It merely required eight months of oligarchic rule. Thinking about surrendering helps one appreciate the fragility of political outcomes and how seemingly disparate events are actually connected. How we end wars and how we build peace are cut from the same cloth. These two issues are far more connected than realism seems to assume. This has practical consequences and a venerable research tradition like realism should have paid more attention to it.

To summarise, realism ignores the logic of surrender that combines the pursuit of survival with the pursuit of recognition and which, as we argued, relates to the concepts of leadership, social mobilisation, new power in action. Realism ignores this logic, is biased towards the perpetuation of the status quo and theoretically disadvantages resource-weak actors. It does so not thanks to prudence but due to this research programme’s way of seeing peace through its systematic victor bias incorporated in Waltz’ structure of the international system and the
assumption of survival when used as the basis for a theory of foreign policy. It also cannot accommodate the variable ‘recognition’ at the beginning of the creation of order. This leads realism to downplay the importance it assigns to social factors and to endorse a problematic periodisation.

The Athenian democrats’ achievement can be seen as a criticism of realism’s victor bias. Thrasybulus, the voice of the democrats, with words stark and succinct, words uttered in a monumental speech after the civil war, and with a tint of irony, said:

“”I advise you... men of the city, to 'know yourselves.' And you would best learn to know yourselves were you to consider what grounds you have for arrogance, that you should undertake to rule over us... Well then, would you say that you are superior in intelligence, you who having a wall, arms, money, and the Peloponnesians as allies, have been worsted by men who had none of these?” (Xenophon 2.4.40).

These words should not be seen as just a criticism toward the oligarchs. They count as a broader cautionary remark; a remark about what realists are willing to advice as prudent based on their own theories.
Conclusion

This thesis set out to study the puzzle of surrender because as we have seen in chapter 1 realism’s view of peace as victor’s peace reproduces a great-power-centric consequentialist logic, a victor bias, which at its heart disadvantages weak states at a theoretical level and marginalises the importance of non-material determinants of the will of the weak state. Thus, realists are left to account for the weak states’ will based on their limited power or their presumed irrationality. We hypothesised that this may not be the case and that realism may misunderstand logics of surrender given variations in the timing, process and stability of surrender, and remarks found in Thucydides and Clausewitz’s work, as well as, more recently by General Petraeus. We then exposed how neorealists and neoclassical realists reify the assumption of surrender by misappropriating Waltz’s theory of the structure of the international system which only serves, it has been argued, to reproduce the victor bias. The thesis then presented the two contending realist drives for surrender, fear and profit, as found in Walt’s view of appeasement and Schweller’s analysis of bandwagoning for profit. It then contextualised this critique within the broader war termination literature and IR debates. It illustrated that the war termination literature suffers from a similar biased view of the will of the weak other showcasing the potential broader impact of this research. It also highlighted that this is particularly problematic for IR given the rather privileged status that realism enjoys in the discipline of IR even by some of its critics with regard to its view of war and survival in war. This thesis argued in chapter 2 that if we start our approach with a realist-friendly framework of analysis, the Strategic Choice Approach, but broaden it to include non-rational factors to avoid the victor bias and problematise the assumption of survival, we can then gain a better sense of why surrender happens. We then linked this framework of analysis with recent advances in narratological studies of Thucydides’ work to show the richness of insights this great thinker is still providing us and the suitability of our approach.

The three empirical chapters maintained that the states that surrendered in all three cases studies did so out of a combination of fear and concern for recognition. In the first case study on the Plataean surrender to Sparta, chapter 3, we observed that the realist focus on fear was explaining neither the timing of surrender nor the process of it. Only when the Plataean
emotion of gratitude toward Athens, which is linked to the idea of recognition, was acknowledged were we able to explain the Plataean logic of surrender and the delay in it. In *chapter 4*, the Acanthians surrendered to Sparta not out of profit or fear, as realists would expect, but out of a combination of fear and seduction, an outcome of masterful diplomacy that evoked recognition, by the Spartan general Brasidas. The last empirical chapter, *chapter 5*, articulated the view that the surrender of Athens to Sparta in 404 should be seen as linked to the Athenian revolution and Athenian surrender in 403. This linkage is better explained not by the materialist logic of realism that would focus on fear but by emphasising the importance of recognition as the unacknowledged factor that illuminates why the Athenians resumed fighting against the odds and their subsequent final surrender.

In the following four sections of the conclusion we will elaborate on our conclusions, offer the original contribution of this study, provide suggestions for possible extensions of the current argument and then suggest one policy implication.

**The Arguments**

This thesis advances three claims that all together support the idea that realism suffers from a victor bias which obscures aspects of the will of the other and especially one of its central elements, recognition. Recognition has a fundamental impact even on considerations of surrender which pertain to realism’s central problematique survival/war and ought to have been hard cases for realism. Realism obscures reasonable high-risk ethically inspired strategies of weak states in high-stake cases like instances of surrender.

First, weak states’ concern for recognition strongly affects their willingness for high-risk strategies in dealing with the dilemma of surrender. States will go to great strides to avoid shame when they feel gratitude, a feeling deriving from recognition, towards a great power ally and will placate their concerns for alliance entrapment and will be willing to delay surrender. States will surrender quickly if they feel recognised by a great power even if it is threatening them, in which case recognition when successful and accepted is in effect seduction. States that suffered defeat or groups within such a state that are able to present themselves as upholders of the state’s sense of ethos and have a sense of injustice, even if they have given up and are in dire straits, will still attempt to reverse some of the results of
the surrender by being able, under certain conditions, to create power in action by externalising their concerns arising from lack of recognition. Taken together, these perceptions about recognition explain a great deal about surrender. In their total absence, as in a materialist realist account, concerns for fear and profit will dominate and make these states highly compliant and predictable.

Second, ignoring weak states’ concern for recognition leads realism to three kinds of status quo biases as a consequence of victor bias. Victor bias operates at the level of realism’s view of peace and manifests itself in different ways. It serves to minimise the importance of non-material and social determinants of the will of the other, which have a different impact in all three of our case studies. Realism’s victor bias obscures reasonable high-risk strategies inspired by concerns for recognition of weak states. These concerns forged social coherence and social mobilisation which the case studies have mentioned and together with inspirational leadership in the last two of the case studies contributed to a) high-risk resistance delaying surrendering, b) high-risk post-surrender bandwagoning relying on seduction and increased identification with one great power and not just a material cost-benefit calculus; c) high-risk resistance. The third case study is fairly straightforward with regard to realism’s status quo bias given that fear does not explain the Athenian resistance, which should have led to compliance with the status quo. The status quo bias of realism in the other two case studies needs to be articulated more explicitly. Starting from the second case, we observed that the quality of the outcome made the difference and not the outcome of surrender per se. In the second empirical chapter we emphasised seduction which, unlike what realism would expect, led to the Acanthians to a) follow Sparta in the campaigns and make public inscriptions of their military expeditions – a direct affront to Athens; b) avoid domestic political polarisation which could have ensued had the Spartans pursued a policy of self-aggrandisement, and; c) set the grounds for sustaining Spartan reputation and momentum in Northern Greece which led to a domino effect of other city-states which followed suit on the heels of the Acanthian surrender. This domino effect that begun in Acanthus had its roots in a non-realist logic of surrender and this is what the victor bias obscures. In this very sense, victor bias led to status quo bias. In the first case study, it is again the quality of the outcome that makes the difference and not the outcome of surrender per se but in a different way. The Plataean attachment to their alliance with Athens for both military and socio-cultural reasons explains why they honoured their alliance until the very end while under siege and why this attachment bond was so difficult to be broken. Realists only see the military side of the
equation but this thesis argued that the rigid form of alliance between the two city-states cannot be explained without recourse to the history of the relations between Athens and Plataea and the Plataean feelings of gratitude. The outcome of this is the generation of inflexible alliances at the regional level which polarises the regional international system. One such alliance was that between Athens and Plataea. In this very sense, realism’s victor bias leads to a status quo bias because it obscures the non-fear based polarising effects of alliances at the international system, which then can become unstable and prone to change (Jervis, 1997, p. 99).

Third, the actual concern of states for physical survival should be supplanted by a concern for recognition. This is exemplified by the three logics of surrender identified in the case studies: 1) surrender out of fear as long as one does not do anything shameful (Plataea); 2) surrender out of fear and seduction (Acanthus); 3) surrender out of fear and as long as one feels a degree of recognition (Athens). The feelings of shame and seduction are linked to the idea of recognition, so the common theme in all three logics of surrender is fear and recognition. The pursuit of recognition is a central finding because at times it can even put at risk the pursuit for physical survival. This demonstrates the irreducible ambiguity of the concept of survival for as long as states pursue a degree of recognition. Realism has acknowledged great powers’ pursuit of revisionist goals at the expense of their physical security. It is high time it recognised weak states’ pursuit of recognition even at the expense of their physical security. It is high time realists brought the weak state in.

**Original Contribution**

Even when considering hard cases for realism, such as instances of surrender, we are still able to criticise realism about war and survival, its home turf, from a realist-friendly perspective and indicate its limitations. We ultimately criticise realism’s view of peace as victor’s peace but we do not do so out of a principled normative position on peace but because it reproduces a victor bias and status quo bias that skew even realist explanations of surrender. We acknowledge that states have different visions of peace. We have not advanced a positive agenda for peace. We accept the realist principle that it would be too difficult for states to agree on a global vision of peace. Nevertheless, following a slightly different footwork, we ended up criticising realism. Simply put, realism’s view of peace and view of
survival are particularistic and not objective. Realists do not accurately present a world divided by different worldviews, as they wish to think. They actually present a world in which different worldviews about peace among states amount to little more than the pursuit of survival defined as autonomy. This is particularly acute with regard to weak states. States surrender for peace with some degree of recognition but realists do not know peace with recognition nor survival as more than autonomy. So, realists present their view of peace as a Catch-22 because mutually conflicting worldviews reinforce realism’s supposedly agnostic view over peace. What this actually shows, however, is that realists contradict themselves. They claim that states have different worldviews, yet, in war, they expect states to fight not for different types of peace but merely for survival. Moreover, they admit that some great powers may even endanger their existence in order to construct their preferred world order and peace. They do not draw analogous implications though, for when weak states fight. To demonstrate this, we have developed an argument that links realism’s view of peace, its assumption of survival, and the neorealist and neoclassical realist misappropriation of Waltz’s theory.

We criticise realism's view of survival for being only about autonomy and not about recognition. We start by criticising realism’s view of peace. Then, we criticise realism for reifying the assumption of survival to mean just autonomy. We then link the two assumptions and argue that they both sustain realism’s victor bias because, for realism, the ultimate goal of weak states is autonomy defended by material power. This is the only type of power realism’s version of peace seems to acknowledge. In examining instances of surrender we show that weak states surrender not only for physical survival but also for a modicum of recognition. This contradicts the realist view of survival as merely about autonomy and the realist view of peace as built on material power and on what the strong imposes since, as we show, the weak may act upon reasonable but high-risk ethically inspired policies. In this sense, we link realism’s view of peace and view of survival and posit that they are interlinked. They provide a biased basis for analysing surrender. This leads realism to problematic understandings of logics of surrender.

Various scholars have criticised realism for its view of peace (Richmond, 2006), its view of power (Baldwin, 2013), its status quo bias (Schweller, 1996), and for ignoring how the subordinate can be reconciled to their status by making them believe they are benefitting by hegemony and by avoiding short-term gains (Lebow, 2006). We acknowledge that when
realists try to eschew short-termism, they at times advocate prudence, as Lebow remarks about Brooks and Wohlfirth, and they “warn against using power to make short-term gains at the expense of long-term interests” (Lebow, 2006, p. 314). We do not contest the intra-realist critique that defensive realists have ignored revisionist powers. We take stock of the idea that realists have a non-normative view of peace or a non-relational view of power. We make a contribution to these debates, however, by adding another layer of criticism. Another way of approaching such concerns is by putting front and centre realism’s view of peace and view of the assumption of survival. Taken together, they represent two mutually reinforcing facets of realism’s vision of peace and what is worth fighting for.

Not the least in instances of surrender, these two realist assumptions usually go unchallenged for cases of war in IR. Even if we remain agnostic about qualities of peace, we argue, we can criticise realism’s material view of power by criticising realism’s view of peace-victor’s peace-for being problematic. We also argue that, as a result of this analysis and our empirical findings, realists discount the potential importance of weak states in IR, and the consequential non-material determinants of their will. Bringing the weak state in reveals a victor bias and a status quo bias in realism. This is not covered by offensive realists’ call to bring the revisionist state back in. It cannot be covered by bringing the weak state in in some straightforward additive way either. Adding a variable for the will of the ‘other’ will not explain this challenge away. The problem runs deep in realism. It is intertwined with its view of the system and its view of foreign policy, which correspond to realism’s view of peace and view of survival respectively.

We illustrate that tracing the way neorealists and neoclassical realists think about war and peace, and taking realism to its logical conclusion on the topical concern of surrender, enables us to appreciate what is problematic and biased in realism itself. It also makes us doubt the theoretical consistency of realist calls for moderation and for a ‘hearts and minds’ approach (Mearsheimer, 2002). Unlike Trachtenberg who attributes such inconsistency to realists’ unclear view of power, we argue that the problem is more fundamental (Trachtenberg, 2003). It relates to realists’ view of peace and view of survival.
Possible Extensions of the Argument and Ideas for Future Research

The conclusions of this thesis lead us to consider new ways of approaching issues revolving around the idea of the power of the powerless. This thesis did not set out to attempt to theorise issues of social coherence and social mobilisation but in its reading of surrender was led to highlight their role in the course of the historical narratives. In so doing we relied on the literature by Tilly, Tarrow and Nexon. In the case studies a connection was revealed among i) the degree of attachment of a weak power to a great power; ii) social mobilisation and social coherence; iii) inspirational leadership; iv) concerns for recognition; and a) generation of the power of resolve and resistance; b) the power of compliance; c) and the insurgency’s power in action. The causal argument between social attitudes, such as social mobilisation on one hand, and generation of power of the powerless on the other hand remains to be articulated more fully in a future work. What particularly animates our interest is that these concerns seem to provide links to Berenice Carroll’s research on the powers of the powerless (Carroll, 1972, pp. 607-614; Carroll, 1980, p. 69). Further expansion of the argument might find fertile ground in Koselleck’s idea that “the vanquished, in their attempt to rework and understand their negative experiences, are those who develop new methodological tools and thereby reveal new insights into history (Olsen, 2011, p. 25). Future development of this research could include a focus on contemporary case studies like the Palestinian Intifada or the Tamils in Sri Lanka and draw the connections with the findings at hand106.

Another interesting point for further research with policy implications is the link between effective discourse framing and a weak power’s degree of attachment to the threatening great power or to another great power. As we saw in the first two case studies, variation in these factors provided coherence to the narrative analysis and provided insights into the strategic calculus and rhetoric of the weak states. Such research could be further linked to studies of international hierarchy, reputational dynamics, and the conditions that lead to, polarise or placate domestic social fragmentation in the face of external threat. Combining this research with the literature on relational power provides opportunities for further research. These include a) treating power as dependent variable and linking it to the idea of power in action; b) relational power, emotions and strategic interactions; c) relational power, international

106 We would like to thank Professor Howard Williams for this useful suggestion.
hierarchy and strategic interactions. Last but not least, this research could be expanded into broader considerations about weak states in international politics.

This research could also be extended into a critique of structural theorisation and support the case for pragmatic eclectic theorisation. This study has highlighted the importance of weak powers in international relations and realism’s underestimation of their will and its significance for international relations phenomena like alliances, dominoes and war. Also, realism’s victor bias diminishes the importance of the willingness of weak states to make peace or resist. However, according to Michael Howard, “[t]here is no war without resistance, but without resistance, and the possibility of resistance, there is no international order” (Howard, 1991, p. 166). If realism would like to have a better view of the will of the ‘other’ it would need to emphasise relations, social ties and recognition. These are factors that affect the processes of how agents form their political views and, as Monteiro puts it, we need to study such processes to grasp system effects (Monteiro, 2012, p. 354). One fruitful exploration of system effects along these lines has been provided by Robert Jervis in his monumental System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Jervis’ definition of the international system “includes the pattern of interests and alignment possibilities as well as the distribution of capabilities” (Jervis, 1997, p. 204). The pattern of interests and the alignment possibilities that we saw here affected the way weak states made their strategic calculations regarding resistance and surrender and they were based on non-realist reasons like historical relations, social ties and recognition. In other words, adding pattern of interests and alignment possibilities in the definition of the international system presupposes historical contextualisation of an international system and its relationships at a given moment and elucidation of the pattern of interest and salient issues. Such a viewpoint is, arguably, incompatible with realism as a paradigm. Adding alignment possibilities at the system level to explain the behaviour of states is like explaining behaviour (such as alliance patterns) with behaviour (foreign policy). This then requires historical contextualisation and dilutes the idea of the international system, which becomes open to interpretation rather than a solid foundation on which to add a theory of foreign policy or of the state as neorealists and neoclassical realists do (Elman, 1996; Rose, 1998; Schweller, 2003, pp. 317, 347; Glaser, 2014). This opens the road for pragmatic theorising and invites researchers to be eclectic and generate varieties of realist constructivisms or constructivist realisms. Such realism would

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107 Paul Schroeder’s work on small states is particularly inspiring for this field of research (Schroeder, 1998).
focus on relations and would appear to be linked to the practice turn (Bueger & Gadinger, 2015).

The work at hand also provides pertinent insights for a series of other literatures which are not its main focus. The concept of recognition can be further related to Lebow’s analysis of honour. In this sense it can contribute to the renewed literature on classical realism as well as Lebow’s own effort in advancing A Cultural theory of International Relations (Lebow, 2003; Lebow, 2008).

This study also demonstrates the centrality of emotions in strategic thinking and the impact they have on high-risk decisions and how they affect a state’s chances of success. It also links them to the creation and maintenance of international hierarchies. The analysis at hand acknowledges that emotions are not something basically negative, a claim that seems to appeal to realism, and that the current emotional turn in IR is something worthwhile (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014). The arguments presented here emphasise both traditional and non-traditional security concerns of states related to survival and recognition, the reflexive process of states, and some conditions under which attempts to change states’ decisions regarding surrender have been effective or not.

**Policy Implication**

The instances of surrender from the era of the Peloponnesian War studied here have assumed a variety of processes and furnished the actual action of surrender with different qualities and will be subject to controversy. This does not invalidate efforts to compare cases and draw wider lessons from attempts to conceptualise surrender as a process and link it to broader political developments. Writing individual histories of cases of surrender can be highly instructive. They provide insights of common themes and larger issues which we can identify and use as heuristic devices. Thus, the challenge is to get a better grasp of the will of the ‘other’ to help us understand the limits it imposes on one’s strategic choices and the opportunities it creates for conflict resolution. This should not be seen as an attempt to decode the human mind or decipher what De Tocqueville called, ‘the habits of the human heart’ (Coker, 2009a). It may be objected that studying surrender is a marginal and rare political issue but its value is that it presents a less complicated picture of a situation by virtue
of being expedient and illustrates in heightened form aspects of international politics and of
the eternal struggle for power, war and peace. It helps us define what can and cannot be
achieved realistically in surrender and wherever the will of the ‘other’ matters.

One policy implication stemming out of this study is that politicians and army commanders
need to be very well coordinated throughout all phases of war and post-war period. Phrases
separating ‘the day of’ from ‘the day after’ attributing responsibility to the army and to
politicians respectively are problematic. This study has indicated that there is a connection
between time and recognition on one hand and war and peace on the other hand. By this we
mean that the use of the term ‘post-conflict’ to describe the days after surrender is strictly
misleading. The concern for recognition creates results both before the war, during the war
and after the war. Before the war it forged a hard to betray special relationship between
Athens and Plataea. During the war it transformed perceptions of the enemy into an ally.
After the war its lack thereof led to insurgency against the odds and to a successful outcome.
Recognition is influenced by the pre-war situation and also shapes both war and the ‘post-
conflict’ environment. The separation between war and the day after is not only artificial but
also problematic. It enables the depoliticisation of war and the deceptive disentanglement of
the day after from war. This takes us beyond the banality that history matters. It forces us in a
constructive way to deal with the enemy on its own terms. Depoliticisation appears to
contribute to the decontextualisation of what matters to the ‘other’. Such a lapse in judgement
could make us less sensitive to the ‘other’s’ historical and psychological influences and how
we affect it or exacerbate it before, during and after conflict. Recognition is a foundational
concept in all this and shows that the concerns and actions of both politicians and army
commanders affect each other in all phases of war and peace.

Aron had questioned whether it suffices for philosophers to teach the wisdom of the
negotiated peace in order for the combatants to denounce the intoxication of victory (Aron,
1951, p. 459). Perhaps one way around this conundrum is to at least appreciate how
problematic the compartmentalisation of the phases of war appears in the light of the impact
of recognition on all of them. Seen as such, war and peace appear as they arguably are: part
of one system. Aristotle’s phrase is particularly apt: “what does it profit a state to win a war
only to lose the peace that follows it?” (Coker, 2014a, p. 76).
If recognition can help us navigate this more interconnected view of war and peace and find solutions to some problems, then it makes sense to debate not if there is only victor’s peace but what the qualities of different types of peace are and how to achieve them. In the presence of a victor bias and the absence of considerations for variable definitions of peace, the problem with the realists examined here is not unlike the one that William Fox had identified some time ago. “[T]hey can explain why there is conflict from time to time […], but they do not shed much light on why these conflicts are sometimes settled peacefully” (Hanson, 1990, p. 17; Fox, 1985, p. 13). We should also add though, that the problem with realists is that by seeing peace as a monolith, they find it hard to perceive how different conceptions of peace may even lead to more persistent conflict than they expect. Recognition serves to elucidate both aspects of the prospects and perils of different concepts of peace. Variations in the timing, process and stability of surrendering induced by the lack of recognition or the acknowledgment of recognition exemplify this. Talking about war cannot be divorced from talking about peace. Realists do so by presuming what the assumption of survival means. As a result, they reproduce their subjective and narrow meaning of survival. This, however, is a sure way for realists to impose on the meaning of survival not real states’ views but their own partial ‘realist’ view of peace that excludes recognition. It is high time realists problematised survival and investigated its connection with the idea of peace.


Available at: http://johnmearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/Leaving%20Theory%20Behind.pdf [Accessed 20 May 2013].


Available at: https://rusi.org/commentary/end-twentieth-century-warfare
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