Conclusion

This project has aimed to contribute to scholarship on intelligence accountability and the privatisation of security. This has been addressed by answering the following central research question: How did the relationship between the intelligence community’s reliance on the private sector and intelligence accountability evolve during the Global War on Terrorism? The thesis has found that, in the years following the 9/11 attacks, the US intelligence community’s reliance on the private sector challenged the intelligence accountability process. Conversely, the problems of privatisation were reinforced by the shortcomings of the US system of intelligence accountability. On the whole, from 2001 to 2009, the relationship between the privatisation of intelligence and intelligence accountability was characterised by both interdependence and imperfection, but not necessarily in a completely negative way.

From the perspective of those charged with administering the accountability process, privatisation complicated accountability holders’ access to information from intelligence providers. It also provided accountability holders of a sub-standard ethical bent with opportunities to disregard existing legal standards. Moreover, the failings in the accountability process emphasised the need for better regulation, control and oversight of private intelligence activities. Overall, senior accountability holders within the executive and legislative branches always retained the authority to devise better means to access private sector information, improve accountability standards, and penalise or reward private intelligence ‘partners’. Their authority, however, was not used consistently and the lack of planning behind privatisation affected the accountability process. The deficiencies of public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’, and by extension the shortcomings of intelligence accountability in the US, can be related to key accountability holders’ preferences. In the years following the 9/11 attacks, effectiveness was deemed more important than efficiency and liberal democratic values, and accountability problems, although they became increasingly obvious, were not thoroughly addressed before 2006. By the time President George W. Bush left office, significant efforts had been made to tackle some of the main accountability challenges relating to the privatisation of intelligence but problems remained. Their persistence emphasised the on-going need for better accountability in public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’ in the interests of efficiency and democratic legitimacy.

Chapter one established a three-tiered conceptual approach that focuses on the actors at the basis of intelligence accountability in the US, the trade-off accountability holders can
face between effective national security and liberal democratic values, and the accountability process. The accountability process is further divided into three phases: first, the occurrence of a problem; second, reactions and responses from accountability holders; and third, specific outcomes. An accountability problem emerges when the conditions for accountability to occur are missing. These conditions focus on accountability holders’ access to information from the holdees, the existence and use of relevant standards by accountability holders, and the availability and application of appropriate sanctions.¹ When these conditions are not met, accountability problems can cause incidents that trigger intelligence accountability holders’ awareness of malfunctions within the system. A key argument here is that accountability holders always react and respond to some kind of trigger when they engage in accountability activities and the thesis has developed the concept of (light and heavy) trigger to assess holders’ awareness of and reaction to accountability problems.² Overall, taking the perspective of accountability as a process has been particularly useful in considering both governmental and societal contributions to intelligence accountability.³ The thesis has used this perspective to frame the relationship between the privatisation of intelligence and intelligence accountability.

The second chapter provided an in-depth account of the relationship between the US intelligence and national security apparatus and the private sector from the earliest days of the Republic to the end of the Cold War. In the US, the legitimacy of the federal government has always been entwined with the private sector and this is related to the values underpinning US political culture, in particular individualism and liberalism. Throughout US history, the private sector deepened and diversified its involvement in national security affairs alongside the government apparatus. In the early days of the US Republic, the private sector filled the gaps left by the US government. The period between 1865 and 1941 was characterised by ambiguity, as both the public and private sectors sought to establish their legitimacy in the realm of national security. From 1941 onwards, the increasing role played by the federal government in the realm of national security intelligence was accompanied by the development of a veritable private security industry. For decades before the end of the Cold

War, public and private intelligence activities have generated public concerns regarding the US political system, civil liberties, human rights and counterintelligence.

The third chapter explored the challenges faced by the intelligence community and the US system of democratic accountability during George W. Bush’s ‘Global War on Terrorism’. The chapter argued that the 9/11 attacks acted as a catalyst that accelerated deeper and pre-existing historical trends in a phase of transition. In the aftermath of 9/11, US policy-makers prioritised national security requirements and put a clear emphasis on secrecy and effectiveness concerning intelligence, sometimes at the cost of liberal democratic values. The hard-line on national security adopted by the Bush administration contributed to a series of scandals, not least by virtue of the sanctioned use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, warrantless surveillance of US citizens and the use of intelligence to justify the decision for war against Iraq. At the institutional level, cross-institutional tensions complicated the sharing of powers but the US system of democratic accountability worked relatively well considering the circumstances. The executive branch pushed its national security agenda unilaterally and Congress acquiesced in some of the most controversial measures put forward by the Bush administration. Nevertheless, Congress, the Judiciary and US society managed to restrain some of the contentious policies championed by the administration. On the whole, the period of crisis that followed the attacks of 9/11 put intelligence and democratic accountability under significant strain. This, naturally, makes the presidency of George W. Bush a particularly interesting time to study intelligence accountability at its limits.

Chapter four examined the expansion and the multiplication of public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’ between 2001 and 2009. There are a number of reasons for this evolution. In the context of crisis that followed the 9/11 attacks, and facing a clear and imminent threat, US decision-makers significantly increased both the intelligence community’s budget and workforce. Additional employees were hired from the private sector where number of former intelligence officers had moved as a result of budget cuts in the 1990s. In the atmosphere of emergency that characterised national security in the early days of the GWOT, the growth of public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’ was not planned and as a result a variety of private entities related to the intelligence community in ways that were not always formal, harmonious and economically viable. In this context, the economic rationale for privatisation ultimately failed to convince. Cost-efficient privatisation of intelligence is not impossible but requires that the US government devise better policies to

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plan and control the development of public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’. Privatisation, it is argued, occurred because the private sector offered a unique pool of knowledge and capabilities that decision-makers deemed necessary at the time.⁵

Chapter five evaluated the impact of privatisation on the intelligence accountability process between 2001 and 2009. It found that the privatisation of intelligence challenged the conditions at the basis of the intelligence accountability process. First, privatisation complicated, but did not prevent, accountability holders’ access to the information necessary to carry out their assessments. Second, the US government lacked clear legal standards with which to consistently hold private intelligence providers to account. Where appropriate legal standards existed, they were not systematically implemented. This enforcement problem can be related to organisational disagreements and a lack of political willingness within the government to systematically control or oversee intelligence and when necessary apply sanctions. Overall, public-private ‘partnerships’ encountered problems of intelligence accountability between 2001 and 2009 but these were caused by deficient public management more than privatisation per se. One of the key lessons offered in this regard is that establishing clear accountability channels should never follow but, rather, ought to precede privatisation. Government institutions need to adapt their accountability capabilities and sourcing policies to the operational tempo. In time of crisis, when surge requirements increase the government’s reliance on the private sector, the growth of public-private ‘partnerships’ must be matched by a growth of the capabilities of the acquisition workforce to maintain appropriate control over the private sector. This, however, was not the case from 2001 to 2009. Table 1 (below) summarises the differences between intelligence accountability for public and private holdees. The table illustrates that privatising intelligence did not fundamentally alter the conditions required for accountability (although it made processes more complex). Such deterioration could have been avoided if the necessary procedures and regulations had been implemented in good time. This suggests that privatisation need not necessarily impact negatively upon intelligence accountability.

⁵ See: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Letter to the Author, FY 2007 Results, US Intelligence Community, Inventory of Core Contractor Personnel, p.5.
Table 1 – The intelligence accountability process: public vs. private holdees (2001-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intelligence accountability relations</th>
<th>Holders’ access to information</th>
<th>Holders’ Standards</th>
<th>Holders’ access to and application of sanctions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public holdees</td>
<td>- Direct (executive branch)</td>
<td>- Some holders have lacked the willingness to hold to account</td>
<td>- Sanctions are available and applied when deemed necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Indirect (legislative, judicial branches, and society)</td>
<td>- Clear legal standards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private holdees</td>
<td>- Mostly indirect</td>
<td>- Some holders have lacked the willingness to hold to account</td>
<td>- Sanctions are available but not always sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Risk of co-optation &amp; conflict of interest</td>
<td>- Their application has been inconsistent and insufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Lack of clear legal standards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The existence of accountability problems which were related to public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’ triggered multiple reactions;⁶ and a number of incidents acted as ‘light triggers’ (that is to say that they generated reactions from some accountability holders). These reactions demonstrated accountability holders maintained continuous awareness of some accountability problems. From 2002 onwards, a succession of high-profile incidents acted as ‘heavy triggers’ and threatened some of the core principles of modern government in the areas of ethics, efficiency, human rights, and civil liberties. These incidents raised the level of awareness and determination of key intelligence accountability holders to carry out their duty and to set limits to the privatisation of intelligence to safeguard the ascendency between public authority and private interests. On the whole, it is interesting to note that public authorities have often originated the activities at the basis of the intelligence scandals involving the private sector; for example this was the case of project MKULTRA in the 1950s and 1960s, the Iran-Contra scandal of the mid-1980s, and the NSA warrantless wiretap

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programme in the 2000s. All of these cases demonstrate that the ascendency of public authority does not guarantee the absence of wrongdoing.

The last chapter of the thesis analysed key accountability holders’ responses to the problems posed by public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’. Both the executive and the legislative branches realised the imperative for change during President George W. Bush’s second term (2005-9) and provided a series of responses to obtain better access to private sector information and regulate public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’. These responses came late, after a series of accountability problems and scandals had occurred, and they were insufficient to fill gaps in the accountability process. By 2009, the US government still had not clarified what it considered to be its inherent responsibility, the IC lacked the workforce to hold its private ‘partners’ to account, and contract management procedures and available sanctions needed to be further clarified and strengthened. The fact that key intelligence accountability holders reacted and provided responses that were, admittedly, partially effective, gave the impression that the intelligence accountability process was improving incrementally. Nevertheless, the tardy responses offered by the US government prompt questions about the possibility to minimise the time between the discovery of accountability problems and the implementation of remedial measures. Overall, this research emphasises the need for more coherent policies and planning in the domain of human resources, and in particular a more stable pool of intelligence personnel to cope with the pressure and demands that typically follow a crisis. The thesis also highlights insufficiencies within the US government and raises questions about the factors influencing key accountability holders’ political willingness to uphold high standards of intelligence accountability, and anticipate as best as they can and respond to the occurrence of accountability problems. In times of crisis, key accountability holders tend to focus on other duties than intelligence accountability, and greater involvement of wider society may be the key to motivating and empowering public intelligence accountability holders.

The case for reform

At the domestic level, reform is nearly always touted as a panacea in the fields of national security intelligence and defence. Since the Second World War, and even more so since the end of the Cold War, the theme of ‘reform’ has been the focus of any number of reports. A study by the Rand Corporation counted 63 distinct acquisition reform initiatives undertaken between the 1960s and 2002.\(^8\) Another one, considered 17 major intelligence reviews from 1945 to 2005.\(^9\) Research has related changes in this domain to organisational structures, policies, culture and practices, and leadership.\(^10\) Overall, very few major reform initiatives have wrought fundamental change. Indeed, bureaucratic and political incentives to reform are notoriously unsuccessful in the realm of intelligence and national security.\(^11\) In the twenty-first century, debates about intelligence reform and reorganisation reached a peak after the 9/11 attacks and ultimately led to the adoption of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.\(^12\) The benefits of this reform remain debatable\(^13\) and the act did not really address challenges in the areas of intelligence accountability and public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’. Past experience suggests that these challenges, although the focus of some political attention in Washington DC since 2009, are unlikely to lead to a major reform effort in the near-future.

In the field of intelligence and national security, incremental change is more suitable than a major, one-time, reform initiative. Michael Warner and Kenneth McDonald note that ‘intelligence is too large, too complicated, and too important either to fix at a stroke or to

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\(^8\) Christopher H. Hanks et al., *Reexamining Military Acquisition Reform: Are We There Yet?* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center 2005) pp. 101-3. See also: Fox, *Defense Acquisition Reform*.


leave alone’. Furthermore, continuous adaptation does not require anticipating the nature of future challenges, an ‘extraordinary difficult task’ according to James Wirtz. Intelligence accountability holders are asked to fine-tune a series of political and organisational trade-offs between liberal democratic values and national security imperatives, formality and informality, and autonomy and subordination. Similar choices need to be made in the context of public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’, for example between in-sourcing and outsourcing, so that the government makes sure it keeps control over its workforce. If accountability holders do not make these choices consistently and carefully, chaotic partnerships will, one more time, have the potential to impact upon intelligence accountability in a negative fashion.

Since the mid-2000s, policy-makers and senior intelligence officials have increased efforts to regulate public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’. Their efforts have not led to major reform. Change, to the degree it occurred, has been mostly incremental, under the leadership of Michael Hayden at the CIA, Ron Sanders at the ODNI, and key members of Congress. These changes were insufficient to fill the gaps and the recurrence of problems in the areas of intelligence accountability and public-private ‘partnerships’ encouraged bleak conclusions. In 2008, the sense of crisis that followed the 9/11 attacks was vanishing and the presidential election provided key accountability holders, may they be new to the function or more experienced, an opportunity to reflect on past practice and refine the government policies in this area. In this light, privatisation could also be considered as an opportunity to reinforce accountability, and safeguard the ascendancy of the relationship between public authority and private interests. On the whole, the case for domestic adaptation is persuasive but political preferences in the area of national security are not only shaped by domestic and

14 Warner and McDonald, US Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947, p.43.
organisational factors. US decision-makers devoted vast sums of money to national security in the years that followed the 9/11 attacks and it has been suggested that, when doing so, the government over-reacted to the attacks. This overreaction can be related to the type of threats faced by the US, and to the absence of a single, well-defined adversary facing the US in the contemporary international system. When there is no clear enemy to compare capabilities, decision-makers tend to favour an absolute growth of the national security state. This growth in the national security state can be related to the US grand strategy of ‘deep engagement’ in world affairs. In this view, a more inward-looking strategy would decrease the demand for foreign intelligence, and refocus decision-makers on domestic priorities such as the efficiency of the US government and its respect for liberal democratic values.

Legacies

Alexis de Tocqueville in *Democracy in America* argued that ‘The great privilege of the Americans does not simply consist in their being more enlightened than other nations, but in their being able to repair the faults they may commit’. The story of public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’ in the early twenty-first century proves America has retained its ability to address its faults. The reactions and responses provided by the US government to the problems of public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’ have engendered a series of legacies, both positive, in the form of new regulations, and negative, in the form of persisting challenges. Since 2009, the IC has continued to rely extensively on the private sector, for example, to target suspected terrorists and militants in the so-called ‘drone war’, or in the

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increasingly important area of cyber-security.\textsuperscript{26} Meanwhile, the impetus towards the regulation of public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’ has continued both at the political level, in the executive and legislative branches of government, and at the bureaucratic level, within the IC. The administration of Barack Obama has demonstrated a clear awareness of some of the most pressing challenges in the area of public-private ‘partnerships’, and a willingness to address some of the errors arising from the Bush years. Shortly after taking office, President Obama directed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to ‘clarify when governmental outsourcing for services is and is not appropriate’.\textsuperscript{27} Subsequently, the OMB warned that ‘overreliance on contractors can lead to the erosion of the in-house capacity that is essential to effective government performance’,\textsuperscript{28} and recommended ‘strong strategic human capital planning’.\textsuperscript{29} In this context, the administration furthered in-sourcing to restore the ‘balance between work done by Federal employees and contractors’.\textsuperscript{30}

After receiving comments on its initial policy guidance, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), within the OMB, released a policy letter on the ‘Performance of Inherently governmental and Critical Functions’.\textsuperscript{31} A government expert rightly qualified this letter as ‘an important step forward’.\textsuperscript{32} The document put limits on the privatisation of government services and established a single definition of an inherently governmental function, based on the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act, as ‘a function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government

\textsuperscript{28} Peter R. Orszag, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum for the Heads of Departments and Agencies, Managing the Multi-Sector Workforce, M-09-26, 29 July 2009, p.1.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, p.2.
\textsuperscript{30} Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the US Government, Fiscal Year 2011, 1 February 2010, p.105.
\textsuperscript{32} Daniel I. Gordon, Statement before the subcommittee on oversight of government management, the Federal workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, US Senate, Intelligence Community Contractors: Are We Striking the Right Balance?, Hearing, 112\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 20 September 2011, p.1.
employees’. The letter offered two examples of inherently governmental functions that are of interest: ‘the direction and control of intelligence and counter-intelligence’, and the determination of price reasonableness. This policy also allowed contractors to take action ‘in self-defense or defense of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury’, but did not allow them to take part in security operations in direct support of combat. Furthermore, the OMB directed agencies to ‘take specific actions, before and after contract award, to prevent contractor performance of inherently governmental functions and overreliance on contractors in “closely associated” and critical functions’. The document provided examples of functions that are ‘closely associated with inherently governmental functions’ such as ‘support for policy development, budget preparation, or acquisition activities’. The OMB also required agencies to give ‘special consideration to using Federal employees to perform these functions’, and ‘special management attention to contractors’ activities’ in this area. In this regard, the guidance was quite precise, which should encourage the refinement of existing procedures within each agency. For instance, the letter provided ‘a checklist of special management responsibilities that agencies must address when contractors perform’ this kind of function. This checklist included tasks such as ‘assigning sufficient number of qualified government employees, with expertise to administer or perform the work’, and ‘taking appropriate steps to avoid or mitigate conflicts of interest’. The letter further outlined ‘a series of agency management mechanisms to strengthen accountability’. Finally, the OMB recommended using in-sourcing more carefully, as a management tool, not as a goal. Depending on its interpretation and application within each government agency, the policy letter may constitute a landmark in the public debate on private security. However, this remains to be seen. In particular, the application of the OFPP policy is likely to be contested by the CIA which has traditionally considered such letters as ‘expressions of executive branch policy rather than requirements’.

34 Office of Management and Budget, Performance of inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, p.56240.
36 Ibid, p.56240.
37 Ibid, p.56229.
38 Ibid, p.56228.
40 Daniel I. Gordon, Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, p.3.
41 Office of Management and Budget, Performance of inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, p.56228.
42 Daniel I. Gordon, Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, pp. 4-5.
From 2009 onwards, Congress has continued to debate, and to legislate on, key issues relating to intelligence contracting. For example, Senators on the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs expressed a clear interest in, and showed good knowledge of, some of the key problems and evolutions in the field during a hearing entitled ‘Intelligence Community Contractors: Are We Striking the Right Balance?’. The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2010 required the ODNI to put together an extensive report on intelligence contractors covering issues such as accountability mechanisms and workforce balance and Congress enacted legislation barring the DOD from employing contract interrogators. Despite the fact that contract interrogators did commit human rights abuses, this measure can be criticised because it shirked the problem of contractors’ supervision instead of addressing it. In fact, the ban has only held in appearance since the act allowed the Secretary of Defense to waive the restriction, and according to a government expert, this loophole suggests that Congress did not consider interrogation to be ‘inherently governmental’. Finally, Congress considered the balance between in-sourcing and outsourcing when in 2009 it enacted a ‘Temporary Suspension of Public-Private Competitions for Conversion of Department of Defense functions to Performance by a Contractor’. Although this measure was judged necessary at the time, it was only a temporary fix and did not guarantee long-term stability in this important area.

The movement of adaptation also continued within the IC. The 2009 National Intelligence Strategy put forward a number of points relating to public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’. The strategy emphasised the importance of enhancing ‘outreach to key external centers of knowledge and expertise’, and a notable enterprise objective aimed to improve ‘cost, schedule, performance, planning, execution, and transparency in major system acquisitions, while promoting innovation and agility’. In terms of acquisition strategy, the document put an emphasis on building a workforce that is ‘properly balanced among its

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47 Daniel I. Gordon, Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, p.6.
50 Ibid, pp. 16-7.
developing qualified acquisition professionals, and employing effective acquisition processes. All of these objectives are laudable, but their application will prove complicated. In 2009, the ODNI judged it started having a good handle on the taxonomy and inventory of contract personnel and the agency released an important directive entitled ‘Intelligence Community Core Contract Personnel’. The directive established a policy for managing the use of core contract personnel that support intelligence missions and compiled a list of the circumstances in which core contract personnel can be used including situations such as ‘immediate surge’, ‘discrete non-recurring task’, ‘unique expertise’, ‘specified service’, ‘insufficient staffing resources’, ‘transfer of institutional knowledge’ and ‘more efficient or effective’ provision of services. The directive required contractors to provide information on individual core contract personnel to the IC. It encouraged the IC to ‘reemploy Federal civilian annuitants as USG employees under the National intelligence Reserve Corps and other applicable authorities rather than as independent contractors’. Interestingly, the creation of a National Intelligence Reserve Corps was one of the recommendations made by Glenn Voelz in his seminal 2006 study on Managing the Private Spies. Finally, the ODNI emphasised the importance of strategic workforce planning and required IC elements to ‘determine, review, and evaluate the actual and projected number and uses of core contract personnel in support of their intelligence mission’. At the DIA, measures were taken to ease former employees’ return to government service and the need for flexibility and adaption was highlighted by Deputy Director David Shedd when he said that ‘demographics tell us in our society the average young person will have four or five careers. The Intelligence community has to be able to adapt and adjust to that and bring that talent back in at various stages’. During his nomination hearings to become Director of the CIA, General David Petraeus confirmed that the effort to reduce the

51 Director of National Intelligence, The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, August 2009, p.16.
52 Ibid, p.17.
53 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Media Conference Call with Dr. Ronald P. Sanders, Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer, 14 January 2010, p.12.
54 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive Number 612, Intelligence Community Core Contract Personnel, 30 October 2009, p.2.
57 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive Number 612, p.3.
59 Miller, ‘DIA to Reform ‘Revolving’ Door for Employees’.
CIA’s reliance on contractors was ongoing ‘for a variety of different reasons’, including ‘fiscal constraints’.60

All of the efforts outlined above had positive effects. They demonstrate that senior decision-makers have remained aware of the existence of problems and are willing to adapt the IC. Nevertheless, problems persist. For instance, a report by the ODNI IG recently identified several shortfalls concerning the IC and the ODNI acquisition workforce.61 The evolution of public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’ requires sustained attention by all intelligence accountability holders. While the executive and the legislature have the most authority in this arena, the role of public interest groups and the media in upholding high standards of accountability is crucial. In recent years, public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’ and the business of ‘doing’ intelligence have spilled into the public arena. The partnerships are now part of the daily routine in which inhabitants of Washington DC, and by extension the US people, live.62 A simple awareness of the existence of these partnerships is not sufficient. Public interest groups and media can play an important role in scrutinizing public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’, educating the US population, and keeping pressure on the federal government institutions to make sure they control, oversee, and review the IC’s reliance on the private sector. There is no ‘silver bullet’ that can solve the problems accountability holders encounter in the area of public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’. Accountability holders need to accept this reality, remain on their guard and continue to fine-tune their decisions, for, as long as they are being watched carefully, public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’ have the potential to benefit national security without damaging the liberal democratic ideals at the basis of the US Republic. In the years between 2001 and 2009, the quality of both intelligence accountability and public-private intelligence ‘partnerships’ were inextricably linked but not in a completely negative way as it is popularly perceived. Such a situation, with all its imperfections, is likely to persist in the foreseeable future.

60 US Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of General David H. Petraeus to be Director, Central Intelligence Agency, S. Hrg.112–307, 112th Congress, 1st sess., 23 June 2011, p.29.

61 US Senate, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Background: Intelligence Community Contractors: Are We Striking the Right Balance?, 112th Congress, 1st sess., 20 September 2011, p.77. A FOIA request has been made for this report, see Appendix 2.