“Towards a Negarchical Peace: Security Threats and the Production of Negarchy and Organizational Resilience in the Contemporary World”

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines cooperation trends in Post-Cold War security organizations through a development of Deudney's Republican Security Theory (RST) and the notion of resilience. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are the default theories in explaining the interactions among states inside an organization. While neoliberal institutionalists argue that organizations exert a strong influence on cooperation, and arise from a need for it, neorealism sees the organization as ephemeral and a reflection of great power interests which ultimately undermine cooperation. The two mainstream theories, crucially, provide contradictory structural explanations for cooperation when applied to multiple regions. I argue that this because both adopt the flawed assumption of immutable international anarchy and thus fail to appreciate that a new ordering principle, negarchy, is emerging. By searching for negarchy, I consider the organizational characteristic of resilience. Resilience is an organization's ability to sustain cooperation after exogenous shocks. I argue that the operation of security organizations in Europe, Eurasia and South America is best explained by reference to environment and ordering principles. RST provides tools that are useful in providing an alternative logic for cooperation based on changes in ordering principles, governance, the material environment and the desire for security and liberty. While RST is a promising alternative for explaining cooperation, it has not yet been utilised to explain the Post-Cold War security environment. In light of this, I modify RST in order to take into account non-state actors as sources of violence, as well as extra-regional powers encroaching on a geographic security sphere. I also introduce a macrostructural and microstructural model that incorporates exogenous shocks and the emergence of negarchy through the detection of the anarchy-interdependence and hierarchy-restraint problematiques. I conclude that negarchy is present in varying intensity in three regional security spheres. This allows us to account for the dynamics of organizational cooperation patterns.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFSJ</td>
<td>Area of Freedom Security and Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALC</td>
<td>Latin American and Carribbean Summit on Integration and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Andean Community of Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAU</td>
<td>Central Asian Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>US Central Command (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Common Joint Task Force Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Common Security Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Agency (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighborhoood Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>Economic and Political Committee (Europe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTAA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area of the Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUAM</td>
<td>Georgia-Ukraine-Armenia-Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HT</td>
<td>Hizb-ut-Tahrir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMU</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Southern Common Market</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Prisoner’s Dilemma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QMV</td>
<td>Qualified Majority Voting</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>RST</td>
<td>Republican Security Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSCT</td>
<td>Regional Security Complex Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>South American Defense Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHDEC</td>
<td>South American Defense Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaties of the European Union (Maastricht Treaty)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (Treaty of Rome)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TREVI</td>
<td>Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and International Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>UNASUR</td>
<td>Union of South American Nations</td>
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INTRODUCTION

New security organizations are emerging in competition with already pre-existing security organizations. They can exist without superseding the older organization’s promise of security. This was first recognized in the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001. It is an organization composed of Russia, the Central Asian Republics, and China. The SCO exists in the Eurasian security space despite the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Which is already made up of Russia and Central Asia, being the security guarantor in this region. Presumably, this is due to a new Russian-Chinese alliance to counter possible encroaching US power in the global arena. Similar situations occur in other parts of the world. In the European continent, the European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign Security and Defense Policy (CFSP) continued to evolve while its members were still under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) protective umbrella. In the case of South America, countries created the unifying body Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and its South American Defense Council (SADC), during a time when the region was sharing its space with the Organization of American States (OAS), the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR).

After 2001, the Post-Cold War development, formation, and culmination of the SCO, EU’s ESDP and UNASUR runs into contradictions in both of the main theories of neorealism and neoliberalism. Neither the emphasis on high-politics in neorealism nor an investigation of low-politics or political economy in neoliberalism account for all three regional developments. The more recent security organizations in fact incorporate both a high-politics and a low-politics element, often attempting to integrate cultures and economies. In the SCO, cooperation in a deeply realist sphere of power balances persisted even when neorealist alliance theory dictates that China should not have been seen as a viable long-term partner. The formation of the ESDP in Europe and the formation of UNASUR in South America was not created because of a demand for cooperation and organization, as liberalism would attest. There is thus a need for both a more appropriate and a more consistent theory.

These new security organizations do not seem to resemble characteristics of neorealist or neoliberal models. What they do resemble is a negarchical model introduced by Daniel Deudney’s Republican Security Theory (RST) in his 2007 book “Bounding Power” (Deudney, 2007). Yet, the threats these organizations must contend with deviate from Deudney’s model, as they come from non-state actors rather than interstate war. Therefore, we intend to develop a modified Republican Security Theory which uses the EU, the SCO, and UNASUR, at different levels of negarchical maturity, to show how negarchy plays out in the Post-Cold War and post-interstate international environment.

The problematique that we face is trying to construct a unified theory that does not have to rely on the either/or explanations of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism in explaining extended cooperation. This thesis is driven by a theoretical puzzle arising from an empirical puzzle.

**The Need for a New Ordering Principle**
The core debates on inter-state cooperation is the neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism debate. Despite the goal for both theories to create ahistorical time-independent and rationalist analysis of organizations, neoliberalism and neorealism has failed in various points in time after the Cold War in explaining the creation of institutionally resilient security organizations in disparate parts of the world. In recent times, organizational research in international relations theory have created more complex hypothesis-testing models and game-theoretic approaches or incorporating these models with reflectivist theories (Hasenclever et. Al., 1997; Hasenclever et, Al. 2000; Jupille et. Al, 2006; Snidal, 2001; Koremenos et al., 2001). The mainstream debates on organizations at their core still utilize the basic precepts of the neoliberal-neorealist debate on cooperation. Much like the earlier theories of political realism and liberalism, or the antecedent theories of functionalism and intergovernmentalism, the popularity of neorealist and neoliberal theories’ appears to cycle with the turn of world events (Lamy, 2008; Waever, 1996).

Realist and neorealist interpretations of international politics, gained favor after World War II and during the Cold War, respectively. Neoliberal interpretations rose in popularity through integrationist theory during the 1940s and 1950s, coinciding with the gains in cooperation in the European continent with the European Coal and Steel Communities. The third wave of neoliberal institutionalism ushered by Keohane in the 1980s rose in popularity during the 1990s after the fall of the USSR.

Neoliberalism, also known as neoliberal institutionalisms, would welcome the introduction of new institutions in general. Neoliberals believe that cooperation is beneficial for all partners and would be possible if it weren’t for fears of “cheating” or deception. Cheating means reneging on a deal so that the partner gets the “better” outcome. Cheating highlights the difficulty of coordinating decisions to achieve equitable outcomes. Under neoliberalism, institutions hold considerable transformative power in altering the long-term behavior of states. The default of state behavior to Neoliberals are very similar (if not the same) to Neorealists. The international realm is filled with rational acting egoistic states without a central body or authority to enforce rules or reinforce cooperation. This condition is known as international anarchy. Being egoistic means that a state would want to gain as much from a scenario as it can independently of the gains/losses of another state. Neorealists have taken anarchy further to mean that there is no central body or enforcer that would prevent others from using violence or the threat of violence to destroy/enslave a state. In regards to these violence-based fears in anarchy, neoliberals counter-argue that institutions have the opportunity to ameliorate fears from anarchy by laying down procedures like nesting or extending the steps and timeline of agreements to promote trust through sustained and repetitive interactions (Keohane and Axelrod, 1985). Iterations are repeated interactions or repeated stages of bargaining activity, while nesting is the process of placing one set of negotiations inside another set of negotiations as an integral part of it. An example of nesting would be negotiating on carbon emissions within a greater set of negotiations on climate change.

By contrast, eorealists do not see institutional structures as holding any intrinsic power over state actors. In other words, institutions are seen as weak playing fields and any sort of collective action is a result of power-calculations between members that share the institution’s battle ground (Hasenclever et. Al, 2000:11). In the case of Hegemonic stability theory, institutions
are a technical tool for the distribution of resources by a hegemonic power. A hegemonic power commands a disproportionate amount of political or economic power over a geographic area with lesser states acting as beneficiaries of the hegemon’s resources. Neorealists would argue that discord would prevail based on concerns that another state would gain more resources relative to their own resources in protecting their national interests (Gilpin 1975; Gowa, 1989; Grieco 1988; Kindleberger, 1981; Pederson, 2002).

Institutional outcomes of sustained cooperation are decidedly more pessimistic under neorealism. This is because neoliberalism believes that the goals of states is to attain the highest possible individual gain from the organization regardless of the gains of others. This is different under neorealism where gains are not absolute. Instead, gains are relative and states have to consider their position in relation to another state when gaining resources or benefits. They would thus choose what is best for themselves as opposed to other states than what is good for the institution as a whole. In a Neorealist world, institutions don’t matter, it is the players that matter. Preferences of states are fixed and given a new or changing organization, states adjust their behavior in the new “pay-off matrix” rather than the organization changing their behavior. Neorealists do not argue that cooperation does not occur or cannot be successful in international politics. Rather, the medium that cooperation arises from is less based on the rules, structure and codified agreements of institutions and more on the waxing and waning of alliances. Neorealist alliance theory uses logics of bandwagoning and balancing as a way to achieve peaceful equilibrium in international politics (Powell, 1999:190; Synder, 2007; Stolberg, 2006:142). The structure of the environment and its distribution of power amongst states matters more so than the structure of the institution when explaining state behavior under neorealism.

Part of our theoretical claim is that these mainstream theories, and rationalist institutionalism in general, operate on a set of three harmful assumptions. The first harmful assumption is the constant presence of “international anarchy”. The second harmful and related assumption is that there is a fundamental difference between international governance and domestic governance. Conventional wisdom by Kenneth Waltz states that the international realm is governed by anarchy while the domestic realm inside the nation-state is governed by hierarchy (Waltz, 1979). The third final harmful assumption in mainstream theories is that considering the other two assumptions, organizational resilience or extended cooperation can be explained in a rationalist almost game-theory based logic. Organizational resilience is the quality where an organization can persist its operations and reasons for existing despite any “exogenous shocks”, or shocks outside of their framework, occuring in the security environment.

In response to these three harmful assumptions, we will attempt to argue in this thesis that the presumption of international anarchy is not valid for all states at the same time. Power balances occur in the international realm which may mimic a hierarchy to the observing state, especially one that is in receipt of beneficial economic or political aide. A hierarchy is described as when one state would hold more resources or coercive power above another state. This would occur in terms of degrees and may involve either a hegemon holding most of the power or a group of powerful states holding more power over the weaker. We will also argue that the international realm is not at a static anarchy. Anarchy in a sense that there is no leading state that holds complete power and
control over other states or no leading state that can protect states from one another. The threats and risks of other states can transform international perceptions into a hierarchical structure. Yet, this global hierarchy isn’t permanent either nor does it have to be integrated to lower levels of analysis. The regional realm of state interaction can also be independent of any anarchic or hierarchic global structure. This is also possible at the organizational level. What matters first and foremost is the perception of a state in relation to its security environment and how integrated with the environment it is when determining if anarchy, hierarchy or anything else is at play. The presence of anarchy or hierarchy alters their strategic calculations. Our last argument to the neorealist-neoliberal debates is that the strategic logic of states in an organization cannot be diluted to the formula of a game. This is true even if the game changes in type, such as from a prisoner’s dilemma to a battle of the sexes game. A prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game is different from a battle of the sexes (BoS), because under PD there is only one optimal outcome that could benefit all. This is different from BoS where there is more than one favorable outcome, but it is difficult for one player to strategize what this outcome is and therefore chooses a sub-optimal outcome that only benefits itself instead of benefitting all players. Contrary to rational institutionalism, we argue that rationality and preferences in states change. This depends not only on the order-type that a state sees itself in, but what strategic leeway it’s capable of in consideration of its security environment.

Republican Security Theory’s negarchy holds the greatest promise in explaining these new cases and also modifying the neo-neo debates to allow for a third player. Republican Security Theory (RST), as an IR Theory, was created by Daniel Deudney. It has been avowed to be the fore-runner of the mainstream realism and liberalism IR theories. The theory draws greatly from political theory, referencing many historical thinkers and their ideal of the republic as a governing style. RST takes inspiration namely from Machiavelli, thinkers on the Roman Republic and the Republic of Venice, and Publius aka, the writers of the US’s Confederate Papers. RST looks at how one ordering principle changes to another ordering principle. The theory also has the warning that scale effects must be considered in analysis. The scale effect simply refers to how optimal governance-types within states are affected as the amount of territory expands. The dual defense of the liberty of the people and of the state itself prompts interesting avenues in considering the balance inside and outside security (Frey & Frey, 2010; Klusmeyer, 2010; Laborder, 2010; Levy, 2006).

One special characteristic of the RST is that since it is inspired so heavily from political theory, it is also a theory of governance. Governance is the process of interaction and decision-making among actors in a collective problem that leads to the creation, production and reproduction of social norms and institutions (Hufty, 2011). In the case of RST, the ideal of the Republic, with its co-binding institutions, and the sharing of power by people alongside elite rule, is the form to be desired for maintaining both internal liberty while adequately defending against external threats. Another characteristic is its introduction of Negarchy. Negarchy is described as a type of ordering principle that forms between the consequences of extreme hierarchy and extreme anarchy. Geopolitics is used to assess the likelihood of extreme hierarchy to emerge. RST also utilizes the experience of new “game-changing” technologies to explain the dissent into a type of anarchy that would make the creation of Republics necessary.
With its inclusion of a confederation-of-republics, RST considers the idea of “super-states” or governance above the nation-state level. This level of supranational governance is not present in traditional neorealism or neoliberal institutionalism which believes in the persistent presence of anarchy in and surrounding the institutions. RST also considers the idea of power-shifts connected to changes in ordering principles.

The reason RST is of interest here is that it allows us to focus on environment as a key factor effective the way in which an institution is formed. By matching the ordering principle with its best-match governance type, an assessment can be made on the longevity of the organization’s cooperation. The key is in acknowledging that there is an external world of international politics outside of the institution and outside the preferences of that institution’s members. Therefore, our challenge was to create a different way to analyse large swathes of states systematically without being bogged down in mid-level theories of foreign policy.

Our Research Question

The central research question that interests us is: What does the conceptual system of Republican Security Theory give us in terms of analysis of cooperation pattern in security organizations given the problems involved with neorealist and neoliberal explanations?

While answering the question we keep these four aims in mind:

1. To challenge the three harmful assumptions of neorealism and neoliberalism that lead to contradictory explanations on the development of regional security organizations
2. To create a new theory that explains extended cooperation in Post-Cold War security organizations by modifying Republican Security Theory.
3. To investigate if negarchy was present in the world and explain its emergence.
4. To see if this negarchy appeared alongside new republican styled security organizations to indicate resilience.

We will answer the central research question by investigating three regional cases. The first regional case study is Europe. The EU will be presented as a mature resilient confederation in a mature negarchical environment. The second regional case study is Eurasia. We will argue that the SCO is a moderately resilient organization and negarchy in a negarchical organizational environment. The third and last case study is South America, an example of a nascent negarchy of undetermined resilience.

We investigate these cases using Republican Security Theory. Yet we still run into some theoretical problems that makes it necessary to adjust Republican Security Theory. Theoretical critics of the neo-neo debate, such as constructivism and critical theory, focus on the problem that preferences of the actors are fixed. We suggest that the debate’s presumption of a fixed environment—international he anarchy—may be the bigger problem. We need to give the Post-Cold War time period due recognition for its unprecedented threat environment by considering new transnational non-state threats and extra-territorial state threats in the analysis.

We present new theoretical tools to explain why these new organizations are arising and why neorealism and neoliberalism are not suitable for their explanation. These tools are:
- Resilience as a tool of methodological analysis on extended cooperation. Resilience is also an organizational quality.
- A macrostructure that allows for exogenous shocks plus three levels of analysis of interstate behavior: The levels are the global level, the regional level and the organizational level. The macrostructure allows for the categorization of anarchy, hierarchy and negarchy as well as the tracking of the emergence of the RST problematiques.
- A microstructure that is actor-oriented and relies on the changing threat perceptions of middle-power states in the region once exogenous shocks are incorporated into the regional security environment.

We hypothesize that the newer institutions are in a better position to persist beyond the incumbent regional security organization. The basis of this presumption is that their governance structures more optimally match their ordering principles in the Post-Cold War era. Ordering principles with matched governance types include balance of power in anarchy and hegemony and hierarchy. What is unique in this analysis, is our introduction to a new alternate ordering principle adapted from Republican Security Theory: Negarchy whose governing structure is co-binding. Co-binding is the mutual restraint of units from committing harm against one another against domination or factionalism.

What makes our theory distinct from neorealism and neoliberalism is not just a matter of explaining odd-cases. The framework of our new version of RST explains resilience with a framework that touches upon the structural conditions of the environment. It also touches upon the different perceptions of a member states’ agency in changing these structural conditions for lasting cooperation. Our new RST thus honors the structural approach of Deudney’s RST while integrating it with agency to display the link between exogenous shocks and cooperation strategies. Our Post-Cold War modification of RST, like neorealism and neoliberalism, is still a general theory. But instead of Neorealism’s ad-hocism of using theories of foreign policy to explain anomalous cases, our theory embeds sub-international processes which we’ve dubbed “the micro-structure” into the causal framework. The causal framework’s purpose is to track the general development of anarchy, hierarchy and negarchy ordering principles. We have deemed this as a more comprehensive and appropriate way of looking at international cooperation rather than limit ourselves to the frozen logics of game theory and rationalist methodology. Researching resilience must take into account prior institutional choices and their impact on later cooperative situations.

To use theories which neglect to do this would be to make a grievous error. Using the wrong kind of theory would mean analyzing episodic instances of cooperation to try to explain staying power rather than making a continuous analysis where causal links could be better accounted for. Episodic, while appropriate for researching effectiveness is not appropriate for researching resilience. Episodic analysis is the research methodology where events and acts in a timeframe are analyzed as separate and exclusive of eachother. This is contrasted by continuous analysis which is a mode of analysis that places emphasis over-time and processes between “episodes” or between the singular events of episodic analysis.

It is with these new tools that our theory makes an original contribution to RST by modifying its super-structure and adding an actor-oriented micro-structure which also incorporates
exogenous shocks into analyses of order change. An exogenous shock is a change that comes from outside a structure and outside of the structure’s bargaining strategies. When investigating regional organizations and their structures, an exogenous shock could be a new terror group that has entered the region, a sudden influx of migration, defeat in war, etc.

Adjusting Republican Security Theory

Republican Security Theory still needs modification. RST in its current form is concerned with historical cases of republican development. Its most recent case being the formation of the United States of America. When RST does consider the future, it focuses on material changes in technology and weaponry transversing geographical boundaries and how it effects conflict. RST has a state-centered concept of “violence-interdependence”, the catalyst for the descent into extreme anarchy. Violence-interdependence describes the growing potential of states to commit harm amongst one another. The game changers in the evolution of technology and the capacity for violence, in chronological order, are: stone weapons, bronze weapons, iron weapons and gunpowder (Deudney, 2007:36).

While Deudney’s RST only mentions nation-states as agents, our analysis takes into account violent non-state actors traversing geographical boundaries. Violent non-state actors often do this by exploiting weaknesses in governance. Also, considering that the regions we are studying contain either regional or global hegemons this would naturally lead to questions of local states’ sovereignty and autonomy. If the individual state perceives a newly introduced power or a transnational non-state actors as a threat, it tries to protect its national territory both from with-in, through governance, and with-out through foreign policy and defense. We also modify “violence interdependence” to take into account social linkages that are also present across geographic boundaries. Social linkages can enable the spread of threats, acting as a force multiplier as new actors become involved and bring in their own links.

We further our critique of on the use of a single level (usually systemic or global level) of analysis by incorporating Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever into the RST framework (Buzan & Waever 2003). Regional Security Complex Theory takes into account the inter-connectedness of threats for creating a security space at the regional level that, at times can also become integrated with other regions or global powers (Buzan & Waever, 2003: 46). Therefor we go beyond mainstream institutionalism theory by looking at inter-state cooperation/interaction above the level of the organization through a global and regional designation of interactions. This new multi-level framework will be utilized to track the origins and emergence of negarchy.

We propose that an organization is the most resilient when its organizational structure matches the environment outside of the organization. This is because the organization’s structure would be pre-disposed to handling the region’s threat environment. We emphasize the distinction between the environment and its ordering principles on one hand, and the organization and its political arrangements, otherwise known as governing principles, on the other. In between the environment and the ordering principles, we can find in common the strategies and rationales of inter-state interaction (see Figure. 1 below).
Considering that we are looking at organizations which possess co-binding characteristicst we have to see if these organizations have emerged and/or developed under an environment called “negarchy”. If we can uncover the emergence of negarchy in the Post-Cold War security environment with the existence of new republican-structured security organizations, we can explain these organizations’ extended cooperation versus older organizations with fluctuating memberships and volatile issues. This explanation is fundamentally different from neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism due to the time-ordered nature and emphasis on incorporating exogenous shocks which are the hallmarks for testing resilience. Resilience is the ability for a structure or organism to persist in functioning despite the introduction of exogenous shocks.

**Introducing Resilience**

Threats have also changed in both type and location in an evolution that parallels the development of globalization. Movement of goods and peoples has transcended (often illegally) national boundaries producing both transnational and non-state threats (Krahmann, 2005; Makarenkno, 2004; Williams, 1994). The Post-Cold War era thus serves as a new reality that goes beyond the nation-state and its territorial boundaries. The causes and effects of cooperation and resilience become “post-national”, with singular nation-states no longer being the main beneficiaries or players. These new threats impact the staying power of a newly formed organization. This is not to say that the nation-state no longer has a part to play in the general equation of organizational resilience. Nation-states still undoubtedly exist and often have to enact their own national policies to combat these new threats alongside or against other member states. What this brings us is a more colorful constellation of threats and risks that organizations have to address while coordinating members. Thus a study of new threats also incorporates a methodology based around resilience entails an emphasis on the changing environment rather than just the state interactions inside the organization.

Resilience is one of the main theoretical tools we introduce to the thesis to supplement RST and the search for negarchy. Resilience is the concept that we use which can open up the theoretical problems of the old theories. It serves as both an organizational quality which helps us identify future extended cooperation, and a method which guides us on how to conduct our research on extended cooperation patterns. In other words, investigating an organizational quality called resilience prompts use to use new methods for the search for new strategic logics, i.e. negarchy.

Organizational resilience as a quality of organizations in international politics is determined by a certain kind of method. The goal of this “resilience method” is seeing whether
cooperation or membership in an organization is sustained over long periods of time. This stability persists despite changes in an institution’s raison d’etre and/or as a consequence of exogenous shocks in the environment (Powell, 1994: 341; Krasner, 1984). Resilience as an organizational quality is distinct from effectiveness. Organizational effectiveness is explicitly goal-oriented and focuses on compliance to static rules and the attainment of objectives (Nollkaemper, 1992:49). Organizations do not need to be highly efficient to retain their members. Cooperation can exist in an ineffective organization, although the goals may not be met and cooperation strategies may be self-defeating. The links between effectiveness and resilience are tenuous. While they both relate to the significance of the organization, they are conceptually independent. This means that you cannot infer one organization’s resilience from looking at its effectiveness and vice-versa, even though correlations may be made on empirical data (Hasenclever et. al., 1997: 3). Resilience demands a more holistic approach to analyzing cooperation than merely investigating its efficiency, or indeed its relations on a member-by-member basis.

Resilience itself is a problematic concept for neorealism. Since neorealism is so environment-centered, an exogenous shock would create new alliances or bandwagoning balancing behavior. This says nothing on whether the organizations themselves remain as a symbolic shell when actual relations have changed or if the organization dissolves to create a new alliance. On the topic of resilience, neoliberalism also contains some minefields based on how they analyze cooperation. This is because they assume that states are rationalist egoists within an unshifting anarchy producing this egoism neoliberals are still tied to rational choice or game theory models to help explain state interactions. In addition to what has already been said about the problems of game theory, any subsequent neoliberal analysis can only focus on a “snapshot” of the health of an institution. Even if neoliberals were to reign supreme over neorealism, this shared reliance on snapshot analysis may show that resilience has occurred, but doesn’t show how because the very nature of an exogenous shock is that is introduced ‘tears up the snapshot’.

The theme of security is particularly appropriate when using resilience investigations as a method. We can use traditional inter-state and non-traditional non-state security threats as representing exogenous shocks to an organization once it enters the security sphere or a local state increases coercive power. The transitional phase between the Cold War and Post-Cold War era produce a multiplier effect of both global systemic and regional shocks in the balances-of-power and the creation of new threats.

Caveats

While our issue with the neo-neo explanations are based on substantive problems with method and efficiency, the next batch of theories that we turn away from were deemed inappropriate to the aims, goals and utility of our study. Other IR theory modelsspeak of organizational resilience in reflectivist terms, i.e. constructivist or post-structuralist. Rather than the reflectivist model, our explanatory framework does not seek to develop social constructivist logic. Instead, our framework takes seriously the rationalist concerns with interest and power and reframes how they are contextualized. Despite the dominance of rational institutionalism in our thesis, our model can still make a positive contribution to the reflectivist literature which seek to explore varieties of strategies in anarchy. For example, it can be used by reflectivists to further
their analysis. Our emphasis on critiquing rationalist theory is done so that we may better focus on the problem of developing a general theory that can operate through multiple geographic contexts.

Constructivism, sociological or cultural theories offer to further colour explanations on persisting/resilient institutions by non-strategic calculations (Pouliot, 2008; Checkel, 1999; Johnston, 2001). These non-rational accounts include themes such as norms-dispersal, historical contexts and changing identities to explain adaptation. Sociological and Historical institutionalism in the question of institutional origins view actors as choosing between a range of ideal-type “institutional templates” that exist in the world and modify it to their circumstances. While these strategies have the potential to fine-tune and illuminate variations in institutions that neorealists and neoliberals may have missed when reaching their conclusions, they narrow themselves to a smaller range of cases. If theorists consider each institution created as being culturally-bound, the analysis of sociological/historical/cultural institutionalists lose ground over the geographic scope of their predictive-power in international politics. Despite their differences in how wide a scope you can pose the theoretical-net, both the rationalist and the more sociological theories on institutions test hypothetical propositions to observed phenomena in order to refine theory (Thelen, 1999: 373).

While our modified RST does not share the same goals as reflectivist theory, part of our framework is influenced by constructivism. The microstructure takes into account perceptions of states and their view of how important their sovereignty and autonomy is and whether it is being threatened. This in turn has a transformative effect on the macrostructure even as we try to find causal links. This constructivist-inspired microstructure or “order altering perceptions” are the gaps we utilize in continuous analysis to find out what triggers anarchies into hierarchies, hierarchies into negarchies, and other permutations of order change that might arise.

Our analysis of the new security organizations does not fit with Hegemonic Stability Theory. Hegemonic Stability Theory states that the presence of a single, strong dominant actor in international politics leads to collectively desirable outcomes for all states in the international system. In the theory, the absence of a hegemon is associated with disorder in the world system and undesirable outcomes for individual states. Thus resilience is a function of particular type of distribution of resources for states facilitated by the dominant state in a system. Snidal has noted that one has to be careful with the applicability of Hegemonic Stability Theory and that its explanatory value is only relevant to a small number of cases (Snidal, 1985). Structurally, earlier organizations mentioned in the regions, NATO in Europe, the CIS in Eurasia and the OAS in South America, are arguably dominated by a hegemon.

However, what we are concerned about are the emergence of resilient organizations after these initial three. The SADC/UNASUR in South America and EU/ESDP no longer include a former hegemon in its membership ranks. The case of Eurasia further complicates any coordinated general explanation of organizational resilience under Hegemonic Stability Theory. The SCO as a later organization still includes their regional hegemon but also brings in a hegemon from an adjacent security sphere. Hegemonic Stability theory therefore is not appropriate for our case studies. The Post-Cold War era as a time period is equally contentious. US unipolarity, and therefore hegemony in world affairs after the Cold War, are one of the underlying claims
challenged in our thesis. If anything, this thesis points out that hegemonies upsets rather than creates balances for smaller states, stimulating new ordering principles.

**Structure of the Thesis**

This thesis contains six chapters.

The first chapter reviews literature on cooperation and organizational resilience. It will focus on a critique of neorealist alliance theory and neoliberal institutionalism and reasons why their explanatory modes are unsatisfactory for regional post-Cold War security organizations. The literature review will then introduce what Republican Security Theory is and its promise for approaching our case studies. In assessing RST’s suitability, we will also be critiquing other theories that are order-based, such as Liberalism Structuralism.

The second chapter will contain a theory-based reconstruction on how to modify RST to equip it to guide the empirical analysis. Given the context from within which the theory is developed, it comes with various limitations we need to address. The purpose of this chapter is to translate the theory so that it provides us an appropriate analytical tool for analyzing the presence or absence of negarchy in the present day. Concepts in RST it is argued that will be retained include the anarchy-interdependence and the hierarchy-restraint problematique. Their presence catalyzes the formation of negarchy. We will also use Deudney’s violence-interdependence, albeit in a modified way, to better reflect contemporary threats. We recommend introducing a tripartite framework that looks not only at orders in an international-level sense, but also regional and organizational levels. It also includes the formulation of micro-processes, also known as the “microstructure” that use an analysis of regional threat movements and a state’s perception of autonomy and sovereignty restriction to create changes in order in organizations. This modified version of RST also borrows from Regional Security Complex theory to geographically delineate cases of order change. From then we can create a number of RST-based governance hypotheses to test our theory in contemporary international politics.

Chapters three to five are the case study chapters. The case study chapters serve as illustrative cases in the lens of our modified RST theory. In doing so they touch upon themes of resilience, the evolution of cooperation shown through pairs of regional security organizations, the effects of regional/global hegemony, and the exceptionalism of the post-cold war security environment. These dyards or pairs of incumbent organizations and new security organizations in the region. The cases serve to show what the RST logics of cooperation are in the region in the new Post-Cold War organizations. The three case studies of Europe’s NATO and EU/ESDP, Eurasia’s CIS and SCO and South America’s MERCOSUR and UNASUR/SADC, when taken as a whole also highlight that the presence and formation of republican-forms are a process and not a guarantee. We are not arguing that each region has a security organization that contains the institutional structures of a republic operating in negarchy. Rather, that while the pressures of globalization and post-cold war politics steamroll negarchy creation, it depends on the region’s particular relationship with great powers and threats if the environment becomes appropriate for co-binding security organizations. Europe is presented as the most advanced case while South America is a nascent case of negarchy.
Each case study chapter starts by critiquing the cooperation literature that use neorealism or neoliberal interpretations for that region. It then looks at three pivotal time periods that represent order-change, making assessments on the presence of anarchy, hierarchy or negarchy in the international, regional and organizational level. Within each time period, the hierarchy-restraint problematiques and the anarchy-dependence problematiques’ emergence will be uncovered. These steps are necessary to determine if negarchy, and thus an environmental need – if not a conscious desire-- for the creation of republican-esque institutions.

The thesis concludes with a sixth and final chapter that reviews our case findings and their importance for our new theory. It will uncover the potential of negarchy in providing a third-way in the neo-neo debates while still retaining strategic modes of thought. It will also show how useful modifications to Deudney’s use of republicanism in international politics can be applied to the post-cold war environment. The chapter will then restate the conclusions drawn from each regional case study individually before looking at the macro-structure and micro-structure patterns across the three cases. Conclusions taken from the case studies as a whole will show how the logic of RST has the potential to more easily fit investigations of these new organizations as an example of post-national politics.
CHAPTER 1. REVISITING ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE FROM NEOREALISM TO REPUBLICAN SECURITY

We have four aims for the thesis: (1) to challenge the three harmful assumptions of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism which lead to contradictory explanations in international politics, (2) to create a new theory that explains organizational resilience in Post-Cold War security organizations, (3) to investigate if negarchy is present in the world, and to see if negarchy appeared alongside republican-styled organizations to indicate resilience. For this chapter, we focus on the first aim. We explain the limitations of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism throughout the thesis by critiquing and investigating its interpretations throughout three security regions: Europe, Eurasia and South America. However, before we continue to these case-based critiques in their respective chapters, we explore the limitations of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism in conducting research in international politics.

In the thesis’s introduction we started with the empirical puzzle of explaining cooperation in Post-Cold War security organizations. But we are not only interested in the world, but also our ability to theorize it. In this chapter, we first critique neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism by proposing the presence of three harmful conceptual and methodological assumptions inherent in framing mainstream analysis. The first harmful assumption is a constant presence of international anarchy in world politics. The second harmful assumption is the analytical dichotomy between unit interactions at the international level, anarchy, and the domestic level, hierarchy. The third harmful assumption is that rational choice and game theory best reflect strategies and bargains in inter-state cooperation. We then present the empirical quandary that arises when relying on neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism when these theories are taken to explain broad regional swathes of security organizations. The empirical and theoretical problematique is that despite neorealism and neoliberalism arising from the same structural assumptions they propose contradictory expectations on cooperation when placed in varied security settings.

We lastly introduce the organizational characteristic of ‘resilience’ with Republican Security Theory as a structural alternative to examining logics of inter-state organizational cooperation. Resilience is not the object of study, rather it is a way for us to conduct our research on Post-Cold War organizational cooperation and brings us closer to our object/culprit: the emergence of negarchy.

In doing the above, we justify the pursuit of our central research question: What does the conceptual system of Republican Security Theory give us in terms of analysis of cooperation patterns in security organizations given the problems involved in neorealist and neoliberal explanations? By showing that there are foundational problems inherent in the mainstream analysis of organizations we lay the groundwork for a grander theory. RST is a theory that can encompass both neorealism and neoliberalism but is clear about their scope conditions and gives us the option of a “third way” in organizational analysis through the emergence of negarchy.

To fully appreciate the contribution RST can make to studies on international organizations, we propose developing methods that assesses organizational resilience so that we may uncover the mechanics behind extended cooperation. Resilience is the ability of an

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1 In this thesis, we use the terms “institution” and “organization” interchangeably, although the former may also apply to rules and norms.
organization to maintain cooperation. RST is more appropriate in explaining resilience due to its perception of anarchy and hierarchy as continuums, rather than as dichotomies of orders, and RST’s contribution of the new ordering principle: negarchy. We claim that the historical narrative approach that RST utilizes is more methodologically appropriate for these studies due to history’s use of “continuous” rather than “episodic” analysis. RST can be a powerful theory for the sub-field of organization studies. It can be used to view organizational resilience by focusing on the changing needs of security governance and the scale-effects of greater collective defense security. Much like neorealism and neoliberalism, it is a complete theory and has its own explanation of inter-state interactions. RST’s expalantory framework considers the changing material context of geopolitics and technology.

We will argue the above points in this chapter through three sections. The first section [1] critiques a set of three harmful assumptions made by the mainstream theories. The main arguments for neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism on cooperation will first be outlined. This includes their view on the utility of organizations and their explanations for inter-state interaction within the organizations. We will then explain the three harmful assumptions and their implications in studying international politics. The second section [2] introduces the empirical problematique of mainstream explanations of organizational resilience. A comparison will be made of these explanations in light of recent security organizational development in Europe, Eurasia and South America in order to show that neorealism and neoliberalism are inconsistent and unsatisfactory theories in explaining cooperation in new Post-Cold War organizations. The third section [3] introduces Republican Security Theory as an alternative theory and address the possible solutions for the second and first harmful assumption using RST concepts. The fourth section [4] addresses the third harmful assumption by discussing the contributions of adding organizational resilience as a concept for looking at extended cooperation with its own separate methodology. We also look at the compatibility of RST in resilience studies. [5] The fifth and final section verifies the case for RST by showing how the theory is better suited for explaining contemporary resilience in light of other order-based theories. These other theories are Liberal Structuralism and Donnelly’s exposition on hierarchy and empire.

1.1. Mainstream Theories of Cooperation and the Three Harmful Assumptions that characterize them

This section provides a review of the literature and an empirical challenge to the two contenders of the Neo-Neo debates in IR Theory. Its aim is to both be acquainted with and question the ability of these theories to explain organizational resilience in a broad sweep of Post-Cold War security organizations.

1.1.1. The Mainstream Theories of Cooperation: Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalism

Neorealisms’s foil in explaining cooperation is neoliberal institutionalism. But there are similarities in both which funnels them into the same research program. Neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism, including neorealist alliance theory and hegemonic stability theory, fall under the ‘Rationalist’ meta-theoretical grouping of institutional theories. The other meta-theoretical camp is the ‘cognitivist’ or ‘reflectivist’ model (Keohane 1989: 285-305; Hasenclever, 1997; Hall & Taylor, 1996).

Rationalist theories see institutions as intervening variables. They are seen as an external part of the agents/states/players, rather than independent variables which are part of the players
strategies. Preferences are exogenous or decided outside of the framework of institutions so they are fixed prior to any restrictions to the desires or needs of states. Strategic choices are decided with an emphasis on the “optimality” of a decision (Jupille et. Al. 2003:12). Their creation arises from distributational conflict or collective action problems and their evolution the result of bargaining processes (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000:7). By contrast, cognitivists are concerned with the ideas, identities and causal beliefs behind each member. These are seen as the driving force that shape and determine preferences or policy options. A change in policy can therefore be created due to a change in belief system or the rising prominence of a particular epistemic community/knowledge network. This is in opposition to rationalists’ notion of policy change as being a result of re-interpreting the maximization of material losses and gains that are part of a specific bargain (Laver, 1997; Shepsle, 1989). Furthermore especially for strong cognitivists, institutions are not usually studied as self-contained structures or technical devices like the rationalists are inclined. Institutions are objects that mutually constitute the identities of their members in a “web of meaning”, establishing linkages to sequences of action and dictating the conduct of states by facilitating the dispersion of norms (Neufeld, 1993:43).

The distinctions between these types of institutionalist theory is necessary to introduce a new alternative theory. It is important for us to separate what is useful in rationalist institutionalism from what needs to be amended in order to have a theory that can accommodate rationalist strategies but have it embedded on a wider viewpoint here rationalist strategies are not always appropriate. RST gives a grander over-arching sense of theory strategy by and rationality specifying the changes in ordering principles. While neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism can operate under anarchic realms, theories of hegemony can be useful in hierarchic realms and RT can explain negarchic realms. Like the present rationalist theories, our thesis seeks to explain strategies given the knowledge of preferences and information (Smith, 2000:388).

1.1.1.1. Neorealism and cooperation

The belief in the role and impact of organizations in cooperation as well as the central variable for investigation, differs considerably for neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists. The central variable of investigation is the relative power between member states while the influence of the organization is weak. The usefulness of an organization is based on how well it projects the power interests of the strongest state, as it is the strongest state(s) which create the organization. Neorealist alliance theory is the main variant of neorealism in organizational studies. It interprets the organization as an arena or playing field for the power interests of states to balance or bandwagon with eachother. Hegemonic stability theory is the neorealist sub-theory in organizations under the conditions that the organization serves as an embodiment of power. Weaker members either stay inside the organization because they benefit from the decreased distribution costs or they are coerced into interacting with the hegemon.

In neorealism, cooperation is not derived from the institutions and its rules, codes or structure but rather through alliance choices that states make. These alliances are often determined outside of or prior to the creation of organizations. Alliances also determinanethe distribution of power in an area. A state’s preferences are therefore fixed and adapt to changes in a pay-off matrix found inside an organization rather than having the organization shape their preferences.
In ‘Theory of International Politics’, Waltz states that the domestic and international spheres possess structural differences in how they manage force and thus how and if there are guarantees to secure regime or state (Waltz, 1978: 102). States have hierarchal systems that are organized to prevent the private use of force by its citizens lending the state to be the monopoly holder in its legitimate use. The international is an anarchic realm where states engage in “self-help” to protect themselves from the ever-present possibility of force being used against them by other states. The root of insecurity lies in that states are the private-holders of force yet there is no format or authorities comparable to domestic systems that would regulate this force. The impulse to use force then becomes based on determining “relations of strength” between self-interested states whom at best wish to survive and at worst wish to expand. Neorealist bandwagoning and balancing mechanics play out in organizations and are closely linked to the effects of international anarchy.

A state of equilibrium or non-conflict in international politics in neorealism is the maintenance of a balance of power. To understand how equilibria is created or sustained in neorealism, we must understand some foundations of neorealist alliance theory. Balance of Power operates under the notion that state behavior is a function of the structural realities of undistributed material capabilities between states. This formulation of the Balance of Power was later supported by Glenn Snyder who assesses the value of alliances as the function of the ratio of a state’s shortfall in military capabilities against its adversary, degree of pre-alliance conflict, and honoring terms of reciprocity rather than retaliation during disagreements (Snyder, 2007:44-46). Waltz proposes that balancing is a more common phenomena in world politics because states’ own survival is at risk if they fail to curb a hegemon. Bandwagoning entails joining the more threatening and powerful side (Waltz, 1976: 126). When Bandwagoning with a threatening power occurs, it is done as either a form of appeasement for defensive purposes or opportunity to divide the spoils of war as an offensive (Walt, 1990: 8).

Bandwagoning and balancing strategies would necessarily lead to the assumption that the persistence of institutions are made possible as long as each member state feels that it’s in their best interest to maintain these structures. This thinking is motivated by a need for existential survival in the security environment. We believe that although neorealists place emphasis on the environment outside of the institution in determining power balances/imbalance, we need to look at the environment inside of the organization as well. Security environments outside of the organization may contain predatory states or states that view themselves to be entitled to act in a parasitic manner by historical legacy. This furthers contributes to the feelings of insecurity that states (especially small states) already face in cases of unconventional or transnational threats in their own backyard. Yet, we will show in this thesis that the organization is a separate level of state-to-state interaction from the region, and that an organization’s perceived ordering principle can have states act differently, especially when co-binding safeguards are put in place.

Despite the information exchanges that institutions offer, neorealists believe that resilient organizations would not only be improbable but also extremely unattractive for nation-states. A state would prefer to join an organization with low exit costs so that they may be able to leave in case a partner starts benefiting more from an arrangement than what was expected (Grieco, 1986:505). Neorealist explanations for the improbability of long-term resilience in cooperation center around a different game or bargain than what neoliberal institutionalists believe exist in international politics. While neoliberal institutionalism look at the pay-off matrix inherent in the Prisoners Dilemma game, neorealist understandings of cooperative interactions come from the Battle of the Sexes game. A pay-off matrix represents the optimal outcomes for a game where
player A has possible moves and player B moves. When analyzed, a pay-off matrix shows the optimal strategy where players will receive the best strategic outcome for their choice in the game.

The Prisoners Dilemma game shows that the structure of cooperation holds two outcomes that could be beneficial for one state but only one outcome that is beneficial for more than one state: cooperation. The other outcomes rely on either defecting from the bargain or cheating in such a way that only the other members lose out. The structure of the Battle of the Sexes game involves divergent choices between the players. As a set of solutions two of the possible strategies are unfair, as one player benefits over the other. If one actor continuously benefits over the other, the strategy is inefficient. This game highlights the perils of coordination even if given that power is equal (which neorealists argue, they’re not) but actual wishes are different (de Mesquita, 2013:145; Krasner, 1991; Martin 1992:775). In the next sub-sections, we will discuss neoliberal institutionalism and show that the main differences between neoliberalism and neorealism in cooperation studies are based on the powers of the organization in-of-itself in effecting cooperation and the types of gains each actor seeks.

1.1.1.2. Neoliberal institutionalism and cooperation

Within the study of international institutions, neoliberalism believes that the impact of the organization in stimulating cooperation is of stronger than that of neorealism but weaker than those of constructivism (Hasenclaver et al., 2006). Organizations are seen as arenas where the central variable, resources in the interests of states, are equitably re-distributed so that they are shared. The role of the organization is stronger than that of neorealists, whom tend to agree that at its best an organization is a playing field for power-centered interests. But generally for neorealism, organizational influence is weak and is seen more as an instrument for powerful member states. Yet the neoliberal view of organizations is still less-comprehensive and strong than the social constructivist view that the organization can be a corporate actor with its own agency separate from that of its member states (Guzzini, 2000; Wendt, 1994; Hasenclever et al., 2006). Neoliberal institutionalists welcome the existence of organizations. They believe that cooperation is beneficial for all parties and would be possible if it weren’t for the concerns of cheating and deception. Cheating can be viewed as either a coordination problem where decisions of equitable outcomes aren’t readily apparent or an intentional act where one state tries for the better pay-off.

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2 Other pro-institutionalism theories in the study of organizations are: Transactionalism, Neofunctionalism, and Neo Institutionalism. These theories are not covered in the thesis due to the narrowness of their scope in the Atlantic or European region – in the case of transactionalism and neofunctionalism – and the cultural emphasis in neo institutionalism. Pivotal thinkers in these sub-theories are Karl Deutche in the study of transactionalism in the Atlantic Community and the idea of pluralistic security communities; Ernst B. Haas’s work on Neofunctionalism’s three causal factors of economic interdependence, organizational capacity in solving disputes, and supranational market rules; Dimaggio and Powell’s exploration of how rules and beliefs constitute actors with cognitive, normative regulatory pressures produce a legitimacy imperative in Neo Institutionalism.


3 We will not be looking at social constructivism in organizations in this thesis due to their most optimal use being when looking at certain organizations as single case studies. This is different from our goal in creating a holistic structural theory that is more generalizable than specific.
on their terms. Organizational resilience is explained in neoliberal institutionalist terms through information flows and repeated interactions over time. Information flows, or the amount of information available for another state to make a decision on how to act, and repeated interactions help alleviate fears members may have for one another even in the event of an external shock. A judgment would have already been made whether or not to cooperate, based on how the other actors would react based on prior knowledge and experiences in cooperation.

Like neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism falls under the rationalist institutionalism paradigm. For rationalists, the default behavior of states is egoistic due to the lack of a central body or authority to enforce rules and reinforce cooperation. The research program for all rationalists is one of methodological individualism, which itself will run into problems, as will be seen in Section 1.1.2.3. under “harmful assumption #3”. But the main difference dividing neoliberal institutionalists and neorealists is whether or not it is possible for self-interested states to become consistently altruistic for the sake of cooperation. Whether the answer is positive or negative, the origins of institutions are seen as being conscious creations of states engineered in such a way to decrease the mutual vulnerability states have against one another.

Neoliberal institutionalists take rational choice even further, as institutions are deemed as important entities that have the ability to transform the interests/preferences its members via rules, norms and structures. These interests are often expressed in the institution’s legal documents whether it be trade or security (Clemens & Cook 1999). With the understanding that states will always be tempted to renege on negotiations or cheat; the avoidance of cheating requires an increased influx of information about actions and preferences about other states shared across all members (Keohane, 1982; Keohane and Martin, 1995). Koromenos, Lipson and Snidal state four problem-types of group interaction: enforcement problems of efficiency, distribution problems of equity, number of actors and asymmetric capabilities, and uncertainty on preferences, the world, and behaviour. Given that the organizational structure of institutions consist of four components: degree of membership, scope of issues covered, the centralization of tasks, what the rules are to control the institution and the flexibility of the arrangements; the severity of the problem types that are to be solved, determine the increase or decrease of these components (Kormenos et. Al. 2001: 797). Solutions towards unwieldy cooperation thus become a matter of design and technical problem solving.

But it is not only the material substance of an institution, i.e. the rules and norms, that creates cooperation or “why” an institution is designed a certain way. What is important for the explanation of cooperation in a neoliberal mindset is the situatio’s structure of the interactions of the members. This consideration is especially helpful in understanding cooperation with the added value of the extended time of interactions. According to Keohane and Axelrod, it is given that the creation of institutions is a rational act of security. For both Neorealists and Neoliberals, the expectations that members will continuously be interacting with one another on single issues and not just in one-off agreements or negotiations greatly affects strategic choice. Such claims are derived from earlier research by Mancur Olsen in 1965 on collective action problems within large groups (Olsen, 1965:176). Olsen claims that in the case of public goods a “collective action problem” occurs: when membership numbers increase, the cost of maintaining the organization, transaction and information costs increases relative to who actually benefits from the goods. In the end, each member would thusly have a lower overall share of the benefits. The basic blueprint for assessing the prospects of cooperation is the basic model of the Prisoners Dilemma game.
Neoliberal institutionalist models can otherwise be defined as “interest-based” models of cooperation whilst Neorealist Models are “power-based” (Hasenclever et. Al., 1996).

What allows the above propositions to come to a cooperative solution for neoliberals is the emphasis on absolutes in looking at benefits for the member states. The interests of these states in terms of gains in negotiation are viewed differently than relative or absolute gains. Relative gains as a product of the security dilemma and anarchy. A relative gain pertains to an individual’s gains or losses in respect and in consideration to the power-balances or gains and/or losses of the other players. Absolute gains are when a state wishes to gain from an interaction as much as it can independently if any other state gains/loses from the arrangements. An extended argument towards the risk of large group action has been provided by Oye (Oye, 1986). He finds that as membership increases the pay-off benefits between states become more and more heterogeneous, greatly increasing the chance that a dissatisfied member would defect and cause a “spiral of defection”. To defect means to leave the game or reject a bargain offered to the player. Any form of punishment towards the defector would be difficult to instigate, due to large membership size. The enforcement of punishments becomes yet another collective action problem (Oye, 1986). Here the distinction between the Neoliberal and Neorealist becomes more apparent in how they interpret the solutions for collective action problems. For Neoliberal institutionalists, the best solution is the establishment of a multilateral institution that can monitor the action of its members, serve as forums for negotiation to uncover hidden preferences, and create structures to enforce compliance of rules and resolve disputes.

A shift in the thinking of absolute to relative gains and vice versa would no doubt indicate a change in strategy of how the game would be played and hence also the pay-off structures of an organization. Therefore we are faced with an either/or scenario of the games that states would play. While solutions to PD facilitate cooperation, if the same strategies were applied to battle of the sexes they impede cooperation because their solutions are inherently different. Essentially no two strategies of both cooperation and coordination games can exist in one organization at the same time without falsifying both neorealist and neoliberal expectations. The games are so different in their payoffs that a new game that is neither neoreal nor neorealist would be neeced to arise.

1.1.2. The Three Harmful Assumptions of Mainstream Theory

We argue that mainstream/rationalist institutionalist theories represent an odd case of two warring paradigms in the interpretation of cooperation. The peculiarity is that their differences of ananlysis are based on the same assumptions and methodology. The consequence of this, as will be shown in section 1.3 on the empirical quandary, bring forth inconsistent and un-unified interpretations of regional Post-Cold War cooperation. We present this argument based on a set of three harmful assumptions. For us, the mainstream theories share the following harmful assumptions: [1] The persistent presence of international anarchy; [2] the strong dichotomy between the anarchic international realm and the hierarchical domestic realm, and [3] the use of rational choice and game theory models.

1.1.2.1 Harmful assumption #1: The assumption of international anarchy

As was discussed on the previous sub-section, the concept of lack of central government, or anarchy, has been accepted at least minimally by both the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist camps as a condition of the systemic inter-state system. Yet although the neoliberal
branch of the rationalist institutionalist see anarchical ordering principles as a starting point that may impede cooperation, it looks at organizations as having the potential to embody the conditions that would make cooperation possible. This still does not take away from their preferences or interests which have been made outside of the institution and under a condition of anarchy in the environment. But while critics of rationalist theory focus on the problem of fixed preferences, we counter that the fixing of the environment is a more fundamental and more severe problem in explaining sustained cooperation.

The problem with the anarchical assumption is that it limits the strategies of states in either bandwagoning or balancing as in neorealism. It also limits us to a cost-benefit analysis of information and transaction costs in neoliberalism. Neorealism and neoliberalism while both prescribing to anarchy argue over relative and absolute gains and coordination or distribution problems. Yet as rationalist theories they both holding onto the assumption that states are egoistic and wish to maximize the security of their existence. This last point on security maximization under anarchy leads us to either viewing states as unconcerned with the gains of others as long as their own gains fit their goals, or in a constant state of fear of predation in security dilemmas. It does not take into account what occurs when their respective strategies reach extremes of interactions. One instance can be when anarchy becomes too aggressive and violence between states or against a state by a non-state actors heightens a state’s urgency for survival. Another scenario is when states operate under/are subordinated under a hegemonic organization willingly yet fortunes in regional, local or global politics stimulates the hegemon to change the way it distributes resources.

It would be incorrect to assume that states would operate under the same types of strategies in already-placed organizations when the severity of the environment can call for extraordinary changes and policy measures. Changes in interactions or policies for a state can occur in an effort to exit either a rigid organization unprepared for anarchy in an environment or a too-rigid arrangement of hierarchy in an organization.

1.1.2.2 Harmful Assumption #2: The assumption of the international-domestic divide

When the term “Order” is discussed in international relations theory it can refer to multiple levels-of-analysis. Mainstream theories like neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism both hold an assumption on anarchy in the international realm as separate from hierarchy or hegemony in the domestic realm underneath the structure of the nation-state (Nye, 1988).

International politics is situated as a realm of anarchy where states are undifferentiated in their will to survive in the absence of a hierarchical structure or state to guide them and ensure their security (Waltz, 1979: 95). In neorealism the mode of interactions or how states ensure their survival, is based on the logics of balance of power. The balance of power arises when weaker states band together to appear stronger in a union against a threatening state with potential power to harm them. This is contrasted from bandwagoning which occurs inside states’ political systems, where parties would throw their support towards one that appears to be on the verge of ruling over them, even if balancing was initially done. Inside of a state, “gains are possible for losers and where losing does not place their security in jeopardy” (Waltz, 1979:126). This anarchic realm exists at the inter-state level and is considered functionally different from the domestic level of states operating under a form of hierarchy. Neoliberals on the other hand believe that states are
geared towards cooperation and ensuring interdependence so that they are both bound to common interests. This is so that as many states as possible are satiated in their cost-benefit calculations towards cooperation. Yet, they also believe in anarchy at the international realm being unable to naturally mediate state desires, thus creating sub-optimal outcomes leading to conflicts of interests between states (Art & Jervis, 2008:1). This is still separate from a governing authority at the domestic-state level which can codify and have the legitimacy to enforce coordination and cooperation between sub-state institutions or actors.

According to Waltz, anarchy, the balance of power as an ordering mechanism between states (the systemic level), is separate from the ordering principle within a state (unit-level). For Waltz, domestic politics is hierarchical and centralized (Waltz, 1979: 51). The hierarchy is referred to when the rulers of the state decide and pass laws over the ruled. Centralization is when the individual states can make their own laws but the central government has the final word. The example he uses is the United States. Society itself is split into functional and specialized parts that do not directly conflict with one another. This is contrary to the international system where the quest for survival makes the goals and purposes of states equal.

Hierarchy is another ordering principle, apart from anarchy, that is possible. Like anarchy, an extreme in hierarchy also produces great insecurity. While anarchy is a lack of order, Hierarchy is order produced by subordination. Hierarchal authority that is produced downwards from a unified center and lacks of mutual-constraints, may usurp sovereignty from the people (Waltz, 1979: 47-48).

Yet hierarchy is only presented in the domestic sphere of the state. This places limits on the imagination of rationalist scholars from recognizing international actors which attempt to form hierarchical distributions of power and roles in multilateral configurations of states. The EU is one instance where its institutions operate similarly to that of a federal state despite it being made up of many nation-states (Majone, 2009). The US is another instance of hierarchical principles of a domestic state being allotted to a centralized government despite the presence of operationally self-sufficient states that are able to provide for their own citizens.

1.2.3. Harmful assumption #3: methodological assumptions and the perils of episodic analysis

The first two of our harmful assumptions are linked to a methodological after-effect of assuming anarchy and isolating it to the international realm of politics: the predominance of rational choice and game theory as methodologies. In this sub-section we first outline the neoliberal and neorealist mechanics of cooperation in organizations and contrast these with episodic analysis (what mainstream theories do with games) versus continuous analysis. We then look at Republican Security’s conception of “bounding power” and compare this with the goals of resilience studies, especially the concept of “punctuated equilibrium” and continuous analysis. Having devalued Neorealist and Neoliberal game mechanics, we show RST’s alternative mechanics through and the solution of the two problematiques: anarchy-interdependence problematique and hierarchy-restraint problematique.

One interesting consequence as a result of using power and interest as the driving motivations in interactions is that the different conclusions from neoliberal institutionalists and neorealists are reached despite originating from the same rational choice assumptions. The Neoliberal content stone, Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD), has recently come under fire. More recent rationalist research still challenges the effectiveness of using PDs and iterative PD tournaments, also known as Folk
Theorems, to model behavior in organizations. Iterations are repeated interactions between states in the context of achieving cooperation. Koremenos, et. Al., claim that while simple models of the Prisoners Dilemma and other 2x2 games can analytically solve enforcement problems to show that cooperation is possible, PD and other similar games do not solve distribution problems (Koremenos et. Al., 2001: 765). This is because folk theorems are indicative of a very unwieldy form of de-centralized cooperation which makes it susceptible to Neorealist assault. Institutions are thus needed and are designed to solve ever-complex problems, especially problems of uncertainty. Time in negotiations and interactions is of particular importance to neoliberal institutionalists. When the timeline of interaction is extended and states retain knowledge of past interactions with other states, states are more willing to cooperate as time goes on because reputations of reliability are built (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Oye, 1986). This idea is known in game theory as “the shadow of the future” (Axelrod, 1984).

For neorealists Fearon, has argued that shadows of the future would actually have a detrimental effect towards long-term cooperation (Fearon, 1998:270). If the forced repeated interactions of institutions are meant to decrease transaction and information costs, it would also decrease the negative cost of defecting or not cooperating. Considerations of power help make defecting more attractive. Lowered non-cooperative costs would be exploited by more powerful states who would adopt a bargaining strategy of delaying or holding out on important agreements. Complications occur when states lack the information or refuse to acknowledge who holds the most power in the negotiating table. In this way, iterative interactions can lead to costly wars of attrition since the opportunity costs for non-agreement becomes lowered due to high levels of uncertainty in assessing relative power (Fearon, 1998:297). An opportunity cost is the loss of other alternatives or strategies once a strategy is chosen. No one is willing to reach an agreement because the consequences have yet to become clear, and it is more rationally advantageous for them to make no immediate decision. This is despite the knowledge that the health of the entire institution may suffer.

Grieco stresses that states are positional and are concerned about the accumulation of pay-offs by their rivals, embodying distrust and uncertainty against the “other” even in positive-sum iterative games (Grieco, 1988:487). A positive-sum game is the outcome of a game where no one wins at the others’ expense. Literally the sum of the wins and losses in a game are positive. This is due to the constant looming threat of force. The root of a power as opposed to interest-based theory is the belief that the utility function all members are interconnected in such a way that any absolute gains from a partner as a result of an institutional bargain decreases the overall utility-function of another state thus discouraging that state to cooperate in the first place (Hasenclever et. Al., 1996:26). A utility function is the mathematical expression that assigns values to all possible choices and ranks them according to their usefulness to a player. This in effect is the relative gain.

The problem is rooted in the persistent use of the Prisoners Dilemma as the game starting point by neoliberal institutionalisms which is structurally different from neorealism’s Battle of the Sexes problem. This is based on the theories actually interpreting international politics into two different types of games: cooperation versus coordination games (Fearon, 1998:269). The problem of cooperation and threat becomes apparent when incorporating varieties of order in the analysis beyond the assumption of anarchy. Neoliberalism and neorealism accept the state of international anarchy and that agents behave differently from the hierarchy found in domestic spheres. This produces an anarchy/hierarchy dichotomy which in turn limits the explanatory capabilities of the
current rational choice and game theory methods. What determines if neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism triumphs in a particular case is if the organization plays by the rules of a cooperation-game, like the Prisoners Dilemma or a coordination-game, like Battle of the Sexes, respectively. Cooperation games assume one optimal solution or equilibria, making cooperation possible, while Coordination games conceive of many, making cooperation more difficult.

The refinement of systemic variables, even if done in accordance with recent contemporary history, like the investigating non-state threats, still results in tunnel vision and a conflation of different types of problems/inputs when the institutions stop at the neo-neo frameworks. Research on problems of distribution and coordination occupy a single flat level of analysis by focusing solely on the level of the organization when reality is more complicated than that. You can extend a game and hope for an evolutionary solution, but if the structure changes in the surrounding security environment a new playing field would have to be redesigned and even a new game-type with different equilibrium would have to be chosen. This creates “snap shots” or an “episodic” approaches to analysis with no two being necessarily the same. Put simply, the difference between the methods used to analyze institutions’ interaction strategies in rationalist institutionalism versus what is required to understand extended cooperation amidst environmental dangers, is akin to the difference between a camera and a camcorder. Adherence to an episodic-approach becomes problematic when researching a dynamic concept such as organizational resilience.

This is not to say that the investigation of “snap shots” could not serve some use in the investigation of resilience. A snapshot could be a useful analytical tool when investigating an exogenous shock or punctuations in the history of resilient cooperation. In resilient institutions, exogenous shocks serve as and can be referred to as “punctuated equilibrium” (Krasner, 1976). The concept of punctuated equilibrium, is taken from studies in the biological sciences, specifically evolutionary biology. Punctuated Equilibrium is a theory that supposes that evolutionary change occurs in short periods of time and tied to specific events. A changed environment would create selection pressures and rapid evolution although the observed variation would be small (Gould & Eldridge, 1972). The evolution of forms alternate between long periods of virtual standstill or “equilibrium” and rapid punctuations or change. The adoption of exogenous shock in IR theory from biological sciences is akin to the discipline’s adoption of the concept of Resilience in the ecological sciences. In ecology one of the understandings of resilience, and the one in which matches most closely to our study, is “the amount of disturbance an ecosystem can withstand without changing self-organized processes and structures” (Gunderson, 2000). Yet, as punctuated equilibriums are just one mechanism in a general theories of evolution, a snapshot is just an indication of one game (or instance of an ordering principle) amongst many game changes. The danger is losing sight of the bigger picture of long trends in cooperation.

The significance of institutions centers on the study of resilience and effectiveness. If this “snap shot” discrepancy of was not realized, any further conclusions on the operation of security organizations and their responses to threats would be analyses of effectiveness rather than resilience.

1.2. The Empirical Quandary of Neorealist and Neoliberal Expectations in Cooperation

These competing visions of organizations does little to explain Post-Cold War trends in organizational development. When neorealism or neoliberal institutionalism is applied comparatively across regions, choosing either or does not produce consistent explanations. One
either believes all organizations react through power-balances, as neorealists do, or through dependence and interests, as neoliberals do, in determining the eventual outcome of cooperation/non-cooperation no matter what the organization’s structure is. Inconsistent explanation is also true when we choose either neorealism or neoliberal institutionalism to explain different organizations in the same region. Yet neoliberalism and neoliberal institutionalism are both rationalist varieties of institutional study who both assume externally decided upon fixed interests, internal bargaining strategies inside the organization based on these fixed interests, and a unified assumption of international anarchy. We argue in the next section (1.3) that the empirical contradictions we outline here are destined to arise due to the shared set of ‘harmful assumptions’ endemic to mainstream theory when researching organizations.

The history of the studies on the European Union is fraught with vacillations favoring either functionalist/neoliberal and intergovernmental/realist accounts dependent on the success and failures of EU policy (Rosamond, 2000:51). The literature lately has been unambiguously in favor of institutions producing greater integration or at the very least towards a rationalist institutional model. But while others may consider the EU as an organization to emulate, this does not mean that it’s resilience in cooperation can be transported to other regions inspired by the EU’s construction of specific rules or charters (Borzel & Risse, 2004; Farrell, 2005).

In Eurasia inter-state relations and the absorption of great power interest like the US and China has given the region the name of “The New Great Game”. Yet despite these constellations of power, sustained cooperation has emerged through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes China as well as Russia in its membership. This is especially a blow for realist alliance theory as the weaker-powered members adopted one strategy of bandwagoning with the SCO but also concurrently adopted balancing against Russia in other organizations or bilateral deals. The SCO, lacks transparency and thus has been measured poorly by researchers (Bailes et al., 2007:1). This makes assessments of information-sharing difficult and a neoliberal defense of the institutions not forthcoming. This is especially the case when the region has other security organizations in operation such as the Common Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which is embedded in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) but has not reached the same level of political success our member states confidence as the SCO (Guistozzi & Matveeva, 2008; Tolipov, 2006). This is true when states such as Uzbekistan have left the CIS or defied its political goals through defecting and joining in bilateral agreements with the US after 2001 (Rumer, 2006). The indicator of two regional security organizations sharing a similar space but with different fortunes means that a researcher would have to go beyond neoliberal presumptions to analyze how cooperation does and does not work in this region. If neoliberal institutionalism were to ensure higher levels of cooperation, such extremely divergent outcomes of cooperation in a single region should not be possible if preferences are indeed fixed.

South America has also defied both neorealist and neoliberal expectations and reasons of cooperation. South America is a region densely populated by sub-regional organizations with little luck in Pan-South Americanism until the post-Cold War establishment of MERCOSUR. However, UNASUR was well established after MERCOSUR’s experience and continued existence. This goes against the neoliberal expectation that the creation of an organization must be based on a “need” or lack of supply of such bodies (Hurrell, 1998:242). This has not been the case. Nor is balancing or bandwagoning an appropriate explanation in the South American continent as old rivalries between Argentina and Brazil have never reached a violent peak, despite numerous territorial disputes and has even led to institutionalized cooperation in MERCOSUR (Manzetti 1993; Merra,
UNASUR’s emergence has also gone against earlier research that the region’s security structure and sub-regional organizations are so fractured that the region wouldn’t be able to cooperate as a coherent whole (Buzan & Waever, 2003).

One issue with neorealist explanations is that since their interpretations of state’s strategic interactions and the preference and fears of survival are intertwined with their views of an anarchic security environment, an exogenous shock in the region would produce new bandwagoning and balancing strategies. This makes any wholesale interpretation of a region extremely difficult. After these change of strategies occur, neorealism is also unable to answer whether organizations become a symbolic shell while the actual relations within them have changed or if a new organization must form afterwards once new alliances have been made. The way realism in general overrides systemic inconsistency in cooperation is with a shifted focus towards mid-level theory in theories of foreign policy. But theories of foreign policy are separate from our designation as a theory of international relations. Focusing on theories of foreign policy sidestep important theoretical questions at the systemic level and prevents systemic theory from further investigating or progressing from empirical contradictions.

Hegemonic stability theory is the closest that neorealism has in accepting the importance of institutions in institutional theory. In hegemonic stability theory, a benign or overbearing hegemon is an absolute necessary component for the alleviation of collective action problems if an institution needs to be designed (Snidal, 1985). But while these hegemonic institutions may relieve problems of collective action; it does not build trust nor solve security dilemmas that arise from uncertainty and suspicion inside institutions. The differing interpretation of the condition of interactions between states in international politics still support the contrasting views found in Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalism. The SADC/UNASUR in South America and EU/ESDP no longer include a former hegemon in its membership ranks. The case of Eurasia further complicates any coordinated general explanation of organizational resilience under Hegemonic Stability Theory. The SCO as a more recent organization still includes their regional hegemon but also brings in a hegemon from an adjacent security sphere, China. Hegemonic Stability theory therefore is not appropriate for our case studies. The post-cold war era as a time period is equally contentious. US unipolarity, and therefore hegemony in world affairs after the cold war, are one of the underlying claims challenged in our thesis. If anything, this thesis points out that hegemonies upsets rather than creates balances for smaller states. These balance upsets stimulate new ordering principles.

Neoliberalism is not without its problems in building a consistent picture of organizational resilience. Despite organizations existing and persisting in all the aforementioned cases, it ignores the power dimensions and relations of states that are already operating outside of the organization. This includes additional means of bilateralism between states or old rivalries and alliances. Rather, neoliberalism distills all things in the realm of interaction into the PD game inside an organization without taking into account these environmental externalities that are still in play outside of the organization’s. Thus “Virtual” organizations can exist which don’t require the level of commitment of information dispersal and trust building that requires a long time period of iteration after iteration in neoliberal institutionalism (Allison, 2008). While the virtual organization can in principle look like an organization that has potential to take advantage of the neoliberal institutionalists’ tools of iterations and shadows of the future, it does not do so and the actors would prefer to continue their interactions outside of the organization. These stumbling blocks in analysis has as much to do with neoliberalism’s faith in organizations as its dependence on anarchy and a
rational choice/game theory methodology it shares with neorealism. The game models may not be an accurate reflection of reality on the ground.

There were several important observations that affected matching the new regional security organizations with neorealist theories: the questionable effectiveness of institutional procedures in binding state action, congruence with bandwagoning/balancing at the macro-level of threats, and the inability for the same explanations to be transposed at the micro-level on the socialization away from the erratic cooperate/defect behavior of middle-powers. While the varieties of threat are important to look into, making a choice between games and equilibria in stop-gaps is not an appropriate reflection of a region where members have to deal with overlapping sets of security issues simultaneously. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are already in disagreement on whether security is a distributional or coordinative problem. These differences would be exacerbated when security as a concept becomes stretched to include human security, traditional border security, or security of governance. With neoliberal explanations, the formation of the SCO and its extended cooperation is a testament to the importance of organizations and the arena they produce to help them realize the high utility of cooperative outcomes. Yet the SCO does not require highly institutionalized information retrieval to function, begging the question on what is it within such an organization that makes cooperation enduring if it’s not the operative tools of the organization?

Part of the reason for these digressions is that neorealism and neoliberal institutionalist rely on functionalist arguments. Their emphasis is on what occurs in cooperation. Their focus is not on what is supposed to occur in cooperation given the right propositions found in the environment. This makes such theories highly variable on interpretation of facts on the ground. This is different from arguments on functionality, or arguments that are designed to explain the appropriate development of a solution to problems matching the environment. While neorealism and neoliberal institutionalists view rationality as logics of consequences, we call for an emphasis on appropriate logics (Muller, 2004). Logics of consequences have less to do with interpretations of the environment outside of the organization and more to do with what the result of enacting a particular strategy inside an organization’s pay-off structure. Logics of consequences determine behavior based on the calculation of expected returns between different choices. Logics of appropriateness have already been explored in sociological or more normative variants of institutionalism where states act based on what is appropriate in a given situation. These logics have an emphasis on learning and are sustained through social practices (March & Olsen, 2004:689). Yet, these logics of appropriateness also focus on episodic interpretations of international politics despite the emphasis on identities and norms. What the balance of power is to realists, norm-shifts are to constructivists (Finnemore & Sikink, 1998:894). The main issue is that both mainstream theories freeze international anarchy in contemporary international politics. As we have shown in this subsection, despite their mutual core beliefs of anarchy, their differing views of behavior of state actors in organizations lead to fragmented and analyses over the existence of post-cold war security organizations as a whole. This is why we call for interpreting appropriateness not on institutional rules governed by state identities, as sociological institutionalists, but on the general desire of security and liberty (or what we refer to: sovereignty and autonomy) rooted in Republican Security Theory.
1.3. Resilience and the Promise of Republican Security Theory

We argue that Republican Security Theory is a promising alternative to mainstream theory because RST provides alternatives or “ways out” of the harmful assumptions. By the close of this section, we hope that RST satisfies the desire for a generalizable and comparable theory in regards to the current mainstream theories of IR.

Republican Security Theory was created by Daniel Deudney and focuses on the development of political arrangements of restraint designed to produce security by restraining the utilization of “violent power” (Deudney, 2007:28). RST follows an intellectual tradition of classical republicanism and has been avowed to be the precursor of realist and liberal thought, the latter two which are viewed as incomplete offspring to RST (Deudney, 2007: 85-88).

We argue that RST, contains the tools necessary to take a broader view of international politics than neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism’s limiting assumptions of international anarchy, international and domestic analytical dichotomies, and rational choice and game theory methodologies. For instance, RST’s focus on the centrality of violence-interdependence and the determination of different types of authoritative structures is contrary to the anarchical assumptions of rationalist theory. RST’s analytical framework on the origins of political order opens up the possibility of different ordering principles other than anarchy emerging from the systemic level. As a theory of governance as well as one of international politics, RST blurs the strong separation between thinking about politics on the international level and political actions at the domestic level by bringing up conventional domestic-arena concerns to levels above the nation-state. In sum, RST is also concerned with survival and rationality, but a different reading of it.

1.3.1. RST and the amelioration of the first two harmful assumptions of mainstream theory

Republicanism originates in political theory from thinkers such as Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Montesquieu who took an interest in the virtues and stability of the Roman Republic or a classical republic. One key principle of a republic is the simultaneous protection of the individual and the collective by constraining each member from doing harm on another. In doing so, a Republican structure promotes a non-interference idea of freedom where the individual can do as they please without being stopped by a single higher authority. Unique characteristics of a republic include: the strategic interaction and organizational feature of co-binding, and the exercise of popular sovereignty. Co-binding is the placement of mutual restraints of authority against all elements of politically-organized units whether it be states, institutional branches, or people. Its placement is to ensure measures against predation from relatively powerful actors in the institution. The exercise of popular sovereignty entails that legitimate government is authorized by the people and that the organizational laws, rules and norms are dictated by the members and not top-down by a hegemon (which would represent an extreme of hierarchy) or through dispersed factions (an extreme of anarchy). The value that is seen in republics is the ability to ensure the public’s fundamental security interests. Republics are formed as both an escape of un-mitigated violence present in anarchy and the insecurity in personal liberty formed by extreme hierarchies.

RST looks into the formation of republics through observations of “the material context”. The material context are geographic and technological factors. Material contexts conditions the viability of security through the three major types of political arrangements: Anarchical organizations, hierarchical organizations and Republics. It shapes the scope and severity of the
application of violent power and thus the extent and type of political arrangements needed to guarantee security.

1.3.1.1. Ameliorating harmful assumption #1 of mainstream theory

Republican Security Theory focuses on the choices or appropriateness of three political arrangements and orders based on the material context. These arrangements are: Anarchy, Hierarchy and Negarchy. Actors in hierarchy are in ordinate and subordinate relationships, actors in anarchies are not authoritatively ordered, and actors in negarchies are authoritatively ordered through mutual restraint (Deundeny, 2007:48). RST maintains that the extremes of hierarchy and anarchy are alike because neither of them provide adequate restraint upon the application of violence to human bodies (Deudney, 2007:31). Thus security requires the avoidance of extremes of both hierarchy and anarchy. This means that the creation of republics is due to the simultaneous negation of anarchy and hierarchy. Republics are defined as authoritative government, thus they are not anarchies and their norms are anti-hierarchical.

Not all situations of weak and strong violence-interdependence are anarchies. Some situations of weak and strong violence interdependence can create hierarchies or ‘empire’. This leads RST to question if other material factors determine if weak and strong violence interdependence creates a second-anarchy (tolerable anarchy) or a hierarchy. Determining features between inter-state anarchy and system-level hierarchies in RST are referred to as: topographical division, balance of power and mixture of power. Topographical divisions have the potential to impede or facilitate human mobility and interactions. Smooth topographies enlarges the space in which anarchy can become intolerable for security, enabling hierarchies. Uneven topographies impede military movements and the capacity of violence-interdependence or threat amongst actors, thereby shrinking the space where anarchy would become intolerable and thus making anarchy tolerable through large swathes of land. In terms of balance of powers, the republican view is that hierarchies are avoided by the presence of a roughly balanced distribution of capabilities between actors. As each actor’s power can be checked by others, it prevents hierarchical universal monarchy. Mixtures of power restrain hierarchy and create large swathes of anarchy. This mixture refers to the presence of both maritime capabilities and land power armies.

Negarchy can be thought of as a pre-cursor to co-binding or confederate formations. Negarchies are ordered authoritatively by “relations of mutual restraint” (Deudney, 2007:48). Furthermore, it can spontaneously spring out of Hierarchy and Anarchy. The way to determine this is by focusing on what types of balancing the unit shifts to. Anarchies are raw and unmediated in balancing while hierarchies offer asymmetric and suppressed balancing. Negarchic governing structures have internally embedded balancing that is channeled and symmetrical as well as recessed or restrained balancing, usually by constitutional means (Deudney, 2007:49). To illustrate such shifts, Deudney gives the example of Anarchy falling into Negarchy when raw balancing becomes channeled or dampened by mutually accepted political processes (Deudney, 2007:50).

Historically, the persistence of anarchic systems were dependent upon restraints on topography and geographic space. Within a restrained anarchy, it is possible for smaller units to develop republics. However, organizations and diplomacy have shrunk topography, having man-made institutions overlay previous material constraints. The prerogative of states have also created
organizations that include memberships not necessarily bound to their immediate geography. These modern innovations make assessments in balances of power fundamentally change as a power can now come from an extra-regional source or bring in new technological threats. New forms of power in states traversing geographic boundaries can also bring along with them interpretations of how to govern in a space that may not be used to governing in such a way, such as in the case of democracy exportation and promotion.

RST gives us alternative foundations and viewpoints on how to assess cooperation-for-survival, and thus organizational resilience, by the benefit that it does not assume constant interstate anarchy and is thus not limited to viewing organizations just one time period at atime. RST rather than using an ordering-principle (anarchy) as its lynchpin for human behavior uses the the need of restraint for survival, it uses the broader and more fluid concepts of violence-interdependence and the need for restraints to ensure state survival. The centrality on the variety of violence-interdependence being different across several spaces and time translates as support for a variety of ordering principles and political arrangements. As was stated in the beginning, these ordering principles are: anarchy, hierarchy and negarchy. This open-ness on behavioral choice allows us to appreciate that anarchy need not be taken-for-granted as the only ordering principle at the systemic level of world politics.

1.3.1.2 Ameliorating harmful assumption #2 of mainstream theory

In the previous subsection on the first harmful assumption on the persistence of anarchy, we have shown how RST observes the variety of ordering principles based on assessments of violence-interdependence. This sub-section explores alternatives for neorealism and neoliberal institutionalists’ harmful assumption of the difference between international political interactions and domestic interactions. Additionally RST makes layered allowances for ordering principles. As there can be unit-level hierarchies in the form of absolute monarchies or systemic-hierarchies in the form of empire, there are also unit-level negarchies (republics) and systems (unions). The interesting characteristic of RST is that while it is a theory of political order, it can be transplanted to various levels. This is because above all, RST is a theory about governance. Governance signifies, “a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule” (Rhodes, 1996: 2-3). As a baseline, it refers to governing styles in which the boundaries of the public and private sector are blurred (Stoker, 1998:18). This reflects our proposed blurring of the distinction between Waltz’s international and domestic order.

The rationale for this lies in the variations in the material environment (material context) and the level of violence-interdependence necessitating authoritative political arrangements. Material context varies through geographic spaces i.e. regions, subregions. The area in which violence-interdependence is present and thus the area in which effective government is needed also varies in space. Technology exacerbates the geographic extent of violence interdependence. This in turn effect the area in which to locate violence-interdependence. Therefor not only does violence-interdependence change across geographic space, it varies throughout time.

We can determine the relationship between the size of government needed, security viability, and variations in hierarchical and republican government through RST’s concept of violence-interdependence plus its designation of first-anarchies from second-anarchies. According to RST, there are three scales of anarchies: pre-state anarchy, authoritative government,
inter-state anarchy. These are otherwise known as “the state of nature”, “sovereignty”, and “the state of war”. What distinguishes the need of government in pre-state anarchy from the acceptable lack of government in inter-state anarchy stems from levels of violence-interdependence. By maintaining their sovereignty, states are not as vulnerable as individuals in a state-of-nature, and as such do not need to submit themselves to a higher authority to maintain their survival. The capacity of actors to behave violently are independent from the distribution or balance of power amongst them.

Republican Security Theory takes the designation of the either/or choice of anarchy and hierarchy and expands it further with a new form of order that is not derivative of either (Deudney, 2007). RST discusses ordering mechanics and principles based on domestic forms of government (republics) translated to the international realm. The theory is sensitive to opportunities for order change through the membership size of participants, material factors, etc. There are two particularly useful concepts in Republican Security Theory for our purposes in breaking free from an anarchical assumption: violence-interdependence and negarchy.

RST places particular emphasis on the notion of violence-interdependence and its severity stimulating either anarchy or hierarchy. First-anarchy is indicative of intense violence interdependence and is akin to the “state of nature”. Second-anarchy is an environment that has low to moderate violence-interdependence and is thus a tolerable state for units to live under. A descent into first-anarchy stimulates scale effects, and therefore the needs of authoritative government similar to the creation of a rule-dispensing organization.

Yet we can challenge this lack of requiring governance and authority in the inter-state system once inter-state anarchy starts mimicking the conditions that create pre-state first-anarchy where the existence of states in a system are in peril. This is a scaling-up or a shifting of goal posts by injecting this evolution of violence into the analysis, but it is a necessary one to accept a claim of organizations requiring the same operations as like domestic unit-level arrangements. RST presents this opportunity with its differentiation in levels of violence-interdependence. First-anarchies are characterized by intense violence interdependence which would make authoritative government necessary, while second-anarchies contain weak or strong violence-interdependence making authoritative government unnecessary.

### 1.3.2. Introducing organizational resilience into methodologies of cooperation: The compatibility of RST

#### 1.3.2.1. Defining resilience

Resilience is the ability of a system to withstand the passage of time as well as changes in conditions. Changes in conditions may refer to the underlying power and preference distributions, from which they were originally created and/or produced (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009:117). In the context of IR theory, resilience is defined as the persistence of a system when faced with exogenous shocks even when power structures between states change (Krasner, 1976).

“Institutional durability” is the nearest concept to resilience in the study of international institutions. Durability/resilience is one face of the coin when assessing the importance or need for international institutions. The other side of the coin is ‘institutional effectiveness’ (Bahadur et. Al.,2010 :15 ). A more detailed distinction between the study of institutional durability/resilience and the study of institutional effectiveness is discussed in Section 1.3.2.2. Institutional
enforcement is another separate dimension, and with resilience, contributes to the strength of the organization.

Before proceeding we must state that the thesis is not concerned with the assessment of organizational strength, enforcement or effectiveness. By having a thorough understanding of resilience as a concept, we can reach an understanding why neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is methodological inappropriate for identifying and explaining changing trends in cooperation. While the use of game theory can bring an interpretation of current strategies in cooperation, the construction of the game theory models are based on interpretations of the world and can be inappropriately applied due to incomplete information about the world scenario. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism will always be at dispute with each other when both are suitable for explaining strength, enforcement or effectiveness in an even when the environment changes.

The dialogue on the conditions of war, conflict, and/or peace is a central theme in international politics and heavily characterizes the neo-neo debates on the prospects for international cooperation. For this thesis, we refer to organizational resilience as *sustained cooperation and membership in an organization over a period of time in the face of exogenous shocks*. In the field of international politics, exogenous shocks may come in the form of new geographic sources of threats, game-changing foreign policies, and natural disasters, essentially anything that can be sourced outside of the structural frameworks inside an organization/system/state. Exogenous shocks can be more easily incorporated into a theory that looks at cases over long periods of time rather than through individual games that focus on the present or a specific instance in the past. This links with our goal of finding new strategies or attitudes that would explain extended cooperation in the Post-Cold War period through a longform view of contemporary international politics.

Scholars that develop a rational choice disposition, like much of the current neorealist and neoliberal research on institutions, expect that institutions change as a reaction to the change in preferences and power distributions of actors\(^4\). We argue that actors’ preferences and power distributions can change as a result of how they perceive the environment. But the organizations themselves either don’t change and cease to satisfy cooperation and security, thus becoming non-resilient. Or their interactions change based on feedback from actors on the severity of threats that become newly introduced. This does not equate to strategy changing because an actor’s preferences/interests can remain the same but with different strategies. We propose that the organization changes in interactions but not raison d’être. We claim through RST that changes in interactions inside an organization are based on the surrounding environment rather than from the wishes of actors to formulate institutions to their wishes. The best way to track these changes in interactions, emanating from the environment, is to utilize the concept of resilience to create a new kind of methodology. We thus have to make it very clear what the difference between studies on

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\(^4\) There is some debate on whether goal adaptation should count as institutional change. Letvitsky and Murillo do not count goal adaptation as change, while Streeck & Thelen does. For our thesis, when we review resilience we look at general over-arching goals as persisting in the post-Cold War organizations we investigate. But we designate operational or tactical goals as indicating institutional change that indicates a lack of comparative resilience. This does not necessarily affect the effectiveness of an organization nor its strength. See: Streeck W, Thelen K. 2005. Introduction: institutional change in advanced political economies. In Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies, ed. W Streeck, K Thelen, New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Pp. 1-39.

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effectiveness entail versus studies on resilience. If we choose to study the wrong concept, effectiveness instead of resilience, we would be doing a disservice to the materialist nature of RST by placing emphasis on the organization rather than the environment as a source of change.

1.3.2.2. Distinguishing between resilience and effectiveness in organizations

Our current understanding on studies of institutional effectiveness and resilience are most commonly linked to regime theory. Effectiveness is measured by the extent that the members abide by the rules and norms, and if the organization is able to achieve certain objectives or purposes. For an organization to be effective, it must do so in two instances (Underdal, 1992). Firstly, organizations can be effective by how often its members abide by norms and rules e.g. regime strength. Secondly, a regime would be effective if it achieves most of its objectives and purposes. A distinguishing feature of effectiveness is that it is static and can be observed at a targeted point in time. The notion of effectiveness is contested between the two schools of thought. The rationalist school sees effectiveness through the goal of regulating behavior. The emphasis is linked to compliance where an individual is punished when not acting a certain way (Axelrod. 1986:1097). Effectiveness is contested when glaring violations of rules and norms are allowed to persist (Sutton & Zacher, 1987:174).

Comparing the structure of Organization A vs the structure of Organization B in determining outcomes from threats has been done before in rationalist institutionalism. But comparisons of organization structures’ in terms of can’t predict changes in the game’s pay-off structures once the environment changes. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism can’t answer the question of why do structurally similar organizations with the same level of information-sharing in the same regional environment yield different cooperative outcomes. Hence looking at factors such as the perceptions of violence-interdependence that need to be dealt, the introduction of new threats, the creation of new organizations in the security sphere, and the encroachment of extra-regional states promising outer-organizational bargains should be taken into account. These factors are what exhibit “exogenous shocks” to what would otherwise have been stable systems for organizations to operate under. Only then can the organizational rules between different organizations be interpreted as we can more easily track states’ reactions over time inside these organizations. This embodies the essence of resilience both as a concept and as a methodology in looking at long stretches of changed cooperation.

Regime durability or resilience is a dynamic rather than static concept and cannot be measured through the investigation of a singular event. Resilience is the ability for a regime’s monds operandi to be reproduced relatively unchanged in the face of an exogenous shock i.e. punctuated equilibrium (Krasner, 1984; Powell, 1994). For resilience to be examined, a change must have taken place within the regime or institution. Exhibition of a change include a fundamental alteration of a regime’s norms and/or a breakdown in members’ compliance to the regime’s proscriptions. A “brittle” or un-resilient regime would be apparent if an institution’s rules/principles or compliance level changes if power shifts between its members (Hasenclever et al., 1997:2). The static vs. dynamic distinction between effectiveness and robustness indicate that these are conceptually separate measures within regime theory yet empirical studies have shown that correlation can occur (Effinger et. Al., 1990:46-9; Young 1994:72-7). That is not to say that they are causally linked. While data gathered on effectiveness can be relevant for determining robustness, it is not a sufficient cause (Hasenclaver et. Al., 1996:4-6). It is possible for a regime to
exhibit an opposing relationship such as low robustness but high effectiveness. Norms can change frequently, yet members will continuously abide by these new norms. The question would be if we can make a qualitative judgment on opposing relationships to determine institutional strength.

1.3.2.3. Ameliorating harmful assumption #3 of mainstream theory

Our third harmful assumption in neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is the use of rational choice and game theory in explaining strategies of interaction inside organizations. We argued that while these theories can examine organizational effectiveness, they are ill-suited for investigations on organizational resilience, or extended cooperation during periods of exogenous shocks. Considering the issue of analyzing cooperations in a rationalist manner without knowing for sure the context of its change and/or persistence, we argue that RST can provide an alternative mode of framing the logic of state interactions that are more appropriate investigating the gap between games. While not an organizational or institutional theory per se, RST lends itself to ideas and critiques of good governance which can be transported to the context of organizations. Contrary to balancing or bargaining, RST provides a more parsimonious and lucid account that is more straightforward than the various permutations of anarchy that neoliberal and neorealist theories fight over. The key ingredients for new assessments of the state of interaction and resilience is the notion of power as “bounding” and its effects towards the feelings of security amongst states during order changes.

“Bounding” is based on leaps and changes. This refers to the material contexts of weaponry used to secure power and the transportation advancements made that allows such weaponry to cross over territorial and national boundaries. In RST the increase in both leads to an increase in the potential of violence an actor can commit against another actor. Deudney provides the example of bow and arrow, spear, sword, and gunpowder weapons transported by railroads, steamships, to missiles.

When observing a theory that views power as a central variable in organizational cooperation, neorealism, we see how the input of this new “bounding” context affect the analysis of a region’s cooperation strategies. RST’s interpretation on the changes in the state’s capacity of power is fundamentally different from a neorealist assessment. For a neorealist, power as a criteria is a fixed part of preference formation when viewing black-boxed rational actors in an institution’s “game”. In neorealism, changes in power capabilities create new preferences for member states followed by a change in the institution.

But our work in resilience observes that there are Post-Cold War regional security institutions that maintain their cooperative rationale. This is despite the changing capabilities of their members and the changed behavior/strategies member states later produce. The primacy of looking at the material context and ordering principle of the security environment in which the member state views “bounding power” or threat makes this possible. This ordering principle should ideally be matched with the political arrangement, aka. Governing principle, best suited to ameliorating “bounding power” or a change in violence.

“Security from violence is a basic human interest” is an assumption on human nature. Since violence is equated with power, RST would be an institutionalist interpretation of international cooperation that uses both power and interests as the central variable of study. RST is corroborated
as a forebear of both realism and liberalism, and hence neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. As such, since the neo-neo theories have evolved from a common ancestor, RST, it would not be presumptuous for us to then claim that unifying the neo-neo dichotomies on organizational resilience require looking at both variables simultaneously. This will later be expanded upon in our next chapter on creating a methodology for RST. But as we change the mode of interaction between states in organizations we input new conditions of creating ordering principles. The two conditions for the creation of negarchy, which would be useful in a study on what makes interactions resilient, are the anarchy-interdependence problematique and the hierarchy-restraint problematique.

The anarchy-interdependence problematique entails a focus on interdependence in relations of violence (Deudney, 2007: 28). When violence-interdependence becomes so extreme in a realm of anarchy, this necessitates some sort of authority with political restraints to form. Otherwise, the realm would be consistently insecure. Violence-interdependence comes in degrees. If there is low or moderate violence interdependence, there exists a tolerable state of second-order anarchy where balancing in a power-based equilibrium can still exist. It is not until violence-interdependence is dubbed extreme does the situation become a first-order anarchy, aka. a state of nature. The state of nature is typified by self-governing groups that lead lives that are fundamentally insecure. This level of vulnerability acts as an incentive to form authoritative government or else fear sudden death by each other’s hands (Deudney, 2007: 34). This culmination of violence-interdependence is at first contained or exacerbated by the material restraints of geography but can in time be overridden by advances in technology. This thesis takes geography into account, but instead of technology it proposes unstable discourses on where threat is located (to a policy maker’s viewpoints) in relation to a state’s territory or borders. The instability of the discourse comes at the helm of competing powers in a single regional block.

The hierarchy-restraint problematique stems from the danger of creating an order that ameliorates anarchy but still places individuals/states in danger. This extreme of order also breeds insecurity. This idea harks RST’s emphasis on the need to restrain security predation by using overly violent means. So given if a hierarchy is present, if it becomes unbearable for other states in a given area, they would consider its immediate amelioration. This is of course present political conditions allowing. The result can either be a switch back into anarchy, or the creation of republics in a negarchical ordering principle. The negarchical ordering principle in resilience studies would be the ideal or most resilient type if combined with a republic. Apart from being appropriately designed for its environment, it is more beneficial than any back and forth sequential interpretation anarchies or a persistence of hierarchy, since both cases would still place security at risk if fallen to the extremes.

The desire for escape from an anarchy and hierarchy problematique would drive states to protect themselves in a number of ways, not just by balancing and not just through the rationalist egoist mindset. The multiplicity of orders contained within Republican Security Theory provides the fill-ins for gaps in cooperative explanations while providing scope conditions for the anarchic but also hierarchical and negarchic orders. This is more consistent with the goal of studying organizational resilience that needs to look at both change and a lengthened timeline to assess the strength in cooperation.

We must be open-minded to the idea that both cooperative and coordination games can exist in a single territorial space, albeit in different time periods and each game can correspond to
different organizations. As was argued in section 1.3.1.1., it should not be assumed that anarchy can be recognized as the systemic level’s only hypothetical ordering principle. While RST introduces negarchy and re-organizes hierarchy and anarchy into a continuum it does not deny the existence of either mainstream orders. Therefore, RST would also take into account both the allied PD and the BoS games in neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism without invalidating the logic of the interactions that take place inside organization frameworks.

What we come in conflict with is the overall cooperative logic of states being frozen and the inability of mainstream theories to acknowledge and investigate the changes in order we have identified. Given the limitations of the three harmful assumptions we’ve investigated, it only makes sense to us that acknowledging neo-neo theories and their variety of games can be undertaken through the adoption of a separate theory that also acknowledges their anarchic order but without taking it as a binding rule. As was argued above, this theory is Republican Security Theory.

1.4 Defending Republican Security Theory: Competing theories of Order and the Post-Cold War World

Republican Security is not the only theory that contests the international structure as anarchic or the strong domestic/international dichotomy. Liberal Structuralism also carries a rich theoretical framework for explaining organizational stickiness based on an international structure of hierarchy but with a liberal state at its helm that does not act like a conventionally accepted hegemon.

Hierarchy has been further classified by Jack Donnelly as not only including hegemony, but also a more extreme form: empire (Donnelly, 2006: 144). As a variant of hierarchy, empire and hegemony to Donnelly are unipolar, or dominated by a single state. Instead of power being coordinate or on a level playing field, power is super-ordinate or vertical (Donnelly, 2006: 142). Donnelly introduced an anarchical type of order called “preponderance”, where unipolarity is wielded in the international realm, yet coordinate authority and not subsumption keeps order in place.

Parallels can be drawn between Donnelly’s imperial preponderance with the new Liberal Internationalism championed by scholars such as GJ Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter. Preponderance can be akin to the “constitutional order” that Ikenberry describes in his book After Victory (Ikenberry, 2001). Constitutional orders produce a form of balancing, but the balancing is institutionalized and channeled through rules and norms of legal and judicial restraint (Ikenberry, 2001: 35). When paired with authority, constitutional orders are maintained as a reflection of political goals and common values that restrain the use of overt power by any single member. Constitutional orders are created as a form of post-war structuring of global politics which has to be put in place proactively by a state (Ikenberry, 2001: 51). This state is the US, having emerged from bipolarity in a relative position of material and normative power following World War II (Ikenberry, 2009).

In later works by Ikenberry, the US is coined as a “Liberal Leviathan”, and acknowledges that the use is a type of “liberal empire” unique in its mechanisms of authority and control (Ikenberry, 2012). Ikenberry argues that instead of a balance of power, the US operates under a web of political and economic relations, institutions and bargains. This web showcases the
importance of interdependence, shared governance arrangements and a specialization of functions that the US holds.

Ikenberry’s webbed order is similar to Anne Marie Slaughter’s liberal hegemony as a network. The networked model relies on collaboration from a central node that is also placed within a hierarchy. Order is flexible and horizontal, yet power is wielded by who sits in the center of the interconnected web. For international politics, this would be the US (Slaughter, 2009). This proposition is also supported by Barry Posen on the US militarily holding a “command of the commons” or dominion over the sea and space areas. This allows the US to exercise economic and military functionalities over large swathes of territory as well as influencing states connected to its liberal model by means of diplomacy (Posen, 2003). Unlike Donnelly, Ikenberry concedes that the present day international order is hierarchical. Other states hold differentiated roles as “allies, partners, and clients” while the US sits at the top (Ikenberry, 2012: 37). One key observation is that the core of the order is liberal states in a reciprocal relationship with the US. What differentiates this order from hierarchy is that the ordering logics are based on consent rather than command/coercion (Ikenberry, 2012: 71). It is debatable if such a “liberal rule by consent” is welcomed in regional spaces where there has been a history of alternative forms of order, such as Eurasia and autocracy or South America and oligarchy.

Like Liberal Structuralism, Republican Security Theory acknowledges anarchy and hierarchy as continuums existing in the world, separated by the kind of rule-based mechanisms. Anarchies are not authoritatively ordered and hierarchies are ordered by subordination. These mechanisms though entail their own special kinds of risks towards insecurity: hence the two problematiques. RST’s introduction of negarchy in the analysis sets it apart from the other theories on order by proposing that instead of new manifestations of hierarchy or mixtures of anarchy and hierarchy, that a new form of cooperation is visible in the Post-Cold War era, one that focuses on restraints of violence and harm on the powerful for the purpose of internal and external security. RST’s prescribed desire of liberty and freedom from coercion from both inside the framework of and outside in the realm of security emanates from the member states themselves. This is in position to Liberal Structuralism’s imposition for such values from a global hegemon.

RST is a systemic theory like Liberal Structuralism. But unlike Liberal Structuralism, it is one that can be applied to multiple contexts and regions. As was shown in section 1.3., the argument of the thesis and the methodology we use include resilient organizational cases that don’t all contain one type of government or another. For instance, the SCO is an autocratic grouping of states while the EU is made of liberal democracies, and the democratic designation of the governments of South America are contested5. We re-state that our overall theoretical contributions to international politics are structural, general, and predictive. While the aforementioned order-based theories give alternative futures for order that are non-anarchical, they do so using a specific chosen narrative of liberal preponderance.

While RST may come from a particular ideology itself, we believe that the changed actions of states in cooperation is more subtle than any exportation of a global ideology. RST’s genesis comes from normative political theory centered on the idea of internal and external liberty as being a desire amongst members of collective political units. Yet, the goal of our thesis is to be

5 In the conclusion we note that as a consequence of these case studies, that the type of government states have in an organization matter less for resilience than “state strength” of organizational members.
explanatory rather than normatively prescriptive. In regards to a normative bias arising from our theoretical propositions and explanations towards negarchy, we work to avoid this by focusing on causal pathways to negarchy. We do not discuss if these causal pathways of governance and reactions to threats are morally or ethically prudent or not.

1.5 Conclusion

Conventional wisdom is that organizations can function as hierarchies within an anarchical realm. They can become more sophisticated although the power-structures continue to be hierarchical and sometimes even hegemonic. Either that or the organization is superfluous and does not function as a hierarchy at all due to the triumph of selfish state strategy.

In our view, organizations can also develop further into negarchic co-binding structures. In Republican Security Theory, this is made possible when a negarchy emerges in the environment. Negarchy, or the use of channeled balancing in a system becomes apparent when members become self-aware that certain changes in the material-environment are occurring. These changes or exogenous shocks” must satisfy two conditions: That they are severe enough that there is a fear that a tolerable second-order anarchy is rapidly descending into a state-of-nature as members try to protect themselves, aka. the anarchy-interdependence problematique. And that the shocks makes a previous hierarchical arrangement threatening, aka. The Hierarchy-restraint problematique. Republican Security Theory is a promising theory to: determine resilience, address changes in order or ‘the space between the games’, and give a new logic for the survival of states in a system.

For our empirical chapters, the challenge is judging where hierarchy, anarchy or negarchy is present. But it doesn’t need to stop at a single systemic level. A layering effect can be achieved and multiple layers of political order is a categorization that RST acknowledges. In the next chapter, we introduce three levels necessary for dealing with a Post-Cold War organization: The global, the regional and the organizational as part of a new methodology for investigating our regional case studies. The shift from an episodic to continuous approach when looking at resilience places an emphasis on finding patterns of behavior. The main object of analysis in our thesis are physical organizations representing a line of defense to regional security threats.
CHAPTER 2. UPDATING REPUBLICAN SECURITY FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Republics are the governance forms that take root in a negarchic order or negarchy. Negarchy, rather than being a natural state or order, is one that has had to evolve. To determine the presence of negarchy is a lengthy task that will take the rest of the chapter. For negarchy to emerge, both a hierarchy-problematique and an anarchy-problematique need to be identified in the same geographic sphere. Hierarchy problematiques become endemic once the question on if the institutions can be restrained while maintaining internal liberty. For the anarchy problematique to surface, there should also be a noticeable change of a tolerable second-anarchy on the continent going towards the brink of a first-anarchy or crisis of governance via increasing levels of violence-interdependence. For the hierarchy problematique in RST, it is especially salient when the government becomes dominant over large swathes of territory.

Our motivation for this chapter is the understanding that problematiques should sequence in such a way that they exist prior to a negarchy being formed and have evolved in a logical or historically-documented manner. Our goal was to create an appropriate methodology that not only tests the emergence of negarchy but also detects resilience. If a negarchy has formed, and has formed in a contingent time period with a republican formed organization, resilience can be expected.

At the same time, while we believe in Republican Security problematique conditions for negarchy we also recognize that some portions of RST need either clarification or modification to fit in our contemporary time period. Deudney’s 2007 work, *Bounding Power*, gives us a rich historiography of Republican inspired theories. But the theoretical content of RST is applied to past cases such as the Republic of Venice up to the founding of the United States of America in the Philadelphian System, post-industrialization cases refer primarily to either the highly theoretical investigation on the possibilities of World Government or the state-centred arguments on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Just as much of mainstream IR theory does, as a systemic theory, RST remains state-centric. For a theory that examines political orders as an amelioration of insecurity, we feel that the theory can be further developed into taking Post-Cold War security into account by introducing new actors as sources of insecurity.

This chapter relates to the overall aims of the thesis by showing us which tools are needed to gather the empirical evidence to help us develop a modern causal understanding of negarchy. This in turn would aide us in another aim of our thesis: to develop a theory inspired by Republican Security Theory which can explain organizational resilience in a Post-Cold War security setting.

We believe that a negarchy-inspired study on resilience demands both an approach that looks at a macro-structure of order change and a micro-structure of secure/insecure perceptions of states across different cases across time. In first section, we explain that our best method in uncovering negarchy and resilience is to use illustrative cases situated around regions along with theory guided process tracing. We also give the rationale why we chose Europe, Eurasia and South America as
these cases and what characteristics they all share. In the second section, we explain our amendments to Republican Security Theory through the incorporation of Regional Security Complex Theory, the changing of the sources of violence-interdependence to malevolent non-state and extra-regional actors, and the inclusion of an “external threat necessity”, vivere sicuro and vivere libero from other Republican thinkers. The third section shows our construction of a tripartite macro-structure that is used for observing changes of order over time and incorporating “exogenous shocks” into the regional systems. Our fourth and final section introduces a heuristic micro-structure of what we call “order-altering perceptions” that indicate changes in orders and the actors and threats involved that produced such perceptions.

2.1 Methods and Case Selection

The methodology that we use throughout the thesis are a mixture of historical narratives with illustrative case studies in chapters 3-5 and systematic process tracing which takes the case studies and paths to negarchy as a whole. Both are sub-sets of Theory Guided Process Tracing (Falletti, 2006). This section explains our choices in case and methods as appropriate to both describe Republican Security Theory and be methodologically appropriate for a study on organizational resilience. We first give a description of the types of process tracing. Then we explain the rationale for our case selections. We close this section by describing the categories we place our theory-testing propositions. Section 2.3.2 sets out our resulting propositions that we test in the case studies.

Process tracing is a useful methodology for drawing descriptive and causal inferences in qualitative research (Collier, 2011). It involves looking at the unfolding of events and situations over time. The historical narrative approach to process tracing serves to provide support for a theoretical argument. Its defining characteristic is the recognition of ‘endogeneity’ or feedback loops within social phenomena. These feedback loops occur when changes in the dependent variable at one point in time may lead to changes in the independent variable at a later point in time, which then would lead to further changes in the dependent variable (Buthe, 2002:486). An independent variable refers to variables that stand alone and do not change in response to changes in other variables that are measured. They can be chosen and manipulated and are also referred to as explanatory variables. Dependent variables are what are measured and effected in studies. They “depend” on the independent variable and are also known as response variables. We find that this is especially compatible with Republican Security Theory. According to what we know about RST if we designate the intensity of violence-interdependence as our independent variable and the resulting political arrangement/order as our dependent variable, then the changes to order via our “exogenous shocks” would also lead to changes in the level of violence-interdependence or how secure the states would then feel. Being able to document these changes through our case studies is an important step to the systematic process tracing we employ in the last chapter of the thesis. In systematic process tracing, patterns are teased out of the case studies and then tested for consistency (Hall, 2003:391). In this way we can compare this with the predictions in RST to find the strongest causal links. This method is ideal for sorting out and giving enough credence to the causal complexities that occur in comprehensive theories like RST.
Given the demands of resilience research in including exogenous shocks and looking at static and changing systems, process tracing is a much more suitable mode of investigation than building game theory models on cooperation modified by events. This is in contrast to merely changing input variables in a game or even a moot in depth investigation of institutional structure that is typical of rational choice and episodic analyses on organizational efficiency. It is especially fruitful when we use the historical analytic variety of process tracing early-on. Time becomes part of the phenomenon which consequently is also a central importance to resilience studies (Pierson, 2004).

Our illustrative case studies are descriptive case studies that are undertaken to show how an interpretation of Republican Security Theory would look when applied to a contemporary setting. We have chosen typical cases of regional organizational development from mature negarchy, developing negarchy, and emergent negarchy. Description is considered the foundation of process-tracing and allows us to build a sequence of independent, dependent and intervening variables that can later be analysed (Mahoney, 2010:125-131). This stage is covered in chapters 3-5 and focuses on the goal of making the unfamiliar dynamics of order change understandable through an RST interpretation as well as testing RST if it has occurred in the region. Each regional explanation will later be tested against each other after gathering our empirical evidence from all three cases and making comparisons on which macrostructural and microstructural patterns we find in common or different. This will be done in Chapter 6 which has a dual goal of theory-testing RST assumptions across space rather than within space and theory-building as we find examples of causal pathways and mechanisms towards negarchy, anarchy and hierarchy.

We have selected our regional cases after a survey of cooperation trends from candidate regional security organizations. We decided to investigate the resilient organizational cooperation in Europe, Eurasia and South America. This was based on an observation that these three regions shared some similarities in organizational cooperation. Broadly speaking we were able to identify three stages of post-Cold War development in each of the regions: [1] a beginning regional stage marked by hierarchy in either the regional, organizational or global level with a hierarchic security organization present, [2] a middle stage that includes development of a new Post-Cold War regional organization and the fragmentation of the security sphere with a number of different actors, and [3] a final stage where the Post-Cold War organization expands in geographic reach or member size. While we find that the late-stage Post-Cold War organization is Republican, resilience is not a given unless the presence of the Republican structure coincides with at least negarchy at the organizational level. This is to control of there are outside factors that have changed the power structures or strategic interaction of the states within the organization.

We define our unit of analysis separate from the phenomenon that’s being studied (Yin 2013:30). Although part of the goal of this thesis is an investigation on organizational resilience in post-Cold War security organizations, our main units of analysis are regions which are represented by the named geographic area of the cases. Our embedded units of analysis within the region are organizations such as Europe’s European Union (EU), Eurasia’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and South America’s Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Further below that, we study the foreign policy interactions of a few key “crucial” states. We have checked the organizational framework and protocols for each organization and have determined that they all share the following common characteristics:
• Exclusive membership, or the exclusive rights of “citizens” (states) in the organization
• Creation of organizational laws by representatives of national governments either through a parliament (like the EU’s European Parliament) or other coordinative body (the SCO’s Council of National Coordinators)
• Co-binding in the form of checks and balances in separated institutions within the organization, i.e. an executive, legislature and parliament
• Norms of liberty as non-interference and non-domination in some of its charter (in the EU, this has at least been maintained in their foreign policy and defense matters) (Wall, 2001; Skinner, 1998)

We have also provisionally designated these organizations’ regional partners as hierarchical actors. The designation of hierarchy is based on the amount of offensive power at their disposal, their ability to project power across large swatches of geography and political clout the privilege whether it is by economic side-payments or other means. The regional partners/organizations are NATO in Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States or the US in Eurasia, and the Organization of American States (OAS) or the US in South America.

In sum, our methodology for the rest of the thesis is to uncover when and if negarchy has emerged in our three regional illustrative case study so that we may match this condition with the formation of negarchic co-binding regional security organizations. If we find that negarchy has coincided with these organizations, we can make an assessment on resilience. We also test theoretical causal linkages to negarchy emergence and republican resilience to create a set of propositions (see Section 2.3.B). The following are the categories where we our create propositions:

1) The presence and emergence of Negarchy.
2) The presence of an “External Threat” that is necessary and causally linked to the maintenance of internal governing stability.
3) The linked presence of security via institutions and “freedom of the community” a.k.a. Presence of vivere sicuro and vivere libero, to forecast resilience.

The next section helps us bring forward our methodology by trying to make our illustrative case studies as accurate as possible when discussing order change and negarchical formations. We do this by modifying Republican Security Theory in such a way that it takes into account the large impact of Post-Cold War threats and organizational formation in response to these threats. These threats include non-state and extra-regional actors have erupted as either products of accelerated globalization or a consequence of the past or bipolar confrontation of the Cold War ending.

2.2 Amendments and Addendums to Republican Security and Violence-Interdependence

Before we can formulate our propositions and uncover the emergence of negarchy and the roots of order change, we have to make some slight adjustments to Deudney’s Republican Security Theory. Just as we have borrowed heavily from RST to incorporate into the realm of governing organizations, we would also have to borrow from other theories so that we can identify our unit of analysis, as well as placing extra emphasis on certain Republican strains of thought that most
closely match contemporary international politics and aide us in uncovering resilience. In this section we expand RST for our purposes by integrating Regional Security Complex Theory, James Madison’s external threat necessity, and Machiavelli’s vivere sicuro and vivere libero into our analyses of organizational resilience.

2.2.1. Incorporating Regional Security Complex Theory

Elements of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever can aide us in identifying geographic centers where we can make our theory assessments. This is especially important considering how the material context in Republican Security Theory places a heavy emphasis on geography. RSCT has the potential to judge the source and extent of violence-interdependence. Furthermore, RSCT possesses a similar valuable analytical concept called security-interdependence. Security-interdependence is the glue that holds regional security complexes together. It is the notion that the security of one state is affected to or connected with the security of another state. The intensity of these connections determine whether states are part of the same region or not. Geographic proximity or adjacency and the balance of power is a major factor in determining which states form part of a region (Buzan & Waever, 2003:45). States that occupy the same region have greater security interdependence with each other. A state that’s within a complex but interacting with a state outside of the complex experiences less security interdependence.

We diverge from RSCT in that we dispute the mandatory existence of anarchy in dictating what is and isn’t a regional security complex. To coincide with RST, we believe that the nature of security complexes are a product of primarily material forces and levels of violence-interdependence, not as a product of a single ordering arrangement. Rather, it is the environment that dictates security arrangements like anarchy rather than anarchy dictating patterns that create the environment. This supports our view from the previous chapter that multiple varieties of order other than anarchy can be present in a region. Regional organizations are not solely a creation of balance of power logics. Also, contrary to Buzan and Waever we do believe that a security complex can be reimagined by the prerogative of an organization or member state. The best example is the European Union. Whether the EU is penetrating or overlaying another regional sphere is not the question or focus. Our object under investigation is the health of that particular post-cold war security organization and not the consequences of their foreign policy stretch. However, we continue to use RSCT theory as providing a valuable tool in drawing the geographic boundaries of our case studies and determining which states should be considered intervening regional or extra-regional powers and to what extent they threaten the existence of states in the region. This will be explained in greater detail during our introduction of a microstructure. But to give RSCT a place in the analysis, we use the “regional” sub-complex definition to determine if there has been “overlay” or “penetration” of a regional or outside power, or in our case, even outside non-state threats.

Buzan and Waever’s cited mechanisms that we will be incorporating into our case analysis are penetration and overlay. Penetration occurs when outside powers make security alignments or alliances with states that are part of a Regional Security Complex. Overlay occurs when great power interests dominate the region so heavily that the local pattern of security relations fail to operate and can start with the stationing of troops and later the alignment of states according to
great power rivalry rather than their own local interests (Buzan & Waever, 2003:63). While these can and do occur from the prerogative of a powerful nation-state, we alter the original conception of penetration and overlay to also come from malevolent non-state actors. This is similar and will further be explained in the next sub-section in modifying RST’s violence-interdependence concept.

For us, the consequence of overlay would most certainly correspond to some perception of a global hierarchy, especially if that great power is a new addition to the region. This is what occurred in Eurasia with the US’s military presence in the region after the events of 9/11. Conversely if over time the local pattern of security had already been dominated by a geographically adjacent great power and that great power leaves the area, we can also expect order change and disruption prompting anarchy. We see this in our case of South America around the time that the Global War on Terror.

Security complexes are defined by RSCT as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization and desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another”. These security complexes can exist in the global as well as regional and sub-regional level. Buzan and Waever places regions as the primary pivot point of analysis and one where the feedback effects of global security complexes and domestic security complexes are judged. RSCT does not say anything about the creation or utility of institutions over security complexes. So with the question of governance open: if Republican Security Theory refers to extreme violence-interdependence as showing insecurity, then the region’s security-interdependence is disrupted once violence-interdependence accelerates. We take this logic to mean that this disruption of security-interdependence or the dynamics of a region would stimulate order changes and possibly negarchy.

The inside/outside debate on security preferences combined with the introduction of RSCT and regions, further links with an expanded notion of security. There are also civic/civilian concerns in large groupings of states. The question of survival beyond the borders as well as stability and the maintenance liberty within it, are questions addressed by classical Republican theory of the nation-state. As was explained in the previous chapter, answers provided by Republicanism are not limited to nations. They can also be extrapolated to larger governing bodies.

2.2.2. Modifying violence-interdependence

In the previous chapter we explained that in RST violence-interdependence is the central concept from which we can understand the varieties of order and the material pressures they arise from. However, in order to track violence-interdependence for the post-Cold War era and relate it to resilience, we make three proposals in modifying violence-interdependence. The first is that the focus in Republican Security on violence as wielded by the nation-state is changed to also include the impact of non-state actors. The second is that connected to our shift to non-state actors whom are also territorially mobile and leap across barriers of geography, that violent actors are more able to do this with their social contacts across geographic barriers rather than technology on its own.

Instead of only states, transnational malevolent non-state actors have the violence. At one extreme, malevolent non-state actors are able circumvent the roles of the state in providing goods and services for a state’s populace in geographic areas where the state is lacking authority (Rotberg, 2003:9). In another scenario, they can contribute to social ills in more developed states or increase
anxiety in domestic matters like employment, the concern for borders and illegal immigration in the case of Europe (Bruggeman, 2002; Vayrynen, 2003). Much of these destabilizing actors can come from outside the original security complex, infiltrating it. This is most obvious in the recent wave of religious-based terrorism where radical Islamists originate from a central command in the Middle East but spread to parts of Eurasia (Rapoport, 2004; Zafra-Davis, 2015). But the geographic transference of non-state threats are not only rooted in terrorism but also in organized crime, the drug trade and illegal migration.

Malevolent non-state actors, rather than relying on their own technological capabilities, exploit social networks of trade and protection through patron states (often as part of a proxy war) as a product of globalization. Furthermore, these violent agents are no longer nation states but can include diverse actors like drug cartels, illicit trafficking rings, and political insurgency groups (Zaccor, 2005). The presence of these groups can occur in states that have insufficient authority over parts of their legal territory or those whose transit policies make it easier for such groups to exploit open borders (Vinci, 2008; Smith, 2000:77; Kicinger, 2004). Half of RST’s material context thus transforms into an immaterial social context based on the acquisition of harmful and violent technologies rather than the capacity of the agents producing them. A focus on the social dynamic highlights the usurpation of sovereignty through the creation of ‘economic sovereignty’ by non-state threats (Davis, 2009). This is made possible by socially dense networks that are anti-state.

This does not mean that nation states are no longer a factor from which violence emerges, creating insecurity in the region. We expand the notion of inter-state threats that are geographically close to middle powers or weak states, to powers that originate far away from the region. We thus challenge the concept of adjacency in RSCT of close states being the most altering of a region. These states outside of close geographic proximity, we call extra-regional powers. The most prevalent one that is featured in this thesis is the United States. In Eurasia, China can also be seen as an extra-regional power that is acting alongside Russia in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well as the BRICS nations in South America during recent times. Whether these extra-regional partners are truly partners or threats depends on these powers’ interactions with the regional states and their biggest security worries. These worries depend on whether the state feels that their sovereignty or autonomy is effected by regional partners, these new extra-regional partners and non-state violent actors. We use the term sovereignty to refer to the exclusive jurisdiction to rule and govern a territory inside that state’s borders. Autonomy is the quality of that state to exercise its own foreign policy without coercion from other states or organizations. Regional and extra-regional partners both within and outside or security organizations are more likely to affect the autonomy of a member state. This is possible if a threat determined by the extra-regional partners is external to a partner state’s borders because it narrows their foreign policy choices.

We understand that this fundamental change in the sources of violence-interdependence modifies the concerns member states have when addressing security concerns. The introduction of non-state threats and their heightened mobility in a region plus the introduction of new state-based extra-regional actors alter the nature of security in a geographic space. It expands what is threatening both beyond and below the nation-state and their political orders. Yet these new threats must be included in the study as member states in a cooperative context must deal with both issues of state and non-state threats simultaneously. In terms of a study on organizational resilience these
are precisely the exogenous shocks we must look at to determine extended or conflicted cooperation in organizations. The development of resilience in an organization is apparent if the same commitment to cooperation is held even if the environment’s (not just the organization’s) power and threat structures change abruptly.

Yet the character of violence-interdependence remains intact. Geography and technology are still the intervening variables in violence-interdependence even if those that wield and circumvent them has been expanded. Social ties are also an important part in this logistics of threat and insecurity. Furthermore they raise important questions of authority and sovereignty from states in cooperative organizational arrangements. The consequences of these changes will be explained in Section 2.4 where we introduce the microstructure model of order-altering perceptions. The interpretation of the perceived geographic locality of transnational malevolent non-state actors and the security mandates of regional and extra-regional partners become intertwined into a new microstructure typology. The resulting micro-structure typology will be explained and incorporated into our method of tracking negarchy development per case-study region.

2.2.3. James Madison’s external threat necessity and correlations with negarchy

However, even if negarchy and the structural form of co-binding exists, the sustainability of co-bound negarchy or confederation often depends on a scenario unique to republican-types. Whether this is linked to the presence of negarchy or if a confederation can exist on its own once the environment changes would need further investigation either in our case studies or theoretically. The scenario, irrespective of negarchy, appears in the writings of James Madison and is known as the “external threat necessity”. We introduce the presence of an external threat necessity as part of our indicators for organizational resilience.

In the writings of James Madison, The presence of external threat is that it is problematic enough that cooperation inside republics would be facilitated for the sake of survival inside international anarchy. Going from the creation of a negarchy and Republican forms, the presence of a negarchy to Madison means that the requirements of an external-threat also meant that an inter-state anarchy must have existed and formed prior to negarchy (Evans, 2010: 5). There are some controversies though on the presence of international-anarchy and its effects on republics. Primarily, from Realist theory, that republics will be forced to take measures that preserve their external security but neglect or compromise their internal balancing structures (Waltz, 1959). What matters in RST though, is that unlike in Realism, anarchy can come into degrees depending on the levels of violence interdependence (Evans, 2010:7). It is with high violence-interdependence that domestic institutions, which would normally uphold popular control and rule of law, will erode with the necessity of keeping external security. The key to the presence of external enemies is their ability to “cement political associations”.

The need for an external-threat is related to Madison’s concern of regime types and their cyclical nature. By assuming that forms of regimes do have the opportunity to change, Madison also highlighted the fluctuations and linkages between liberty and power to facilitate regime change. For Madison, Liberty was not a pure or static good. While Power in its excess may directly lead to hierarchy and absolute monarchy, republics also have the potential to shift towards hierarchies if restraints on liberty are un-checked. A surplus in liberty, or excess in popular
influence, was believed to descend into factionalism and anarchy, leading naturally into an absolute monarchy to keep the internal peace. Madison abhorred this potential for “factional domination and Evans interpreted this as being akin to a state of nature due to its nature to lead to monarchical forms which are against the idea of liberty (Madison, 1787: Federalist # 51). In a sense, this would mean that a factionalized-republic was still more desirable than absolute monarchy (Evans, 2010: 18).

The requirement of an external-threat and international anarchy, thus makes co-bound organizations sustainable, and are threatening to the formation of hierarchies. As with most Republican theory, the historical case was the decay of the Roman Empire. What was termed as “Sallust’s Theorem” or the irreversibility of Rome’s degradation with the disappearance of Carthage as a threat. Carthage produced enough credibility as a threat for the citizens to practice moral restraint and cooperation between warring domestic factions (Wood, 1995). Thus the fall of Rome and threats to the durability of republics in general is not just a matter of administrative governability, which could be institutionally rectified, but of the lack of an external enemy. Such enemies maintain internal liberty and the freedom of action amongst disparate groups with the addition of stability to prevent descent into domestic internal anarchies. Thus the absence of external enemies would prompt large republics to form into a hierarchy.

2.2.4 Machiavelli’s vivere sicuro, vivere libero and republican resilience

While we have included the external threat necessity as a factor in resilience and negarchy formation, it would seem incomplete to observe Republican Resilience as correlated to something outside of the level of analysis of the organization. Considering this, we include an additional test inside the republican-esque organization itself. We have found a systematic way to do this is to delve deeper in to the values of a classical republic other than co-binding security. Thus we include Machiavelli’s concepts of vivere sicuro and vivere libero to take a more internal look inside an organization to see if its evolution also matches the material context.

One characteristic of a Republican-type of governance is the linked presence and presence of vivere sicuro and vivere libero in the state. These two concepts translate roughly into a strong government that check the aspirations of nobility and the people; and the active participation and connection between the nobility and the people. Vivere sicuro and vivere libero were introduced in Niccolo Machiavelli’s “Discourses on Livy”, a critique both extolling and investigating the rise and fall of the Roman Republic before its ascent as an empire. Machiavelli has contrasted these two concepts by employing the example of 17th Century France, representing vivere sicuro alone, against the Roman Republic as the ideal in possessing both vivere sicuro and vivere libero. Machiavelli works on the belief that the latter is the ultimate goal of political orders. Contrary to Machiavelli’s image as a supporter for totalitarianism in “The Prince”, his insight in the “Discourses on Livy” is that the population thrives on the concept of “Freedom of Community”, aka. vivere libero. This was achieved in the Roman Republic through both the people and the nobility taking an active role in self-government (Machiavelli, 1531: 202). Essentially this is an internalized way of viewing security as satisfying voice-options throughout multiple roles of power. A voice-option is a degree of leadership or activity which is used to change an organization from within. The nobility is clearly more powerful in materialist terms than the population, yet the coordination of both groups makes the liberty of all possible and prevents the descent into tyranny.
As with the writings of Madison, the fall of popularly-dominated governance into hierarchies, monarchies and tyrannies connects with the more modern Republican Security Theory, as a warning against the creation of a “hierarchy-problematique”. A proto-instance of a “hierarchy problematique”, in the eyes of Madison, is the absence of an external threat which would have checked the unfortunate cycle of republics and democracies falling into factionalism and a need for absolutism.

For Machiavelli, absolutism shines as a future spectre for states that focus solely on vivere sicuro. Institutional mechanisms were present in 15th century France paired by a rule of law that the monarch and the nobility were beholden in order for the people not to be suppressed (Machiavelli, 1531: 314, 422). A strong government was also in place to keep in check both the powerful and the weak, thus creating a “Secure Community” or vivere sicuro. The pitfall of vivere sicuro is that once a state makes this sort of security a priority, it will not arm its citizens for fear of an uprising against the nobility. But the state itself would be weak as it has to rely on foreigners to fight on its behalf. Such domination and the weakening of “a will to protect” amongst citizens creates a passive and impotent populace. Without the empowerment of the general populace to balance against the nobility, vivere libero cannot take root and republics would not be present.

The mix in indicative characteristics of republican-states derived from Modern Republican Theory, Madisonian, realist international relations theory, and the early Republican political theory of Machiavelli’s vivere sicuro/vivere libero; are apt to describe supra-governance in organizational form and allows us to test if organizations are not only able to operates as a singular entity, and also of a Republican non-hierarchical organization. Once this is confirmed, the trajectory of regional security or at the very least the requirements of its resilience, can be forecasted by tracing scale-effects of governance. We could then get a sense on what members of organizations need to be secure both externally and internally. Essentially, these three streams of Republican thought when integrated into a new way of looking at international/regional/organizational orders, also provides insights on the inside/outside on highly-integrated security realms. Rather than seeing security as “either/or”, security is integrated for stability on both the cooperation of member states amongst each other and coordination to best protect a union. When Post-Cold War security organizations can be seen as a new form of governance or “super billiard ball” the underlying structure of member-states bargaining amongst each other gives us a fruitful analogy of ‘the people’ and ‘nobility’, of more powerful members and lesser-powered members.

This leads us to our discussion on how an investigation on organizational level variables relate to our tracking of resilience over time. The following section introduces the Macro-Structure of our research. The macrostructure outlines how vivere sicuro, vivere libero, and the External Threat Necessity are incorporated and embedded in a step-by-step consideration of propositions.

2.3 Introducing the Macrostructure: Tracking Negarchy

2.3.1. Layers and stages in regional organizational development and punctuated equilibrium

The global level are what the states believe is the global structure of power. This can be emboldened in their favour if they believe they or other regional states possess qualities of global political influence or dampen their own personal ambitions if they think they’re witnessing overlay
of a greater power not from their own region. The regional level is determined by RSCT’s definition of a region and includes the perception of interactions member states have within the region irrespective if they occur inside our outside their regional organizations. This could include the state of bilateral relations with regional or extra-regional powers or the urgency of non-state threats. Lastly, the organizational level will be composed of the relations of states towards each other inside an organization.

We assume negarchy would erupt in the organizational sphere creating prime conditions of republican formation in either one of two scenarios. One scenario would be “simultaneous negarchy”. Simultaneous negarchy is occurring if there was an anarchy-interdependence problematique and hierarchy-restraint problematique that exists either in the above the two levels, trickling downward forcing a need for negarchic interaction. Another scenario is “prior pathway negarchy”. Prior pathway negarchy is when the anarchy-interdependence problematique and hierarchy-restraint problematique would occur at a prior time period from when negarchy emerges. Of course in terms of the anarchy-interdependence problematique, in order for there to have been stages of anarchy in that same level of analysis and an observed transformation from a second-anarchy to a first-anarchy.

Three time periods are used to track the creation of negarchy, along with pivotal events (usually the establishment of the Post-Cold War security organization) signifying “punctuated equilibrium” in the realm of inter-state regional cooperation. This time-lapse model is more appropriate for observing the development of resilience than one that looks at an individual cataclysmic event. The time periods for each regional case study is as follows.

- **Europe**: The first era is 1992-1996 and Europe’s Post-Cold War infancy up to the point of French-NATO rapprochement. The second era is 1997-2001 and the formation of an autonomous European capability, the end of NATO rapprochement and the unfortunate extension of the capabilities gap. The third and last era is 2001-the present day, where the European Union made leaps in bounds in developing intra-European military cooperation and drafted the European Security Strategy outlining Europe’s role in the world.

- **Eurasia**: The first era, 1991-1995 is following the fall of the USSR and the creation of the Common Security Treaty Organization as well as a wealth of other Pro-Russian or anti-Russian subregional security bodies until 1995. The second era is from 1995-2001 when the US first took deep interest in the region, it was also around the time when the Shanghai Five was established, the precursor for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The third and final era is from 2001 until the present day, observing the effects the introduction of US military bases has in the region as well as the human rights critique that apparently has brought some Central Asian states closer to the SCO.

- **South America**: The first era is 1990-1998 which includes the creation of MERCOSUR in South America and the Unit on Democracy Promotion in the US-dominated OAS. The second era is from 1998-2008, signalling the start of the Pink Tide movement against US hemispheric policies, the subsequent exit of the US from the regional security sphere and the search for new extra-regional partners. This era also signalled the creation of UNASUR. The third and last era is from 2008 until the present day which starts with the establishment
of the South American Defense Council within UNASUR but also signals the start of increasingly violent border disputes between Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador.

The time periods per case study are not uniform because we do not assume that negarchy creation is a simultaneous phenomenon. As was discussed in our examination on Regional Security Complex Theory, these regions are self-contained and exclusive. Therefore, we believe that their security dynamics are unique to their material contexts and thus violence-interdependence in each region is manifested differently. This is especially true when extra-regional or regional partners show different levels of interest in the regional sphere at different points in time.

At the end of each illustrative case study, a table is constructed which designates the three levels of analysis in each region: the global perception, the regional perception, and the organizational perception of interaction (see Figure 2 below).

Figure 2. The Macrostructure of Ordering Principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Early-Stage</th>
<th>Mid-Stage</th>
<th>Late-Stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional</strong></td>
<td>anarchy/anarchy-interdependence/hierarchy/hierarchy-restraint/negarchy</td>
<td>anarchy/anarchy-interdependence/hierarchy/hierarchy-restraint/negarchy</td>
<td>anarchy/anarchy-interdependence/hierarchy/hierarchy-restraint/negarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational</strong></td>
<td>anarchy/anarchy-interdependence/hierarchy/hierarchy-restraint/negarchy</td>
<td>anarchy/anarchy-interdependence/hierarchy/hierarchy-restraint/negarchy</td>
<td>anarchy/anarchy-interdependence/hierarchy/hierarchy-restraint/negarchy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These perceptions are taken from the view of the middle powers or weakest states, adopting a lowest-common-denominator approach to analysing interactions. It is towards these states that we derive the idea of “the people” in RST, considering that these states are the ones that have the most to gain from a co-binding structure and the most to lose in terms of defense of their interests if a hierarchy emerges instead.

2.3.2. Interpreting the macrostructure

In regards to the three Republican indicators of: (A) negarchy (B) external threat necessity and (C) resilience, vivere sicuro and vivere libero, several propositions are needed to be asked and answered.

To prove negarchy, all three time periods would need investigating. Firstly we would need to identify:
(A1) When did the anarchy-interdependence problematique arise? When did a tolerable second-anarchy descend into an intolerable first-anarchy? Was there any indications of increasing violence-interdependence?
(A2) When did the hierarchy-restraint problematique arise? Was there any discussion on hierarchy-restraints?

Then when investigating the External Threat Necessity we ask:
(B1) Can extra-regional or regional powers be considered an external threat to the autonomy of a region’s states?
(B2) Even when the external threat has been identified, for the transformative power of Republican Security Theory to be active, we need to ask does a presence of an external threat correspond to the emergence of an anarchy-problematique.

The third set of sub-questions are on Resilience, *vivere sicuro* and *vivere libero*:
(C1) Has the development of rules and institutions (if any occurred) corresponded with an attention to *vivere libero*?
(C2) Does the creation of co-binding organizations or *vivere sicuro* pre-date *vivere libero*?
(C3) Does *vivere sicuro* correspond to the emergence of negarchy?

2.4 Introducing the Microstructure: Order-Altering Perceptions

An assessment on the consequences of the intersections of these 2 meta-discourses on alliance stability is given below. The sum of these discourses will be referred to as Order-Altering Perceptions. In this thesis, changing threat perceptions are indicators of emerging orders such as anarchies, hierarchies and eventually, negarchies. Threats are either extra-regional powers or transnational threats. This determines their location in the threat perception typology and also displays a form of movement through the typology in catalyzing order changes. In the context of international theory, an extra-regional power threat embeds itself in a world-view of imposing itself in either global or regional mandates. The global mandate may be the role as a patriarchal “protector” against global transnational threat, which is linked to the actual regional powers own security perception of how much protecting they need by the extra-regional power. Problems arise when a global mandate turns into a regional mandate that conflict with the region’s own security goals. A state’s view of regional security can include combating other types of threats and perceptions of what is required for regional security. An extra-regional ally could then find themselves as appearing as an “enemy” to a region’s security. This stimulates a hierarchy-restraint problematique to emerge and then have to be ameliorated for the sake of stability.

The geographic reach of partner mandates are important for our study. Our two types of partner mandates are regional mandates and global mandates. When we refer to mandates, we are speaking about the “imagined territory” a state may claim as embodying their security interests. Partners with global mandates operate geostrategically when focusing on regions and their foreign policy in the region is part of a greater global plan. Global mandates can come from an extra-regional partner Regional mandates can be based ideationally on historical memory or geostrategic. Note that the partner, often a great power, does not have to be present in the organization, just present in the security constellation of the region. The two discourses that are linked with the mandates
are ones of sovereignty—territorial integrity in governance and autonomy—political independence for states to pursue their own foreign policies un-coerced.

What the threat is actually threatening matters too. In the new framework, whether the threat is regionally or globally mandated, they can threaten either the unit’s sovereignty or autonomy. A threat to sovereignty is one where a unit could potentially be prevented in governing its own internal interests or protection. A threat to autonomy concerns relative powers of protection in the fields of external policy when negotiating with other members. Sovereignty is the ability of a state to have independent authority over a geographic area. Autonomy, in relation to moral philosophy, is the capacity of an actor to make an informed un-coerced decision. Threats to autonomy can be interpreted as one of relative-deprivation. What determines sovereign or autonomy-laden threats relies on the location of the threat as being internalized within the unit’s territory, or externalized outside of it. These mandates and threat location nexuses can be seen as micro-processes leading to order change. The thesis refers to these as “Order-Altering Perceptions”.

We propose that the planned usage of security-policy-producing and global vs. regional mandates produces two functional discourses whose outcomes appear both horizontally and vertically linked. Securitization discourse analysis pinpoints the locality of threats when conceived by middle-power policymakers. Securitization discourse analysis uses the concept of speech acts, or declarations of security, in actions or words to get a better picture of the security environment that a state is perceived to be facing. Threat perception can fall under two categories: internalization and externalization. In our view, “internalization” occurs when the threat exists inside the state’s territorial boundaries for a direct-attack on the regime. It is a sub-state threat occupying its’ own level below that of the organization and states. Conversely, “externalization” is where the threat is physically located /operates outside of the states’ borders and can only reach the domestic regime indirectly. The threat then occupies a level at the same plane as states and moves between states. These threats place an extra burden on a horizontal anarchy-interdependence problematique as terrorist movements force certain inter-state interactions.

The following typology (Figure. 3) describes these interaction between states and their partners and the threats that are present for states in the region.

Figure 3. The Microstructure of Order-Altering Perceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner’s security mandates</th>
<th>Policy location of threat relative to states’ borders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Sovereign Contestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Autonomy Contestation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus we come to the following four order-altering perceptions:

- **Sovereign contestation**: Is the condition where a partner with a regional mandate is interacting with states that have internalized their security concerns. The internalization of security is manifested as a threat to the internal domestic regime of the state. This often occurs with the labelling of enemies of the state as terrorists or the penetration of the territory of the state by violent non-state actors. Sovereignty is contested because the partner feels it necessary to deal with a regional threat by altering a domestic policy in a state where it has no formal jurisdiction.

- **Sovereign non-interference**: Is the condition where a partner with a regional mandate is interacting with states that have externalized their security threats. Externalized security threats are seen as transversing territorial boundaries so that they effect the neighbours of each state or are sourced by the states’ neighbors. Here, a feeling of the state’s sovereignty remains intact as the collective of states wish to ameliorate the regional situation jointly with the regional partner.

- **Autonomy contestation**: Is the condition where a partner with a global mandate is interacting with states that have internalized their security concerns. The designation operates similarly to sovereign contestation. The difference is that globally mandated partners that are extra-regional work outside of the regional organizational framework. Thus autonomy or the capacity to govern their foreign policies according to their own domestic frameworks are threatened.

- **Autonomy non-interference**: Is the condition where a partner with a global mandate is interacting with states that have externalized their security concerns. The designation operates similarly to sovereign non-interference apart from the policies proposed by the globally mandated partner.

The microstructure, for the moment, serves primarily as a heuristic device. It allows us to best categorize what is occurring during the time directly after an exogenous shock is introduced into the regional system. While our case study chapters use this typology to illustrate or point-out these perceptions’ occurrences, the typology cannot immediately be used as strong indicators for the emergence of a particular anarchy, hierarchy or negarchy. First we had to gather the paths and results from Chapters 3-5 so that we could compare them in Chapter 6 if there is any regularity or link between the perceptions and the development of particular political orders at the regional and organizational level.

### 2.5. Conclusion

For this chapter, we first explained and justified our decision to use three illustrative case studies paired with theory guided process tracing so that we may uncover negarchy and resilience. The function for these methods are to guide the reader to understanding Republican Security Theory when applied to the cases of regional security organizations that are at descending qualities of resilience. The methods themselves are appropriate for resilience studies based on the crucial notion of “time” and development.

In the next three chapters we use the tri-partite model of global, regional and organizational level of perceptions and examine the levels against three periods of exogenous shocks. For each
segment we determine if anarchy, hierarchy or negarchy is present by taking into account the power, threat, and security factors that would determine each. At the same time we explore our microstructure heuristic by analyzing what situation each exogenous threat time-period signifies. We then match the results and processes by what we know of Republican Security using the propositions we created. The conclusion we come to is that Europe is descriptive of an advanced Republic with a negarchical organizational and regional structure, while Eurasia is a developing republic with only an organizational negarchy and South America is an emergent republic that lacks negarchy. Later on, in Chapter 6 we gather the findings from the previous three case study chapters and collate them so that we can uncover any in common casual pathways leading to the emergence of negarchy.
CHAPTER 3. EUROPE: A CONFEDERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

“Hard as it is to say now...I look forward to a United States of Europe, in which the barriers between the nations will be greatly minimized and unrestricted travel will be possible.”

– Winston Churchill, 21 October 1942, letter to UK Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden

The above quote was written in the midst of WWII after the first British victory at the battle of El Alamein. It is during this turbulent time that readers of the secret letter may have found such notions preposterous at worse and delusional and optimistic at best. Churchill not only foretold a Europe where war between nation-states was a distant memory, but one without internal borders vis-à-vis Schengen and the free movement of European citizens. While the two choices, would have been equally adept at consolidating and maintaining peace, what is interesting to note is that the concerns of Europe being swallowed up by a hegemonic US or Russia that created calls for imperial unification have resurfaced in the 21st century. What also may have been unforeseen, is that in addition to these old fears of extra-regional powers, the above pro-federal Churchill quote hadn’t considered the consequences of transmobility.

Early theories of geopolitics have recognized the material diversity of Europe’s landscape and topography, forming power-projections around Europe as a geographic entity (MacKinder, 1904; Montesquieu, 1748; Spykman, 1938). Europe from the onset was distinguished from the great plains of Eurasia and the naval expanse of the North Atlantic, in the possibilities of: conflict, logistics, and varied governance styles. Essentially Europe came to comprise a microcosm of social interaction bounded by material realities. The sociological/governance turn in European studies took root in the 1950s and 1960s through the works of Ernst B. Haas, the father of Neofunctionalism, and Karl Deutsch (Haas, 1968; Deutsch, 1968).

With the US and Russia at other ends, inside the European Union (EU)’s borders lay organized crime syndicates, terrorist groups, WMDs, migration flows, failed/failing and transitional states as the new threats. Yet both these old and new realities combine to create a late 20th century regional security environment primed for a confederation.

So far, in chapter 1, we have completed the first thesis aim – to challenge the harmful assumptions of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism which lead to contradictory explanations. In this section we survey the European theories of integration and which part of these arguments make a holistic explanation difficult to achieve in the European region.

Our thesis second aim was to create a new theory that explains organizational resilience in Post-Cold War security organizations. In this chapter, using our modified RST, we will demonstrate that the European Union (EU) is representative of an advanced resilient confederation of republics residing in a mature negarchy. In a continuum of negarchical resilience, the EU holds the most advanced stage. We will show that this was done gradually through a type of pathway of negarchy that we coin “prior pathway negarchy”.

In our third thesis aim, investigating negarchy in the world, we find two instances of negarchy formation in Europe. In Europe’s late-stage, we have determined that negarchy had formed in both the level of the region and the level of the organization. Both negarchies were a product of the anarchy-interdependence problematique at the regional level combining with the hierarchy-restraint problematique at the global level (for producing regional negarchy), and the hierarchy-restraint problematique at the organizational level (for producing organizational negarchy) during Europe’s mid-stage. These moves towards negarchy are facilitated by the emergence of autonomy-contestation shifting to autonomy-non contestation by virtue of the EU’s expanding borders and immigration, asylum, and crime polices.

In this chapter we argue that the EU is highly resilient due to the presence of co-binding structures and a mature security sphere appearing in its late-stage alongside both a regional-level and organizational-level negarchy. This completes our fourth aim to see if negarchy has appeared alongside republican forms to indicate resilience.

In regards to our central research question: *What does the conceptual system of Republican Security Theory give us in terms of analysis of cooperation patterns in security organizations?*

Our alternative framework for understanding the character of European integration in a security sense, harks back to the observation made by Republican theorists of Post-Machiavellian times. The observation is that moderate sized republics are first and foremost concerned with their internal security and externalizing their use of force would lead to degraded internal governing capacities. Conventional case studies of Republican Security Theory, such as the US’s Philadelphia model, indicates a republican structure as can be a supranational entity which encourages cooperation through its tripartite legal/organizational apparatuses. But it is not organizational structure and legal codes alone which determines the unity of separate parts. The formation of a stable Republican structure also must emerge from a change in the material-context or violence-interdependence in the continent-wide geographic context. In the case of Europe, problems of migration, organized crime/the drug trade, and terrorism represent transnational cross-border threats rather than the traditional inter-state threat in Deudney’s Republican Security Theory.


### 3.1. Theories of European Cooperation and an RST Reading

#### 3.1.1. Theories of Cooperation in Europe

There is a disjuncture between the development of International Relations Theory and theories on the solidarity of Europe. Part of this is the divide between theories which explain looser inter-state cooperation, such as the neo-neo debates of the 1980s and those that focus on tighter integration or the enhancement of cooperation through codified rules and institutions. The other reason is that scholars view the Europe Union as a “special case” or anomaly of contemporary governance. What could be inferred from the general overview of theory development is that
neorealism has lost the debate against neoliberal institutionalism in Europe. Neoliberal institutionalism lives on through intergovernmentalism, functionalism and neofunctionalism.

This section will conclude that while neoliberal institutionalist theories can explain cooperation in the European space and neorealism has failed to adequately explain progressive EU integration; neorealism still has opportunity to rectify weaknesses in neoliberalism. Such weaknesses in neoliberal institutionalist theories are the lack of recognition of hard security variables or specific world events that could impact a change in state behaviour.

The bargaining power of states under neoliberal institutionalism are determined by the relative intensity of their preferences and not by material capabilities or military power (Powell, 1991:1304). What this suggests is not necessarily that neorealism has disappeared from the debate on Europe. As the EU becomes a zone of peace, states adapt and change to operate in an institutional structure. This structure though, has no consensus on whether it is a “playing field” for state interests or if it fundamentally binds and changes preferences. The genesis of preference changes hold the key to whether a theory of European Security Integration should be institutional or international-conflictual.

The EU is a mix of intergovernmental and supranational institutions. An intergovernmental institution has the preferences of states as the main arbiters of influence. Supranational institutions exist above the level of the member state, whom delegate their authority to individuals/parties in the supranational institution. These individuals/parties whom don't share the same roles/office at the member-state level. EU intergovernmental institutions include the European Council. The European Council, which is made up of the Heads of Government of all the member countries and charged by the Treaty of Lisbon with defining the “general political direction and priorities” of the Union. The supranational EU institutions relevant to this case study is the European Parliament (EP). The EP will take an indirect role in the investigation of security policy change by virtue of its part in the policymaking of EU common security, defense, and freedom and justice.

“Purer” strands of neorealism focus on the resilience of member states and the continued emphasis of material power rather than social bargaining. Prominent neorealists have dismissed the role of institutions in maintaining a cohesive Europe. In the case of Europe, Waltz viewed European integration as uneven and the reason why it has progressed was because the US acted as a security guarantor after World War II. This has left integration free to flourish without the usual realist fear of West European states being scared of their neighbors (Waltz 1979:70-1). John G. Mearsheimer has made a further commitment to neorealism’s behavioural basis of self-help and the security dilemma by predicting that the fall of the Soviet Union would result in a multipolar world where European states would once again be concerned about relative gains. Multipolar or multipolarity is when more than two states in the international system hold considerable and equal power. The re-emphasis on relative gains would place restrictions on how far a member state would wish to integrate (Mearsheimer, 1990).

The neorealist literature does little to explain or predict how the EU operates as a specific, or unique, set of institutions or how integration has progressed in Europe. In the formation of the EU, cooperative acts from member states run into contradictions central to Neorealism. The contradictions include the precept that in neorealism, states seek security to ensure their own survival, whereas EU member states believe that enhancing security entails wilfully eroding their own sovereignty (Collard-Wrexler, 2006:416). Another contradiction in Europe was that instead
of favouring balancing as the dominant strategy, most states, especially East European members, adopted bandwagoning. Arguably, the Neorealist hypothesis on the breakdown of intra-European relations have not come to fruition. However, most of the assessments on the advent of cooperation inside Europe focused on political and economic gains through treaties of supranational governance.

Integration operates very closely with the liberal institutionalist variant of liberal intergovernmentalism. This makes the identity of neorealism in the European Security sphere, dependent on the assumption that the EU would not last and will revert back to neorealism’s old logics of balancing and bandwagoning. However, balancing and bandwagoning in a European context is fraught with problems of translation into the European sphere. Instead of operating on a single logic of action across the board, the EU’s member states are varied in their responses to different spheres of policy.

One explanation for varied policy responses is the lack of a uniform voting procedure. Defense, foreign policy, taxation and social security remained under unanimous voting; including the right of member states to veto the decisionmaking procedure (Koukoudakis, 2013: 98). However, in the Council of the European Union, substantial changes in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty would transfer most unanimity voting policy areas originally designated in the Nice Treaty of 2001 to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) ⁶. After the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, expanded issue areas for QMV in the Council of Ministers include: funding the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Common Defense Policy, Humanitarian aid and rules concerning the Armaments Agency. QMV was also expanded to “inside” security areas such as immigration, border controls, civil protection, police cooperation and EUROPOL. A new item was also introduced for QMV voting, “responses to natural disasters or terrorism”. If the council does not act on proposals made by the Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the qualified majority is increased to 72% votes of the Council members and at least 65% of the population of the EU.

These voting changes should not be taken for granted by neorealism. The shift from unanimity to QMV greatly affects the level of autonomy states have in enforcing their individual wills on defense and security policies. This issue becomes complicated when considering the institutional linkages inside the EU and how institutions must act with one another. Complications of supranationalism include not just QMV, but also the fact that QMV is extended to the Council of Ministers, an intergovernmental body. This means that a member state's interests may be outvoted when legislation is enacted. This furthers the erosion of member state sovereignty.

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⁶As of November 2014, QMV under the Lisbon Treaty will also be modified from a proportional system to one that requires a “double majority” or 55% of the member state votes and 65% of the population. Decisions can also be blocked by a veto of four member states or a “blocking minority”.
3.1.2. Post-Cold War Republican Security and Strong Resilience in Europe

The “nation-state as the predominant actor” view intentionally ignores the possibility of state transformation towards a higher plane of governance. It also disregards the inside/outside distinction in European security and the impact of transnational issues that impact more than one state geographically. The factor of geography is still especially prudent within European institutions, especially under the context of Enlargement and where precisely the European security sphere ends. This is true for not only Europe within the European Security Defense Policy (ESDP), but also for the European members in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For example, the question of Turkey’s ascension has enflamed conflict with Greece’s opposition, despite Turkey also having the second largest NATO military force in the region.

Both the WEU and NATO are either insufficient as European defense and security providers because of the non-European North Atlantic elements’ interests as per NATO, or the over-emphasis on a strictly political and military European structure at the expense of a lacking political integration. The EU with its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) has the potential to address such political integration, with the AFSJ holding the most potential.

To understand Europe’s choices and development under a security context, Europe can still be seen as an institution. Domestic and inter-state squabbles can and do remain between member states. However, what it means to keep Europe secure and protected should be seen as a collective rather than individual good. Considerations of a new supra-national sovereignty, rather than state-based sovereignty changes the boundaries and meanings of security in Europe (Soronsen, 1999). Europe’s priority then becomes protection of the union as a whole, with existential threats and encroaching powers focusing on a distinct geographic sphere of “Europe”. The same Europe would thus be apart from the North Atlantic region, France, Germany, being a “state” in of itself. The creation of the “State of Europe”, as historical institutionalism would point out, can be tracked with the arena all member states found themselves before in the Cold War, to the 1990s, to the new millennium and post-9/11. The global arena, much like Waltz’s international system, thus creates the structures that produce the “new governance” in governance approaches. Institutions remain important. But rather than being the drivers, they are actually products of their time.

The anarchy-interdependence problematique was found in Europe’s mid-stage. Indicators of increasing violence-interdependence were connected with the incorporation of the Schengen Process into the EU legal framework. The stimulation of second-anarchy to first-anarchy occurred when non-state actors like criminal organizations and drug traffickers took advantage of the opened borders and administrative difficulties of the member states and also incorporated illegal trade routes from outside of the region. This trickled downward to the member state level amidst national debates on immigration and fighting organized crime (De Giorgi, 2010).

The hierarchy-restraint problematique also emerged in the mid-stage at the global-level and the organizational level. The concerns that stimulated the two problematiques are not the same. The global level hierarchy-restraint problematique was a result of continuing EU-NATO negotiations where it became apparent that the US holds the specialized military artillery and “right of first refusal” in missions both within and without the European sphere. The organizational level hierarchy-restraint problematique was also present in the EU’s member state interactions when
France, the UK and Germany started colluding and then solidifying their leadership in the terms of negotiating European security. This was evident in the build-up and aftermath of the St. Malo declaration. The global level hierarchy-restraint problematique was discussed and may even have brought a hand to a more confident EU block in NATO.

For the European case, the US, acting with and without NATO, acted as the external threat necessity to stimulate cooperation in formulating European defense. This was evident in the American acts of unilateralism that characterized the war in Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq invasion which soon reached into Europe’s “neighborhood”.

We will show that the European Union qualifies as being a highly resilient co-binding negarchical institution. We demonstrate this by showing how the development of “freedom of community”, also known as vivere libero, took a gradual development alongside the EU-NATO question for vivere sicuro. The progressive extension of Qualified Majority Voting on internal issues (which eventually became security issues under Area for Security, Justice and Freedom) is one indicator of vivere libero. The extension of joint-decisionmaking powers for the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers under the co-decision procedures under the Lisbon Treaty is another indicator.

3.2. 1992-1996 Europe Bandwagons in Hierarchy

The decision to co-bind and negarchies do not appear out of nowhere and neither do the problematiques which make them necessary. Europeans saw themselves in a different security environment after the Cold War than before. Before the Cold War, a first-order anarchy resulted in death and destruction. It is possible that a lack of appropriate continent-wide governing capacities may have averted it. During the Cold War, there was less of an incentive for European states to emerge out of anarchy at least between themselves, being shielded under the US security umbrella. The fall of the USSR had left bandwagoning a moot point, at least politically with the quieting international environment….until the wars of Yugslavia and the fears of Eastern migration.

The first era case-study section explores the period from 1992 to 1996. External security is first discussed with reference to the Yugoslav wars and the powers of the Western European Union (WEU) during Maastricht. Then internal security and transmobile non-state threats are laid out with the new Justice and Home Affairs pillar of the treaty before the third section where the pillars are discussed in general. Problematiques are necessary for negarchy to emerge. This section shows how hierarchies in the global-level and organization-level laid the groundwork for hierarchy-restraint problematiques and how policy can turn an anarchy into an anarchy-problematique in the next section.

3.2.1. The US’s place in Global Hierarchy within European Security

During the early to mid-90s, lack of European capability with the US as the surviving power after the end of the Cold War created necessary bandwagoning with NATO. This US unipolarity and domination in NATO created a perception of a hierarchical global-level order in the field of international security. As we will show, in the next few sections, this global-level hierarchy persisted throughout the three time periods.
The dissolution of Yugoslavia on the 27 of June 1992, still fell under the Economic and Political Committee’s (EPC)’s remit, Europe’s only security structure. Yugoslavia had a trade agreement relationship with the European Community (EC) since 1970. Europe at the time of the Yugoslav Wars lacked a formal military structure and the Maastricht Summit that would create the Maastricht Treaty was not due to meet until December of that year. The political will and military means were thus low during the beginning of the ex-Yugoslav conflicts. Serbian president Milosevic, convinced of the EC’s bias, sought a UN-brokered arrangement which rendered the EC to secondary actor status.

While an identifiable and active security concern for the EC, Yugoslavia’s crisis came at a sensitive time for transition in the European integration project. The parallel EPC process of the EC was being transformed to the more ambitious and comprehensive process of Maastricht. The eventual 1992 EC sanctions were imposed with great difficulty and was met with public outrage. Hence responsibility in the security sphere was later delegated to the UN and eventually NATO in December 1992.

In 1993, European states adopted the Maastricht Treaty, creating the three-pillar governance system of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), establishing the European Union. The Economic and Political Committee (EPC) was reformulated into the CFSP pillar. Maastricht still retained the civilian and intergovernmental characteristics of earlier European Defense development. Yet the CFSP pillar was still set in the context of NATO’s primacy and preservation (Smith, 2001).

The CFSP’s Joint Actions was previously drafted under the Asolo Declaration of 12 December 1991. Asolo identified four areas where members would have security interests in common and be encouraged to Joint Action. These four areas were the OSCE Processes, disarmament and arms control in Europe, nuclear non-proliferation and economic aspects of security. Joint Actions were used to administer humanitarian aide to Bosnia, monitor elections in South Africa and Russia, operating blockades on the Adriatic and Danube, and regulating the trade on dual-purpose goods.

The EPC was more reactive, the CFSP was drafted to make the EU’s external actions and to create consistency with other actions adopted by EU member states (Duke, 2000: 112). For EU responses that require military action; the Lisbon Report created a distinction between “defense implications” and “security dimensions”. Defense Implications require military action, while Security Dimensions do not. Issues with Defense Implications, unlike Security Dimensions, are not subject to the Joint Action procedure. “Common interest” was introduced as constituting the basis for adopting Joint Action.

The geographic areas deemed “common interest” were limited to the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It was understood at the time that these geographic areas assumed that WEU operation would likely require international backing, such as from the US. The breakup of Yugoslavia was a pivotal moment of Security that occurred in Europe’s backyard. This tested the responses of Europe and NATO. The lack of military capabilities and the absence of any global clout of Europe into the external world though, left the WEU at an operational disadvantage to deal with the crisis. Early acknowledgement of the
necessity of international backing for WEU operations forebodes a tacit acceptance of a hierarchical order at the global-level by a power(s) that was non-European.

Weaknesses in informal and formal European foreign policy apparatuses during the Yugoslav wars had led to the desire to strengthen common foreign policy. Involvement by NATO crept upwards from August 30 1995 after NATO directed five waves of air strikes against Bosnian positions. This was also the first time NATO forces were being used in the conflict. But the actual lack of practical capabilities of the WEU in the Bosnian crisis still persisted, culminating in the deployment of an Implementation Force (IFOR), a multi-national force led by NATO following the UN Security Council Resolution 1031 in December 1995. What followed was the US initiated Dayton Peace Accords. This appeared to end the debate on the EU’s ability to contribute to European Security (Medcalf, 2005:83; Schake, 2002:16).

In 1994, parallel with the continued development of CFSP, a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) was proposed at a NATO Brussels Summit and later became known as the Berlin Agreement (Par. 4, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994). Two main goals of ESDI was to equalize the burden sharing for Europe to participate in security missions while using NATO assets and capabilities such as C3 and logistics support; and also to reinforce the transatlantic link by defusing frustrations from the US on Europe’s inability to act within its own geographical remit.

The move towards ESDI was facilitated by the French, framing the beginning of the mid-1990s as one of NATO-Rapprochement. Towards the beginning of the 1990s, France blocked NATO involvement in the former Yugoslavia. However, in December of 1995, French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette announced a changed strategy where European states can contribute to European Security. His statement reflected a lack of support in Europe for a European capability outside of NATO (Medcalf, 2005:83). Thus was the decision of the European states to consolidate their defences within NATO rather than outside NATO during the early to mid-90s.

ESDI’s operations centred on the Combined Joined Task Force concept (CJTF). The CTJF allowed creations of coalitions of the willing that are not NATO-members, such as those participating in partnership programs, and missions and tasks that can be undertaken beyond Alliance territory (Medcalf, 2005:84). It also allowed for all-European coalitions, which exclude the US and Canada, to operate if the North American allies choose not to intervene. Command of the CJTF was ensured by allowing the WEU to lead. In the meantime, the ESDI allowed for access to assets necessary to conduct military operations. However, this strengthened pillar of European competency in defense was still constructed within the NATO organization rather than developing them through European institutions. Whether this was for the sake of convenience or acknowledged hegemony of the US needs to be investigated further. The assumption of CJTF was that a consensus between European and North American allies in NATO would be reached. The reliability of the CJTF concept was put into question with the US’s unilateral decision to stop implementing the Bosnian embargo in December 1994.

The operational reality of the CJTF both politically and militarily leads to a privileged position of the US in Europe’s own security domain. The legal embeddedness of EU states in NATO negotiation processes for European security, even via the ESDI, indicates a process called “overlay”, or where the security region is being defined by outside powers. The materials and means of guaranteeing external security for Europe as a continent, is bound with the necessary
assistance of an outside power. In this case, the outside or “extra-regional” power is the US via NATO.

In 1996 the ESDI and CJTF was further finalized in the Berlin-Plus Processes during the NATO Berlin Summit. This was made possible through France’s acceptance that a military capability could not be built outside of NATO. WEU was designated as the institution where NATO would work towards building up European capabilities. The Berlin Summit further clarified circumstances when NATO assets would be used and the procedures for their use. The problem with NATO assets, however, is that there are little collectivized assets and the collective assets that are available are not useful for force projection (Medcalf, 2005: 85). Those assets that the WEU would use under the CJTF; such as sea and air lifts, satellite communications and refuelling capabilities, are primarily US-owned.

US control is maintained while Europe’s capabilities and burden-sharing is increased, strengthening the security in European theatres as a whole in the early to mid-90s. So while the Berlin arrangements may appear win-win for Europe and North American allies within NATO, the advantages are still mostly toward the US. The US still facilitates access to useful assets, is relieved of the burden of Europe when crises don’t serve its interests, and maintains its alliance. NATO also becomes strengthened with the additional procedures from the Berlin Processes without competition from another European security provider.

At this point, NATO still retained its role as the primary protector of Europe. Europe and the EU while having the protection of other NATO allies with the additional option to act on its own with collective-NATO assets, comparatively still lacked influence as a region and the military capabilities to deal with practical problems. This passive agreement towards its own security has a wholly negative effect toward institutional development ruled by European states themselves. The situation changed in the next section in 1997-2001, with EU becoming stronger and Europe becoming bolder in voting against US desires inside NATO forums.

In the context of our modified Republican Security Theory, this initial Post Cold-War starting point was a hierarchy at the global-level. It was still in the European state’s interests to accept US hierarchy and bandwagon with NATO to acquire military assets that their own organizations lacked. This security dependence on an outside alliance (even one which they are a part of), that is dominated by a foreignstate does not bode well for an internal balance inside the EU for Republican Security Theory. By not concentrating on arming their “citizens” or member states, the EU had passively produced a dynamic where another power is required to “fight on their behalf”. If the EU were to analogously be similar to a state, it would be a weak state based on that external security-providing characteristic. The next question in the upcoming eras is whether such conditions had changed in a way to stimulate other global orders, such as anarchy and negarchy into forming at the global-level for Europe.

3.2.2. Non-state threats lurking outside the fortress

The regional-level perception of security in the first time period was anarchic. More precisely it exhibited a tolerable second anarchy both between states and in the non-traditional threats of terrorism and migration pressures.

Before the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 the participation of European organizations in crafting a space for internal security were fragmented. Between 1986 and 1991, prior to the EU, a
host of new organizations dedicated to the fight against transnational crime, illegal immigration and terrorism developed to over twenty organizations. All of the organizations were ad hoc intergovernmental bodies whose goals were linked to the transition of the Internal Market. This was the result of the urging of senior policy advisors in member countries that noted that the TREVI structure was too narrow a framework to jumpstart a much needed increase in cooperation (Flynn, 1997:85).

Coordinative difficulties at the regional level were evident with the displacement of European security issues to a multitude of ad hoc and intergovernmental bodies. For one, there was no overall strategy or framework and there was little information sharing between agencies, most not knowing of each other’s work. Considering the proclaimed interconnectedness of the new threats that have launched the TREVI working groups, such policy fragmentation only exacerbated roadblocks to further cooperation. (Mitsilegas et. al, 2003 : 31).

During Maastricht, progress was made in resolving the organizational problems of the many parallel but separate European intergovernmental security organizations. In Masstricht’s Treaty of the European Union (TEU), Article K.1, for the first time gave a formal treaty basis for the adoption of measures on combatting unauthorized immigration and fraud, border controls, judicial cooperation and police cooperation against terrorism, drug trafficking and other international crimes. Formalized instruments, similar to the external security CFSP pillar were also given to the JHA pillar via Article K.3 including: Joint Actions, Joint Positions and Joint Conventions. Article K.4 provided special procedures for decision-making, a senior Coordinating Committee and mention of the European Parliament and financing. JHA and Europe’s internal security for the first time became centralized under a larger integration rubric.

The need for consolidation and legal formalization under Maastricht was an acknowledgement that the EU as a whole were facing European-wide rather than domestic problems. At the regional-level, the EU’s threat perception was anarchic as the institutional architecture of JHA was at its infancy and strict mechanisms for police and judicial cooperation between nation-states was still lacking. Intergovernmentalism, or the preference of states to deal with matters with eachother rather than through supranational institutions and processes, was still strong despite the recognition of the potential for cross-border threats spilling over with the project of creating a singular market space.

Terrorism was thought to originate from the Middle East, outside of EU jurisdiction. Terrorism was emerging as a transnational threat as terrorist groups not only used European countries as bases but also engaged in activity such as cooperating to procure arms and munitions, training and intelligence (Ranstorp, 2010). Yet, even though terrorist ideology may have spread within Europe, the origins of these threats were still viewed as originating outside of the EU. Drug trafficking was also a problem, due to the wider availability and falling prices of LSD and heroin. Drug Cartels from South America were globalizing towards Europe. In the early 1980s, the market was also infiltrated by cheaper cocaine coming from South America (Ruggiero & South, 1995). There was also a worry of changing drug trafficking routes with increasing routes going through Europe as a result of the US upgrading anti-drug measures during the Reagan administration. Columbian cartels applied industrial-style transport to drugs and diversified their markets with an eye on Europe (Williams and Sovana, 1996: 18). The allied threat of organized crime was also linked to the drug trade. With the 1970s and 1980s expansion of international drug trafficking,
growth of international trade and financial transactions and economic inter-penetration of Western Europe lead to a spread of organized crime.

What can be observed thus far, is that threats were located or thought to originate “externally” from the EU’s boundaries. The importance of EU geographic boundaries were brought up by Germany who sourced many of these external threats as coming from ex-USSR states from which it shares its borders. This further drives home the anxiety a removal of internal borders may cause for member states. Thus, although recognizing the potential of threats wreaking havoc internally inside the EU, policy discourse still identifies the threat as being external and avoidable. Hence the “externalization of threat”.

Migratory pressures and its effects in the beginning of the 1990s became a new set of issues for JHA. Migratory pressures were identified as emanating from war-torn and destitute third world countries. From the 1980s, international migration flows were increasing due to military conflicts, political persecutions, and the widening gap between poor and prosperous countries. From the 1990s, nearly 20 million refugees were fleeing war and persecution while 100 million economic migrants were attempting to escape from poverty (Mitselegas et. Al., 2003: 25). Many migrants have attempted to take advantage of EC member states’ generous asylum systems. From 1987-1992, the number of asylum application in the 12 EC states rose from 132,799 to 556,391 with Germany being a favourite country (Reermann, 1997: 122) The internal strains inside member states were clear after this drastic increase of migration numbers which came with administrative problems, additional expenditure and ethnic ghettos in cities. Illegal immigration and bogus asylum seekers became linked to criminal organizations that aide it as well as a suspicion that these groups exploited the differences between national social/criminal systems and the dismantling of the internal market.

Non-state mobile actors were recognized as threats, but more specifically, threats that were at the time outside of the EU. This made the threats salient only if they penetrated the EU’s external borders. By then, by virtue of the JHA pillar’s intergovernmental system, perpetrators would be at the mercy of the police and judiciary of the state they settle in rather than a European-wide crime fighting force. The continued pursuance of “bordered” internal EU most likely slowed the progress of integration of the police and judicial JHA elements.

In the early 1990s member states had to face problems not only with the consequences of completing the internal market, but also new sources of the new threats of organized crime. These new sources were from Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and their successor states. At the time, the territory of the EC/EU had not included these external sources of threat despite their geographic eminence. Germany felt especially vulnerable, as their border was at the frontiers of the new Central and East European states. This caused Germany to push for greater progress at the European level in battling immigration and transnational crime. In the 1990/1 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), Germany highlighted the problems of a borderless market with the seriousness of a mounting external threats as being a paramount issue of internal security and the JHA. The 1995 European Organized Crime Report appeared to have reflected a continuation in trends from the earlier years. Organized crime has been acquiring an increasingly international dimension regarding the composition of groups, where their working areas are and the cooperation of groups of different origins (van der Heijden, 1996).
Solutions combatting these external threats were still able to be developed by Europe without outside interference by the US. The sovereignty of a European state, while threatened by the non-state threat, is not threatened by an extra-regional power even if the extra-regional power operates inside Europe.

Transnational terrorism, organized crime and migration are still territorially and geographically bound intimately with Europe. These were European problems emanating from the EU’s frontiers. Hence, “sovereign non-interference”. Violence-interdependence and hence anarchy at the regional-level was still low, as the non-state threats were more vigorously stopped at BorderStates. The lack of EU integration with Schengen, did at least delay the coming of the first-anarchy, as will be seen in 1997-2000.

Threat perceptions in the regional European geographic space, combined with NATO external relations, produced a state of “sovereign non-interference” allowing the EU to develop their internal security without the desire, need or presence of outside-power interference. Inside the EU organizational-level.

3.3.3. Still an organizational hierarchy, pillars and differentiation before cohesion

At the EU organization-level, the presence of intergovernmentalism and the norms of unanimity voting has decidedly placed the EU order as most likely being hierarchic. The decision may be controversial, but actions of France, Germany and the UK, dominating affairs inside the EU and affairs with the US and implicitly, NATO, indicate that not all EU states are equal.

The organizational ordering principle was hierarchical despite efforts of pillarization due to the intergovernmental nature of the two out of the three pillars. The organizational hierarchy is evident in the disproportionate influence, France, Germany and the UK had in the trajectory of EU security and foreign policy.

The inside-outside European security conception has become more apparent after reading the two previous sections. Considering the three-pillar structure of the EU, the first pillar or Economic pillar falls under supranational jurisdiction and thus have tighter integration mechanisms than the intergovernmental second pillar of CFSP and intergovernmental third pillar of JHA. Institutionally, in the 1990s, both outside and inside security spheres of the European Union operated under unanimity voting rather than Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). Security was largely outside of the co-decision procedure where QMV was required within the European Parliament. This would no doubt hinder rather than encourage political integration, as the emphasis on internal security under Maastricht much like external security was cooperation amongst member states rather than integration and supranationality. The strong intergovernmental nature on internal security of states at the European level during the early 1990s has led to fragmented development in cooperation on international terrorism, drug trafficking, international organized crime and migration.

A structure of supranational governance by the EU over member-states in the area of JHA may be incompatible with the existence of the nation-state and national government (Mitselegas et. Al 2003: 8). Although European members were willing to pool their sovereignty and create a legal order of the European Community, when traditional state functions such as national law-making and law enforcement were to be affected, EU member-states favoured the less integration-demanding intergovernmental approach. JHA issues are generally exempt from supranational
elements of Maastricht as they are sovereignty sensitive. The issues include border controls, measures relating to public order, (i.e. national police forces), criminal law approximation and rules on the entry of third-country nationals. Threats such as organized crime however, have highlighted the impracticality of a nation-state being able to guarantee the internal security of its citizens. Yet during the 1990s, European states favoured intergovernmental cooperation over supranational integration.

The third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs under the Maastricht Treaty was developed as an intergovernmental activity. Before Maastricht, member states monopolized internal security and has used internal security as a matter of national sovereignty. The drive towards state cooperation in internal security matters despite the differences in national legal systems, police forces and earlier European initiatives, stemmed from 1970s processes of the European Economic Community. Unlike calls for a common foreign and security policy; justice and home affairs was originally outside of the EC integration process. Such resistance to JHA and similarly security integration from member states are a credit to how resilient the idea of the nation-state being the sole security provider is.

Increasing supranationalism inside the EU structures could have been a remedy, but external and internal security of the EU was still linked with Wesphalian themes of sovereignty and autonomy for member-states individually rather than the EU as a whole. These fears within Republican Security Theory, indicate that the institutional structure of the EU still needed improvement in terms of vivere sicuro or the protection of the nation-states from a supranational Brussels apparatus. This is exacerbated with fears of what Schengen would mean for externalized threats that will soon become internalized. This also corresponds with the scholarly view of Europe being hierarchies-within-anarchy at the regional-level. Sovereignty non-interference against the US or NATO was fortunately still able to emerge, allowing the JHA pillar to form within the EU context despite the hierarchies at the global-level looming above.

3.4. 1997-2000: Europe and Defense Rapprochement

This section explores the late 1990s development of European Security, from 1997-2000. This period is characterized by an end to NATO-Rapprochement where an EU-based solution to European Security problems were sought. The start of CFSP and ESDP starts to solidify through increased codification within the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam and the Helsinki Headline Goals, as well as the further incorporation of the WEU in the EU.

The widening and changing of threat perceptions in NATO, the US and parallel with the EU provides a link to how European-concerned organizations respond to “security” as a concept. NATO, despite US capabilities and European negotiation perks, does not help combat the mafia, drugs, terrorism or weapons proliferation inside Europe.

Currently there is an overlap between NATO and the EU in out-of-area peacekeeping roles. One reason for this could be linked to the pillar-system at the time and the concept of security and how it may link CFSP to Justice and Home Affairs. While NATO hoped to retain the traditional role of providing collective security for the European continent, as a traditional security organization would be expected to, European Security would be seen as a batch of non-traditional functions and initiatives.
3.4.1 The hierarchy-restraint problematique and the affirmation of self-sufficiency in European defense

Tellingly, the reluctance of NATO to act in the early Yugoslav wars for the benefit of the European area was very different from its swift participation in Kosovo, which required the involvement of global-players China and Russia to spurn the American side of the Atlantic alliance to act expeditiously. Strains in the ESDI after France was denied a NATO leadership role within its own neighbourhood further drove this pessimism home. This indicates the emergence of a hierarchy-restraint problematique to be felt by EU leaders at the global-level.

Less obvious was the continued hierarchy at the EU organization-level with the persistence of the pillar system both by political will of the big 3 European middle-powers and military capabilities. The problematique at the organization-level, which characterized EU governance was apparent but only retroactively in the next time period after a backlash and calls for “democratization of the EU”.

The European Defense Identity process that was created inside and responsible to NATO was showing its limitations by the late 1990s. In practice, the US was reluctant to donate its assets to WEU-led operations (Medcalf, 2005:86). This has brought into question the actual operability of the Berlin processes in being able to facilitate all-European coalitions inside the NATO framework. Such incidences highlighted the overall importance the US placed in its own foreign policy objectives over those of their NATO allies whom would wish to perform missions without indirect US political influence. The level of involvement the US is willing to get involved in other missions is determined by (1) significance of core national security interests (2) duration of the mission (3) risks involved for the US and (4) the financial costs (Yost, 1998:233; Medcalf, 2005:55).

Discordance in US wishes and allies’ needs within NATO would explain the different reactions the US had to European crises. Reactions spanned from the reluctance of the US to be involved in the former Yugoslavian/Bosnian crises to US NATO-led activism in Kosovo. In the former Yugoslavia, the US instituted no-fly zones through the Dayton peace accords. Although the US did lead IFOR through NATO, they willingly transferred IFOR’s command to the UN rather than the WEU, which was incapable to offer resources at the time. Contrast this with Operation Allied Force in Kosovo which was not UN mandated. Operation Allied Force was blocked in the UN Security Council by Russia and China. In general, NATO’s role as an institution was well-suited to the Balkans. This was especially prudent in fields of security provisions and peacekeeping. The issue though with the Balkans was that it represented both strategic divergence in the face of NATO’s, and especially the European allies, widening of threat perceptions.

For Europe, this inconsistency in activism in the Balkans would indicate that the US and NATO were no longer to be thought of as a reliable security guarantor. Franco-American tensions that would impact NATO’s raison d’etre reared its head in 1997. The dispute was over NATO’s Southern Command, AFSOUTH. France’s desire was to test the operability of ESDI in NATO, as it saw the ESDI in helping Europe maintain real influence in NATO as a new European pillar. As a Mediterranean power, even if practically such a move would be blocked by other European pillar, France lobbied for the right to take over AFSOUTH command. The request was denied by the US and kept its command role. For France, this signalled that ESDI was an identity with
little influence over NATO rather than a capability (Medcalf 2005:86). Such prior events would make what transpired at St. Malo a year later, understandable.

Since 1998, US support for ESDP or the use of NATO assets in EU-led operations have rested upon three “red lines” or the three Ds (Khovanova, 2008:39):

1. No decoupling from NATO. The ESDP should complement NATO and not affect the *indivisibility* of European and North American security.
2. No duplication of NATO command-structures and/or alliance-wide resources.
3. No discrimination against European NATO countries that are not in the EU.

The unwillingness of the US to lend American assets via NATO for WEU use signalled a “hidden veto” to the security sphere that the EU was trying to protect. The brazen-ness of the announcement of the “3 Ds” further highlight the disproportion of US influence in future EU decisions to upgrade its military capacity to fit EU-priority missions. Lack of an operational organizational balancer of the WEU at Europe’s doorstep, lack of political influence within NATO, and inability to autonomously defend their external border in the Balkans has given the US a tremendous impact on the success or resolution of security issues in the Europe.

In December 4th 1998 during an annual Franco-British summit in St. Malo, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac declared that the EU should have “the capacity of autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (Franco-British Declaration on European Defense, 998). This declaration was momentous as it laid out the intent to create a separate and self-sufficient means for European states to provide to their own security and to declare their own interests separate and outside of NATO.

The international security dimension affecting security operations for Europe could not be ignored and was a factor in the St. Malo declaration. The deficiencies of European members in strategic transport, command, control and intelligence were known since the early 1990s. The best source of the lacking assets was the US. This presented a double-bind where operations in the interest of European states could only be successful with the aide of the very power that would opt-out of such Europe-only operations. Despite having the legal and institutional processes to allow the EU to be a separable actor, the CJTF lacked autonomy opportunities for the EU due to the heavy links to NATO and the CJTF’s overall NATO-integrated military force structure. The Bosnian Campaign also heavily used US airpower over Serbia, assets which European allies could not contribute to.

Prior to St. Malo, France had acted strategically in matters of military diplomacy such as in NATO and the Balkans. French President Chirac placed France as a willing ally to NATO. France recognized that closer links to NATO and particularly the US was necessary to gain access to American military technology as well as greater French influence in NATO out-of-area problems (Kaplan 2004: 123). The tone of Franco-NATO relations changed when the main issue on how to use NATO assets without being subjected to NATO control came to the fore. For the Americans, the understanding from the CJTF was that Europe was free to fulfil its own ESDI aspirations as long as the WEU or the EU would remain responsible to the SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe). The SACEUR, however, is the head of the US European Command in NATO, and is held by an American and selected in a process within the US rather than one with
the understanding and stake from Europe itself. The problems of ESDI being subordinated to SACEUR did not go unnoticed by France and the other EU states.

France’s interpretation of the CJTF was that Europe would have access to NATO resources to conduct Europe-related security missions but without NATO supervision (Kaplan, 2004 :123). France thusly insisted on either a European being able to take control of the SACEUR position or AFSOUTH. Both propositions were rejected by the US. European states may have thusly sprung to calls for further autonomous military capabilities after sensing a hidden “physical veto” over Europe-only operations (Duke, 2001:40). St. Malo was thus declared not only to allow for the EU states to function freely in their own sphere of security, but to also break the bonds of American dependence. The NATO Madrid Summit of 1997, where NATO agreed to enlarge its members to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland was viewed by France as a manipulative move where the US incorporated countries that were more subservient to American interests.

While EU members whom were also NATO members should in theory have equal weight in the voting of missions to be undertaken, the operational capacity of the US and the EU military’s need of specialized assets are enough to counter-balance any European vetoes in unanimity voting within NATO. Furthermore, even if the EU were to have autonomy in defense themes, much of the direction was given by actions of the government of France, the UK and Germany through informal joint diplomatic groupings rather than through the institutional structure of the EU, which had yet to formalize internal balances within CFSP and ESDP – a needed characteristics in negarchies. Thus in addition to a global-level hierarchy-restraint problematique, an organizational-level hierarchy-problematique was a product of both NATO’s encroachment into the EU sphere and the continued dominance of the big three EU states in the direction of policy. The latter would be akin to a “class of elites” but in member state coalition form dictating the direction of EU policy.

The difference and development between the Helsinki and St. Malo summits rested on the idea of European autonomy. Autonomy was introduced in the St. Malo Declaration and was the first time the word was used in European security planning, “autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so…”. The meaning of the word ‘autonomy’ would be the ability of the EU to engage in military and security missions that the US would disagree with in importance of involvement under NATO. This would in effect mean that the EU would then have to rely on its own material capacity to complete their chosen missions without the use of US assets. Autonomy would then have to be used in the acquisition of intelligence, C3I, strategic air lifts, logistics and political coordination. The problem with this conception of ‘autonomy’ was that the implications of the St. Malo discourse would conflict with NATO’s forbidden “3 Ds” of decoupling, duplication and discrimination (Albright, 1998). This was denied by the St. Malo Declaration, yet denying contravening the 3 Ds would require a weaker role for ESDP. One in which ESDP would only be called upon to act in support of NATO or US initiatives but not to actually participate in the mission. This would mean that there would no serious EU security policy development in areas where the US does not support the action (BASIC, 1999: 3).

The problem of Helsinki’s “autonomous capacity” and Malo’s “autonomous action” was the description of the missions that ESDP could take. The WEU tried to clarify matters with the creation of ‘Illustrative Mission Profiles’ which included missions that could be carried out by a single nation, to brigade level strength, to missions that needed several divisions (missions that
could not be practically carried out by non-NATO forces). Anxiety in Washington was not abated as US foreign and defense policy advisors in the last quarter of 1999 urged their European counterparts “not to take the notion of autonomy too seriously” (Whitney, 1999).

After St. Malo, France and UK visions of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), were at odds. The French paid no heed to any consequences of ‘necessary duplication’ of military hardware. French politicians were also insistent on ESDP as a self-contained valuable process that could one day lead to strong European autonomy (Howorth, 2005: 49). The French discourse still shielded these motivations by insisting on a re-balancing of the alliance to increase its overall strength, rather than as a way to diminish US influence. The UK still wished to adhere to Albright’s 3 Ds and stressed that any developments on ESDP was to strengthen rather than weaken the alliance without challenging NATO’s supremacy. The crux for UK discourse was on “strengthening” rather than “rebalancing” NATO. This was supported by Lord Robertson’s positive 3-I’s of Indivisibility of the Alliance, Improved European capabilities, and Inclusiveness of all partners (Robertson, 1999). These differences had not changed for the UK until after the experience of Kosovo.

As we can see above, the issue of autonomy becomes not only important, but was highly contested in EU-NATO relations. NATO exhibits itself in this era not only as a partner with a global-mandate, but also a partner that is an external threat. When NATO or the US itself is the threat, autonomy becomes a right that the region’s states have fought to retain.

This particular threat perception is transitional in the case of Europe. But it is transitional by virtue of outside external events producing new geopolitical threats. What is encouraging is that this does mean that autonomy-interference was not a permanent state of EU-NATO relations nor is a hierarchical-order permanent. This allowed for further institutional development to strengthen EU institutions and its quest or potential for autonomy.

The US contains more mobility strategic assets, e.g. aerial re-fuelling and air transport, submarines, surface ships, precision-strike munitions, electronic warfare, long-range air and missile strikes and C4SIR assets\(^8\) than their European counterparts. Due to these technological advantages, the US is also the only NATO member that can plan, conduct and sustain theatre wide operations with crucial competencies such as power projection through the use of mid-long range missiles, deployment of hundreds of aircraft and the transport and logistics to upgrade air fields (Yost, 2000: 99). European allies lacked vital logistical support to be effective in the Balkans. Even in Bosnia, the US provided 46 of the 48 Communications satellite channels as part of IFOR in 1996 (Atkinson and Graham, 1996). Much of the challenges in Operation Allied Force, also stemmed to problems of interoperability of information systems, with the US having to resort to older “legacy” systems to communicate with the lower-end communication capabilities of their NATO allies. US assets appeared decisive in the completion of missions and further legitimated any US-veto without European material and political autonomy.

In response to this capabilities gap, in December 1999, the EU member states announced the creation of the Helsinki Headline Goal. The purpose of the goal was to facilitate the EU in increasing military capabilities through the ESDP, not NATO. Part of the goal was the creation of a catalog of forces called the “Helsinki Force Catalogue”. Included in this force catalog

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\(^8\) Communications, Command, Control, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
was a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) made up of 50,000-60,000 troops that can be deployed at 60 days notice equipped with maritime and air assets that can be sustained in a single theatre for up to a year (Medcalf, 2005:88). The forces would be self-sustaining with C4SIR capabilities, additional combat support services including naval and air elements (De Wijk, 2000). Note, these are precisely the capabilities that the US possesses supremacy over in the NATO frameworks and were evident during Operation Allied Force-Kosovo. The Helsinki Headline Goal was expected to be operational by 2003. Previously, Atlantic allies expected of European troops, and was encoded in Europe documents was that European troops would be peacekeepers.

The Helsinki Headline Goal was a massive step in the direction towards greater EU integration for the defense of Europe. The improvements of 1999 also signalled a break in the “Atlanticist” mentality of the UK and the Benelux countries in accordance with NATO (Hoon, 2000). A European response and identity through ESDP and CFSP started to become solidified in the name of a more comprehensive idea of Europe and European Security.

Spending made by the EU on defense in the Helsinki Headline Goal were seen as holding more political legitimacy for the population of the member states rather than spending in the name of NATO. Tangible improvements to increasing the EU’s military capacity began to take force after the stall in the early and mid-1990s. The EU would then be more able to influence the spending and military/defense budgets of European states. This spending configuration points to the development of a “states-union” type of republican system. Spending allocations, such as the ATHENA mechanism to, where member states contribute to defense spending through their GDP shows a federal mechanism that can penetrate nation-states into effecting the individual. Although not yet instigated, this acknowledged link between the EU individual’s ability to vote and influence European-wide policy and defense via their representatives show a downward penetration that could lead to future mutual restraints between the nation-states, the EU and EU citizens.

The EU members and the Commission agreed with the suggestion of the UK to move the EU to the unchartered territory of hard military power. This proposal was developed through providing an institutional framework which would be operationalized through national capabilities. The framework was also to be extended through civilian aspects of security, i.e. policing, and to address the arms market. It was a direct response to NATO and sparked the competition between the EU and NATO for the European Security space (Deighton, 2002: 726). There was a tension though between what the US leadership would have welcomed an increase in the raising of defense expenditure by European states, where Washington wished to rectify “overall imbalance” in the expenditures within the alliance. US Secretary of Defense, William Cohen notes that the EU spends 60% that of the US but can only achieve 10% of the capability (Becker 1999). Part of this was due to the fact that the US has been preparing for trans-oceanic operations for decades due to its role in the Cold War. This is contrary to the Cold War European experience, where a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation scenario required the understanding that European troops would “fight in place” (Yost, 2000: 100).

It would thus appear that while the EU does have a desire for NATO autonomy in their own sphere and an increase in its own military capabilities, following the Balkans, use the St. Petersburg tasks and Helsinki Headline Goal for dual purposes. The former, focusing the long avowed defense tradition on civilian peacekeeping while the latter focuses on both civilian and military campaigns. The political and operational difficulties highlighted by NATO’s Operation Allied Force Kosovo plus fears of spill-over into Albania, put forth an undesirable interdependence between Europe and
its Atlantic Partners in NATO with US dissatisfaction of burden-sharing in military operations. The closing of the 1990s was one of both diplomatic teeth being cautiously shown by a new France-UK partnership at St. Malo and of the EU tentatively crafting a niche or division of labor between “civilian power Europe” and military minded NATO, as a means of European self-sufficiency. This was at the expense of the WEU, but this inter-organizational streamlining has converged politics into the field of security and defense with interesting consequences.

A hierarchy problematique had arisen by 1997 after an analysis of the combined joint-task force concept in NATO by EU states and several other new legal NATO developments. NATO’s out-of-area missions were encroaching on EU security. The US disagreeing with Europe’s cries for defense autonomy since the Franco-British declaration at St. Malo. This is a clear indicator of the order-altering threat perception of autonomy-contestation being present in the regional-level.

3.3.2. The anarchy-interdependence problematique and the idea of threat movements in the Amsterdam Treaty

What we can see from the following events is the presence of another order-altering threat perception from the EU directed at NATO, an encroaching Extra-regional power. This order-altering perception is “autonomy non-interference”. The NATO partner is perceived to have moved towards a global mandate, especially with consideration of the constrictions given to EU defense capability development and the inclusion of extra-territorial missions. Non-state and non-alliance threats particular to the EU, as will be seen in this sub-section, have become further internalized territorially into the EU internal system. This reflected expectations of disrupted domestic and continent-wide economic security via the newly integrated Schengen process.

The transmobile threats that were externally sourced in the 1990s were freed up and escalated within the European continent-wide domain after the incorporation of the Schengen area into the EU while domestic transmobile threats internationalized. Schengen removed internal borders of the EU for travel and employment, but also greatly increased violence-interdependence with organized criminal structures becoming networked and linked with commodities crime and money laundering, revealing an anarchy-interdependence problematique. Hence 1997-2000 as a pivotal point in this case study as a pre-requisite for negarchy formation.

The communitarization of internal security concerns into the Economic Community pillar I, was extended to visas, asylum and immigration. What was momentous about the transposal of these movement-related concerns, was that for the first time “The Community Method” for establishing the completion of the Internal Market, was extended to matters of internal security. “Higher levels of safety” as mentioned in Article 29 of the last vestiges of the intergovernmental JHA third pillar included measures in terrorism, trafficking of persons and offenses against children, illicit drugs and arms trafficking and corruption and fraud. To that regard, Article 30 and 31 specified the terms of “Common Action” among EU member states. While EUROPOL was not provided with operational powers as of yet, Article 30 outlined that the organization encourage cooperation and coordination by authorities inside the member states. What was asked in Article 30 in terms of cooperation went far beyond the sole informational-exchange function of EUROPOL in the early 1990s.
Intergovernmentalist attitudes were still apparent in the Amsterdam text despite the communitarization. New provisions for pillar III areas, e.g. drug trafficking and financial/economic crime, were vague and important questions of extra-territorial evidence in judicial cooperation were not mentioned at all. In terms of member states operating within another member states’ territory, Article 32 still provides an intergovernmental EU body, The Council, the “conditions and limitations” for operation. The problem is that a central condition for progress in Europe-wide juridical and police cooperation is linked to the text’s acknowledgement of crimes being transborder, yet cross-border cooperation in the prior Maastricht Treaty lacked substance. In order to be effective, European-wide actors in the third pillar would need adequate instruments to complete objectives.

Amsterdam also included the full incorporation of the entire Schengen System, halting the parallel development outside of the EC/EU integration framework by making the Schengen External Border Control as part of the ‘acquis’ for future member states. These developments were a triumph for the Schengen Group’s strong insistence of incorporating the Schengen into the union as well as quelling Austrian, French and German concerns on the approaching EU enlargement of the Central and East European states.

The nature of transnational crime and threats internally placed within the union was not only being further developed and combatted, but the borders and goalposts of the EU being recognized as expanding and bringing along risks that had to be addressed in the treaty. These were the first steps to move away from a pillarized system in internal security, developing “inside” security as the new EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). The AFJS thusly became a highly institutionalized and very real new element for the European integration project, being put in the same esteem for being developed alongside the furthering development of the Economic and Monetary Union, the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and framing of the Common Defense Policy.

At the regional-level the violence inter-dependence that emerged from the freeing of the internal market and Schengen’s borders had worsened. The harmonization of Schengen with EU policies had contributed to the ease and hence shrunken the geographic distance that transnational criminal networks were able to operate on.

Of the various activities that organized crime groups undertake in Europe, drug trafficking was a major concern with data of 35% to almost 80% of organized crime groups being involved. Both foreign and domestic groups control importation and distribution functions. Heroin trafficking in the EU is controlled mostly by Turkish groups who utilize routes from the Balkans into other member states. Columbian, Uruguayan and Argentinian nationals are involved in cocaine trafficking in Spain. Spain and France were the important transit countries for Cannabis from Morocco. Despite the control of Columbians in the production and management of cocaine, indigenous organized crime gangs in Western Europe have established relationships with the Columbian producers so that they may distribute them to major population centres (Shelley, 1995: 473; Binnendijk & Claws 1997: 201). Circuitous routes throughout the outer-rims of the EU at the time were used as transit points via Poland, Kaliningrand and the Baltic States with Italy and Spain being favourite ports of entry. Drug trafficking within the EU is an unabashedly global external issue linked to the internal issue of domestic organized crime.
The priority drug problem, from 1999 was heroin (Mitselegas et al., 2003: 71). UK Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that much of the heroin in the UK has come from EU applicant countries (Allardyce & Tendler, 2000:4). Much of the origin of opiates is smuggled into Europe from “the golden triangle” of Thailand, Laos and Myanmar or the “Golden Crescent” of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The two areas make up 90% of the world’s supply of opium. The importation of Heroin into Western Europe has several known routes. One of these is the Balkans, including Bulgaria and the former Yugoslavia; once disrupted due to the 1991-1995 conflict, drug trafficking has resumed and intensified. Drug trafficking groups from Bosnia and Albania are highly active with the aftermath of the war complicating the work of law enforcement agencies (Stares, 1996: 43). This has been mirrored in the rise of heroin use in Italy. The second heroin route originates in Pakistan and Afghanistan and passes through Turkey or other regions which is then shipped using a network of Turkish and Kurdish ethnic communities in Western Europe. The third heroin route is through the Central Asian Republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan with heroin originating from Iran, Afghanistan and India. The opium has been smuggled through Russia and trafficked into Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states, Hungary and the Czech Republic before entering Western Europe.

Police authority at this time was still maintained by EU member states rather than a coherent supranational EU policy. This is consistent with the arming of units in the early period of the Philadelphia Model to achieve a balance and prevent over-centralization of powers into forming a hierarchy. Yet it included the drawback of having less coordination with different varieties of police forces and judicial traditions of convicting and extraditing felons in Europe, hindering effectiveness in combating such threats. These change in circumstances created an anarchy-problematique to arise in the regional-level.

Organizational changes to organized crime as a response to changed policing practices supported by the JHA, indicated an adaptability that has made these transnational threats particularly more lethal. It would be incorrect though to locate all transnational organized crime in the EU as emanating from foreign sources. The majority of crimes carried out by organized groups among the EU member states are perpetuated by domestic groups. Organized crime member operations also originate inside the EU and transverse the now borderless continent. Italian nationals have been found involved in ten member states while Dutch nationals have been found in seven. The trans-EU Italian presence is made possible by Italian families of organized crime located inside Italy, e.g. Mafia, Camorra, ‘Ndrageta and Sacra Corona Unità. Organized crime among Dutch nationals is due to the major role the country plays as traders and transporters by road of legal goods across Europe.

EU-origin organized crime in the mid-1990s started to experience a change in their organizational structure, particularly in the Italian groups that went from a hierarchical structure to flat structures. The changes are presumably a response to new applied law enforcement measures and need to develop internal structures due to the criminal activity undertaken. European organized crime groups that are involved in drug trafficking are also likely to be involved in other activities such as armed robbery. In Italy, much of this is from organized crime families branching out in their operations. Families usually familiar with ransom and kidnappings have been found to have established direct contacts with international drug traffickers from Turkey and Colombia. There was also an important link identified in the relationship between local ethnic/minority/diaspora communities and organized crime groups of foreign origin. Turkish
groups were found in ten EU countries while Chinese groups were found in nine, both are heavily involved in the trafficking of heroin.

The internationalization of domestic crime groups, which started prior to the 1990s, had matured with actual drug trade routes from outside Europe being connected to domestic EU markets. The threat locality had become internalized inside the EU’s external borders, i.e. the internalization of threats. When combined with the presence of a partner with a global mandate, even if that partner is not involved in the domestic EU problem of organized crime, autonomy-contestation still becomes a characteristic of the regional-level security environment. In this case, this was done via the hierarchy-problematique being present at the global-level of the EU against the US/NATO.

Responses by the EU on organized crime include the acknowledgement during the Tampere summit that Freedom of Movement was closely intertwined with a secure and just domestic environment (Rees & Webber, 2002:106). A Joint Action was also passed on money-laundering, and another to counter the problem of private-sector corruption. One strategy of the EU’s approach to internal security was the creation of a hard external border for the EU built around Schengen. A common external frontier allows states outside of the EU border to represent a threat and justify exclusion. This attitude led to a pre-accession pact on organized crime set up in May 1998 to ensure that applicant states were comparable to the EU’s standards on combatting crime. It included the EU’s own action plan on organised crime with a set of targets and timetables. The other strategy was to institutionalize a pattern of law enforcement and judicial cooperation between its members. But instead of a common legal framework built around harmonization, the EU pursued sectoral cooperation. The 1998 establishment of a European Judicial Network created points of contact for authorities to liaise with once an investigation becomes transnational in nature, facilitating the exchange of personal to work inside the ministries of justice in their neighboring countries.

The EU’s internal security model has thus relied on linkages of old threats being recently interconnected. Transnational organized crime became linked to terrorism and illegal immigration. This is from similarities between aspects of the three problems alongside the common responses that the EU has formed around them. Illegal immigrants are often trafficked by transnational organized crime groups as a source of income alongside drug-trafficking and contraband. Measures that the EU has adopted against organized crime could be applied to terrorism and illegal immigration. Information gathered as part of the Schengen Agreement, i.e. fingerprinting of individuals, could be used by Europol to fight organized crime. The incorporation of Schengen into the EU means that the Shengen Information System could be made available to the EU (Bort, 2000:3).

The internal security regime has become increasingly overlapping with external security both in how threats are defined and combatted. This signals the blurring of inside and outside security fields for the EU. Both fields of security are equally important for the EU not only to become an international actor in world and external affairs, but in retaining its democratic elements that it claims to characterize in intra-continental or European-wide affairs. Thus this progressive blurring of what the EU means to be “secure” in a common goal or vision enables it to act more and more like a republican structure.
3.3.3. Negarchical developments and internally empowering the EU for defense

Thus far, we have shown that both hierarchy-restraint problematiques and anarchy-interdependence problematiques were present from 1997-2000. The anarchy-interdependence problematique arose from the internalization of mobile malignant threats after the incorporation of the Schengen Process. What was exemplary, though was that there was an unprecedented significant capacity to act against internal security threats at the European level which was also gave member state citizens the right to demand from their own governments. The following events and the expansion of Qualified-Majority Voting (QMV) in matters of internal security are indicative of a strengthening of vivere libero in the EU’s institutions.

The Treaty of Amsterdam was result of the 1996 Intergovernmental conference (IGC). Its achievements were the clarification of the size of the EU Commission, the weighting of votes and the extension of QMV. The Treaty of Amsterdam extended QMV into CFSP via decisions based on common strategy, such as Common Positons or Joint Actions, with an “emergency brake”.

Inter-institutional developments in Europe included providing the Commission in the EU with the role of elaborating and executing the CFSP in the pillarized structure despite the pillarization being a trump card against further supranationalism. There was also the creation of informal military groupings such as Eurocorps and the further development of security policies, labelled “Civilian Power Mark I” (Stavridis, 2001). These developments along with the coalesced economic resource of Pillar I in the EU and the new diplomatic tools of the High Commissioner for Foreign Affairs were fortuitously placed into practice during the Balkans war.

In Cologne on June 1999, the Cologne European Council began to incorporate the role of the WEU into the EU. The Cologne Council was called immediately after the Kosovo War. All functions of the WEU would be transferred into the EU except for the Article V clause on collective defense. This would mean relations between NATO and Europe would be towards the EU instead of the WEU. Considering the EU’s all-encompassing administration of Europe in Economy, CFSP and internal European security, spill-over in linked issues of member-states and the EU’s supranational organization would provide further inroads for non-immediate concerns to couple themselves with policy choices on European security.

There is evidence of dual-thinking in planning material military assets for the EU. First was through the Helsinki Headline Goal, the second was political institutional innovation. The urgency that these developments were made and the understanding that another treaty (The Treaty of Nice) would not be a condition for their implementation, signals a change in autonomy and direction of the EU as a self-standing military entity relative to the US-dominated NATO alliance. The weakening of the WEU appeared necessary for a self-standing EU in CFSP and ESDP affairs to carry a counter-weight to the NATO-dominated status quo.

The Headline Goal and the Rapid Reaction Force helped to make a military capability for EU defense, a politically-consolidated and agreed upon concept throughout Europe. This was an important step in the EU exhibiting characteristics of a federal union or republic. Instead of relying on a third-party organization like the WEU, defense of the realm becomes integrated into the EU governing structure itself with support of its member states. The ability to combat external threats is an important part of maintaining sovereignty in the world not just as a state, but as a supranational entity like a federation.
Much of the problems of Maastricht and the increase of Amsterdam, was the continuing duality between first economic pillar and third pillars in JHA internal security (Balzacq & Carrera 2006:4). The third pillar remains questionable in terms of democratic practice for the EU. The European Court of Justice lacks full competencies to review and interpret the legal instruments necessary for juridical and police cooperation. The European Parliament, also has a more limited role in pillar three. This in effect also decreases the influence of the European Commission in AFSJ matters. While the first pillar has regulations, directives, recommendations, decisions and opinions; pillar III relied on conventions, common positions and framework decisions which did not require national ratification. Consequences of the duelling pillars also included the negative outcomes of pillar III being one of a lack of transparency, a high degree of inefficiency and lack of efficacy.

What would look like at first glance from Maastricht to Amsterdam to Tampere, is the lessening of movement and economy-related internal security and the transferal of “more serious” Europe-wide security matters to intergovernmental decision-making systems in the EU. In comparison, the third pillar of AFSJ became more similar to the second intergovernmental, pillar of CFSP, rather than the supranational first pillar of the Economic Communities of which the AFSJ issues share a common origin.

Apart from Title VI areas, under Amsterdam, unanimity also extended to communitarized areas of border control and illegal immigration. Operationally, this only left visas and combating fraud elements of internal security, treatment of foreign nationals, the implementation of JHA decisions, i.e. free movements of persons, asylum and immigration, applicable to QMV voting and codecisions with EU supranational bodies (European Parliament, European Commission).

What Amsterdam started and Tampere finished was the successful decoupling of the Single Market from broader objectives of the AFSJ (Kaunert, 2005: 467). The Tampere Summit sought to create a five-year program running from 1999-2004 with the intent to provide a proper balance between freedom, security and justice. The timeframe, called the “Tampere Scoreboard” amounted to deadlines and political agendas. Tampere gave more specific areas to what would fall under AFSJ, notably “firmly rooted in a shared commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions, and the rule of law”. This shows a broader remit than Amsterdam’s original “freedom to live in a law-abiding environment protected by effective action of public authorities at the national and European level” and reflects the development of internal security into a broader-base for the acquis and future enlargement applicant countries.

The Tampere text supports this with the stipulation that JHA concerns, “integrated into the definition and implementation of other policies and activities” including external relations9. The AFSJ threats were thus continuously being seen as arising from outside of the Union. While “internal security” was being translated into external problems with needed “external relations”, the political reality of AFSJ issues remained within domestic political concerns of the member states. JHA issues have thusly become externalized, but also developed alongside a process of “deflation” or de-prioritizing of policy harmonization between member states (Lavanex & Wallace, 2005: 95).

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9 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, October 1999
The decoupling of economic spill-over to security and the forked development of AFSJ into a broader geographic space foreshadowed the deepening and tightening of the European security sphere, primed for EU Enlargement.

3.4. 2001-Present, Europe and Security Maturation

The previous concepts, mechanisms, processes and agreements were key to the solidification of the ESDI/European Pillar within NATO. These communications between NATO member states were still a NATO-based imperative to European problems. Security concerns could still persist in Europe, yet the scope of NATO by this time had included out-of-area missions in their raison d’etre. If Europe as a security sphere is to be self-sufficient, autonomy must be gained and sovereignty re-asserted.

While the Berlin-Plus Agreements appear to have bolstered autonomy of European defense through the opt-out clause and dispersal of common assets, the material reality of insufficient European force-capabilities to complete its missions indirectly anchors the US as part of the execution process in combating Europe-based threats. At the mercy of a US partner whose mandate exceeds the partner’s own physical geography, such required input places Europe’s autonomy into question.

If sovereignty was based on territoriality, the reach of sovereignty would be dependent on how Europe wishes to define its security sphere irrespective of NATO/North American out-of-area interests. The dual nature of European security; security within the member states and security outside the member states’ borders reflect previous institutional structure-creating attempts such as the splitting of Justice and Home Affairs with the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar (1993-2009).

3.4.1 US global hierarchical intrusions and European blowback

NATO’s hierarchy in transatlantic organizational relations became greatly diminished with the US sidelining the organization and the blockage of Turkey’s security concerns by Greece before the Iraq War. These consequences produced the perception of an anarchic order at the global-level which emboldened the EU states to cooperate with each other and further force the issue of autonomy. Two pivotal world events were a test to the EU’s foreign policy/defense cohesion but also an opportunity to rally and dissent towards NATO: Responses to 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq War.

The terrorist events of September 11, 2001 changed the strategic setting for NATO and its allies. While NATO was made in preparation for a soviet invasion of Western Europe, the Cold War did not turn hot in the Western European theatre and was thus not called on to act militarily, instead acting as a means of US-directed defensive military build-up in Europe. Following 9/11, for the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 of its treaty. Article 5 stipulates that if a NATO ally was victim to an armed attack, each and every member of the alliance would regard the violent act as an armed attack against all NATO members. All members are also expected to take actions they deem necessary to assist the ally that was attacked. The invocation of Article 5 was a return to the original raison d’etre for NATO as a collective defense organization. It also signalled a trend-change from the 1990s when NATO was searching for relevance in order to maintain its existence as a security organization. Hence, humanitarian intervention and acts of “collective security” in out-of-area missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and the First Gulf War.
Europeans were the first to commit and offer support to the Bush administration following the 9/11 attacks. However, the US ignored NATO’s overall declaration of support and viewed that operations that include NATO involvement would be more of an impediment rather than an effective channel of response (Shearman & Sussex, 2004: 55). Sources of impediment via NATO were interpreted as bearing restrictive parameters due to NATO’s multilateral decision-making framework.

There was a difference of threat perception which differentiated the US and EU in terrorism policies. The 9/11 attacks was viewed as a direct threat to US global power. The “new terrorism” was directed against a perceived US hegemony and an iteration of an anti-globalization backlash upholstered by democracy promotion and the US-directed Washington Consensus after the fall of the USSR. Western Europe did not view 9/11 as being a direct threat to the continent and thus did not experience a radical shift in strategic priorities. Most European states have grown accustomed to combating terrorism on their soil for decades, e.g. the Irish Republican Army in the United Kingdom and the Red Army Faction in Germany. For instance, European response to terrorism appears to have been relegated to an intra-continental problem related to the community and Justice and Home Affairs section. Post-9/11 European action included the adoption of a European arrest warrant, freezing of terrorist assets, cutting the financing of known terrorist individuals and groups and the signing of a Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition agreement with the US and EU member states participating in Afghanistan.

Other problems ensued for the nature of NATO combating an international-scale threat, particularly NATO’s regional purpose and its primarily military competencies, which could militarize the fight against WMDs. The question of NATO’s geographic scope out-of-area thus became even more prominent an issue, as the prospective nuclear capabilities of the Middle East did not pose a direct strategic threat to European populations. Thus combating the threat of WMDs emanating from the Middle East, apart from protecting Turkey, would transform NATO’s regional focus into that of a global-reaching organization. The 1990s NATO debates on WMDs were abstract, as for the US, the purpose was to find a way for NATO to maintain relevance for new Post-Cold War threats.

This was an instance when the resilience of NATO and the EU can be compared. In order for resilience to prevail for an organization, the make-up or structure of the organization should be optimal to the environment it finds itself in. This in turn is related to the spheres of security that NATO and the EU wish to represent. NATO’s extended security scope to include a global mandate across many continents, even further afield than the locus of power in the US. This was made possible by the US militarily developing its technologies since the Cold War to have assets that could transverse oceans and deploy in other continents to combat the prevailing threat of the USSR. Compare this to the military capability of Europe’s states who not only had the benefit of the US security umbrella, but whose armies, save for the UK and France, were developed to “fight in place”.

Despite the capability and overall will of NATO to be a global military force, the incorporation of several security complexes could politically lead to conflicting interests between members. This was made evident with Greece’s dissension of Turkey’s own security interests in a separate Aegean security complex. The incorporation of unanimity voting did not help matters.
The EU, while also possessing unanimity in its CFSP and ESDP is less likely prone to the problem of global overstretch. This is in part due to its long negotiation processes in creating a more strictly delineated mandate with immediate geographic areas to its regional base, rather than being truly global. While NATO’s scale effect may exhibit symptoms of overstretch, the EU’s medium sizing makes its external security and governance from the center more manageable. Power-wise, NATO is a hierarchy with the US being on top. But practically, NATO members still operate as if under an anarchic ordering principle. The emboldenedness of the EU and an increase in its own military capacities gave it the push for one of its members to exercise its veto power, which it might have been politically constrained to do so before. The global-level to European perceptions was becoming more and more multi-polar. This would make sense considering the global-level hierarchy-problematic that preceded it and Europe’s wish to correct this.

The week prior to the Laekan European Council Summit, a since-removed portion of text detailing European anxieties about the global reach of the US was written with the intent of appearing on the Final Declaration. The reference was for the need of the international community to be fully consulted about any US intervention into any countries alleged to be harbouring terrorists (Palmer, 2001). The aim in the Middle East for the EU was to provide security and humanitarian aid to the people of Afghanistan. Within the actual summit, there were informal grumblings on the US’s non-commitment to world-stage multilateral treaties such as the refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the scrapping of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the US opposition to the Kyoto Protocol and the US veto on the Biological and Toxin weapons convention. Relations with Russia was also prioritized in lieu of the looming 2004 EU Eastward Enlargement. Threat perceptions of the EU and NATO were no longer aligned to each other, creating large-scale balancing (with some bandwagoning) instead of total bandwagoning. The global-level has thus been transformed anarchically.

The European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) formulated at the Laekan Summit on December 2001, was used to address an earlier assessment of EU-wide defense technology shortfalls during the 2000 Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels. The Brussels conference also had EU member states commit on a voluntary basis to make national contributions to an EU Rapid Reaction capability. However, it became clear that there were apparent shortfalls in capability commitments following a review of the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue, the operational requirements of the Petersburg Tasks, and the Force Catalogue, setting out national commitments. Twenty-one of the thirty-eight identified shortfalls were noted as “significant” (Schmitt, 2003). The Laekan Summit prepared the plan through the creation of nineteen panels composed of at least one “lead nation” to investigate solutions from March 2002 onwards. The panels reflected the need for theatre-wide capabilities, increased development of long-range missiles and other uses of air power.

The final document of the 2002 NATO Prague Summit, indicated the operational transformation of NATO as a global, rather than just regional actor. The text states, “in order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed...to sustain operations over distance and time”. After Iraq, NATO would be able to claim acting not only out-of-area but also out-of-continent as NATO led the international stabilization force in Afghanistan and limited support to stabilization of post-Saddam Iraq (Gartner, 2005:135). The globalization of NATO further developed when for the first time,
five NATO nations held aerial war games with non-NATO members, India and Japan, over Alaska in exercise Cooperative Copethunder, on July 2004 (Ibid).

In 2002, EU-NATO relations culminated in the “NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP”, agreed on the 16th of December. The declaration re-affirmed the EU’s assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities for the EU’s own military operations. This declaration was further developed operationally in the field of NATO-EU crisis management through the “Berlin Plus” arrangements. Politically, this allows the Alliance to support EU-led operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged. On the 17th of March, 2003, the “Berlin-Plus Agreement”, the latest iteration of the Berlin (plus) Process was adopted by NATO and EU members.

While 9/11 was a policy game-changer for the US, the disruptive event of the 2000s that brought to attention the incohesiveness of a common European foreign policy was the 2003 Iraq War. The split of European statements among European NATO members and EU members, discredited the cohesiveness of both institutions and would have strengthened the resolve of US unilaterism. In terms of NATO, the dissension of France, Germany and Belgium for NATO planning and defense improvements on fellow NATO-member Turkey on 10 February 2003, called into question the alliance’s central undertaking of collective defense (Naumann, 2004).

NATO played no role in the Iraq War, not in small part to staunch criticism coming from German and French allies in the alliance (Shearmann and Sussex, 2004:56). Much of this blowback from Europe occurred with the perception that after 9/11, NATO had changed from being a military pact with mutual obligations to a pool from which the US would derive adhoc coalition partners to serve US national security interests (Joffe, 2002). The charge of adhoc-ism was recognized and responded to by Javier Solana, “...the notion of ad-hoc coalitions of docile followers to be chosen or discarded at will is neither attractive nor sustainable in the long run (Solana, 2003: 64).

Once again, the strong opinions between EU members and the adhoc and exclusive coalitions of only a small number of EU states made the organizational-level in danger of once again continuing a hierarchy-restraint problematique into the 2000s period. This was aggravated by the coming 2004 EU enlargement that would consist of new Central and East European states who were politically aligned with the US and were already members of NATO since 2003. Cracks among the member states prior to Iraq were already in place in the early 2000s. The EU had a dispute of taking over the NATO peacekeeping mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in 2002. The EU’s Seville Summit of July 2002 failed to produce a final decision on FYROM. The Seville summit also was still rattling over the “Berlin-Plus Dispute” of 2001, blocked first by Turkey and then by Greece over NATO and the EU sharing assets. France and Belgium argued that since the EU force was a small 800 troops that the EU mission should go ahead without any EU-NATO accord (Menon 2004: 636). Dissenting states of an EU force-takeover included the UK, Spain and Germany. Reasons of dissension ranged from fear of what a takeover would mean for the transatlantic alliance to operational concerns that the situation in Macedonia could still potentially escalate, necessitating NATO’s support. An EU official in charge of the operation emphasized the need to consider worst-case scenarios where the force would be extracted. This would be done under NATO command and control with the assistance of NATO forces.10

10 BBC News Online, 28 March 2003.
From the previous sections, it should become apparent that much of ESDP policy initiative was centred on the three EU members the UK, France and Germany. The voice options between the large and small member states have haunted the early creation of ESDP with small/middle states such as Sweden’s wishing to extend the EU Rapid Reaction Force to have a police element while Finland disagreed on the EU participating in peace-enforcement missions. This is different from the UK and France’s more militaristic approach to EU security, desiring armed forces that were capable of being deployed in military crises. Country-groupings within Europe once again appeared when France, Germany and Belgium blocked a request by Turkey to hold talks based on Article 4 of NATO’s charter on 16 February 2003 (Oliver, 2003).

In lieu of the developments over NATO and Turkey in the planning stages of the Iraq invasion, the EU Presidency held by Greece, at the time called for an “Extraordinary European Council Summit” to forge a united European voice. The Summit was held in Brussels on 17 February 2003. A closer reading finds that mention of giving UN weapons inspectors “the time and resources the UN Security Council believes they need” as a nod to Franco-German desires while “inspections cannot continue indefinitely” as acknowledgement of the Spanish-British position (The Economist 20 February 2003). Yet, the charge by the US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld of France and Germany being part of “Old Europe”, further soured relations within Europe. Jacques Chirac at the 17 March 2003 European Council Meeting, voiced his anger at the future EU ascension states taking the side of the US in Iraq. By Mid-April 2003, Chirac confided to the Latvian President that NATO had become irrelevant (Financial Times 15 April 2003). At the end of April 2003, divisions between the EU states appeared to become grounds for exclusion in the policy-making process. France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg held their own “mini-summit” on further developing the ESDP. The coincidence of the four participating countries being the most vocal against military action in Iraq sparked fears from the UK that the mini-summit was aimed at a preparation for the forthcoming EU’s 2003 Intergovernmental Conference in enabling the EU to compete against the US and NATO (Menon, 2004:639).

However, instead of a swing into anarchy at the organizational-level, innovations in role and a re-balancing of intergovernmental AND supranational bodies created by the 2009 Lisbon treaty had the organizational-level take on a more negarchic structure. This was necessary because the hierarchy-restraint problematique from the second era combined with the anarchy-interdependence problematique on the eve of 2003, precipitated a negarchic security environment.

The international focus of the US has shifted to terrorism, the Gulf, the Middle East and North-East Asia, while Europe’s remains in the Balkans or Africa (Thomson, 2003). The EU was still scrambling to close the military capabilities gap. Shortfalls that were identified through the 2001 ECAP process could only be rectified either through member states revising their contributions and offering capabilities they already had but had not contributed before, or rectified through short-term leasing and upgrading or large-scale procurements. These shortfalls became impediments up to the 19 May 2003 Capability Conference despite EU Defense Ministers announcing the EU, “now has operational capability across the full range of Petersburg tasks” (EU, 2003:2). Yet, the resulting ten project groups following the Capability Conference harks some resemblance to NATO’s 2002 Prague Capabilities. For instance, the ten project groups also included “role specialization” as a part of EU capability procurement solutions. Other solutions included acquisition, leasing and “multi-nationalization”. The road towards these solutions are noticeably forked towards either Europe needing to develop its own defense industries or free-ride
from American-made technologies. The crux would be if the contribution of the EU would be as a
civilian peacekeeping force in tandem with NATO or if more militarized uses would be considered
in defense and security.

EU members did not adopt a pivotal national security strategy until 12 December 2003, the
European Security Strategy (ESS). This could be an indicator of the importance of the Iraq War
experience and European-wide identity becoming more important in terms of what a threat
perception was to them than the threat of international terrorism highlighted by the US during 9/11.
German foreign minister at the time, Fischer, noted that although 9/11 did have member states
realize that the geostrategic landscape of international politics has been altered, it was still not
enough for states to develop an EU strategic analysis (Penska, 2004). The consequences of an
absence of a European assessment and lack of strategic consciousness wasn’t realized until the
Iraq War broke out. These deficiencies impeded productive dialogue the EU could have with the
US. The ESS was to be an attempt for Europe to articulate their view on the new security threats.
For instance, the European Security Strategy of 2003 was also the first time a European-
wide strategy was adopted against the proliferation of WMDs in the EU Strategy against the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, also 12 December 2003. The 2003 EU Strategy
against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction did include terrorists as a critical part of
the primary threat, working alongside the delivery of materials.

The EU delves deep into security, combatting “the root causes of instability” by enhancing
areas of political conflicts, development assistance, reduction of poverty and the promotion of
human rights. The European conception of security then becomes more encompassing and blurring
the lines between inside/outside security. External sources of insecurity for the continent become
unpacked, with the source of the problem within these threats being ones of internal state
governance, see: development assistance and reduction of poverty. It also shows what the EU
considers a false divide of civilian versus military operations.

The ESS sees threats as interwoven and includes its own triangle of connected threats:
conflict, insecurity and poverty. Compare this to America’s triad of “terrorism, tyranny and
technology” in its 2002 National Security Strategy (Haine and Lindstrom, 2002). The five main
threats identified in the ESS were: terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction, regional conflicts,
failed states and organized crime (Solana, 2003b:3). The development of the ESS spans from
Europe’s achievements in civilian security, e.g. its developments in JHA and AFSJ. The
internalization of security has started to seep into external security as exhibited by the 2003 ESS.
Part of this is the acknowledgement in the ESS that combating new threats would require more
than a military response. The emphasis in ESS was one of conflict prevention, albeit it would
require a complex combination of diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, intelligence, judicial,
policing, military and political strategies (Ginsberg & Penska, 2012: 22). Economy refers to the
first community pillar while intelligence, judicial and policing would refer to the third
intergovernmental AFSJ pillar and military and political strategies to the second intergovernmental
pillar. The EU as a cohesive supranational whole would have to direct and remedy these new
threats using their “new” type of governance system.

The new emphasis on the discourse of European security comes at a fruitful time alongside
the enactment of the Treaty of Nice, which occurred on 1 February 2003 in preparation of the EU’s
2004 eastward enlargement. There appears to be a normative agreement on the diffuse nature of
security threats. While earlier in 9/11, the urgency of the triple-threat of international terrorism,
failed states and WMDs came to the fore, it was the diffuseness of other threats that made their way into the 2003 ESS (Burghardt, 2003). The other threats were ethnic conflict, organized crime and drug trafficking and their sources was the extended European region, outside of the EU.

The next development for ESDP and CFSP would be the institutional formalities of the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. Here, ESDP and CFSP were merged and renamed as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It also marked the dissolution of the WEU and the execution of its tasks through an EU framework.

3.4.2. Regional negarchy and an expanded space for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

The importance of the past emergence of autonomy-contestation is that while it operated in a hierarchical global environment (hence “contestation”) inside a regional anarchy interdependence -problematique, when the institutional architecture of the EU caught up with the internalized threats, a negarchic-order would trickle down into the future onto the organizational-level. This is due to the presence of the regional-level anarchy problematique combining with the hierarchy-restraint problematiques to make the emergence of negarchy necessary in regional and organizational levels.

Vivere Sicuro became highly developed in this area. The previous discourse of Tampere would change with the Hague Program of 2004-2009. In the Hague Program, a security-led approach dominated the programme with security meaning, “the development of an area of freedom, security and justice, responding to a central concern of the peoples of the States brought together in the Union”. The Hague Program was a turning point, placing security-related measures into those promoting freedom rather than security by itself, and thereby having security of the State predating the liberty of the individual/citizen (Balzacq & Carrera, 2006:5). This lends itself to concerns of developing Vivere Libero.

The 2004 Hague Program was agreed by the European Council on the 4-5 November 2004. It set out a new five-year policy agenda for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice to run from 2004-2009. The main onus of the Hague Program focused on the further development of migration and asylum-related policies in a now 25-member state EU. The program expected to improve the member states’ ability to “guarantee fundamental rights, procedural safeguards and access to justice; fight organized crime; repress the threat of terrorism; provide protection to refugees, regulate migration flows and control the external borders of the union”. The contribution of the Hague Program is linked to migration and the timely emphasis to threats of terrorism in a new security context as the program states “international migration is likely to continue”.

On the topic of refugees, a policy shift in the Hague Program is indicative when referring to refugees’ countries of origin, treaty text has been transformed from referring to them as “partnerships” to a new program of the “external dimension” to asylum and migration policy. This points to a promotion of refugee protection beyond the EU’s borders and sees migration management through broader foreign policy concerns (van Selm, 2005). The arm of the EU in AFSJ has reached further and further beyond their original EU-continental remit and even into areas, like foreign policy, reserved for the second pillar by virtue of the geopolitical nature of migration. This is evident in the four sections of the program that include partnerships with: third countries, countries and regions of origin, countries and regions of transit and a return and
readmission policy. This multiplies the amount of countries the EU is not obligated to, yet chooses to cooperate with. This sort of cooperative saturation, however, is unlikely to qualitatively increase justice internally if it only includes external policies with non-EU members who are geographically close in proximity.

There are thematic differences in emphasis between The Hague Program and the 1998 Tampere Program. While The Hague may cover the same topics, Tampere’s, “shared commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law”, was not a cornerstone of the program. Presumably the shift from Tampere and Hague is from “freedom” to “security”. The Hague Program reflects the European Council’s high priority to security as, “the development of an area of freedom, security and justice, responding to a central concern of the peoples of the Statues brought together by the Union”. Comparatively speaking, sections of The Hague program focused extensively on security-strengthening measures in provisions for “strengthening security”, e.g. improvement of exchange of information for counter-terrorism, as well as “strengthening freedom”, e.g. border checks, fight against illegal immigration, biometrics and information systems. Other Tampere mentioned measures, such as protection of fundamental rights, fair treatment of third-country nationals, the role of the ECJ and Fundamental Rights Agency are only dealt with briefly (UK Parliament, 2005).

The impact of EU Enlargement, surrounding The Hague Program, was the redrawing of the EU’s external borders and alongside it, the consideration of the expansion of the status of becoming an EU citizen as part of one of the ten “strategic objectives” of the Commission’s Action Plan for The Hague Program (Gorny and Ruspini, 2004). The 1 May 2004 EU Enlargement has created a variety of status of citizen’s variable to the freedom the citizen can move and live for employment purposes.

Considering that “security” is a crucial aspect to The Hague Program, freedom of movement does not subsume security. Rights of the EU citizen, formulated by the EU and therefore their legal separations was undoubtedly supranational in character yet formed a strong line between insider and outsider. The context for the preparation of the Stockholm Program was the precipitation of the global economic crisis of 2009 and the projected short-term and long-term figures on migrants in and through Europe (Ibid). One 2009 JHA Council issue was the immediacy of illegal migration flows in the Mediterranean and the solidarity-driven political actions of the self-named Quadro Group – Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta. Illegal migration and asylum continues to be a long-term goal of the program. But the text itself was reactive and tailored to fit the proposed institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty. The impact of Lisbon and migration/asylum policy meant that legal immigration would be pursued under the “ordinary legislative procedure” otherwise known as “co-decision”. Measures to determine the entry, residence and rights of legal migrants would be voted on by QMV instead of unanimity. The European Parliament’s ability to veto new legislation, brings it to the fore as an important policy-actor in migration. However, member state control was still granted under Lisbon on volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek work.

The EU Enlargement and therefore expansion of EU citizenship fell under an inner-continental domestic remit in EU institutions. As insiders, EU citizens and legal migrants would then fall under Community procedures as legal migrants since they have been “internalized” into the system away from being the externalized threat they once were. This explains the move from
intergovernmental decisionmaking processes to community processes like QMV voting and the multiplication of Commissioners. In accordance with the Philadelphia model, as the EU citizenry is extended, further restraint on core powers becomes necessary. Hence the lattice of institutional linkages in the precise domain of migration amongst the Commission, EP and the intergovernmental Council of Ministers which used to vote unanimity on those issues.

By the conclusion of 2010, The Hague Program only met half of their goals in the integrated border management division and did not meet the completion deadline of their Common European Asylum system (Collet, 2010). The Stockholm Program was the third program after Tampere and The Hague, which attempted to create an area of Freedom, Justice and Security. The Stockholm Program was prepared on 15-17 July 2009 and presented to the European Council on the 10-11 of December 2009. It was a five-year plan for JHA in all states of the union, running from 2010-2014.

The Stockholm Program calls for an “open and secure Europe” and debuts a new additional area, “external dimensions of freedom, security and justice”. This corresponds to one of the differences between Stockholm and The Hague, namely that the Global Approach to Migration, i.e. cooperation with third-countries on migration, moved from third/fourth on the list of priorities to the top of the list. The internal dimension of migration is still evident, as the Stockholm Program calls for effective evaluation of the policy proposals which involve greater interaction with civil society actors and improved communication with the European public. Still, the external dimension has led way into an emphasis on policy cohesion. This means that immigration policy became linked to foreign and development policy, trade, employment, health and education (Collet, 2010).

Four particular related external security areas are of interest: The Global Approach to Migration, migration and development, and the external dimension of asylum. The Global Approach to Migration builds upon pre-existing mobility partnerships with immigrant-origin countries in Africa and Eastern Europe. The explicit highlight was to determine common interests with third countries. Most detail in the section on global migration has been transferred to illegal immigration. This appears to be a transplantation of the negative impact of migration from being a social concern being transferred externally to internally towards also being a security concern inside the EU. In an effort to coordinate combating illegal migration with third-countries, the EU sought a range of strategies including financially supporting the development of border management policies or readmission and visa facilitation agreements. The external dimension of asylum makes migration management a part of foreign policy. This includes the promotion of refugee protection beyond the geographic confines of the EU. Stockholm further develops refugee programs instigated by The Hague, such as the Regional Protection Program in Eastern Europe and the Great Lakes region of Africa. Such programs for refugee protection in Europe still lags behind the programs found in North America.

Through the innovation of legal competencies in the fields of migration and asylum, relations with named “third-countries”, and the introduction of the ENP the collective of European nation-states called the EU is beginning to mimic more and more like a federal confederate or negarchical system. Collective identity construction on what it is to be “European” has found its way into not only the external relations of what is not European but also in the police- coordinative combatting of crime or demographic risks that emerge from the non-Europeans in the immediate neighbourhood. The EU as a whole, even before Lisbon, is able to act cohesively enough with
enough agreed upon rules and legislation to have a unitary personality in external affairs of pillar II and now pillar III. This is true even if legal personality is only given to the economic first pillar, the EU is still able to have an operative personality in the others. The EU is thus able to operate as a de facto state in affairs outside of its legal pooled-sovereignty territory.

3.4.3. Externalizing threats and the growing pains of a mature negarchy

At present, vivere libero or “Freedom of Community” with the increase of military capability by national governments on behalf of ESDP is maintained with the unique features of intergovernmentalism in defense. This is not at conflict with Vivero Sicuro. Rather, it avoids the pitfall of making vivere sicuro a priority which would have led to absolutism. Rather than something that needed to be developed, vivere libero and defense intergovernmentalism from Maastricht were created before the vivere sicuro acts of co-binding and balance found in the Lisbon Treaty.

Additionally, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was instrumental in the re-externalization of threats in European security. This was done indirectly, since it’s not states in the ENP that are considered threats per-se but rather malignant non-state actors that can transverse across territories emerging from unstable governance. The creation of ENP could only have been possible under a negarchical order at the regional-level. The threats indirectly related to ENP are by nature “externalized” outside of the EU. Their jurisdiction at the moment is not in conflict with the foreign policy priorities of the US or NATO despite their global mandates. The framing of ENP-linked threats of global terrorism and migration help this case. Thus the threat-matrix for the 2000s period is one of autonomy-non-interference which is either indicative of an escape from hierarchy or a development away from anarchy at the regional-level. Whatever its source, negarchy has appeared to emerge.

The Lisbon Treaty, enacted in 2009, was a massive institutional overhaul of the three-pillar structure of the Maastricht Treaty. The three-pillar system was abolished and the EU came to have a singular legal personality. Previously it was only the economic/market first pillar, Economic Communities, that had such a personality i.e. can sign treaties under that name. As part of the consolidation process, the Economic Communities was replaced with the “European Union” personality. Thusly this incorporates all competencies of the EU and the legal personality of a state with a legislative, executive, judicial and defence (and now merged foreign policy) arm. The new role of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with the disappearance of the pillar structure, ensures coherence between EU institutions and between those institutions and member states.

The introduction of Lisbon has extended the EU judiciary as an important institutional actor in helping to implement the co-binding of executive functions. Lisbon has also utilized the EU legislature or EP to co-bind with the intergovernmental Council of Ministers. The equalization of different external actions makes such co-binding even more possible eliminating the hierarchy of different decision making procedures which would dictate intergovernmentalism or supranationalism in policy rather than a hierarchy of priorities.

Intergovernmentality in defense and foreign policy would mean that the CFSP system was based on international law. This was altered with Lisbon which attempted to integrate CFSP further
and further into EU Law (Elsuwege, 2010: 998). EU legal integration however, runs into several stumbling blocks which enable the continued exceptionalism of CFSP and defense outside of unitary EU developments. This is due to the complexity of the treaty making the distinction between CFSP and non-CFSP external action competencies difficult for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to make rulings over. An inadvertent consequence for the demise of the EU’s pillar-structure is the abolition of the priority of a Community interpretation over that of a CFSP-domiciled one in several external action provisions.

Contrary to what would be expected that CFSP decision-making would subordinate Community decision-making, what the previous pillar system did was reduce CFSP to narrowly defined, residual category of the EU’s external relations activity via Article 47 of TEU (Heliskoski 2008:908). This is in opposition to Lisbon where now equal weight is attributed to the different types of EU External Action under Article 40 TEU and Article 1(2) TEU which states both TEU and Lisbon’s TFEU hold the same value (Elsuwege, 2010:1002). The priority of using non-CFSP powers in external action is no longer valid. There is now an absence of clear criteria to distinguish between CFSP and non-CFSP related activities. Normally the ECJ would apply a “centre of gravity” test to reach decisions. However, such a test can no longer be easily implemented as a result of Lisbon’s competence overlaps and the intertwined nature of different foreign policy areas thus making it difficult for the ECJ to judge “aims and content”. This could be seen with actions involving terrorism that not only hold a CFSP but also an AFJS element. More frustratingly, the Lisbon Treaty has removed reference to explicit CFSP objectives, leaning more towards generalized abstraction.

Such increased institutional blending measures of supranational and intergovernmental bodies in internal security indicate that vivere sicuro or “Freedom of Security” was being developed within the EU. The total supranationalization though of ESDP and CFSP through co-binding would be highly undesirable.

The Lisbon Treaty has tried to address inter-institutional tensions in foreign policy by drawing up an External Action Service to draw up expertise from both institutions, and the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is also now the Vice President of the Commission. The creation of the High Representative accompanies unclear divisions of power with already existing positions and institutions. One instance is the confusion of the roles of the High Representative versus the President of the European Council and the High Representative versus the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The High Representative role was a merger of the High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Commissioner for External Action. As part of the Commission, the High Representative also becomes responsible to the European Parliament, which has to give a vote of consent to the entire Commission. Thusly they are beholden to the Commission, the EP and the European Council (EC), by virtue of how they are appointed. The resources that the High Representative has by itself, is less than those of colleagues in the European Council and the Commission. Thusly, the High Representative has to balance between both institutions. For some, this can be seen as an asset for there is an actual position facilitating the balance of power within the EU framework.

Despite two institutional scenarios of supranationalism or intergovernmental-complexity, the latter is deficient as it makes Foreign Policy and Defense dependant on an external understanding of security. This makes the terms of “rationalized intergovernmentalism” able to co-exist in the field of defense and foreign policy with an overall supranational union. A more
cohesive understanding of security can be developed that blurs the fields of internal and external, so that an assessment of external-action alone would give an incomplete view on the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. What is encouraging to note is that although areas of “serious crime”, and indirectly, those of defense are still intergovernmental and possess unanimity voting, the playing field of “inside” European Security is looking externally, post-2004 EU Enlargement through the European Neighborhood Policy Instruments (ENP). This indicates a blending of the inside/outside field and the potential for spill-over as the EU’s pivotal Council of Ministers play both roles in “inside” and “outside” security.

The ENP was an attempt to ensure the EU’s geostrategic interests in expanding the zone of stability, security and prosperity beyond its borders but without providing further EU-enlargement opportunities (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006:140). By offering neighbors with a stake in the EU’s internal market, involvement in EU programs and cooperation in transport and energy networks. These benefits were previously only reserved for EU member states. Providing these benefits to partner countries means that the EU does not need to offer membership and enlarge further, which could place strain on EU institutions.

The ENP holds an additional role for the EU: to be responsive to citizen concerns on energy supplies, migration, security and stability. Other commentators view the EU’s external influence in the ENP regions as a form of foreign policy where EU governance is extended beyond its geographic borders through conditionality in each partner country’s Action Plans (Lavenex, 2008). Instead of a hierarchical policy-structure of goals, instruments and strategies, the ENP serves as a roof over a system of functional regional integration with areas that move at different speeds with different dynamics. The ENP thus creates horizontal process-oriented modes of networked governance. This networked-governance was created by the EU in light of its own lack of strong leverage, opposite to a more hierarchical strategy and use of conditionality that could be expected in usual Foreign Policy strategies (Lavenex, 2008: 939). Conditionality is the policy where prior to membership or privileged status, states are meant to abide by the Copenhagen criteria and adopt the acquis communitaire, aka. The legal norms and documents arising from the EU.

The main incentive of the partner countries from 2003 were further economic integration and liberation for the promotion of free movement of persons, goods, services and capital (Kahraman, 2005: 34-35). The new incentives that would replace the free market incentive were the renewed emphasis on security building and regional cooperation. This has transformed the earlier support of democratic transitions and reform in the EU neighbourhood from a goal in its own right, into the goal of a secure, stable and cooperative neighbourhood. While the original discourse of ENP focused on “increasing its neighbours prosperity, stability and security” the new discourse had become security-driven. Since 2004 Commission Strategy Paper, the EU has introduced the importance of a “mutual commitment to common values” of the EU and its neighbors as the basis for cooperation (European Commission, 2004: 8). Differentiation was then introduced so that partner countries would be measured with their own yardsticks, with their relationship to the EU judged on a commitment to common values and their will and capacity to implement agreed upon priorities. ENP partnerships are then strengthened/weakened based on the more a country conforms to EU values, the closer it can cooperate with the EU (Kelley, 2006). The new EU rhetoric on ENP has thus changed from originally being about conditionality and strong incentives to one of partnership and shared values (Tocci, 2005:25-27). Even deeper
relationships are provided to those who cooperate on key foreign policy objectives e.g. counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of WMDs (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006:140).

The impact of the removal of internal border frontiers enabled commentators on an EU security-deficit to reign in migration and asylum under a policy rubric of existential threats (Weaver, 1995; Buzan et. Al, 1998). A chain of equivalences or an “internal security sphere” was created in the EU with irregular migration, transnational crime, and terrorism on a single security continuum (Bigo & Leveau, 1992).

The externalization of internal security first involved the bifurcation of Freedom of Movement paradigm on one hand and security paradigm on the other. This bifurcation was a result of the separation of the supranationalism of the first pillar with the intergovernmentalism of the third pillar (Monar, 1998; Monar, 2001). The process of the dissolution of the third pillar from the Amsterdam Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty had the security paradigm permeate the first pillar where it became a new priority at the expense to questions of freedom. A negative conception of freedom, i.e. freedom from danger, risk, and fear, which necessitate security measures, became a precondition for the original positive freedom for EU citizens to cross borders (Huysmans 1998, 2002; Kostakopoulou, 2000; Bigo 2004; Lindahl 2004, 2010). This resulted in the EU wishing to imitate the protection function of states while increasing the EU’s social legitimacy. The idea of a “protective Union” was expected to provide high levels of security for its citizens while making free movement in the internal market possible (Kaunert, 2005).

The de-pillarization of Lisbon opens up the possibility of full involvement by the supranational institutions of the Commission, European Parliament and the ECJ. Contextually, internal security under Stockholm was no longer the primary driver for legislation. Instead, ensuring rights and protection and the engagement of EU citizens were given as being essential for the legitimacy and credibility of enhanced cooperation in the AFSJ (Kostakopoulou 2010). The re-weighting of “freedom” in the AFSJ after Stockholm, indicative by a new “citizen-oriented” and “rights-based” perspective (Kostakopoulou, 2010: 153). The EU acting as a state has to also take into account the internal to external merging of the Area of Justice and Home Affairs alongside the European Neighborhood Policy instrument.

The 1997-2000 time period’s hierarchy-restraint problematiques and anarchy-interdependence problematique had paved the way for a negarchy to develop in the European space from 2001 onwards. This made it ready for the EU to develop using this stable security foothold. Several milestones in European affairs have alluded to this development: the release of the European Security Strategy (2003), the establishment of the European Defense Agency (2004), and the abolition of pillarization and the restructuring of the EU decision-making processes under the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). At the regional-level, the EU’s threat-perception discourse moved back into non-interference with the re-externalization of transmobile threats as a result of the creation of new border frontiers with the European Neighborhood Policy instrument. More precisely it was autonomy non-interference in the shadow of the US being a global hegemon.
3.5. Conclusions on Europe: The EU as a Mature Negarchical Organization in Negarchy

Europe has developed a cohesive security sphere allowing it to act as one voice, reflecting a broader security imperative due to its accelerated developments in security and defense mechanisms after 1996. This was due to the creation of a negarchical order in the regional realm as a response to US hegemony in NATO and confidence-building from EU experience in internal security in the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs pillars. Institutional solidification was thus derived from an international environment of mobile threats and great power intrusion. This shouldered the need for Europe to create and act as a matured and confederated state in foreign affairs. The macrostructural and microstructural steps that led to this transformation can be seen in the figure below:

Figure 4. Europe’s ordering principles and order-altering perceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Global</th>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>Organizational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992-96</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Anarchy</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-01</td>
<td>Hierarchy-restraint problematique</td>
<td>Anarchy-interdependence problematique</td>
<td>Hierarchy-restraint problematique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-n</td>
<td>Autonomy-Contestation</td>
<td>Negarchy</td>
<td>Negarchy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The EU is an ideal case to show how a confederation of republics can form and exist in the contemporary world. The exogenous threats of multiple wars in its backyard, e.g. Yugoslavia, Kosovo, and the threats that policy brings in several opportunities for order-altering perceptions. The contentions of sovereignty brought by the EU and autonomy brought by NATO are hotspots for testing resilience and directs us towards the policies an organization would develop to protect itself and its raison d’etre. Negarchy was able to emerge in the late-stage via prior-pathway negarchy, as a result of the eruption of the two hierarchy-restraint problematiques and the anarchy-interdependence problematique in the mid-stage.

The EU was able to frame its solutions to global security concerns in such a way that a policy of exporting of EU governance norms, aka ‘conditionality’, to be agreeable to the US’s own democracy exportation. This was also bolstered by repeating the US’s concerns of WMDs and international terrorism as security concerns in the 2003 European Security Strategy. While at the organizational-level, scholars would still argue the unit-level primacy of states as drivers with the continued foreign policy divergence of the big 3 in Europe. However, changes made under the Lisbon Treaty along with the matured blurring of inside/outside security corresponded further and further with co-binding as positions such as the High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs took on multiple roles and “turf battles” occurred between institutions. Thusly suppressing over-exercise in executive and legislative power, with the judiciary given role as mediator in deciding which domain of foreign policy a decision falls under.
CHAPTER 4. EURASIA: CONSOLIDATION OF AN ORGANIZATION-LEVEL NEGARCHY

The SCO occupies a geographic region where constant fragmentation and hyper-shifting alliances can occur in 3-5 year cycles. An earlier organization, the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), was unable to prevent not only the permanent withdrawal of its South Caucasian members, but also failed to capture consistent compliance of Uzbekistan and build confidence between Central Asian members. Sub-regional structures in Central Asia were unable to fully integrate their economies. As a result, there was an eventual re-integration with Russia through the CSTO (Common Security Treaty Organization), despite balance of power logics. As a whole, Eurasia presents itself as a “bad neighbourhood”. One that is ill-equipped to provide any lasting cooperative assurances of trust, commitment and regional security coordination.

And yet the SCO persists. Its membership has survived the Rose Revolution of Kyrgyzstan, the auctioning of various base sites by the US during Operation Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, draconian retaliations of Uzbekistan on other members and a centuries-long territorial feud between Russia and China. Threats are numerous and functionally varied in Eurasia. Neorealist Alliance Theory, with balance of power, threat and interests can give conflicting stories and analyses when applied to the same observation. This is particularly true for Eurasia as a whole (a further analysis of this is given in section 1). The problem comes when attempting to measure power, threat and interest, which are accountable to multiple interpretations. Thusly, episodic limitations of rational institutionalism, as discussed in Chapter 1, provide an unnecessary fragmented explanation to the genesis of organizations. These rationalist accounts also do not give enough credit to the uniqueness of operation of the structure of power within the SCO. Western analysts discuss the SCO as an autocratic club and an anti-NATO bloc. But systemic explanations of US balance may give an explanation for the cause but not the continuance of a pattern of cooperation i.e. resilience.

In relation to our thesis’s first aim, challenging neorealism and neoliberalism’s contradictory analyses, this chapter starts with the investigation of realist and neoliberal interpretations of Eurasian regional organizations. We start by showing that the SCO has defied neorealist expectations of balancing whilst the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) remains active. The SCO has also managed to create a resilient atmosphere for Central Asian states when other regional integration efforts have failed.

For our second thesis aim, to create a theory that explains organizational resilience, we help to achieve this through using modified RST. We have found that Eurasia’s SCO is a moderately resilient negarchy and occupies a middle space in our continuum for organizational resilience after Europe’s EU. This will be indirectly demonstrated through the completion of our third and fourth aims. Additionally, what would make this negarchy less resilient was its development of vivere sicuro but not vivere libero.

Our third thesis aim, investigating the presence of negarchy in the world, we find that in Eurasia negarchy has developed in the inter-state interactions at the organizational level. Concurrently, we find that the SCO’s co-binding concert-like structure mixed with this
organizational-level negarchy completes the fourth aim of finding resilience. A concert is a configuration of states that have agreed to only take joint-action on certain issues.

However, unlike the case of the EU, negarchy is absent from the regional-level. In our modified RST, and in the completion of the fourth aim of finding resilience, this would be the reason why we place it in the moderate slide of the resilience continuum. We explain this in the case study by showing that Eurasia’s move towards negarchy was done at an accelerated rate due to the many disruptions in its security sphere during its late-stage. We thus coin this type of negarchy “simultaneous negarchy” because it was produced in the same time-period as when the anarchy-interdependence and hierarchy-restraint problematiques had arisen. These events are indicative of vivere sicuro, or freedom of security, being in place yet the SCO did not have the luxury of time to develop vivere libero, or freedom of community, within its organization. Furthermore, what distinguishes Eurasia from the European case study is the absence of prior-pathway negarchy. Instead, negarchy has also emerged from Eurasia but under “simultaneous negarchy”. Simultaneous negarchy is when the anarchy-interdependence problematique and the hierarchy-restraint problematique occur in the same time period, which also causes the emergence of negarchy albeit in a single level of analysis, the organizational level. Contrast this with prior-pathway negarchy in Europe where negarchy developed after the emergence of one or more hierarchy-restraint and anarchy-interdependence problematiques.

By completing these aims we move forward in answering our research question: What does the conceptual system of Republican Security Theory give us in terms of analysis of cooperation patterns in security organizations?. In the case of Eurasia, we learn through RST that the resilience of the SCO versus the instability of the CIS/CSTO is a function of the structures ameliorating the hierarchy-restraint problematique of both Russia, and later the US. The inclusion of China as well as Russian, and its pan-Eurasian military exercises gives confidence to the Central Asian states that they would not be under predation inside the SCO framework. The organization plus the security situation surrounding it, provides binding and resisting opportunities to the ills of increasing violence-interdependence both through governance critiques made by the US and the accelerated activism of radical Islamists.

The chapter is divided into five main sections. The [1] first section is a literature review on international relations theory and Eurasian organizations and an exposition of RST. The next three sections are investigations of time periods in Eurasian history used to illustrate the main arguments [2] 1991-1995 Russia and the hierarchy-restraint problematiques [3] 1996-2000 the eruption of anarchy in the region [4] and 2001-present the rise of negarchy following the US human rights critique on Central Asian state governance. The [5] section concludes the case study, summarizing the sudden and fast rise to negarchy.

4.1 Theories of Eurasian Cooperation and an RST Reading

4.1.1. Theories of Cooperation in Eurasia

This analysis holds as a test to both neoliberal and neorealist theoretical outcomes. What the findings highlight are the problems of the Anarchical assumption of mainstream theory in explaining behavior. It looks to neorealist and neoliberal interpretations of regional cooperation in Eurasia. We highlight the fragmented interpretations of Russian hegemony in the CIS and GUAM.
The CIS is embedded in the greater post-soviet regional security complex. This regional space was securitized as the “near abroad” a year after the CIS’s inception. Lack of an international identity as separate from being anti-West and exclusion from Western institutions in the post-cold war era caused Russia to focus inward to develop its security by focusing in each subregion (Buzan & Waever, 2003:405). This was paired with the idea of reclaiming prestige in the world stage by claiming dominion over a large regional space, where the CIS was conveniently placed. Russia would then be poised to become “bloc leader” (Buzan & Waever, 2003:412). Failure of consolidation of the CIS can be interpreted as failure of instrumentality of integrationist efforts of post-soviet states. The CIS failed to be effectively utilized by Russia as a balance against other powers outside of its region, like the US. The “common goals” to be worked on by the member states included: coordination of foreign and security policies, orderly conduct of military assets from the USSR, economic integration, etc.

Failure to meet these goals resulted from the tension between attempts of Russian hegemony acting against the desire of each country’s leaders to be free to shape their own domestic politics (which is often in conflict with CIS goals) (Olcott, 2000:17). One example is the inability of Russia to mobilize the CIS states to adopt a common foreign policy regarding protection of the volatile Afghan-Tajik border and support for anti-Taliban rebels. Each state interpreted the security threat in different ways. Turkmenistan did not attend the Almaty summit in 1996 and in the end gave de facto recognition to the Taliban government. This is in opposition to Uzbekistan whom enthusiastically supported the Western allied Northern Alliance.

We should be wary of the appropriateness of this particular systemic/hegemonic analysis and be careful not to apply this explanation to all organizations in the post-soviet space. This is especially crucial when looking at institutions that have excluded Russia from direct participation in its institutional structures. Russia therefore does not bear the sole responsibility of undermining the effectiveness of an organization like GUAM since the origin of GUAM was to allow the participant states to serve as a counterbalance against Russian regional hegemony engendered by the CIS (Kay, 2003:133). GUAM states attempt to benefit from aligning their foreign policy towards the West as a form of extra-regional balancing against Russia. Therefore, it is useful to look at how other great powers (and Russia) impact individual state capabilities and if this in itself would eventually create reasons for defection/loss of solidarity in policy options.

The majority of the states in GUAM are involved in inter-state conflicts or are involved in the larger Caspian Sea resource disputes. This provides an additional opportunity for Russia to indirectly change the payoff structures so that best-possible outcomes would be against cooperation between the member states. In neorealist terms, these internal wars, and energy/pipeline politics, would act as “structural modifiers” in a sense that national security of the state would have to take preference in calculations of the level of commitment to integration allowed for a particular state in GUAM. In the context of internal regime security, Russia has played a complicated role in both supporting the disputed territories and the home governments in ethnic conflict (Buzan, 2003: 413). In Georgia, Russia has supported the Abkhaz territory with visa regimes yet would also support Sheverdnadze for the sake of Georgian regime security when Sheverdnadze was having trouble rallying a domestic support base. This was on the condition of an agreement of the Abkhaz ceasefire on Russian terms (Roeder, 1997:236). Similar actions can be observed in Russian support for Armenia in arms shipments in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict joined with support for Aliyev and extraditing his Armenian rival when issues of Azeri oil was on
the table. The example of Azeri relations in particular indicated Russia utilizing Issues linkage in the absence of hegemony.

There is a counter-critique against Neorealists propositioned by Neoliberals. Neorealist theory explains interactions rather than formulation and redefinition of state-interests. Neoliberals suppose that institutional theory delves into domestic politics in such a way that institutions transform national interests via the imposition of norms, rules, and procedures (Nye, 1988:239). As we have seen throughout this analysis, the very formulation of institutions in the post-soviet space does not conform to the instrumental normative goals of Western multilateralism.

Central Asia is an interesting case in debasing this counter-critique by illustrating how their level of state development rather than regional institutions formulates their interests. The utility of regional institutions functions as a form of “protective integration” to insulate their domestic regimes from liberalizing western forces that would impede on regime security and disrupt the process of nation-building (Allison, 2008:189). This shows that fundamentally we can’t compare these trends using neoliberal institutionalist theories. Main impediments towards institutionalized socialization (in the Western sense) has manifested itself with increased intra-regional competition from: other states’ fearing Uzbekistan as becoming a malignant hegemon, economic limitations, and issues of nation-building/regime security (Cornell, 2000; Allison, 2004).

When it comes to systemic neorealist variables; like the presence of hegemony or Neoliberal variables like trade, the results fail to yield a single common denominator. Each organization was different. The main problems of the CIS included Russian hegemony and divergence of security interests evidenced by the states in their theater groupings. Russian hegemony was not a direct concern of Central Asia’s institutional health either, as it saw Russian resources as a positive source to bandwagon with. Although external powers such as China and the US did become active in Central Asia, these additional influences are not primary impediments as they were used by other states to balance against a more compelling impediment to regionalism: anxiety over Uzbekistan (this variable wasn’t felt in either the CIS or GUAM except when Uzbekistan defected rather than flex its economic muscle).

The SCO defies neoliberal and neorealist sensibilities. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an inspiration for this project as a deviant case in resilience. The SCO changes its milieu-goals from confidence-building, to collective defense, and shows signs of collective security instead of falling apart when the threat-environment changes. The outcome of the SCO’s resilience is in opposition to Neoliberal Institutionalism. The organization was weak at its onset and does not exhibit the qualities of transparency and high information dispersal of a typical institution. Most interestingly in contrast to the predictions of liberal theories, the SCO maintains longstanding memberships, extended military cooperation and enthusiastic calls for greater trade integration despite extreme instances of power-balancing.

4.1.2. Post-Cold War Republican Security and moderate resilience in Eurasia

What we can learn from the above is that the failure to institutionalize or the failure of compliance is a product of both the security dilemmas between states exacerbated by Great Power intrusions in the security complex, and domestic concerns of states from being dominated by these other powers.
The framework proposed in Chapter 2 is an attractive solution in interpreting what would normally be contradictory explanations. The SCO is viewed as an “end-state” organization. It is the latest in a succession of organizational development. The SCO is impacted by both the history of its security environment and the exogenous shocks which strengthen its cooperative resolve. By highlighting the cooperative patterns of the Eurasian region as a whole, we can identify other non-traditional factors to explain organizational resilience.

In Eurasia, the anarchy-problematic arose in the late-stage at the regional level. Second-anarchy was present in the mid-stage and was a tolerable condition of the introduction of the US into the region and the creation of additional policy partners/organizations outside of Russia. In the background during the mid-stage were non-state threats of the radical Islam of the IMU and HT, as well as the logistics of the drug trade that linked them. These non-state threats descended into first-anarchy with the growing violence-interdependence of social connections between the IMU and Afghan Islamists.

The hierarchy-restraint problematic appeared several times in this case study. The period where it has the most impact is Eurasia’s late-stage when it combined with the anarchy-interdependence problematic. The hierarchy-restraint problematic also occurred twice in the early-stage, once in the regional level and the other in the organizational level. Both early-stage hierarchy-restraint problematic emerged from the influence of Russia in the subregional conflicts and Russia acting as a hegemon in the CIS. There was no discussion on organizational restraints on Russia in the CIS and the great power remained dominant and unopposed. In the mid-stage, these two hierarchy-restraint problematic shifted into anarchy.

Although neorealism would identify Russia or China as the regional threat, the actual external threat necessity in an RST sense was the US. The US is an extra-regional power with a global mandate based on the War on Terror and a human-rights critique on other states in the international system (Fitzpatrick, 2003; Robinson, 1996; Schulz, 2006:44). While it was not the cause of the anarchy-interdependence problematic in the region, the US precipitated a hierarchy-restraint problematic when it criticized Uzbekistan’s handling of its domestic political situation. This makes the US a necessary external threat for the SCO to be protective of the Eurasian states. The SCO is incentivized to be an attractive internal-power-restrained option for cooperation for member states. In other words, a cooperation option where their own governance would not be threatened by intervention. This is bolstered by the SCO norm of non-interference (Ambriosio, 2008: 1324; Chung, 2004: 992; Lanteigne, 2006).

The creation of late-stage organization level negarchy in the same realm of existence as the SCO, satisfies our minimal benchmarks for organizational resilience. This is supported with the development of vivere sicuro, or freedom of security, inside the SCO. The successful co-option of the revisionist state, Uzbekistan as an SCO member in 2001 signaled a space for noncoercive cooperation. The success of military exercises or “peace missions” incorporating all member states as well as the powerful China and Russia, was another indicator that vivere sicuro was occurring via mutual protection of eachother. However, due to the speed and urgency of responding to threats after 2001 and the relative recent-ness of the SCO, it is too soon to tell if the co-binding institutions in its charter are frozen or merely unchallenged. Thus we are unable to comment on developments of vivere libero at this time.

In Republican Security Theory, the material-context and violence-interdependence, sees the cause of violence and thus its solution still inside an exclusive states system. But material and violent contexts have created networks that cross-cut levels and has created a format of insecurity upon all hierarchical and anarchical participants.

The mechanism behind the dual hierarchical formation as a structural-effect would be dependent on certain foreign policy strategies of states in the presence of material contexts (Deudney, 2007:56). The formation of hierarchy at the regional and organizational level can be attributed to Russian strategy of “domination”, often via a loose interpretation of CIS articles.

4.2.1. Regional Hierarchy-restraint and Conflict in Eurasia Post-USSR

After the fall of the USSR, Russia immediately created the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This was done in a joint-signing with Belarus and the Ukraine, called “The Minsk Agreement” in December 8th, 1991. The other remaining 11 states in the region, except Georgia, ascended later during the Alma-Ata summit of December 21st, 1991. The earlier agreement also proclaimed the end of the USSR as a geopolitical and legal entity despite not being ratified by all ex-USSR members. In light of this, the CIS was intentionally created to be institutionally weak, especially in terms of past bad experiences with sovereignty contestation in Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Azaerbaijan and Moldova (Voitovich, 1993). Legally, the CIS holds no supranational powers as an organization. Instead, policy is undertaken inter-governationally with the coordination of several institutions including: Council of the Heads of State, Council of the Heads of Government, councils of border troops, foreign ministers, defense ministers, etc. This division-of-labor may reflect the looseness of not having created working or reliable mechanisms for conflict prevention/management, despite numerous legal documents in place (Tavares, 2010: 99).

Materially, the means were present for Russia to become the regional and organizational hegemon due to supplying and forming armies, trade, and regime security creating “unequal vulnerabilities” (Roeder, 1997: 231). This was a result of relics of the highly integrated economic structure, Russian-led national armies, and security ties from the soviet era that Russia has inherited from the collapse of the USSR. In addition, Russia exerts leverage in the form of economic debts as “aide packages” facilitated by CIS trading and by military doctrines taking advantage of Russian diasporas in the region (Roeder, 1997: 232). These acts are indicative of a regional hierarchical or hegemonic order within Eurasia during the early 1990s despite what should have been a binding hierarchical institutionalism at the organizational level.

As a consequence of the soviet-legacy the material context is an asymmetric distribution of material power. Taking advantage of the material context, Russia undertakes foreign policy strategies with the aim towards domination. These are linked with the shift in Russian foreign policy with the November 1993 Doctrine, from one of non-interference to subsuming intervention into local conflicts under the overarching umbrella of regional security (De Haas, 2001). Within the document: Russian intervention necessity centred on fear that instability in the post-soviet sphere would potentially spill-over into Russia’s external borders and its responsibility in protecting Russians abroad. In light of this, the regional hegemon appears to employ a number of strategies including: divide and conquer and threat transference from the local to the regional level. These domination strategies took place initially through interventions outside CIS operations, but were later integrated into CIS peacekeeping protocols.
Divide and conquer is especially prevalent in the frozen conflicts of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh and Moldova/Transnistria. The former, Russia vacillated by first supporting Azerbaijan in the spring of 1991 by removing Armenians from the Shaumian district in Nagorno (Aves, 1998:177). Then Russia later switched allegiances to Armenia with a mutual defense pact in 1992. The pact included a 25 year agreement on the construction of Russian military bases in the country. The added support enabled Armenian control of the enclave (Arbatova, 2008: 10). Armenian acceptance to Russian presence was acknowledged as a way to combat Turkish military pressures that may arise (Baev, 2003:49). In the latter frozen conflict of the Transnistrian enclave in Moldova, Russia was an early supporter of the Transnistrian forces and even encouraged Transnistrians to fight Moldova in April 1992 following a visit from Russian President Nikolay Rutskoy. Support came from the Russian 14th army that was stationed in the Transnistrian capital of Tiraspol. Formerly the Russian 14th was stationed in Moldova since 1945. After the fall of the USSR, the Russian 14th transferred its allegiance to the CIS organization and acted as a de facto regional force even after the cessation of armed conflict in Transnistria in late summer 1992 (Watch, 1993). A similar justification of protecting Russians abroad was made in interventions supporting the autonomous region of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Georgia in the early 1990s.

In the second strategy of domination, Central Asian collusion with Russia in the Tajik Civil War indicated an acceptance of CIS states on the importance of regional security beyond domestic contexts. In May 1992 fighting broke out into Tajikistan following disputes of the results of the 1991 presidential elections between the old-guard supporting President Nabiyev and a coalition of opposition forces made up of ethnic groups from the Garm and Gorno-Badakhshan Pamiris districts. The Tajik Communist Party broke into regional factions and a coup in the 7th of September 1992 culminated in Nabiyev being held at gunpoint, forcing his resignation. Yeltsin regarded the Tajik civil war, not necessarily with the aim of combating the internal unrest and restoring domestic stability. Rather, the conflict was interpreted as being a regional contagion of terrorism and fundamentalist Islam, although the Tajik opposition itself was composed of liberal democratic reformers in addition to Islamists (Neumann and Solodovnik, 1996:99). During the CIS Bishkek summit of October 1992, the CIS states agreed that the security of the Tajik border concerned the security of all CIS states. It was also agreed that a CIS peacekeeping force with “legitimate authority” would be deployed if Tajikistan requested so (Neumann and Solodovnik, 1996: 89-90). But it was primarily Russian forces with help from the Uzbek army which pushed the Tajik opposition forces into Afghanistan following the coup of the Tajik president. Russia later embedded itself in Tajik territory through the signing of the Agreement on Mutual Assistance in May 25th 1993. The agreement included the stationing of border guards. By 1996, when Russia facilitated an agreement between the Tajik government and the United Tajik Opposition, Tajikistan was home to 25,000 Russian troops (Jackson, 2003: 147-148).

Russia’s regional domination and hierarchy in the organizational sphere coincided with its meddling and creation of frozen conflicts inside Azerbaijan, Moldova and Armenia. These territorial conflicts were on disputed territory where more than one Eurasian state claimed dominion. Each party to the conflict internalized its security and the threats of “ethnic separatists”. These converged into an order-altering perception of sovereign-contestation as Russia intervened in territories which weren’t its own, following the fall of the USSR.

Threat problems point to the emergence of the hierarchy-restraint problematique at the regional level due to fear of Russian dominance. The hierarchy-restraint problematique also becomes present at the organizational level of the CIS/CSTO, which are Russian led organizations. Such
feelings soon led to isolationism e.g. Turkmenistan, or the creation of a counter-institution that was Western-facing, e.g. GUAM in 1997. This is not surprising as the avowed “non-interventionism” rooted in territorial integrity of article 3 of the CST charter, has been operationally dubious. In the CIS-offshoots, the Collective Security Treaty (CST) established in 1992, and its 2002 institutional form, the Commonwealth Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); both forms declared that any aggression against the signatories would be perceived as an act of aggression against all. The combination of institutional weakness and lack of clearly defined peacekeeping principles culminated in Russian interventionism despite the creation of the CIS.

4.2.2 The CIS and organizational level hierarchy-restraint

Consistent with Republican Security Theory, a consequence of Russia’s domination strategy was the swift re-establishment of a regional hierarchy akin to the Soviet period. The CIS is instrumentalized as embodying the norm of regional security often superceding the individual security of the Eurasian states. At this point and time, it is hierarchy all the way down. Threats were exclusively still made in the context of Russia intruding on internal affairs and conflicts. However, although an action by Russia alone states the creation of hierarchy at the regional level the organizational level would require the actions of the other CIS states in combination with the domination strategy of Russia to support the continuance of hierarchy. In these instances, it can be argued that domination is facilitated by providing security to parties under CIS missions, rather than outright conquest. Russia perpetuates its apex position of power in relation to the Eurasian states by careful distribution of its military resources and implementing itself within the resolution process of local conflicts. Domination also appears by way of security discourse of privileging Russian Diasporas or “compatriots abroad” and the idea of an “external border” over the sovereignty of other states (Gayoso, 2009).

The material benefits /regime and national security that Russia offer would be taken into account for each state calculation on whether to stay with CIS’s goals, or defect. The impediment is institutionalized Russian hegemony and the diversity of domestic security-initiatives working against cohesion of the various security subcomplexes inside the CIS in particular. The outcomes of these calculations can be seen in variances of compliance in behavioral groupings ranging from purely economic compliance of the CIS (Moldova) to full integration support (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) (Roeder, 1997: 225). The Western and South Caucasian Theaters have in fact merged to form their own informal groupings within the CIS. This grouping became GUAM. This is contrasted with the predominantly pro-Russian Central Asian bloc which would later also participate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with Russia and China.

Russia’s hegemonic advantage over the CIS states is not strong enough to counteract the overall difference in common-security perceptions. The CIS still has the power to impede cooperation amongst all CIS members from acting as a united bloc against Russia. This is based on material dependency on Russia for supplying and forming armies, trade, and regime security creating “unequal vulnerabilities” (Roeder, 1997:231). This was a result of relics of the highly integrated economic structure, Russian-led national armies, and security ties from the soviet era that Russia has inherited from the collapse of the USSR. In addition, Russia exerts leverage in the form of economic debts as “aide packages” facilitated by CIS trading and through military doctrines taking advantage of Russian Diasporas in the region (Roeder, 1997:232). Though the disparity of power in Russia is great, logically this could be remedied by bandwagoning with other great powers. But this has not been successful and Russia is still needed as a safeguard for regime
security. This is especially as CIS cannot rely on other external power such as the US based on their authoritarian tendencies.

Given the asymmetry of the power environment and the comparatively low-level of Eurasian inter-state tension in the early 1990s, most states practiced a “hiding” foreign policy where there were no feasible opportunities for domination nor balancing. The former was not possible as the US at this time focused on free market promotion rather than military investment or confrontation. Policies of hiding are status-quo strategies rather than ones that actively attempt to change material dynamics. This in effect implies that there is a degree of consent to the hierarchical order or the very least lack of opportunities. The added absence of any contingent (extra-regional) power practicing penetration or overlay leaves the developmental path to dual-hierarchy unopposed.

The emergence of a hierarchy-problematique is observed through the dominating strategy of Russia and the passive hiding reaction of the other CIS states. To test whether the hierarchy-restraint problematique existed, means viewing whether there was a pull and pull of resistance against Russia’s organization-based authority. Indicators include a move to anarchy by recognition of another actor who can compete with Russia in providing public goods. When the “Regionalist Revolution” of the mid-90s occurred with prospects to balance against Russia with US-bilateralism, there were still many elements of mistrust between Central Asian members.

4.3 1996-2000: Erupting Anarchy in Organizations and the Region

4.3.1. US penetration and the security organization market in mid-1990s anarchy

This chapter places an assumption that the global state of affairs is unipolar with the US as the dominant actor in economic, military and political capabilities. The US found the multiple security theatre dynamics of Eurasia and the CIS easily exploitable in the Mid-1990s to September 2001. The US’s Pre-2001 involvement would be characterized as penetration while 2002 onwards would be attempted overlay.

We look at co-option and competition in parallel to what the presented threats produce in policy terms. The gradual penetration of US foreign policy from the mid-90s can be seen slowly transforming Eurasian security politics even before the events of 9/11 and the start of the Global War on Terror. The Eurasian regional sphere in the early 1990s took a different local anarchical rather than global hierarchical order-character with a different set of problematiques, prior to US involvement.

The hierarchy-restraint problematique manifested itself in two parts in the early-stage of the macrostructure. As stated earlier, it first occurred regionally. Russia’s domination of the CIS made an organizational hierarchical sphere co-exist in parallel with a historically hierarchical regional sphere. This was broken by the US’s introduction into Eurasia.

Although not as pervasive as post-9/11 activities, the US was present in the region during the early 1990s with a policy focused on preserving the independence of states in the region and controlling the post-soviet stockpile of Weapons of Mass Destruction (MacFarlane, 2004: 450). A shift came in the mid-90s when the second Clinton administration saw potential in the region for being an alternative source of energy outside of the Middle East. This subsumed the earlier aims of democratization and good governance in favor of more strategic objectives (MacFarlane, 2004:452). US attention was sporadic prior to 9/11, focused on gaining a foothold in the South Caucasus and Central Asian energy sources e.g. the Baku-Tiblisi and Ceyhan pipeline (Berman,

Most of the US’s military impact came through multilateral Western ventures such as the NATO Partnership-for-Peace (PfP) programme joined by all Central Asian states except Tajikistan in 1994. The US military impact also came with the formation of Centrazbat in 1995. Centrazbat is a battalion made up of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, created in hopes of the countries’ troops becoming participants in UN peacekeeping operations (Butler, 2001). Exercises included Centrazbat ’97 held in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Centrazbat ’98 in Osh, Kyrgyzstan and Chirchik, Uzbekistan and Centrazbat 2000 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. In August 1995, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan along with 12 other PfP militaries participated in the training exercise “Cooperative Nugget” at Fort Polk, Louisiana (Weitz, 2004: 516). 11 Investment in PfP, through multiple military training exercises, was a response to Russia’s discontent with the 1994-95 NATO eastern enlargement. The enlargement was viewed as encroaching on Russia’s Near Abroad. The quickening pace of the program was a conscious Western effort to provide an option to balance against Russo-centric organizations such as the CIS (MacFarlane, 2004: 453).

In 1999, Uzbekistan joined the group retitling it GUUAM, following the Tashkent bombings. In May 1999, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia would abandon the Russian-led CSTO “on political grounds” (Weitz, 2004:516).

US penetration immediately changed the polarity of the region, allowing new balancing foreign policy strategies amongst the Central Asian states and ultimately producing a regional anarchy. The lukewarm foreign policy of the US during the 1990s provided options but no formal US-Eurasian organizational memberships. This created a nascent “Security Market” where Central Asian states could later pick and choose between Russia and the US as bilateral and multilateral security providers (Tolipov, 2006). Uzbekistan’s Sovereignty-contestation discourse on Russian-hierarchical condemnation culminated in Uzbekistan joining the Western-oriented GUAM alliance on April 24th 1999 and leaving the Russian-dominated CST. Consequentially these choices meant a breaking away from the first hierarchy-problematique’s threat of Russian domination with the opportunity of aligning with the West. Non-Russian regional structures in the 1990s were not republics. They were merely multi-polar anarchic alliances. Joining organizations that were not headed by a regional hegemon was a veto against Russian domination. The result was a shift away from hierarchy towards the emergence of an anarchical order in both the regional and organizational levels.

The inclusion of the US penetrating the Regional Sphere and the activist aspirations of its short-term partner, Uzbekistan, created an exogenous shock to the security complex. This set off a proliferation of new organizations, much to Russia’s chagrin. Hierarchy at the regional level devolved into anarchy, while the conscious decision to distance themselves from the CIS with other side-projects made the side-projects themselves anarchical as there was no clear hegemon in either theater (only aspirants). At this point, the US still kept its interactions at arms-length prior to 2001. The Mid-90s is typified as an era of risks, the risk of defection for bilateral deals and

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ultimately coordination problems. The organizational level was thus anarchic. The regional level fragmented, once these new projects occurred, into an anarchic environment where Russia was no longer seen as the only option for public goods of economic and political security.

4.3.2 The regional mobilization of non-state threats

The presence of Russia and the introduction of the US bring their own national interests with Terrorism in general. But these national interests are not initially articulated through organizations like the CSTO or SCO, but rather through bilateralism. In the context of alliance value, the label of “terror” is modified by middle powers’ interactions with allies in order to deal with a real material threat.

There are three main sub-state transnational threats that shape the Eurasian landscape. Two are groups of radical Islamists that have been known to communicate with each other: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). The third, the narcotics/opium trade, developed independently from the Eurasian context. Central Asia became a major drug trafficking route, taking over from Iran after the Iranian government took measures to curtail drug trafficking in the mid-90s (Cornell, 2005: 587). The region served as the transit routes from Afghanistan opium production which increased in 1996 shortly after the Taliban came into power and continued to increase in 1997 (Cornell, 2005: 586). By 1999, Afghan opium production increased from 2,700 tons in 1997 to 4,700 tons following similar crackdowns in drug smuggling in Turkey and Pakistan (Cornell, 2005: 587). The Central Asian opium trade works as an enabling factor, particular for the movements of the IMU. The trade routes will be discussed alongside Radical Islam incursions and financing in the events on the emergence of malignant first-anarchies.

The roots of the IMU started as a political opposition party in early 90s Uzbekistan under the name “Adolat”. Between independence and the 1991 elections, two religious based parties, Adolat and Islam Lashkari, gathered support in the Namangan district, part of the Fergana Valley (Melvin, 2008:31). Adolat started as a splinter group from the moderate Islamic Renaissance Party. A voluntary Salafist militia, Adolat members imposed Sharia Law in the Fergana valley, arresting and trying violators in ad hoc courts (Dwivedi, 2006). Its supporters grew to the thousands and held a demonstration in Namangan in December 1991 at the eve of elections demanding the declaration of Islam as the state religion (Fierman, 1997:382). In March 1992 Karimov instituted a crackdown outlawing Adolat, arresting over 100 activists, and consequently forcing leaders Namangani and Yuldashev into exile in Tajikistan whom would later establish the IMU (Bohr, 2004:27; Rashid, 2001: 147). September 1992, in a reply to human rights NGO Helsinki Watch addressing the crackdowns, Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdurazzakov said, “The political parties and movements which have organized hundreds of unsanctioned rallies and demonstrations... as a rule are unaware of the importance of maintaining civil order” (Pulatov, 1992). Subsequent arrests and bans continued later that year towards secular opposition parties Erk and Birlik (Sneider, 1992). Presumably this would indicate Islamism being grouped into the broader threat of opposition movements. Uzbek officials told the New York Times in 1993, “Uzbekistan has taken an objective lesson from Tajikistan and cannot allow Islamic fundamentalists and naive democrats to inflame

12 The IMU in this thesis is an umbrella term encompassing its predecessor, Adolat, off-shoots as well as the most recent name, Islamic Party of Turkestan. What holds these organizations in common are their violent tactics and genesis of the two founders of Adolat-Uzbekistan, Namangani and Yuldashev.
tensions” implying that the regime believes a link exists between the Uzbek opposition and proponents of Islamic rule (Erlanger, 1993).

Hizb ut-Tahrir originated in Jordan but has extracted many followers from Central Asia, mostly ethnic Uzbeks, with an ideological goal of recreating Caliphates (ICG, 2003). It is considered a non-violent organization in contrast with the militant IMU. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the group presents itself as a political party rather than a religious organization (Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006:316). Due to the transnational character of its teachings, decentralized governing structure, sub-state operating context and network potential with more violent groups across Central Asia; HT has become a source of anxiety in the West and Central Asia as “The New Al-Qaeda” (Bowers et. Al., 2003; Chaudet, 2006; Cohen, 2003).

The transnational nature of HT is evident in its interpretation of an ideal Islamic state. Original members included Palestinians in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006:316). HT holds an absolutist interpretation of the Islamic State, rejecting contemporary efforts of establishing Muslim states like those of Sudan, Iran and Saudi Arabia (ICG, 2003:4; Karagiannis & McCauly, 2006:317). This is due to the belief that unlike in modes of governance like democracies, where sovereignty and authority are both wielded by the people; sovereignty is only wielded by god while authority is a temporarily entrusted in the hands of the populace. This makes all alternative forms of governance seem man-made and imperfect (Baran, 2005:23). Thus, the group is not concerned with establishing Islamic nation-states but instead advocates re-establishing the Islamic Caliphate, a transnational state. The re-establishment of the Caliphate requires the demolition of existing state apparati to construct the new Islamic state. The Caliph, elected by assembly, appoints a military leader known as an Amir to declare Jihad against non-muslim countries (ICG, 2003:10). It is believed that it is through the Caliphate that the Muslim world will once again become free and powerful (Chaudet, 2006:116).

The alternative administrative boundaries of HT reflect their rejection of the modern notion of the nation-state. HT sees the world as divided into provinces or Wilayah rather than countries. These provinces can coincide with the boundaries of a nation-state or a particular region of the state. There are reportedly 12 Waliyahs globally (Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006:317).

While the IMU’s spread is motivated by material and resource necessity, the HT’s modus operandi revolves around religious persuasion and the use of ideology as a framing tool in order to interpret current political realities. But also, like the IMU, HT’s networked spread is also a product and reaction to circumstances banning the group, and consequently its ability to mobilize resources in successive countries. In the context of threats: transnationalism by resource ease, new ideological framing logics, and displacement as training camps and meeting points are raided/closed down due anti-terror measures by states, territorially unbind malignant non-state actors. These factors provide them with more scope for movement.

The presence of malevolent non-state actors would provide incentives for military intervention between states to protect interests of regime security that weren’t there before. This rings especially true in the case of Eurasia where the most influential transnational terror network, the IMU, is also a sub-state threat directed at Uzbekistan’s Karimov regime. Yet the IMU also embeds itself in a wider geographic network.

This risk of regional power intervention and overspill was present to a lesser extent in the mid-90s with the Tajik Civil War. Although at that point the main peacekeeping organization with the
The CIS was still encountering issues of contained-legitimacy as more members pursued their own means of integration through outside organizations such as Georgia-Ukraine-Armeina-Moldova (GUAM) and the Central Asian Union (CAU).

The developmental route from Adolat to the IMU was a foreboding of the transnational potential of the creation and networks of violent terrorist groups in Eurasia. Adolat’s leaders, Tohir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani, were forced into exile to Tajikistan in 1992, taking with them 30 IMU militants and a handful of Arab liaisons of Saudi Islamic foundations (Johnson, 2007:119). They quickly aligned themselves with radical elements of the United Tajik Opposition- The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), in the Tajik Civil War (Cornell, 2005:584). Here, Namangani was entrusted by IRPT leaders to lead their ground troops in the Tavildara Valley region during the civil war (Rashid, 2002). Tavilidara Valley would later re-emerge as a geopolitical hub along with the Ferghana Valley, bordering along Kyrgyzstan. These hubs along with the Uzbek-governed Vorukh and Tajikistan governed Sokh enclaves in the Batken region of South Kyrgyzstan, were not only coordinative points of attack and retreat in the terror-strikes of the late 90s and early 200s but also recruiting stations for both the IMU and Hizb-ut Tahrir (Cornell, 2005: 585; Karagiannis, 2005: 141). While Namangani was directing the Tajik opposition from Tavildara, Yuldashev from 1995-1998 was based in Peshawar, Pakistan. Yuldashev’s new political base was a result of the connections he made with various Islamist groups in Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran. He also came into contact with Saudi, Iranian and Turkish intelligence agencies (Rashid, 2008:68). Yuldashev’s Peshwar funds came mostly from Pakistan’s Jamiat Ulema Islam party as well as Pakistan’s inter-services intelligence agency (Naumkin, 2005:71). Pakistan’s Jamiat Ulema Islam enlisted Uzbek activists in their madrasahs. Pakistan’s inter-services intelligence agency previously ran the anti-Russian opposition in the late 80s Soviet-Afghan War and would later fund the Taliban (Rashid, 2002).

The June 1997 power-sharing peace accords that ended the Tajik Civil War were greatly opposed by Adolat members. The end of the Civil War was marked as the beginning of the spread of Radical Islam in greater Central Asia (Luong, 2003: 337). After the Tajik Civil War, Yuldashev met with Taliban officials and Osama bin Laden in 1997 and relocated to Kandahar province in South Afghanistan. Yuldashev soon agreed to have Adolat set up a base in Northern Afghanistan. In 1998, the IMU was formally named and established in Taliban-controlled Kabul, Afghanistan (Sanderson, 2010:7).

The challenges of connecting links between the threat-movements of IMU and HT to the reactions of Central Asian states fall on Radical Islam’s divergent natures and strategies of the radical Islamist threat rather than making links between the states they target. Mihalka described it best as: “So with the IMU, we have action without organization and with the HT organization without action (Mihalka, 2006:140).” However, one thing is for sure and that is both threats’ impact on state interaction. In this context, threatening policies between states become dependent upon the condition that the non-state threats are geographically mobile and thusly affecting multiple theaters.

However, during the same period of Western penetration into the region, the Central Asian states also cooperated with Russia and amongst themselves on numerous occasions. While the West in general was providing arms-length military integration into their structures, and the US focused on primarily economic interests and post-cold war arms proliferation, the region was
combating the spread of radical Islam which was seen as a regime destabilizing force. US policy would not be interested with such security issues until after September 11th 2001, although the US expressed concern over drug trafficking in the region.

In May 1998, a Triple Alliance Agreement was signed between Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to combat extremism. It is notable that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan did not participate even though the latter’s enclaves have proven troublesome throughout the mid and late 1990s as staging grounds for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, a short-lived coordination center for conducting joint operations against terrorists was founded in 1999. However, plans collapsed on a joint-task force and the states were forced to request support of Russia and returned to previous Russian-led anti-terrorism agreements (McDermott, 2004:10). Bilateral deals with Russia included a Mutual Defense Pact signed with Russia in late 1999 despite joining GUAM and leaving the CST that same year. On April 1999 Tajikistan and Russia would reach an agreement on a base in Khujand, Tajikistan for the stationing of Russia’s motorized 201st division. The Khujand base would become the largest instalment of Russian troops abroad. Steps were also taken to de-militarize the Central Asian borders with China through heightened cooperation by forming the Shanghai Five and the signing of the “Treaty of the Deepening of Military Trust in Border Regions” on April 26th 1996. Uzbekistan would later join on June 15th 2001 to form the Shanghai Cooperation Organization alongside the signing of the “Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (the three evils)”. When borders become porous, the insecurity of a state becomes more apparent. Divergent policies amongst state actors and unequal reactions of retaliation becomes the outcome known as the Anarchy-Problematique. It is a matter of perception, but a powerful one assuming that a state-of-nature that has erupted in the region would affect the internal stability at home.

4.3.3. The effects of non-state threats and inter-state relations

The geographic mobility of the IMU stems from the human resources gathered as a result of (1) physical displacement (2) the drug trade and (3) Social networks gathered from communicating with HT. The most famous IMU offensives included: the 1999 Tashkent bombings, the 1999-2000 Batken incursions, the assassination attempt on Kyrgyzstan’s National Security Council Secretary in September 2002, and shoot-outs and bombings in Bukhara during 2004 which included the first use of the suicide bomb by Central Asian terrorist groups (Sanderson, 2010). Contentiously, the political uprising in Andijan in 2005 was also attributed to being incited by the IMU. The policy responses witnessed between states included the mutual planting of landmines for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and unilateral search-and-destroy operations by Uzbekistan within Kyrgyz and Tajik territory. Inter-state tensions were already present even before the first terrorism-related target in Central Asia. In response to Kyrgyzstan’s WTO December 1998 ascension, Uzbekistan imposed strict tariffs and controls on Kyrgyzstan (Karagiannis, 2005:141).The rising powers within Central Asia are Kazakhstan (after attempts to jumpstart the Central Asian Union) and Uzbekistan, with vital water resources and highly attractive strategic location of bases for US’s Operation Enduring Freedom. At the regional level, Russia still remains the hegemon in a hierarchical formation and acts as such in the way it operates its peacekeeping missions within the CIS. The bargain of collective security or institutional cooperation is still especially crucial for states in Central Asia. The members of the SCO faced conventional state-to-state security threats amongst themselves. They also face threats that are based on the anxieties over the weakening of their internal domestic development structures and regime legitimacy.
On the 16th of February 1999, the IMU placed a bomb in Tashkent, Uzbekistan as an apparent assassination attempt against Uzbekistan’s president, Islam Karimov. As was described in the previous section, much of the IMU’s contacts were acquired by the top leadership, Yuldashev and Namangani, dating back to the Tajik Civil War. Uzbek pressure was placed on the IRPT, now in Tajikistan’s coalition government, to force Namangani out of their territories after the Tashkent bombings. Namangani was able to broker a transit agreement on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border through the Garm Valley Road, into Dijital district and into the Ferghana Valley on the Tajik side (Rashid 2002). In response, Uzbekistan closed all its borders with Tajikistan (Gunaratna, 2002:170; Weitz, 2004:507). Uzbekistan also unilaterally sealed its Ferghana Valley border with Kyrgyzstan with the construction of an electric fence (Luong, 2003:339; Megoran, 2004). The Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan border closures were later followed by the placing of mines by Uzbekistan, resulting in civilian deaths (US Dept. of State 2001: 24). Mining then also became a common practice for Kyrgyzstan. But while Kyrgyzstan plants mines in mountain passes and peaks where no civilians live, Uzbekistan plants mines in densely populated agricultural areas (Kyzy, 2003). In June 2001, Kyrgyzstan passed a law to remove and destroy landmines in the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, Uzbekistan did not return the favor. Uzbek authorities cited the mines as anti-terror and anti-drug trafficking precautions and refused the removal of the landmines.

The order-altering perception in this case was one of sovereign non-interference during the Tashkent bombings. The IMU’s focus was on the Karimov regime, and thus were an internalized threat. Karimov framed the Tashkent bombings as a domestic threat and was able to solve it as such without interference from Russia.

But the IMU’s largest campaign was from August 1999 to August 2000. This terror campaign became known as the Batken Incursions, transversing the borders of Southern Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The aim of the Batken Incursions were trans-territorial in scope. The coordinated attacks were done with the hope of overthrowing all Central Asian governments and re-establishing the Islamic Caliphate along the Central Asian Islamic crescent from Chechnya, Russia in the West to Xinjiang, China in the East (Gleason, 2007: 279). The incursions started with the capture and ransom of the mayor of Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan. A consequence of the incidents had Tashkent placing the blame on Dushanbe for providing refuge to IMU fighters who crossed over into Batken. They also accused Tajik leaders of closing their eyes to the Tavildara Valley in Tajikistan, a major border transit area and retreat/regroup point used by the IMU (Matveeva, 2005:143). After the multi-pronged Batken incursions, Uzbekistan launched a series of search-and-destroy operations and air strikes in the neighboring states without permission from their governments (Walker, 2003: 28). Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan protested the measures claiming that it killed their civilians, disrupted transnational commerce, and directed the IMU towards softer targets (Weitz, 2004:511). Karimov accused Kyrgyz officials of failing to vigorously crackdown on IMU operations launched from their territory. Even as far as into June 2004, tensions still ran high between Uzbekistan and its neighbors as Kyrgyzstan protested the border-fence building in the Tuya-Moyun area of southern Osh, situated near a reservoir adjacent to the Ferghana Valley (AKIpress, 2004). Kyrgyzstan claimed that the fence cut into Kyrgyz territory by 60km and were in violation of its state border (AKIpress, 2004).

The IMU’s geographic mobility corresponds to locations that are part of the Batken Opium Route (Cornell, 2005: 587-588). The route erupted in the late ‘90s after the UN Drug Control Program and the Kyrgyz government made attempts to limit the smuggling along the Khorog-Osh highway, known as the “Osh Knot”. The alternative Batken route incidentally crosses the Tajik-
Kyrgyz border from the Jirgatal and Garm districts in Tajikistan, the same strongholds that the IMU used during the Tajik civil war (Madi, 2004: 13). Geographic enclaves acted as the IMU’s storage points for trafficked heroin. The states that legally administer the enclaves are unable to assert their authority due to the nation-state borders. They are then vulnerable and subsequently exploitable by these non-state actors that do not respect such boundaries. These enclaves include: Vorukh and Sokh, Uzbekistan, administered by Tajikistan; Chorku, Kyrgyzstan also administered by Tajikistan; and Qalacha and Kalmion, Kyrgyzstan administered by Uzbekistan (Cornell, 2005: 588; Madi, 2004:10). The Qalacha and Kalmion enclaves are also used as recruiting stations for HT. From 1997, IMU militants freely passed from Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan via the Korgon Gorge (Cornell & Sandstrom, 2006:20). The timing of the first wave of the Batken incursions corresponded to a record patch of Opium harvested from Afghanistan in June 1999 and the closure of the mountain passes in late September from the snow (Cornell, 2005: 588). Following the Batken incursions when the IMU fled to Tavildara, the UTO and IRP in Tajikistan once again had to convince Namangani to go to Afghanistan in early November 2000, specifically to Mazar-e-Sharif, where he was reunited with Yuldashev and the Taliban (Rashid, 2001: 52).

As the threats of radical Islam became mobile with increased interaction between the IMU and HT, Islamist incidents of terrorism dragged in several countries to a tipping point along their borders. Worries about domestic regime stability emboldened Uzbekistan to take pro-active measures and eventually intervention even inside another state’s territorial sphere. This was indicative of an externalization of threat when the regional level was anarchic with Russia still holding a regional mandate despite the US’s penetration of the region. Thus the order-altering perception was one of sovereignty non-interference, at least from the point that Russia did not intervene inside Central Asian conflicts.

4.4. 2001-Present: From 9/11 to the Human Rights Critique and Negarchy’s rise

4.4.1. The evolution of Central Asian terrorism and the anarchy-interdependence problematique

The IMU provided the Taliban with recruits for fighting the West-supported Northern Alliance. In 2001, Taliban authorities appointed Namangani as head of an Islamic Foreign Legion that included Pakistanis, Turks, Uighurs and Uzbeks (Satybekov, 2003; Weitz 2004:507). In June 2001, the IMU changed its name, to the Islamic Party of Turkestan in order to become more inclusive with Xinjiang, China province in their goal to establish their Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia (Pannier, 2001; Weitz 2004:506). In August 2002, an Uzbek born IMU member was captured by Pakistani authorities and revealed that the IMU has reached northwards towards Dagestan, Russia, aiding Chechen rebels. An investigation also revealed that the bombs that were exploded in Tashkent were the same type employed by Chechen terrorists in Russia (Koichev, 2001). In October 2002, it was also reported that in addition to the Tavildara Valley, the IMU gathered support in the Karategin Valley of Tajikistan. Karategin was another stronghold for Muslim opposition forces during the Tajik Civil War and also the site of a mass exodus of Uzbeks following the religious crack-down after the Tashkent bombings (Rotar, 2012). It was also in 2002 that the IMU came into contact with Hizb ut-Tahrir (Weitz, 2004:506). By 2004 it was determined by Kyrgyz intelligence officials that the IMU and the HT had exchanged literature and both benefitted from drug trafficking (Hallisey, 2004; Karagiannis 2005:140-143).
Intensification of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s activities occurred after 2000 in Northern Tajikistan and Southern Kyrgyzstan (Cornell & Spector, 2002:200). In 2001 there was a noticeable upsurge in religious literature confiscated in Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken, Kyrgyzstan with a reported 2000-3000 members (ICG, 2003:37). There are more HT supporters in Kyrgyzstan than Uzbekistan. In 2003, HT activists were detained in Tajikistan’s Sughd Oblast along with printing and computing facilities that were determined to come from foreign support (Wishnick, 2004:17). Tajikistan feared that HT’s reach was spreading southward. Following the US’s 2003 invasion of Iraq; HT leaflets advocating war against the US were found in Kazakhstan’s south Shymkent oblast, and the Chui, Issyk-Kul and Talas regions of north Kyrgyzstan. (Ibid 19). At one time confined to the Ferghana Valley; after 2003, HT geographically expanded. HT-related arrests were also confirmed in northern Kazakhstan, the Bishkek area of Kyrgyzstan and Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan (Baran, 2005:46). These trends signal a change from HT’s previously Uzbek dominated strategy. None of the new areas have a significant Uzbek minority nor do any of these new territories border Uzbekistan (Baran, 2005). The 2004 arrests in Tajikistan even included homogenously Tajik parts of the country, such as Kulyab (Matveeva, 2005:144).

The transnational HT also operates under a sub-state strategy of exploiting group-tensions. HT then uses marginalized ethnies to create cohesion amongst these mulitple sub-state actors to become intimidating enough to be viewed as an existential threat to the state. This recruitment tactic results in a security-dilemma created at the intra-state level rather than the conventional inter-state level (Posen, 1993). Hotspots for HT activity within Ferghana Valley include: Andijan and Ferghana province in Uzbekistan; Sughd province, Tajikistan; Osh, Batken and Jalal-Abad province, Kyrgyzstan (ICG, 2003:18).

However, HT failed to capitalize on the political opportunity afforded dby Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 Tulip Revolution (Mihalka, 2006). For the 2000s, the risk heightens when considering that China has its own worries with more extremist bands of Uyghurs vying for a return to “Greater Turkestan” in its Xinjiang province as well as Russia and separatist movements in the Northern Caucasus. Much like the mission towards a Caliphate, the Greater Turkestan conception also jeopardizes other states’ territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The combination of Central Asian terrorists in utilizing drug routes, enclaves as recruiting points, and utilizing connections in the greater Muslim world including supranational fundamentalists and sub-state separatists; means that non-state actors have taken advantage of the full-array of trans-border geography by sheer physical movement. It is notable that while Hizb ut-Tahrir and the IMU have communicated and share the same resources; their support groups and strategies differ. While Hizb ut-Tahrir are the champions of civilian grievances within Central Asia and privileging the sub-state dimension, the IMU operates on a very material network with other religious extremists but their allies also appear to be secessionists. The IMU managed to create greater insecurity by prompting counter-terror interventions from states against each other’s territorial boundaries. Thus plunging the region into a first-order anarchy where both regimes and territories are under threat by both their neighbors and these new mobile terrorist groups. An organization must form to alleviate the new intrusive risks provided by the states themselves as well as the risk of a direct attack by malevolent non-state actors.

The consequences of the above events indicate that in Republican Security Theory: the fall from tolerable second-anarchies to first-anarchies, while exacerbated by malevolent state-interactions, does not have to be prompted solely by a state’s technological resources. Rather, the
genesis of first-order anarchies can be found outside of state-structures with states responding reactively. This does not make first-order anarchies inevitable between states when a transnational threat rears its ugly head. Whether the first-anarchy, and subsequently the anarchy-interdependence problematique, develops depends on which path states choose to respond: terrorism as a domestic crime or as a multi-territorial war. Yet, it is the condition that non-state threats have become territorially unbounded which makes the “war response” more likely. With no effective organization to combat these threats while maintain order between members, and with no organization that can maintain faith amongst its members that they will not be dominated (the hierarchy-restraint problematique), state interaction will most likely fall into an anarchy-interdependence problematique generated by the first-order anarchy that developed previously.

Central Asia’s threat-reaction-dynamic highlights how perceptions of enemies can be non-technological and social. The above section shows how violence-interdependence in the Post-Cold War era has become “networked” rather than a simple game of “tit-for-tat” between states. In the old Republican Security Theory, technology’s domination of geography has been supplemented by complex social linkages.

Terrorist locations not only dictate the location and securitzation of threat but also draw other powers so they themselves can be situated inside the regional sphere. Choice between alliances for Central Asian states becomes a function of ally presence and the mandates they take with them when fighting terrorism. Below, a descriptive account shows the evolution of a threat perception on terror and preponderance. While the previous section focused on how geographic movements of non-state threats impact Central Asian inter-state relations, this next account highlights how the changing perception of a threat is constituted by interactions with Great Powers. The US’s recent activism in the region solidifies Russia’s relation as a lesser power in the eyes of middle-states and makes these erratic discourses possible. In this way, US presence and its willingness to co-opt states holds a great risk because it intrudes on another power’s (Russia’s) sphere.

The anarchy-interdependence problematique thus displays itself as a horizontal binding instrument for middle, great, and super powers alike in Eurasia. The threats that necessitate binding can come from below and above the organization. Below the level of the organization there may be sub-state actors which exploit issues of regime legitimacy by acts of terror on the states. Above the level of the organization, in the region or global level, there may be residual fears of extra-regional powers disrupting cooperative aims. In this way, the anarchy-interdependence and hierarchy-restraint problematique has come to fruition in its existence to merge into a negarchical precept. This finally makes the SCO ripe for resilience.

4.4.2. The US and the hierarchy-restraint problematique in Eurasia

It wasn’t until this last chronological stage that a consciousness of a Global Order with a Global actor and Global as well as sub-state mobile threats became paramount for the Central Asian Republics. This held interesting consequences for member perceptions at the organizational level of the SCO in the context of threats. A systemic level of order had to be taken into account that wasn’t there previously as threat movements had crossed borders. Furthermore, the regional security complex overlapped with the global security complex in the War on Terror and experienced overlay with the US with the introduction of for-ward military bases. More active penetration and participation has also been observed by China, which is officially part of the Russian-centered Eurasian complex, through increased contributions to the SCO’s Peace Mission military exercises.
Initially after 2001, it would appear that the security market that arose in the mid-1990s matured greatly under a uniting threat of global terrorism. All of this changed in 2002 with the strengthening of military ties in the region through a still Russian dominated but newly established CSTO. Strengthening of relations in the region also occurred with the growth of the Shanghai Five to include the difficult state Uzbekistan. The catalyst of this change was more active participation by the US when they launched Operation Enduring Freedom and a forward basing strategy following Operation Iraqi Freedom. The second hierarchy-problematic arose after 9/11, through the emergence of a consciousness of global US hierarchy. This was set in motion even before Liberal critique come into the fora. The aggressive basing strategy of the US brought a dramatic ~78% increase in military aid to the client states, after 9/11 (see Figure. 5) Uzbekistan was the largest recipient, going from $9.1M to $50.7M. This demonstrated a globally rooted hierarchy inside Eurasia with the ability to compete with Russia’s security provision.

Full Central Asian bandwagoning with Russia and China was dependent on the presence of two factors: the occurrence of the colored revolutions and the timing of the human rights critique. Both allegedly had Western roots (Caruthers, 2006). Despite the military aid and common focus on Global Terror, after 2005, the US played the role of an extraterritorial-regional threat via colored revolutions and the military forward-basing for Iraq and OEF-Afghanistan. Active liberal critique, democratic contagion, the disturbing discourse of regime-change and military might, created the perception of a greater globally-based Hierarchy-problematic i.e. encroaching liberal empire. The security environment looked very different from the 1990s. Firstly, the wave of colored revolutions in neighboring sub-complexes of Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in has made the legitimacy of autocratic governments –aka. regime security-- in Central Asia more insecure. Contagion of regime failure is a particular problem. Secondly, the US campaign in Afghanistan has made the US more embedded in the greater Regional sphere with its attempts to hold on to the air bases in both Uzbekistan (The K2 airbase), Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (Manas air base).
Many Central Asian states opposed US involvement in Iraq, save for Uzbekistan. The fear was that if they would cooperate with the US, Islamic tensions would worsen in the region. Kazakhstan in particular was worried that Iraqi oil would flood their markets while others worried that stray missiles and rogue aircraft would put their countries at risk (Wishnick, 2004: 14). The particular threat emanating from an Iraqi invasion were internalized as fears amounted to both regime change inside their territories as well as externalized in the form of what the US would bring to the region.

Autonomy-Contestation existed because if the states would hypothetically ally with a globally-mandated US, any solution towards the threat of Radical Islam against their own regimes runs the risk of forced cooperation in a conflict not of their own choosing. This amounts literally to a perception of US contestation of their own autonomy in foreign affairs. This was displayed by Kyrgyzstan’s concerns in March 24, 2003 when Kyrgyz parliament issued a statement calling US intervention in Iraq a violation of International Law. Specific worries included fears of being dragged into the conflict unwillingly if planes from Manas airbase were sent to Iraq (Wishnick, 2004: 15).

Sovereign Non-interference would have necessarily existed in the case of Russia as a regionally-mandated partner. Both Russia and the Central Asian Republics viewed an externally-rooted/extra-regional US as a possible threat to stability with its Iraq- adventurism. Russian priorities would thusly be concentrated elsewhere, i.e. American presence, rather than on control of their “Near Abroad”. Sure enough, after the US’s regime-change subtext came to fruition in the 2003 Iraq invasion, Eurasia experienced a growth in both non-Russian bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation. In 2003 a series of deals between the arms and defense industries of Moscow and Tashkent were concluded, substantially strengthening military ties (Berman, 2004:65). In October of that year, the Russian air force opened up a new base at Kant, Kyrgyzstan. A mere 30 km from the US Manas airbase (Weitz, 2004:517). For Kazakhstan, a Joint-Action Plan for security cooperation was made with Russia on January 2004 which outlined roles in both the CIS and the SCO (Berman, 2004:65). All CIS members were also given the opportunity to purchase Russian weapons at domestic prices in 2004, as well (Wishnick, 2004: 22). On May 14th 2004, signatories of the CIS’s Common Security Treaty signed a new charter for further military integration by creating the CSTO, modeled after NATO. However, Uzbekistan was noticeably absent from the CSTO. A month later, the SCO opens the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS)in Tashkent on June 2004. This was also roughly the same time that Russia was able to have Uzbekistan sign a Strategic Partnership (Tolipov, 2006:163), despite Uzbekistan having signed a similar agreement with the US in 2002.

But it would take a larger exogenous shock for Uzbekistan to fully commit to solely Russian-led multilateralism and organizations. That exogenous shock, was the US’s condemnation of Karimov’s conduct during the Andijan protests of 2005. This falls under the second catalyst for Negarchy creation: colored revolutions and fear of direct regime change facilitated by the US human rights/governance critique. Essentially between the US and Uzbekistan, there were conflicting views on how to react to terrorism when terrorists reach a partner’s domestic domain. This illustrates an unaddressed discourse on governance coming to light once Karimov reverted back to viewing terrorism as a crime and a threat to the regime, punishing Islamists/opponents accordingly. The US-Uzbek alliance was prone to instability once the extra-territorial paradigm of the threat was transformed back into its internalized manifestation as a threat to regimes rather than just a threat to territory. In Andijan this discursive change was facilitated when the IMU/Hizb-ut-Tahrir infiltrated Uzbek civil society. They served as a regime-destabilizing force by organizing
protests supporting 23 businessmen being tried for extremism (OSCE, 2005). The securitization linkage to oppositional groups reappeared but through forced closure of human rights INGOs such as IREX, Freedom House, RFE/RL, and UNHCR (Human Rights Watch 2006). The main discourse of the War on Terror provided a false sense of security, as it was only a matter of time before the IMU would reach Uzbekistan once again and the US would have to construct a counter-identity based on Karimov’s reactions to the threat.

Note that in the pre-Andijan public exchanges there was a constant language use of “war” with terrorism. Bush’s September 20th speech was littered with declarations for pre-emptive actions (Washington Post, 2001), actions similar to how Karimov behaved towards Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan during Batken. The initial US-Uzbek alliance was thus firmly cemented in the idea of terror as a territorial enemy to be defeated. The graveness of the War on Terror circumvented considerations on human rights and governance. But Post-Andijan, the US now played the role of transnational extraterritorial/regional threat—via coloured revolutions and the action of Iraq and OEF. This made the identity grouping of the SCO as the “sovereign democracy” bloc appealing under times of perceived crisis (Kagan, 2008). Acknowledgement of terrorism as a regional problem provided an “othering” identity for Uzbekistan and Russia to build a common platform. This same “other” was now projected to the image of the West and their critique on the use of non-democratic measures to protect regimes against internally-located terror, or regime threats. Similar US charges had already been encountered with Russia’s human rights record on the War in Chechnya (CNN, 1999).

Nothing was felt more loudly in regards to this conversion of Eurasian policies than the 2005 SCO summit in Astana where the SCO states, including Uzbekistan, collectively demanded a timeline for US withdrawal from their bases. Uzbekistan noticeably changed its tune in 2005. In November 2005, the US vacates the Kharsi-Khanabad/K2 airbase in Uzbekistan amidst Uzbek pressure. That same month, Uzbekistan signs an Alliance Treaty with Russia. Four years later in February 19th 2009, Kyrgyz parliament passes a bill evicting the US out of Manas airbase. The eviction notice was delivered a day later.

Although the US may present itself as “meddling” in regime affairs with accusations that Western NGOs ignited the colored revolutions and the observations of the aftermath of the Iraq-invasion, the US still looms in the background as a check for the future. The geopolitical proximity of Central Asia to Afghanistan, China and the SCO observer states of India and Pakistan would hold Central Asia in US interests for many years to come. This new systemic global consciousness of the region’s importance in world affairs creates a perception of Hierarchy, with the US as being more economically and militarily capable than Russia in providing for the Central Asian Republics.

4.4.3. Organizational negarchy and achieving vivere sicuro

The case of Eurasia and the SCO and global-level overlay illuminates the nestedness of a complex which can still operate in opposition to an overlay. On the systemic level, when looked through the lens of the Global War on Terror, overlay appears to have occurred with the US (and in earlier respects, NATO) entering the region with the sanctioning of Kyrgyz and Uzbek bases for US use and Uzbekistan’s strong US alliance. But this was only temporary and appeared to have halted and reversed with the coming of the Colored Revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia. This would point towards the resurgence of suspicious Central Asian Republics at the organizational level. These threats may point to the edge-wise development of a second-anarchy that was
prompted by non-state and sub-state actors. By targeting the integrity of the state itself, suspicions rose of what this kind of “contagion” would mean between states. A later colored revolution also occurred in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, known as the “Tulip Revolution” and another revolution with a new government formation occurred in 2010. However, this did not appear to affect the health of the SCO.

For the Organizational level of the SCO, since they excluded the US it would not be an example of overlay. It may be an example of penetration by China if not for one important difference. While penetration occurs in the context of the Balance of Power (Buzan & Waever, 2003:46), the inclusion of China in the affairs of Eurasia started with a confidence-building measure between Russia and China with border talks dating back to the 1980s; not an act of balance against the US nor an act of Bandwagoning by the Central Asian Republics with China. The Russian-Chinese relationship was only later joined by the Central Asian Republics in the establishment of the Shanghai Five in 1996 and later institutionalized into the SCO in 2001. The Shanghai Five’s first summit was a dialogue on how Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could enhance security in their mutual borders by agreeing not to engage in any offensive activities. Such agreements included not conducting military exercises against the other, invite each other to any planned military exercises, the prevention of dangerous military activity in the border area, friendly exchange between military forces and border patrol forces, and the lessening of the scale and level of military exercises on the borders (Jiao, 2012).

This poses a threat to Russia which may have used this opportunity to strengthen ties with the extra-regional power: China. The regional context changed from the 1990s in being centered and hegemonic via Russia, into a more multipolar and anarchic. However, the regional context was more stable than the experience of the “Regionalism Revolution” once all of the Central Asian Republics was fully committed to the bargain. However, the strengthening of friendship between the two great powers of different spheres provides a detriment for Russia. But it is also an opportunity for the Central Asian Republics to safely assume that the tension between Russia and China’s dominion in the SCO could balance out any future thoughts of hegemony. This leads to a layering of internal balances in the regional sphere signaling an outline from which organizational negarchy can emerge.

The collusion of the two great powers and the Central Asian states was part of a long process which culminated in the two dangers of the hierarchy problematique and anarchy problematique in the regional security environment. The resurgence of Russia from organizational anarchy started Central Asian bilateralism, made possible by the conditions of the Global War on Terror. The War on Terror gave Russia the ability to run an anti-terrorism agenda in parallel with the US. Accelerated Chinese rapprochement may not have been necessary if not for the anarchy-problematique forming from the rise of radical Islam and the contingent effects of enclaves of Central Asian ethnicities inside other states. Enclaves and the mobility of the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir created a border crisis of mobile threats. Radical Islam also created inter-state tensions as countries scrambled to secure their borders or influence each other’s domestic decision making. Tensions were manifested by draconian economic tariffs, or in the case of Uzbekistan, their non-Russian military interventions.

The hierarchy-problematique was also present in the Post-9/11 period prior to negarchical construction. The most current hierarchy-problematique was a product of allegations laid by Eurasian states on Western NGO involvement in the colored revolutions, along with the human
rights critique brought by the US. The human rights critique was viewed as particularly dangerous to Central Asian regimes due to the threat of global hierarchy originating from US overlay. Overlay was materially prevalent by active choice. The US’s foreign policy choice formed a Global Mandate supported by its active forward-basing strategy and military bilateralism. Central Asian-US bilateralism was made possible by the earlier condition of regional anarchy that was in production since the mid-90s.

Keep in mind that apart from the Post-9/11 hierarchy-restraint problematique, recent history also contained the earlier 1990s hierarchy-restraint problematique of Russian dominance in the CIS centred collective security organizations. The choice of balancing between two domineering powers, the US and Russia, was ideally escaped by cooperation with a third-party, China. Cooperation with another external power was desirable even if the third party was in active cooperation with Russia due to the organizational make-up of the SCO. Thusly, the production of negarchy at the organizational level was preceded by hierarchy-restraint problematiques of past and future dominance by a great/super power and an anarchy-interdependence problematique brought by mobile Islamists.

In Republican Security Theory there are mechanisms to resist the disruption of the regional order. States, when knowing that their individual interests are under threat by a superpower, will band together to protect their order. This came in the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) after the joining of Uzbekistan to the Shanghai Five.

In Eurasia knowing of the risks of placing themselves under a regional hegemon as protection against the global hegemon, Central Asian states may be more open-minded about the prospect of cooperation if regional organizations had binding instruments. Balancing would be provided by another power to check the powers of Russia if there are still lingering fears of regional hegemony. China voluntarily penetrated the regional sphere into the Shanghai Five framework in 1995 (a precursor to the SCO). This was in mutual acceptance of Central Asian states recognizing the need for border controls around China from bilateral deals dating back to the late 1980s. The order of the region began to take an overlapping character in 2001 including states outside of the Eurasian regional sphere with the creation of the SCO. Some of this was due to providing a competitive arrangement apart from the US’s increase in economic and military aide in Eurasia.

Rather than reproducing a hegemonic hierarchy, the SCO had the added benefit of a powerful partner, China. Embedded within the organization, China can bind and counteract fears of a return to Russian regional hegemony and the hierarchy problematique for middle-powers. Likewise, Central Asian states see the utility in Russia’s involvement the SCO as a counterbalance to fears of Chinese expansionism and crowding of regional markets (Giustozzi and Matveeva, 2008). Thus Central Asian states materially balance themselves between the great powers of Russia and China inside the SCO. Much like a domestic state-like co-binding structure, Russia and China are able to channel their balancing with differentiated roles between them. Russia’s aims with the SCO are mainly diplomatic and political, Reserving its main military and defense objectives for its expanded CSTO. China sees the SCO as instrumental in restraining the forces of Uighur separatism in its Xinjiang province, as well as providing energy and economic trade to further develop in the Northwest (Xing, 2001). In this regard it views the security of the Central Asian states and their ability ban Islamist activity on their own soil, important for preventing extremist structures from taking route in Xinjiang (Laumulin, 2006: 10). In return, China offers the Central Asian states economic aide. This includes the training of 15,000 troops from Central Asia and $900m in export
credit in 2005 that could be paid back in 20 years (Plater-Zyberk, 2007: 5). Since 2006, China’s main focus started shifting more towards using the SCO as a vehicle for regional economic development (Huang 2006). Below the Chinese and Russian restraining relationships, the smaller Central Asian states balance against each other, mostly against Uzbekistan who in turn attempts to balance against Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, all members are united under the banner of combating “the three evils” of terrorism, separatism and extremism; a strong central state, and a policy of non-interference in internal affairs (Giustozzi and Matveeva, 2008: 10).

This is in contrast to purely Russian-centric integration efforts through the CIS. Although it displays the ability to capture and merge the Central Asian states into larger integration efforts by absorbing their structures, memberships are not consistent. The CIS itself lost Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan initially in 1997. Even in its CSTO incarnation, Uzbekistan surprised many when they withdraw in 2012 after having petitioned to join in 2006 alongside its other Russian rapprochements during that time. Later CIS integration efforts have proven equally weakly-institutionalized, with an inability to achieve stated goals e.g. the Eurasian Economic Union. Although they are numerous in numbers and ambitious, they are often short in duration (Sushko, 2004).

Durability from the security space of the SCO can be conceived to operate on a system of checks and balances since the 2000s. This provided ripe space for the Shanghai Five to evolve institutionally and co-opt Uzbekistan. The external environment may also explain the cooperative success of the CSTO. The mixture of an American-made Hierarchy at the Global perceptive level and the multipolar anarchic configuration at the Regional level produces a solution to cooperation at the SCO’s organizational playing field. This solves the Hierarchy Problematique. The solution of the Hierarchy Problematique via layered power-balancing is but one of two conditions towards the emergence of a Negarchy and a precursor for sustained Republican formation. The other condition relies on the amelioration of the anarchy-problematic. This particular problematic was created by the first-order anarchy of radical Islam and the numerous unilateral mining of borders and artillery strikes caused by the anxiety from this. The creation of security institutions to combat transmobile threats, plus the particularity of the SCO in balancing and protecting against external and internal regional powers resulted in the emergence of organizational negarchy.

4.5. Conclusions on Eurasia: The SCO as a simple co-binding organization in negarchy

Threat has become truly mobile. They can become incentives for other states to intervene in each other’s affairs. Based on this study, the internalization of threats produced conflict due to the insecurity of authoritarian-regimes in having interlopers. On the other hand, externalization diverts attention away from the regime towards other states in fighting terror. This produces a contestation/non-interference discourse. This also shows how a tolerable second-anarchy in Republican Security Theory can devolve into a first-anarchy very rapidly. The flexibility of terrorism as a threat greatly complicates state interactions and what states can expect from each other. Suspicions would likely grow until they take cover under a Republican formation that can guarantee restraints and safety, as balancing logics go into free-fall. Furthermore, regime paranoia can twist a one-time ally into a vertical threat that needs protection from the lower levels of Russian-Chinese organizational protection.
In the context of analyzing the causes of institutional resilience in the SCO, we must be reminded of the definition of resilience. Resilience is the ability of an organization to maintain its membership, functions, essentially its’ equilibrium in the face of exogenous shocks, i.e. changes in the environment outside of the institution. The two sources of exogenous shocks in Eurasian orgs include the introduction of extra-regional powers, i.e. the US, and the accelerated spread of intra-regional mobile threats. A graphic account of the orders and moves can be seen below:

Figure 6. Eurasia’s ordering principles and order-altering perceptions

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The macrostructure from the beginning of the 1990s towards the end of the first decade of the 21st century exhibit considerable change. Prior to US activism and regional overlay practiced Post-September 11, 2001; Eurasia operated as a self-contained regional unit or Security Complex. This omits the global dimension for the first two time periods, restricting this analysis on orders to the regional and organizational levels. The early to mid-1990s saw the presence of a regional order based on hierarchy supported by the sole collective security guarantor, the CIS. The CIS, being Russian-dominated as evidenced by its behavior in various peacekeeping exercises, represented a hierarchical order that also dominated the organizational level.

From the mid-90s to the 2000s we saw the creation of a “security market” emerging from Eurasia. US foreign policy from the Clinton administration started focusing more on post-soviet states while NATO continued with its Partnership for Peace exercises. While it fell short of overlay, this penetration altered the regional order to a power-configuration that appeared more anarchic with variety of choice for new non-Russian alignments. This has emboldened post-soviet states to form their own organizations such as GUAM and the CAU, the CIS and the new Shanghai Five lurking in the background. These new orgs, with no clear hegemon and paired with their dependence on bilateral relations with outside powers (GUAM and the US, the CAU and Russia), represented an anarchic configuration on the organizational level.

As a caveat, despite the anarchical orders, the sorts of anarchy at both the regional and organizational level were arguably tolerable second-anarchies. One of the shocks to the state-social systems in Post-9/11 Eurasia occurred with the radicalization and heightened mobility of non-state threats. The other shock came with the sudden American bargaining of bases on Central Asian soil, increased development funding with tenuous links to colored revolutions, and . While we can observe that the new Global level exhibited at least the perception of a hierarchy, both in norms and materiality via the US’s new overlay policies. What also occurred was the development and introduction of the two problematiques that predicate the need for Republican-organizational
forms. In Section 3, the route to problematique development was introduced through the medium of territorial threat flows and the perception of an extra-regional partnership for a different kind of violence-interdependency. This is contrary to conventional Republican Security Theory’s technology-based and state-directed emphasis on violence-interdependence.

Two types of perceptions were simultaneously present for middle-powers by the mid-2000s. These include Autonomy-Contestation and Sovereignty-Non-interference. The Autonomy-Contestation perception is a product of the change in tune of US foreign policy in critiquing and advocating a more hardline approach to regime and governance issues. The US in this case is a threat that has been internalized within the boundaries of the state. Contrast this with the sovereignty non-interference perception when the threats of the IMU (and the continuous strategy of HT) has become unbounded from issues of governance in their regional jihad strategy and at the same time became territorially mobile. This shifted itself away prioritization from any Regional threat Russia would possess and thus become a more amicable partner within the SCO – and with reservations – the CSTO. Furthermore, the Autonomy-Contestation perception mirrors the emergence of the macro-process perception of a Global Hierarchical order.

If the mid-90s represented a fall into anarchism in the regional level from a hegemonic post-soviet CIS, the 2000s, presented a long process of reconsolidation. It presented the solution of the anarchy and hierarchy-problematique. The first problematique was addressed under a greater emphasis for diplomatic and military cooperation under both the SCO and CSTO. The second problematique’s solution was a product of nested balancing starting with countering US’s liberal overlay with the CSTO alternative, while restraining Russian regional hegemonic tendencies with the SCO. The SCO can be a precursor to a model co-binding organization with potential for greater institutionalism and connectedness, nestled inside a negarchical order.
The organizations that will be our focus in this chapter are: The Organization of American States (OAS), the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), MERCOSUR, Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the South American Defense Council (SADC). The three time periods under investigation are the periods 1990-1998, 1998-2008, and 2008-n. These time periods represent the creation and acceleration of MERCOSUR, the rise of the Pink Tide and the creation of UNASUR and the SADC. Threats that would be explored include the extra-regional penetration (but not overlay) of the US into South America via the OAS, the transnational and domestic threats of coca and poppy cultivation and narco-trafficking, neoliberal economic policy and border disputes.

While MERCOSUR may have stagnated over the course of the 1990s, in the late 2000s, UNASUR and the South American Defense Council had sprung from the rash of the Pink Tide in the late 1990s. Nation-building, development and democracy appears to be usurped by populist reactions to a new hegemony (the US), fear of contagion of transnational threats and new calls of collective security from a maturing of states.

In our South America case study, we completed the first aim of our thesis by questioning the importance of the Brazil-Argentina nexus in neorealist thought for explaining the under-conflictual nature of South America (Malamud & Gardini, 2012; Mares, 1997:210). We also throw doubt towards neoliberal institutionalism’s exultation of The Southern Cone Market (MERCOSUR). The early success of MERCOSUR has corroborated some theorists’ belief of a superiorly under-conflictual Southern Cone sub-region (Oelsner, 2006; Powers & Goertz, 2011; Steves, 2010). We challenge this neoliberal example by highlighting MERCOSUR’s slowdown in the 2000s correlated with the foundation of UNASUR (Carranza, 2006; Gardini, 2011; Sanahuja, 2012). UNASUR’s overlapping membership of MERCOSUR and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) places further doubt on the fragmented sub-region thesis made by other scholars on why regional security governance hasn’t emerged (Hurrell, 1998: 228; Philips, 2001). We argue in this chapter that regional security governance has emerged, but it’s

When we trace the security processes preceding UNASUR’s foundation we go towards completing the second task in our thesis--to forge a new theory that explains organizational resilience. UNASUR is placed on the lowest end of the organizational resilience and negarchic-formation continuum relative to Europe’s EU and Eurasia’s SCO. We describe it as being a nascent negarchical co-binding organization without negarchy actually being present in the environment. Although UNASUR has n negarchic and confederate characteristics in it structure, the security environment is not negarchic even on the lowest organizational-level of inter-state interaction.

In our completed third thesis aim of investigating if negarchy is present in the world, we found that Europe and Eurasia possess negarchy in their late-stages but South America did not produced negarchy in any of its time periods. Due to this lack of negarchy in the South American
case, it was not feasible to continue onto the next task of pairing a detected negarchy with co-binding structures to indicate resilience levels.

To answer our research question, *What does the conceptual system of Republican Security Theory give us in terms of analysis of cooperation patterns in security organizations?*, we will show through our modified RST, that South America has the potential of creating a republican confederation. The ingredients of negarchy; hierarchy-restraint problematique and the anarchy-interdependence problematique are both present in the post-cold war security environment. But crucially, the sequencing of the development of these hierarchies are broken and their paths diverged during the mid-stage.

The chapter is divided into five main sections. The [1] first section is a literature review on international relations theory and South America and plus an exposition of RST. The next three sections are investigations of time periods in South American history used to illustrate the main arguments [2] 1990-1997 the US and the War on Drugs’ contributions to the hierarchy-restraint problematique and the anarchy-interdependence problematique [3] 1998-2008 The Pink Tide governments and the change from problematiques to anarchies which broke negarchical development [4] and 2008-present the absence of negarchy and the return of the anarchy-interdependence problematique at the inter-state level. Finally our conclusion section [5] traces these processes to conclude that there was no consistent path of the problematiques, thanks to perceptions made after autonomy-contestation, to create negarchy in the environment in the late-stage.

5.1 Theories of Cooperation in South America and an RST Reading

5.1.2. Theories of Cooperation in South America

The conflict matrix of South America spans both regional and domestic levels. The region has experienced threatened uses of force and military intervention by outside or extra-regional powers. Between each other, South American countries had long-standing militarized border disputes. States in the region have their own domestic concerns with long periods of authoritarian rule, high levels of political instability and domestic violence.

(Neo)Realist explanations for the lack of large-scale war in South America include materialist and geopolitical arguments as well as the benefits of the UK, and then the US, in a “policing role”. The former is typical of a balance-of-power type of system. The literature predominantly focuses on the balance-of-power between Brazil, Argentina and Chile (Buzan, 2003; Hurrell, 1998). A classic anarchic regional system. Supplementing balances of power are conflict-restraining material factors such as: absence of transport links, borders that are geographically removed from centers of economic and political activity and unsuitable military technologies for wars of conquest (Hurrell, 1998: 228). In comparison, the latter realist arguments of a policing-role of an extra-regional power describes a structural hierarchy in a hotbed of anarchy. Yet the grouping together of extra-regional power roles and the geopolitical isolation from extra-regional influences in realist literature is contradictory when taken as a whole. While it would be true that other powers in Europe and Asia may be unable to intervene easily by basis of geography, North American intervention could still be seen as a threat. The dichotomy of
interpretations in the materials that enable cooperation between South American states and a hegemonic power on one hand, and the cooperation of South American states with each other on the other hand, creates a very fragmented realist narrative.

The benevolence or positive influence of the US is strongly disputed such as involvement in the War on Drugs and the School of the Americas (Livingstone, 2009). While the US is deemed an insurance of regional stability, several US policies run contrary to the internal conflict dynamics defining South America. A shifting of geopolitical goalposts and a shifting of actor identification would be necessary to explain the surge of security cooperation in the 1990s while reconciling the contradiction of isolation and domination by outside powers.

Brazil and Argentina, whom were rivals since the days of the Spanish and Portuguese conflicts over territory in the 1820s have cooperated over several modern organizational ventures such as MERCOSUR and UNASUR. Examining Brazil-Argentina rivalries also dismisses claims of shared values, language and culture as an explanation of South American cooperation via Brazil’s Portuguese influence, racially distinct population, and that it was established as a monarchy in a sea of republics (Hurrell, 1998: 231).

Neorealist factors are present which are important for the the start of cooperation but they are not sufficient in explaining changed foreign policy trajectories that concern group or security policy sphere identity changes. The easing of tensions from 1975 to 1985 were focused on the change in relations between the strategic triangles of Argentina-Chile-Brazil and Argentina-Brazil-USA (Hurrell 236). Of particular interest to neorealist theorists was the shift in relations between Brazil and the US during the Carter Administration. Security threats that were being mediated were border disputes, the proliferation of nuclear technology and possible military encroachment by Brazil. Post-1980s, it was acknowledged that the nature of threats have changed from the Brazil-Argentina security dilemma to concerns that guerrilla activities may seep down from the Andean region, subversion from the Caribbean region, countering narco-trafficking and controlling disorderly economic development from the Amazonian basin (Hurrell 243). Competing models of democratization and the question of mediating civil-military relations was also a more recent threat of the 1990s between Brazil and Argentina. Yet, Neorealist variables that would have contributed to a security dilemma has peculiarly not spiraled out of control.

Neoliberal explanations for “regime demand” run into a sequential problem in the regional case of Latin America. The creation treaties were done in response to declining regional interdependence. In November 1985, the Argentine and Brazilian presidents signed an agreement on nuclear issues, energy cooperation and a commission to examine prospects for economic cooperation (de Camargo, 1986). The latter points of the negotiation resulted in a free-trade area being constructed within 10 years via the 1986 Integration Act, Economic Integration and Integration Program (PICE), the Treaty of Integration and Cooperation in 1988 and the Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development of 1989. Rather than fostering cooperation as the main agents of change, Brazil-Argentine regimes and institutions successes were products of earlier attempts of rapprochemen.
On the more salient Political Economy front of neoliberal institutionalism, scholars still point to MERCOSUR as an example of a highly institutionalized success story. However, MERCOSUR had been in decline from the early 2000s (Covarrubias & Dominguez, 2014). Integration theories and Vulnerable Integration models have tried to transfer lessons from Europe into Latin America. However, the former was used specifically to explain the European Communities. Historically, Latin America did not face the same conflictual history as Europe prior to the 1950s. Even before MERCOSUR’s existence, interstate war was improbable. Cason’s analysis of MERCOSUR puts forward the Vulnerable Integration Model (Cason, 2011). Vulnerable integration, states that states with undeveloped domestic institutions are more vulnerable to exogenous shocks from the global economy. This would create weak regional organizations because the need to manage decisions and domestic economies must be made during the establishment of the organizations. Domestic decisions made at the time of origin influence decisions to regress or expand in the future. This would explain the need for regional organizations and why MERCOSUR is “weaker” than the European Union, but not why MERCOSUR was so strong during the 1990s but not in 2000. In terms of pivotal eras, what we can determine is that the late 1990s and early 2000s exhibit a wave of change both in integration, extra-regional foreign policies and economic cooperative directions. The link between future of security and the future of economy must thus be examined.

Buzan has also noted the under-conflictual nature of South American regional politics. There are sub-complexes of security within South America: The Andean North subcomplex containing Peru, Ecuador, Columbia, Venezuela and Guyana; and the Southern Cone subcomplex. There is also a separation between a North American security sphere and a South American security sphere, yet the US has time and time again dominated economic policy as the region’s largest trading partner. Weak state development in the region as a whole contributes to the mobility and rise of non-state malignant actors. These forces gain supporters from both the indigenous and the poor, especially in coca farming, making economic development tied to security and unit-level governance. Security scholars note that there are two divergent paths that the South American sub-complexes to take. For the Andean North, it’s the progress of the War on Drugs. In the Southern Cone, it would be the future of cooperation via MERCOSUR (Buzan, 2003).

The emphasis of Brazil and Argentina as powers does not into take into account that non-traditional security threats rather than state-actors hold more of a proportionate influence on the development of regional security cooperation. Conflict dyads and triangles have not managed to be permanent and often times were created to balance against other emergent dyads and triangles between states (Buzan, 2003:316). Important ones include: Chile’s conflict with Argentina or bipolarity in the Southern Cone, Chile’s prevention of a Peru-Bolivia-Argentina axis, Argentina’s fear of a Brazil-Chile alliance and Peru’s worry of going into conflict with either Ecuador or Chile (Mares, 1997: 210). Yet Buzan notes that the strongest South American alliances of Brazil-Chile and Argentina-Peru, have not solidified into strong European style alliances or bipolarity due to many conflicts and cross-cutting interests (Buzan, 2003: 344).

The Northern Andean region has progressed differently, with conceptually different actors on its quest for peace than its Southern Cone neighbors (Buzan, 2003: 360). The War on Drugs in
Columbia has brought the US into the region for interventions for the sake of counter-terrorism/counter-narcotics. It has created functional links with Panama in harboring non-state violent actors, and the “balloon effect” where suppression of production in one country leads to production in another in terms of coca growing. The balloon effect had threats seeping into Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela (Faoila, 2002). The War on Drugs has also become intermingled with the longest civil war in the region, la violencia. The conflict patterns of the North thus exhibit violence at all levels, increased external interventions by the US, and a weakening of the domestic system in the states. By contrast, the Southern Cone is characterized by de-territorialization and integration. Again, the main drivers are identified as Brazil and Argentina with Brazil serving as a possible lynch pin between the Andean North and Southern Cone.

In 2003, the Cusco Declaration was signed between MERCOSUR and the Andean Community for reciprocal associate-member status and the statement that they would create a political South American community of nations. The Cusco declaration is connected to the Pink Tide and the realization of the “Bolivarian Dream” of a united Latin America. This ties in again with the culmination of UNASUR in 2008, with a unicameral South American parliament and equally important South American Defense Council (SADC) of 2010. The creation of the SADC is noteworthy when placed against Buzan’s charge that South America remains an un-integrated security sphere due to the lack of regional conflict management. One of the purposes of the SADC is to do just that.

After 1998 and into the early 2000s, the movement of left-leaning governments speaking through the region known as “the pink tide” needs analysis. This could impact on the way security is retro-actively framed for the region.

The ascendancy of Venezuela in the international political scene should also be taken more seriously, possessing energy reserves that are more geopolitically grounded than other trading assets. The concurrent rise of BRICS nations and re-emergence of Brazilian sub-regional power identities following the 2008 global economic crisis is another example of large-scale structural developments. MERCOSUR’s role in security by the 2008-established regional institution, UNASUR as a response to the new security realities after the 1990s. The explosion of ascendant actors unfolds new avenues of power-relations with the US, where we must ask if it still acts as a “policeman” or if the image of the US has changed to a more sinister perception. The Organization of American States (OAS) gives US a stake in South American regional politics (Buzan, 2003: 293).

5.1.2. Post-Cold War Republican Security Theory and Weak/Potential Resilience in South America

Despite its anomalous low conflictual nature, South American security could still benefit from general theories of security in developing countries. Security institutions are created in developing countries because of a strategic need to protect democratic orders. Security complexes form around the protection of civil democratic governances (Vivares, 2014:27; Bonilla & Long, 2010). The logic is that states had to make their own systems for generating welfare production too, in order to temper economic growth. Conflict becomes another inherent part of development
as states struggle to maintain these systems. This would mean that conflict and security analytically becomes paired with development and democratic governance in the third world.

States in South America have replaced the non-intervention rule in the 1990s with a collective obligation to defend constitutional democracies. The new market-oriented democratic regimes founded the South American sub-regional organizations that we’ll be studying. The regimes thusly gave regional organizations more power to be intrusive in domestic realms as an instance of protecting democracy and markets. This protective strategy could be greater investigated through Republican Security Theory. Apart from Africa, South America has been cited as a region where the relationship between interactive capacities and geography/distance has had the most limiting impact (Buzan, 2003: 337). Classical Republican theories, especially those that focus on geography and the limits of centralized power such as the republic of Venice, bears promising parallels for South American security integration. This is especially true when one considers that some globalization scholars believe that the age of exploration was one of the earliest instances of the spread of trade and economic systems i.e. globalization. Other similarities in early Republican thought, such as the protection of a governance system coincides with modern Republican Security Theory when assessing new transnational security threats.

It is important to note that the democratic question of South American states is a separate issue from co-binding (in the South American case, Republican) formation. Democracy, especially liberal democracies, are not synonymous with Republics in Republican Security Theory. The Bolivaran dream was for South America to become a united Republic. Therefore, if a path to negarchy can be found in the security nature of South America, the democracy-protection the US would be ineffectual in explaining how South American states are able to transcend their security dichotomy of Andean nations vs. Southern Cone nations, to tackle their threats collectively. This would make some republicansecurity concepts as the role of military relations and civilian protection irrelevant in the case of South America, which uses the military as a mouthpiece for civilian grievances rather than as an arm for protecting the government.

In this Chapter, we argue that the biggest factor determining the prospect for extended organizational cooperation and resilience are the foreign policy actions of the US.

For South America, the anarchy-interdependence problematique appeared twice in the region’s recent history. It was present at the regional level during the region’s early-stage and it re-appeared at the regional level at the late-stage. We found this through an analysis of the drug wars in the early-stage, where the anarchy-interdependence problematique was linked to the global-level hierarchy-restraint problematique. The creation of the early stage’s anarchy-interdependence problematique was due to the US’s longterm policy on the War on Drugs.

Because of this chronological disjuncture of the anarchy-interdependence problematique and the hierarchy-restraint problematique, negarchy has not yet formed in South America. This was due to the addition of a disruptive “buffer period” in the mid-stage. The dual presence of the War on Drugs crisis of the anarchy-interdependence problematique and US domination of the OAS and terms of trade in the hierarchy-restraint problematique in the early-stage of South America was unable to precipitate negarchy. The presence of the autonomy-contestation threat perception
in the region’s microstructure contributed to the non-state of negarchy in the early-stage. Threat was embodied by the US for its democratization rather than directed at the non-state participants of the drug war, as the US policies included penetration into state’s governance.

The reason why prior pathway negarchy didn’t appear in the stage afterwards (the mid-stage), as was found in Europe was also due to the presence of autonomy-contestation alongside sudden dramatic political changes in the region. The introduction of the “Pink Tide” in South American politics emboldened the region to ameliorate the hierarchy-restraint problematique. But their breaking of the hierarchy-restraint problematique was in finding other extra-regional partners rather than in taking control of their own regional security governance. Similarly, rather than take the republican formation route, the anarchy-interdependence problematique was ameliorated but not with the willful participation of South American states. Rather, it was the US’s change in global foreign policy, concentrating most of its efforts in the Middle East following September 11th 2001. While the destabilizing effects of the War on Drugs remained, states had more of a hand in determining their own governance policies against this sub-state threat. The US’s threat, to due its exit in the mid-stage, to the South American nations’ governance thus alleviated the anarchy-problematique into a tolerable second-anarchy in the mid-stage.

In terms of the “external threat necessity”, South America’s external threat is the US acting as an extra-regional power. The US holds a prime spot as the external threat for the region. The globalized drug networks, while an outside observer perceives them to also be an external, is not the external threat needed for resilient cooperation under our modified RST. Rather, the threat is operating under a hierarchy-restraint problematique of possible domination by the US in both the South American security sphere at the global level and over inter-state interactions at the organizational level. This makes the situation of South America closely akin to the classical republican Madisonian aspect of international anarchy where an external threat is necessary to give the member state (or for us, organization) the drive towards extended cooperation under governance (Bednar, 2004:403; Evans, 2010; Madison, 1787). The consequence is that without regional recognition of drugs being an extreme externalized problem, it remains an internalized governance problem.

5.2. 1990-1998: Democracy and Drugs -- US Western Policy Failures of Hierarchy and Anarchy-Interdependence Problematiques in South America

5.2.1 The hierarchy-restraint problematique of the OAS and democratic interventions

Founded in 1948, the Organization of American States (OAS) is one of the oldest regional organizations in the world, covering 35 member states in both North and South America. The OAS mandate is wide-stretching. It includes culture, education, science and technology, human rights, international law and drug trafficking. The OAS charter also includes a specific mandate to act in the field of peace and security. The OAS’s role in South America has been limited in relation to its interventions in Central America. Regardless of any perceived US organizational hegemony, one of the OAS’s more forceful positions was in the support of democracy. This was first exhibited in 1979 with the OAS’s human rights condemnation of the US-backed Somoza regime in Nicaragua (Cooper & Legler, 2006:4). The OAS has experienced a rise in prominence in the
1990s. The OAS’s newly strengthened inter-American political and military system revolves around an effective collective defense of democracy (Herz, 2003:213).

In 1991, the OAS created the Unit for the Protection of Democracy (UPD) within the General Secretariat to support the consolidation of democracy in the region. In terms of organizational capacity for intervention, in 1991 the OAS foreign ministers approved the Declaration on the Collective Defense for Democracy aka, the Santiago Commitment. The Commitment resolved that during the course of a “sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic institutional process” that an emergency meeting of foreign ministers would be called (Hurrell, 1995: 265). During the meeting it would be decided whether to adopt Resolution 1080. The resolution contains procedures to convene the Permanent OAS Council in the event of a coup or disruption of constitutional order in the Americas. In South America, Resolution 1080 was applied in Peru in 1992 and Paraguay in 1996. Disruption of domestic circumstances, i.e. democratic procedures, in member states became grounds for collective action after the signing of the Protocol of Washington in 1992 (Peck, 1998: 142). The Protocol of Washington allowed for the suspension of a member state from the OAS if its democratic government was taken by force. By 1997, the protocol was put into force.

From this background, during much of the 1990s the US held a privileged position as the agenda-setting state in the OAS. The OAS is remarkable because it was the only Pan-American organization in South America. Yet, the overall strength in power of the US both in economy and defense relative to the South American nations placed the US in a hierarchical position in the OAS, i.e. the organizational-level of South America. The added incentive towards democracy transformation in the South American countries threatens the ability of the South American countries to be fully in charge of their own governing structures inside their territorial boundaries. With this in mind, the hierarchy that the US reigns over the region becomes the more serious hierarchy-restraint problematique at the global-level as the US’s foreign policy concerns overlay the governing interests of South America.

The OAS experienced a new agenda in the 1990s by way of a series of ad hoc US-led meetings called the Summit of the Americas, first held in 1994. The first summit in Miami included a dual promise from the members to protect democracy and to promote free and open trade. The Declaration of Principles states that “Democracy and development reinforce one another” (Heads of State of Thirty-Four American Nations, 1994). In terms of free trade and open economies, the emphasis was on an elimination of trade barriers, subsidies, unfair practice and the inclusion of productive investment. The latter included the condition that there would be no subsidies or unfair practice. The 1998 summit held in Chile laid groundwork for a hemispheric free trade area, setting up a Trade Negotiations Committee made up of the vice ministers of the member states. A free trade area was resolved to be established by 2005. Although later it would be seen that the goal was not met. There was once again a call to eliminate the trafficking of illegal drugs. Earnest efforts that the US made to have Latin America join a hemispheric free trade area was greeted by suspicion as yet another attempt to enrich the US at the expense of Latin America.

The stimulation of the hierarchy-restraint problematique is evident in not only the goal of democratic interventions in South America, but also in the domination of trade in the South
American economic sphere. The US, already holding a global mandate by being an extra-regional power intruding on South America has become concerned with South America’s internalized concerns of domestic economic development and internal government via democracy. This internalization of threat as a governing policy intersects with the US’s global partner mandate, to produce the order-altering perception of autonomy-interference. South American states are restricted in their own policy by the implicit coercion or interference of an extra-regional power.

Rather than just focus on economy and trade as inroads for influence. The US also works bilaterally with other South American countries on their own “War on Drugs” campaign to stem the drug trafficking trade into the US. The Miami Summit meeting provided the OAS with the responsibility to “enhance peace and the democratic, social and economic stability of the region. The recognized security threats in the region at the time are framed as being detrimental to “economies, ethical values, public health and the social fabric” (Declaration of Miami, 1994). These threats that were mentioned in the summit are organized crime, illegal narcotics, money laundering, illicit trafficking of arms and chemicals and the growing of illicit crops. Terrorism was also mentioned. As a reason to eradicate poverty, it is mentioned that “the fruits of democratic stability and economic growth must be accessible to all” (Declaration of Miami, 1994).

After the Cold War there were three rationales for US intervention in South America. These include: (1) combating drug trafficking, (2) promoting democracy and (3) peacekeeping. Drug trafficking remains the central military mission. From 1989, US Southern Command has played an extremely intrusive role that exhibit extreme overlay rather than the milder penetration. In that year, the Andean nations replaced Central America as the largest recipient of US military aid in Latin America with $439M channeled to Columbia, Peru and Bolivia (Bagley, 1992). US troops built and operated radar complexes in the jungles and coasts of Columbia. US army specialists trained Andean soldiers in their fight against guerrillas that were part of the drug cultivation trade. The US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) even set up a base in the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru. All military assistance funds in the Andes was dedicated to anti-narcotics missions and no pre-existing counterinsurgency programs. In Columbia and Peru, the US supported local militaries in counterinsurgency wars. The DEA in the Andes had the US strengthen relations with militaries with dire human rights records despite multilateral efforts to enhance civilian rule and respect for human rights (Americas Watch, 1990).

A 1995 report made by Human Rights Watch has found that contrary to any statements the US makes through the OAS on the nexus of regional threats, democracy and human rights -- the US War on Drugs in Colombia had supported programs and policies that contain human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch, 1995). The rural anti-narcotics police (UMOPAR) have a reputation as “thieves and thugs”, yet US officials failed to use US leverage to pledge adequate reform. When questioned about attempts to address human rights violations in the context of drug trafficking, the US’s Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that operates in the country had stated that “the Bolivians have their own way of doing business” and “it is not our job to intervene” (Human Rights Watch, 1995:341).
5.2.2. The hidden anarchy-interdependence problematique

Intervention by the US has worsened security situations inside South American countries. The rampant social networking and exploitation of the lack of governance in geographic frontiers by guerrillas, and later cartels and paramilitaries, in the Andes has created a self-perpetuating conflict. This points to an anarchy-problematique below the surface of South American leadership concerns. A hierarchy-problematique and thus a hierarchy at the global-level was perpetuated by the War on Drugs. The pre-eminence of the OAS as the premier forum for security in their own democratic-protectionist brand also produced a hierarchy at the organizational level.

South American and Central American Guerrilla movements characterized much of the confrontation between the US and its Southern neighbors during the Cold War. Groups still persisted after the Cold War and have evolved. The new post-cold war Latin American insurgent movements differ from Cold War insurgencies in their political approach to peace negotiations. Insurgent groups gather their social bases among the indigenous population and mobilize new resources via criminal activity and drug trafficking, rather than with outside powers (Chernick, 1996: 294). The prominent cases in South America that exhibits this new reality are: Columbia, Peru and Ecuador.

Columbia’s insurgents have dated back from the 1940s and the 1950s with the start of the protracted civil war known as La Violencia. They are made up of two factions: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), a pro-soviet group linked to the Communist Party of Columbia; and the ELN, a pro-Cuban and Marxist-Christian group led by revolutionary priests who abide by liberation theology from the 1960s and 1970s. During the Cold War, negotiations with guerrillas were seen as a way to both democratize government and extend the geographic reach of the state (Chernick, 1996: 296). Columbia would not allow international organizations or outside powers to participate in the peace process. Instead, revolutionary insurgents were seen as a domestic issue to be dealt with bilaterally between the state and the groups. By the 1990s, ELN and FARC retained their political identity and agenda. But they also became involved in criminal activity, particularly coca and opium poppy production. In 1995, the groups have used the peace negotiations for political purposes, even when the Columbian government made some overtures by allowing for the participation of international mediators.

The insurgencies of the Andean region of South America were began as political power struggles that were occurring inside states. The location of threats are thus internalized within state borders. The object that was threatened were the countries’ regimes rather than their borders as these insurgents were domestically sourced.

The threat matrix of South America in the 1990s experienced a blurring between insurgency and crime. Columbian guerrillas turned to criminal activities to finance their war. This included kidnapping, extortion, burglary, etc. Linked to this is the development of the Andean region into the principal exporter of coca and cocaine. The increase in demand from the 1980s transformed the economies of Columbia, Peru and Bolivia. Their economies subsequently became interlinked in a shadow-process whereby Bolivia exports coca paste to Columbia for processing into cocaine. Export booms spurned peasant movements that then depended on the coca trade.
Coca trade has come into tensions with South American governments whom are under pressure from the US to repress the coca trade. Disputes were generally settled peacefully except for the case of Peru and Columbia whom had pre-existing armed insurgencies. The export boom reshaped the dynamics of the guerrilla conflict. Peru and Bolivia became integrated into the regional economy for their coca production.

Yet although the insurgencies began inside of states, this connection with the coca trade and revolutionary group financing soon transnationalized the insurgencies. Social networks were being made between political radicals, drug traffickers, and peasant farmers from country to country until they spread through the Andean subregion. As more and more countries and leaders became under threat, and radical political grievances merged with shadow-illegal economies, the threat of violence in the Andean countries worsened. We thus categorize this multiplication of threats into an instance of the anarchy-interdependence problematique at the regional-level by virtue of the threats’ mobility, ability to penetrate into the governance of a territory, and social density.

The coca trade sustained the armed group, Shining Path. The group developed a relationship with peasant coca farmers from the Upper Huallaga Valley. This included drawing support and recruits (Gonzalez, 1992). In the 1990s, Red Path, another group, had operations in Upper and Central Huallaga and newer coca producing lands in the Ene River. In Columbia, drug wealth benefited armed groups associated with landowners, political bosses and traffickers. FARC became the principal authorities in the regions of Caqueta, Guaviare, Putumayo and other parts of the northern Amazon basin. The most lucrative of its acquisitions are the opium-growing zones in the Central Andean highlands. Dominion over coca and opium growing lands gave FARC the wealth to expand its military operations. The peasants that produced the opium and coca were also a source of recruitment numbering in the hundreds of thousands (Chernick, 1996:301). Peasant farmers in Columbia and Peru are made up of internal migrants looking for work. The drug cultivation trade created boom towns in areas where the state did not have effective control (Conaghan and Malloy, 1994: 197).

Further down the supply chain, drug cartels refine coca and coca paste into cocaine and then smuggle them so that they can reach the world market. Cartels should not be confused guerrillas and peasant coca growers. Much of the profits of the drug trade reach cartels rather than guerrillas or peasant cultivators. Cartels are large multinational organizations. They do hold some similarities with the guerrillas such as possessing their own armies and the ability to negotiate with the state for political influence. During the 1990s, the Cali cartel rose to challenge the state of Columbia. The state is therefore faced with multiple challenges in the 1990s. Rather than being a bipolar conflict of the state vs. guerrillas, conflict has evolved into multipolar points.

The additional conflict actors of armed political insurgencies and drug cartels now also include drug traffickers and paramilitary groups. Paramilitary groups are involved in drug-trafficking more than the FARC. This isn’t unusual considering that the roots of the paramilitaries were to act as protection for drug traffickers (Johnstone, 2006:172). The strategy of state security shifts back and forth between negotiations with guerrillas or negotiations with cartels. Negotiating peace with guerrillas to include a commitment for them to withdraw from the drug trade are one
of the solutions in alleviating conflict. Erstwhile, the state is also expected to make a commitment to find alternative forms of sustenance for peasants involved in coca and opium growing.

The tragedy of the anarchy-interdependence problematique was the competing perceptions of the hierarchical US and the local South American nations. While the US viewed the drug trade as being transnational and external, the weaker South American states insisted that coca was a domestic issue that can be solved inside their state systems rather than through an organization. Regional organizations used peace missions to help develop more democratic political regimes. However, such a strategy of peace missions is not effective when confronting various types of warfare waged by guerrillas and drug cartels in South America. This is because the drug trade is international yet it fosters violent national/domestic conflicts. While the drug trade operates on global movements of arms, goods, money, drugs and people; the drug wars operate in domestic settings. Cartels may undertake assassinations against presidents, but they could also use their private armies to fight against guerrillas over territory and politics, as in the case of the Cali Cartel and Columbian guerrillas. Other dichotomies apart from the global vs. domestic levels of the drug wars are consuming vs. producing nations. In consuming nations, like the US, drug trafficking is a social problem. In producing nations, it is an economic and political issue drawing in violent criminal organizations, displaced peasants and industrial workers operating in a non-regulated economy. The problem with US involvement through its War on Drugs is that its emphasis on military operations inflame intra-state tensions by playing into the hands of guerrilla movements. These guerrilla movements in turn find support amongst the coca and poppy growing peasantry.

The evolution of guerrillas from political roots to narco-terrorism was still seen as a domestic and thus internalized threat issue. It was a catch-22 situations for South American nations in battling threats while ensuring secure democracy and development. This is especially true when the US acts as both a unilateral state and as a leader of the OAS. On March 22 1995, the US informed Bolivia that it would cut off aid and oppose multi-lateral bank loans if certain counter-trafficking initiatives weren’t met. The initiatives included the destruction of 1,750 hectares of coca. The announcement bred domestic dissent in addition to other domestic governing problems. On April 18, the Bolivian government declared a state of siege, suspending constitutional rights and rounding up labor leaders who were part of the public opposition against initiatives. In the above case of Bolivia, a vicious cycle of the governance principles of the OAS is being undermined by security initiatives. OAS has been unsuccessful in conflict regulation. Regional organizations replicate within themselves, power imbalances. The sensitivity of regional powers to become involved in regional civil conflicts reflects the sensitivity in creating precedents that might justify intervention into their own countries (MacFarlane & Weiss, 1992:31). The OAS had set up the Inter-American Defense Board. Originally the OAS was created for collective security to mediate between inter-state disputes. Recently, the range of OAS activities has grown considerably (Herz, 2003:214).
5.2.3. MERCOSUR, addressing economy without security

MERCOSUR was established in March 26, 1991 through the signing of the Treaty of Ascension by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. MERCOSUR stood for the Southern Common Market, reflecting the goals of the treaty. MERCOSUR was not just envisioned as a trading bloc, but also as a political project. The development of MERCOSUR coincided with the development of other regional post-cold war trading blocs. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Western Europe started looking at the ex-communist states for developing markets. In mid-1990, NAFTA was signed between the US, Canada and Mexico. Fearing a loss of markets and influence in Europe and North America, the southern states defensively clung to eachother, strengthening their ties (Domínguez, 1998). Prior to Brazil’s financial panic in 1999 and the start of Argentina’s economic recession, 1990-1998 intra-MERCOSUR exports grew by 23% per year from $4.1B in 1990 to $20.4B in 1998 (Devlin et. al., 2003: 166-7). By 2000, intra-regional exports accounted for 21% of total exports. While Chile signed an agreement with MERCOSUR short of membership, by the 1990s, the experience of MERCOSUR improved relations between Chile and Argentina culminating in across-the-board military, economic, security, and boundary relations (Mares & Aravena, 2001: 40).

Along with the establishment of MERCOSUR, 1991 saw the signing of Decision 297 on the 16th of May 1991 by Andean presidents. Decision 297 was an open-skies policy or the integration of air-transport of the Andean subregion. The signing was meant to increase integration in the subregion. The integrative capacity of the Southern Cone is not an anomaly of cooperation in the rest of the South American continent. Four years later, in 1996, what was once known as the trading bloc, the Andean Pact --1969, became further institutionalized and renamed itself as the Andean Community of Nations (CAN). Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador were the initial members of the Pact, Chile withdrew in 1976 under Pinochet for economic incompatibilities. In 1997, CAN reached an agreement on how to incorporate Peru into the Andean Free Trade Zone. Security subregional complex convergence was also in development in the mid-1990s. In 1995, the Amazonian Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) was established to give legitimacy to the Amazon Cooperation Treaty of 1978. ACTO’s members include Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela. Their focus is on sustainable development. ACTO was the first instance of pan-subregion integration since the Rio Group; incorporating the Southern Cone nations of Brazil and (at the time) Venezuela, alongside the Andean countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. As was mentioned earlier in the chapter, the symbolic gathering of nations for development purposes should not be taken as a non-security issue. Development, democracy, security and collective security/defense form a nexus in regards to South America.

The 1990s defense and foreign policy of South American nations still exhibited a very realist undertone. The two threats that dominate are still the US, who has intervened in the past economically and militarily, and other South American states (Calvert, 1994: 51). While the 1990s experienced a growth in regional organizations, these regional organizations indeed worked separate from eachother. The key to the development of cooperation in the region necessitated through going beyond trading blocs. The security threat of the US as hegemon was felt in an
intervention clause in the OAS for the sake of protecting democracy. But the US was not seen in this context, but more of a partner in trade. The US as an external threat was present but not yet recognized until the next time period to come. This is due to the policy allowances that the US makes in pursuit of its own security policy in the War on Drugs without addressing the political abuses still present in South American states. Autonomy-interference was recognized with the inability to stem the tide of narcotics and domestic meddling by the US, a partner with a global mandate.

5.3. 1998-2008 Pink-Tide, Neoliberal Threats and a Break from the Negarchic Path

As with other developing parts of the world, South American security becomes continually redefined by the state and non-state conflicts present. Historically, in developing countries, conflict arises from poverty and inequality. In the current developing world, conflict arises more from crises in weak civil democratic governance, organized crime and refugees. Economic globalization/neoliberal policies, while not security markers, modifies how states view threats outside of their regional system or why they have identified certain actors as threats. There is a wide variety of literature on neoliberalism and the rise of populism. Populism in Latin America and the Pink Tide is an example of a counter-hegemonic or counter-imperial system in the neoliberal global economic order.

In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter incorporated the Washington Protocol. In 2001 the Inter-American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalizing the democratic paradigm. As was displayed in the previous section; the use of protecting democracy consolidation served as a pretext for US interventionism and free trade adventurism. The mishandling of the War on Drugs placed forth many security and economic concerns. Blowback was inevitable. 1998 signals the start of the Pink Tide. A stream of victories of left-wing candidates started sweeping South American presidential elections. The countries affected included the Andean nations of: Venezuela in 1998 and 2006; Bolivia in 2006, and Ecuador in 2006. Even the Southern Cone nations of: Chile in 2000 and 2006; Argentina in 2003 and 2007; Uruguay in 2004, and Paraguay in 2008, were affected by the Pink Tide. Brazil was elected a Pink Tide leader in 2002 and 2006. The Pink Tide was named so because the victors were moderate leftists, its end came in 2008. Socialism had a revival during the 2000s. The utility of socialism was to confront the region’s continuing poverty and extreme inequality while calling into question the dominant free enterprise system. Socialism was presented as the highest form of democracy. It added warmth of collectivism and nationalistic solidarity that was perceived as absent from individualistic and elite-captured capitalism. The US was seen as a natural enemy, being the face of liberal capitalism and historically being opposed to socialism (Holden & Villars, 2013:65).

5.3.1. The fragmented rise of the Pink Tide

The rise of the Pink Tide and its competing personalities and ideological roots held great implications for the Macrostructure of South America’s ordering principles. The bold policy steps
that were taken from the populist strand was an earnest attempt to break the globally-based extra-regional hierarchy-restraint that the US enjoyed in the region.

One of the most prominent leaders of the Pink Tide was Hugo Chavez, president of Venezuela from 1999 until his death in 2013. Chavez envisioned a South American brand of socialism deemed “twenty-first century socialism” in 2005. The hallmarks of his socialism included: political centralization, concentrated powers on the presidency, the nationalization of privately owned enterprise, and limits on freedom of speech. Similarly, other presidents from the Pink Tide utilized socialism’s flexibility and appeal to national solidarity. Bolivia’s Evo Morales secured the presidency of Bolivia in 2006 from The Movement towards Socialism party. He advocated the development of an Andean-Amazonian Social Model unique to Russia, China or Venezuela. Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa was a proponent of Chavez’s socialism, although wished for socialism to be modified to fit different national realities (Holden & Villars, 2013).

The rise of the Left in South America was a consequence of the wide acceptance of democracy being unable to assuage the harsh economic realities of poverty, inequality, poor infrastructure, high unemployment and lack of competitiveness. Democracy was also unable to address what plagued domestic politics in South America: corruption, weak/non-existent rule of law, elitism and ineffective governance. The Left that made up the Pink Tide stem from two roots. One type was from Castro-ism and Marxism, which was experiencing a resurgence. The other type was from a tradition of populism from the days of working-class champions of the people e.g. Juan Peron of Argentina and Ecuador’s Jose Velasco Ibarra. This populism was anti-communist and authoritarian (Castaneda 2006: 33).

The Populist left was characterized by an anti-US dialogue contrary to the more moderate and pragmatic stance of the Marxist Left. The Populist Left consisted of Venezuela’s Chavez; Argentina’s Kirchner, a Peronist; and Evo Morales of Boliva. Morales was the leader of the Cocalera movement representing coca growers of Peru and Bolivia against US-funded attempts to eradicate the Coca crops. Evo Morales was able to turn the US War on Drugs to his advantage when gathering his constituency of coca farmers, poor indigenous people where coca formed a traditional part of their daily ceremonies. Unlike in Colombia, coca is legal in Bolivia and Peru where the governments make a clear distinction between coca and cocaine. In his “strategy for the struggle against drug trafficking and the re-evaluation of the coca leaf, 2007-2010”, Morales proclaimed that coca is a question of sovereignty, which ran contrary to the US’s War on Drugs policy (Morales, 2006). Kirchner routinely bashes creditors and the IMF and combatted the US’s FTAA (Ruiz, 2007:9). Chavez has bought Argentinian debt as well as explored nuclear technology and financed political campaigns in Bolivia and Peru (Castaneda, 2006:40).

The Marxist Left included Lula da Silva of Brazil (2003-2011); Vasquez of Uruguay (2005-2010); and Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010, 2014) of Chile (Castaneda, 2006). In opposition to the populist elements of the Pink Tide, their rule was characterized by pragmatic relations with the US as well as the adoption of neoliberal policies with several negotiations of free trade agreements in all three countries. While Vasquez would voice opposition to Bush’s policies and neoliberalism, he also negotiated an Investment-Protection agreement with the US and stood up to anti-globalization groups in Argentina during disputes on
the building of wood mills in Uruguay. Lula vowed to comply with fiscal and monetary targets of the IMF and macro-economic policies of his predecessor paired with innovative social initiatives. While it did lead to economic stability, unemployment and GDP was still low. Lagos governed in alliance with Christian Democrats and Chile experienced high economic growth; significant reductions in poverty; and a drop in inequality. Chile also negotiated a free trade agreement with the US and their presidents backed as candidates to head the OAS.

5.3.2 Breaking hierarchy-restraint, the breakdown of MERCOSUR-CAN, and the search for alternative extra-regional partners

MERCOSUR’s magic also began to wane, shocked by the fallout of the twinned economic crises of Brazil and Argentina in 1999-2003 (Domínguez, 2006:111). Much of MERCOSUR’s institutions are weak and rely mostly on the initiatives of the presidents in the Southern Cone. This would explain how the divergent paths of Pink Tide presidents, while initially appearing as a united front, would only replicate the anarchic power imbalances in MERCOSUR. The economic crises has shown that the one mechanism that worked automatically without friction in MERCOSUR, the lowering of tariff barriers of goods, would be the basis of strategic alliance rather than security. This gives a more “virtual” feel of multilateral cooperation amongst Southern Cone members rather than a substantive transformation in political and security cooperation. In 1998, a framework for the creation of a Free Trade Area between the Andean Community and MERCOSUR was signed in Buenos Aires. In 2000, heads of state from the Andean Community and MERCOSUR pledged to begin negotiations on the Free Trade Area by 2002. On August 2003, during a meeting in Montevideo, foreign ministers from both organizations met to discuss. The Andean Community delivered proposals for guidelines in negotiation, reaffirming cooperation between the two trading blocs.

The break from hierarchy-restraint problematique at the global level was thusly underway during the term of the Pink Tide leaders. The countries of South America were both emboldened and empowered with Brazil’s membership in the BRICs nations. They also took advantage the region’s new leverage of the anti-US domestic political discourses to search for new extra-regional partners such as Russia and China.

However, in April 2006 Hugo Chavez withdrew Venezuelan membership from the Andean Community as a protest move against the FTAs that Columbia and Peru signed with the US. Chavez felt that the signings caused irreparable damage to the Community. Perhaps as a symbol of retaliation or a restatement on the exclusivity of the subregions, Paraguay later would oppose and block Venezuela’s bid for membership into MERCOSUR. Venezuela’s membership into the trading bloc would not come to fruition until 2012.

The fourth Summit of the Americas held on November 4-5 2005 in Mar del Plata, Argentina was mired with anti-globalization protests. Hugo Chavez and then-presidential candidate of Bolivia, Evo Morales were among the participants of the protests. The summit also failed to reach an agreement on the long awaited FTAA. Protests occurred amongst the civilian population in Latin America after the US refused to end or reduce protectionism from its
agricultural markets. The FTAA was viewed as a US proposal and was blocked by Venezuela in addition to the four MERCOSUR countries of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.

At the organizational-level, the US’s hierarchy took a blow from the failure of the FTAA negotiations. This indicated that power was changing even within pan-American organizations despite the slowdown of MERCOSUR and CAN. The organizational-level of power relations thus shifted from the 1990s hierarchy to becoming anarchic with strong balancing tendencies against US economic and economic development influence.

Since the 1990 proposal for a hemispheric trade area and the 1995 rescue of the Mexican Peso, the US has not had any large scale economic plans for South America. While most Latin American countries wish to negotiate trade accords, similar to Chile’s in 2002, there are a number of grievances against US economic policy. These include trade distorting support payments to US farmers, harsh US anti-dumping rules, new demands for intellectual property protection, extremely high tariffs and quota limitations on high-volume Latin American imports such as sugar, orange juice and cotton (Hakim, 2006:49). These economic demands have made Washington seem ungenerous and have placed into question the US’s advocacy for free trade. Instead of cooperating in the FTAA process, South American nations enlarged their own trading bloc, MERCOSUR to cooperate in a FTA with the Andean Community of Nations.

The US had become further unable or unwilling to address Latin American economic development concerns, despite the 1990s priority on trade. One factor could be that Latin America has sunk in its list for foreign policy priorities after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Washington’s shrinking budget and focus on the Middle East/Iraq, Hurricane Katrina and budget cuts has diverted what capital the US would have left after its new regional non-latin American foreign policy ventures (Hakim, 2006). Unlike the EU, which transfers economic resources from wealthier to poorer subregions in its domain on the belief that equitable growth across the EU would benefit all members, the US operates on a “trade not aid” basis. The US’s macroeconomic strategy in Latin/South America is that hemispheric free trade arrangements would boost Latin American development by expanding trade, attracting foreign direct investments and jump-starting wide ranging reforms.

Additionally, the US appears to have exited the scene as a hegemon, with the Pink Tide politicians carving their own policies in South American regional affairs. This would point to a premature dissolution of the hierarchy-restraint problematique before an organizational and global-level negarchy could reliably form in the lower levels of our analysis of the late 1990s-late 2000s. South American states even bandied with each other to balance the US in the OAS. This was illustrated in the 2002 OAS condemnation of the anti-Chavez coup. Argentina, Brazil and Chile still remained allied with the US from a defense standpoint, cooperating with US investigations on terrorist activity in the Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil’s intersecting borders. The three states however, still refused to represent a common front against Venezuela and Bolivia. Furthermore, the return of balancing strategies against the US in the OAS preface a swing back into an acceptable second-order anarchy at the regional level.
In 2008, the closest to the Bolivaran dream of a confederation of republics was realized through the founding of the Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALC), hosted by Chavez in Venezuela. The formation of CALC was done with the signing of the Declaration of Caracas. The founding date was momentous at it was two centuries after the breakdown of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies. Notably, the organization denied the US and Canada membership while accepting Cuba, who had refused to participate in the OAS. This was a large blow to the organizational hierarchy that was felt in North and South American organizations.

The breakdown of a global hierarchy from the perception of Latin American states was also indicative in the extra-regional global relations South American leaders were forging. Brazil’s recognition as a member of BRICS in 2009, highlight interest and missions into the region by other powers. Venezuela has forged ties with Russia over energy. China has focused on South America since 1999 with a projected $100B in investment over the next ten years over primary resources of energy and natural resources and is also in cooperation with Brazil over satellite technology (Chipman & Smith, 2009: 90). India’s private companies have infiltrated South America such as Jindal’s investment in the Bolivian ore industry, Reliance deals with oil concessions in Peru and Columbia and imports crude oil from Venezuela, Brazil and Ecuador. In a security and defense, in 2008 India brokered a defense export deal with Ecuador over advanced light helicopters while Russia makes a supersonic cruise missile in the region. Venezuela has been in talks with Russia, China and Iran over military and nuclear hardware. While it is too soon to tell at the present time, the impact of these extra-regional and extra-hemispheric powers in South America, represents a disruption in path dependency.

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The global-level has thus become anarchic with the new BRICs powers while different strands of the Pink Tide movement created alliances within themselves, creating an anarchy at the regional-level. This would be reproduced as anarchies despite the bridging of MERCOSUR and the CAN. It is more believable to think that this anarchy was a reaction to the hierarchy of the OAS in the 1990s and the FTAA rather than a republican formation. While a negarchy could have occurred, the prior regional/domestic conflict on where to place FARC has disrupted the salience of a non-state anarchy-problematique coming to the attention of regional states.

The exogenous shock of 9/11 and the rise of populism in South America points to a negative path of resilience for the Pan-American OAS. Cooperation in this organization would likely falter when faced with a rising confidence amongst South American leaders in pursuing their own hemispheric identity paired with decreasing interest from the US. There are also indications of a subregional kind of protectionism rallying the South American countries. The US has become increasingly irritated that no South American nation wishes to challenge Chavez’s aggressive protectionism. Most South American leaders hold sympathy for Chavez’s anti-American and anti-Bush polemics. In kind, many countries in the region hold commercial and financial relationships with Chavez’s Venezuela and would not place it in jeopardy nor face domestic popular backlash for going against his policies. The 2005 meeting of the OAS’s General Assembly saw the rebuffing of a US proposal on setting up a Committee to Monitor Democracy in Latin America. The Latin American states blocked the proposal presumably because the committee was set up to place the
spotlight on Chavez’s democratic failings. On the international scene, one of the US’s closest regional allies Chile (along with Mexico) opposed a UN resolution endorsing the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Additionally, only seven of the 34 Latin American countries supported the Iraq War, the six Central American states were in trade negotiations with Washington and Colombia receives more than $600M/year in military aid.

Yet despite the dual amelioration of the globally perceived hierarchy-restraint problematique and the organizational hierarchy ordering principle, structurally this became an impediment to the formation of negarchy in the South American sphere. Change has occurred through political actions of South American leaders, but they have not converged in a way that hierarchy-restraint and anarchy-interdependence would be present at the same time. This prerequisite for the presence of both problematiques were thus unfulfilled in the continent’s mid-stage.

5.3.3. Ignoring the non-state anarchy-interdependence problematique

Consequentially, by focusing on attacking the global-level hierarchy-restraint and the organization-level hierarchy of the US, under the Pinke Tide, the order-altering perception of autonomy-contestation became frozen. It was not only frozen but supported by the discourse of the populist Pink Tide which accused the US of regional imperialism in trade, security, and their domestic governance. The threat of drugs, insurgency and governance instability was still present in the region but the discourse amongst the South American nations had not changed. It was still considered a domestic problem and even one of national economic identity, in the case of Evo Morales and coca farming.

In Peru, Shining Path suffered a blow when its founder, Guzman, and several high public officials were arrested by police in their Lima hideout. The once social revolutionary insurgency lost momentum as a result of the elected authoritarian government of President Alberto Fujimori’s (1990-2000) changed counterinsurgency strategy of strengthening the national economy and bolstering national security. After 2000, Shining Path survived by exploiting its knowledge of coca growing zones. They sold “protection” to drug traffickers and gradually took control of cultivation and distribution of coca and the production of cocaine, an additional link on the supply chain that Cartels in other parts of Latin America would control (Holden & Villars, 2013:62).

During this time period, FARC and the ELN in Columbia experienced massive setbacks and loss of popular support. In the early 1990s, the Columbian state was unable to penetrate large parts of its national territory, leaving remote settled areas to fend for themselves. Outside of large cities, 1990s Columbia was controlled by congeries of guerrilla groups, anti-guerrilla vigilante armies, large landowners, drug dealers and paramilitaries of traditional political parties. During that time, the relationship between guerrillas and their controlled territory became more complicated. Guerrilla groups started “taxing” drug traffickers and the land itself were coca and poppy were cultivated. There were also taxes on the labs where cocaine and heroin were made. To defend themselves against guerrillas, major drug gangs organized and financed paramilitary organizations, many had direct ties with military and police officers. A second internal war was created, the war between guerrillas and paramilitaries, which ran alongside the previous internal
war of drug cartels vs. their enemies (Holden & Villars, 2013: 138). A more complex economic web of ancillary criminal enterprises were created, i.e. kidnapping, ransom and assassinations. Those killed in the drug wars were often civilians suspected of aiding enemies rather than a direct confrontation between organizations. By the end of the 1990s, the drug war in Columbia spawned 2 million internal refugees. In 2009, more than 2000,000 Columbians were taking refuge in Venezuela.

The tide changed in 1998 when President Pastrana tried to reassert authority in the region by yielding control of a territory the size of Switzerland. In 2000, the US made a massive financial and military collaborative program with Columbia called “Plan Columbia”. Plan Colombia included $1.3B in aide, 77% of which was military (Livingstone 2009:188). It included technology and money to build military bases in the Andes, which would no doubt intensify the security dilemma amongst neighbors. The US’s security strategy in South America still revolved around military solutions to the Drug trade. American revisions to Pastrana’s original “Plan Colombia” transformed the document into a document verifying the need for US to focus on South America to stem the northward flow of drugs into US domestic markets. The original 1999 Spanish-language text called for moderate reforms and an integrated peace plan. Pastrana also recognized that coca cultivation was a social problem and support for peasants to switch to alternative crops is needed. The American translation for the plan prioritized “strengthening the Colombian state” and unlike the original text, inserted drug trafficking as the root cause of Colombia’s problems (Livingstone, 2003).

The FARC would use the offered 1998 land as a safe haven for its operations while negotiations between FARC leaders and Pastrana proved fruitless. Much of the failure came from suspicions of the guerrillas on why the Colombian government was stockpiling US military hardware if not to create an offensive strike. In 2002, Pastrana ordered the Columbian army to take back the territory. Public support for the guerrillas have disappeared by that time. Later in 2002, the public elected the hardline president Alvaro Uribe. Uribe placed FARC and the ELN on a military defensive in the countryside, forcing them to cede territory. Uribe’s re-election in 2006 was by 64%, the largest margin ever recorded by a presidential candidate. Under his tenure, there were sharp declines in the rates of murder, kidnapping and massacre as well as the highest economic growth rate in 30 years. The arrests of paramilitary leader’s unveiled massive corruption at a large scale involving congress and other public officials. Yet the government was still unable to stop the poppy and coca trade. This continued the financial backing of the ELN and FARC, whom still held considerable military strength.

Part of Plan Colombia was the fumigation of coca crops. However, the consequences of this was that aerial pesticides also negatively impacted other crops, animals, and the health of workers. Not only that, but the problem deepened as peasant farmers move from poisoned plots of land to other plots deeper in the Amazonian basin (Johnstone, 2006: 189). This is known as the “balloon effect”, squeeze the balloon at one end, it expands in the other. Coca farmers, once restricted to the Southeast Amazon Basin, became more dispersed throughout the state. Crisis of governance over large swathes of territory would still be an issue and one that could continually be exploited by the FLN or ELN.
Plan Colombia continued past US policy changes after 9/11. Latin America became a region of less importance relative to the Middle East, yet the region was still re-framed to coincide with the US’s new pre-occupation with terrorism. Instead terrorism was incorporated into the other concerns of drugs and security. Several South American countries however, refused to grant immunity to US military personnel on their soil due to their concern with Guantanamo Bay, illegal renditions and general American disregard for international law. Form 2003-2006, the US suspended all non-drugs-trafficking related military aide to Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela (Johnstone, 2006). The US discourse of Latin America, illustrated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s remarks, “a combination of violent gangs, drug traffickers, smugglers, hostage-takers, terrorists…. seeking to destabilize governments and take advantage of borders and ungoverned areas” (Rumsfeld, 2005). While this was a comprehensive statement of the security situation, it did not coincide with South American leaders’ primary worries of jobs, trade and living standards.

At the micro-level of order-altering perceptions, disconnecting security priorities would be the downfall of accelerated negarchic formation. While an anarchy-problematique of cartels, indigenous movements, and guerrillas were still present, their defeat by military action gave quick but ineffectual victories. This was not a problem for the presidents of the Pink Tide where a very vocal continengent led by Chavez chose instead to focus on crafting the US and macroeconomic policies as an external threat. While this is a necessary external threat in classical republican thought, it froze order-altering threat perceptions to the level of autonomy-contestation. This will later be seen with the eruption of crises after 2008.

5.4. 2008-Present: The Return of Border disputes and the birth of UNASUR and the SADC

So far in our study, alliances between groups of South American states were subsumed by the OAS. The period from 2008 onwards was a reclaiming of South American leadership in their own defense concerns. The founding of UNASUR in 2008 also came with the creation another body, the South American Defense Council (SADC), in taking care of their own defense issues. Instead of democracy protection, much like the SCO of Eurasia, the SADC would rely on norms of non-intervention, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Defense autonomy would be achieved by 2012 when Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela announced the retirement of the TIAR. Although collectivity in defense was achieved, the governance problems that still plague the region reproduces anarchy at the organizational level despite the potential of negarchy to develop.

5.4.1. The Andean Diplomatic Crisis and the return of the anarchy-interdependence problematique

During March 2008, South America was rocked with a confrontation between Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela in a diplomatic stand-off known as the 2008 Andean Diplomatic Crisis. In March 1 2008, the Colombian military made an incursion in the Patomaya River into Ecuadorian territory. The incursion led to the deaths of over twenty militants and sixteen members of FARC, as well as increased tensions between Colombia and Ecuador (Lendman, 2008).
The conflict followed the souring of Colombian-Venezuelan relations in connection with Operation Emmanuel in 2007. In that year, Chavez was acting as a mediator in an authorized negotiation between FARC and the Colombian government. Then-Colombian president Uribe, allowed the mediation on the condition that it would take place on Venezuelan soil and Chavez was not to contact the Colombian military directly but to go through other diplomatic channels. Instead of these directions, Chavez contacted Gen. Mario Montoya Uribe, the commander of the Colombian National Army. The 2008 incursion was rooted in a government-intercepted phone call on February 27, 2008 between Chavez and FARC leader Raul Reyes on the release of FARC hostages. The satellite signal traced Reyes to a location along the Colombian/Ecuadorian border. Colombian troop movements to the border began on the night of February 29 where Colombian intelligence reports determined that Reyes would be spending the night in the town of Angostara, Ecuador (Noticias 24, 2008). On March 1st, Colombia conducted the Angostara Raid involving the Colombian Air Force followed by a Colombian Special Forces group and the Colombian national police. A few hours after the operation, President Uribe spoke, “today we have taken another step against terrorism, which does not respect borders” (El Universo, 2008).

The new territorial conflicts were an evolutionary product of the nexus on drugs, crime and domestic instability. Spill-over occurred with the territorial displacement of armed groups. Thus non-state threats not only became recognized as an external territorial force, it also drew in states and reached a peak of border conflicts. The legacy of the Pink Tide, while it broke US hierarchy (alongside the US’s exit from the region to focus on the Middle East and Eurasia) had an unintended consequence of strengthening interactions between regional South American powers and also produced a resurgent Venezuela. The rise of regionally-mandated South American powers in the Andean region and the externalization of threats to one of states against states changed the order-altering perception to one of sovereignty-contestation. Territories and borders were being contravened by other states, not just by non-state actors.

Such sentiments of territorial spill-over were not agreed upon by Ecuador nor Venezuela which saw the operation in violation with Ecuador’s sovereignty. In a press conference, Ecuadorian president Correa denounced the raid as a “massacre” (BBC Mundo, 2008). On March 2, Correa also remarked that the intrusion invaded Ecuadorian airspace. Chavez’s denounced Uribe as a “lackey of North-American Imperialism” and that it sought to become “the Latin American equivalent of Israel” (AP, 2008). Uribe responded that while he had not intended to disrespect Ecuadorian sovereignty, that Reyes, for many years, was launching criminal operations taking place in Southern Colombia from a location in Ecuador. The Colombian national police then released documents that implicated Venezuela and Ecuador in FARC activities. The Andean crisis peaked with the movement of Venezuelan and Ecuadorian troops to their borders with Colombia. Chavez warned that Colombian incursions into Venezuela would be a “cause for war” and he would “back Ecuador under any circumstance”, moving ten battalions to the border (James, 2008).

The regional organizational response to the Andean Crisis reflected the power-realities and mood of Hispano-American relations. The OAS’s Secretary General, Jose Miguel Insulza of Chile called an emergency meeting of the OAS Permanent Council for March 4th 2008. During the meeting, Ecuador tried to convince the council to condemn Colombia’s actions as a violation of Ecuador’s territorial integrity. Colombia argued that the organization be committed to condemning terrorism
and its funding. By the 6th of March, the OAS released Resolution 930, stating that the operation was in violation of Ecuadorian sovereignty but stopped short of condemning Colombia’s actions (OAS, 2008). The dual competing security perceptions of inter-state threats of Columbia and Ecuador breaking each other’s territorial integrity versus the non-state transnational threats of the War on Drugs undermining internal state governance institutions dominated the meeting. It took the Latin American non-US dominated alternative to the OAS, the Rio Group, to facilitate an amicable reconciliation between the three states on March 7 2008.

The Andean Crisis created an ambitious collective defense proposal started by Brazil (Saint-Pierre & Castro, 2008). In Washington DC on March 2008, the Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim announced intentions to create a South American Defense Council (SADC). The council would be a body, “based on the principles of non-intervention, sovereignty and non-territoriality”. Jobim would later travel the region to promote the cause. The creation of the SADC was taken up by Brazil, Argentina and Chile as a cooperative defense arrangement (Battaglino, 2012: 82). The envisioned competencies would be in enhancing multilateral military cooperation, promote confidence and security building measures, and foster defense industry exchange. Around the same time that defense became a regional issue, another body, UNASUR, the Union of South American Nations, would take formal shape.

UNASUR formed on 23rd of May 2008. Its roots were the third South American Summit on 8 December 2004 and the signing of the Cusco Declaration. It was agreed that UNASUR’s capital would be in Quito, Ecuador, a capital city from an Andean Nation. Notably, UNASUR pledged that during its first phase, no new institutions would be created. Instead it would utilize pre-existing institutions from previous trading blocs i.e. MERCOSUR and CAN. The hope of UNASUR and the SADC would be felt throughout the region. Despite the initiation of Plan Columbia, Columbia joins UNASUR on the 20th of July. The Constitutive Treaty from which UNASUR was signed became legal on 1 December 2010 after Uruguay became the 9th state to ratify the treaty.

In a UNASUR special summit on December 2008 the decision to launch the SADC was formally adopted. March 10 2009, president of Chile, Michelle Bachelet appoints a working group to investigate and create a plan for the new defense council for UNASUR. Findings would become a part of the Declaration of Santiago de Chile of March 2009 which states that the SADC be a forum for the consultation, cooperation and coordination for defense. The SADC’s objectives are three fold: [1] To consolidate South America as a zone of peace and a basis for democratic stability [2] to construct and to strengthen the unity of Latin America and the Caribbean and [3] build consensus to strengthen regional cooperation in defense.

What is notable about UNASUR and the SADC was that their creation was a joint effort by leaders of both Andean and Southern Cone memberships. This corresponds with a noticeable geographic and governance widening from the sub-region to the South American region. Structurally, this level of multi-lateral cooperation between states is on a medium-scale being larger than the subregional organizations of MERCOSUR and CAN but smaller than the contentious pan-Americanism of the OAS. This interpretation is corroborated with an ideal medium-sized geographical reach of republican political arrangements.
From these series of events, a return to territorial disputes have come to the fore in South America. It was a reversal of the hypothesis that South America has entered a zone of peace where war would be unforeseen. These stand-offs are expected in an anarchic environment. The anarchy in this situation however is not the acceptable one and a problematique has indeed occurred. What is interesting in this anarchy-problematique is that it once again involves state actors yet its roots are in a prior “invisible” anarchy-problematique that had been taking shape through the spread and intricacy of non-state actors in the War on Drugs since the 1990s. Its consequences have only just been felt. This was possibly due to earlier policy misguidance on the War on Drugs having a military rather than social bent due to US policy. The violence-interdependence has come as a combination of both US military exports and an intractable drug trade brought by poor democratic governance.

The response amongst other South American nations ranged from demands of an explanation from Columbia to condemning the operation as an encroachment on Ecuadorian sovereignty. The United States however backed Columbia’s decision and sent diplomatic assistance as well as offering assistance to Columbia in case of military actions taken against it (Agence Presse Francais, 2008). Bolivia’s Evo Morales showed particular concern that the incident would be a setback to the consolidation of UNASUR. He also called for a special meeting of the UNASUR Council of Foreign Ministers to operate alongside the Rio Group meeting in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

5.4.2. Continued global-hierarchy: Columbia-Venezuela crisis and the return of territorial integrity Post-US

Both the 2008 Andean Crisis and the 2010 Columbia-Venezuela crisis illustrates the interstate implications of domestic conflicts when they turn transnational. The SADC played a key role in mediating the 2010 Columbia-Venezuela Diplomatic Crisis. The 2010 Crisis was yet another stand-off between Uribe and Chavez. This time, in July 2010, Uribe reveals that the Venezuelan Government actively permitted FARC and ELN guerrillas to seek safe haven in Venezuela. Evidence was presented to the OAS in the form of confiscated laptops acquired during the 2008 raid in Ecuador. The OAS was to hold a special meeting on July 22 to hear charges that Venezuela tolerated the rebel camps in its territory. During the meeting Chavez would once again break diplomatic ties with Colombia. An alarmed Evo Morales called for an emergency meeting of UNASUR, imploring the UNASUR head, Ecuador’s Correa, to convene an emergency meeting of the 12 heads saying that “war was in the making” (Presstv.ir, 2010). A few days after breaking diplomatic relations, Chavez went further and threatened to cut oil exports to the US if Colombia was to launch a military attack. He later stated upon cancelling a trip to Cuba, "the possibility of an armed aggression against Venezuelan territory from Colombia" was higher than it has been "in 100 years." (Al Jazeera, 2010).

The failure of the OAS to reach a decision to act and Venezuela’s bold anti-American moves would demand a purely South American resolution to the crisis. UNASUR Secretary General, Nestor Kirchner of Argentina, mediated the crisis. This was an apt resolution considering
the Andean Crisis context which accelerated the formation of UNASUR and the SADC. Yet, the drastic turnaround of Colombian-Venezuelan relations may not have been possible without the inauguration of a new Colombian President. On August 10th, days after the inauguration of Colombia’s new president, Juan Manuel Santos, Chavez and Santos vowed to re-establish diplomatic ties including the set-up of a bilateral commission. The commission would relate to commercial, economic, social investment and security issues. Santos received reassurances from Chavez that he would not allow guerrilla groups to set camp in Venezuela admitting that Colombia had the right to set up military agreements with the US as long as they do not impinge on the sovereignty of neighbors or become a threat. The bilateral agreements used the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

During this time period, territorial integrity and the ability for the region to collectively act was also tested with the September 2008 Bolivian crisis. A serious political crisis was under way as Santa Cruz, the richest province in the country declared autonomy after a referendum. This was followed by a domino effect where the provinces of Beni, Pando and Tarija followed suit in an uprising against Bolivian president Morales. A clash then occurred between government supporters and opposition protesters resulting in at least 30 casualties and the expulsion of the US ambassador. The Chilean President, Michelle Bachelet and the chair pro-tempore of UNASUR called for an emergency summit. The summit resulted in the Moneda Declaration, where the heads agreed that they would not tolerate any threat to Bolivia’s territorial integrity and created a commission to investigate the massacre at Pando (Malamud, 2008). The inability to solve the domestic situation illustrates a crisis of domestic governance in a region attempting to operate as a confederation. The use of a multilateral organization, like UNASUR to solve the crisis serves towards mediation rather than intervention.

The exit of the US from playing a prime role in the negotiating table, refers to the continuance of anarchy at the global-level. The confrontation of the two crises also point to an anarchy at the regional and organizational level. Anarchy is thus inferred as the ordering principle due to the balancing strategies that still dominate South American states. The difference is that the regional anarchy erupted from a regional hierarchy while organizational anarchy persisted from the previous era despite UNASUR/SADC’s involvement. The involvement was in fact, spearheaded by Argentina, an old subregional power.

The OAS has not disappeared from the cooperation scene during this time period. In 2008, the OAS sponsored peace talks between Colombia and Ecuador and held a prominent role in strengthening the governability of Bolivia in 2008 (Tavares, 2006: 76). But in 2011, the president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa exclaimed, “Why do we have to go to Washington to discuss our problems?”

5.4.3 Anarchy over Negarchy? UNASUR’s prospects

The exit of the US and the waning effectiveness of the OAS stood in stark contrast to the victories of UNASUR and South American unity during this time period. The successes however, had less to do with the creation of a true negarchical confederation and more to do with the happy
coincidence of an order-altering perception matching the norms of a particular organization i.e. the SADC and sovereign non-interference. By that time, the threat of transnational narco-terrorism became externalized outside of their domestic roots in Columbia, affecting Ecuador. This intersected with the presence of UNASUR and a renewed South American defense identity as holding an agreeable regional mandate as opposed to an aggressive US extra-regional global mandate. Sovereign non-interference itself is in direct opposition to interventionism that was perceived in the 1990s and much of the 2000s.

While this is great progress and holds great potential for the effectiveness of UNASUR in mediating regional conflicts it says nothing of autonomy non-interference on a state-by-state basis. This is because the cooperative tendencies of Latin American states is yet to be tested if South America was to act as the US and start intervening in the governance codes of their members. As a result, we expect to see more of the balancing behavior, not between South and Andean but between presidential personalities, that was witnessed in this chapter rather than the co-binding of the negarchic ideal.

While UNASUR holds some promise in acting as mediaries to the newly invigorated territorial conflicts, this still calls for a cautious optimism. Despite the need arising for UNASUR in a regional security sense, the interactions of the individual states in relation to the drug war highlights that security is at a boiling point. Considering the reactive nature of UNASUR’s formation we can rely on the objective fact of its republican structures but not of the environment being conducive to resilient cooperation. That is because negarchy formation requires both a hierarchy-restraint problematique as well as an anarchy-interdependence problematique. South America holds anarchy-interdependence at the late-stage but not hierarchy-restraint as a problematique. The lack of the hierarchy-restraint problematique is both a virtue of the South American powers becoming more confident on the global level, but also a curse in RST terms. Without a negarchy in place surrounding organizational structure, we can expect that UNASUR may one day be subject to a growing regional or extra-regional power dominating the interests of its members.

There has been some indication of a continuing desire to coordinate with US military/defense leaders when combatting regional threats. On July 24-26 2012 Columbia hosted the 4th meeting of the South American Defense Conference (SOUTHDEC). The conference included both military and civilian leaders of 11 South American nations and representatives from US Northern Command, the Inter-American Defense Board and Center for Hemispheric Defense studies. Illicit trafficking, the spread of trans-national organized crime and “narcoterrorism” were cited as threats that have evolved. New threats that were mentioned included cybersecurity, energy security, natural disasters and humanitarian crises (De Anda, 2012). The deployment of military forces was recognized as an enduring reality. In the case of Brazil and Operation Martillo, air and naval forces are deployed along with civilian forces to reduce the prevalence of illicit trafficking. The “Sword of Honor Plan” for Columbia combines military forces with national police forces and state institutions to sustain offensive military action against narco-terrorist organizations in Columbia.
The growing recognition by South American nations that the regional non-state and sub-state threats require a regional effort is a step in the right direction. Even re-invigoration of US interests in South America could also aide in negarchy creation. Whether this is prudent or proper is another matter and is not in the scope of this thesis.

5.5 Conclusions on South America: Nascent but Absent Negarchy

The first time period had the privilege of a hierarchy-problematique imposed by the US. The prime organization in the region was the Organization of American States. Yet it was the conflicting nature of the OAS’s democracy promotion agenda and the ill-chosen policy options of the War on Drugs as linked to democracy that stimulated an anarchy-problematique of non-state threats at the regional level. The tragedy of this perfect storm is that there was a disconnect of the US perceiving the War on Drugs hemispherically, while South American states still perceived it at their own domestic levels. This allowed US-dominated hierarchies to propogate at the regional and organizational governance levels during the 1990s despite the formation of MERCOSUR (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. South America’s ordering principles and order-altering perceptions

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From 1998 until 2008, the hierarchy-restraint problematique, being decoupled from the “true” anarchy problematique, corrected itself into an anarchy at the global level through the rise of BRICs and South America’s search for more reliable economic partners. The South American nations began to view the US as an imperialist power in the economic and security fields, and an extra-regional one at that, during the course of the Pink Tide. Paired with the fragmented and conflicting Leftist ideologies of the Pink Tide, the regional-level devolved into an anarchy, but not one of a problematic nature. The same process occurred at the organizational level from the transition of hierarchy to anarchy.

The occurrence and salience of the anarchy-problematique didn’t occur until 2008, where the Andean Crisis and later the Colombia-Venezuela crisis displayed the transnational evolution of the Drug Wars. The formation of UNASUR and the SADC was prompted by anarchy and could thusly still be vulnerable to either anarchic or hierarchic governing principle depending on the inter-state relations of South American nations. This gives the creation of a confederation in form but not in spirit. In other words, there was no concurrent hierarchy-problematique to give impetus for a negarchical formation despite a co-binding negarchical organization forming. The resilience of UNASUR is therefore in doubt for the longerm with the exit of an external threat (the US) once it has exited the region for other lands after 9/11 and Iraq.
This is not to say that a negarchy may never form. The building blocks were and still are there. The problem at the micro-level of threats and their evolution in policy discourse however, has frozen the path development into vacillating between anarchies and hierarchies without converging into negarchy. This is due to the order-altering perceptions being stuck between autonomy-contestation and sovereign non-interference. The former was exhibited by the US’s actions in its “backyard” with the War on Drugs, and later with its still global pre-eminance in unpopular free trade and security dealings in the late 1990s- late 2000s. The latter by the advent of UNASUR/SADC, a regional multilateral organization, committed to transnational regional non-state threats. While South America may have achieved sovereign non-interference by the close of the new century, the void left by the US after 9/11 would not allow the region to realize autonomy non-interference, an order-altering perception necessary for realization of a mature negarchic ideal. This will be further argued in the next chapter.

Recent accelerated and differentiated developments of security cooperation in South America indicate the formation of a nascent negarchy. Rather than the purely security-driven logic of Eurasian security development, collective governance takes on both a civilian, economic and security form akin to late-developed Europe and the EU. However, unlike the EU, the continuing consolidation of democracy has impeded twinning with security governance. While South America would be promising in terms of Republican formation, it still possesses disadvantages from dealing with a dual civil/security problem in addition to a counter-hegemonic response. It is thusly disadvantaged and at a lower level of Negarchic/Republic development than Eurasia. Eurasia, for the time being, has strong autarchies in its collective governance structure so their focus and energy is primarily on combatting (and manipulating) the cross-cutting security threats found in their security domain. This includes the security threats threatening the integrity of their own domestic governing systems.

In the next chapter we gather our findings on South America, as well as our findings on Europe and Eurasia for purposes of comparison and detecting the links between the macrostructure and the microstructure.
CHAPTER 6. IMPLICATIONS, EXPLANATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF REPUBLICAN SECURITY

It is from this exhaustive investigation of the evolution of security cooperation in Europe, Eurasia and South America that we can conclude the following. We have found that when we apply the conceptual tools of RST we can observe that negarchies are forming in contemporary international security as a result of the changing threat and global power environment after the end of the Cold War. The conclusion we come to is that negarchies and related republican structures are forming in the contemporary world. But more importantly, they are forming around strategic inter-state military alliances rather than being restricted to co-binding formations at the nation-state level. The consequences of this leads us to extend the utility of Republican Security Theory to the present day, rather than situating the empirical claims of the theory in the past or transplanting its propositions to some essentially unknowable future. This conclusion also shows that negarchical formation, much like what occurred during the Roman republic, Venetian republic before culminating in the US-continental Philadelphia system, is a structural process that occurs more than once in history, gradually and adaptively to new material contexts and innovations in governance-forms.

In this discussion chapter, we first recapture our critique on IR theories of cooperation to show the need for an alternative approach to cooperation and resilience. Then we show how this alternative approach, Republican Security Theory has been modified to fit the analysis of our three Post-Cold War regional cases. We then build a deeper and more cohesive understanding of negarchy emergence and resilience. We have done this by first comparing our three regional findings on a macro-structural level of anarchy/hierarchy/negarchy and then later incorporate our macro findings into comparative studies of our micro-structural framework so that we may isolate causal chains. The result of our findings corroborated the Republican Security Theory thesis that a global-level hierarchy and the simultaneous occurrence of a hierarchy-restraint problematique and anarchy-interdependence problematique were necessary and sufficient conditions for the production of negarchy. We have also found that the micro-structural mechanic of autonomy non-interference was related to the creation of the most resilient republican security organizations in operation. The other micro-structural mechanic, autonomy contestation, was found to serve as a pivotal point and era indicator where negarchy is at the cusp. In this chapter we would have thusly fulfilled the main aim of our thesis: to create an alternative theory to explain the emergence of negarchy rather than just negarchy’s presence.

Once these chains have been isolated and our findings presented, we lastly reflect on whether our research has met its aims and its implications for the utility of RST and the study of resilience and international politics. At the conclusion of our discussion we find that negarchy is indeed an ordering principle that warrants further research and that the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of using RST can yield interesting contributions to the field of political science and not just IR Theory.
6.1. The Promise of Republican Security Theory in the field of Institutionalisms

In Chapter 1 and again in our empirical chapters we have broken down the main competing strands of mainstream International Relations Theory: neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. For the European case, RST reconciles neorealism’s inability to explain the creation of the ESDP/CFSP interlinked with NATO, by showing the EU as a new variety of “state” in of itself, one with Republican structures. In Eurasia, similarly Neorealism would have led others to believe that the region is more fragmented cooperatively than has been the actual case with the creation of the SCO. But when RST is provided as an analytical frame, it becomes apparent how the SCO remains more cohesive than the CIS. Cohesiveness is a function of the type of threats that are in the regional security environment. When we analysed the cooperation patterns of South America, we took into account the effects of state-building and US foreign policy changes to find out the reasons why UNASUR was still required to form after MERCOSUR’s promise of regional peace via bipolar rule.

While RST provides a more evolved form of cooperation theory for the contemporary world and despite the persistence of institutions in all regions challenging the neorealist thesis in general, the question remains: can RST be a better or more appropriate alternative to neoliberal institutionalism? Both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism believe in self-help or international anarchy separating the social dynamics of the international stage from the centralization and separation of functions inside the nation state. Both theories believe in nation states as unitary actors. This black boxes states and tends to dismiss the special characteristics of each unit. They also believe that states are rational actors and that they have a fixed order of preferences in which to make their calculations. Rationality is not the contested notion. Rather, it is the linked methodological use of game theory in advancing neorealist and neoliberalism predictions which they use to represent rationality. In this regard, our critique is not unique in IR theory. The basis of the predictive differences in neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism is on how important an institution is in explaining cooperation trends. Neoliberal institutionalism sees institutions as structures that constrain and support cooperative strategies. They are solutions to the international anarchy that prevails among states. Neorealism sees institutions as mere playing fields where power and a selfish desire to survive are placed in their calculations. What our theory strives to do, and what separates us from other critics of game theory, is to interject more realist variables of power with the RST idea of restraint in political authority to create an alternative structural model of state rationality.

Connected to our methodological critique on neorealism and neoliberal institutionists, we have found that these differences of belief depends on which rules of politics or “the game” neoliberals and neorealists subscribe to. Neoliberal institutionalism has its basis on the prisoner’s dilemma, where the most beneficial solution to all parties is to cooperate. In contrast, Neorealists base their viewpoint on the Battle of the Sexes game that shows how the preferences of each state make it impossible to reach an ever-extending threshold where they would need to converge in interests. Game theory is, (much like neoliberalism, neorealism, and even RST) a theory. A hypothesis or proposition on what reality may be but without the certainty that it is what reality is. That leads us to a discussion of neoliberal institutionalist explanations of cooperation in general.
The game, their perception of gains and their hopeful cooperation outcomes is what differentiates neoliberal institutionalism from a theory that is the same in basic structural assumptions of international politics as neorealism. Essentially what it boils down to is that neorealism and neoliberalism is a matter of choice and values, of optimism or pessimism, and finding the cases that would fit each. What we have found is that in the contemporary world, there are at least three cases that fit neither.

In response to the previous concerns we have determined that the functional methods used and common assumptions of structure in neorealism and neoliberalism are what is in most urgent need of revision. Both neorealism and neoliberalism fall under the name “rational institutionalists”, yet both are extremely fragile over time. Assumptions such as pay-off matrices, preference structures and other often arbitrary and non-empirically grounded institutional choices can greatly alter the “game” that is applied in the scenarios (Hall & Taylor, 1996:18). As was discussed in our early critique sections, game theory utilized/rationalist based accounts are “snapshots” of singular institutions. Their fixed preferences binds them to the either/or scenarios of cooperation or defection. Fixed preferences become a problem due to the methodological notion of equilibria and understates the importance of power asymmetries among actors. Equilibria, or Nash equilibria is when a player reaches the point where it knows the other players’ strategies and concludes that it would not be gaining anything by changing their own strategy. It is the starting point and goal of game theory to find the Nash equilibrium. While neorealism and neoliberalism change their strategies in response to changes in the organizational structure, preferences remain fixed (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 19).

Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalist analysis therefore does not say anything of the development of successive institutions that would possess different actor behaviour, preferences, and different characteristics. When it attempts to do so, it uses a mixture of alternating neoliberal and neorealist explanation for a single case across time periods. Even when both models are accepted and put into a chronological sequence, there is little that both neo-neo theories can explain in terms of what occurs between the gaps in these “games”. While critics of mainstream theory believe that preferences being fixed is a problem, we believe that the international environment being fixed in mainstream theory is the bigger problem.

Neoliberalism is not the only competing camp in the explanation of cooperation in institutions. Yet, while our issue with the neo-neo explanations are based on substantive problems with method and efficiency, the next batch of theories that we turn away from were deemed inappropriate to the aims, goals and utility of our study. Constructivism, sociological or cultural theories may offer to further colour explanations on persisting/resilient institutions by non-strategic calculations. These non-rational accounts include themes such as norms-dispersal, historical contexts and changing identities to explain adaptation. Sociological and Historical institutionalism in the question of institutional origins view actors as choosing between a range of ideal-type “institutional templates” that exist in the world and modify it to their circumstances. While these strategies have the potential to fine-tune and illuminate variations in institutions that neorealists and neoliberals may have missed when reaching their conclusions, they narrow themselves to a smaller range of cases. But if theorists consider each institution created as being
culturally-bound, the analysis of sociological or historical institutionalists lose ground over the geographic scope of their predictive-power in international politics. Despite their differences in how wide a scope you can pose the theoretical-net, both the rationalist neo-neo theories and the more sociological and historical theories on institutions is to test hypothetical propositions to observed phenomena in order to refine theory (Thelen, 1999: 373).

So how does this connect with institutional theories or theories of cooperation? The key is in acknowledging that there is an external world of international politics outside of the institution and outside the preferences of that institution’s members. Therefore, our challenge was to create a different way to analyse systemically, large swathes of states without being bogged down in mid-level theories of foreign policy. Yet we still pursued the aim of creating RST as a more generalizable non-western-contextual theory of cooperation. We have done this in Chapter 2 by introducing theory-guided process tracing. We argued for the use of theory-guided process tracing to construct a macrostructural tripartite model based on identifying ordering principles of anarchy, hierarchy and negarchy at the global, regional and organizational level. This was done to in order to enable us to detect the emergence of negarchy. A micro-structural framework incorporating the geographic location of non-state threats and partner security mandates of global or regional scope was also developed to allow us to determine in case study contexts the behavioral mechanics leading to order change.

The over-arching central question that drives our research is: What does the conceptual system of Republican Security Theory give us in terms of analysis of cooperation patterns in security organizations given the problems involved with neoliberal and neorealist explanations?

This question is driven by our interest in the puzzling empirical patterns of co-operation in the various regions in the world and the concomitant inability of neorealism and neoliberalism – the primary theories of co-operation – to give us useful tools to analyse this.

Our aims were: [1] To challenge the three harmful assumptions of neorealism and neoliberalism that lead to contradictory explanations on the development of regional security organizations [2] To create a new theory that explains institutional resilience in Post-Cold War Security Organizations. [3] To investigate if negarchy was present in the world. And (4) to see if this negarchy appeared alongside new co-binding styled security organizations to indicate resilience.

In response to the question and through an exploration of RST-inspired theoretical framework, this thesis has sought to explore the process of negarchy formation and how this is tied to the rise of cooperation patterns. But before we examine our conclusions our conclusions fully, let us discuss in more detail the modifications to RST we have implemented to bring the new yet old theory of governance into the contemporary international realm.
6.2. Republican Security Theory in the Post-Cold War Era

To analyse negarchy formation we need to be open to analysis of various processes and contexts within which they may form. We should not assume that the context of Post-Cold War international politics is the ‘same’ as the context for the rise of the Roman republic. To ensure context-sensitivity and to enable contemporary analysis on the basis of conceptual categories primarily used in historical cases, has necessitated our first segway away from Republican Security Theory as interpreted by Daniel Deudney. Rather than focusing on the “International” or focal points in “international history” producing a uniform logic that changes the character of nation-states’s governance and security; we place emphasis on the unique contemporary history and contemporary perceptions of regional systems. This serves to de-Westernize the Republican experience away from purely European or American histories. Essentially despite their divergent paths, one day non-Western negarchies will come to mimic those we know of that erupted from Western political philosophy or culture. We reiterate that there is no singular causal path to negarchy and that it comes in stages of governance. These stages are represented in our case studies: Europe as a mature negarchy, Eurasia as an institution-level moderate negarchy, and South America as a proto but delayed and nascent co-binding negarchic formation. What is the dominating factor that brings these mature to proto-negarchies together is that they are linked to the Post-Cold War (and later Post-9/11) condition of a unipolar international system dominated by the United States.

There are a number of points not originally covered by Deudney in Republican Security Theory that are present in international politics. (1) One point utilizes his “violence-interdependence” causal pathway of leading to second-order anarchies. But instead of giving violence to the nation-state against another nation-state surpassing geographies, we find it more appropriate that it be used to describe the multitude of malevolent non-state actors that have taken advantage of globalization to challenge nation-states. (2) We are also keen to acknowledge that these (what we call in this thesis) transnational-mobile threats do have domestic-level or sub-state level origins. Consequentially, we are given reason to believe that the analysis needed not only behavioural observations in inter-state levels but also in other levels. This leads us to point (3) the necessity of considering multiple levels of analysis per region to track order change and convergence. These multiple levels are: the global level, the regional level and the organizational level.

In the case of multi-level cooperative institutions, or our military alliances, we interpret these institutions as regional culminations of changes in order. We work on the premise that changes in order creates changes in governance style or cooperation types. We also, admittedly take for granted that each governance type naturally belongs to a particular order such as hegemonies with hierarchies, balance of power with anarchies, and co-binding or republican structures with negarchies. Governance styles for us are adaptations to and follows the security order. Like Deudney (and in other literature, Ikenberry) governance style persists unless “exogenous shocks” or influences outside of the institution are introduced which would modify the order. We consider two types of exogenous shock. One shock is the development of non-state transnational malevolent actors. The other exogenous shock is the “external threat necessity” and
has been borrowed from the classical republican theory of James Madison. US domination as a result of Post-Cold War unipolarity is one obvious external threat. In addition, since our case studies are situated around regions, geographically closer but more powerful states could be another external threat to a member state\textsuperscript{13}.

In the empirical analysis, drawing on Republican Security Theory and our extension of it, we assessed whether each three levels are characterized as anarchies, hierarchies or negarchies. But instead of focusing on a single level systemic or global level for an outcome, we take all three levels into consideration. We utilize some principles of Regional Security Complex Theory that we judge compatible with our research agenda, to help analyse what the perceived orders are in each level of analysis. We keep in mind processes of overlay versus penetration to judge the severity of anarchy and hierarchy in the levels. We did this so that we can determine if a level of analysis is at a crisis point. We have also categorized threats based on where a member state would locate it based on whether the source of the threat was inside or outside the state’s territory. Threats were either internalized and absorbed into a governance problem for a member state or externalized and seen as a conduit for greater regional cooperation.

Conflicting partner mandates and the spill-over of security through the movement of non-state threats were taken from Regional Security Complex Theory. These additional concepts help us better understand how mobile threats and outside power interference fundamentally alter how a state relates to its survival in its security environment. This was why it was necessary to create our micro-processes, labelled “order-altering perceptions” so that we can track what created cemented allegiance in the new organizations. It is with these new tools that our theory makes an original contribution to RST by modifying its super-structure and adding an actor-oriented microstructure which also incorporates exogenous shocks into analyses of order change.

We have also borrowed from the classical republican theory of Machiavelli to determine the internal resilience of post-cold war security organizations. In order to qualify for the highest form of resilient republics we used the check list of two ideals: vivere sicuro and vivere libero. Vivere sicuro is the ideal where a strong government holds in check both the aspirations of the nobility and the people. In the international realm, we translate this to nobility being greater global or regional powers while the people are lesser states. Vivere Libero means ‘freedom of the community’ and depends on the active participation and connection between the nobility/great powers and the people/lesser states. Both can be shown through the development of institutional structures and mechanisms contained inside the organization. Whether vivere libero was developed after vivere sicuro, if at all, would indicate a truly strong and mature negarchy. This step for checking on the viveres was not to be taken until signs of negarchy emergence become apparent.

From then we utilized these modifications to RST to find new structural conditions for negarchy. These new structural conditions do not centre solely on the nation state and can be applied to the level of the organization as a state, or above to the regional and global environment.

\textsuperscript{13} We use the capacity to harm as a signifier of power
6.3. Case Study Findings and Structures

The conclusions of our regional cases uncovered the existence of negarchy in the Post-Cold-War world. We find that negarchy had indeed emerged in Europe and Eurasia, but failed to emerge in South America despite the presence of regional security organizations. This calls into question the true resilience of new security organizations. The cases’ purposes was to display how an updated theory of Republican Security would look like if certain structural and threat modifications were made. The studies themselves don’t serve as definitive proof of a process of negarchy emergence on a global scale as each case was treated as a self-contained analysis with no reference point to one another. As such, the cases as they stand are parts of a general theory that is essentially un-tested. This section seeks to change that. Here, we redeploy the macrostructure and micro-structure framework but instead of focusing on one case at a time, we look at cases comparatively to isolate conditions and uncover causal chains. This effectively satisfies one of our aims of creating an alternative theory to explain the emergence of negarchy rather than just stating its presence.

6.3.1. The macrostructure

A summary of the orders involved per level and time period of each region can be seen in Figure 8. For simplification purposes, the time periods in each regional case will be referred to as “early-stage” “mid-stage” and “late stage” and are designated as A, B and C in the diagram below. Each time period is further split into three levels of analysis: The global level, the regional level, and the organizational level. These levels designate different type of orders or state-interaction logics.

We place either a blank slot, anarchy, anarchy-interdependence problematique, hierarchy, or hierarchy-interdependence problematique in the levels of analysis. A blank slot indicates no perceptive consciousness at that level, often due to self-containment of a regional security complex by a regional power. We distinguish between hierarchy and the hierarchy-restraint problematique as well as anarchy and the anarchy-interdependence problematique in the levels of analysis. Problematiques indicate an exogenous shock, such as introduction of an extra-regional power or the mobilization of a non-state threat across territories, which create the extremes of the problematiques. The problematiques are catalysts for order change in RST. Just anarchy or hierarchy are designations of passive order-types that can be kept in the status-quo in subsequent time periods. Anarchy without the problematique refers to a safe second-anarchy in RST where violence-interdependence is a low or medium, i.e. tolerable, level. Anarchies are indicative of alternating bandwagoning/balancing logic of states. Just hierarchy, without the problematique, is a state of domination over lesser states by willing subordination. Hierarchy can be found by assessing trade dependence, military bases in another states’ territories, and (Lake, 2009). We determine that hierarchy shifts into a hierarchy-restraint problematique when there is an imminent threat that a states’ ability to dictate its own foreign or domestic policies become overridden by the interests of the hierarch. This may mean policy effects on the defense spending habits of states
or border management policies. The hierarch can be a great power in the region or an extra-regional power.

From our studies, we found that the anarchy-interdependence and hierarchy-restraint problematiques were present in all three regional case studies. Both problematiques occurred at different points in time. Patterns of problematiques were not uniform for all three cases. Yet the development of negachy was still evident in the cases of Europe and Eurasia in the late stage. We also found an anomaly in the case of South America. In South America, negarchy has not emerged despite early-stage South America holding the same causal structure as late-stage Eurasia. The case of South America would later prove pivotal to the understanding of the underlying mechanics of order change.

Figure 8. Comparison of case study ordering principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Early-Stage</th>
<th>Mid-Stage</th>
<th>Late-Stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Hierarchy-restraint</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>problematique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Anarchy</td>
<td>Anarchy-interdependence</td>
<td>Negarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>problematique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Hierarchy-restraint</td>
<td>Negarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Problematique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|            |                      |                             |                            |
| **Eurasia**|                      |                             |                            |
| Global     | --                   | --                          | Hierarchy-restraint        |
|            | problematique        |                             | problematique              |
| Regional   | Hierarchy-restraint  | Anarchy                     | Anarchy-interdependence    |
|            | problematique        |                             | problematique              |
| Organizational | Hierarchy         | Anarchy                     | Negarchy                   |
|            | problematique        |                             |                            |

|            |                      |                             |                            |
| **South America** |                |                             |                            |
| Global     | Hierarchy-restraint  | Anarchy                     | Hierarchy                  |
|            | problematique        |                             |                            |
| Regional   | Anarchy-interdependence | Anarchy                  | Anarchy-interdependence    |
|            | problematique        |                             | problematique              |
| Organizational | Hierarchy         | Anarchy                     | Anarchy                    |
|            |                      |                             |                            |

In the case of Europe, the early-stage held no problematiques and was a typical hierarch as dominated by NATO at the global level and the influence of the US felt in the organizational-level. Early-stage Europe’s regional level was a tolerable second-order anarchy in terms of threat
levels brought in by fears of migration, the drug trade, and organized crime. The mid-stage of Europe changed to a hierarchy-restraint problematique with the realization of the US’s hidden veto in the Combined Joint-Task Force Concept offered by NATO. NATO’s refusal for France to head AFSOUTH has also been felt as an unneeded penetration into the organizational-level yielding an additional hierarchy-restraint problematique. This problematique arose as a reaction to Europe’s increasing calls for autonomy during the years of the St. Malo Declaration where the UK and France declared the wish for increasing autonomy from NATO and an ESDP that can work self-sufficiently and independently. At the regional level, the introduction of Schengen had accelerated the ability of the early-stages migration threats to come to the fore with drug traffickers becoming globalized and making links and connections to Europe’s periphery, finding ways in. This soon became entangled with organized crime groups including human traffickers bringing in illegal migration. The single anarchy-problematique and the two hierarchy-problematiques combine in the late-stage in a process known as “prior pathway anarchy” which will be further discussed below. While hierarchy was still felt by NATO in the global-arena, its present wasn’t as strongly felt as the US started using more unilateral methods to deal with the new global threats of the Global War on Terror and Iraq. The EU was not concerned with the former, as they had their own history and ways with dealing with terrorism, and opposed the latter. Europe’s late-stage negarchical development became developed through both the widening of geographic threat perceptions and a change in discourse of cooperation with external states through the European Neighborhood Policy at the regional-level. At the late-stage organizational level, a massive restructuring occurred within the EU that increased powers of the European Parliament with a new co-binding legislative procedure known as co-decision.

In Eurasia, the global-stage was absent from both the early-stage and mid-stage of negarchical development. This is linked to Russia’s all-encompassing economic and political hegemony of power over small states in the Eurasian region. This manifested in hierarchy-restraint problematiques, being regional-level problematiques due to Russia’s predatory nature of divide-and-conquer in regional frozen conflicts and near-monopoly on well-equipped armed forces. They also formed a hierarchy-restraint problematique in the organizational-level through their leadership as partners or adversary in Eurasian sub-regional organizations. The mid-stage broke Russia’s monopoly on Eurasian security and thus ameliorated the hierarchy-restraint problematiques into anarchy problematiques as the US penetrated the region through NATO’s partnership-for-peace exercises and interests permeating the region. This was also the stage in the regional-level when the threat of radical Islamists started to form when political dissent started being felt in Uzbekistan and the Uzbek reaction to the Taskhent Bombings drove out the leaders whom started to create social linkages to enclaves. This would spill-over into the late-stage’s regional-level where an anarchy-interdependence problematique erupted from the events of the Batken incursions and growing linkages between the two main terror groups, the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Andijan protests, and drug routes from Afghanistan. There were also border confrontations involving land mines between Uzbekistan and its neighbors. This was also around the time of 9/11, and while the US overlayed the region with air bases, at first they were positive partners to the Eurasian states. However, following the Andijan protests, the US started condemning Human Rights abuses, whereas Uzbekistan saw these as governance issues not to be meddled with by outside powers. Additional accusations included the use of western-ngos
instilling descent during the colored revolutions permeating Eurasia and Eastern Europe. The organizational-level during the late-stage profited from the hierarchy-restraint problematique created by the US in the late-stage and the anarchy-interdependence problematique emerging in the region. The late-stage organizational-level thus developed into a negarchy by virtue of “simultaneous” negarchy. Waiting for this environment, was the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which offered aide and Western protection through the norm of non-interference. It had a co-binding structure which balanced what would have been a dominant Russia with China and the Central Asian states in the organization.

The last case study, South America, had no negarchical development in the environment. While the early-stage had a hierarchy-restraint problematique, brought by the US’s dominance of the OAS and its mandate to intervene in South American for the sake of democracy, this was mitigated in the mid-stage global arena. In the mid-stage global level, the US placed South America lower on their priority list and instead focused on the Middle East. At this time, an anarchy in the global-level’s mid-stage formed as leaders of the new political movement, The Pink Tide, started seeking other great power extra-regional partners through BRICS. This increased the polarity of powers in the region that South America could partner with, thus created anarchy away from the early-stage’s hierarchy-restraint problematique. The early-stage’s regional level had an anarchy-interdependence problematique as narco-terrorists, radical groups and coca growers became intertwined in a drug economy. The issue is that the early stage’s regional anarchy-interdependence problematique was not handled as the governance and social issue by the US during their War on Drugs Campaign. The US in South America’s early-stage also penetrated the organizational-level as a hierarchy, while OAS was the premise security providing organization and MERCOSUR preferred to balance the region through regional trade links. This was once again ameliorated in the mid-stage with the US’s exit and decreasing influence of the OAS by Pink Tide opposition. UNASUR was also created in the mid-stage’s organizational-level and offered a new non-US dominated organizational alternative. The late-stage in South America was characterized by a global-level hierarchy with Venezuela attempting to be a resurgent power and the US’s renewed interest in the War on Drugs under the context of terrorism. The late-stage also created another anarchy-interdependence problematique that was related to drugs but was enacted by several border-disputes where one state would intervene in another’s territory to retrieve political dissidents. Negarchy couldn’t form in the late-stage either as there was no longer a hierarchy-restraint problematique at any level. Reasons why the two early-stage hierarchy-restraint and anarchy-interdependence problematique in the South American early-stage didn’t create a “simultaneous negarchy” or “prior pathway negarchy” is seen as an anomaly and is hypothesized to be because of the mid-stage’s buffering effect and policy choices creating anarchies.

Taking an overview of the three regional cases as a whole, we are able to make the following observations of the conditions that contribute to the emergence of negarchies vis-à-vis the hierarchy problematique as a starting point. After an explanation of these initial observations, we can create a set of hypotheses for negarchy in particular:\[14:\]

---

\[14\] A Necessary Condition is when condition ‘A’ is necessary for a condition ‘B’, if (and only if) the falsity (non-existence/non-occurrence) of ‘A’ brings about the falsity (non-existence/non-occurrence) of ‘B’.
1. Global level hierarchies are a *necessary but not sufficient* condition for negarchy to emerge.

2. A hierarchy-restraint problematique at the global level occurring concurrently with an anarchy-interdependence problematique at the regional level is a *necessary but not sufficient* condition for negarchy to emerge at the organizational level.

3. A hierarchy-restraint problematique at the global level occurring concurrently with an anarchy-interdependence problematique at the regional level at a prior time period is a *necessary but not sufficient* condition for negarchy to emerge at the regional level.

4. A hierarchy-restraint problematique at the organizational level occurring concurrently with an anarchy-interdependence problematique at the regional level at a prior time period is a *sufficient but not necessary* condition for a negarchy to emerge at the organizational level.

5. In general, a hierarchy-restraint problematique occurring concurrently with an anarchy-interdependence problematique at the same time period is *not a necessary and not a sufficient* condition for negarchy to emerge in general.

6. In general, a hierarchy-restraint problematique occurring concurrently with an anarchy-interdependence problematique at the same or prior time period is a *necessary and sufficient* condition for negarchy to emerge.

The first observation is the most general observation made between cases. Observations 2-4 are case-dependant observations and indicate a variety of causal chains for negarchy emergence. The fifth and sixth observations, are more of inductively reasoned conditions that are simplified from observations 2-4. Setting these 6 observations throughout our key case studies is an important step in testing RST as well as creating future hypotheses for negarchy creation. These observations could also aid us in determining the continuum of resilience in the regional security organizations we studied, which we will show in section 6.4. Inconsistencies found in this exercise, particularly in regards to South America, substantiates the need for looking at the micro-structure for further assurances for negarchical creation.

Global level hierarchies (observation 1) has appeared in both negarchy-produced cases of late-stage Eurasia and late-stage Europe. It is a necessary condition, because without a hierarchy or hierarchy-problematique at the global level, no negarchy is observed. However, it is not a sufficient condition for the production of negarchy. Global level hierarchies were also present in the cases of early-stage Europe and mid-stage South America. Yet global level hierarchy had not produced negarchy at any level in the same time period. Nor was it linked to producing negarchy in the later time periods for those two cases. The later three observations are narrower in scope. This also indicates a narrowing of scope for the conditions and cases where RST may operate.

The second observation, negarchy arising at only the organizational level when a hierarchy-restraint problematique at the global level emerges concurrently with an anarchy-interdependence problematique at the regional level, refers to Eurasia. Note that this observation details the *simultaneous* creation of negarchy rather than a prior pathway leading to negarchy (see figure 9).

---

*A Sufficient Condition is when condition ‘A’ is sufficient for ‘B’, if (and only if) the truth (existence/occurrence) of ‘A’ guarantees the truth (existence/occurrence) of B.*
The second observation does not apply to mid-stage Europe nor early-stage South America because although they satisfy conditions, negarchy did not occur concurrently in the same time period. At the state of current research, the second condition is not sufficient for the general production of negarchy. Yet, this is not the only causal pathway to negarchy.

Figure 9. Simultaneous Negarchy (Observation 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage/Time Period</th>
<th>Global</th>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>Organizational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hierarchy-restraint problematique</td>
<td>Anarchy-interdependence problematique</td>
<td>Negarchy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third observation, A hierarchy-restraint problematique at the global level occurring concurrently with an anarchy-interdependence problematique at the regional level at a prior time period is a necessary but not sufficient condition for regional negarchy to emerge -- refers to one way negarchy was created in the European case. Specifically this refers to the production of regional negarchy in Europe. The emphasis is on hierarchy-restraint and anarchy-interdependence problematiques being prior pathways (see Figure 10). It is different from the simultaneous condition of the two problematiques in Eurasia where both problematiques emerged during the same time period as negarchy. This condition for regional negarchy is considered not sufficient because we presently have only one case, late-stage Europe, where regional negarchy has been observed. Regional negarchy is not observed in either Eurasia or South America for the third observation. We have found that despite the conditions being present in early-stage South America, regional negarchy still did not occur in mid-stage South America through the “prior time period” causal pathway. To reiterate, negarchy hasn’t appeared in South America at all. The reasons for this will be further investigated in the micro-structure section of this chapter. Because of South America, we now know that the conditions for this third observation are not sufficient for negarchy. But we cannot jump to the same conclusion that this prior pathway condition to regional negarchy is not true for Eurasia even if regional negarchy hasn’t (yet) emerged. Late-stage Eurasia, where the condition fell flat, was the terminal chronological point for this thesis but not for the study for negarchy in general. This means that future research could still either further support or falsify the third observation as time goes on. There is still a possibility for regional negarchy in Eurasia but this was not investigated in the timeframes set out by this thesis.
The fourth observation refers to another path of negarchy creation in Europe. The fourth observation states that, a hierarchy-restraint problematique at the organizational level occurring concurrently with an anarchy-interdependence problematique at the regional level at a prior time period is a sufficient but not necessary condition for organizational negarchy to emerge. Observation 2 also deals with organizational negarchy, but it presents the two problematiques of being a simultaneous condition that occurs in the same time period as negarchy emergence, rather than observation 4’s prior pathway. Because there are two different instances where organizational negarchy appears -- Europe’s prior pathway model and Eurasia’s simultaneous model -- this condition is not necessary for the creation of negarchy at the organizational level. It is important not to be confused between the hierarchy-restraint problematique and hierarchy in general. Only hierarchy is seen at the organizational level in early-stage South America, not a hierarchy-restraint problematique. So the comparisons between Europe and South America do not apply. Europe possessed a hierarchy-restraint problematique at the organizational level during the mid-stage, producing a negarchy via prior pathways. Whereas South America only possessed hierarchy at the organizational level during the early-stage without the problematique. Thus the fourth observation still stands as a sufficient condition for the creation of negarchy at the organizational level.

The fifth observation, much like the first, was created as a result of looking for possible similarities in all three case studies. The fifth observation states that hierarchy-restraint problematique occurring concurrently with an anarchy-interdependence problematique at the same time period is not a necessary nor is it a sufficient condition for negarchy creation. Observation five is a summation of what we have observed in negarchical formation in the Post-Cold War era in an attempt to find the strongest condition for negarchy creation. We have thus found that whether or not the hierarchy-problematique and anarchy problematique exist concurrently, it is not sufficient due to the South American case not producing negarchy. The fifth observation is also not a necessary condition because other pathways exist for the creation of negarchy in general, e.g. prior pathway conditions to negarchy.

The sixth and final observation, is that a hierarchy-restraint problematique occurring concurrently with an anarchy-interdependence problematique at the same or prior time period is both a necessary and sufficient condition for negarchy to emerge. It is a generalized observation from all three of the case studies. It is purposely vague because it has been simplified. This observation can refer to either a simultaneous or prior pathway negarchy and it does not designate levels for the anarchy-interdependence and hierarchy-restraint problematiques. This is because we
widened the scope of our conditions so that we are not wrapped up in a particular type of negarchical pathway. All of the possibilities we have investigated in observations 2-4 when taken together become both necessary and sufficient conditions.

Although the case observations have shown the emergence of negarchies, they have shown the emergence in inconsistent ways that result in different pathways across cases. More specifically any one of observations 2-4 in negarchy emergence could have been necessary and sufficient if they held true for South America. What is of particular concern is how come mid-stage South America, while satisfying all the necessary conditions for both types of negarchies (simultaneous and prior pathway) still has not produced any negarchies in its security space? Intervening South American processes that could have stunted the growth of negarchy and resilience in organizations include: the lack of a global hierarchy from South America persisting (instead it swung to a global level anarchy). Also, instead of a regional negarchy arising as a result of an anarchy-interdependence problematique at the regional level, South America had ameliorated the anarchy-interdependence problematique into a tolerable first-order anarchy. We need to find out why these alternative non-negarchical order processes occurred.

It is difficult to determine if South America is the exception or the rule. In order to find out which it is, we need to delve deeper into seeing if there are general patterns below the surface of the macro-structure of negarchy. We will now investigate South America’s exceptional case of non-negarchy creation by looking at the micro-structure. Then we will observe the appropriate order-altering perception corresponding to the presence and/or absence of negarchy: autonomy contestation’s relationship to sovereign non-interference.

6.3.2 The microstructure

The microstructure’s purpose is to serve as a device to help us better understand the underlying mechanics of order change, rather than just making superficial comparisons and observations. While the macro-structure indicates the structural conditions that produce negarchy, the micro-structure concerns itself with both agency in the member states and the introduction of exogenous shocks into the system. Thus the application of RST combines structural, agent, and process-based conditions to yield a comprehensive theory on negarchy creation.

The state responses and threat interpretation inherent in the micro-structure stimulate the creation of four mechanisms, aka. “order-altering perceptions”. They take into account both the Post-Cold War phenomena of non-state malignant threat movements and the RST observation on the presence and absence of external threat. It tracks changes in the member state’s perception of challenges towards their own sovereignty or autonomy. Negarchy thus becomes a state of mind as well as a structural ordering principle.

The typology in Figure 11 is best used for case comparisons and pattern finding. It is essentially a summary of each region’s movement through the four mechanisms to their negarchical destination. When we look at perceptions, we are referring to those of states that are considered weak or middle powers. We chose these states as the focal point of perceptions because under RST they have the most to gain or lose if a region was to turn hierarchic or hegemonic given the relatively low amount of defense resources they have at their disposal. Thusly weak or middle-
power state are more likely to adopt balancing/bandwagoning in strategies in anarchy or subordination strategies in hierarchy, apart from cooperation under negarchy.

The columns refer to the location of the threat in a state’s security perception, internalization means that malevolent non-state threats were active within what the state considers its own territorial boundaries. Externalization means that the non-state threats have become transnational, affecting multiple states and are a security concern in the eyes of more than one member state.

The rows represent intervening powers or external partners, whether they are part of an organization or part of a looser alliance. They are categorized as either being perceived to have a global or regional mandate for security concerns. Those that are globally mandated may not geographically come from the actual security region under investigation, thus they are usually seen as “external threats” and can alter the nature of global-level orders. Regionally mandated powers are typically reside in the same regional security environment and have immediate regional goals. However, it is possible for them to have global aspirations, but this effect is more appropriately observed in the macro-level.

These regionally or globally mandate powers are present in the security sphere at the same time as non-state or extra-regional state threats. The intersection of globally/regionally-mandated powers and the presence of non-state and extra-regional threats produce perceptions of contestation or non-interference in a regional (weaker) state’s sovereignty or autonomy as a reaction to policies of the globally/regionally mandated power. Non-state threats and the mandate of state actors thus impact on how member states view their security or insecurity (See Figure 11).
Figure 11. Comparison of case study order-altering perceptions and threat movements (in chronological order i.e., 1, 2, 3)

### Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner’s security mandates</th>
<th>Internalization</th>
<th>Externalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Sovereign Contestation</td>
<td>Sovereign Non-interference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. NATO and Yugoslav Wars; outside-terrorism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Autonomy Contestation</td>
<td>Autonomy Non-interference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. NATO’s CJTF; Schengen and internal-EU crime organizations</td>
<td>3. US and Iraq war; ENP and external migration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Eurasia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner’s security mandates</th>
<th>Internalization</th>
<th>Externalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Sovereign Contestation</td>
<td>Sovereign Non-interference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. CIS and Frozen Conflicts; Tashkent bombings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. IMU Batken incursions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. SCO and Mobile Terrorism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Autonomy Contestation</td>
<td>Autonomy Non-interference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### South America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner’s security mandates</th>
<th>Internalization</th>
<th>Externalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Sovereign Contestation</td>
<td>Sovereign Non-interference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Inter-state border disputes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Autonomy Contestation</td>
<td>Autonomy Non-interference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. US War on Drugs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. US regional economic policies; War on Drugs cont.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each order-altering perception is a general response inside a time period. However, one caveat is that it is not necessarily true that each box time period results in a single box/order-
altering perception. This is glaringly obvious when looking at the case of Eurasia where the mid-stage occupies two boxes: sovereign-contestation and sovereign non-interference; and the late-stage moves rapidly between three boxes: autonomy non-interference, autonomy contestation, before settling on sovereign non-interference. This may be indicative of a level of instability in the time period, which is a product of the different types of interactions and reactions in the micro-structure. By looking at all three cases we can find if there are any links to the order types of anarchy, hierarchy and negarchy emerging in the macro-structure to the four mechanisms in the micro-structure. Our results are as follows:

1. **Sovereign contestation** - A security situation where there is a regionally mandated external partner working in conjunction with internalized threats. An internalized threat is one where the source of the threat is inside the state’s own borders and is thusly perceived as a domestic issue. Political dissidents are internalized threats. When present it, corresponds to cases of malignant regional hierarchies. This can be seen in early-stage Eurasia and the CIS.

2. **Sovereign non-interference** – A security situation where there is a regionally mandated external partner working in conjunction with externally placed threats. Externally placed threats are seen as emanating from outside of states’ territories, often outside of the region and have thusly mobilized. They can either be extra-regional powers or mobile region-wide insurgencies. It is related to the presence of regional anarchies. It was present in early-stage Europe, mid-stage Eurasia and post-Andijan late-stage Eurasia, and late-stage South America.

3. **Autonomy non-interference** - A security situation where there is a globally mandated external partner working in conjunction with externally placed threats. It applies to the presence of negarchy in the regional and organizational level in mid-stage Europe and the 9/11 period of late-stage Eurasia. Its manifestation with negarchy at the organizational level and the presence of a global mandate further supports the condition that the presence of a hierarchy at the global level is a necessary condition.

4. **Autonomy contestation** - A security situation where there is a globally mandated external partner working in conjunction with internalized threats. No initial pattern was found when looking at the corresponding macro-structures. This prompts the need to investigate the causality of contradictory cases. When taken with our previous case based research, South America’s exception could be brought into further light through comparing early-stage South America with late-stage Eurasia. This also brings us the opportunity to further clarify why the macro-structural conditions for negarchy have been insufficient to create negarchy’s rise in general.

The above four results point to the correlations between each order-altering perception and the presence of orders. Our cursory observations was able to isolate autonomy contestation as the sufficient order-altering perception to result in negarchy. But they still say little about the actual causal chain in producing negarchies. For this, we can take a closer look at contradictory cases at the macro-structure and our most enigmatic order-altering perception: autonomy contestation.
From what we know when comparing both the micro and macro-structures, autonomy-contestation appears to be a pivotal or crucial stage where the road forks to either negarchy emergence or non-negarchy emergence. For Europe, sovereign non-interference from the early-stage preceded autonomy-contestation in the mid-stage. The presence of autonomy contestation in mid-stage Europe resulted in the negarchy-related autonomy non-contestation in the late-stage.

Compare Europe with what occurred in late-stage Eurasia where wild vacillations from autonomy non-interference to autonomy contestation finally settled on sovereign non-interference. These three steps to organizational negarchy all occurred in a single time period in Eurasia (Post-2001). Autonomy non-interference was the order-altering perception resulting from the Post-9/11 deals member states had with the US after the super-power enacted a global mandate under the Global War on Terror.

Autonomy-contestation manifested as a counter-reaction to the human rights critique that the US placed on Uzbekistan. This prompted the overall shifting of allegiances back to the SCO. In South America, autonomy contestation remained frozen and present in the early-stage and the middle-stage even when the structural conditions changed dramatically in the mid-stage as a result of the rise of the pink tide. This large disjuncture and the inability to find an order-altering link for autonomy contestation in instances of simultaneous organizational negarchy leads us to further question the inconsistencies in the macro-structure.

6.3.2.1. Comparing different cases’ microstructures: The mystery of missing negarchy in South America.

One question from the macro-structure was, “Why did early-stage South America not produce organizational negarchy when the global hierarchy-problematique and regional anarchy-problematique were present?” in other words, “Why did South America not experience simultaneous organizational negarchy?” Even on a micro-level, South America’s first experience of autonomy contestation did not match structurally with Eurasia or Europe’s. Autonomy contestation’s causal chain was different for each. Not only does autonomy contestation in South America not match the micro-structural sequence of late-stage Eurasia. South America’s macro-structure during autonomy contestation also doesn’t match the overall macro-structure of organizational negarchy in Eurasia even despite having global hierarchy-problematique and regional anarchy-problematique appear concurrently (see: observation 3 in macro-structures). The main difference between South America and Eurasia’s autonomy contestation is that South America’s remained frozen, while Eurasia’s transformed into sovereign non-interference.

We can untangle the inconsistency by making an organizational comparison between the choices of organizational allegiance in member states for South America during autonomy contestation – the OAS and MERCOSUR; and Eurasia—the SCO and CSTO. Keep in mind we have already designated South America as an exceptional case among our three case studies, we isolate the security condition of autonomy contestation as the factor preventing negarchy.

We compare South America to Eurasia in order to explain why the South American case did not produce simultaneous organizational negarchy despite sharing the characteristics of having a simultaneously occurring regional anarchy-problematique and hierarchy-problematique. What
we are able to observe is that in the micro-structure, South America’s perceptions were fundamentally different from that of a Eurasian state. While South America’s hierarchy-restraint and anarchy-interdependence problematiques were operating under only autonomy contestation; Eurasia’s hierarchy-restraint and anarchy-interdependence problematiques had to deal with three fast-shifting policy exchanges dealing with the US, a Russian-dominated CSTO, and the more co-binding negarchical structured SCO. In order, these were the shifts between autonomy non-interference, autonomy contestation and sovereign non-interference. Yet, despite these radically different micro-structures, autonomy contestation was at one time, a common response between South America and Eurasia. So if both South America and Eurasia had concurrently occurring hierarchy and anarchy problematiques and a micro-structure that contains anarchy contestation, why does South America still not produce simultaneous negarchy? The key to make this theory not just conjecture, is to look at what we know about the level of development of the security organizations on offer for states during early-stage South America and late-stage Eurasia.

In Eurasia, the CSTO was as hierarchical as any US partnership. A move back into the CSTO would have led to a sovereign contestation as bad a choice as a US centered partnership’s autonomy contestation (see the US human rights response to Andijan) preventing a member states right of deciding its own policy uninterrupted by another state. The availability of a co-binding SCO allowed members’ threat perceptions to change from autonomy contestation to sovereign non-interference and organizational negarchy. The SCO’s membership structure also contained partners (Russia and China) concerned with a regional mandate in Eurasia, which interacted with the internalized threat of terrorism to a member state’s governance. This created sovereign non-interference’s regional anarchy in the late-stage. This made the SCO an optimal choice for allowing Eurasian members to maintain their governance styles in response to terrorism whilst being regionally secure. In short, the SCO’s values of non-interference matches the member states’ desire for non-interference after experiencing the human rights critique that the US imposed on Uzbekistan. This conclusion prompts us to incorporate the structure of the available organizations and compare it in parallel with ordering principles in case studies. If, as in this case, the ordering principles match 2/3 with the macro-structure of negarchy producing region but still does not produce negarchy, the micro-structure can provide insight into why another ordering principle emerged.

South America’s only option for security in the early and mid-stage was the US-dominated OAS, a hierarchical organization. Autonomy contestation was evident in early-stage South America as the US still held a global mandate over South America based on the War on Drugs. The global mandate held up even though the threat was conceived as a governance threat internalized in their own territory by the South American member states hence their perception of autonomy contestation. The situation was not any better in mid-stage South America. MERCOSUR was ineffective in providing security as it still held to anarchic mechanics of balancing and bandwagoning. Hence the pairing of MERCOSUR’s behavior with US intrusive policies created the freezing of autonomy contestation. The macro-structural shift from the hierarchy at the global level to the anarchic level was a regional response to US domination in the Latin American sphere taken up by a handful of member states in a string of socialist-won elections, known as the Pink Tide. Pink tide leaders continued supporting the view of a now-
changed global level anarchy to its members through its activities with BRICs and search for external partners. The organizational level shift from hierarchy to anarchy was a result of the exit of the US from the South American sphere altogether, in favor of the Middle East, along with their organizational influence. This decrease in American activity coupled with the divergent regional aspirations of Pink Tide leaders led to the shift from hierarchy to anarchy at the organizational level. However, despite these two macro-structural changes in mid-stage South America, this did not mean that autonomy contestation had to change as the War on Drugs and the US’s continued role in it was a persistent agitating factor.

The explanation for South America is that MERCOSUR and the perception of autonomy-contestation brought by the US’s South American activities does not produce negarchic logics in creating resilient republican forms. The organization was too weak to bring about structural change or policies in their security environment to hasten the shift away from anarchy contestation to sovereign non-interference. This is indicative of autonomy contestation persisting and being frozen during the region’s mid-stage. The continued presence of autonomy contestation, despite the change in a global hierarchy-problematique to a global anarchy plus a change from a regional anarchy-problematique to a regional anarchy, was due to perceptions of the external regional security environment remaining unchanged. The macro-structural changes ushered in by the policies of the Pink Tide did not appear to make a micro-structural impact against the policies of the US and worsening condition of the War on Drugs on the governance stability of the member state. By the time that UNASUR was created, it was created under the balancing logics of a fully anarchical environment, both regionally and hierarchically. As a result the organization became a playing field for balancing rather than the unifying body that it was institutionalized and intended to be. Intense US intervention and then abdication determined the relations and perceptions of South American states between each other, rather than being driven with confidence from a strong republican-esque security organization (UNASUR). UNASUR never had the opportunity to maneuver in a security environment it was optimally designed for. Thus a republican structured organization does not itself create negarchy. The absence of negarchy was a result of factors indicative in autonomy-contestation.

What this means for our central research question is that the absence of negarchy still supports Republican Security Theory. What RST states and what was demonstrated by South America is that the roots of orders such as anarchy, hierarchy and negarchy must come from the environment and are not produced by organizations or their member states. Therefore, contrary to neorealism and neoliberalism, the environment and logics of cooperation inside an organization are not one and the same. Patterns of cooperation are not reflective of the environment. This would explain why there are conflicting interpretations for organizational cooperation that go unresolved if both neorealism and neoliberalism are consistent that state actors act logically (but differently) despite sharing the assumption of an anarchic environment.

6.3.2.2. Comparing similar cases’ micro-structures: The creation of regional negarchy and the roots of resilience.

Comparing cases that were successful in producing negarchy can also illuminate useful mechanics between the micro-structure and the macro-structure. In this instance we compare
Europe and Eurasia, which both experienced negarchy but in different structural conditions, i.e. *simultaneous negarchy versus prior pathway negarchy*. Simultaneous negarchy is the environmental condition where a hierarchy-restraint problematique and an anarchy-interdependence problematique occurred at the same time period as organizational-level negarchy. Negarchical creation was thus swifter and more immediate in the environment. Prior pathway negarchy is a more gradual process. In prior pathway negarchy the anarchy-interdependence negarchy and hierarchy-restraint problematique occur one time period before negarchy emerges. Our goal now is to find out why simultaneous negarchy occurs in one instance and prior pathway negarchy occurs in another.

The question we can ask out of the macro-structure that may be explained through the micro-structure is, “If South America was unable to experience simultaneous negarchy due to its pathway in autonomy contestation, how come South America also did not experience prior pathway negarchy?” This question can also lead to the following questions posed from the standpoint of Europe: Why did Europe’s double negarchy emerge one period after the organizational-level negarchical conditions of anarchy-interdependence problematique and hierarchy-restraint problematique were already present? And how come organizational negarchy did not occur in mid-stage Europe when the hierarchy-restraint problematique occurred concurrently with an anarchy-interdependence problematique, like in Eurasia?

This leads us to consider a deeper investigation of the organizations/options of Europe and Eurasia that were present during the time periods they experienced autonomy contestation. These organizations are: Europe’s NATO and the EU/ESDP; and again, Eurasia’s SCO and CSTO.

In Europe, autonomy contestation was followed by autonomy non-interference. Meanwhile in Eurasia, autonomy contestation was followed by sovereign non-interference. Both Europe’s late-stage autonomy non-interference and Eurasia’s sovereign non-interference produced late-stage negarchy. But Europe’s double negarchy hints at one more additional factor for stability which was lacking in Eurasia’s single-negarchy: the presence of regional negarchy with organizational negarchy. This is checked by the logics of the macro-structure and our earlier investigations of vivere libero and vivere sicuro in the case study chapters. Europe’s EU is more potentially resilient than Eurasia’s SCO even though both had republican co-binding features. The development of vivere libero in the EU is a credit to resilience, but we must also consider the circumstances that would allow both the time and the will for it to flourish. On that vein, we compare the case of mid-stage Europe with late-stage Eurasia to detail root and the emergence of Europe’s distinguish hing structural feature: a regional level negarchy.

What separates Eurasia from Europe is that autonomy non-interference did not correspond to late-stage Eurasia’s negarchy. Eurasia’s negarchy was linked to sovereign non-interference. Europe’s organizational negarchy and Eurasia’s organizational negarchy are thus fundamentally different in type and process. This was explained earlier on the macro-structure, but we see from comparisons of the micro-structure that the member states “belief” in agency and the changing whims of greater external partners produces two paths to negarchy. Like in our previous different cases comparison, both regions experienced autonomy-contestation at the micro-level during the presence of a concurring global hierarchy-problematique and regional anarchy-
problematique. Autonomy-contestation was produced from the internalization of threat and a globally mandated partner. For Europe, threat internalization was evident as a consequence of the EU Schengen policy and the free movement of goods and people, recasting threats and drawing them inside European territorial boundaries. This was seen in the event of drug trade routes from outside Europe becoming more and more embedded in the domestic EU markets. The US and NATO moved towards a global mandate with restrictions given to the spending and development of a self-sufficient European defense capability paired with the inclusion of out-of-area missions. Yet after a shared micro-process and a shared macro-process structure, while Eurasia changed to an order-altering perception of sovereign non-interference, Europe changed to autonomy non-interference. This gives the impression that autonomy non-interference is correlated with regional negarchy, but why? And why didn’t Eurasia also go the pathway of autonomy non-interference so that it may too feel the benefits of regional negarchy?

Autonomy non-interference is produced from an environment where a globally mandated partner is present and threats are geographically externalized outside of member state territory. Autonomy non-interference was created from a resulting factor of the US’s continued domination of NATO and the instrumentality of the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument in re-externalizing European threats in global terrorism and migration. The autonomy non-interference context was vital for the creation of a European security region; one that was tied with its wider Justice and Home Affairs to include Europe’s surrounding areas. This would not have been possible had the EU been institutionally weak. In terms of organizational choice, bandwagoning with NATO at the stage of autonomy contestation would be an abandonment of the European project. The risk of siding with a hierarchical organization like NATO that could have maintained the status quo of autonomy contestation would mean that the EU may not have had the will to develop its threat externalization policy to produce autonomy non-interference and regional negarchy.

But what ultimately distinguishes the two regions are the speed and the stability of the time period. Europe moved away from autonomy contestation in the mid-stage and stayed at autonomy non-interference in the late-stage. Europe’s internal security during the mid-stage was not as dire as Eurasia’s. While Europe had the stability and time to consolidate and stay in autonomy on-interference, Eurasian states had to immediately switch out of their autonomy non-interference perception as a product of US policy starting to threaten their ability to decide their own nation-state governance. Eurasia’s security situation was relatively less stable and more conflictual than Europe’s because of the presence of non-state, state, regional and global threats continuously disrupting member states’ stability.

We are not yet through with exploring the value contained within this similar case comparison. What is puzzling is that Eurasia indeed had experienced autonomy non-interference before but didn’t settle down so that it may produce regional negarchy. Eurasia’s autonomy non-interference shifted to the autonomy contestation before arriving at sovereign non-interference. Sovereign non-interference is a less desirable stage for Eurasian states to be. Although Eurasian members had the protection of the SCO operating in a negarchy so that they would not be at war with each other or under a hegemon, it does not address the hierarchy-restraint problematique
lurking at the global-level nor the anarchy-interdependence problematique in the region. Eurasia’s shift from autonomy non-interference to a more perilous autonomy contestation was not wholly the fault of Eurasian member states. Shifts in perception are triggered by exogenous shocks, whether it is a change in territorial mandate from a regional partner, a new introduction of an extra-regional power in the security sphere, or the accelerated geographic movements of non-state malevolent actors and their level of threat in targeting a member state’s internal governance. As was the case in South America, US policy once again proved structurally decisive in changing inter-state relations and perceptions.

Earlier in the late-stage immediately following 9/11, Uzbekistan held a relatively peaceful relationship with the US. Uzbekistan benefitted from US military funding in combatting what it perceived as its own internal challenge of governance, dissidents from roaming Islamists threatening to topple the state. For a time, this was overlooked from the US which prioritized an idea of a territorially externalized conception of terrorism under the Global War on Terror. The shift to autonomy contestation was created from complications between the US human rights critiques following the 2005 protests in Andijan where Uzbek security forces opened fire on dissidents and accused “terrorists”. As a whole, the starting point of autonomy non-interference completely altered the micro-structure of organizational negarchy development.

What this tells us about negarchy creation is that not only are the exogenous shocks of external partnership a factor in stable negarchy creation. But also, in addition to the presence of a stable autonomy non-interference perception; autonomy-contestation is a crucial and pivotal step in the micro-structural process in either creating or disrupting negarchy emergence.

6.3.3. Conclusions on general theory

Reverting back to what we have seen in the case studies, the following statements can be made on negarchy and organizational resilience.

On simplifying our original macro-structure observations:

- Global level hierarchies are necessary but not a sufficient condition for negarchy to emerge.
- In general, a hierarchy-problematic occurring concurrently with an anarchy-problematic at the same or prior time period is a necessary and sufficient condition for negarchy to emerge.

By way of micro-structures alone:

- Autonomy non-interference is a necessary and sufficient condition for negarchy to emerge organizational level of state interaction. This is the closest we can get to certainty in the theory at this present time.
- Sovereign non-interference is a necessary but not sufficient condition for negarchy to emerge in general.

And through a combination of both:
A negarchically structured organization is not sufficient enough to grant resilience to that organization. This means that resilience in terms of extended cooperation patterns is not an inherent characteristic of republics. Rather, it is negarchy matched with republics. This further emphasizes the strong distinction between the environment and the organization when using resilience as a research tool for explaining extended cooperation patterns.

In order for resilience to be assured in co-binding negarchical organizations, negarchy must be present in the organizational level plus one other level of analysis.

A hierarchy-problematique at the global level is a necessary but not sufficient condition for organizational negarchy to emerge if a hierarchy-restraint problematique has occurred concurrently with an anarchy-interdependence problematique within the same time period alongside the presence of autonomy contestation.

A hierarchy-restraint problematique at the global level is a necessary but not sufficient condition for regional negarchy to emerge. This is true if a hierarchy-restraint problematique occurred in a prior pathway concurrently with an anarchy-interdependence problematique. Autonomy contestation must also be present in the prior pathway.

Autonomy contestation in a causal path is a necessary and sufficient condition for the production of resilience in republicanly structured organizations.

6.4. Implications for Republican Security Theory and Re-Assessing our Aims

6.4.1. The case for Republican Security Theory in the twenty-first century

Results of our observations on the macro-structure corroborate with earlier theoretical work about Republican Security Theory and negarchy.

RST originally believed that it was the development of technology and geography affecting the severity of threats that bind members. Through our illustrative case studies we have shown that today it is perceptions of legitimate regional authority and disruptions of territorial-sovereignty that matter. This was shown through the development of the tool of micro-structure, which includes questions of interference into a member states’ autonomy and sovereignty, as well as the geographic movement of non-state threats.

There is potential for the above observation to be an empirical proof of the scale effect in collective International Politics: changes in size produces changes in the proportions of its parts, affecting the characteristics of the parts until eventually a new entity emerges. Europe’s ever enlarging size and security remit through the European Neighborhood Policy towards the end of the 2000s necessitated the strengthening of its republican institutions. Something similar happened in Eurasia, where the SCO was comparable in size to the CSTO, but focused on changing its internal power structures to a more Republican-type. Whereas the institutions of South America stayed rooted to its geographic limitations of the South American continent, despite the integration of the Andean Community and UNASUR. This has made South America as a whole still vulnerable to the anarchy-interdependence problematique of transnational sub-state malevolent actors with a minimal republican-structured organization which couldn’t cope with the regional security dynamics.
6.4.2 Resilience and our findings

We come to four case-based propositions on negarchy and resilience based on our conclusions when looking at the macro-structure of orders and the micro-structures of order change.

Firstly, regional negarchy and organizational negarchy are necessary and sufficient for the emergence of “high resilience” in republican-styled security organizations. This finding was reached through comparing the macro-structures throughout the three regions.

Secondly, Europe’s creation of negarchy occurred more gradually than Eurasia’s as as Europe’s hierarchy-restraint problematique and the anarchy-interdependence problematique occurred one time period prior to negarchy at either level. This has been built upon older institutional legacies. This indicates the ideal of republican resilience and gradual negarchy being created. Resilience is evident from the presence of an organizational-level negarchy matching with a regional negarchical environment. We have confirmed this with the theory through the empirical cases and testing for the presence of vivere sicuro and vivere libero within the organization of the EU/ESDP. This is done once negarchy has been established. We provisionally accept that both viveres need to be present for an organization to be a stable republic.

Thirdly, Eurasia’s organizational negarchy-related security organization (the SCO) is less resilient than Europe’s EU. This is because the organizational level negarchy is out of place with its current regional security order, which is an anarchy-interdependence problematique, rather than a matching negarchy. This may be due to the negarchy’s simultaneous or quick reactive nature of its member states in dropping out of the hierarchical CSTO in favor of the republican-esque SCO at the organizational level. We further test the future resilience of the SCO by repeating what we had done for Europe’s EU: finding indications of vivere sicuro or vivere libero. The SCO, while it is institutionally developed in vivere sicuro it is lacking in vivere libero. This corroborates our suspicion that the frequency of exogenous shocks are a destabilizing element to the region and that sharp-reactiveness makes it unlikely that a resilient republican organization can both form and catch up to an advanced level.

Fourthly, in the case of South America, while co-binding and negarchical features can be identified in institutional scope and structure within UNASUR, resilience cannot be inferred at this time. What was evident from our gathering of macro-structural and micro-structural evidence was that there was a lack of global hierarchy persisting through the stages. Also, instead of creating regional negarchy South America has retained an anarchical regional structure instead of shifting to a different order like hierarchy altogether. Instead we witnessed the amelioration of the anarchy-problematique at the regional level during the mid-stage and a swing back to the anarchy-problematique during the late-stage. These are small and minute steps in order change. This was due to the exit of the US from the security sphere, the inability of the Pink Tide to organize and the still present differing interpretations between the US and South American states on non-state threats. The dealbreaker for resilience lies in that the security environment MUST match its intended ordering principle. Without negarchy characterizing the inter-state interactions at the organizational level, a mature negarchical formation in South America is a moot point.
Considering our additional observations from the micro-structure, what hinges upon our four propositions are the choices made by member states during the crucial juncture of anarchy - contestation. This is connected to their perceived room for maneuvering their national security agendas and the organizations that are on offer at the time.

As was seen in the earlier studies, the most resilient organization – the EU, was a resilient structure, not only because it had co-binding and negarchic organizational features (which the case of South America’s UNASUR showed was not sufficient) but also that the preceding mid-stage contained a more flexible “fork in the road” with autonomy contestation. The EU was both reflexive and proactive in the determination of its own security environment. Contrast this with other instances of autonomy contestation such as in South America where the only choices were the OAS or the non-security concerned MERCOSUR.

Europe as a case for resilience, also had the benefit of a stabilized security sphere where the only intrusion of the US was in the EU’s development of defense resources. This is in stark contrast with the US’s more aggressive presence in South America and Eurasia. Especially in the latter region, the US’s governance critique and the flexible concept of terrorism has left member states insecure about the stability of their cooperative relationships. Thus producing the wildly vacillating order-altering perception micro-structures within a single time period. In conclusion, Europe is privileged in having the right combination of US policies towards the region, policy reactions to externalize and internalize mobile threats, and relatively stable regional security to form regional negarchy. These factors made it possible to create a matching negarchic security sphere for its co-binding organizations to finally be resilient.

Taken altogether, in Figure 12, we can observe a continuum of resilience in negarchical placement. At high end of resilience we find the EU as a resilient organization due to its co-existence with a negarchical European regional security sphere. At the low end of the spectrum is the Republican structured UNASUR/SADC that has yet to break the confines of an anarchic regional mentality and an anarchic organizational mentality. In the middle is Eurasia’s SCO which does operate in an organizational negarchy as a result of their regional and global security perceptions, but in doing so provides no room or time for maneuver into creating a regional negarchy.
6.4.3. The aims of the thesis revisited

We started our research of negarchy with our central research question: What does the conceptual system of Republican Security Theory give us in terms of analysis of cooperation patterns in security organizations given the problems involved with neorealist and neoliberal explanations?

To answer the central research question, we created four aims. [1] To challenge the three harmful assumptions of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism\(^{15}\) that lead to contradictory explanations on the development of regional security organizations [2] To create a new theory that explains extended cooperation in Post-Cold War Security Organizations by introducing the organizational and methodological concept of resilience . [3] To investigate if negarchy was present in the world. And [4] to see if this negarchy appeared alongside new republican styled security organizations to indicate resilience.

Our functional tasks centred on uncovering the presence or absence of negarchy, an ordering principle of Republican Security Theory, and the conditions for its emergence. We introduced the concept of negarchy when confronted with a set of empirical contradictions for the emergence and extended cooperation of Post-Cold War security organizations when viewed under neoliberal and neorealist lenses. We put forth the proposal that the inability of neorealism and neoliberalism to provide a coherent theory across cases was due to their conceptual and

\(^{15}\) (1) The constant presence of international anarchy (2) The belief that one level of analysis is governed one way while others are governed by another, at all times. See: Anarchy at the international level, Hierarchy at the domestic level. (3) The methodological dependence on rational choice and game theory models.
methodological dependence of international anarchy in framing their cooperation logics. As a solution, resilience was introduced both as an organizational quality and a methodological tool.

As a quality, resilience focuses on cooperation over time against the introduction of exogenous shocks, in opposition to the quality of organizational effectiveness. As a methodological tool resilience prompting us into uncovering the mechanics that inhabit the space between games linked with anarchy by turning our focus to the security environment.

We then created a new framework that took into account the new Post-Cold War realities of threat movements of malevolent non-state actors and extra-regional powers intruding on already integrated security spheres in addition to the RST concepts of problematiques, scale effects and violence-interdependence to help us uncover negarchy. We argued that extended cooperation can be explained by examining the resilience of an organization, which can be found by seeing if the organizational structure matched with ordering principles of the environment. In our case of Post-Cold War organizations, it would be a republican-structure matching with negarchy.

We looked at three regional cases to locate and track the emergence of negarchy, and thus create explanations for Post-Cold War extended cooperation. We finally took our data from the three cases and compared them against each other to unearth the mechanics and causal linkages for resilient negarchical cooperation.

If we base the success of our thesis on whether or not the aims we set out were met, we are satisfied. We are able to show an alternative set of inter-state logics based on a combination of restraints on inter-state violence, the choice of political authority, and the policy reactions to Post-Cold War risks of domination and non-state threats. What the theory additionally accomplishes is marrying the agency of a member state to determine the level of threat an extra-regional power or non-state threat holds to its sovereignty/autonomy, with the structure affected by the introduction of threats and powers.

6.5 Implications on IR Theory and the Study of International Politics

While RST introduced negarchy, unlike the limits of our thesis, it is not concerned with only the production and creation of negarchy. RST’s classical predecessors also explained the creation and operation of hierarchical and anarchical orders. Even if negarchy in the future does not become the new persistent condition in all regions, advances in theory could tell us why other orders remained prominent. This could be done through processes of globalization, state governance types, epistemic communities, or any additional factors at the discretion of the researcher. Future studies would remain RST-like in spirit as long as there are consistent references in the relationship between the international and state levels and the governance of organizations. Keeping the methodology of a tripartite macro-structure and an agency-based micro-structure can assure this.

As a general theory, RST provides a new lens for looking at the creation of organizations. It breaks free from a constrictive idea of frozen structural anarchy inherent in the Neo-Neo debates by delving into the foundations of order creation. This heralds a speedier introduction of a “third way” approach to the study of cooperation while still honoring the existence of anarchies and
hierarchies. The study of interactions in anarchy and hierarchy is still useful to retain in international politics. Our theory adds an additional order and the circumstances from which it emerges rather than negate anarchy and hierarchy, which may still be present in other parts of the world.

The methodology used is also more appropriate for the study of organizational resilience than the mainstream approaches due to its introduction of a two-way environment-actor feedback in creating ordering principles. This is in contrast to neorealist/neoliberal approaches where the structure of the environment changes and the states adapt moves but not their wishes or desires. The responsiveness and reflexivity in methodology makes the theory more equipped to incorporate exogenous shocks into its causal chains provided that they are categorized appropriately in the micro-structures i.e. seen as internalized or externalized.

The beauty of constructing a general theory that utilizes causal paths and continuous analysis, instead of “snapshot” game theoretic models, is that history and empirical knowledge can be used to better inform the causal pathway models. The multitude of factors/variables/conditions present provides numerous opportunities for analyzing the practical exercise of defense and power. When the breadth of factors are taken in conjunction with a time-oriented analysis, RST can not only give guidance for what the appropriate action is, but also when that action should be taken.

While one of our macro-structural conditions was the required presence of a global hierarchical structure for resilience, we should emphasize that the modified RST is separate theory from hegemonic stability theory. In theories of hegemonic stability, the world hegemon is seen as a stabilizing force for peace in the region through either acting as a fair distributor of goods much like a government in a nation-state or through coercive practices in its organization. The organizations we are focusing on are co-binding and negarchic styled organizations created so that the global hegemon, the US, does not hold a role inside the organization. Furthermore, our theory is still different in a sense that the hegemon does not always act in the favour of weaker states.

There is still opportunity for further work to be done with RST in forecasting future policy options in the regions we have studied. For instance, while the SCO’s resilience has yet to be tested through the passage of time, the development of its security sphere appears promising. Late-stage Eurasia mimics the prior pathway condition seen in Europe of forming a regional negarchy. This is possible if: the organizational interactions between states continue to be negarchical, there are no overwhelming exogenous shocks to swing the hierarchy and anarchy-problematic orders into different types of orders in the global and regional levels, and that the organization develops its deficit in vivere libero. Depending on what occurs in the future, this may also mean that our original observations of the macro-structure level would have to be adapted. The reflexivity of such a future research design would move the study of international cooperation further towards the holy grail of international politics: crafting perpetual peace.

The chimera-like nature of RST makes it possible for the theory to make contributions beyond the field of International Relations. Negarchy, like the ordering principles of hierarchy and anarchy, can be attributed to more than one level of human/collective interactions. Even from using only our three illustrative cases, additional observations can be made on negarchy creation
relating to comparative politics or the domestic level alone. It is interesting to observe the resilience continuum in a state-capacity vs. democracy context. Negarchy and resilient organizations were most successfully produced in strong and democratic states, i.e. Europe. Negarchy, albeit the resilience of its organization the SCO is in question, also occurred in Eurasia’s strong but undemocratic states. The one regional case that negarchy didn’t emerge from, South America, were composed of democracies but their state strength was very weak. One snap judgement or hypothesis for future research is that democracy is not necessary (although it does help) for the emergence of negarchy and that it is the strength or capacity of the states that are the crucial factor for resilience. An investigation of this relationship, perhaps with a larger number of cases, would lead to an even greater understanding of the mechanics of negarchy. Thanks to the governance emphasis of RST, negarchy’s contribution need not be on international theory alone.
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