British Intelligence, Counter-Subversion, and ‘Informal Empire’ in the Middle East, 1949-63

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This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

September 2013
DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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SUMMARY

This thesis is a history of a hitherto unexplored dimension of Britain’s engagement with the post-war Middle East with a particular focus on intelligence and security aspects. More specifically, it examines the counter-subversive policies and measures conducted by the British Intelligence and Security Services, and Britain’s secret propaganda apparatus, the Information Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign Office, in Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran, during the period between 1949 and 1963. This thesis is also about intelligence liaison – the relationship between British Intelligence and Security Services and their Middle Eastern counterparts. This thesis argues that the British Empire declined between 1949 and 1963; in this, intelligence was understood by British policymakers as a tool to maintain British influence and preserve British strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. The imperial drive derived from a mixture of strategic and economic interests in the region but it was Britain’s anti-Communist attitudes which were shared with Middle Eastern governments. This was the context in which intelligence liaison was established between Britain and Middle Eastern states on the basis of their common interests. Although Britain’s anti-Communist policy contributed to preventing the spread of Communist movements in the region, it sought to strengthen the repressive capability of Middle Eastern governments which undermined their own political position by their repressiveness. An unintended consequence was that the Middle Eastern governments conducted counter-subversion not only against Communists, but also their own people. This thesis concludes that Britain’s anti-Communist policy sustained British influence and British interests in the region in the short term, but failed to sustain its objectives in the long term. It demonstrates the importance of common interests in encouraging intelligence liaison and the significance of conflicting interests in restricting it.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis could not have been completed without a lot of help. I would firstly like to acknowledge the financial support from the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University which funded this thesis substantially through an E.H. Carr Studentship. I was also supported by generous grants: the Caroline Adams Travel Bursaries of the Department (twice in row); the Aberystwyth Alumni Student Hardship Fund; the Royal Historical Society; and the Founders Fund Award for 2012 of the British International Studies Association.

I would secondly like to thank my supervisors, Len Scott, Paul Maddrell, and James Vaughan, for their invaluable expertise and their support. A particular thank again goes to Len, not as my supervisor, but as my employer for his generosity to sustain my family in the final year of my PhD. Thanks also go to the anonymous reviewers at Intelligence and National Security and The International History Review for their comments on articles drawn from the thesis. I would also thank James Simpson, who knows my (in)ability in writing English from my undergraduate here, for his friendship and kindness to read final drafts of this thesis. Any mistakes may appear in the text are of course entirely my own.

I would thirdly like to thank people who kindly helped my journey of a historical enquiry into state secrets. I am grateful to Mustafa Ozcan, who helped my fieldtrip in Turkey, and Hamid Soorghali, who translated transcripts from Farsi into English, for their friendship. I am also grateful to various people for sharing their knowledge/experience with me, whose identities remain anonymous. I would also thank to Youmna Asseily for her generosity to allow me to consult her late father’s private papers.

Finally, not the least, I would like to thank my family for their support. Words must go to my mother, Shoko, for her financial and moral support for my academic career in Britain from undergraduate. I should also thank my daughter, Miyaka, who was not born when I started my PhD but has grown rapidly, for distracting me from my obsession with this PhD research whenever I was at home. Above all, my deepest gratitude goes to my wife, Sawa, for her continuous and dedicated support for my entire academic career, without which I could not have completed this thesis.

CHIKARA HASHIMOTO
Aberystwyth
September 2013
Introduction

Liaison:

Short-Term Success, Long-Term Failure
There is no such thing as ‘friendly intelligence agencies’. There are only the intelligence agencies of friendly powers.

- Henry A. Kissinger

This thesis is a history of a hitherto unexplored dimension of Britain’s engagement with the post-war Middle East with a particular focus on intelligence and security aspects. More specifically, it examines the counter-subversive policies and measures conducted by the British Intelligence and Security Services, and Britain’s secret propaganda apparatus, the Information Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign Office, in Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran, during the period between 1949 and 1963. Since counter-subversion in foreign countries inevitably entailed cooperation with local authorities, this thesis is also about intelligence liaison – the relationship between British Intelligence and Security Services and their Middle Eastern counterparts.

In recent years, the ‘War on Terror’ has raised the public profile of British intelligence liaison with Middle Eastern governments. This is not a new phenomenon, however. Sir Stephen Lander, former Director-General of the Security Service, MI5, for instance, reminds us that the British Intelligence Services maintained a relationship with their Middle Eastern counterparts long before the ‘War on Terror’. According to him, international intelligence cooperation is ‘something of an oxymoron’; while intelligence services serve national self-interest of individual states, they often cooperate with their foreign counterparts on their common interests. He also explains that intelligence liaison, in other words international intelligence cooperation, is not only intelligence sharing, but also has a variety of forms, including exchanges of ‘technical know-how’ and intelligence and security training. Such ‘operational collaboration’ happened ‘where there was a pressing

4 Ibid., p.481.
shared need that [went] beyond the capacity or capability of one country to address’. Indeed, this thesis shows that this was the context in which the British-Middle Eastern intelligence liaison developed in the Cold War. Yaacov Caroz, a former Deputy-Chief of the Israeli Intelligence Service, known as Mossad, also testified over three decades ago that the British Intelligence Services had been instrumental in developing the Arab security services.

The subject of intelligence liaison is a developing field but it remains one of the least studied subjects of Intelligence Studies. Len Scott and Peter Jackson once remarked in 2004 that it is ‘a final ‘missing dimension” in the field. In recent years, some scholars have started to engage with the subject, especially in the context of the intelligence failure prior to the Iraq War in 2004 over the issue of the agent codenamed Curveball; and so-called ‘extraordinary rendition’ in the ‘War on Terror’. While there is a general discussion of how, when, and why a state cooperates with another through intelligence liaison, few studies, nevertheless, offer an adequate explanation on the basis of a rigorous historical analysis. On their respective case-studies on contemporary liaison, Stephane Lefebvre and Chris Clough both argue that trust is a necessary condition for intelligence liaison. James Walsh, however, suggests that it is not trust but a hierarchy that dictates intelligence cooperation. Jennifer Sims further suggests that an intelligence service ‘must penetrate its liaison partner to determine if losses are likely to exceed gains in the relationship’ ensuring that ‘the partner is not penetrated by a hostile third party’. One of the main problems of these existing studies is associated with their methodologies. Some of case-studies are theoretically driven – for instance, Jennifer Sims’s work is on the one hand framed in her neo-realist perspective on international politics that the international system is ‘inherently competitive and selective, even among allies’, because it is ‘essentially one of self-help and anarchy’; James Walsh’s case-studies, on the other hand, are based on ‘social scientific [deductive] approach’ to develop his ‘theoretical

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5 Ibid., p.492.
11 Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison’, p.205.
12 Ibid., p.196.
argument’. The following thesis seeks to contribute to these discussions and offers an insight into intelligence liaison from the case-studies of Britain’s engagement with the post-war Middle East.

The following thesis is not only a case-study of intelligence liaison, however. The significance of Britain’s counter-subversion policy and its counter-subversive measures in the Middle East cannot be underestimated. As Bernard Porter once remarked on the role of MI5 in the domestic context, ‘without it [counter-subversion] we would be a very different country from what we are today’. His remark is also applicable to the Middle Eastern context. As Communist Parties were largely prohibited in the Middle East, the Communist movements and influence in the region were less prominent throughout the Cold War. This was perhaps helped by the undemocratic characteristics of most Middle Eastern regimes, chiefly supported by strong domestic security forces which were central to the existence of these regimes. As this thesis demonstrates, a hidden connection was maintained through liaisons between British Intelligence and its Middle Eastern counterparts, and British anti-Communist policy was behind the development of Middle Eastern security services, who also received training in counter-subversion from their British counterparts.

Looking at a history of British counter-subversion in these Middle Eastern countries with particular focus on intelligence and security aspects gives new insights into our understanding of the past and present. Firstly, it is known that MI5 operated in the territories of the British Empire, but this thesis sheds new light on MI5’s activities overseas, outside the colonial territories in the Middle East. This may indeed seem rather contradictory as areas outside the British territories were normally considered to be the remit of Britain’s foreign intelligence service, the Secret Intelligence Service, also known as MI6. This thesis shows that MI5 was given responsibility to liaise with Middle Eastern governments, and demonstrates that MI5 and MI6 operated together in the region. Secondly, any historical

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enquiry into British intelligence liaison with its Middle Eastern counterparts also requires an analysis of Middle Eastern intelligence and security services. The relationship was based on different political systems – between democratic and non-democratic governments, which also reflected differences between Britain and Middle Eastern countries in political and cultural values, and operational conditions, in counter-subversion. This element of the thesis adds a non-Western dimension to the existing literature. ¹⁸

Thirdly, this thesis contributes to the rather thin literature on the subject of intelligence liaison. As Sir Stephen Lander noted, intelligence liaison was just synonymous not only intelligence sharing, but also included other forms of cooperation. The thesis explores the nature of the British-Middle Eastern intelligence liaison, its efficacy and limitations, and the role of bilateral and multilateral intelligence liaisons in the region during the period. In addition, it offers another aspect of intelligence liaison – liaison as the means of influencing the policy of a foreign government. The thesis thus explores the extent to which Britain was able to influence the policies of Middle Eastern governments in favour of its own national interests through clandestine means. Finally, this hitherto unexplored aspect also resonates with contemporary issues surrounding human rights abuses by Middle Eastern governments, and Britain’s alleged complicity in human rights abuse. ¹⁹

This thesis discusses the extent to which British Intelligence was involved in such misconduct by its Middle Eastern counterparts at the time, and how Britain saw the actions conducted by Middle Eastern governments in the name of anti-Communist counter-measures, including torture of political prisoners.

It is necessary to explain the use and meaning of the phrase ‘informal empire’ in the Middle East in the title of this thesis. The term ‘informal empire’, as opposed to ‘formal empire’, involves countries outside of the colonial administration of the British Empire. ²⁰

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¹⁸ The field of Intelligence Studies has been dominated by Western perspectives, but recently non-Western perspectives are emerging. See Philip Davies and Kristian Gustafson (eds.), Intelligence Elsewhere (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013); Rob Dover, Michael Goodman and Claudia Hillebrand (eds.), Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies (London: Routledge, 2014), part iv. But more than two decades ago, there was also a comparative study on intelligence organisations, including Japanese and Chinese ones, see Jeffrey Richelson, Foreign Intelligence Organizations (Cambridge, US: Ballinger, 1988).


also connotes the notion of imperialism, and influence over subordinate states, without the formal status as a colonial territory.\textsuperscript{21} The Middle East in the post-war period consisted of both colonial territories (Cyprus, Aden Colony, the Palestine Mandate, and the Persian Gulf) and foreign countries. Britain’s interactions with those non-colonial Middle Eastern countries, and her desire to influence the policy of these countries, have sometimes been referred to by imperial historians to as Britain’s ‘informal empire’ in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{22} This thesis thus addresses Britain’s engagement in these non-colonial territories of the British Empire in the Middle East.

\textbf{Intelligence, Security and Subversion}

The term \textit{intelligence} is a vague concept.\textsuperscript{23} For Sherman Kent, a leading figure of American intelligence analysts, it denotes three distinctive meanings: intelligence as ‘a kind of knowledge’, ‘the type of organisation which produces the knowledge’, and ‘the activity pursued by the intelligence organization’.\textsuperscript{24} In addition, it is used and applied differently from one country to another.\textsuperscript{25} According to one definition, intelligence is ‘a means for public policy to ensure security’.\textsuperscript{26} More precisely, the term comprises ‘that which states do in secret to support their efforts to mitigate, influence, or merely understand other nations (or various enemies) that could harm them’.\textsuperscript{27} It thus implies that the term intelligence can refer to intelligence as information for governmental knowledge, and also intelligence as activities

\textsuperscript{26} Rob Dover et al., \textit{Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies}, p.xvi.
\textsuperscript{27} Michal Warner quoted in \textit{ibid}.

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associated with intelligence organisations – collection, analysis and even clandestine political actions – to ensure security. Similarly, the term *security* is also an elusive concept and has been the subject of academic attention from various fields. In this thesis, however, security is frequently used to describe the activities commonly associated with MI5. In the realm of MI5’s activities, it refers to both information (such as security intelligence, including counter-intelligence/espionage and counter-subversion) and certain activities (such as protective security, including security vetting and physical security – access to secret information or documents). In this regard, the terms intelligence and security overlap – this is particularly the case as the terms relate to different organisations. For instance, both MI6 and MI5 maintain their own counter-intelligence functions. To avoid duplication of work, and confused jurisdiction, a demarcation line was drawn by the Attlee Directive (also known as the ‘Attlee Doctrine’) of 1948 – wherein MI5 would maintain authority for imperial security through the British Empire and Commonwealth, while MI6 would operate in foreign countries outside them. However, while the Attlee Doctrine was about geographical division of responsibility, functions were performed by both as in counter-espionage. In order to minimise these conceptual and terminological confusions, the terms, intelligence and security, are selectively and carefully used throughout the thesis. Specific terms, such as counter-espionage, counter-subversion, and protective security, are also referred to in their specific context, rather than employing the umbrella term *security*. In addition, in this thesis, the term intelligence does not refer to the specific activities of MI6, clandestine political actions, also known as special political actions.

The subject of *counter-subversion* is understudied in the literature, and the term itself also needs some clarification. It is sometimes treated as an area of irregular warfare and the term is often interchangeably used with *counter-insurgency* in the literature. According to Frank Kitson, a first-hand practitioner as well as classic theorist in the field of counter-insurgencies, the term *subversion* means ‘all measures short of the use of armed force taken by one section of the people of a country to overthrow those governing the country at the

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31 See Note 17 above.
time, or to force them to do things which they do not want to do’.\textsuperscript{33} It may include the use of political and economic pressure, strikes, protest marches, propaganda, and ‘the use of small-scale violence for the purpose of coercing recalcitrant members of the population into giving support’.\textsuperscript{34} The term \textit{counter-subversion} means counter-measures by the rulers of the government against such activities. Kitson, who differentiates between subversion and insurgency, also offers a useful distinction – insurgency covers ‘the use of armed force by a section of the people against the government’, whereas subversion means ‘all measures short of the use of armed force’ to overthrow the rulers of the government.\textsuperscript{35} This distinction was indeed made by the British Government and used in this way during the period. In this thesis, therefore, counter-subversion precludes any military conflicts involving the use of armed force against subversive elements.

Propaganda was also an integral part of both subversion and counter-subversion. According to the definition of propaganda by Jowett and O’Donnell, it is ‘the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist’.\textsuperscript{36} Propaganda was extensively used both by subversive elements against political authorities and by the authorities reacting against the subversive elements.\textsuperscript{37} The terms \textit{propaganda} and \textit{psychological warfare} can often be used synonymously in a similar context. According to Philip Taylor, \textit{psychological warfare} is normally used in times of war and is particularly associated with the activities of military services.\textsuperscript{38} The British Government also distinguished these terms – while the use of the term \textit{propaganda} was mostly associated with the activities of the IRD under the direction of foreign policy, the term \textit{psychological warfare} was used by military forces mostly in counter-insurgency campaigns, which was defined as ‘the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions in support of military

34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid.  
operations’. Thus, instead of psychological warfare, the term *propaganda* is used throughout the thesis.

The term *counter-subversion* connotes an action of a political authority to counter anti-governmental activities of individuals or groups. The meaning is thus political in nature, which makes it inherently subjective. As a result, a recurrent theme throughout the thesis is that the term was understood and applied differently by Britain and Middle Eastern governments. For the British it was primarily directed against Communist activities and, to a lesser extent, radical anti-British nationalist movements in the region, whereas for Middle Eastern governments it was against any anti-governmental political activities. The difference becomes more apparent in applying counter-subversion by propaganda. For the British, the purpose of propaganda was essentially to broadcast and publicise information to expose the methods and tactics of Communist subversive propaganda. Counter-subversion was purely seen as a defensive concept to counter or prevent subversive propaganda activities in the region.

However, the regional members of the Baghdad Pact (Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan), for instance, adopted a more aggressive definition: they considered that aggressive counter-subversion would be necessary to eradicate the threats coming from outside the Pact area, not only the Soviet Union, but also Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In addition, the term counter-subversion was above all understood by the regional members as dealing with subversive elements ‘by locking them up’. Moreover, owing to the subjectivity of the meaning, the demarcation line between subversive elements and anti-British sentiment was also a cause of confusion even among MI5 officers in the region, who were responsible for counter-subversion but found it difficult to distinguish between anti-British nationalist

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40 Note that the purpose of propaganda was essentially a reaction to Communist propaganda and to dispel an illusion about the Soviet Union as a ‘workers’ paradise’ throughout the world by the exposure of the reality in the Soviet Union and Communist bloc. See Christopher Mayhew, *A War of Words: A Cold War Witness* (I.B. Tauris: London, 1998), pp.14-47. Sir Roger Stevens, the British Ambassador in Tehran (1954-58), who saw ‘Communist propaganda’ undermining ‘morale and confidence’ of the Baghdad Pact countries by twisting ‘the truth’, once noted in 1956 that ‘truth must be told and people should have a correct view of events and policies’. Quoted from TNA: PRO FO371/121283: V10710/8: telegram by Sir Roger Stevens, Tehran, to FO, 5 Apr 1956.
movements and legitimate anti-British governments.\textsuperscript{43} Thus, owing to the inherent nature of the term itself, \textit{counter-subversion} connotes both offensive and defensive meanings. Although the term is sometimes interchangeably used, and it was used during the period as such, it is hoped that the contexts make the meanings clear throughout the thesis.

The core forms of counter-subversive activities to be addressed in this thesis thus exclude the activities associated with military forces, but constitute the following activities; policing, intelligence-sharing, protective security, security training, special political action (so-called covert action), and propaganda, all of which were pursued and clandestinely implemented through MI5, MI6, and the IRD. This thesis thus rules out the activities of all military agencies, including the Directorate of Forward Plans, the post-war deception organisation within the Ministry of Defence.\textsuperscript{44} However, these services (MI5, MI6 and the IRD) had different roles in counter-subversion, some of which overlapped and some of which were incompatible. MI5 was responsible for defensive counter-subversive activities, such as protective security and security training. Similarly, the IRD exclusively conducted propaganda campaigns. MI5 and the IRD did not engage in special political action, such as paramilitary operations and overthrowing a foreign government by clandestine means, for which MI6 was responsible. These services were engaged in different degrees of intelligence-sharing with local authorities. As the thesis shows, these defensive and offensive counter-subversive activities could also be incompatible with one another. In some conceptual frameworks, propaganda is a sub-category of covert action.\textsuperscript{45} The use of the term covert action is avoided in the thesis unless necessary.

\section*{Literature Review}

The subject of Britain in the Middle East in the post-war period has long caught attention from different strands of scholarship. The literature offers a range of geographical


\textsuperscript{44} Deception operations can be considered part of counter-subversion, and the Directorate of Forward Plans (DFP) certainly operated with MI5, MI6, and the IRD. See Richard Aldrich (ed.), \textit{Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain, 1945-1970} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), pp.229-231. Also see TNA: PRO CAB121/110: JP (50) 67 (final): report by the Joint Planning Staff ‘London Controlling Section’, 2 Jun 1950, which stipulates that the DFP ‘will maintain close liaison with the Foreign Office, MI5, MI6 and other government organisations and departments’.

focuses and themes. Diplomatic historians have paid attention to the non-colonial territories of the British Empire in the region in the Cold War context, but mostly regarding regional crises, such as the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the Iraqi Revolution in 1958, or histories of a specific country. 46 Imperial historians, however, tend to overlook the significance of the region in post-war British imperial strategy after the end of the Palestine Mandate in 1948 as they often see the region in the context of wider British decolonisation. 47 Historians of the Middle East mostly ignore the connections with Britain especially in the post-war period. 48 Some works on the importance of the Cold War to post-war British imperial strategy have suggested that these Cold War and End of Empire historiographies overlap. 49 Military historians have studied Britain’s post-war defence strategy in the context of the Cold War in the region, which has been described by Wm. Roger Louis as ‘a region honeycombed with British military installations’. 50 Indeed, the British military presence in the region has also attracted historians, who have produced a wealth of studies on British counter-insurgency


48 This has been addressed by a number of scholars. Cf. Alon, ‘Historiography of Empire’, pp.33-34; Sluglett, ‘Formal and Informal Empire in the Middle East’, pp.422-423.


campaigns in the colonial territories, such as the Palestine Mandate, Cyprus and the Aden Colony.\footnote{On the counter-insurgency campaign in Palestine, for instance, cf.: David Charters, \textit{The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47} (London: Macmillan, 1989); idem, ‘British Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1945-47.’ \textit{Intelligence and National Security} (hereafter \textit{INS}), vol.6, no.1 (1991), pp.115-140. On her colonial, foreign, and defence policies in South Arabia, cf. Peter Hinchcliffe, John T. Ducker and Maria Holt, \textit{Without Glory in Arabia} (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006); Spencer Mawby, ‘The “Big Lie” and the “Great Betrayal”: Explaining the British Collapse in Aden’ in \textit{The Cold War in the Middle East}, edited by N. Ashton (London: Routledge, 2007), pp.167-187; Simon Smith, \textit{Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf} (London: Routledge, 2004). On the “special operations”, Clive Jones, \textit{Britain and The Yemen Civil War 1962-65: Foreign Policy and the Limits of Covert Action} (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004); Spencer Mawby, ‘The Clandestine Defence of Empire: British Special Operations in Yemen 1951-64’, \textit{INS}, vol.17, no.3 (2002), pp.105-30. On counter-insurgency campaigns in Cyprus, Panagiotis Dimitrakis, ‘British Intelligence and the Cyprus Insurgency, 1955-1959’, \textit{International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence} (hereafter \textit{IJIC}), vol.21, no.2 (2008), pp.375-94. Note that although the studies on counter-insurgency campaigns address intelligence and security issues, their prime focus on military-led campaigns inevitably precludes rigorous discussion of political intelligence. The point about ‘missing dimension’ in the studies on counter-insurgencies was firstly raised by Richard Popplewell. See, idem, ‘Lacking Intelligence’: some reflections on recent approaches to British counter-insurgency, 1900-1960’, \textit{INS}, vol.10, no.2 (1995), pp.336-352. See also Walton, \textit{Empire of Secrets}, pp.xi-xxxii.} These existing literatures make clear that Britain had vast defence, economic, imperial interests in the Middle East in the post-war period, and the defence of the region was indeed regarded as one of the pillars of British post-war strategy in the case of war against the Soviet Union. The retention of the region was considered necessary for several reasons, namely strategic bomber bases for attacking on the Soviet Union; communicating with the Commonwealth and Colonies; and its natural resources, vital for fighting wars as well as the recovery of the post-war British economy. As a result, the Chiefs of Staff thought that the integrity of the region was essential to this strategy. Despite Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s attempt to retreat from the region, it was Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, ‘the architect of Britain’s imperial strategy’, who dominated the government in the formulation of foreign and defence policy and firmly accorded with the line of the Chiefs of Staff.\footnote{Quoted from Kent, \textit{British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War}, p.2. Note that the Prime Minister Clement Attlee, a ‘committed internationalist, actively opposed a military strategy based on the traditional imperial pattern’, also acknowledged that foreign affairs including Commonwealth or colonial affairs, economic policy and defence were Bevin’s sphere and it would be ‘a mistake to intervene personally’. See Raymond Smith and John Zametica, ‘The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee reconsidered, 1945-7’. \textit{International Affairs} vol.61, no.2 (1985), pp.237, 251. Also see Clement Attlee, \textit{As It Happened} (London: William Heinemann, 1954), p.169; Alan Bullock, \textit{Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951} (London: W.W. Norton, 1983), pp.215, 399.} This was also endorsed by the Permanent Under-Secretary to Bevin, Sir William Strang.\footnote{Richie Ovendale, ‘William Strang and the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee’, in \textit{British Officials and British Foreign Policy 1945-50}, edited by John Zametica (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990), p.217.} The culmination of the British preoccupation with maintaining its influence in the region can be seen in the Suez Crisis, where Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s personal endeavour against Egyptian
leader Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser included collusion with France and Israel. Some so-called ‘revisionist’ historians have suggested that the Iraqi Revolution in July 1958 had a far larger impact on Britain’s position and its influence in the region.

Despite the exhaustive literature on Britain’s engagement with the post-war Middle East, the subject of counter-subversion is considered marginal in the scholarship on post-war British history. To illustrate the point, the series of *Documents on British Policy Overseas* and *British Documents on the End of Empire*, for instance, contain no reference at all to British counter-subversion policy overseas. One of the main policy-making bodies of British post-war counter-subversive activities overseas, including in foreign and colonial territories, was in fact established in late 1949, named the Official Committee on Communism (Overseas), also known as the AC (O) Committee. However, the collection edited by Ronald Hyam, which covers not only colonial matters but also the defence of the Middle East from 1945 to 1951, contains no reference at all to the existence of the AC (O) Committee. This is somehow understandable: the declassification process of the first batch of the records on the AC (O) Committee only began in October 2010 – over six decades after the establishment of the committee.

The British government, however, was far more concerned with subversive activities not only in domestic contexts, but also in foreign and colonial territories against British interests overseas. A declassified record of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of 1958, for instance, viewed ‘subversive threats’ to ‘British interests throughout the world’ as the highest priority intelligence targets, together with a strategic nuclear attack by the Soviet Union against Great Britain. However, this is not reflected at all in the collection edited by

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58 E.g. amongst a few, the first batch of the declassified records were PRO CAB134/2-4.
Ronald Hyam and Wm. Roger Louis, which covers the period between 1957 and 1964. This is perhaps owing to a lack of attention to intelligence, even though a close examination of intelligence targets can reveal the priorities of British concerns at a time.

In spite of the lack of scholarly attention to the subject, there are indeed like-minded scholars who have worked on counter-subversive measures implemented by the British Government. Some have identified the importance of MI5, and law enforcement activities, for instance, during the Second World War, when any subversive elements, mostly aliens or immigrants associated with the Axis powers, were detained without trial under Defence Regulation 18B. In the post-war period, when serious academic work on maintaining internal security in Britain was seldom carried out, Bernard Porter’s book, *Plots and Paranoia*, was a pioneering study outlining MI5’s activities in Britain (before the publication of the authorised history of MI5 by Christopher Andrew in 2009). In the imperial dimension, based on declassified records of MI5 and the Colonial Office, Calder Walton has recently demonstrated in his book, *Empire of Secrets*, the existence of MI5’s connections with colonial policing in the context of British decolonisation. He has argued that MI5 was above all successful in maintaining British influence through its own liaison officers with local authorities even after the independence of the Colonies.

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While there is no comprehensive work on counter-subversion, there is literature on the propaganda campaigns conducted by the British Government in the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, the release of records on the IRD has caught scholarly attention as a covert instrument of anti-Communist British foreign and colonial policy. Concerning the Middle Eastern context, there is work by James Vaughan on the development of British propaganda policy towards the region and its activities in the early Cold War until 1957. His central thesis was mainly that Britain and the United States failed to influence the population in the region in favour of the West. Johan Franzen follows Vaughan’s thesis and argues that the Iraqi Revolution was largely the result of failed British propaganda efforts.

The literature on the activities associated with Britain’s Intelligence Services, such as MI5, MI6, and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), in the region is very slim. While there is some literature which indicates that MI5 operated in the post-war Middle East, there is no serious academic study on this aspect. The authorised history of MI5 only covers the Colonies in the region, such as the Palestine Mandate, Cyprus and the Aden Colony. There are a few academic works on MI6’s special political action. A notable such
case is the coup in Iran in August 1953, which MI6 orchestrated with its American counterparts. Richard Aldrich’s recent book on the GCHQ contains a section on the Middle East, though it is arguable whether the GCHQ had a role in counter-subversion. On the subject of intelligence liaison, the literature is even thinner. As the subject concerning the Middle East has also been dominated by the theme of the UK-US special intelligence relationship, there is no academic work on British-Middle Eastern intelligence liaison.

A Historical Enquiry into State Secrets

An enquiry into state secrets inevitably faces methodological hurdles. This is no exception to a history of British Intelligence, especially after the Second World War. Despite positive developments since the Waldegrave initiative on Open Government in 1992 – including the recently released files from the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department (PUSD), which included some aspects of MI6’s work at the time as the PUSD liaised with MI6, access to the sources remains limited: not all intelligence records have been made available to the public. MI6 maintains its official policy of ‘not releasing its records into the

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70 On MI6’s activities during the Cold War in general, see Dorril, MI6, passim; Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand (Woodstock: Overlook, 2001), passim; Lucas, Divided We Stand, pp.193-195.
public domain’ and withholds its own archives. Similarly, GCHQ, Britain’s largest intelligence organisation, has only partially opened its own records to the public domain, most of which predate the Cold War. Above all, the intelligence record is by no means complete. Richard Aldrich reminds us that archived intelligence records which are to be exposed to public scrutiny are inevitably selective, and some parts are redacted in the declassification process. Moreover, those records kept for permanent preservation made up merely 2 per cent of the official records, and the rest of them were destroyed before being scrutinised by historians. Besides these limitations, the records concerning the subject of the thesis are incomplete in many other ways, largely due to the fact that, for instance, the majority of the records concerning Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME), the regional headquarters of MI5 in the Middle East, did not survive at all. Nearly all SIME files were destroyed in the course of the reorganisation process in the mid-1950s even before its closure in 1958, although some of the relevant counter-intelligence records were passed onto MI6 for continued use.

In addition, another difficulty is that owing to ‘over-classification’ of intelligence records, beyond the 20 years rule (of course 30 years rule until 1 August 2013), it is nearly impossible to construct an oral history as the people concerned with the subject had mostly passed away by the time the records were declassified. In the course of this doctoral research (2009-2013), a number of officers who were involved in the subject have been identified. One of the key officers was Brigadier William Magan, Head of SIME (1947-1952) and also a


According to GCHQ’s official statement, ‘Work is currently underway to review and release GCHQ intelligence reports dating from the early Cold War period, 1945-1950’, accessible on-line at http://www.gchq.gov.uk/History/Pages/Historical-Records-and-Release.aspx (accessed, 8 Sep 2013). This planned release is on ‘the Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact 1945-1950’, and after this will be ‘intelligence of the Soviet Military in the 1950s’, and there is thus no plan to release ‘any post-war non-eastern Bloc material’, including the Middle East. Email exchange with the GCHQ historian, 28 Feb 2011.


Aldrich, Hidden Hand, p.6.

Those records which have been referred to in this article are correspondence, telegrams and reports sent between MI5 Head Office and SIME; and also between SIME and other departments. Thus, the declassified MI5 records concerning SIME are largely the records which had been stored at MI5 Head Office, not at SIME.

TNA: PRO KV4/437: SIME instruction No.2/54 by W.F.H. Ruxton, for Head of SIME, 8 Mar 1954. Indeed, the records of the latter category are yet to be released into the public domain.
long-career MI5 officer, who passed away at the age of a hundred-and-one in January 2010. In addition, despite the declassification of the records, there is a tendency on the part of the former intelligence/security officers, or even non-intelligence or security related officials of other departments, to be extremely reluctant to talk about their experiences to anyone, even their own family members. According to Christopher Andrew, this ‘attitude’ of many former intelligence/security officers who worked either for MI5 or MI6 in the 1940s/1950s makes the task of intelligence historians more difficult. As a result, the sources used throughout the thesis are inevitably documentary evidence, while indirect oral testimonies proved useful for background knowledge.

The sensitivity of the subject matter is another hindrance. As subversion aims at overthrowing a government, it is directly related to an issue of national security. Any policies, or activities, to counter subversive threats can thus be very sensitive if a government resorts to any clandestine measures to counter the threats. It is notable, for example, that the existence of the aforementioned AC (O) Committee was kept secret even within the British government at the time, and knowledge of its activities was confined to a small circle of British officials on a “need to know” basis. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office (1953-57), once warned all his departments about the secrecy of the committee, so much so that even the name of the committee ‘should never be mentioned to posts abroad, and quotations from its minutes or papers should only be made after consultation with the OPS [Overseas Planning Section, sub-committee of the Official Committee on Communism (Overseas)]’ and that it should be referred to as the “ACO” Committee.

Bradford Westerfield, one of a few preeminent scholars on the subject of intelligence liaison, once remarked that the paucity of the literature on intelligence liaison reflected the fact that the subject is one of the most secret aspects of intelligence activity. It indicates that

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84 Letter by Nicholas Ray, son of Philip Ray, to me, 17 Sep 2011.
86 Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’. 
a historical enquiry on the subject of intelligence liaison may face more severe methodological challenges than other research projects on intelligence. His remark carries some weight. For instance, the records concerning the multilateral international intelligence/security cooperation between Britain and Middle Eastern states, namely the Liaison and Counter-Subversive Committees of the Baghdad Pact (later renamed Central Treaty Organisation), are largely limited due to the nature of the topic. The materials can only be found from FO371 series (the Political Department of the Foreign Office) but have been redacted in the declassification process. In addition, the delegation of the British Government to the Liaison Committee was from MI5, which has no intention of disclosing its records on the subject. 

Rigorous multi-archival research may have fruitful results, for instance, on the other side of the Atlantic, but as the US delegation team was mostly headed by CIA officers, and as it remained an ‘observer’ in the Pact, documentary evidence is very sketchy. Even in a declassified in-house history of CENTO by the Department of State of the United States, for instance, the sections on the Liaison and Counter-Subversive Committees have been completely blacked-out, including the names of the committees. In addition, owing to the sensitivity of the subject, the existence of these committees was kept secret and their activities were kept separate from other activities of the Pact. Professor George Harris, a former Political Officer attached to the American Embassy in Ankara (1957-62), where the headquarters of CENTO were housed, for instance, was not informed of such activities of the Baghdad Pact, let alone the existence of the Liaison and Counter-Subversive Committees, during his stay in Ankara.

Moreover, despite the fact that the CENTO itself was dissolved in 1979, over thirty years ago, British documents concerning the Liaison Committee have been mostly removed from the National Archives in London. Furthermore, while CENTO records were confirmed

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87 Similar to other intelligence services, such as MI6 and the GCHQ, MI5 is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act of 2000. See MI5’s official statement, accessible on-line at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/how-we-operate/managing-information/access-to-information.html (accessed, 8 Sep 2013). MI5 has no intention to release any subjects concerning intelligence liaison, such as the Baghdad Pact. Letter by T. Denhan of MI5 to me, 12 Oct 2011.


89 Indeed, he was not even aware of ‘such major programs as the U-2 base in Turkey’ until after Gary Powers was shot down on May Day in 1960. Email exchange with George Harris on 11 Jan 2012.

90 The documents have been replaced with a statement that ‘CENTO DOCUMENT(S) REMOVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. THE ORIGINAL(S) SHOULD BE FOUND IN
to be held in Ankara, where the headquarters of CENTO were located after the Iraqi Revolution in July 1958,\footnote{This was confirmed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1306-11), 13 Dec 2011.} no such CENTO records, i.e. the memoranda or minutes of the meetings, can be found or accessed at the Turkish State Archives in Ankara.\footnote{Some documents on the subject from Turkish perspective have been found at the Turkish State Archives [Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü] in Ankara.} A senior official of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in charge of the declassification of intelligence and security related records, is more inclined to believe that, akin to the bulk of other historical records, CENTO records no longer exist.\footnote{Informal conversation with an FCO official at the Cabinet Office, Dec 2011.} Evidence suggests that these records, especially these from before the Iraqi Revolution, were confiscated by the revolutionary Iraqi government; some were passed on to Nasser’s Egypt, and others were deliberately destroyed by MI6 officers.\footnote{According to Sir Alistair Horne, Alexis Porter of MI6 ‘received a decoration for destroying the secret files during the Revolution of 1958’. See Horne, \textit{But What Do You Actually Do?}, p.55. On the confiscation of the Pact records by the revolutionary Iraq government, see The Oral History Office of Foundation for Iranian Studies (hereafter, OHOFIS): Dean Rusk, interviewed by William Burr, Athens, Georgia, 23 May 1986, script no.1, p.15, accessible on-line at http://fis-iran.org/en (accessed 8 Sep 2013). On the records in Nasser’s hands, see Mohamed Heikal, \textit{Nasser: The Cairo Documents: the Private Papers of Nasser} (New English Library: London, 1972), p.95. And also TNA: PRO FO371/133949: telegram from the Viscount Hood, Washington, D.C. to FO, 25 Jul 1958.}

Finally, intelligence liaison is sometimes maintained on the basis of an informal arrangement, and therefore no such records cannot be found from archives. As a result, the only way of finding evidence for such liaison is to find records on intelligence/security liaison in private hands. To illustrate the point, Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the Director-General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion (1952-56), noted in his diaries that when he made a secret and informal agreement with his Lebanese, Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish counterparts on intelligence sharing on subversive threats in the region, there was a ‘clause’ of their secret security cooperation providing that any records regarding the intelligence cooperation were indiscriminately kept as personal possessions and not disclosed to anyone, including any evidence of the cooperation which was considered to be ‘unsafe to hand to a successor’. Moreover, it further recorded that if any of the persons involved in the liaison had been ‘sacked or transferred’ by their own governments, the records referring to the existence of the secret liaison between these states had to be ‘destroyed’.\footnote{The Imperial War Museum (IWM), London: Private Papers of Sir Colonel Patrick Coghill, vol.2, p.119.}
In spite of these methodological hurdles, nevertheless, a historical enquiry into state secrets can still be conducted. Pioneering intelligence historians, such as Christopher Andrew, accomplished it about three decades ago, when British Intelligence Services did not officially exist. Diligent and time-consuming multi-archival research, mainly at the National Archives in London, can yield fruitful results.\textsuperscript{96} The following dissertation is thus a product of multi-archival research (including official records, private papers, and archives abroad), combining oral interviews and published sources. In addition, a number of records released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 2000 at my request shed new light on hitherto unexplored aspects. The majority of primary sources are British, but American, Arabic, Turkish and Iranian records are also used.

\textbf{Thesis Organisation}

The following thesis thus seeks to make an original and significant contribution to Intelligence Studies, International History, Cold War History, Imperial History, and Middle Eastern studies – thus this is not a theory-based case study such as in International Relations Theory or alliance theory.\textsuperscript{97} While the thesis intends to contribute to a general discussion of the subject of intelligence liaison, it also provides a hitherto unexplored history of Britain’s engagement in the post-war Middle East. Nevertheless, some limitations in the thesis must be stated. Firstly, although this thesis addresses the nature of intelligence liaison, its efficacy and limitations, it does not discuss the extent to which intelligence acquired through liaison was used (or not used) and influenced policy-making, in other words the so-called “intelligence cycle”. The reason for not doing so is that no evidence has been found about it. Secondly, while the thesis analyses the role of British Intelligence in counter-subversion in the post-war Middle East, there are some inevitable limitations in access to government records, particularly those of MI6 and the GCHQ. Further multi-archival research may yield more fruitful results in the future, but owing to the time constraint of doctoral research, I have been unable to overcome such limitations.

The geographical focus of this thesis includes countries such as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Iran and Turkey, but excludes Britain’s Colonies and Protectorates, such as Cyprus, the Aden Colony, and the Persian Gulf, and also Israel. There are some reasons for the exclusion of these countries. Firstly, Britain’s engagement in the Colonies in the region is mainly a subject of counter-insurgency, rather than counter-subversion. The authorised history of MI5 indicates that there were elements of counter-subversion in counter-insurgency campaigns, but the military forces remained the major actor in fighting against insurgencies. In addition, it has been found in the course of this research that MI5 was also involved in the protective security of oil companies in the Persian Gulf, but its involvement was passive – mainly contacting security officers of the oil companies concerning vetting procedures of oil companies’ employees (i.e. excluding Communist elements in the oil companies). Moreover, while Britain had close connections with the local police in the Persian Gulf, its security liaison was mainly for maintaining law and order, such as in cases of disturbances and riots, rather than for political reasons – fighting Communist activities there. Furthermore, the research on British-Israeli relations after 1948 indicates while there were some informal personal connections between British Intelligence and its Israeli counterparts, there was not much official cooperation in counter-subversion during the period. According to Tom Bower, the biographer of Sir Dick White, both former Director-General of MI5 and Chief of MI6, ‘anti-Semitism’ amongst senior MI6 officers and ‘pro-Arab sentiments’ within the Foreign Office prevented MI6’s cooperation with the Israeli Intelligence Service, Mossad. Nevertheless, the exclusion of these countries leaves scope for further research.

The argument of the thesis is as follows: the British Empire declined between 1949 and 1963; in this, intelligence was understood by British policymakers as a tool to maintain British influence and preserve British strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. The imperial drive derived from a mixture of strategic and economic interests in the region but it was Britain’s anti-Communist attitudes, which were shared with Middle Eastern

98 See Andrew, Defence of the Realm, pp.442-482.
101 A notable example for the personal connection is Sir Maurice Oldfield, who was in charge of counter-intelligence in the region until 1947 and who maintained some connections with Israelis even after 1948. See Deacon, ‘C’, chs.3.4.
102 Bower, Perfect English Spy, p.239. According to him, it was in 1960, when MI6 officially contacted Mossad and posted a liaison officer in Israel. ibid., pp.240-241.
governments. This was the context in which intelligence liaison was established between Britain and Middle Eastern states on the basis of their common interests. Nevertheless, the British intelligence liaison with its Middle Eastern counterparts was a short-term success but a long-term failure. Although Britain’s anti-Communist policy contributed to preventing the spread of Communist movements in the region, it sought to strengthen the repressive capability of Middle Eastern governments which undermined their own political position by their repressiveness. The problem was that common anti-Communist interests encouraged intelligence liaison, but conflicting interests between Britain and Middle Eastern states also restricted it. It was also exacerbated by the fact that, unlike the Colonies, Britain had little influence over the policy of Britain’s ‘informal’ empire in the Middle East. An unintended consequence was that the Middle Eastern governments conducted counter-subversion not only against Communists, but also their own people. This thesis concludes that Britain’s anti-Communist policy sustained British influence and British interests in the region in the short term, but failed in the long term. British anti-Communist policy in the post-war Middle East was thus not far-sighted. It demonstrates the importance of common interests in encouraging intelligence liaison and the significance of conflicting interests in restricting it.

The thesis consists of six chapters, divided into thematic topics. There is, however, a degree of overlap between the chapters owning to the nature of the subject. Each chapter makes an original contribution to the literature. A number of arguments are presented throughout the thesis. Chapter One shows the development of Britain’s anti-Communist policy overseas from the Attlee Government of 1945-51 to the Macmillan Government of 1957-63, and how the role of intelligence was understood by policymakers in dealing with the difficulties Britain faced in maintaining its positions overseas, and especially in the Middle East. Based on records declassified under the FOIA, it demonstrates that counter-subversion was the centre of concerns for the British Government throughout the period, and shows that intelligence was considered as the solution to these problems by policy-makers such as Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Chapter Two investigates the introduction of British security/police liaison officers and the role of the liaison officers in instituting the anti-Communist measures on the part of Middle Eastern governments up to the mid-1950s. This was the period in which police training in anti-Communist measures was considered particularly necessary in the region as the Chiefs of Staff contemplated a potential war against the Soviet Union. The chapter demonstrates that not only Britain’s anti-Communist policy but also requests from Middle Eastern states for Britain’s advice on anti-Communist
measures dovetailed neatly with Britain’s interests in the region. Chapter Three examines the role of a hitherto unexplored organisation, Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME), the regional headquarters of MI5, in counter-subversion in the region. It shows how SIME operated in the region to liaise with local authorities, and its relationship with MI6.

Chapters Four and Five are both concerned with the nature of multilateral intelligence and propaganda cooperation with the signatories to the Baghdad Pact. Chapter Four examines not only anti-Communist measures in the Pact, but also the many obstacles or preconditions which limited intelligence sharing. It shows that the protective security of the Baghdad Pact was a prerequisite for intelligence cooperation. Chapter Five demonstrates conflicting interests between Britain and Middle Eastern governments in counter-subversion by propaganda. It shows the British were primarily concerned with Communist activities. This concern did not necessarily accord with those of the regional members. A schism in propaganda approaches can be seen as a microcosm of the problems affecting regional cooperation as a whole. Based on the findings from preceding chapters, Chapter Six examines the general extent to which Britain was involved in the conduct of anti-Communist measures by Middle Eastern governments, and Britain’s attitudes towards the security measures of Middle Eastern governments, often conducted in violation of human rights. It also discusses the efficacy and limitation of the intelligence liaison between British Intelligence and its Middle Eastern counterparts.
Chapter One

Fighting the ‘Communist Menace’ Overseas: The Development of British Counter-Subversive Policy in the “Informal Empire” in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{103} The term ‘Communist menace’ can often be found in official records, but was firstly referred to by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in his memorandum to Prime Minister Clement Attlee in the context of the establishment of the Official Committee on Communism (Overseas). Cf., TNA: PRO PREM8/1365: PM/49/115: memorandum by Bevin to Attlee, Top Secret, 17 Aug 1949.
The term “counter-subversion” is used in this paper to mean clandestine activities, whether by propaganda or by operations, directed against Communism or, in the Colonies, against subversive forms of nationalism.

- Prime Minister’s Memorandum, 10 December 1955

The principal object of our Middle East policy has recently been stated by Ministers to be the security of the oil on which the United Kingdom so greatly depends. The main instrument by which we hope to achieve our policy is the Baghdad Pact. Its value to the United Kingdom is primarily as a means of improving the Western position in the cold war and retaining the goodwill of two of the oil producing countries, namely, Iran and Iraq.

- The Chiefs of Staff Committee, 13 Jul 1956

Introduction

By the end of the 1940s, the British government had adopted a firm anti-Soviet stance and envisaged a potential war against the Soviet Union. In order to fight the Cold War against the Soviet Union, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had, by 1949, decided to establish the Russia Committee, the Information Research Department (IRD), and the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee in the Foreign Office. Recent research by Daniel Lomas detailed the strong anti-Soviet stance taken by the Attlee Government, which attached particular importance to MI5’s role in preventing Communist influence in the United Kingdom. Concerning MI5’s role in the Colonies in the post-war period, Calder Walton has shown the close link between the Security Service and the Colonial Office, which, he claims, was an important factor in maintaining British interests overseas against Communist influence during the transition period when the Colonies were moving towards independence. His work is important especially as there was the relationship between anti-Communism and decolonisation, in which MI5 had a special role to play to maintain the

internal security throughout the British Empire.\textsuperscript{110} Despite the importance of MI5’s role in British decolonisation, Britain’s post-war anti-Communist policy overseas has been understudied.

The chapter will show the development of Britain’s post-war overseas anti-Communist policy from the Attlee Government to the Macmillan Government, with a particular focus on Middle Eastern countries between the late 1940s and 1955/56, when anti-Communist measures in the Middle East were considered most important to preserve Britain’s national interests in the region. It will also show how the role of intelligence in anti-Communist measures overseas, and especially in the Middle East, was understood by the British Government. In addition, it will demonstrate that the shift in Britain’s anti-Communist policy in 1955/56 mainly came from the difficulties of fighting the Cold War with limited financial resources and departmental infighting. Britain’s relationship with the United States in anti-Communist measures in the Middle East will also be discussed.

\textbf{The Origins of Post-War Counter-Subversive Activities Overseas}

The range and scope of the activities of MI5 remained largely unknown until the publication of the authorised history of MI5 in 2009. \textit{The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5} confirms that MI5’s role was not confined to Great Britain, but instead extended to the territories of the British Empire for \textit{the defence of the realm} against any forms of subversive activity including espionage, subversion and sabotage.\textsuperscript{111} Based on declassified records of MI5 and the Colonial Office, with a particular focus on British decolonisation, Calder Walton’s \textit{Empire of Secrets} shows that, especially during the early period of the Cold War, the role of MI5’s local representatives, working under the title of Security Liaison Officer (SLO), was to liaise with local security forces to prevent Communist influence and ensure that newly-independent states would not fall to Communism.\textsuperscript{112} In addition, the establishment of the Security Intelligence Adviser (SIA), a representative of MI5, who advised the Colonial Secretary on security matters in the Colonies, was another important development in maintaining the post-war internal security of the British Empire.\textsuperscript{113} The Colonial Office even formed its own Intelligence and Security Department in 1955, and

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., pp.139-147.
\textsuperscript{111} Andrew, \textit{Defence of the Realm}, passim.
\textsuperscript{112} Walton, \textit{Empire of Secrets}, pp.143-145.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., p.140.
MI5 regularly organised a series of training courses for colonial security officers both in Britain and in the colonial territories in order to maintain Empire’s internal security.\(^{114}\)

These activities of MI5 were largely Cold War phenomena. The academic literature makes clear that such activities of MI5 were less prominent before the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939.\(^{115}\) In *Empires of Intelligence*, Martin Thomas showed that the maintenance of security throughout the British Empire in the early 20\(^{th}\) century was mostly dependent on military intelligence units.\(^{116}\) The in-house history of MI5 shows that prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, there were just a few MI5 officers responsible for D Branch (Imperial Overseas Intelligence),\(^{117}\) and only a handful of representatives, under the title of Defence Security Officer (DSO), were stationed in a limited number of colonial territories.\(^{118}\) Harry Hinsley and Anthony Simkins, the official historians of *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, note that the security arrangement was ‘more impressive on paper than in practice’ and ‘no more than the skeleton of an imperial organisation for security’.\(^{119}\) During the war, nevertheless, at the urging of the Colonial Office, the contingents of MI5 officers grew noticeably. According to MI5’s in-house history, the value of the DSOs for training and advising the colonial police was noted by the Colonial Office, and their relationship was maintained in the post-war period.\(^{120}\)

However, MI5 was not acting independently on its own. All activities of the intelligence and security services were directed by government policy. While Calder Walton’s book is less clear about the relationship between MI5’s activities overseas and government policy, it was government policy that directed these post-war anti-Communist measures overseas across government departments and services. In addition to the establishment of anti-Communist organisations, such as the Russia Committee, the IRD, and


\(^{117}\) Note that at the outbreak of war in 1939, MI5 officers were located in the ‘permanent establishment of the Security Service overseas’: ‘Gibraltar, Malta, Cairo, Aden, Singapore and Hong Kong’. The officers were provided with ‘a small staff of military personnel’. Quoted from John Curry, *The Security Service 1908-1945: the official history* (PRO: Kew, Surrey, 1999), pp.396–7.

\(^{118}\) According to the authorised history of MI5, only ‘three’ officers were responsible for D Branch. See Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm*, p.134.

\(^{119}\) Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, vol.4, p.141.

\(^{120}\) According to the in-house history, there were ‘twenty-seven’ officers and ‘twenty-one’ secretaries despatched to the colonial territories. Curry, *Security Service*, pp.396-7, 399.
the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee, there were additional but more important developments in Britain’s post-war anti-Communist stance at the Cabinet and interdepartmental levels in the late 1940s. As stated in the Introduction, records declassified in October 2010 reveal that an interdepartmental official committee, the Official Committees on Communism (Overseas), was established in December 1949.121 This highly secret cabinet committee were established at the suggestion of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who recommended that Attlee set up ‘a small official committee’ to conduct, in Bevin’s words, both ‘offensive and defensive’ actions against the ‘Soviet and Communist menace in all spheres, political, military, economic and social, at home and abroad’.122

The activities of the committee were supervised by the newly-established Ministerial Committee on Communism, alias the AC (M) Committee, chaired by Attlee himself.123 The AC (M) Committee periodically received the reports on their activities from the Official Committees on Communism (Overseas), and the role of the AC (M) Committee was to approve the proposals and recommendations put forward by these official committees. One of such proposals concerning anti-Communist activities overseas in December 1950 was, for instance, MI6’s ‘certain activities’ behind the Iron Curtain and its ‘full co-operation with the Americans’.124 Another decision was to establish a domestic-focused anti-Communist committee, the Official Committee on Communism (Home), in 1951.125

The Official Committee on Communism (Overseas), alias the Anti-Communist Committee, or AC (O) Committee, was chaired by a senior official from the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department of the Foreign Office: Sir Gladwyn Jebb (1949-50); Sir

121 TNA: PRO CAB134/2: AC (M) (51) 3: note by the Secretary of the Cabinet, 19 May 1951. On the Official Committee on Communism (Overseas), also see Chikara Hashimoto, ‘British Security Liaison in the Middle East: The Introduction of Police/Security Advisers and the Lebanon-Iraq-Jordan ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’ from 1949 to 1958’, INS, vol.27, no.6 (2012), pp.850-854. Note that prior to the establishment of the Official Committee on Communism (Overseas) in December 1949, there was also an interdepartmental committee, named ‘Committee on Communism’ at the Cabinet Office, formed earlier the same year, which studied some anti-Communist measures in the territory of the British Empire. See TNA: PRO CAB134/53: Committee on Communism, from May until Dec 1949.
122 TNA: PRO PREM8/1365: PM/49/69: a minute by Ernest Bevin to PM, 19 Apr 1949.
123 Other members included: Lord President, Foreign Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Minister of Defence. Cf. TNA: PRO CAB134/2: AC (M) (49) 1: note by the Secretary of the Cabinet, 31 Dec 1949.
125 TNA: PRO CAB134/2: AC (M) (51) 3: note by the Secretary of the Cabinet, 19 May 1951. A reference to the Official Committee on Communism (Home) can be found in Lomas ‘Labour Ministers, intelligence and domestic anti-Communism’.
Pierson Dixon (1950-53); Sir John Ward (1954-55); and Sir Patrick Dean (1955-56). The permanent members included the Chairman of the JIC, the Chief of MI6, and representatives of the Ministry of Defence and of the Chiefs of Staff. Members of relevant departments, including the Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Office, and MI5, were invited to the committee meeting on an ad hoc basis. From 1953, MI5 became a permanent member, and was represented by Brigadier William Magan, Director of E Branch (the overseas department in charge of external affairs, liaising with all Colonial, Commonwealth, and friendly foreign countries). The purpose of the committee was the co-ordination and initiation of ‘any measures’ which ‘appeared desirable in the conduct of the Cold War’. ‘Any measures’ included propaganda by the IRD; clandestine paramilitary operations by MI6; and security training of both foreign and colonial police forces supervised by MI5. Thus, the activities associated with MI5, as Calder Walton has identified, were directed by the AC (O) Committee. As will be shown in Chapter Two in more detail, the AC (O) Committee was also the engine for facilitating its security liaisons with Middle Eastern countries.

In addition to their own wartime experience, some counter-measures were also borrowed from the techniques and methods of Britain’s post-war enemies, the Soviet Union and International (Soviet-sponsored) Communism. Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor, an influential figure in setting up the AC (O) Committee, who was also one of the architects of Britain’s plans for the liberation of the Eastern Bloc through special operations in the late 1940s, for instance, commented on countering Communist threats overseas that, although ‘we should never descend to their levels’, it would be ‘profitable to borrow certain methods from our enemies’ and ‘we should not hesitate to adopt measures against them which would not be warranted in dealing with a Civilized Power’. Interestingly, a parallel development, and also very similar thinking to that of the Doolittle Report (a report on covert activities of the

126 The committee was also referred to the names of the chairs, such as ‘the Jebb Committee’, ‘the Dixon Committee’, or even ‘the Cold War Committee’. Cf. TNA: PRO KV4/472: the Liddell Diaries, 25 May, 13 Jun, 22 Jun, 14 Nov, 1 Dec 1950; PRO KV4/473: the Liddell Diaries, 6 Feb 1951. Note that, although the Russia Committee, which he also chaired, was mentioned, not surprisingly, Sir Gladwyn Jebb mentioned nothing at all about the AC (O) Committee in his memoirs. See Lord Gladwyn, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), pp.226-227.


United States), was also taking place on the other side of the Atlantic, where the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was empowered in 1948 under the National Security Council (NSC) Directive 10/2 to engage in special operations, including 'subversion against hostile states', in other words, well-known as ‘covert action’.131

In the mid-1950s there was an important shift in British Government anti-Communist policy. The AC (O) Committee was disbanded in February 1956, and replaced by newly established committees.132 Firstly, there was an international context – there was a new application of the traditional Leninist critique of the West by the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death in March 1953; the rise of nationalism in the colonial territories and the emergence of the non-alignment movement loomed large, and ‘colonialism’ became the pretext under which the Soviet Union was attacking European empires. As a result, the AC (O) Committee was regarded as too ineffective to cope with these complex colonial problems, and the way in which anti-Communist measures were conducted under the direction of the AC (O) Committee would produce less fruitful results. Secondly, there was also the domestic context – there was departmental infighting, and the AC (O) Committee, was regarded as an undesirable body for the conduct of the Cold War.

**Quarrelling over the Conduct of “The Cold War”**

As opposed to a departmental policy, anti-Communist policy overseas was dealt with by Cabinet committees. Assessing the chain of command in making anti-Communist policy overseas is, however, a difficult challenge.133 This is partly because any decisions that emerged from interdepartmental committees sought a consensus amongst committee members.134 The distinctiveness of British culture in policymaking, as evident from either


132 TNA: PRO CAB21/2992: letter by Patrick Dean of FO to Sir Harold Parker of MoD, 9 Mar 1956.

133 On a general discussion on policy-making process in Whitehall, see Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled*, pp.44-65.

minutes or memoranda of the JIC, for instance, so-called ‘collegiality’, i.e. a tendency to mask over the political processes of debate and discussion by seemingly joint consensus, makes it difficult to identify organisational or individual opinions between departments. Moreover, there was also the fact that policy formed through several layers of interdepartmental committees, such as the AC (O) Committee (and the OPS, a sub-committee of the AC (O) Committee for policy-planning, which was housed in the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department of the Foreign Office) or the JIC. These committees all directly or indirectly influenced anti-Communist policymaking, which even more difficult for historians to assess the policy-making process. Richard Aldrich reminds us that a static view of how these interdepartmental committees operated is ‘bound to be misleading’ since ‘the exact location of power and responsibility shifted in each administration, depending on the preferences of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Secretary’. Nevertheless, the AC (O) Committee remained at the centre of making anti-Communist policy overseas, as well as coordinating all anti-Communist activities overseas, until its dissolution in February 1956. From this period, how it evolved further will be discussed below.

Concerning the relationships between intelligence and security activities with departments in Whitehall in general, the JIC remained as the central hub at the national level, where intelligence customers (such as the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, and three military services) and the three intelligence services (MI6, MI5 and GCHQ) were represented. Until 1957, the JIC was as a Chiefs of Staff Committee before moving to the Cabinet Office, and its output was more associated with what was needed by military planners. MI6 and GCHQ were the main intelligence collectors and were held administratively answerable to the Foreign Secretary. MI5 had direct access to the Prime

Minister, and became answerable to the Home Secretary from 1952, providing the JIC with security intelligence but also remaining as an independent and self-tasked organisation.\textsuperscript{140}

At the departmental level, the three intelligence services maintained their relationships through liaison with the other departments.\textsuperscript{141} It is worth mentioning MI6’s anti-Communist activities in particular. From 1949, MI6’s link with the Foreign Office was maintained through the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department (PUSD).\textsuperscript{142} In the early post-war period, however, MI6 had an even closer relationship with the Chiefs of Staff and the Ministry of Defence than the Foreign Office.\textsuperscript{143} A former intelligence officer recalled that the Chiefs of Staff, and also the Ministry of Defence, remained the ‘primary customer’ of intelligence collected by MI6 in the early post-war period.\textsuperscript{144} There was also the fact that MI6 had traditionally been headed by former Navy or Army officers until 1956.\textsuperscript{145} This relationship was not only formed by the requirement for intelligence collection, the Chiefs of Staff also used MI6 as a tool of ‘Cold War fighting’ – special political action, including paramilitary operations against Albania, code-named Operation VALUABLE.\textsuperscript{146}

Despite the consensual committee approach, which obscures any particular input in policy-making process, careful analysis shows that departmental infighting over Britain’s conduct of the Cold War was a common occurrence. In The Hidden Hand, Richard Aldrich showed that Britain’s post-war foreign, defence and security policies often formed out of civilian-military infighting especially in the early period of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{147} Aldrich argues that while the Chiefs of Staff had dominated Britain’s foreign policy and MI6’s special political action after the war, the Foreign Office took control of the conduct of the Cold War from 1950 onwards.\textsuperscript{148} However, this departmental infighting continued in the first half of the 1950s up until February 1956, when the AC (O) Committee was officially disbanded. Before going into detail about the subsequent development in Britain’s anti-Communist policy from

\begin{footnotes}
\item[141] Davies, British Secret Service, pp.xxi-xxv.
\item[142] Jeffery, MI6, pp.620-621.
\item[144] Private information obtained through an interview, 4 Sep 2012.
\item[145] Jeffery, MI6, passim.
\item[148] Ibid., pp. 179, 315-319, 324-341. For instance, Aldrich asserts that ‘by 1951 the desire of the British military to do something about winning the Cold War was being effectively contained’. Ibid., p.319.
\end{footnotes}
the mid-1950s, it is worth exploring the reasons behind the disbandment of the committee. A series of developments in Britain’s anti-Communist policy from the establishment of the AC (O) Committee in 1949 to its replacement with new committees in 1955/56 resulted from such civilian-military infighting.

As noted earlier, the AC (O) Committee was established in December 1949 at the suggestion of Ernest Bevin, which came largely in response to pressure a year earlier from the Chiefs of Staff, who suggested that the Attlee Government take stronger action against the Soviet Union and the spread of International Communism.\footnote{TNA: PRO PREM8/1365: Annual Report on Strategic Policy by the Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor, 20 Jul 1948.} Considering action to counter Soviet propaganda and political pressure, the views from the Chiefs of Staff were expressed through the Ministry of Defence to the Attlee Government by Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor, then Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, who noted that:

> In order to help the Foreign Secretary effectively to undertake this onerous task we recommend that the existing machinery should be appropriately expanded and put on a higher level, in close touch with the Chiefs of Staff and with advisory, planning and coordinating functions…not only to counter possible Soviet moves but also to put us in a position to take the initiative ourselves and take advantage of Soviet difficulties as they arise. […] Co-ordination of the activities […] should be secured by the appointment of a Cold War Committee.\footnote{TNA: PRO PREM8/1365: note ‘the cold war’, by the Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, Annex A to Annual Report on Strategic Policy, Top Secret, 20 Jul 1948.}

Prime Minister Clement Attlee, who was still uncertain whether a new committee for ‘conducting the Cold War’ was necessary, asked the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, for his opinion on this matter. After consulting with officials from both the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence, Brook endorsed Bevin’s suggestion to establish such a committee.\footnote{TNA: PRO PREM8/1365: a minute by Sir Norman Brook to PM, 20 Apr 1949.}

A similar situation played out in mid-1950s. By October 1955, the Chiefs of Staff had noted a change of Soviet tactics from direct military confrontation with the West to ‘the intensification of subversion’ all over the world, and recommended that the Eden Government take stronger and extensive anti-Communist action throughout the world. According to them, their anti-Communist measures had largely been so far ‘by way of ad hoc measures aimed half-heartedly at the stopping of gaps’, and warned that this was ‘the reverse of a winning policy’.\footnote{Note that although this document has been removed from the PREM file, it can be found in other departmental records, such as TNA: PRO CO1035/116: COS (55)262: memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff, ‘Cold War – countering covert aggression’, 12 Oct 1955. And also in PRO DEFE13/331, which contains an extra page.} Echoing the point made by Air Chief Marshal Slessor five years...
earlier, the Chiefs of Staff pointed out the need for ‘a world-wide strategic policy’ including foreign and colonial territories and also at home, to initiate ‘whole-hearted’ counter-offensive operations against ‘communist subversion’ as well as behind the Iron Curtain itself. As one of the ‘fundamental requirements for our success in the cold war’, the Chiefs of Staff noted, ‘we should vigorously combat and counter-attack subversion by clandestine and all other related means’. This recommendation preceded by a week a separate suggestion by Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan for forming the new anti-Communist committees which would eventually replace the old AC (O) Committee. However, while this recommendation by the Chiefs of Staff triggered a change in anti-Communist policy, it took the policy in a different direction from what the Chiefs of Staff desired.

Prime Minister Anthony Eden sought out Sir Norman Brook for his long-standing position at the centre of the Cabinet Office and, as Attlee had a few years earlier, asked Brook for his comments on the report put forward by the Chiefs of Staff and the suggestion by Harold Macmillan. Once more choosing the Foreign Minister’s side, Brook supported Macmillan’s proposals as being the ‘more cautious’ approach to the subject to the Chiefs of Staff’s on which he labelled a ‘rather feverish and muddled report’. Macmillan’s recommendation was to revise Britain’s anti-Communist policy overseas, and to review the activities of MI6, MI5 and the IRD in the context of decolonisation and on the basis of Britain’s financial limitations. Macmillan suggested Eden pay more careful attention to colonial problems as well as maintaining British interests abroad, especially in the Middle East, where the Soviet Union was exploiting anti-British nationalist movements on their side. He pointed out that anti-Communist activities against the Communist-occupied states were yielding unfruitful results, and only wasting Britain’s resources.

Sticking to the outline of the framework that Harold Macmillan suggested, Sir Norman Brook dispatched a memorandum on the subject to Anthony Eden. With specific and clearer recommendations on subsequent anti-Communist policy, officially termed ‘counter-subversion’ policy from this point (thus the terms counter-subversion and anti-Communist measures were used interchangeably in official papers hereafter), it also contained Brook’s own views on a problem in the British Government’s approach to counter-subversion. Firstly, agreeing with Macmillan’s point, Brook suggested that Eden suspend anti-Communist

\[153 \text{ Ibid.}
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\[154 \text{TNA: PRO PREM1 1/1582: PM/55/142: minute by Macmillan to PM, Top Secret, 19 Oct 1955.}
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\[155 \text{TNA: PRO PREM1 1/1582: minute by Norman Brook to PM, 21 Oct 1955.}
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\[156 \text{TNA: PRO PREM1 1/1582: PM55/142: minute by Harold Macmillan to PM, 19 Oct 1955.}
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activities conducted by MI6 and IRD against the countries behind the Iron Curtain for the time being.\(^{157}\) Secondly, he also agreed with Macmillan’s suggestion on the necessity of ‘more vigorous steps’ towards countering the colonial problems. In order to counter ‘Communist encroachment’ in the Colonies, Brook noted that ‘sound’ Colonial administration, ‘good’ police forces, and an ‘efficient’ intelligence system were necessary. It could be done through coordinating covert counter-subversive measures under the direction of clear governmental policy. He also noted that by mobilising ‘all our available resources’, ‘Communism is held in check and nationalist movements are guided along sound lines’.\(^{158}\)

Thirdly, and more importantly, Brook expressed his views on the way in which the AC (O) Committee, more specifically the Chiefs of Staff, handled counter-subversion abroad. He noted to Eden that:

I fear that Ministerial responsibility is being weakened by allowing the clandestine activities in this field to be “stimulated” by an interdepartmental Committee of officials including a representative of the Chiefs of Staff...One of the disadvantages of the term “cold war” is that it has tempting the Chiefs of Staff to think that it is their business. This Committee [the AC (O) Committee] was originally appointed at a time when the Chiefs of Staff were restive about the conduct of foreign policy and thought that the Foreign Office were not doing enough to counter Communist encroachments abroad...Now that the risk of “hot war” has become more remote, the Chiefs of Staff have again become restive about the conduct of the “cold war”.\(^{159}\) It is clear there was a growing sense in Whitehall that the Chiefs of Staff were interfering in the conduct of governmental policy in late 1955. There is evidence of further interference by the Chiefs of Staff under the pretext of the “Cold War”. A minute of the Colonial Office reveals that the Chiefs of Staff also attempted to initiate a survey on ‘Communist infiltration in schools, both in the United Kingdom, and all foreign and colonial territories’ as a ‘general exercise by the JIC’.\(^{160}\) Once this was known to Brook, who thought it an inappropriate action by the Chiefs of Staff, he intervened in the matter and stopped it.\(^{161}\)

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\(^{157}\) TNA: PRO PREM11/1582: minute by Norman Brook to PM, 21 Oct 1955. MI6’s special political actions being conducted against the Soviet Bloc at the time of 1955 was unclear from this report, but existing literature indicates some activities against them. On Operation ‘Lyautey’, see Aldrich, Hidden Hand, pp.178-179; Bower, Perfect English Spy, pp.261-262; Paul Maddrell, ‘British Intelligence through the Eyes of the Stasi: What the Stasi’s Records Show about the Operations of British Intelligence in Cold War Germany’, INS, vol.27, no.1 (2012), pp.54-55; idem, ‘What we have discovered about the Cold War is what we already knew: Julius Mader and the Western secret services during the Cold War’, Cold War History, vol.5, no.2 (2005), pp.250-251. Also see Dorril, MI6, pp.483-517; Paul Maddrell, Spying on Science (Oxford: OUP, 2006), pp.176-204.

\(^{158}\) TNA: PRO PREM11/1582: minute by Norman Brook to PM, 21 Oct 1955.

\(^{159}\) Ibid.

\(^{160}\) TNA: PRO CO1035/116: minute by D. Watson to Sir T. Lloyd, 21 Feb 1956.

\(^{161}\) Referring to this incident, Duncan Watson, Head of the newly established ISD of the Colonial Office, recorded in his minute to Sir Thomas Lloys, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, that ‘you may wish to let the Secretary of State know how Sir N. Brook reacted’. TNA: PRO CO1035/116: minute by D. Watson to Sir T. Lloyd, 21 Feb 1956.
It was not only Brook who felt discontented with the interference by the Chiefs of Staff, this was also a prevalent feeling amongst senior officials especially in the Foreign Office. As a result of ‘a clear cleavage’ in the AC (O) Committee between the Chiefs of Staff, who wanted to ‘get cracking’, and those of the Foreign Office, who preferred ‘a more cautious approach’, Sir John Ward, Chairman of the AC (O) Committee (1954-55), consequently found himself in the ‘invidious position of acting as a brake rather than an accelerator on the Committee machine’. In addition, Sir Patrick Dean, the successor to Sir John Ward as Chairman of the AC (O) Committee (1955-56), who also chaired the JIC, recorded in his minute in December 1955 to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, that:

...there would be no objection to telling General Templer and the Chiefs of Staff generally about what was going on [about counter-subversive policy in the FO], but the trouble was that they conceived it their duty to “stimulate” action and were always interfering in the details of the special operations which were not their concern. We are always having difficulty on this with the Chiefs of Staff representative in the OP Section of PUSD [the Overseas Planning Section of the Permanent of Under-Secretary’s Department, a subcommittee of the AC (O) for drafting planning of anti-Communist activities].

Moreover, ‘in my experience’, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick noted to the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, when the Chiefs of Staff were arguing that stronger counter-subversive activities were necessary, they mostly relied on ‘hearsay’ from their low-level representatives and did not ‘always know what they [were] talking about’.

Brook also insisted to Eden that the use of the term ‘Cold War’ in any official minutes and memoranda should be refrained from as it meant a wide variety of activities, ranging from economic support to a friendly state to the conduct of military operations. The term was, in Brook’s words, ‘responsible for a lot of muddled thinking – or, worse still, lack of thinking’, which ‘led the Chiefs of Staff to suppose that they are in some way responsible for matters which are essentially the business of the Foreign Secretary’. In addition, agreeing with Macmillan’s suggestion of paying more attention to the colonial problems, the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, also noted that:

162 TNA: PRO CAB21/5003: memorandum by G.P. Young to Norman Brook, ‘AC (O) and AC (M)’, 31 Jan 1955.
163 A minute by Patrick Dean to Sir I. Kirkpatrick, 31 Dec 1955. OPS/1/55, obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013.
164 A minute by Sir I. Kirkpatrick to the Foreign Secretary, 13 Feb 1956. OPS/1/56, obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013, which contains ‘For example, they constantly allege that the Foreign Office block all proposals for action against the Communists. This they are told by some of their low-level representatives.’ Emphasis original.
165 There was also a similar episode in 1949. See Aldrich, Hidden Hand, p.316.
166 TNA: PRO PREM11/1582: minute by Brook to PM, 28 Nov 1955.
we should not I think allow the metaphorical expression, “cold war”, to blind us to the fact that what we are considering is not war-like operations at all, but, whatever methods may be employed, operations which are essentially political.167

In his minute, Brook endorsed Lennox-Boyd’s perspective on the inappropriate machinery of the AC (O) Committee, which had no permanent representative from the Colonial Office, and then reminded Eden that counter-subversion was ‘an instrument of policy, not an end in itself’ and thus must be directed either by its foreign or colonial policy in respective territories: the Foreign Secretary must be responsible for all counter-subversion in foreign countries, and the Colonial Secretary must be similarly responsible for counter-subversion in the Colonies.168

Following the minutes by Harold Macmillan (October 19), the Colonial Secretary (November 15), the Minister of Defence (November 23), in consultation with Sir Norman Brook, and Prime Minister Anthony Eden issued a memorandum on 10 December 1955, which defined British counter-subversive policy both in the Colonies and foreign countries. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the term counter-subversion was defined, without reference to the term ‘Cold War’, as ‘clandestine activities, whether by propaganda or by operations, directed against Communism or, in the Colonies, against subversive forms of nationalism’.169

The Eden Memorandum and the Establishment of the ‘Special Committee’ in the Foreign Office

Following Cabinet approval on 24 February 1956, the AC (O) Committee was disbanded and replaced by new counter-subversive committees.170 Unlike the old AC (O) Committee, these new committees excluded the Chiefs of Staff, who were ‘very strongly opposed’ to Eden’s memorandum which proposed the formation of these committees.171 The Official Committee on Counter-Subversion in the Colonial Territories was formed as an inter-departmental committee formed at the Cabinet Office to cover the colonial territories, supervising all counter-subversive activities in the colonies, and some Commonwealth

167 TNA: PRO PREM1 1/1582: minute by ALB to PM, Nov 1955.
168 TNA: PRO PREM1 1/1582: minute by Norman Brook to PM, 28 Nov 1955.
169 TNA: PRO PREM1 1/1582: memorandum by Anthony Eden, 10 Dec 1955.
171 A minute by Patrick Dean to Sir I. Kirkpatrick, 31 Dec 1955. OPS/1/55, obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013.
countries, under the direction of the Colonial Policy Committee. The other committee, the Overseas Planning Committee (1956-57), was directly concerned with foreign countries, including Middle Eastern states, according to declassified records released under the FOIA. The committee, often referred to as the ‘special’ committee, was established in the Foreign Office. From 1957, after absorbing the Russia Committee, it was renamed the Political Intelligence Committee. Unlike the interdepartmental Official Committee on Counter-Subversion in the Colonial Territories, the Overseas Planning Committee was an intra-departmental committee in essence – it consisted of senior experts of three geographical areas of the Foreign Office; the Soviet Union and its satellites; the Middle East; and the Far East. Experts on other areas, such as Central and South America; economic matters; and information matters were called on if necessary. MI6 and the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) also had their own representatives there.

Eden’s memorandum, which set up these new committees, replacing the old AC (O) Committee, and excluded any representation of the Chiefs of Staff, was largely influenced by Sir Norman Brook’s input. Sir Patrick Dean, Chairman of both the AC (O) Committee and the JIC, found this development ‘even more radical’ than Macmillan’s initial proposal but ‘not for that reason any the less welcome’. Indeed, the total exclusion of the Chiefs of Staff invited acute criticism on committee decisions. A minute by Dean to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick indicates that the newly appointed Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, who had been the Minister of Defence until December 1955, was concerned about the exclusion of the Chiefs of Staff, especially from the Foreign Office’s special committee. Despite this concern, Dean sought to convince Selwyn Lloyd that ‘the memorandum was right’ and that ‘it would be better for the Chiefs of Staff to keep out of this sort of activity because they could not be

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172 TNA: PRO CAB130/114: GEN 520/14 meeting, ‘Committee on Counter-Subversion in Colonial Territories’, 16 Mar 1956. It was composed of the representatives of the Foreign, Colonial, and Commonwealth Offices, Ministry of Defence and MI6 and MI5, excluding the Chiefs of Staff. After the Colonial Policy Committee ceased to exist in late 1963 as a consequence of the re-organisation of cabinet committees and government departments, the Committee on Counter-Subversion was renamed the “Counter-Subversive Committee” and placed under the new Official Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy. Also see TNA: PRO CAB21/5379, the file entitled, ‘Counter-Subversion’.

173 A minute by the Foreign Office ‘The Russia Committee and the Overseas Planning Committee’, 18 Jul 1957. O/1/57. obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013.


175 A minute by Patrick Dean to Secretary of State, 16 Dec 1955. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013. Patrick Dean also noted that ‘The Prime Minister’s proposals for reorganising the anti-subversion campaign are much more far-reaching than those proposed by the Secretary of State [Harold Macmillan]. The Secretary of State proposed that the A.C. (O) Committee should in general oversee all such activities both in foreign countries and in the Colonies…The Prime Minister proposes to abolish the AC (O) Committee altogether’.
responsible for the policy, which must be the Foreign Secretary’s, and they in fact had virtually no resources to help’.  

However, in the end, Selwyn Lloyd decided to include Major-General William G. Stirling on the Overseas Planning Committee as a representative of the Ministry of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff. In addition, it had been planned that the newly established Foreign Office’s intra-departmental committee be chaired by the Head of PUSD, but Selwyn Lloyd instead selected his Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Douglas Dodds-Parker, to chair the committee. Lloyd thought that ‘it would be useful for a Minister to be closely concerned because he could then talk to the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defence as well as discussing with the Secretary of State himself’. The chairing of the Foreign Office’s special committee by Dodds-Parker was formally accepted by the same Cabinet meeting that approved Eden’s memorandum on 24 February 1956.

The Eden memorandum was significant in a number of ways. Firstly, it established a clear government policy to maintain British interests overseas – shifting the focus of anti-Communist measures away from the Soviet Union and its satellite countries to the Colonies and also to non-colonial territories, most notably Middle Eastern states, where Britain had national interests – oil in particular. The memorandum stated that in shifting from the Eastern Bloc, ‘we should be ready to make more use of counter-subversion in the smaller countries in the Middle East and in South-East Asia which are seriously threatened with Communist infiltration’. Secondly, the Eden Government recognised that while nationalist movements in the Colonies were not necessarily Communist, they had the potential to be exploited by the Soviet Union or local Communist parties. The recognition of this longstanding problem at the highest level led to developments in the Foreign Office.

In addition to setting up the new intra-departmental committee, the memorandum also directed the collation of intelligence and intelligence assessments in the Foreign Office.

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176 A minute by Patrick Dean to Sir I. Kirkpatrick, 31 Dec 1955. OPS/1/55, obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013.
177 A note of a Cabinet meeting ‘Counter-Subversion’, OPS/1/56, S.50/94/4/1st meeting, 24 Feb 1956. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013. This was at the suggestion of Selwyn Lloyd ‘in order to keep the Chiefs of Staff informed’ of counter-subversive activities in foreign countries. Quoted from TNA: PREM11/1582: minute by Brook to PM, 23 Feb 1956.
178 A minute by Patrick Dean to Sir I. Kirkpatrick, 31 Dec 1955. OPS/1/55, obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013.
179 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
Around the same time, there had been a parallel shift of emphasis in Foreign Office intelligence from ‘a possible global war’ against the Soviet Union and its satellite countries to ‘present and increasing’ subversive activities overseas, such as the Middle East. Observing this shift, Sir Patrick Dean, the JIC Chairman, noted that ‘nearly all the intelligence now considered by the Joint Intelligence Committee in its weekly review is of a political/economic nature’ rather than military threats.\footnote{A minute by Patrick Dean to M.S. Williams, ‘Organisation of Intelligence in the Foreign Office’, 22 Dec 1955. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013.}  Dean also commented that:

> the JIC are considering whether some part of the considerable effort put by our collecting agencies (particularly JIB, our friends [MI6] and GCHQ) into obtaining intelligence about the military organisation, capabilities, state of preparedness, etc., of the Sino-Soviet bloc could not be switched more profitably and successfully to these “grey” territories [such as the Middle East and the Colonies] where the politico/economic/cultural threat is more imminent. If some of the effort directed to obtain order of battle and similar types of intelligence could be dropped, the resources thus freed could be used to obtain intelligence about Communist plans for subverting and penetrating the “grey” areas [such as the Middle East, where Britain had vast national interests].\footnote{Ibid.}

While a possible change in the allocation of intelligence collection efforts was being discussed at the JIC level, Dean noted that ‘there is a strong case for seeing what steps can be taken by the Foreign Office to improve immediately the organisation for collating and assessing Sino-Soviet intentions and plans, both general and particular, for attacking and increasing their influence in these “grey” territories’.\footnote{Dean emphasised that the expressions “Communists” or “Sino/Soviet” being used in his minute were not to ‘denote purely Communist or Russian/Chinese plans: they would include also extreme nationalist plans etc., which are likely to receive support and comfort from the Sino-Soviet bloc and local Communist movements’. Ibid.}

As the responsibility for collating and assessing intelligence rested with the Foreign Office, where ‘much of the necessary information is already available in departments of the Foreign Office’, Eden’s memorandum, setting up the new intra-departmental committee on subversive activities in such countries, was a welcome development for the Foreign Office.\footnote{‘For instance, enquiries have shown that almost all the intelligence and formation which revealed that the Russians were planning to launch a major economic drive in the Middle East, beginning with Egypt, this autumn was available to Foreign Office departments (and to the JIB and our friends) as long ago as last February/March’. Ibid.}  Records of an internal Foreign Office meeting report ‘there is a need for the collation in the Foreign Office of all kinds of evidence bearing on Communist/extreme nationalist political intentions in order to foresee and if possible anticipate their plans’, and based on which ‘what counter-action should be undertaken’.\footnote{A record of meeting held at the Foreign Office, 17 Jan 1956. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013.}  Indeed, this was a prelude to the subsequent 1957
development that saw the JIC placed in the Cabinet Office with a representative from the Colonial Office as official members.\textsuperscript{188}

Thirdly, the memorandum defined counter-subversion as one of the ‘clandestine activities’ to be conducted by MI6, MI5 and the IRD, and reiterated that all counter-subversive activities were to be directed by government policy: the Foreign and Colonial Secretaries were ‘responsible for all counter-subversion’ in their respective spheres. It also noted that ‘subject to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary should retain sole control over C’s organisation [MI6]. C’s activities in support of foreign policy should remain subject to the Ministerial control of the Foreign Secretary’.\textsuperscript{189} This statement was mainly intended to prevent any further interference by the Chiefs of Staff in counter-subversive activities conducted by intelligence and security services. The Eden memorandum further stated that:

> in relation to counter-subversion in foreign countries, I doubt whether we need any inter-departmental organisation at all. This counter-subversion will be used solely in support of foreign policy, and it will be carried out by an organisation which is already under the Foreign Secretary’s control.\textsuperscript{190}

Once the government’s counter-subversive policy was made clear, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick despatched a top-secret and personal letter by diplomatic bag to all ambassadorial and ministerial positions in foreign countries, instructing them to pay more careful attention to ‘signs of Communist or other subversive activities’. He wrote:

> We have decided, in view of the new type of threat, that counter-subversion, i.e. clandestine activities whether by propaganda or by special operations, will have an increasing part to play in support of foreign policy…We have accordingly tried to draw up a broad list of priorities for such action [owing to limited resources]…Action is most urgently required in the Middle East and South-East Asia…Her Majesty’s Representatives are in the best position to suggest ways of countering dangerous activities and of reinforcing the influence of those well-disposed towards us and their ability to resist hostile subversive activities; and you should not hesitate to put forward such suggestions, whether they are for overt anti-Communist measures or for ways in which the policies of Her Majesty’s Government might be furthered by clandestine means.\textsuperscript{191}

The letter by Kirkpatrick made clear that there were limited resources available for counter-subversive activities by clandestine means, but stated firmly that such clandestine activities were understood to be a means of implementing foreign policy. In addition, ‘even in cases where counteraction is not possible by ourselves owing to lack of resources’, Kirkpatrick also wrote in the letter that ‘it may still be possible to do something in consultation with our allies,

\begin{enumerate}
\item TNA: PRO PREM1/1582: memorandum by Anthony Eden, 10 Dec 1955.
\item Ibid. Emphasis added.
\item A letter by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick to Ambassador/Minister overseas, 17 May 1956. OPS/1/56, obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013.
\end{enumerate}
Counter-Subversion in the Middle East

As stated in the Introduction, Britain’s post-war policy towards the Middle East has been the subject of scholarly attention for some time. Despite Attlee’s attempt to retreat from Britain’s imperial commitments to the Middle East after the Second World War, Ernest Bevin reminded the Attlee Cabinet in August 1949 that ‘in peace and war the Middle East is an area of cardinal importance to the United Kingdom, second only to the United Kingdom itself’. In addition, the defence of the Middle East was also considered by the British military as a pillar of Britain’s post-war defence strategy. The academic literature also suggests that the subsequent Conservative (Churchill, Eden, Macmillan) governments also put particular importance on the region in its foreign and defence policies. However, Britain faced challenges in the region – the British military presence in Egypt was seriously threatened by growing anti-British sentiment throughout Egypt; and then by the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, under the terms of which British military forces were to be evacuated from Egypt. The centre of gravity of British foreign and defence policies in the region had already shifted from Egypt to the Iraqi-Jordanian axis. From the mid-1950s, British foreign and defence policies in the region depended on the Baghdad Pact, which had been formed in April 1955.

The excerpt from a Chiefs of Staff report on Britain’s commitment to the Baghdad Pact shown at the beginning of this chapter clearly demonstrates the priority placed on ‘the security of the oil’ and the retention of ‘the good will’ of the oil-producing countries, such as

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192 Ibid.
194 On post-war imperial defence strategy, to name some sources/scholarly works: cf. Gorst, “We must cut our coat according to our cloth”; Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p.215; Ovendale, ‘William Strang and the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee’, p.217.
Iraq and Iran. The Baghdad Pact was then understood as ‘the main instrument’ to achieve such objectives. As will be shown in detail below, Britain’s counter-subversion operations had a large role to play in maintaining British interests in the region under the Baghdad Pact. Before going into detail about the roles of the Overseas Planning Committee and the Baghdad Pact in counter-subversion in the Middle East, it should be explained that there was a framework of counter-subversion in the region before the mid-1950s.

The reason for Britain’s post-war counter-subversive policy in the Middle East after the Second World War was the need to prepare for a possible war against the Soviet Union. Since the Middle East consisted of both colonial (the Palestine Mandate, Cyprus and the Aden Colony) and foreign territories with which Britain had military commitments under defence treaties with Middle Eastern states, such as Egypt, Jordan and Iraq, the necessity of anti-Communist measures in the region also came from the defence, foreign, and colonial policies of the Attlee Government in the late 1940s. These seemingly diverse policies were all in essence directed by the Defence Transition Committee (DTC) and the 1948 Government War Book. The 1948 War Book was a government policy, setting procedures for all departments, including intelligence and security services, to deal with the possible event of war against the Soviet Union.

In this context, the role of MI5 was to inform security authorities of ‘lists of persons’ who should be detained under draconian defence regulations. To ready itself, MI5 prepared its own in-house war book, which was constantly reviewed and circulated within MI5, including its own outstations, such as Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) and Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE). As the following chapters (Chapters Two and Three) will show, without exception, the 1948 Government War Book was the key driving policy for MI5’s activities in the Middle East. Similar to MI5’s practice at home, SIME as the regional

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199 The backbone of it remained the same but was constantly reviewed and revised by relevant departments throughout the Cold War. Cf. TNA: PRO CAB21/3420: the file entitled ‘Departmental War Books: reports of progress on preparation’, from Nov 1952 to Aug 1953, which includes MI5.
headquarters of MI5 was the prime security authority in the region, and prepared security measures in case of an emergency or war. The Chiefs of Staff envisaged the possibility of a Soviet invasion of the region, and SIME was also particularly important here because the integrity of the Middle East was essential for British defence planning. In the same way, their activities were further directed by foreign and colonial policies in the region.

The AC (O) Committee was the most important body for stimulating and coordinating counter-subversive activities in the Middle East. Although the minutes of the AC (O) Committee meetings were heavily ‘weeded’ in the declassification process, the indices of the minutes clearly suggest that the committee attached special importance to the Middle East. Countries such as Iran, Syria and Lebanon were identified as flashpoints vulnerable to Communist exploitation of local conditions, such as low standards of living and unequal distribution of wealth. Sir Michael Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, the chief expert on Middle Eastern affairs, was, for instance, frequently invited to the committee’s meetings to express his opinion. Wright once pronounced in June 1950 that the danger of the spread of Communist influence in the Middle East was ‘very real’.

It is important to note that a distinctive characteristic of the Middle East was that Communism had been made illegal in most Middle Eastern countries by the late 1940s. Although Communist Parties had not gained popular support in the region, the Communist movement was by no means non-existent: as their activities were prohibited, the members of the Communist Parties, and their sympathisers, went underground. According to the first post-war comprehensive survey conducted by the JIC, these underground Communist movements sought to exploit nationalist elements for ‘opposition to the interests of “Anglo-American Imperialism”’. Despite these activities being prohibited by local authorities, this was a cause of concern, especially, for the Chiefs of Staff, who had to plan a potential war against the Soviet Union. These local Communist Parties and their sympathisers were inevitably regarded as “potential fifth columnists”, whose activities might threaten an allied

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202 Note that the 1951 Government War Book was more relevant to SIME, which included ‘limited war’, TNA: PRO CAB21/3393.
203 Note that TNA: PRO CAB158 and PRO CAB159 series contain the JIC estimates which regularly assessed the Soviet military threat to the Middle East area.
204 In the case of the Colonies, see TNA: PRO CO537/5082: Defence Transition Committee: Government War Book Sub-Committee: ‘evacuation of civilian population from certain Colonies in the event of war’ (1949).
205 TNA: PRO CAB134/4: AC (O) (50) 18th meeting of Cabinet Official Committee on Communism (Overseas): minute, ‘Communist Influence in the Middle East’, 2 Jun 1950.
206 Ibid.
207 The exception was Israel.
war effort in the event of war with the Soviet Union, but it was difficult to obtain a clear picture of the extent of Communist influence because the movements operated underground. More importantly, as will be shown in Chapter Two, the local security services were considered ill-prepared for war, especially as far as their anti-Communist security measures were concerned. In addition to stimulating and coordinating anti-Communist measures overseas, the AC (O) Committee was the engine for facilitating security liaisons with Middle Eastern countries, which was one means of implementing anti-Communist measures in the region.

Although the Middle East held an important position in Britain’s post-war strategy, it is noteworthy that these counter-subversive measures in the region had not been systematically coordinated until the Eden memorandum was issued in late 1955. This was mainly owing to the fact that counter-subversion in the region was not clearly defined at the government policy-level. More specifically, the implementation of these measures in the region was mostly associated with the Chiefs of Staff, and thus oriented towards war planning. In addition, these measures were conducted on an ad hoc basis whenever the opportunity arose. However, once the Eden memorandum was issued in late 1955/early 1956, the focus of counter-subversion shifted away from the Soviet Union and its satellites, and became to preserve British interests overseas. Counter-subversive measures in the case of foreign countries began to be coordinated by the Overseas Planning Committee of the Foreign Office, with the first committee meeting noting that ‘the Middle East and South-East Asia, in that order, are the areas most immediately threatened and where counter-action both overt and covert is most urgently needed.’

MI5’s large role in enhancing the security of the Colonies throughout the British Empire was identified by Philip Murphy in an Intelligence and National Security article in 2002. Using the transition of the Central African Federation from the Colonies to the Commonwealth as his case study, Murphy noted that Britain was skillfully and mostly

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210 This will be explored in detail in Chapter Two.

211 A minute by Patrick Dean to the Foreign Secretary, 19 Mar 1956. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013. Emphasis added. As noted earlier, the JIB was also a member of the Overseas Planning Committee, but link with the JIB before the re-organisation in 1955/56 is unclear. On the JIB, see Huw Dylan, ‘The Joint Intelligence Bureau: (Not So) Secret Intelligence for the Post-War World’, INS, vol.27, no.1 (2012), pp.27-45. Also see Huw Dylan, The Joint Intelligence Bureau: Economic, Topographic, and Scientific Intelligence of Britain’s Cold War (Aberystwyth: PhD thesis, 2010).
successfully exporting their security practices through the police and security services across the British Empire. He argued that a close link with local security services through the representative of MI5 was an important element in creating a ‘Commonwealth intelligence culture’. The declassified records make clear that the practice of enhancing internal security overseas was not confined to the British Empire.

The first report by the Overseas Planning Committee clearly stated that one of the pillars of counter-subversive measures was ‘security training’, noting that ‘We consider that the value of training in security and anti-communist techniques cannot be overemphasised’. The Eden memorandum provided the financial resources (£25,000 a year) needed for security training especially for foreign (not colonial) security forces, in contrast to earlier efforts where the finances were lacking, as will be discussed in Chapter Two. In addition to arranging such training courses for foreign security/police officers either in Britain or host countries, it had been very difficult for the Foreign Office to persuade the Treasury to authorise payments to despatch British security/police advisers to foreign countries to conduct security training on an ad hoc basis.

In addition, the Overseas Planning Committee also clearly set out the use of ‘covert operations’ by MI6 as counter-subversive measures. In his minute to the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, Sir Patrick Dean reported that:

We are preparing a circular letter to Her Majesty’s representatives abroad informing them that the increased use of clandestine means to further foreign policy has been approved and requesting them to bear this constantly in mind and to submit recommendations for such activities in consultation with the local representatives of our friends [MI6]. We recommend that this should be followed up by more detailed instructions as appropriate to individual posts, asking for more reports on Communist penetration and prospects and recommendations for counter-action.

This excerpt shows the linkage between the Foreign Office and MI6 concerning the use of ‘covert operations’, in other words special political action. Moreover, the approval by the Eden Government of the increased use of covert operations suggests that such operations were considered by the Government as a useful, and cost-effective, tool to implement foreign policy. The term ‘cost-effective’ being used here meant that the use of covert operations was

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213 A minute by Patrick Dean to the Foreign Secretary, 19 Mar 1956. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013. Sir Patrick Dean noted in his minute to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick that ‘We have Ministerial approval for expending an extra £25,000 a year on this and we must make sure that full use is made of this’.

214 Ibid. Emphasis added.
less costly than sending troops overseas. This point was made by Harold Macmillan, who used the example of sending British troops to Kenya, British Guiana, and Cyprus, which incurred huge expenditures of money and manpower, to suggest to Anthony Eden a wiser use of intelligence, when he proposed to establish the new committees.  

Furthermore, Macmillan may even have suggested this increased use of covert operations, informing Eden in 1955 that:

[T]here is sometimes reluctance to contemplate the use of covert means until it is rather too late for the proper planning to take place. I think therefore we should examine our present procedures and organisation to ensure that the possibility of using covert means to achieve our ends and in support of our overt policy is constantly borne in mind and the necessary planning carried out wherever possible well in advance.  

As will be discussed later in detail, this clearly suggests that Macmillan saw the use of intelligence services as an instrument of policy as a valid proposition.

Harold Macmillan and Counter-Subversion in the Middle East

Harold Macmillan was one of the key decision makers who set the direction of counter-subversive activities, especially in the Middle East. Concerning Macmillan’s approach to defending ‘British interests in the Middle East’, Nigel Ashton remarked that he ‘was not only the foremost of the Cabinet hawks over Suez’ but also he was ‘if anything, even more radical’ than his Cabinet colleagues. In his minute to Anthony Eden in October 1955, Macmillan noted that the ‘supply of oil’ from the Middle East was vital for reviving Britain’s exhausted economy, and therefore, maintaining Britain’s position in the region was necessary ‘at almost any cost’. In addition, Macmillan was also instrumental in initiating the sharing of the methods and techniques of Britain’s anti-Communist measures with certain Middle Eastern countries. The motive behind his decision to do so was to keep Soviet influence out of the Middle East, ensuring that Britain’s influence was maintained.

Macmillan’s views on the intelligence services have been noted elsewhere. The existing literature shows that Macmillan was above all in favour of MI6’s special operations,

216 Ibid.
219 For instance, Christopher Andrew has shown in the authorised history of MI5 that Macmillan viewed MI5 with a degree of scepticism in the context of domestic political scandals, especially during his premiership. Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p.482.
particularly in the Middle East. In his memoirs, Christopher “Monty” Woodhouse, the chief architect on the MI6 side of the 1953 Iranian coup (codenamed Operation BOOT/TPAJAX) recorded that it was Macmillan, not Anthony Eden, who was keen to know more about the operational details of the 1953 Iranian coup. According to Woodhouse, Macmillan was ‘clearly looking to the future possibilities’ of using such an operation elsewhere. In addition, Woodhouse also noted that, in their conversation about problems with the colonial insurgency in Cyprus at a party in the Ministry of Defence in December 1954, Macmillan said to him, ‘We ought to be trying some of your [MI6] stuff there’. With a few exceptions, documentary evidence on these matters, especially associated with MI6’s activities, is very thin in British sources. Declassified documents from the other side of the Atlantic, however, demonstrate Macmillan’s favourable attitudes towards such activities. When US officials were deliberating a possible collaboration with the British on clandestine special operations in the Syrian Crisis in September 1957, the Secretary of State of the United States, John Foster Dulles, noted that there was ‘genuine, intimate and effective cooperation, stemming directly from Macmillan’.

Besides Macmillan’s understanding of the role of intelligence in assisting his foreign and defence policies, it is worth exploring the motives behind Macmillan’s suggestion for establishing the new committees in October 1955. One year earlier, when Macmillan was appointed Minister of Defence (in October 1954), it appears that he was not aware of the existence of the AC (O) Committee, the activities of which had been supervised by the AC (M) Committee under the Attlee Government. Macmillan wrote in one of his memoirs, Tides of Fortune, concerning Britain’s anti-Communist activities overseas, on 30 November 1954 that:

No one is wholly responsible – it’s partly Defence, partly Colonial Office, partly Foreign Office. There’s no central anti-Communist organisation with any drive in it. ‘Cold War’ alarms

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221 Woodhouse, _Something Ventured_, pp.132-3.

222 The King’s College London Liddell Hart Military Archives (KCLHMA): GB0099 the Private Papers of Col Hon Christopher Montague Woodhouse (hereafter Woodhouse Paper) 8/1: letter by Woodhouse (recipient unknown), classified confidential, 10 Dec 1954. His response was ‘I said jokingly: “You tell that to the Colonial Office!”’. The recipient of the letter was perhaps “C”.

223 An exception has been an accidental finding of JIC papers concerning the Syrian Crisis in 1957 from the Dancan-Sandsys private papers by Matthew Jones. See Jones, ‘The “Preferred Plan”’.

224 Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library: Box 48, file folder “Syria (3)”: memorandum of conference, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, Mr. Loy Henderson, Secretary Rountree, Secretary Quarles, General Twining, General Whisenand, General Cabell, Mr. Wisner, General Cutler, General Goodpaster, 7 Sep 1957.
me more than ‘Hot war’. For we are not really winning it, and the Russians have a central position...and a well-directed effort, with strong representation (through the Communist party) in every country.  

Macmillan discussed the same topic with Woodhouse a few days later, in December 1954; Woodhouse wrote in his memoir, *Something Ventured*, that:

Macmillan said to me: “I am sure there is not going to be a hot war. The danger is that we shall lose the cold war. What I am trying to do is to find some ways of getting everyone to coöperate and pull together – the Cabinet, the Foreign Office, the service chiefs, the information people, yourselves and so on – everyone. But you cannot do that through committees; you want one man in control. In fact what you really want is a Minister for Cold War. Of course, I understand the Foreign Secretary’s anxieties about all this, naturally: after all, I may be Foreign Secretary myself one day.”

There was in fact the following discussion, which was recorded and filed in Woodhouse’s private papers. According to Woodhouse, Macmillan seemed still occupied with his own remarks about ‘a Minister for the Cold War’. He recorded that:

I said [to Macmillan] that I thought everything depended on having the right man in the right place: it was obviously a question of leadership, not of machinery. I asked him if he had thought of the possibility of a political chairman for such committees as the AC (O) Committee – a junior minister like Dodds-Parker. He said that the idea had not occurred to him, but seemed interesting. *(He appeared, by the way, to be confusing the AC (O) Committee with the Russia Committee).*

Macmillan’s unawareness of the presence of the AC (O) Committee was perhaps understandable. While the Attlee Government supervised the activities of the AC (O) Committee through the AC (M) Committee, the subsequent Churchill and Eden Governments discontinued such a practice. In addition, owing to the infighting between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff over the conduct of the Cold War, despite the fact that anti-Communist activities overseas were still being conducted, the AC (O) Committee meetings for policy-discussions also became less frequent – there was no AC (O) Committee meeting held in 1954. Moreover, Macmillan’s discussion with Woodhouse also indicates that Macmillan may well have been influenced by his discussion with him. This was certainly possible in the case of the appointment of Dodds-Parker as Chairman of the Overseas

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228 TNA: PRO CAB21/5003: memorandum by G.P. Young to Norman Brook, ‘AC (O) and AC (M)’, 31 Jan1955. It recorded that ‘AC (M) has not met since July, 1951’.
229 TNA: PRO CAB21/5003: note for record by Norman Brook, 28 Feb 1955.
Planning Committee – this may in fact not have originally come from Selwyn Lloyd, who may instead have been influenced by either Macmillan or Woodhouse.230

Macmillan’s view of the Cold War and how to wage it needs to be explored further. Macmillan’s diaries suggest that he had hoped to be Minister of Defence since 1951.231 However, by the time Macmillan finally became Minister of Defence in October 1954, his ambitions had evolved in the direction of the Foreign Office.232 This was the context of the aforementioned discussion between Macmillan and Woodhouse concerning ‘a Minister of the Cold War’. At a party in the Ministry of Defence, in December 1954, Macmillan, as the Minister of Defence, told Woodhouse:

We are fighting the wrong war – I’m convinced of it. I’ve only been five weeks in the job, but I am sure what we are doing now is all wrong. We’re getting ready for a hot war that is never going to happen; and anyway we can’t fight it, because we have’nt got the right weapons. What we ought to be doing is using our brains – that’s the one thing we have got to beat the other side with…233

Despite his vague designs for the Cold War, in addition to the use of special operations by MI6, the minute by Macmillan dated in October 1955 on the use of intelligence overseas demonstrates a clearer plan for the conduct of the Cold War. It also contains a different aspect of his views on the use of the intelligence and security services in the context of British decolonisation.

Facing the Soviet exploitation of anti-colonial nationalist movements both in colonial and foreign countries, such as the Middle East, on the one hand, and the lack of economic and defence resources on the other, Macmillan regarded intelligence as a cost-effective tool in implementing British policy overseas. Macmillan noted that:

…To accomplish this our first line of defence in these territories must be to build up wherever possible adequate reliable intelligence/security forces from the local population and resources so that…these forces are in situ and capable of preventing a relapse into Communism or anarchy…I am convinced that the sooner we get to work in some of these foreign territories and British Colonies the easier our task will be and the cheaper to us in terms of manpower and money.234

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230 In his memoirs, Dodds-Parker mentioned that ‘Mr Dodds-Parker’s Committee’ planned special actions against Egypt, which seems a different one from the Overseas Planning Committee. According to Dodds-Parker, Geoffrey McDermott was the official secretary to the ‘Mr Dodds-Parker’s Committee’. See Douglas Dodds-Parker, Political Eunuch (Ascot, Berkshire: Springwood, 1986), pp.102-104.


233 KCLHMA: GB0099 Woodhouse Paper 8/1: letter by Woodhouse (recipient unknown), classified confidential, 10 Dec 1954. Emphasis original. It appears that Peter Catterall has not used this source in his The Macmillan Diaries.

Macmillan was referring not only to the problems in the Colonies but also in Middle Eastern countries on which Britain’s national interests depended. Moreover, as will be discussed in detail in Chapters Four and Five, during exactly the same period, Macmillan decided to ‘make available technical advice on Communist subversion’ to the members of the Baghdad Pact (Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan), and proposed the formation of multilateral intelligence/security cooperation for intelligence sharing and fighting against Communist problems in the Pact area.235

This proposal was significant in at least two ways. Firstly, by consolidating local security services through intelligence sharing on the techniques and methods of Communist subversion, local authorities were more likely to become resistant to Communist subversion. Thus, pro-British regimes, e.g. Iraq in the case of the Middle East, would remain in power. As noted earlier, this was already being done elsewhere in the Colonies during the same period. A further advantage of liaising with other intelligence/security services was to obtain intelligence that might not otherwise be available. Sir Patrick Dean noted that it was ‘one of the functions of the Security Service; to obtain secret intelligence by its own means’.236 Thus, the arrangement for sharing intelligence with local authorities would in turn enable Britain to ‘check the growth of Communism’ in the region.237

Declassified records from the Overseas Planning Committee further confirm that bolstering Britain’s closest ally, Iraq, against subversion was at the centre of counter-subversive measures in the region. In addition, the Baghdad Pact was considered a defence against the growing influence of the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser, who became a symbol of anti-British agitation in the region from 1955. The first report by the Overseas Planning Committee in March 1956 noted that:

The retention of Iraq as a firm base is of the greatest importance to Her Majesty’s Government, and we should ensure that membership of the Baghdad Pact is seen to be more profitable than Egyptian “neutralism”. Although no drastic covert action is urgently needed, we recommend that:….our friends [MI6] and the Security Service should be asked to pay particular attention to forces acting in Iraq against Nuri Pasha and our interests, and to put forward suggestions for counter-measures.238

While the report did not contain any operational details, it nevertheless indicates that one of Britain’s main post-war anti-Communist measures, viz. enhancing the needed security of

236 A minute by Patrick Dean to the Foreign Secretary, 16 Dec 1955. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013.
238 A minute by Patrick Dean to the Foreign Secretary, 19 Mar 1956. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013.
British territories overseas, especially after 1956, was carried out not only in the Colonies, but also in foreign countries in the Middle East.

**Britain’s Relationship with the Americans in the Middle East**

Britain’s relationship with the United States in the Middle East has been a subject of numerous studies. The literature suggests that the United States was content with Britain to maintain its strategic position in the Middle East until 1958. Ritchie Ovendale argued in his study of Britain’s relationship with the Americans in the Middle East that Britain’s ‘paramount power’, which had been established for decades, was rapidly fading away by the mid-1950s, and by Britain’s invitation, the transfer of power to Americans was completed by the early 1960s. The relationship between Britain and the United States was not a zero-sum game. In the wider context of British decolonisation, Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson have suggested that the British Empire was ‘transformed as part of the Anglo-American coalition’ in the Cold War. Most of the existing studies give credit for this to Harold Macmillan, who managed a closer relationship with the United States after the Suez debacle. While it is undeniable that Macmillan was important in cementing the so-called special relationship after Suez, other works such as those by Scott Lucas and Richard Aldrich remind us that, despite occasional differences in policy, a close connection between the


British and the Americans had already existed at official and intelligence levels before the Suez Crisis.\textsuperscript{244}

Indeed, the literature also suggests that Britain had a different degree of cooperation with the Americans at departmental and intelligence levels. Amongst all, perhaps, the closest cooperation was maintained at the military level, thanks to the Second World War, which also included intelligence sharing.\textsuperscript{245} This was particularly true in the case of the post-war Middle East, where joint military planning saw the highest level of cooperation.\textsuperscript{246} Security intelligence reports on Middle Eastern affairs compiled by SIME were periodically shared with the Americans after the end of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{247} MI6 also enjoyed fairly close cooperation with the Americans. A notable example of this is the aforementioned 1953 coup in Iran.\textsuperscript{248} They cooperated on the 1953 coup once a sceptical Harry Truman was replaced by President Dwight Eisenhower at the beginning of 1953. The reasons for cooperation with the Americans on the British side were both financial and practical difficulties. When diplomatic relations were ended in October 1952, the British Embassy staff, including the MI6 station, were expelled from Tehran, where MI6’s agents were contacted and maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), such as Roger Goiran, CIA station chief in Tehran, and Kermit Roosevelt, who carried out the operation with US finance.\textsuperscript{249}

The aforementioned Overseas Planning Committee also referred to future cooperation with the Americans in the case of counter-subversion in foreign countries. In addition to the aforementioned letter by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick addressed to all posts abroad, in his minute, which set out the outline of counter-subversion in foreign countries under the direction of the Overseas Planning Committee, Sir Patrick Dean noted in March 1956 that:

\textsuperscript{246} Cf. Cohen, ‘The strategic role of the Middle East after the war’; idem, \textit{Fighting World War Three from the Middle East} (London: Frank Cass, 1997); idem, ‘From ‘Cold’ to ‘Hot’ War.
\textsuperscript{248} To name some essential memoirs: Woodhouse, \textit{Something Ventured}, chs. 8-9; Roosevelt, \textit{Countercoup}; Wilber, ‘Clandestine Service History’.
\textsuperscript{249} Eden noted, ‘it was impossible without the Americans’. Woodhouse, \textit{Something Ventured}, p.133. Also see idem., chs. 8-9; KCLHMA: GB0099 Woodhouse Paper 8/1: draft of his autobiography, \textit{Something Ventured}, 16 Aug 1976.
We must cooperate even more closely in all “cold war” activities. The Americans will certainly welcome a more robust attitude on our part... We should not scruple to ask them for financial help.  

Owing to its financial difficulties, the Overseas Planning Committee encouraged invitations to the Americans to cooperate on counter-subversion in foreign countries. The declassified records further reveal that in the case of counter-subversive measures in Jordan, for instance, which had maintained a close connection with the British since the end of the First World War, a number of problems were identified, such as an influx of refugees caused the collapse of the Palestine Mandate and the establishment of Israel, growing Communist influence, and all forms of hostile propaganda from the Soviet Union and Egypt. In March 1956, Douglas Dodds-Parker suggested counter-measures in Jordan to Selwyn Lloyd, ‘May we discuss these with the Americans?’ By ticking against the line, Selwyn Lloyd appears to have approved the action.

A record declassified under the FOIA shows that the United States had assumed ‘financial responsibility’ from Britain for the Jordanian Army by the beginning of 1958, and the American Military Attaché acted as a liaison officer with the Jordanian Army, who was making ‘successful’ efforts to influence the Jordanians. The financial assistance to Jordan was indeed a part of the so-called “Eisenhower Doctrine”, which provided American assistance to Middle Eastern states that were prepared to resist Communist threats.

Reporting on the American activities in Jordan to the Foreign Office, Sir Charles Johnston, the British Ambassador in Jordan (1956-60), noted that this caused him ‘no misgivings’ since ‘our relations with the Middle Eastern side of CIA are very close at present’, and that ‘we are agreed that it is a Western interest to keep the Jordan Arab Army both strong and efficient’. Moreover, in his autobiography, Jack O’Connell, the former CIA station chief in

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250 A minute by Patrick Dean to the Foreign Secretary, 19 Mar 1956. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013.
251 Idem.
254 TNA: PRO FO371/134072: letter by Sir Charles Johnston, Amman, to E.M. Rose of FO, 6 May 1958. The file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 0894-11), 27 Oct 2011. ‘I doubt whether the American Military Attaché makes any attempt to influence Jordanian staff officers against the British Embassy. He has frequently expressed the opinion that the Jordan Arab Army has been built up on British lines and that it should continue so...As for the Jordanians the tendency is to believe that they can get more for the Army from the Americans than they can from us. I should add that there is no sign of a widespread anti-British trend within the Army’.
Jordan (1963-71), who liaised directly with King Hussein of Jordan, indicates that the CIA’s long relationship with Jordan started from his arrival in Jordan in the summer of 1958.255

Despite the American involvement in certain areas of individual countries, such as Egypt and Jordan, their overall policy towards the region was mostly dominated by the so-called Project ALPHA from 1954 until early 1956, concentrating on means of achieving peace between the Arab states and Israel, and their oil interest in Saudi Arabia.256 The ambiguous attitude of the Americans towards the region was clearly seen in the context of the US attitudes towards the Baghdad Pact – while the United States was a full member of some important committees of the Pact, such as the Economic and Military Committees (it joined in 1957), it was not yet a member of the Pact itself until 1959.257 More importantly, in the committees specifically dealing with subversive activities in the Pact area, namely the Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees, which will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters, the United States remained officially neutral as an ‘observer’ until its accession as a full member in 1959. Elie Podeh has suggested that ‘all these mixed signals created the impression that Washington did not consider the Baghdad Pact as a major instrument of policy’.258 A report by the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff confirms in August 1958 that, ‘up to the present time’, from their point of view, ‘the United States have had no wish to support or protect British interests’.259

My archival research indicates that the American accession to the Pact in 1959 as a full member largely resulted from British efforts to maintain the Pact as a regional defence/security organisation. When the Baghdad Pact lost its headquarters, after the Iraqi withdrawal from the Pact, Britain faced difficulties in persuading the remaining regional members to maintain to the rationale for and morale of the Pact. Unlike the other members (Turkey was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and Pakistan was a member of the South-East Treaty Organisation), Britain’s was especially concerned about Iran, which belonged to the Baghdad Pact but not to any another Western security organisations. A CIA report noted that ‘the British are anxious to boost the Shah’s morale’,

256 Eveland, Ropes of Sand, pp.125, 155-8, 299.
258 Ibid., p.113.
259 TNA: PRO PREM11/2754: MO1/P(58)303: a report by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff ‘A Policy for the Middle East’, 9 Aug 1958. The file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: F0029264), 17 Mar 2012.
and also recorded that the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd insisted in September 1958 on the United States becoming a full member and expressed his concern that ‘Iran might go neutralist if the Shah does not receive the material and moral support he deems necessary’.  

Records declassified under the FOIA further show that soon after Britain ‘lost’ Iraq, its closest ally in the region on 14 July 1958, Harold Macmillan reconsidered Britain’s position and reformulated a new policy towards the region. As will be shown in Chapter Five in detail, Britain’s policy towards the region had maintained a strong anti-Nasserite policy, paying particular attention to ‘the region-wide task of diminishing Egyptian and Saudi influence’, and ‘breaking the Egypt/Saudi axis’. However, Britain re-examined its national interests in the region, and decided to drop its outright anti-Nasserite policy. In order to maintain good relations with the Baghdad Pact members, who were unlikely to welcome such a policy, the British government decided that the Americans ‘should be induced to join the new organisation’. Consequently, the United States joined the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), which was the Baghdad Pact renamed, and they participated in counter-subversive activities as a full member from 1959 onwards.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how anti-Communist policy evolved throughout the period, especially in connection with the Middle East. The subject of anti-Communist measures was at the centre of debates in the British Government concerning the conduct of the Cold War throughout the period between the late 1940s and 1955/56, in which divergent views on the “Cold War” existed within Whitehall. The year 1955/56 was the beginning of the transition period of Britain’s post-war anti-Communist measures – in another word, counter-subversion.


261 TNA: PRO PREM11/2754: a minute by Norman Brook to Mr Bishop, 21 Jul 1958. The file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: F0029264), 17 Mar 2012.

262 A minute by Patrick Dean to the Foreign Secretary, 19 Mar 1956. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013.

263 TNA: PRO PREM11/2754: ME (M) (59) 6: memorandum ‘Middle East Policy’ by FO to PM, 10 Mar 1959. The file has been released under the FOIA at my request (REF: F0029264), 17 Mar 2012.

264 TNA: PRO PREM11/2754: memorandum ‘short-term policy in the Middle East’, 23 Jul 1958; COS (58) 183: memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff ‘position in the Middle East’, 28 Jul 1958. Also see PRO PREM11/2754: M87/59: minute by PM to Foreign Secretary, 11 Mar 1959. The file has been released under the FOIA at my request (REF: F0029264), 17 Mar 2012. According to Macmillan Diaries, the inclusion of the United States into the Baghdad Pact as a full member had already been in Macmillan’s minds in November 1955. See Catterall (eds.), Macmillan Diaries, p.511.
The role of the Chiefs of Staff was considered less prominent from that year. Despite the shift of the balance, the important of anti-Communist measures in the Middle East was sustained throughout the period from 1949 to 1963. Until the mid-1950s, the Chiefs of Staff placed paramount importance on the region as it was the Middle East where a Third World War against the Soviet Union would likely originate. As a result, as will be discussed in Chapter Two and Three, SIME was regarded as ‘an integral part of the military machine’ in the region and its activities were chiefly directed by both the Chiefs of Staff and the Defence Committee in the event of war.\footnote{Quoted from TNA: PRO KV4/472: the Liddell Diaries, 6 Jul 1950.} And, as will be seen in Chapters Four and Five, from 1955/56, counter-subversion was seen as a tool of foreign policy – under the Baghdad Pact, regional cooperation in counter-subversion was regarded as necessary to check and prevent the spread of Communism in the region.

This chapter has also shown that how the roles of intelligence and security services in anti-Communist measures were understood by policymakers in London. Winston Churchill’s penchant for secret intelligence and his use of it is well-known.\footnote{Christopher Andrew once noted that ‘unlike any previous prime minister, Churchill was sometimes in danger of showing too much enthusiasm for secret intelligence and too much hastiness in using it’. Christopher Andrew, ‘Churchill and Intelligence’, INS, vol.3, no.3 (1988), p.192. On his use of MI6, a notable example is in Iran in 1953. Churchill famously said to Kim Roosevelt, who briefed Churchill on Operation Ajax/Boot, “Young man,” he said, “if I had been but a few years younger, I would have loved nothing better than to have served under your command in this great venture!” Quoted from Roosevelt, Countercoup, p.207. also Andrew, ‘Churchill and Intelligence’, p.182.} Anthony Eden also sought to use MI6 as his personal tool against Nasser.\footnote{On MI6’s plot against Nasser, Dodds-Parker, Political Eunuch, pp.102-104; Lucas, Divided We Stand, pp.193-195. Also see obituary of John McGlashan of MI6, The Telegraph, 10 Sep 2010, accessible on-line at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/7995221/John-McGlashan.html (accessed, 5 Sep 2013).} However, in the field of anti-Communist measures overseas, including the Colonies and foreign countries, it was Harold Macmillan who appeared most ready to use intelligence in implementing and guiding his policies. In the history of British decolonisation, Macmillan is well known for his ‘Wind of Change’ speech made to the South African Parliament in 1960. While there is little discussion about Macmillan’s views on intelligence in his diaries, it is important to acknowledge that Macmillan’s attitudes towards British decolonisation were formulated on the basis of his views on the role of intelligence/security services in counter-subversion overseas.\footnote{For instance, Macmillan Diaries, edited by Peter Catterall, do not contain any aspects about Macmillan’s views on intelligence at all during the period under the discussion.}

Finally, this chapter has demonstrated that Britain’s anti-Communist measures were not confined only to the Colonies, but extended even to foreign countries, especially in the
Middle East. The role of intelligence and security services in anti-Communist measures was regarded as a central tool of anti-Communist policy in London. As will be shown in the following chapters, MI5, MI6 and the IRD had particularly large roles to play in anti-Communist measures, but there were also implications for the internal security of the regional governments. While these implications will be hinted upon in following chapters, they will be discussed in full in the Conclusion.
Chapter Two

Police Training in Anti-Communist Measures and the Introduction of British Security Liaison.\textsuperscript{269}

\textsuperscript{269} See further on this topic, Hashimoto, ‘British Security Liaison in the Middle East’.
People in the Arab world were intrigued by the Communists... The old political parties all over the Arab world were bankrupt of ideas and influences because the world was changing and they were not prepared for change. So there was a vacuum of power and the idea of Communism was potentially attractive... When the Communist Manifesto was smuggled into Egypt it caused a sensation. Intellectuals read it and thought that they had come upon a key which could open all the political and social doors.

- Mohamed Heikal

**Introduction**

The quotation from Mohamed Heikal, an Egyptian journalist, illustrates a common sentiment amongst Egyptians immediately after the Second World War. This sentiment could be found throughout the Middle East, where many dominant political parties were with Britain and were increasingly being challenged by a public growing frustrated with their local politics. While the idea of Communism never became popular in the region, thanks to the measures adopted by the strongly anti-Communist governments, frustrated anti-colonial nationalists adopted a revolutionary tendency which was often associated with International Communism and engaged in subversive activities to change the status quo. Nevertheless, the significance of the potential danger that these movements might be exploited by Communists, or that they might adopt Communist tactics – a perception resulting from the complex picture of the Cold War and the decolonisation process in the region – has yet to be adequately addressed by historians. In addition, how the local police and security services dealt with Communists and subversive activities in the region is largely unnoticed in the academic literature.

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270 Mohamed Heikal was a close confidant to the Egyptian Presidents, such as Col. Gamal Abdul Nasser and Anwar El Sadat. Quoted from Heikal, *Nasser*, pp.24-5.

271 A notable example of this intermarriage can be found in the context of post-war Egypt, in which an anti-British militant group, the Muslim Brotherhood, conducted subversive activities against the pro-British Egyptian Government in tandem with Communists. Anwar El Sadat wrote that ‘it is in countries where social unrest and resentment may be exploited that Communism gains a hold. The Middle East, as long as it remains under the imperialist yoke, took the line of least resistance to Communism. In Egypt, at this time, we were witnessing the birth of a new fanaticism - Communism - and the revival of the old fanaticism of the Muslim Brotherhood. At first taking parallel courses, the two creeds finally converged and united...’. Quoted from Anwar El Sadat, *Revolt On the Nile* (London: Allan Wingate, 1957), p.79.


273 See Hanna Batatu’s classic work on the Iraqi context, see idem, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*. On Middle Eastern security services in general, see: Caroz, *Arab Secret Services*, ch.1.
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that there was a close connection in anti-Communist policy between Britain and Middle Eastern governments, a connection which was maintained through intelligence liaison. It will show how the British government came to conclude that training Middle Eastern security services in anti-Communist measures was necessary, and the way in which these measures were implemented in the region. This chapter will also show that British anti-Communist policy and British concerns about the Communist movements in the region dovetailed neatly with the demands of Middle Eastern governments for British advice on anti-Communist measures. The cases discussed here are those of Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and Jordan, all of which illustrate the extent to which Britain successfully, or unsuccessfully, sought to implement anti-Communist measures in the region. It will conclude with some discussion of the usefulness of such an intelligence liaison in the region.

**Communist Movements in the Middle East and British Security/Police Liaison in Anti-Communist Measures**

In the 1920s and 1930s, local Communist Parties in the Middle East were founded under the direction of the Comintern, and adhered to a Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideological doctrine. While undermining the reputation of local authorities by subversive publications, these Communist groups attempted to infiltrate local authorities, especially focusing on the Army and security services. The local authorities were aware of these Communist methods and techniques. According to the Iraqi Penal Code, expression of approval for or dissemination of the doctrines of Communism would be punished by penal servitude, and if the offence occurred in the ‘presence of more than one member of the armed forces or the police’, it would be ‘punishable with death’. Similar measures were enforced in other Middle Eastern countries. By the late 1940s Communist activities were outlawed in the region.

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275 TNA: PRO FO371/82410: E41019/1G: letter by Sir Henry Mack, Baghdad, to Ernest Bevin, 7 Nov 1950. Note that under the Nuri al-Said government from 1954, the Iraqi penal code also embraced subversive activities, including Peace Partisan and Demoratic Youth activities, which were categorised in the same way as Communist activities. See Gallman, *Iraq Under General Nuri*, p.6.
Despite these legislative settings, the attitudes of Middle Eastern governments towards Communists varied from country to country. Amongst them, Iraq, Britain’s closest ally, which had maintained a strong anti-Communist policy since the 1920s, was above all the leading anti-Communist government in the region until 1958. Despite being resilient since its establishment in the early 1930s, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was consistently suppressed by the Iraqi authorities. These security measures were conducted by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Iraqi Police, led by Colonel Bahjat Beg Attiyah since the 1930s. Meanwhile in Lebanon, which was considered to have the most liberal government in the region, the authorities were more reluctant to take firm action against Communists. Emir Farid Chehab, the Chef de Sûreté [Head of the Lebanese Sûreté Générale] (1948-1958), once told a Western journalist that ‘They [Lebanese politicians] will tell you they are fighting Communism, but it is only because they think it will please [the West] to hear that’. When Sir Michael Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, the chief expert on Middle Eastern affairs, was invited to a meeting at the AC (O) Committee to express his opinion on Communist influence in the Middle East in June 1950, he insisted on the need to ‘stimulate’ the Lebanese government to take necessary action as they were showing ‘very little vigour in tackling this problem’. When Chehab visited Captain Guy Liddell of MI5 at Leconfield House in London in 1951, he lamented the fact that he had received virtually no support from his Ministers to conduct anti-Communist measures in the country. In addition, Chehab only had a handful of officers whom he could trust in his organisation, and believed that the Lebanese police had been penetrated by Communists or their sympathisers.

Since the Middle East was considered of paramount importance to Britain’s post-war strategy, in terms of its defence planning against the Soviet Union and the natural resources

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277 The exception was Israel.
278 On Attiyah, Communalism and Nationalism in the Middle East, p.174.
279 On Attiyah, see Batatu, Old Social Classes, pp.465, 479, 486, 488, 553, 606.
280 On Attiyah, see Batatu, Old Social Classes, pp.465, 479, 486, 488, 553, 606.
282 TNA: PRO KV4/473: the Liddell Diaries, 25 Jun 1951, which recorded that Chehab could place no reliance upon the ordinary police, who were both ‘venal and stupid’, and whenever he warned the police about a forthcoming Communist demonstration in the country, ‘the information reached the Communist Party within an hour’.

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for its post-war recovery, the aforementioned highly-secret cabinet anti-Communist committee, the AC (O) Committee, paid close attention to Communist activities in the region. The problem with the Communist movements in the Middle East, from the British point of view, was that, since they had been forced underground, it was difficult to obtain a clear picture of their extent and influence. In addition, regardless of their size and popularity, the danger of Communist activities was understood to be that, ‘communism does not wait until it secures a majority’, and ‘a small group of fanatics carry out the coup d’état’.  

General Sir John Bagot Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion, also wrote to the Foreign Office in 1950 with an Arab proverb that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ – both Britain and pro-British regimes were easily targeted by propaganda from Communists and the Soviet Union, and Communists could be seen as allies by non-Communist anti-British groups. This fear of the Communist menace was exacerbated by the fact that the region was full of intrigue, conspiracies, and assassinations by internal opponents and external enemies. Once the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the AC (O) Committee was particularly concerned about the situation in the region as, despite Communist Parties being prohibited, local authorities were not particularly aware of the ‘insidious nature of methods used by Communists’ outside the region. The Foreign Office also noted that even the most diligent security forces in the region, such as those of the Egyptians and Iraqis, were also considered ‘not particularly well-conceived or effective’ as they tended to ‘make arrests too soon, thus losing valuable intelligence’. Above all, the AC (O) Committee considered that local authorities lacked experience in anti-Communist security measures for the event of a Third World War.

Following reports on the counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya by Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner in Malaya, and a Foreign Office analysis of the methods and

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284 Ibid.  
techniques employed by the Communists to seize power in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s, the AC (O) Committee came to the conclusion that the training of foreign police officers was an essential element of measures to prevent the spread of Communist movements overseas. The role of the police was considered particularly important in the Communist seizure of Eastern Europe – after the formation of a Democratic Front, the Soviet Union appointed a ‘Moscow-trained’ Communist as Minister of the Interior to control the police, and created a ‘strong secret security police’ commanded by Communists, which was extensively used against political opposition. Sir Gladwyn Jebb of the Foreign Office, the Chairman of the AC (O) Committee, commented that:

…in countries which have been communized since the war the role of the police force has invariably been decisive, and it has been represented that it would help to prevent Communist infiltration of police forces in countries outside the Orbit if it were possible to offer increased facilities for the training of foreign policemen in this country.

Sir Stewart Menzies, Chief of MI6, and Captain Guy Liddell, Deputy Director-General of MI5, a non-permanent observing member, both saw training of foreign police a ‘definite advantage’ in the fight against the spread of Communism. The AC (O) Committee then decided in May 1950 that the training of foreign police was essential in anti-Communist measures, and tasked the Foreign Office, as well as MI6, to ‘stimulate foreign governments’ to ask Britain for ‘assistance in training their police in anti-Communist measures’.

The targets of foreign countries for anti-Communist training by the AC (O) Committee included a variety of countries from different regions, such as Western Europe, South-Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South-East Asia, and Latin America. However, the Middle East was given special attention. Although the minutes of the AC (O) Committee have been heavily “weeded”, the declassified Guy Liddell diaries make clear that training of foreign police officers from the Middle East was prioritised over any other countries, for which MI5 would be responsible. After providing anti-Communist training to a number of Middle Eastern police officers, a different approach was adopted by 1951. Working to a different standard and practice, the Middle Eastern counterparts could not be trained

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293 Ibid.
alongside forces from other regions, such as Western Europe. Moreover, since most Middle Eastern security officers did not understand English at all, anti-Communist training in Britain had ‘little chance of improving national security services’ in the Middle East. Guy Liddell then instead suggested the AC (O) Committee anti-Communist measures be implemented ‘through local liaison by Security Service trained personnel or by Police advisers’.  

While the minutes of the AC (O) Committee meetings do not record its specific objectives in detail, they suggest that the introduction of the British adviser had at least two objectives. The first objective was to try to control the spread of Communism. The second was to obtain information on Communist movements in the region. Chairman of the JIC, Sir Patrick Reilly, also a permanent member of the AC (O) Committee, recorded:

Apart from the obvious value of this to our general anti-communist effort, any such strengthening of links with foreign police authorities can be of great advantage both to [MI6] and the Security Service, by paving the way to the exchange of information and operational liaison.  

Thus, by 1951, the posting of security advisers to local governments had become the preferred method for advising local authorities on more effective administrative and legislative measures against the local communist problem. It also functioned to check the spread of Communism in the region through liaison with the local police of ‘strategically important countries’.  

In addition to the introduction of British security advisers in the region, the AC (O) Committee decided in June 1951 to use Britain’s closest ally in the region, Iraq, to encourage other Middle Eastern authorities to take ‘legislative and administrative action to combat Communist activities’ through the sharing of Iraqi experience and information. The British Ambassador in Baghdad was instructed to suggest that the Iraqi government cooperate with other local authorities to ‘take steps to segregate and re-educate politically persons held on charges of Communist activities’.  

297 TNA: PRO FO371/80199: J1641/1G: minute by Patrick Reilly, 26 Apr 1950. Note that while the name of MI6 has been redacted in the ‘weeding’ process, it is logically, and also easily, assumed that the redacted word was MI6 by cross-referencing of the materials.  
298 TNA: PRO FO371/91178: E1018/1G: memorandum by C.E. King, head of the Overseas Planning Section, 7 May 1951.  
299 TNA: PRO CAB134/2: AC (M) (51) 4: memorandum, ‘the work of the Official Committee on Communism (Overseas)’, 23 Jun 1951. Archival research does not shed much further light on the meaning of the sentence ‘...take steps to segregate and re-educate politically persons...’.
The Lebanese Sûreté Générale and Ousting the French influence

Lebanon is normally regarded as part of the French sphere of influence owing to its colonial legacy, but was in fact one of Britain’s ‘strategically important countries’ and hosted one of Britain’s secretly placed security/police advisers. In post-war Lebanon the internal security system was inherited from the French Mandate, in which the Sûreté Générale, the Lebanese Security Service, was responsible for internal security, including counter-espionage and counter-subversion. As a result of the Lebanese government’s reluctance to take strong measures against the Communist threat, Britain considered Lebanon to have the most insufficient anti-Communist measures. In addition, the complexity of the Lebanese security apparatus also hampered effective security work. One such ‘petty annoyance’ which Emir Farid Chehab, Head of the Sûreté Générale, complained about to Major David Beaumont-Nesbitt, Assistant Military Attaché at the British Embassy in Beirut, was that his official telephone line in the Sûreté was ‘tapped by agents of the President’s brother’. Major Beaumont-Nesbitt was in fact serving as the representative of MI5 in Lebanon and Syria, seconded from the Army on a temporary basis. He reported to MI5 headquarters on the status of the Lebanese security apparatus that ‘the mechanics of this preposterous operation, if true, are, as one may imagine, highly complex and there are the usual wheels within wheels, the agents concerned being simultaneously employed by various organisations’. The British had compelling reasons for more robust anti-Communist measures in Lebanon. Lebanon housed the highest number of Communist party members (12,000) and sympathisers (50,000) in the Middle East. The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) was also believed to have been cooperating very closely with the Syrian Communist Party (SCP) under a Joint Higher Committee. The strength of the SCP was estimated at around 2,000 to 2,500 members. A JIC report stated that the LCP also ‘kept in close touch with the Soviet Legation’, through which it was believed that the Soviets maintained close ties with regional Communist Parties.

304 Ibid.
305 Ibid.
It is noteworthy that, by the time the anti-Communist measures in Lebanon were discussed at the AC (O) Committee in London, the Lebanese had already approached Britain for advice. In March 1949, the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hamid Franjieh, approached Sir William Houstoun-Boswall, the British Minister in Beirut, to ask for a British expert on anti-Communist measures. Houstoun-Boswall then reported the Lebanese request to London with great secrecy as ‘nobody including the chief of secret police knows anything of this move which it is desired to keep secret and quite unofficial’. The reason for the secrecy was not only due to the sensitivity of the subject, but also to the presence of a French security adviser to the Lebanese government in Beirut. As shown in a recent study on the British-French rivalry in Lebanon, countering French influence in post-war Lebanon had been a concern of the British since before the end of the war. The Lebanese approach thus presented the British with a unique opportunity to establish influence in the French sphere by placing a senior British police officer in the heart of the Lebanese government with access to the Lebanese Prime Minister and the chance to impart personal advice on anti-Communist measures.

L.G. Thirkell, a senior official of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, in charge of Syrian and Lebanese affairs, noted that appointing such an expert without informing the French ‘would arouse the worst suspicions’, but it was decided not to tell them as notification would ‘invite serious criticism and such an appointment would presumably have to be kept secret or have some form of cover’.

Soon after the approach, a meeting was held in the Foreign Office, where it was decided that “the best man” for the assignment, Graham Mitchell of MI5, was to be sent to keep the Lebanese government on track. Mitchell’s mission was to secure a position in Lebanon - his failure to do so might cause the Lebanese government ‘to approach another

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306 TNA: PRO FO371/75319: E3456/G: telegram by Houstoun-Boswall to FO, No. 142 of 15 Mar 1949, which noted that ‘the spread of Communism was a great source of anxiety to the Lebanese Government and it was felt that new methods must be devised to meet the menace…I think it is important from every point of view to meet this request. What they want advice about is how to organise an effective counter espionage against the Communists’.


310 Ibid. Note that Mitchell was then in B (Counter-Espionage) Division, later Deputy Director-General of MI5 under Sir Roger Hollis. This recommendation was most likely made by Sir Dick White, then Director of B Division (counter-espionage) of MI5, later Director-General of MI5 and Chief of MI6.
Power instead, such as the Americans or even the French’. In November 1948 the Foreign Office had in fact also contemplated sending Graham Mitchell, ‘a specialist on communism’, to countries such as Iran, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon and Egypt, to ‘tender advice to those countries on communist methods and tactics’. This earlier proposal was eventually turned down as there were no requests made from the local authorities. In addition, it was also noted that ‘[s]hould the Egyptian Government ask for our assistance at any time in this matter, the representative of SIME would be able to provide it’.

Mitchell’s visit in May 1949 was an appreciable success. During the visit, he convinced the Lebanese Prime Minister, Riad el-Solh, that the Communist movement was a ‘formidable enemy’, able to act as ‘a fifth column in the event of war with Russia’. He also managed to obtain an oral promise to appoint a British adviser to the Head of the Sûreté Générale, Farid Chehab. This was in fact an objective of his visit to boost intelligence collection on the Communist movement in the region. Mitchell wrote in his report that:

> repeated reports from various sources have emphasised that from the Russian Legation in Beirut there springs a multitude of espionage and other subversive activities...British control, direct or indirect, of a local Security Service [Sûreté Générale] working on efficient lines would therefore hold out a promise of producing material of considerable intelligence value.

In addition, Mitchell noted later in his report that it was essential to meet with Farid Chehab, with the permission of Riad el-Solh, to discuss the subject as Farid Chehab was ‘thoroughly friendly to British interests and ready to co-operate’. Farid Chehab was above all ‘a close contact of our [MI5] representative in Beirut’.

Farid Chehab, still remembered as ‘Bay al Amn al Aam [Father of the Sûreté Générale]’ in Lebanon, retained the post of Chef de Sûreté until September 1958. He served his country diligently, but most of all, Farid Chehab was an anti-Communist, believing with Britain that Communism was a real threat which was detrimental to the values and traditions of the Middle East. He once noted to a Middle East correspondent of TIME, Keith Wheelock, in 1954 that:

> If it comes to war, the Middle East will fall to the Communists inevitably. Just as inevitably you'll have to take it back. The West could not abide Russia controlling the Middle East. It'll

313 Ibid.
314 Ibid.
315 Ibid.
be a lot easier to take it back if the people are on your side. If they’re not on your side it will be almost impossible to take it back.\textsuperscript{317}

Moreover, as Mitchell rightly noted earlier, Farid Chehab was clearly pro-British, as opposed to being pro-American - he regarded the Americans as being ‘temperamentally incapable of understanding the complexities of the Levant’.\textsuperscript{318} Farid Chehab had an intimate relationship with the British: after his imprisonment by the Vichy French, he had, though indirectly, cooperated with Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the head of the British Security Mission in Lebanon during post-war independence from French rule; in August 1947, he attended a three-month training course, including counter-espionage, at Scotland Yard’s Superior Police Training College in Britain. Once he was back from Britain, he was appointed Head of the Sûreté Générale.\textsuperscript{319}

Written recommendations were left by Mitchell with Riad el-Solh regarding steps to take in combating Communism. It is noteworthy that Mitchell suggested Riad el-Solh enhance the capabilities of the Sûreté Générale – giving Farid Chehab a ‘free hand’ for internal security; allowing him to have a technical liaison with the Minister of Posts and Telegrams with the ‘object of putting at the disposal of the Sûreté means for the interception of communications of suspects’; and to set up effective control of frontiers and of ‘Russian and satellite aliens’ by ensuring that ‘no alien enters or resides in the Lebanon’ without the knowledge of the government. These were deliberately written in French to conceal ‘evidence of British origin’.\textsuperscript{320} In his report Mitchell recommended that the Foreign Office respond quickly should the Lebanese formally request an adviser, and to make the necessary appointment while ‘the iron is hot’. If not, Mitchell wrote that an alternative possibility was to insert a ‘technical officer at a lower level’ into the Sûreté to ‘be elevated gradually by Farid [Chehab] as opportunity offers’.\textsuperscript{321} Soon after Mitchell’s visit, administrative developments indeed emerged: Farid Chehab acquired a new building for the Sûreté Générale and strictly compartmentalised sections were established for organisational efficacy.\textsuperscript{322}

After initial hesitation by the Lebanese President, Bechara El Khoury, who favoured a French connection, a formal request for an adviser from the Lebanese government eventually

\textsuperscript{318} Assiely et al., A Face in the Crowd, p.191.
\textsuperscript{319} Ibid., pp.9, 193-4, 202.
\textsuperscript{320} TNA: PRO FO371/75319: E7476/G: report (Flag D) by Mitchell, ‘Suggested recommendation to be tendered to Prime Minister at second interview’, 17 June 1949.
\textsuperscript{321} Mitchell Report, p.3.
\textsuperscript{322} Beaumont-Nesbitt Report.
reached the Foreign Office via the British Embassy in Beirut. J.M. Kyles, the former Commissioner of Police in Sudan, a fluent Arabic speaker with some twenty years of experience in Palestine, was appointed Security Adviser in May 1950. A letter sent by George Clutton, Head of the African Department of the Foreign Office, to Khartoum in September 1949, during the search for a suitable candidate for the post, reiterates the advantage of placing a British security adviser in Beirut:

Lebanon is, as you probably know, the chief centre of communism in the Middle East; and such an appointment would have the double advantage of putting the Lebanese security services into some sort of shape to deal with the local Communist menace and of providing us with first-hand information about communist activities in the Middle East straight from source.

J.M. Kyles was tasked by the AC (O) Committee to ‘stimulate’ the Lebanese government ‘to repress’ the Communist menace. On September 1950, about four months after the appointment of Kyles, Riad el-Solh issued a new secret decree for the formation of a special Anti-Communist Bureau, to be headed by Farid Chehab as the Chef de Sûreté. Shortly after its establishment, Farid Chehab was once again in Britain, this time particularly for training in anti-Communist measures.

Nevertheless, anti-Communist measures in Lebanon through both J.M. Kyles and Farid Chehab ended with mixed results. Following the formation of the Anti-Communist Bureau, Sir William Houstoun-Boswall despatched a letter to Ernest Bevin:

Mr Kyles, the Police Adviser whose task, as you can well imagine, is not an easy one here, has been trying to influence the authorities to work along more systematic lines. The trouble is, as you will not be surprised to hear, that Mr Kyles’ advice is very rarely sought and when given is not acted upon…But now they have at least begun – if only dimly – to appreciate the very real danger presented by Communism. And I do not propose to allow them again to relapse into their pipe dream that Communism must be dead just because it is outlawed.

This indicates that the influence of a British security liaison officer in the implementation of legislative measures was limited as the final decision was always in the hands of the Lebanese government. In fact, the anti-Communist Lebanese government was short-lived. When Riad el-Solh was assassinated in July 1951, the implementation of these anti-

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323 TNA: PRO FO371/75319: telegram from Beirut to FO, 18 Jul 1949.
327 Asseily et al., A Face in the Crowd, p.10.
Communist measures became more strained. It also caused the termination of Kyles’ advisory post. When Farid Chehab met with Guy Liddell during his training in anti-Communist measures in Britain in June 1951, he told Liddell that Kyles’ advice had rarely been sought owing to constant changes in government policy, which also cut the manpower of Chehab’s organisation from ‘200 to 100’, of which Chehab felt he could rely on ‘barely 5 per cent’ as the organisation, he believed, had been penetrated by Communist sympathisers. In addition, Farid Chehab noted that he received little support from his ministers, and even when he reported that someone in the government was ‘working for the Russians’, no action was taken. As will be shown later, however, through the close connection made through the appointment of the Security Adviser to Farid Chehab, he became one of the most important supporters of British anti-Communist measures in the region.

**Iranian G-2 and General Razmara**

After Lebanon, the next move was made in Iran. Here again the initial approach came not from the British but instead from the Iranian side. General Hadj Ali Razmara, the Chief of the Iranian General Staff, secretly contacted the military attaché at the British Embassy in Tehran in January 1950. Before this Iranian approach, as noted earlier, the Foreign Office had already contemplated sending Graham Mitchell of MI5 to Tehran in November 1948 to ‘obtain information about Communism’ in Iran by sharing the British experience of combating Communism in Malaya with the Iranian authorities. This proposal was nevertheless rejected due to the lax security of the Iranian government at the time; it was feared that news of the contact might leak to the Russians. In addition, in March 1949, when the Iranian Police informally contacted Scotland Yard requesting counter-espionage training for their police officers in Britain, MI5 had also considered the opportunity ‘desirable to exploit’, but a formal request was never made by the Iranian government. Iran had indeed been a cause for Cold War concerns since the end of the Second World War, where

331 Ibid.
332 Ibid.
the strength of the Tudeh Party was estimated at 10,000 to 12,000 members, according to JIC estimates from early 1950. The approach made by General Razmara was thus Britain’s opportunity to train the Iranians in anti-Communist measures, as well as to obtain information about Communist activities in Iran.

Razmara’s decision to approach the British came after debriefing a Soviet walk-in, named ‘Vassilev’, who defected to the Iranian authorities with some documents on the subversive activities of the Tudeh Party. Convinced that Iran’s own methods of fighting against Communism in the country had been insufficient, General Razmara hoped to improve his own security organisation, a counter-espionage organisation within the Iranian General Staff, named the Deuxième Bureau (also called the ‘G-2 organisation’), with help from Britain. Despite the presence of a large American military mission in Iran, Razmara later noted to Haldane-Porter of MI5 that he did not consult with the Americans on this matter since the Americans had ‘no understanding of the Asiatic mentality’, and it would therefore be ‘a waste of time to have a resident American Adviser’ in Tehran.

After Razmara’s initial approach, a discussion was soon held at the Foreign Office, where Sir Francis Shepherd, the British Ambassador to Iran (1950-52) and representatives of MI5’s Overseas Section, Sir John Shaw and Haldane-Porter, were also present. As no one was available from MI5 Headquarters at the time, it was considered that Brigadier William Magan, Head of SIME, regional headquarters of MI5, would be an ideal candidate to be despatched to Tehran for a discussion with General Razmara, as Magan spoke Persian and knew the country well from his experience there during the Second World War.

337 TNA: PRO FO371/82314: EP1017/3G: letter by Colonel D.K. Betts to Brigadier V. Boucher of DDMI, ‘Defection of Soviet Subject’, WO, No.307 of 27 Jan 1950, which states that ‘Vassilev was, I understand, deputy manager of the Soviet controlled transport company named “Iransovtrans” which operates in Persia. The C.G.S. [General Razmara] said that Vassilev brought with him a number of letters which showed that certain Soviet controlled commercial concerns in this country were falsifying the figures submitted to the Persian Minister of Finance, in order to turn over undeclared profits to the financing of Soviet propaganda and espionage in this country’.
338 Razmara regarded his own G-2 as ‘the only effective organisation in the country’ in combating the continued underground activity of the Tudeh Party. This was owing to the fact that the police, he believed, had been penetrated by the Communists. See TNA: PRO FO371/82314: EP1017/3G: letter by Colonel D.K. Betts to Brigadier V. Boucher of DDMI, WO, No.518 of 28 Jan 1950.
340 Note that Magan’s wartime experience in Iran as a liaison officer of the Intelligence Bureau in India with the Persian government can be found from Magan, Middle Eastern Approaches. See also Middle East Centre Archive (hereafter MECA), St. Antony’s College, Oxford: Private Papers of W.M.T. Magan and Alan Roger (MAGAN/ROGER), Collection GB165-0199: letter by Magan to Denis Wright, 3 Feb 1981.
task was to find out whether the long-term appointment of a British residential adviser was necessary. The proposal was, nevertheless, turned down by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who was content to advise the Iranians on anti-Communist measures in principle, but unhappy with the ‘likelihood that the Russians would know who Mr Magan is’. It was then decided that Haldane-Porter, a senior officer of MI5’s Overseas Section, whose real identity was ‘certainly not known to the Russians’, instead travel to Tehran via Cairo in late March 1950 in the guise of ‘a member of the Foreign Service’. The US Embassy in Tehran was informed of Haldane-Porter’s visit in advance.

In the course of his four-day-long discussions with General Razmara, which were conducted in French owing to Razmara’s lack of fluency in English, Haldane-Porter was fully briefed on Razmara’s G-2 organisation with a chart of its organisational structure; it had been given particular responsibility for watching and countering the activities of the Tudeh Party under a special law passed after the attempted assassination of the Shah in February 1949. However, from Haldane-Porter’s view, ‘G-2’ was an ‘ambitiously large’ organisation – while being responsible for intelligence collection and analysis for the Iranian military services, it also functioned as an internal security service, for which the responsibility included espionage, counter-espionage, anti-subversive activities, and censorship. Haldane-Porter was also informed of the activities of the Tudeh Party, and the difficulties Razmara was facing in countering their activities – ‘Russian agents of all kinds were continually being sent across the Persian [Iranian]/Soviet frontier with money, with arms, and with propaganda material’. During the discussions, he was also handed classified documents from G-2 of up-to-date reports on the activities of the Tudeh Party, and on a member of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, Daniel Semyonovich Komissarov, a Russian Iranologist, who was believed to be connected with the Tudeh Party.

General Razmara then requested his military officers be trained in anti-Communist measures in Britain, and that a British security adviser be stationed in Tehran. The discussion

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341 TNA: PRO FO371/82314: EP1017/1G: minute by H.A.A. Hankey, 2 Feb 1950; EP1017/4G: minute by H.A.A. Hankey, 8 Feb 1950. His brief visit was proposed to be kept secret and thus he would have to be sent ‘in the guise of an officer from G.H.Q. [General Headquarters in Cairo]’.
345 The Haldane-Porter Report, p.4.
346 The Haldane-Porter’s Report.
347 The Haldane-Porter’s Report.
also touched upon what the British government could receive in return. In the current arrangement, the British military attaché had been granted limited access to ‘some Russian defectors’ in Iranian hands. General Razmara agreed to extend the existing arrangement to allowing the British completely free access to ‘any Russians who either defected from the Soviet Union into Iran or were captured by the Iranians’ in Iran. Haldane-Porter was also promised that General Razmara would prepare for him ‘a long detailed report’, setting out ‘the sum of’ Razmara’s ‘knowledge of the Tudeh Party’. Haldane-Porter commented on the rationale behind this arrangement in his report:

In all our discussions on the subject of Russians, Razmara adopted a surprisingly sensible and realist attitude. He said that the Soviet Union was a very big, powerful country which could easily occupy Persia [Iran] by force; he was therefore not really interested in what went on inside the Soviet Union, except in the immediate area of the Soviet/Persian frontier. We, however, were extremely interested in the Soviet Union and he was glad to help us in obtaining information about it.  

General Razmara’s mentality, which Haldane-Porter described as having ‘an exaggerated but understandable phobia of the Russians’, perhaps also added to his rationale.  

Besides the appointment of a British security adviser, Haldane-Porter later proposed to MI5 headquarters that a Russian-speaking assistant military attaché should be appointed to the British Embassy in Tehran for the purpose of this new arrangement, instead of using a representative from either MI5 or MI6. This was owing to the fact that, to Haldane-Porter’s surprise, General Razmara was unaware of the presence of an MI6 officer operating in Tehran at the time. Thus, without raising General Razmara’s suspicions, Haldane-Porter noted that the appointment of a ‘genuine’ Russian-speaking assistant military attaché was ideal, someone who would be able to use ‘his knowledge of Russian to interrogate Russians in Persian [Iranian] hands’ in addition to carrying out his normal duties as an assistant military attaché. The name of the appointment is unclear, but it was probably Alexis Kougoulsky Forter, a former RAF officer, who had emigrated from Russia. Alexis Forter had been in the Middle East in the late 1940s as a junior SIME officer, and, according to available

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348 Ibid.
349 Ibid.
350 For instance, TNA: PRO FO371/82314: EP1017/3G: letter by Colonel D.K. Betts to Brigadier V. Boucher of DDMI, 28 Jan 1950, which states that ‘I have told the Ambassador about General Razmara’s approach to me…I have also discussed the question with the local MI6 representative’. Emphasis added. Indeed, MI6 was given responsibility for intelligence collection in Iran after the end of the Second World War. See The India Office Library Records (IOLR), the British Library: L/WS/1/1570: cipher telegram from the War Office to C-in-C Middle East, C-in-C India, GOC-in-Persia and Iraq, desp. 092320 of Aug 1945.
351 The Haldane-Porter Report, p.4.
evidence, he was also present in Tehran in the tumultuous year of 1953 not as an MI5, but an MI6 officer. He later became the Head of Station in Baghdad in the late 1950s.\(^{352}\)

Appointing a British security/police advisor to Tehran, however, did prove difficult owing to an agreement with General Razmara, who insisted on absolute secrecy about the arrangement, except the Shah of Iran. In addition, General Razmara also made it clear that there would never be formal contact between the British and Iranian governments. The *maison de rendezvous* for the intelligence liaison was to be somewhere in Tehran, where an Iranian military official, chosen by General Razmara, and the British security adviser ‘could meet frequently for the discharge of their business’.\(^{353}\) Razmara also noted that the adviser should be protected by diplomatic immunity as a member of the British Embassy staff in case of arrest by the Iranian Police.\(^{354}\) Given the growing anti-British sentiment throughout Iran as a result of the internal political situation at the time, Razmara’s obsessive secrecy was understandable. Razmara was above all a military officer, but also a calculating politician. Stephen Dorril has noted that Razmara was ‘well aware that any suspicion of British meddling and influence could spell political suicide’.\(^{355}\)

The main difficulty of this arrangement from the British point of view was MI5’s chosen candidate – Sir William “George” Jenkin, former Deputy Director of the Intelligence Bureau in India (1930-50).\(^{356}\) As there were ‘large Indian and Pakistani Embassies in Tehran’ whose staff were well aware of Sir George Jenkin’s career in India, creating a diplomatic cover for him – without a risk of exposing his contact with the Iranians – was ‘impossible’.\(^{357}\) While concern was also expressed that the appointment of Sir George Jenkin ‘might stimulate’ the Russians to ‘greater activity there’, the AC (O) Committee, nonetheless, recommended to Ernest Bevin the appointment of a British adviser to the Iranians on anti-Communist measures.\(^{358}\) However, Bevin turned down the proposal for appointing Sir

\(^{352}\) Forter was present in Tehran during the period just before the 1953 coup and was also recruited by MI6 and later the Head of Station in Baghdad. Cf. Bower, *Perfect English Spy*, p.236; Dorril, *MI6*, p.570; West, *Friends*, p.122. Forter was also a junior officer of SIME, seconded from the RAF, for a short period in 1947. C.f. TNA: PRO KV4/438: a report by J.C. Robertson, ‘report on visit to middle east’, p.8, 14 Apr to 14 Jun 1947. Forter died in Paris in 1983, when he was the Head of Station there. See Horne, *But What Do You Actually Do?*, p.55.

\(^{353}\) The Haldane-Porter Report.

\(^{354}\) Ibid.

\(^{355}\) Dorril, *MI6*, p.559.

\(^{356}\) The Deputy Director of Intelligence Bureau in India was also the Director of Intelligence in the Bureau. See also Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, pp.152-153, 173-174, which misspelled Jenkin’s name as ‘Jenkins’.

\(^{357}\) The Haldane-Porter Report.

\(^{358}\) TNA: PRO CAB134/4: AC (O) (50) 18th meeting of the AC (O) Committee: minute, ‘Communist Influence in the Middle East’, 2 Jun 1950.
George Jenkin as ‘there might be a risk that the Russians would be given a good excuse for complaining strongly to the Persians [Iranians] about our activities’.  

The AC (O) Committee strongly endorsed the arrangement of the appointment as a ‘valuable means of combating subversive Russian activities’ in Iran. In addition, consideration was given to the fact that General Razmara was the most likely to become the next Prime Minister of Iran. On 26 June 1950, five days after Clement Attlee approved the proposal, General Razmara indeed became Prime Minister. Although archival records do not provide the name of the security adviser in Tehran, available evidence suggests that a possible substitute for Sir “George” Jenkin was John Albert Briance, the former head of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Palestine Police until 1948. Guy Liddell noted in his diaries that John Briance was operating in the guise of Political Adviser in Iran and provided ‘90 per cent’ of the information on the internal political situation, mostly concerning the activities of the Tudeh Party, in Iran. Christopher “Monty” Woodhouse also noted in his memoir, *Something Ventured*, that, when he visited Tehran during the turmoil of 1952, there was ‘a useful liaison, approved by the Shah, with the chief of the Security Police, who was well informed about the Tudeh Party’, which seems to suggest that Woodhouse was also referring to John Briance.

During his tenure as premier, Razmara was an ardent anti-Communist, acting as the Minister of the Interior and controlling the Iranian Police at the same time. Razmara undertook a series of both legislative and administrative initiatives to counter subversive activities, including the improvement of prison discipline to control the activities of Tudeh.
prisoners; the creation of a law giving the government discretion to proclaim Martial Law; and taking action against subversive publications. Sir Francis Shepherd, British Ambassador to Tehran, reported to Ernest Bevin that ‘these measures have been reasonably effective.’

In addition, as agreed with Haldane-Porter, Razmara sent four hand-picked Iranian officers (two from the Police, and two from G-2) to Britain in late October 1950, but the knowledge of the purpose of these Iranian officers was even concealed from the Iranian Embassy in London. These Iranian officers stayed for one year for anti-Communist training, all the expenses of which were paid by the Iranian government. The course was particularly made by MI5 to fit their purposes. Sir Francis Shepherd noted to Sir Michael Wright that ‘on return they would be capable of setting up a competent unit for dealing with subversive activity.’ He also noted that:

…we have already provided them [the Iranians], at their request, with an expert to advise the General Staff on these matters [anti-Communist measures], and he is now busily and successfully at work…The responsibility for watching and checking Tudeh activities is also shared by the Police, and here again we are helping by arranging for two police officers (and two army officers) to undergo a course of training in the United Kingdom. These two measures should go far to keep the Persian Government fully aware of the insidious nature of Communist methods and of ways of dealing with them.

Nevertheless, the Iranians’ effective anti-Communist measures did not last long – Razmara was assassinated on 7 March 1951, two days after he refused to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in the face of pressure from the National Front, led by Dr Mohammad Mossadeq. This abrupt end to Razumara’s premiership was a clear setback for anti-Communist measures in Iran. In addition, the appointment of John Briance, presumably the security adviser to Razmara, did not last longer either. According to the Liddell Diaries, once the post of John Briance had been withdrawn by 1952, any information on internal political matters ‘practically dried up’.

Just before Razmara was assassinated, there had been a series of propaganda campaigns by the left-wing press, such as ‘cartoons’ showing Razmara’s and the Shah’s close

and secret association with ‘the Union Jack’. After his assassination, ‘Pravda’, one of the main Soviet arms for propaganda, also seized the opportunity to damage British influence in Iran, stating that the assassinator of Razmara was largely influenced by ‘imperialist’ – Britain and United States – plots, though its reason for stating this was obscure. By June 1952, correspondence of the Foreign Office indicates that the Iranian armed forces had also been penetrated by the Tudeh Party. The available evidence suggests that either further security training of the Iranians or the appointment of a new security adviser did not take place at least until the mid-1950s, though there was evidence of the presence of MI6 officers in Tehran before and after the Iranian coup in August 1953. However, as will be shown in Chapter Four, a different form of security was provided to the Iranians once Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955.

The Iraqi Connection and Concerns about American Influence

As noted earlier, Iraq had maintained a strong anti-Communist stance throughout the period since the 1920s until 1958. However, there was growing concern in Whitehall about the regional influence of the United States, whose participation in strengthening the Iraqi Police in anti-Communist measures troubled British policymakers and prompted the appointment of a security/police adviser to the Iraqi government. While CIA-MI6 collaboration in support of the Iranian coup of August 1953 is an example of the Anglo-American special intelligence relationship at work in the region at the time, Britain was less receptive, at least in early October 1953, to the idea of cooperation in the field of security building in Iraq, which was essentially regarded as a British province. The British and Iraqis engaged in intimate cooperation on security matters, the foundation of which was the close connection between MI5 and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Iraqi

375 Cf. Woodhouse, Something Ventured; Cavendish, Inside Intelligence, pp.140-142.
376 While the connections between MI5 and the Iraqi CID will be discussed in Chapter Three in detail, this section primarily concerns the appointment of a British security/police adviser in Iraq.
This connection was strongly backed by the regional foreign and defence policies of the early 1950s, when the focus of British strategy shifted from Egypt to Iraq.\textsuperscript{378} Given this robust security cooperation, it is no surprise that Iraq was not on the AC (O) Committee’s priority list of countries in need of anti-Communist measures in the early 1950s. The JIC estimated that there were only approximately 2,000 active members of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) in 1950, far lower figures than those for Lebanon and Iran.\textsuperscript{379} Since the outlawing of the ICP in January 1947, its members had been severely suppressed and its most influential leaders had all been imprisoned or executed.\textsuperscript{380} Their foe, the Iraqi CID, was regarded as the ‘most efficient’ anti-Communist force in the region and maintained a strong liaison with their representative of MI5, which was noted to be ‘probably closer than anywhere else in the Middle East’.\textsuperscript{381} When Sir Henry Mack, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, was asked by the AC (O) Committee in October 1950 to report any recommendations for strengthening legislative and administrative measures against Communists, he was content with the measures adopted by the Iraqi authorities, and wrote to Ernest Bevin that:

In my opinion these laws and administrative measures have proved an effective check on communist activity and influence in Iraq...The Iraqi Criminal Investigation Department, which owes much to the tradition established by British officers who served in it up till 1947, is by Middle Eastern standards a fairly efficient organization. Doubtless it could be improved if British officers were reintroduced, but the political difficulties in the way of this are very great, and moreover to find a suitable man would not be easy. Even if these difficulties were overcome there would be a risk of prejudicing the present close relation between the Criminal Investigation Department and the representative of the [Security Service].\textsuperscript{382}

This situation and British attitudes towards the co-operative Iraqi CID would, nevertheless, change in 1953, with a growing Communist influence in the county and, more importantly, a growing American interest in Iraqi affairs.

Despite the ICP’s small membership, underground Communist activities persisted in Iraq, and in October 1953 the British Embassy in Baghdad was approached by the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, Said Qazzaz, who asked for British experts to reorganise the Iraqi

\textsuperscript{377} The Iraqi CID was established in 1947 by the British security delegation in Iraq headed by J.F. Wilkins, who had been in Baghdad since the 1920s in charge of internal security in Iraq. See TNA: PRO KV4/384: report, ‘report of visit by Mr AJ Kellar to the Middle East’, p.14, Jul 1946. Also see Batatu, \textit{Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq}, p.1157.

\textsuperscript{378} On shifting of British strategy from Egypt to Iraq, cf. Lucas, ‘The Path to Suez’.

\textsuperscript{379} TNA: PRO CAB134/3: AC (O) (50) 18, JIC report (annex), ‘Communist Influence in the Middle East’, annex, 21 Apr 1950.

\textsuperscript{380} Ibid. Detailed reports on the raid by the Iraqi CID on the ICP in 1949: cf. TNA: PRO FO371/75130; 75131. Also see Batatu, \textit{The Old Social Classes}.


\textsuperscript{382} TNA: PRO FO371/82410: EQ1019/1G: Letter by Sir Henry Mack to Ernest Bevin, 7 Nov 1950.
Police and the CID. Whitehall was alarmed to learn that Said Qazzaz was also prepared to engage the Americans, who were able to provide support free of charge through the Truman Administration’s Point Four Program, providing financial aid for development. Sir John Troutbeck, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, warned the Foreign Office that this was not only ‘the thin edge of the wedge of American penetration in what has been our province’, but would also lead to the dislocation of the Iraqi CID and police, with ‘results potentially disastrous to the security of the whole country’.

The Iraqi move was also flagged by Roger Lees, MI5’s representative in Baghdad, serving in the guise of the Assistant Air Attaché to the British Embassy in Baghdad, who commented that it would be ‘a great pity if the reorganisation of the Iraqi police were to fall into the hands of the Americans’. Moreover, Sir Hugh Stephenson, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (Middle East) (JIC/ME), also raised his concerns about this matter, stating that ‘from an intelligence point of view and in our concern with Communism, we are largely dependent in Iraq on our CID liaison’.

The British not only had to provide the advisers free of charge if they were to compete with the Americans, but they also had to avoid financial and political complications in the Iraqi Parliament. Anti-British sentiment in Iraqi politics added to a growing concern that the Iraqis were leaning towards the Americans. While waiting for a formal request from the Iraqi government backed by the Iraqi Cabinet, there was a clear increase in British concern over American influence in Iraq. In his telegram, Sir John Troutbeck commented from Baghdad that:

An American might well come as a temporary visitor...under the cover of “Security Adviser to the American Embassy” or something similar rather than as an employee of the Iraq Government...The most effective way therefore of preventing the appointment of an American is for us to evince a more active desire to help the Iraqi Minister of the Interior on the issue...Otherwise, an American adviser – or at least a temporary adviser – may be here before we know it. There are various signs that the Americans are prepared to move rapidly to redeem their diminished prestige here at our expense.

385 Although no reference to his career in MI5 was stated, his career as Head of the Special Branch in India a few years earlier can be found from his autobiography. Roger Lees, *In the Shade of the Peepul Tree* (private publication, 1998), p.89.
Despite the insignificance of Communist activities in Iraq, the Foreign Office recognised the advantage of placing a British security/police officer in the Iraqi government, and they came to the conclusion that ‘if we do not provide free assistance, there is a very strong probability that the Americans can and will’, and above all, the maintenance of order and stability in Iraq was ‘essential for our oil and other interests’.\(^{389}\) The Foreign Office decided to forestall the possibility of the appointment of an American security adviser to the Iraqi Police and go ahead without the Iraqi budget being in place, asking the Treasury to provide funds for the security adviser. This meant that a British adviser would be sent to Iraq free of charge.\(^{390}\)

Indeed, around this time, while the United States also considered Iraq ‘to be entirely within Britain’s political sphere and in a manner consistent with British objectives’, the US Ambassador Burton Berry was trying to ‘exert a more positive role in guiding Iraq’s future planning’.\(^{391}\)

Meanwhile, the Foreign Office searched for potential police/security advisers, enquiring about suitable candidates for the post to the Home and Colonial Offices. All enquiries to the Home Office were consistently turned down without any positive recommendations, and the case of Iraq was no exception to this.\(^{392}\) The hunt by the Foreign Office thus, as had always been hoped, relied on the Colonial Office, through which suitable candidates from the colonial police were recommended. Although MI5 only had an advisory role in this process, the Foreign Office sometimes appeared to expect MI5 to play a more active role.\(^{393}\) This was mainly owing to the secrecy of MI5’s activities; they were mostly compartmentalised from other departments. The appointment of a security/police adviser in the Iraqi case is an illustrative example of the extent to which the nature of security/police advisers’ work differed from that of representatives of MI5.

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\(^{389}\) TNA: PRO FO371/104719: EQ1641/16G: memorandum by P. Mallet, ‘Iraqi request for assistance in re-organising police’, 18 Dec 1953, which noted that placing a British security/police officer in Iraq would be ‘more valuable to nip Communism in the bud than to fight against well-established Communist organisations’.


\(^{391}\) Eveland, _Ropes of Sand_, p.67.

\(^{392}\) Note that queries by the Foreign Office to the Home Office were readily turned down on the grounds that there were ‘no specialists in riot control and no funds with which to second an expert or send a police mission to Iraq’. Cf. TNA: PRO FO371/104719: EQ1641/11G: letter by R. Lloyd-Thomas of Police Division, HO to R.L. Joseph of FO, 10 Nov 1953; EQ1641/16G: memorandum by P.S. Falla, ‘Police Expert for Iraq’, 23 Dec 1953; letter by R. Allen of FO to A.E. Drake of Treasury, 30 Dec 1953.

\(^{393}\) For instance, while the search for a suitable candidate for the security adviser position at the Lebanese Sûreté was being conducted by the Foreign Office, Sir William Houstoun-Boswall complained that MI5 was ‘largely responsible’ for the failure to find one. MI5 was not responsible for interviewing candidates. See TNA: PRO FO371/75319: E10297/G: minute by L.G. Thirkell of FO, 14 Sep 1949.
When the initial approach was made by Said Qazzaz in October 1953, the representative of MI5, Roger Lees (1951-53), was due to be replaced. Sir John Troutbeck, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, suggested to the Foreign Office that a successor to Roger Lees should be competent to advise the Iraqis on the reorganisation of the CID. In this way, he hoped, the Iraqi requirements would be met ‘without any extra burden on either their or H.M. Government’s budget’.\(^{394}\) However, MI5 already had their own chosen candidate as the successor in Baghdad, who had served in the ‘British Police on Special Branch duties’ and was thus competent to advise on anti-Communist work, but who had ‘no special qualifications for advising on the organisation of the CID or criminal work’.\(^{395}\) The MI5 officer being referred to was perhaps Norman Himsworth, who was to replace Roger Lees as Security Liaison Officer (SLO) with Said Qazzaz, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior.\(^{396}\) Instead, upon his departure, Roger Lees made arrangements with Said Qazzaz that his successor would advise the CID ‘unofficially on anti-communist work’, and reported that ‘the head of the CID has been instructed accordingly’.\(^{397}\)

Both MI5’s and MI6’s suggestion to the Foreign Office for the two posts in Iraq was their favourite candidate, the aforementioned Sir “George” Jenkin, on whom H.P. Goodwyn of MI5, liaising with the Foreign Office, commented that ‘a man of his calibre would best suit all purpose’ and ‘could do both jobs’.\(^{398}\) Following interviews with the candidates conducted by Paul Falla, head of the Levant Department of the Foreign Office, with the help of Lloyd Thomas, an expert from the Home Office, the Foreign Office decided to send only one, not two, advisers to Iraq. The chosen candidate was not Sir “George” Jenkin, but Duncan MacIntosh, the retiring Commissioner of Police in Hong-Kong (1946-1952). This was mainly owing to a note from the Colonial Office describing Sir “George” Jenkin as ‘rather too much

\(^{393}\) TNA: PRO FO371/104719: EQ1641/9G: minute by P.L.V. Mallet, 26 Oct 1953. Although MI5 could not find ‘anyone else with the dual qualifications’, they instead suggested Sir John Troutbeck assure the Iraqi Interior Minister that he was capable of giving ‘considerable under-cover assistance’, alongside police advisers who would also be able to advise on CID reorganisation. See TNA: PRO FO371/104719: EQ1641/10G: telegram by FO to Baghdad, 31 Oct 1953.

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of a specialist to take the lead of a general mission on Police re-organisation’.

In addition, Sir “George” Jenkin was described as ‘somewhat highly-strung, shy and reserved’, whereas MacIntosh was considered to have a ‘blend of astuteness and friendliness’, which would ‘earn the confidence, and goodwill of the Iraqi authorities’. Above all, MacIntosh was regarded as a ‘first-class all-rounder’, who thus could manage not only the CID but also the police post.

Although his appointment was delayed due to the dissolution of the Iraqi Parliament and general elections in Iraq, MacIntosh finally arrived as Security/Police Adviser in Baghdad in October 1954 after the thirteenth government was formed under the premiership of Nuri el-Said. Said Qazzaz remained as the Minister of the Interior and was still ‘eager for MacIntosh’s cooperation in his campaign against the Communists’. Sir Robin Hooper, Counsellor at the British Embassy in Baghdad, observed two months after his appointment that MacIntosh was liked by the Iraqis and was making progress in the Iraqi police and the CID:

his advice is being sought and readily taken. He has made far-reaching recommendations for the re-organisation of the C.I.D. and the uniformed branches of the Police Force, including…the creation of a Special Branch and integrated reporting of political and subversive activities between the various districts...[and] there is a marked desire among junior officers of the Police Force to better themselves now that they see that the Government is taking steps to reform and improve the Police Force, which has for so many years remained virtually stagnant.

MacIntosh’s post as the Security/Police Adviser in Iraq ended when the Iraqi Revolution occurred in July 1958.

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400 TNA: PRO FO371/111043: VQ1641/14G: telegram by FO to Baghdad, No.334 of 31 Mar 1954. Lloyd Thomas observed the nature of police and CID work as inseparable, with the latter ‘to some extent subordinate’ to the former. The Foreign Office commented that ‘we cannot guarantee that J [Jenkin] would work happily “with but after” M [MacIntosh]’. A passage recovered under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1344-11, 25 Jan 2012) states that MacIntosh was ‘recommended by our friends [MI6] as an all-rounder’. See TNA: PRO FO371/111043: VQ1641/10G: report ‘Police and CID Advisers to the Iraq Government’, undated (circa Mar 1954).
Jordan’s Arab Legion and the Anti-Communist Triangle

The Jordanian case was unique in the region as the Arab Legion, the chief external and internal security force of the country, was commanded by a British officer, General Sir John Bagot Glubb, until March 1956. As a recent study has shown, British personnel were involved in training the Arab Legion and developing Jordanian military intelligence. A less well known fact is, however, the British involvement in developing Jordanian civilian political intelligence, especially anti-Communist and counter-subversion measures. There was in fact the far from negligible regional security contribution made by Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the Director-General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion, who was responsible for internal security in Jordan and foreign liaison.

As a relatively small country in the region, where there were also limited areas for inhabitants owing to its terrain, Communist activities were almost non-existent in Jordan. According to a JIC estimate in 1950, members of the Communist Party in Jordan numbered less than fifty. While the AC (O) Committee rightly considered the Communist problem in Jordan far less significant than elsewhere, this assessment differed from the perception of the Jordanian government. Since late 1950 Jordanian police officers constantly attended ‘special training’ courses in anti-Communist measures in Britain, and the Jordanian government requested that Britain exchange any information on Communist activities.

At Jordan’s request, Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the wartime head of the British Security Mission in Lebanon (1941-45), was appointed in April 1952 as security/police adviser to Jordan in anti-Communist measures and helped with the reorganisation of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Arab Legion. His formal title was the Director-General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion (1952-56), but he was also known as the Head of

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the Jordanian CID. Colonel Coghill’s career has not been thoroughly documented, and this is particularly true of his anti-Communist/anti-subversive work in Jordan. Owing to the nature of his work, perhaps, he has received inadequate attention from historians, but his role as the Director-General of Intelligence was significant in a number of ways. Jordan had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or other Eastern bloc countries, and technically nationals of those countries were not allowed to enter Jordan. Colonel Coghill was responsible for internal security concerning the movements of foreign nationals and subversive activities in the country. In addition, Major-General James Lunt, the Second-in-Command of the Arab Legion, recalled that the Free Officers Movement within the Arab Legion was kept under ‘a close watch’ by Coghill.

Moreover, despite Communist activities being nearly non-existent in Jordan, subversive activities included not only those associated with Communists, but also those of the Egyptians and Saudis, who were seen by Coghill as ‘the worst’ subversive activity in the country. According to Coghill’s letter to the War Office in late 1955, the Egyptians were propagating hostile attacks on King Hussein of Jordan as one of the ‘imperialists’ and ‘colonisers’ in the region, and also were trying to attempt a provocation of the Israelis by organising sabotage groups to be infiltrated from Jordan into Israel as if they were Jordanians. Likewise, the Saudis were bribing the Jordanians, including the royal family, politicians and newspapers, to weaken the Hashemite influence. These activities, perceived as subversive, were indeed in part instigated by Soviet and Egyptian propaganda, particularly their call to arms against ‘imperial powers’, and they presented a potential danger to be exploited by local Communists.

In his capacity as the Director-General of Intelligence, Coghill reorganised the Jordanian Police, within which he also headed the CID, and a selected number of Jordanian police officers were sent to Britain for training in anti-Communist/anti-subversive measures. It is noteworthy that Coghill sent his senior (Jordanian) officers for

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407 A former commander of the Arab Legion, Peter Young, noted Colonel Coghill’s title as the ‘director of CID [Criminal Investigation Department]’. Quoted from Peter Young, Bedouin Command with the Arab Legion 1953-1956 (London: William Kimber, 1956), p.174.
410 Ibid.
411 Ibid.
security/police training not only in Britain but also another Middle Eastern country, Libya. Coghill’s choice of Libya in fact had a solid and logical foundation for both technical and political reasons. Libya in the post-war period hosted an ‘advanced’ police school, which Coghill described as ‘extremely efficient’, run by a retired superintendent of the British Metropolitan Police, Arthur Giles.\footnote{Ibid., p.122.} On the technical side, Coghill’s (Jordanian) officers often found difficult to understand the meaning of security training courses in Britain as having a good knowledge and command of English was essential for attending such security training courses in Britain. In addition, although it is uncertain to what extent the conduct of police work would differ on the basis of different legal systems, Coghill noted in his memoirs that the Jordanian legal system was principally based on the code of Napoleon, inherited from the Ottoman Empire, the whole approach and procedure in the courts of which was different from the use of Britain.\footnote{Ibid., p.123.} Moreover, while there were some police training facilities in Egypt and Iraq, Coghill avoided sending his officers to these countries for political reasons as, it was noted, both Iraq and Egypt had their own designs on the internal affairs of Jordan. For these reasons, security/police training in Libya, where training was conducted by a British ex-police officer in Arabic, was ideal for Coghill’s purpose.\footnote{Ibid., p.123.}

More importantly, perhaps, Colonel Coghill’s work with his Arab counterparts was one of most important factors in developing regional security liaison for Britain. While archival evidence on this aspect remains tentative, his private papers testify that Colonel Coghill collaborated closely with Farid Chehab, Head of the Sûreté Générale, and Bahjat Attiyah, the Director of the Iraqi CID, by exchanging information on anti-Communist and anti-subversive matters in the region. Based on his personal relationship, firstly with Farid Chehab, and later with Bahjat Attiyah, the security liaison between Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan became gradually institutionalised and became known in Coghill’s own words as the ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’.\footnote{Ibid., p.118.} This security liaison involved not only intelligence sharing on security matters in Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan, but also intelligence sharing on subversive activities elsewhere, most of which were instigated by Egypt and Syria.\footnote{Ibid.} It also included a ‘specially strict’ surveillance request on the leading figure in anti-British activities in the region, Haji Amin al-Husseini, the ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, whom Colonel Coghill

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}
called ‘the most evil power in Palestine Arab Nationalism’. As the Director-General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion, Coghill’s role in anti-Communist work was appreciated not only by the Jordanians but also by the Iraqis. Before the aforementioned Duncan MacIntosh took up the post of Security/Police Adviser in Baghdad, Said Qazzaz, the Iraqi Minister for Interior, insisted that MacIntosh ‘should break his outward journey at Amman to discuss his work with Coghill’. It was no exaggeration when Colonel Coghill described the presence of the Arab Legion in his report to the War Office as ‘one of the principal key-stones’ in providing stability to Middle Eastern security as a whole.

One of the most important contributions of the Jordan-Lebanon-Iraq anti-Communist triangle was perhaps their stimulation of the coordination of anti-Communist measures with neighbouring Arab states by establishing closer liaison between the regional security services. One aspect of this regional initiative came to the fore in 1954 as the foundation for a covert cooperation effort in ‘the fight against Communism and Zionism’ under the Arab League, with participants from Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and other countries. Behind this regional collaboration, as mentioned earlier, the AC (O) Committee acted as a facilitator, seeking to enhance the anti-Communist measures of Middle Eastern governments by ‘means of improving liaison and the exchange of information’ between the relevant governments. In addition to Iraq, Britain’s closest ally in the region, the Lebanese Sûreté Générale was also chosen to lead the initiative. A senior official at the Foreign Office noted that Farid Chehab appreciated ‘the need for and the value of liaison between themselves and their counterparts in other Arab States’ and that the Lebanese initiative ‘would be less likely to arouse suspicion’ if it came from any other Arab state. This regional collaboration under the Arab League was particularly efficient in combatting Communist, and also ‘anarchist’, activities inside their territories. The united anti-Communist campaign led to the discovery of several

418 IWM: Private Papers of Patrick Coghill, ‘Before I Forget…’, vol.1, p.44. Haj Amin al-Hussini had also been closely watched by SIME. C.f. TNA: PRO KV2/2085-2092, all of which are Personal Files of MI5 on him. See also TNA: PRO FO371/111094: telegram by Sir Chapman Andrews, Beirut, to FO, 16 Dec 1954.
421 Asseily et al. (eds.), A Face in the Crowd, p.68.
422 Quoted from TNA: PRO FO371/91177: E1017/3G: letter by Furlonge of FO, 4 May 1951. See also: PRO CAB134/2: AC (M) (51) 4: memorandum by Pierson Dixon, successor to Sir Gladwyn Jebb, ‘the work of the official committee on communism (overseas)’, 23 Jun 1951.
underground Communist cells in the region. The cooperation between the Jordan-Lebanon-Iraq ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’ even extended beyond the Arab states. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four, the Turkish and Iranian security services cooperated with the ‘Triangle’ on subversive activities in the region from the mid-1950s onwards.

There were, however, certainly limitations to Coghill’s anti-Communist measures owing to the unstable conditions of Jordanian politics, where anti-British sentiments were on the rise. That Coghill’s position was filled by a British officer had often been a cause of political confrontation between the Jordanian government and political opposition groups. Eventually, the Jordanian Police was separated from the Arab Legion, and was placed under the Ministry of the Interior from July 1956. This move was initiated by King Hussein in response to a recommendation by the Jordanian Cabinet Committee on the reorganisation of the government, and also due to public pressure to separate civilian and military functions.

Once it was announced by the Jordanian government, the Foreign Office noted that Coghill would be deprived of ‘a most valuable observation post on communist activities, not only in Jordan but in the Middle East as a whole’. It also considered the appointment of another Police Adviser to the Jordanian Police. Before the separation of the Jordanian Police was brought into effect, Coghill’s post as the Director-General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion abruptly ended as Sir John Bagot Glubb was dismissed from the Arab Legion in March 1956.

Despite the volatile political climate in Jordan, especially over Jordan’s connection with Britain, there was in fact a request from the Jordanian government for a British security/police adviser to the Jordanian Police three years after the dismissal of Colonel Coghill. The aforementioned Duncan MacIntosh, who had been the Police/Security Adviser to the Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi CID, escaped from the Iraqi Revolution and was appointed as

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the Police Adviser in Jordan in October 1958. A letter by Sir Roderick Parkes, British Ambassador in Amman (1962-66), indicates that, despite opposition by ‘dyed-in-the-wool’ traditionalists and conservatives, as Police Adviser (1958-62) MacIntosh achieved his aim to reorganise the Jordanian security services ‘on an independent, logical and modern basis’ using his experience in Hong Kong as his principal model. In addition, the CID’s public security functions were separated out to form a new department responsible for ‘all internal security matters outside the province of the uniformed police’, including sections dealing with Communists and liaising with foreign services. This department was established and later named ‘the General Intelligence Department [Dairat al-Mukhabarat al-Ammah]’ in accordance with Act 24 of 1964. Sir Roderick Parkes commented on MacIntosh’s achievement in a letter:

I cannot finish this letter without warm tribute to MacIntosh. His health has suffered recently, yet the energy, single-mindedness of purpose and wisdom with which he has carried out a singularly difficult assignment have impressed me deeply. He is due to go at the end of January, when his six-month contract comes to an end. All those Jordanians who have been in touch with him will be sorry at his departure. I shall share their feelings.

Indeed, archival evidence suggests that even after MacIntosh’s retirement from the post, training of Jordanian police officers as a part of anti-Communist measures continued. In addition, as noted in Chapter One, the British anti-Communist policy in Jordan allowed the Americans to participate in the internal affairs of Jordan from the mid-1950 onwards, and since then, the United States has enjoyed its own influence over the Jordanian government.

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431 According to Nigel Ashton, he has not found the name of MacIntosh from his archival research at the Hashemite Archives, under the authorisation of King Abdullah. Email exchange, 11 Sep 2011.
432 The information is derived from the official website of the General Intelligence Department, of Jordan: accessible at: http://www.gid.gov.jo/en/home.html (accessed on 26 Aug 2013). The Jordanian Police was re-organised during MacIntosh’s four-year tenure in Amman, which laid the foundations for the Jordanian Police and the Security Service today. Evidence of the continuity from the re-organisation by MacIntosh was that it was firstly headed by Colonel Muhammad Rasul Al Kailani, who had been the Deputy Director of the CID, and who had been separated from the Public Security by MacIntosh. See TNA: FO371/170335: EJ1641/2: letter by Sir Roderick Parkes, Ambassador to Jordan, to L.C.W. Figg of Eastern Department, 28 Dec 1962.
435 See Chapter One. And also O’Connell, King’s Counsel.
Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the training of Middle Eastern security services, primarily focusing on the introduction of British security/police advisers to Middle Eastern governments on anti-Communist measures. Training of Middle Eastern security services in anti-Communist measures is a recurrent theme of Britain’s anti-Communist policy in the region throughout the period and will be further discussed in subsequent chapters in different contexts – protective security (Chapter Four), propaganda (Chapter Five), and the extent to which Britain was able to influence Middle Eastern anti-Communist measures through this training (Chapter Six). This chapter has shown the intimate connections between Britain and Middle Eastern states, such as Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and Jordan, which developed in the context of the Cold War. The AC (O) Committee was a driving engine for intelligence liaison with Middle Eastern states and also for facilitating anti-Communist measures in the region. Sending a British security/police adviser was considered to be the best way to improve the internal security of Middle Eastern states.

It is important to point out that the cases presented in this chapter are not necessarily selective – Britain did not have a police/security adviser in every single Middle Eastern country. For instance, placing a British security/police officer in Syria was once considered, but the country was too unstable for such liaison to be established.436 Owing to the flow of illegal Jewish (and possible Communist) immigrants from the Eastern Bloc into the newly established state of Israel, MI5 also contemplated liaison with the Israeli authorities in 1951, but there is no archival evidence to suggest that MI5 established its liaison with them.437 In addition, as will be shown in Chapter Three, Britain maintained a close connection with the Egyptians through the representative of MI5 until the early 1950s on anti-Communist matters: there was no need to place a security/police adviser there. Moreover, more importantly, it was not a one-way street: British anti-Communist policy and British concerns about the state of Middle Eastern security also dovetailed neatly with the demands of Middle Eastern governments for British advice on anti-Communist measures. At the time, Britain was seen by Middle Eastern governments as their most reliable ally in fighting subversive elements in their countries. This was mostly due to their reputation for organisational

436 TNA: CAB134/4: AC (O) (50) 18th meeting: minute of the AC (O) Committee meeting, 2 June, 1950; PRO FO371/82851: letter by C.E. King to Captain Liddell, 6 Feb 1951.
reliability, as well as personal relationships developed through Britain’s involvement in the region over many years. Above all, their relationships were based on common interests, anti-Communist measures in the region.

Placing security/police officers in the heart of Middle Eastern governments was indeed advantageous for Britain: the local security services, including police forces, were unique local assets for intelligence and security purposes, and security liaison with them was invaluable in at least two ways. Firstly, as Communist movements in the region were illegal in these countries, intelligence collection on them was carried out by the local security services, with physical surveillance of the suspects and premises, probably even utilising its power to tap telephones and intercept other communications such as censorship. Security liaison with regional police forces meant that Britain was able to access intelligence on Communist activities in the region, including police records, which would otherwise have been inaccessible. Secondly, from British analysis of the Communist seizure of Eastern Europe following the War, a strong security service was regarded as essential to forestall Communist subversion. Thus, the training of the security services was seen as the best way of containing the spread of Communism in the region. In addition to the training of the security services, placing security/police advisers was regarded as the best way to influence the conduct of anti-Communist measures by Middle Eastern states.

The main problem with these relationships for Britain was that they were based on a non-institutionalised agreement in a hostile environment, where anti-British sentiment was commonplace, and thus an institutionalised arrangement was impossible for Middle Eastern leaders who were risking their political careers by associating so closely with Britain. As a result, although some personal connections were maintained, the posts of British Security or Police Advisers were abruptly ended in the face of a crisis.
Chapter Three

The Defence of the Realm in the Middle East

438 An article based on this chapter has been accepted for publication. Chikara Hashimoto, ‘Fighting the Cold War or Post-Colonialism? Britain in the Middle East from 1945 to 1958: Looking through the Records of the British Security Service’, The International History Review (forthcoming in 2014).
In the minds of many people, it [the British Secret Service] has become a dark legend, an organisation of fantastic power, whose tentacles extend everywhere. The reality was a little different. Nobody will deny the power and ability of the Secret Service, but it is a long way from being the “all-seeing eye” of popular legend. What keeps the British Secret Service functioning is simply money, and the irresistible temptation which money represents to rogues and traitors.

- Anwar El Sadat. 439

**Introduction**

The authorised history of MI5, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5*, confirmed that the security service’s roles and responsibilities were not confined to Great Britain, but included the maintenance of internal security throughout the British Empire. 440 It also records that MI5 maintained a regional headquarters in the Middle East, SIME, until 1958. 441 Before the authorised history appeared, the most detailed reference to SIME could be found only in the context of the Second World War from the official history of *British Intelligence in the Second World War* and the works of H.O. Dovey. 442 Academic studies concerning the post-war activities of SIME are nearly non-existent, however some reference to SIME can be found in the literature, such as memoirs and biographies. 443 These works hardly shed any light on the post-war activities of SIME, let alone the implications of its activities for the British presence in the post-war Middle East. 444 By virtue of the Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government of 1992, a series of files related to MI5 has now

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440 MI5’s authority for imperial security in the post-war era was stipulated in a directive by Prime Minister Clement Attlee, also known as the “Attlee Directive”, in 1948. See Andrew, *Defence of the Realm*, p.443. See also, Jeffery, *MI6*, pp.638-639.


443 West, *Friends*, p.17; Cavendish, *Inside Intelligence*, chs.4, 5; Deacon, ‘C’, ch.4; Horne, *But What Do You Actually Do?*, chs.3-4. In connection with the Israelis, see Black et al., *Israel’s Secret Wars*, pp.74-5.

been gradually declassified. These materials, including files documenting the activities of SIME from 1939 to the early 1950s, concern a range of subjects, including not only Communist and fascist leaders, but also anti-British figures such as Haji Emin al-Husseini, the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, and information on anti-British and nationalist groups, such as the Ikhwan al-Muslimeen of Egypt, known as the Muslim Brotherhood. The declassified materials also suggest that the territorial coverage of SIME included not only the Colonies, but also foreign countries in key geographical locations, such as Egypt and Iraq.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine for the first time the activities of the hitherto unexplored SIME after the Second World War until its closure in 1958. It will show how SIME, as the regional headquarters of MI5, became an integral part of the military machine which was chiefly directed by the military planning of the Chiefs of Staff, and also show the extent to which MI5 cooperated in the post-war Middle East with MI6 and its Middle Eastern counterparts. By examining declassified records, this chapter will argue that having increasingly become an instrument of the Cold War, the role of SIME was not to defend British interests against anti-British movements, but was instead quite narrowly focused on the fight against Communist movements in the region. It will further argue that the activities of SIME were largely limited owing to the fragile nature of intelligence liaison in the post-war region, which was increasingly hostile to the British military presence. In addition, it will examine the shift in thinking regarding the conduct of the Cold War amongst policymakers as implied by the story of SIME’s closure in 1958. As a result of the prospect of war against the Soviet Union being reduced, SIME became obsolete in the eyes of military planners. However, MI5 remained involved in maintaining regional security thereafter.

**SIME in the Second World War**

SIME is a relatively unknown organisation in British Intelligence, and its activities can only be found in the context of the Second World War in the literature. While it is

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445 They are accessible at TNA. The total number of MI5 records at TNA is more than 5,003 records, accessible on-line at [http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/](http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/) (accessed, 22 Jan 2013).
446 C.f. TNA: PRO KV2/2085-2092, all of which are Personal Files of MI5 on him.
448 The authorised history of MI5 only covers the colonies in the region, such as the Palestine Mandate, Cyprus, and the Aden Colony. See Andrew, *Defence of the Realm*, pp.442-482.
449 See Note 443 above.
unnecessary to repeat the whole wartime story here, it is necessary to illustrate its roles and activities during the war. A former British Army officer, who served under the Middle East Command during the war, once described SIME as ‘MI5 behaving rather like MI6 and doing it better’.450 This is rather misleading because, while it certainly maintained connections with MI5, SIME was never the regional headquarters of MI5 during the war: it was staffed and administered by the British Army and operated entirely under the direction of the General Headquarters of the Middle East (GHQ/ME). The exception was the Defence Security Officer (DSO) in Cairo, Colonel (later Brigadier) Raymond J. Maunsell, an army officer on the MI5 payroll.451 SIME’s connections with MI5 developed on an ad hoc basis throughout the war, especially, in the context of SIME requiring technical advice on counter-espionage in the region. As the war progressed, and the “double-cross” operations to deceive the Axis Powers, in particular Italy and Germany, got underway, as a counter-espionage organisation in the theatre, SIME received instruction from MI5 for the enhancement of its security practices.452 Thus, MI5’s direct commitment to regional security did not precede the post-war reorganisation of the British intelligence community, through which its overseas commitments expanded substantially.453

Secondly, Michael Howard, an official historian of *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, has described the nature of wartime security work in the region as ‘an intelligence officer’s paradise and a security officer’s hell’.454 This was owing to the fact that the Middle East was virtually borderless from a security perspective and consisted of a diverse collection of Crown Colonies, Protectorates, Mandated territories and neutral countries, where the provision for maintaining internal security differed significantly. The complexity of maintaining regional security over these territories fostered the organisational development of SIME and led to an increase in its activities. While SIME originally started in

451 TNA: PRO KV4/383: ‘Security Intelligence, Middle East Charter’, undated. Also see, Andrew, *Defence of the Realm*, p.138. Note that at the outbreak of war in 1939, MI5 officers were located in the ‘permanent establishment of the Security Service overseas’, such as Gibraltar, Malta, Cairo, Aden, Singapore and Hong Kong. The officers were also provided with ‘a small staff of military personnel’. See Curry, *Security Service*, pp.396-397.
454 Howard, *British Intelligence*, p.31.
December 1939 as a spinoff from the DSO in Cairo, it expanded rapidly in size and in territory covered. At the height of the war in 1941, SIME was staffed by ninety officers and a hundred others, mostly from the Army. A number of military officers were posted as DSOs throughout the region to liaise with local authorities and to advise on internal security in territories covering the Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa, including Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Palestine, Syria/Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Transjordan, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Egypt, the Canal Zone, Eritrea and Aden. An example of Britain’s proactive security measures through SIME can be found in the context of Egypt, where the DSO in Cairo closely cooperated with the Egyptian security forces such as the Cairo City Police. Anglo-Egyptian joint security cooperation in fact resulted in the rounding up of Abwehr agents in what was known as Operation ‘Condor’.

The wartime conditions also made it necessary for Britain to exercise executive powers enforced with military support, and some reluctant local governments were indeed threatened with military measures. Notable examples were the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran and the overthrow of the anti-British Prime Minister of Iraq, Rashid Ali, in 1941. The security measures taken by local governments included the detention of enemy agents and suspects who were likely to spy for the Axis Powers or turn to sabotage; the security examination of new arrivals in the region from neutral or enemy occupied territory; and border control conducted with the field security force of the military police. For security purposes, detention camps were established in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Cyprus and Egypt, strictly under the control of the Middle East Command, under whose direction SIME operated. According to one set of figures from November 1944, a total of 32 German intelligence officers who had parachuted into the region were detained, and 1,719 ‘fifth columnists’, who might have acted in favour of the enemy powers, were interned.

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455 Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence*, p.152.
457 Dovey, ‘Operation Condor’.
460 By comparison, 1,003 security suspects were interned by the security authority in India.
refugees and travellers were examined in the first six months of 1944, excluding all the Jewish refugees who were examined by either the Palestine Police or SIME.\footnote{461 TNA: PRO KV4/383: Paper no.19: Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) by Head of SIME, undated, circa 1945-46.}

Thirdly, it is important to note that SIME only functioned as the regional centre for collation and dissemination of security intelligence. Apart from a special section which controlled double-agents against the Axis Powers, SIME never ran its own agents for use as intelligence sources nor conducted counter-intelligence operations especially in the post-war period.\footnote{462 An exception was in the late 1940s, when Anthony Cavendish operated as a German Prisoner-of-War in Cairo. Cavendish, Inside Intelligence, pp.25-41.} SIME had instead two main sources of intelligence and was entirely dependent on them: MI6 and the outstation DSOs. As enemy agents mostly crossed the borders from neutral countries such as Turkey,\footnote{463 Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, p.164} SIME needed the close cooperation of the regional headquarters of MI6, also known as the Inter-Services Liaison Department (ISLD). Official historians have noted that a close relationship between SIME and ISLD was naturally maintained due to the ‘excellent personal relations between the officials concerned’.\footnote{464 Quoted from Howard, British Intelligence, p.32; also cf. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, vol.4, pp.152-153.} In addition, SIME shared with ISLD intercepted materials from enemy wireless communications, technically termed as ISOS (Intelligence Section, Oliver Strachey) materials – Oliver Strachey was responsible for solving, decrypting and circulating German intelligence messages at the Government Code & Cipher School (GC&CS); these decrypts were named after Strachey and issued as the ISOS series.\footnote{Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, vol.4, p.44.} These decrypts of Abwehr hand- ciphered messages proved vital for SIME’s counter-espionage work during the War especially in the context of “double-cross” operations against the Axis Powers.\footnote{Cf. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, vol.4, passim.} The main functions of the DSOs were not only to advise local authorities on any measures for internal security, but also to collect intelligence from local security services, in most cases the police, through liaison. For instance, intelligence obtained by the DSO in Cairo, Colonel Raymond Maunsell (later first Head of SIME, 1939-1944), included copies of ‘full surveillance reports on suspects both of European and Arab/Egyptian origin’ from a Special Section of the Cairo Police and the Ministry of the Interior, which formed a list of suspects earmarked for arrest and internment on the outbreak of war. In addition, under the supervision of DSO Cairo, British-Egyptian censorship provided Colonel Maunsell with the
opportunity to examine a special ‘dirty tricks’ section concerned with ‘secret censorship’ of both private and diplomatic mail.\(^{467}\) It is important to reiterate that the wartime situation necessitated the very close and friendly cooperation of SIME with MI6 and local governments. The post-war conditions were entirely different.

### SIME and Post-War Imperial Defence in Middle East

Except for Cyprus, Aden, and the Palestine Mandate, the Middle East predominantly consisted of independent countries. Intelligence organisations that had thrived in the region during wartime thus had to be dismantled in peacetime, returning prime responsibility back to MI6.\(^{468}\) The first casualty of the post-war reorganisation in the region was the Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq/Iran (CICI), a comparable organisation to SIME under the control of the Royal Air Force: CICI’s networks were taken over by MI6.\(^{469}\) Despite working predominantly within foreign territories, SIME in the post-war period was nevertheless preserved as an inter-service organisation and became the regional headquarters of MI5. However, while key executive positions (the Head and Deputy Head of SIME) and strategically important outstations (Egypt, Iraq and the Palestine Mandate) were held and maintained by MI5 officers, SIME was not a civilian but a military organisation, the majority of staff being seconded from the Army, Navy and RAF on an ad hoc basis. The Head of SIME reported not only to the Director-General of MI5, but also to the Middle East Defence Committee, later renamed the British Defence Co-ordination Committee in the Middle East (BDCC/ME), with regard to its local policy and executive action.\(^{470}\) The purpose of maintaining SIME into peacetime was purely due to the needs of the Chiefs of Staff. In addition to British military commitments to the region under defence treaties, there were also

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\(^{467}\) IWM: Private Papers of R.J. Maunsell: 4829 80/30/1, pp.2, 5. The relationship between Maunsell and Jenkins was also noted by Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence, vol.4*, p.150.

\(^{468}\) Indeed, SIME was just one of a number of wartime-intelligence organisations operating in the Middle East. In addition to SIME, there were the Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq/Iran (CICI), a security organisation administered by the RAF; the Inter-Service Liaison Department (ISLD), a regional headquarters of MI6; the Middle East Intelligence Centre (MEIC), a political intelligence assessment centre; the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), responsible for British propaganda; the Special Operations Executive (SOE); the Combined Bureau Middle East (CBME), a regional section of the Government Code & Cipher School (GC&CS). See Adam Shelley, *British Intelligence in the Middle East, 1939-46*, (Cambridge: PhD thesis, 2008).

\(^{469}\) IOLR: L/WS/1/1570: cipher telegram from the War Office to C-in-C Middle East, C-in-C India, GOC-in-Persia and Iraq, desp. 092320 of Aug 1945.

a number of strategic reasons for SIME’s continuance in the developing Cold War climate: the integrity of the region was regarded by the Chiefs of Staff as a pillar of British imperial defence, and the maintenance of the region in peacetime was thought essential; in particular, Egypt was considered the keystone of Middle East strategy where adequate forces could be based to fight a full-scale war against the Soviet Union. In either offensive or defensive strategic roles both in peace and war, the presence of the British armed forces in the area was thus thought essential.\(^{471}\)

As MI5 had become ‘in loco parentis’ towards SIME owing to the closeness of the liaison relationship during the war,\(^ {472}\) it was thus logically assumed by the Chiefs of Staff that SIME would pass into the hands of MI5, whose commitment in the region was understood as the ‘fourth defence force’.\(^ {473}\) In addition, the outgoing Commander-in-Chief Middle East Command, General Sir Bernard Paget, the key decision-maker regarding the fate of post-war SIME, noted that an effective intelligence system in the region should be ‘one organisation for security, one for political intelligence and one for military intelligence, i.e. MI5, MI6 and MI [Military Intelligence]’.\(^ {474}\) Having been dissatisfied with the recent transition of its networks in Iran from CICI to MI6, he preferred to preserve SIME and also welcomed SIME ‘becoming part of a larger Imperial Security Organisation’ under the authority of MI5.\(^ {475}\)

When Sir Dick White, Deputy Director of B (counter-espionage) Division of MI5 and later both the Director-General of MI5 and ‘C’ of MI6, visited the region concerning the fate of SIME, he was ‘not at all impressed by the general organisation of SIME’ as, since the end of the War, it had mostly been staffed with junior officers, who had no knowledge about intelligence and security. However, White reluctantly accepted the fact that a new separate security organisation to maintain a British military presence in the region would be ‘inadvisable’.\(^ {476}\) A formal recommendation was made through the Joint Intelligence Committee in the Middle East (JIC/ME) and this was approved by the Joint Intelligence

\(^{471}\) TNA: PRO CAB79/46: COS (46) 51\(^ {st}\) meeting, ‘strategic position of the British commonwealth’, 29 Mar 1946. On post-war imperial defence strategy, cf. Kent, British Imperial Strategy, ch.3; Cohen, ‘The strategic role of the Middle East after the war’ Gorst, “We must cut our coat according to our cloth”. On the important of Egyptian bases, see Kent, ‘The Egyptian Base and the Defence of the Middle East, 1945-54’.. On the convergence of the Anglo-American strategic (offensive) interests, and subsequent the formation of the Bagdad Pact, see: Cohen, Fighting World War Three from the Middle East; idem, ‘From ‘Cold’ to ‘Hot’ War’.

\(^{472}\) TNA: PRO KV4/384: report of visit by Mr A.J. Kellar to the Middle East, ‘III: organisational problems of SIME and CICI’, p.15, Feb 1945.


\(^{475}\) Ibid.

\(^{476}\) Ibid. Also see TNA: PRO KV4/383: JIC (46) 3\(^ {rd}\) meeting: minute of JIC (MEF) meeting, 17 Jan 1946.
Committee (JIC) in London and the BDCC/ME.\(^{477}\) Thus in September 1946, SIME finally came under the authority of MI5, and SIME was the regional headquarters of MI5 thereafter.

As the regional headquarters of MI5, SIME functioned similarly to MI5 at home but had different commitments. Like the wartime SIME, it was responsible for the collation and dissemination of security intelligence relating to counter-espionage and counter-subversion which might have had implications for British authorities throughout the region. Its intelligence customers included the Army Commander-in-Chief Middle East; the Naval Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean; the Royal Air Force Commander-in-Chief Middle East; the Naval Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet; and British Ambassadors, Ministers, High Commissioners and Governors.\(^{478}\) In his memoir, Brigadier William Magan, Head of SIME (1947-1951), noted the responsibility of SIME:

> My task consisted in knowing in as much detail as possible the threats to the area as a whole and in ensuring that we had the means, the knowledge and the understanding to counter them. To that end it was my responsibility to pass to MI5 the information of which they needed to be informed, and to feed to local authorities the information of which they needed to be aware, [and also] to advise the individual territories on their security organisation and practices. In many of the territories we had our own SIME representatives to liaise with and advise the local authorities.\(^{479}\)

More importantly, the difference between SIME and MI5 was that, although MI5 enjoyed no commitments to a particular department,\(^{480}\) SIME was ‘an integral part of the military machine’ in the Middle East. It was in fact distinctively associated with the military forces and planning in the region and had its own commitments to the post-war strategy of the Chiefs of Staff.\(^{481}\)

However, operating in peacetime did influence SIME’s work. Their activities were largely restricted and the number of SIME personnel was kept to a minimum: capped at twenty-five staff of all ranks under the inter-service agreement reached before the end of the war.\(^{482}\) Although the territorial coverage remained equal to the territory under the BDCC/ME Command, the number of its outstations, in other words, the physical presence of DSOs, was reduced to a few strategically key stations such as Egypt, Iraq, the Palestine Mandate and


\(^{479}\) Ibid., pp.98-99.

\(^{480}\) It was administratively responsible to the Home Secretary under the 1952 Maxwell Fyfe Directive. See Andrew, *Defence of the Realm*, 324-325.

\(^{481}\) Quoted from TNA: PRO KV4/472: the Liddell Diaries, 6 Jul 1950.

\(^{482}\) TNA: PRO KV4/442: SF51/30/85: letter by MI5 to DDMI, War Office, 24 May 1945.
Cyprus. The purpose of maintaining its own representatives at these outstations was to liaise with local security services, especially on advice regarding security measures in the event of war. According to the recent declassified diaries of Guy Liddell, Deputy Director-General of MI5, in the event of war, staffing at SIME would be increased by at least 50 per cent through secondments from the War Office. Moreover, it was also envisaged that in the event of war, when British military forces were to reoccupy those countries in the region with which Britain had a defence treaty, SIME was expected to ‘keep its links going wherever possible, [so] that Middle East Command should have a proper security organisation at its back’. SIME faced difficulties operating on foreign soil, but these difficulties arose in securing cooperation from other departments of the British government. This was particularly true in the case of Iraq, where the RAF’s wartime CICI had been forced to close down and was replaced by a new Army-oriented SIME outstation. When one of the ‘best’ MI5 officers, John (“Jack”) Percival Morton, former officer of the Indian Police, the Delhi Intelligence Bureau (DIB), was despatched from London under cover of Assistant Air Attaché to establish his DSO office within the British Embassy in Baghdad in 1947, he had to cope with opposition from the RAF staff at the Embassy. As the RAF maintained its own headquarters at Habbaniya, a major regional airbase, Iraq was considered RAF territory and Morton’s association with the Army-oriented SIME made him ‘rather friendless’. Owing to a lack of cooperation from these staff, the DSO’s records of the Registry, all necessary for Morton’s security work, were kept fifty miles away in Habbaniyah due to the ‘lack of suitable and secure accommodation in Baghdad’. The reason for Morton’s physical presence in Baghdad was indeed to maintain the close connection with the Iraqi CID.

483 Aden Colony was added to the list of its outstations from 1953. Cf. TNA: PRO KV4/475: the Liddell Diaries, 12 Feb, 9 Apr 1953.
486 When James Robertson, MI5 officer, inspected the conditions of the DSO in Baghdad in 1947, with Captain Guy Liddell, Deputy Director-General of MI5, the physical security of Morton’s work was reported ‘practically nil’. TNA: PRO KV4/438: report on visit to Middle East by Mr J.C. Robertson, p.34 - 36, 14 April – 14 June, 1947. See also TNA: PRO KV4/468: the Liddell Diaries, 4 Dec 1946; PRO KV4/469: the Liddell Diaries, 2 Oct and 3 Nov 1947.
487 TNA: PRO KV4/438: report on visit to Middle East by Mr J.C. Robertson, p.35, 14 April – 14 June, 1947.
488 TNA: PRO KV4/438: report on visit to Middle East by Mr J.C. Robertson, p.34 - 36, 14 April – 14 June, 1947.
In addition, Morton’s DSO cover was publicly blown by Douglas Laird Busk, the Counsellor at the British Embassy in Baghdad, who was ‘cynical about intelligence’. The main reason for this uneasy relationship with the British Embassy in Baghdad was perhaps that Morton was seen as an intelligence officer comparable with the wartime CICI operative, who had been responsible for not only internal security, but also tribal and political intelligence. During the war, the local CICI operatives, named Area Liaison Officers (ALOs), had operated to collect ‘raw material’ from their several stations in Iraq, but had caused troubles for the diplomats in their political dealings with the Iraqis who ‘increasingly’ resented ALOs’ presence. The issue was resolved after an investigation by Sir Edward Bridges, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and head of the civil service (1945-56), who understood Morton’s liaison work and ‘the intelligence value’ Morton received from his Iraqi counterparts. Owing to the importance of ‘the special strategic position’ of the region, it was agreed at an inter-departmental meeting chaired by Sir Edward Bridges that ‘the work of SIME was essential and should continue’.

The Relationship between SIME and MI6

As SIME operated in foreign countries, it is important to note the extent to which SIME and MI6 worked together in the region. It is commonly understood that MI5 and MI6 had since 1931 (if only in principle) operated under the so-called ‘three mile limit’ rule. As the authorised history of MI5 shows, however, in the complex post-war British decolonisation period, the jurisdictions of the Services were re-defined by the Attlee Directive of 1948, which gave MI5 authority for imperial security throughout the British Empire. Nevertheless, the Middle East was an exception to this and SIME was not strictly defined by either role or directive. It operated on an ad hoc basis, governed by the broadly-
defined SIME Charter, which stated that ‘SIME will maintain close relations with MI6’. 496

The official history of MI6 records that there was tension with MI5 over the issues of the post-war role of SIME and their jurisdiction over the Middle East in the late 1940s. 497

According to the Liddell Diaries, nevertheless, in order to avoid duplication of their work, an agreement over the division of labour was reached between MI5 and MI6 in 1950 through Dick White of MI5 and Jack Easton of MI6, and was referred to as the ‘White/Easton Agreement’. 498 From 1950 onwards, MI6 took charge of the field of counter-espionage in the region, with an MI6 officer heading the counter-espionage division of SIME, often referred to as the Joint Intelligence Division (JID), which was composed of both MI5 and MI6 officers on secondment. 499 Thus, while intelligence on any espionage activities of foreign states was dealt with by MI6, intelligence on any subversive activities in the region was chiefly handled by MI5. SIME was responsible for the final collation of security intelligence (any intelligence on espionage, sabotage, and subversion) as the regional headquarters of MI5.

Unlike at their headquarters in London, the working relationship between the Services on the ground seems to have been less problematic. 500 While SIME was the regional hub of security intelligence, MI6 was an intelligence collector on the ground. Moreover, because the headquarters of SIME was housed within (sequentially) the Army headquarters in Cairo (1939-1946); Fayid, in the Canal Zone of Egypt (1946-1953); and Cyprus (1954-1958), it cooperated closely with the British military in the region. SIME officers, including the representatives of MI5 working in the guise of DSOs, mostly used the cover of military ranks. 501 MI6 was, on the other hand, operating with civilian cover mostly associated with the Foreign Office, though occasionally with the Ministry of Defence. The regional headquarters

496 Third paragraph, SIME Charter. See Appendix I.
497 Jeffery, MI6, pp.634-639.
499 TNA: PRO CAB301/30: memorandum by Sir William Strang to ‘C’, 17 Apr 1950; memorandum by Sir Edward Bridges to Sir Percy Sillitoe, 17 Apr 1950. Note that a similar arrangement was also made after the Second World War in the Far East. C.f., TNA: PRO KV4/425: P.2/SIFE/HSIFE: minute, 23 June 1953. Note that the post of the Joint Intelligence Division of SIFE was headed by MI6 officers such as Maurice Oldfield and Fergie Dempster. See further TNA: PRO FO1093/393, file entitled ‘relations between the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS): memorandum of agreement’, Mar – Dec 1949.
500 Sir Bernard Burrows, Head of the Eastern Department, the Foreign Office, for instance, who had once believed that both organisations in the Middle East were in a ‘struggle for power’, was surprised to find out that their working relationship on the ground was, nevertheless, ‘very much more friendly’. TNA: PRO FO371/75319: minute by Bernard Burrows to William Hayter, 21 Oct 1949; minute by [name unreadable], 31 Oct 1949.
501 An exception was Norman Himsworth of MI5, who was posted as the Security Liaison Officer (SLO) in Iraq (1953-56). See TNA: PRO FO371/115796: VQ1643/3: letter by R.W.J. Hooper, Baghdad, to R.M. Hadow, of FO, 2 Dec 1955.
of MI6 in the post-war period was in Beirut, operating under the cover name of the Combined Research and Planning Office (CRPO) with which SIME worked well.\textsuperscript{502}

The good relationship between SIME and CRPO on the ground was not without reason: their organisational differences and activities, and the way in which they collected intelligence were mutually beneficial, not competitive. This was due to the division of overt and covert means of intelligence collection in the region. MI5’s networks consisted entirely of ‘overt’ security liaison officers, whose presence was declared to the host governments and was thus accepted by their local counterparts, mostly the local police or secret police. MI6, on the other hand, was a covert intelligence network, operating without the knowledge of the host governments.\textsuperscript{503} This special arrangement gave MI5 access to particular, and otherwise unobtainable, intelligence. Indeed, as the formation of Communist parties was illegal in most Middle Eastern states, any activities associated with them were handled by the local police. Thus MI5’s special overt liaison, especially its ‘close and useful relations’ with ‘the local police’, was praised by the local MI6 representative as a ‘considerable help’ with regard to its own intelligence requirements.\textsuperscript{504} It is noteworthy that, as Guy Liddell noted in his diaries, the demarcation between MI5 and MI6 in the post-war period was in fact not geographical but functional.\textsuperscript{505}

MI6’s covert networks in the region also provided SIME with intelligence otherwise unobtainable from its local counterparts through DSOs. This was the reason for the close regional relationship between SIME and MI6. Though it was indeed necessary for intelligence collection, it nonetheless remained a sensitive issue. There was tacit understanding amongst the intelligence and security services that while an intelligence/security liaison was maintained, they would not be spying on each other.\textsuperscript{506} Once the existence of covert activities by MI6 became known to local authorities, a common pretext was rightly or wrongly given that they were operating in host countries under the ‘third country rule’, whereby MI6 stations are ‘supposed to target neighbouring states, rather than the host nation’.\textsuperscript{507} In his memoir, Kim Philby also testified in relation to his role as Head of Station in Turkey that ‘They [the Turkish intelligence/security organisations] knew


\textsuperscript{503} TNA: PRO KV4/438: report on visit to Middle East by Mr J.C. Robertson, 14 Apr – 14 Jun, 1947.

\textsuperscript{504} Ibid. See also TNA: PRO KV4/470: the Liddell Diaries, 2 Mar 1948.

\textsuperscript{505} TNA: PRO KV4/473: The Liddell Diaries, 1 Aug 1951.

\textsuperscript{506} This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.

\textsuperscript{507} Davies, ‘The SIS Singapore Station and the SIS Far Eastern Controller’, p.117.
of us, and tolerated our activity, on the understanding that it was directed solely against the Soviet Union and the Balkans, not against Turkey’. 508

As available documents testify, the reality was, nevertheless, that owing to the constraints on MI5’s overt contact with local authorities, MI6 was also operating in line with the requirements of SIME to collect security intelligence, in other words, intelligence on subversive activities, in the region. 509 In the late 1940s, for instance, when Kim Philby was in Istanbul, he was asked by William Magan, Head of SIME, to provide another officer from MI6 to fill the vacuum in Eastern Turkey. 510 Moreover, while the DSO in Baghdad, a representative of MI5, was closely cooperating with the Iraqi CID as an overt contact, Magan also requested an MI6 representative to be posted in Northern Iraq, where the Kurdish tribes were a cause for concern for SIME. 511 This reflects the fact that MI5 and MI6 officers were often working in the same country. 512 The main sources of intelligence for SIME in the post-war period thus remained both MI6 and the local authorities. 513

Limitations in Intelligence Collection and Counter-Subversion

Unlike MI6, MI5 indeed collated intelligence from all available sources and was also an intelligence assessment body. The authorised history of MI5 shows that, despite its organisational predisposition being anti-Soviet and anti-Communist, MI5 was more cautious in its assessment of the danger of Communist movements in Britain than its own intelligence customers. 514 MI5 was also careful when analysing intelligence sources. One such instance was when MI5 received a report from its own representative saying that the Indian intelligence service, the so-called ‘Bureau’ or ‘IB’, had seized a document in Abadan, Iran, recovered in the round-up of the Communist cells in 1952, which indicated ‘plans for the future of the Communist movement in Asia and the Middle East’, and claimed that ‘the Communist movement all over the world was centrally directed by the Cominform in

509 C.f. TNA: PRO KV4/234: 50z: circulating letter by SIME to DSOs in the area, 27 Dec 1944.
510 TNA: PRO KV4/236: 171: minute by J.C. Robertson, B3a, to DB, White, 23 Apr 1948.
512 The authorised history of MI5 records that as of 1968, ten countries played host to both representatives of MI5 and MI6. Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p.481.
513 TNA: PRO KV4/471: the Liddell Diaries, 12 Oct 1949. Sir Alistair Horne also noted that SIME was also receiving SIGINT. See Horne, But What Do You Actually Do?, pp.56-57.
514 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, passim. Also see Walton, Empire of Secrets, passim.
Russia. The origins of the sources were carefully examined, and MI5 disregarded the news as being unreliable and possibly coming from MAUVE (a codename for any reports from Russian émigrés which were unreliable and unverified). As the regional headquarters of MI5, SIME also adopted a similar approach to MI5 and remained the security authority in the region. When anti-British riots broke out in Egypt in early 1952, despite the insistence of some officials at the British Embassy in Cairo that they must have been plotted either by the Soviet Union or Communists, SIME refuted the assessment made by the British Embassy staff on the grounds that ‘no acceptable evidence has been produced in support of them’. SIME’s source was ‘a senior official in the Special Section of the [Egyptian] Ministry of the Interior’, and the information provided by him was checked against all available intelligence.

While the quality of intelligence reports on regional security was maintained, SIME faced limitations in intelligence collection in the post-war period. Despite the close cooperation on counter-espionage between SIME and MI6, the quality of intelligence obtained by MI6 seems to have been less than satisfactory during the late 1940s and early 1950s. According to the Liddell Diaries, intelligence from MI6 in the region was ‘practically valueless’, and MI6 was ‘clearly employing a number of agents who were MAUVE’. Anthony Cavendish has also claimed in his auto-biography that the sources of MI6 on the Soviet Union were mostly MAUVE and that MI6 obtained no valuable intelligence from them in the early 1950s. They indeed suffered from a fatal defect: Kim Philby, a Soviet mole, was placed at the heart of MI6 as Head of R5 (counter-espionage), the Head of Station in Istanbul, and later in the United States to liaise with the Americans. An example of his disruption of MI6’s work was the Volkov affair of 1946, in which Kim Philby was personally involved in disrupting a defection by Konstantin Volkov, an NKGB officer stationed in

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515 Similar documents were also recovered by the Tunisian authorities. Cf. TNA: PRO KV3/285: letter by W.F. Bell, SLO New Delhi to H/SIME, 19 Jul 1952.
517 TNA: PRO FO141/1455: 1016/3/52G: a letter by H.S. Stephenson, Chairman of JIC/ME to Creswell of FO, 15 Apr 1952. The whole file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 0903-12), 9 Oct 2012.
518 Ibid.
520 Cavendish, Inside Intelligence, pp.50-51.
521 Philby, My Silent War, ch.9.
Turkey, who was sent back to Moscow due to Philby’s intervention. Donald Maclean, a Soviet mole within the Foreign Office, was also present at the British Embassy in Cairo as Head of Chancery (1948-50), to which DSO Cairo was also attached. According to Major A.W. Sansom, the Security Officer at the Embassy, Maclean certainly enjoyed his privileged position as he ‘openly went home with a brief-case stuffed with secret material whenever he pleased’.

SI\ME had a problem with intelligence collection not only through MI6, but also with local authorities through the liaison of the DSOs. As the intelligence liaison was not institutionalised under diplomatic regulations or treaty, intelligence collection was very delicate and problems compounded by limitations in the intelligence exchange between the representatives of MI5 and the local security services. MI5’s intimate relationship in the late 1940s and early 1950s with its Egyptian counterparts illustrates this point. With thirty-years of personal experience of Egypt and extensive inside knowledge of the Egyptian police, Colonel Geoffrey Jenkins, the DSO Cairo (1943–48), enjoyed ‘excellent relations’ with the Egyptian police and was able to obtain ‘much useful intelligence’ from the Egyptians through his liaison. The intelligence obtained by Colonel Jenkins included, for instance, documentary evidence of secret negotiations between the Wafd Party, a nationalist political party in Egypt, and the Russians suggesting ‘future collaboration’.

While admitting that the Egyptian police as such are unlikely to pass information to Jenkins that may harm Egyptian interests... their liaison with Jenkins on Communist, Russian and Jewish matters has nevertheless been, and should increasingly be, of considerable value to us. Egyptians of the present ruling classes, and their counter-parts in the rest of the Arab countries, hate the Zionists and fear the Russians and the increasing influence and strength of the

523 A JIC minute records that when the Middle East Land Force (MELF) Headquarters, which included SI\ME Head Office and DSO Cairo, was scheduled to move to the Suez Canal Zone in 1947, the representative of MI5, Colonel J.G. Jenkins then, was requested by the Egyptian Minister of the Interior and the Director General of Public Security to remain in the country as ‘an overt organisation’ under cover of the British Embassy, for ‘mutual benefits’. The Director-General of Public Security, the Egyptian counterpart of MI5, also requested ‘a weekly exchange of information on security matters’ with this representative. See TNA: PRO CAB159/1: confidential annex: ‘future organisation of security intelligence in the Middle East’, 14 May 1947. The successor to Colonel Jenkins as DSO Cairo was Walter Bryan Emery. See TNA: PRO KV4/473: the Liddell Diaries: 24 Jul 1951.
Communists within their frontiers. We can therefore always be certain of their willingness, while they remain in power, to exchange intelligence with us on all these topics.\textsuperscript{527} Intelligence liaison was thus concerned with specific issues of common interest. Intelligence sharing also occurred on the basis of mutual benefit to both parties. For instance, Sir Alistair Horne, a former SIME officer recalls that whilst the Egyptian Police provided intelligence to SIME on ‘Communist activities’, SIME supplied the Egyptians with information on ‘hashish-traffickers’.\textsuperscript{528}

In addition to the Cairo Police, Colonel Jenkins maintained a ‘close and friendly’ relationship with the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior, and with the Director-General of Public Security throughout the war. Once new appointments were made after the war, Colonel Jenkins had to convince the Egyptians of the raison d’être of the intelligence liaison and rebuild mutual trust with the Egyptians. For instance, a new but sceptical Director-General of Public Security questioned the extent of Jenkins’s intelligence activities in Cairo, concerned that he was ‘seeking intelligence about Egyptian politics’, particularly about the activities of anti-British figures. Jenkins’s first task was then to win ‘the goodwill’ of the new Director-General of Public Security.\textsuperscript{529} In this context, the extent to which SIME was able to obtain intelligence through its own sources (MI6 and DSOs), and to warn its intelligence customers in the region was indeed limited. A notable example of the limits of its intelligence collection was the Egyptian coup of 1952. Despite the DSO Cairo being in close contact with his Egyptian counterparts during the turmoil of early 1952, SIME had no intelligence forewarning of the Free Officers’ coup in 1952.\textsuperscript{530} As the Egyptian authority was also caught by surprise by the coup d’état, the DSO Cairo’s sources also seemed to have been unaware of the plots in the Egyptian Army. A similar case can also been seen from the Iraqi Revolution. Despite SIME being acutely aware of the existence of disaffection in the Iraqi Army as early as the early 1950s, information on which had been

\textsuperscript{527} Ibid. Emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{528} Horne, \textit{But What Do You Actually Do?}, p.56.
\textsuperscript{529} TNA: PRO KV4/438: report on visit to Middle East by Mr J.C. Robertson, 14 Apr – 14 Jun, 1947.
\textsuperscript{530} TNA: PRO FO141/1455: 1016/3/52G: a letter by H.S. Stephenson, Chairman of JIC/ME to Creswell of FO, 15 Apr 1952. The whole file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 0903-12), 9 Oct 2012.

In a similar vein, there were also severe limitations on SIME’s counter-subversive activities in the post-war Middle East. During the war, SIME had executive and law enforcement powers through which security measures were undertaken in each country in the region. However, Britain no longer enjoyed executive powers over the local authorities in the post-war era. One of the problems in the early post-war period was that SIME was strongly associated with the military planning of the Chiefs of Staff. As an integral part of the military machine, SIME preserved its own wartime detention camps under the direction of the Chiefs of Staff until the late 1940s, which, admitted William Magan, Head of SIME, was a continuation of its ‘own mistaken wartime policy’.\footnote{Magan Report, 24.}

Moreover, another problem was the extent to which SIME was able to obtain cooperation from local authorities which had changed since the war. Rising regional anti-British sentiment in the post-war years made SIME’s task even more difficult. Sir John Shaw, Director of the Overseas Section of MI5, for instance, informed the JIC that the Egyptian Police, SIME’s closest ally in the late 1940s and early 1950s gradually became ‘hostile’ and SIME received ‘no help’ from 1952 onwards.\footnote{TNA: PRO CAB159/11: JIC (52) 2nd meeting, minute, ‘Coordination of Intelligence in the Middle East’, 3 Jan 1952.} Unlike at home, where the role of MI5 was to defend its own government against subversion, SIME was not necessarily conducting counter-subversion for the benefit of local governments. William Magan once explained to his successor, Colonel (later Brigadier) Robin ‘Tin-eye’ Stephens (1951-1953),\footnote{He was better known as the Commandant of Camp 020, the wartime ‘spy prison’, and its counterpart in post-war Germany, Bad Nenndorf. On Robin Stephen in Camp 020 and Bad Nenndorf, see Oliver Hoare (ed), \textit{Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies} (Richmond: PRO, 2000), pp.1-30. He was the Security Liaison Officer (SLO) in the Gold Coast after Germany. See Andrew, \textit{Defence of the Realm}, p.451. He was seconded from the Army.} that:

\begin{quote}
Security Intelligence presents a difficulty because it cannot be exactly defined for SIME purposes. You have only to consider the impossibility of drawing a line by definition between an Arab political party and an Arab subversive organisation to see the problem. A broad definition of Security Intelligence, however, gives rise to that part of the intelligence division of the organisation which concerns itself with subversive individuals and bodies – “subversive” also, of course, cannot be exactly defined.\footnote{Magan Report, 7.}
\end{quote}
The complexity of the demarcation line between subversive and anti-British elements was a cause of confusion even among MI5 officers. With intense disturbances and street riots occurring, all of which were ultimately associated with anti-British and nationalist sentiments throughout the region, Colonel Stephens requested MI5 Head Office to send more MI5 officers to the region as ‘links’ to local authorities in places where MI5 was not represented. His request was, however, turned down by MI5 Head Office as it was considered unnecessary.

It is noteworthy that Colonel Stephens’ request generated a discussion in MI5 Head Office regarding MI5’s commitments to safeguarding British interests overseas. In this regard, MI5’s role overseas in the wider context of counter-insurgency in the British Colonies merits brief attention here. The person considered to be at the centre of this discussion was William Magan, former Head of SIME, who had just been employed as a full-time officer at MI5 Head Office after coming back from the region. It is worthwhile mentioning William Magan here in particular as not only did he have extensive experience in the region but he was also soon promoted by Sir Dick White in 1953 to Director of E Branch (the overseas department in charge of external affairs, liaising with all Colonial, Commonwealth, and friendly foreign countries) and remained in executive positions for fifteen years until his retirement.

According to Magan, maintaining law and order, including the suppression of disturbances, riots, and terrorist activities even when directed by a political organisation, was outside MI5’s remit and should be dealt with by the relevant local authorities. The police were responsible for maintaining law and order but the armed forces should also maintain their own link with the local authorities as they might be deployed ‘in aid of the civil power’. In the case of ‘purely local indigenous subversive political persons, movements, parties and organizations’ in British territory, this was again the concern of local authorities and military

539 Magan, Middle Eastern Approaches, p.166. Before then, Magan was seconded from the Army to MI5 as the DSO in Palestine (1946); acting Head of SIME (1947); Head of SIME (1947-51). During the Second World War, he was in Persia for intelligence/security purposes: creating a stay-behind network; and controlling double-agents in Persia against the Axis Powers. See, ibid., ch.5.
540 Bower, Perfect English Spy, p.144. In addition to his longest tenure as Director of E Branch, Magan remained a Director, for example, of C Branch (Protective Security) and F Branch (Counter-Subversion at home). Magan, Middle Eastern Approaches, p.166. Nigel West, for instance, notes that ‘No history of the postwar Security Service would be complete without a reference to Brigadier William M.T. Magan, one of the most remarkable intelligence officers of his generation’. Nigel West, Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence: Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, No.1 (Oxford: Scarecrow, 2005), p.321.
forces. The position of MI5 in this context was that it should only be informed if they were categorised as ‘conspiratorially political subversive’, and/or if they had the ‘possibility of outside influence, such as contact with a hostile foreign power’. Referring to the roles and responsibilities of SIME, Magan further commented that:

[O]ur resources, whether at home or overseas, are inadequate for a one hundred per cent fulfilment of our tasks. This is an inherent feature of all defence forces. We must, therefore, follow the age old military principle of concentrating on the main objective. I have thus always held the view that the wise thing is to stop the holes of the big rats properly even if this meant ignoring the little rats, and risking the odd nip from them.

‘The big rats’ referred to by Magan were the Russians and Communist movements; he considered anti-British movements and disturbances as ‘little rats’. This meant that SIME, as the regional headquarters of MI5, was supposed to be concerned with ‘conspiratorially political subversive’ activities, mostly those associated with external threats such as International Communism and the Soviet Union.

The Primacy of Cold War Concerns over Anti-British Nationalist Movements.

Magan’s approach to MI5’s responsibilities in the British territories overseas indicates that MI5’s post-war concern was primarily associated with the Soviet Union and the Cold War, but MI5 had to deal with the new challenge of Zionist extremists and terrorism in the immediate post-war period. It was a learning environment for MI5 regarding its own commitments overseas at the time. During the period of the transition from war to peacetime SIME was mostly ill-equipped to cope with the flow of ‘illegal’ Jewish immigration and countering Jewish terrorist activities in Palestine. Moreover, it is important to note that the prime responsibility for internal security in the Palestine Mandate lay not with MI5 or SIME but the Palestine CID, which had the intelligence and executive powers necessary to deal with the situation. Despite a shortage of personnel at SIME Head Office to deal with Soviet

541 TNA: PRO KV4/238: 294a: minute by W.MT. Magan, B1g, to Alex Kellar, OS, 8 Aug 1951.
542 Ibid.
544 TNA: PRO KV4/438: report by JC Robertson to DG, ‘IV: DSO Palestine’, 14 Apr to 14 Jun 1947, pp.18, 21, which states that ‘...the Palestine CID, a secret police with intelligence and executive powers alongside which
incursions. SIME’s chief concern was the infiltration of Soviet agents into the region amidst the flow of illegal Jewish immigrants. SIME was in fact right to be worried about the Soviet penetration of Palestine. Records from the Soviet archives smuggled out of Russia by a former KGB archivist, Vasili Mitrokhin, show that there was indeed a series of attempts to exploit the situation by the KGB, whose task was to ‘ensure that large numbers of its agents were included in the ranks of the Soviet Jews allowed to leave for Israel’.

Since MI5 had taken over SIME from the Army as in loco parentis, one of the ways in which MI5 sought to improve SIME’s security measures was to institute the MI5 standard practice of record-keeping at SIME’s Registry. Records declassified in 2009 show a gradual but clear shift in SIME record-keeping by the early 1950s, and also demonstrate the extent to which SIME and its outstations (DSOs) collected and collated intelligence according to specific principles. The SIME Central Registry stored all information on identifiable officers and proven or suspected agents of foreign intelligence and security services, regardless of nationality; and the DSOs were instructed to record all information on identifiable Communists, Communist sympathisers, and also nationalists at their own Registries. In 1953, SIME only had four outstations: Cairo, the Canal Zone, Cyprus, and Baghdad. The largest outstation was still DSO Cairo, which also had the largest Registry, containing an estimated 50,000 card-indexes, covering 40,000 individuals. DSO Baghdad was the second largest outstation, and its Registry contained 33,000 cards concerning about 20,000 individuals. As it inherited records from the wartime organisation, CICI, Roger Lees the DSO’s own intelligence contribution much be highly specialised if it is not to be redundant... In deciding the role to be played in Palestine by the DSO it is essential to realise that the CID is a high-grade intelligence organisation, disposing of many of the resources available to the Security Service, and having executive and armed powers which the Security Service and the DSO have not’.

Sir Alistair Horne notes the Soviet section of SIME was ‘a long way behind’ the Jewish, which was ‘by far the biggest’ section, and the Arab section, which came second. See Horne, *But What Do You Actually Do?*, p.54. I am grateful to Sir Alistair Horne for pointing this out.

Brigadier Douglas Roberts, Head of SIME, stated to Field Marshal Sir Bernard (“Monty”) Montgomery, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in late 1946, that although the evidence was tentative, resembling the piecing together of ‘a jig-saw puzzle’, ‘the one heartening factor’ was that the Russians were ‘developing an intelligence offensive in the Middle East’, and that ‘such an offensive provides, of course, the most favourable and secure opportunities for our penetration of Soviet Intelligence’. TNA: PRO KV4/234: SIME/008/232/T: report, ‘Investigation of Left-Wing Activity’, 8 Apr 1946; SIME/700/XI/1: statement by H/SIME to CIGS, ‘Russian Intelligence and Subversion’, 25 Nov 1946.

A senior officer at MI5 Registry noted that the record-keeping at SIME Registry through ‘the card-index system’ was an ‘instrument of primary importance to the whole organisation’. TNA: PRO KV4/436: extract of telegram, ‘office instruction no.97’, by Mr Power, 27 Mar 1946. See also Horne, *But What Do You Actually Do?*, pp.57-8.

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of MI5, DSO in Baghdad, noted that a large number of people were carded on ‘tenuous
grounds or for reasons which are now no longer of interest to us [MI5]’, but he stored ‘all
persons of security interest’, about 12,000 of whom were ‘communists or communist
suspects’. On a much smaller scale, there was the DSO in the Canal Zone, whose main
responsibility was to protect the presence of the British Army there. The records held
‘approximately 2,050 cards’, mostly referring to ‘nationalists and “thugs”’. The DSO in
Cyprus stored approximately 10,000 cards of which 5,500 were Communists or Communist
sympathisers; and ‘about 1,500 cards connected with nationalists’ and 3,000 more on
suspects.

At the SIME and DSO Registries records were kept on those involved in ‘subversive’
activities against the British and local authorities. It is notable that while keeping records on
‘subversive’ elements for their own security purposes, the prime concern of SIME, and thus
MI5, was their direct connection to the Soviet Union and the spread of Communist
movements in the region. A declassified MI5 file on the Iraqi counterpart of the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Jamiyat al Adab al Islamiya, also known as the Moslem Ethical Society
(MES), shows that SIME recognised the full subversive potential of the MES as a strong anti-
British force and as a ‘nationalist movement’, but whose fate was largely dependent on
whether the local authorities were able to resist them. While the MES was militant and
subversive in character and notably anti-British, the DSO Baghdad, Jack Morton of MI5,
nevertheless, judged that the MES was of ‘little security interest’ to SIME as it was a
religious and theological group. SIME’s prime concern was whether any leading members of
the MES were in contact with Soviets who might exploit them; or whether the MES could
emerge as ‘an effective barrier against Communism’.

Prime Importance: War Planning

It is clear from its authorised history that MI5 – the people and the service – was
predominantly anti-Soviet and anti-Communist. However, setting a higher priority on
keeping records on Communist elements rather than anti-British nationalists and groups

552 TNA: PRO KV4/436: letter by JEF, DSO Canal, to SIME, 1 May 1953.
553 TNA: PRO KV4/436: letter by A.N. Druce, DSO Cyprus, to SIME, 25 Apr 1953.
555 Ibid.
556 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, passim.
shows SIME had a clear and logical foundation beyond anti-Communism. All post-war activities associated with MI5, and indeed SIME, were subordinate to British government policy. The central components of this policy were the Defence Transition Committee (DTC) and the 1948 Government War Book.\textsuperscript{557} As briefly noted in Chapter One, the 1948 War Book was a government policy, setting procedures for all departments, including the intelligence and security services, to deal with an emergency situation in the event of war with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{558} As Britain’s only security service, the role of MI5 in the event of war was to inform security authorities of ‘lists of persons’ who should be detained under draconian defence regulations.\textsuperscript{559} As an essential requirement, MI5 also prepared its own in-house war book, which was constantly reviewed and circulated within MI5 and its own outstations.\textsuperscript{560}

Without exception, the 1948 Government War Book was the key driving policy for MI5’s activities in the Middle East. SIME was particularly important in this as the integrity of the Middle East was essential for British war-making, and the Chiefs of Staff envisaged the possibility of a Soviet invasion of the region.\textsuperscript{561} For this reason, SIME Headquarters and its outstations were all attached to British military bases and, under instruction, SIME and DSOs prepared security measures and their own ‘Arrest Lists’ in each country for ‘the event of war, or other emergency’ taken from their own Registries.\textsuperscript{562} The lists consisted of a short list of subversive individuals and organisations who were the most likely to engage in subversive activities to disrupt allied war efforts against the Soviet Union. They were particularly designed to grant the DSOs ‘information sufficient to neutralise them, for which purpose it will normally be adequate to be able to identify their principal directing personalities’.\textsuperscript{563} Amongst all other activities, the preparation of arrest lists of those who would be detained in


\textsuperscript{558} The backbone of it remained the same but was constantly reviewed and revised by relevant departments throughout the Cold War.


\textsuperscript{561} Note that PRO CAB158 and PRO CAB159 series contain the JIC estimates which regularly assessed Soviet military threat to the Middle East area.


\textsuperscript{563} TNA: PRO KV4/436: draft Heads of Agreement reached at a meeting held between representatives of the Security Service and SIS to consider modifications in the integration of the two Services in the Middle East, Dec 1953.
the event of war or an emergency was an ‘important SIME commitment’ in post-war imperial strategy in the Middle East.\(^{564}\)

However, implementing these security measures was difficult primarily because the territorial coverage of the BDCC/ME Command consisted of mostly foreign countries, with the exception of Cyprus and later the Aden Colony. Since these security measures inevitably required the cooperation of local authorities, a good security liaison with local authorities was essential. A glimpse of these liaisons with local authorities on such security measures can be seen in the case of Iraq, in which DSO Baghdad became the main outstation of SIME in the 1950s after the wane of the intimate relationship with the Egyptians in the early 1950s.\(^{565}\) The relationship between the representative of MI5 and the Iraqi CID, led by Colonel Bahjat Beg Attiyah, originated from the establishment of the DSO Baghdad in 1947.\(^{566}\) Their close relationship necessitated intelligence-sharing on certain topics. For instance, following the roundup of some 160 Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) members, including those of the Executive Committee, in 1949, the Iraqi CID duly passed intelligence on the linkage between the ICP and the Russians to Philip Bicknell Ray of MI5, the DSO in Baghdad (1949-51). Detailed reports (over 300 pages) on the ICP members, the party composition, and their activities, made by Philip Ray for MI5 Head Office and the Foreign Office show that the Iraqi CID interrogated the leading ICP members and obtained confessions from them to the effect that the ICP leaders had direct connections with the Russian Legation in Iraq. ICP members had received financial support and propaganda materials, named the ‘Al Qa’ida Press’, from the Legation; the latter were also shared with the members of the Tudeh Party.\(^{567}\)

It was also discovered that the Russians had made contact with the ICP through a small group of Armenians and that the ICP had also intended on agitating among minority circles such as the Kurds.\(^{568}\)

The relationship between the representative of MI5 and the Iraqi CID grew even closer in the 1950s as a result of the joint war planning. Guy Liddell noted in his diaries that

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\(^{565}\) Even when a good security liaison was maintained, the planning for security measures in the event of war was concealed from local authorities even in the case of Egypt in 1950. See TNA: PRO FO141/1402: MIL/1243/ME: Security Directive, Joint Standing Instruction No.2 (Plan Celery), issued by the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, 29 Sep 1950.

\(^{566}\) On Iraq and the Communist Movement, see Batatu, *Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq.*


\(^{568}\) Ibid. Also see PRO KV4/470: the Liddell Diaries, 29 Dec 1948.
the relationship between the DSO Baghdad, Philip Ray, and his counterpart, the Director of the Iraqi CID, Bahjat Attiyah, was ‘extremely close’, and that Bahjat Attiyah had a ‘tremendous respect for all the advice and help which Ray had given him’. Philip Ray was instructed by the BDCC/ME through the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) Iraq Command to discuss arrangements with the Iraqi authorities for ‘the preparation of lists of security suspects to be arrested on the outbreak of war’. Philip Ray’s approach was dependent on ‘the general deterioration in the international situation’ rather than war planning against the Soviet Union as envisaged by the Chiefs of Staff. As instructed, Philip Ray also cooperated with Bahjat Attiyah on a war plan covering travel control, censorship, interrogation and the protection of vulnerabilities, leading to the combination of the arrest lists of both parties. The number of suspects who were destined to be arrested for interrogation in ‘special’ camps at the outset of war was estimated at 2,000 in the first stage, and would consist mostly of those who were associated with the ICP and Soviet Union. Any underground Communist members and suspects, or other persons likely to engage in subversive activities, were destined to be detained and interrogated automatically by the Iraqi CID under the existing legal framework.

The security measures in place in the event of a war in Iraq expanded towards the mid-1950s and extended beyond mere intelligence liaison. As these security measures required the highest level of cooperation, in March 1952 Sir John Troutbeck approached the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-Said, regarding the security plans for war. Agreeing to the suggestion in principle, Nuri al-Said preferred using the police as opposed to the armed forces to ‘concoct the planning on the Iraqi side’, mainly due to volatile Iraqi sentiments towards the West, particularly Britain. Nuri al-Said worried that the disclosure of war planning would cause ‘a serious political storm’ in which his government would be accused of ‘dragging the country into war on the side of the Western Powers’. He decided to delegate the task to Alwan Hussain, known as Alwan Pasha, Director-General of Police, who would later hand the task

over to Bahjat Beg Attiyah, the Director of the CID. On the British side, Sir John Troutbeck nominated Roger Lees of MI5, DSO Baghdad (1951-53), the successor to Philip Ray, to be the British counterpart for security planning in the event of war in Iraq.574

After an initial discussion between Roger Lees and Bahjat Beg Attiyah on the security planning to effect the Iraqi Prime Minister’s orders, Lees reported that:

After several meetings [with Bahjat Attiya] and after examining old files covering the last war to see whether any aspects of the planning were covered then, which could be adapted for our present needs, it became apparent to me that a completely fresh approach in our present planning would be necessary. I therefore met both Alwan Pasha and Bahjat Beg and it was agreed that I should draw up a detailed scheme for their consideration.575

While keeping an updated combined-arrest list, the security plan, contemplated by DSO Baghdad and the Iraqi CID, was for ‘the laying of the foundations of sound security under peace-time conditions, on which efficient war-time measures could be immediately introduced on the outbreak of hostilities’. For this purpose, the Director of the Iraqi CID, Bahjat Attiyah, was given training by the British in ‘protective security matters’ during his visit to London in June 1952.576 Guy Liddell also noted his meeting with Bahjat Attiya in his diaries when Bahjat Attiya was in Britain.577 In addition, after the examination of Lees’s proposed scheme, Alwan Pasha gave orders to set up a ‘special planning section’ under cover of the Iraqi CID. This small and compartmentalised section was headed by Colonel Yusef Peters, Commandant of Police, assisted by two Assistant Commandants.578 Colonel Peters was also given ‘detailed instruction’ on the security measures in Baghdad, ‘paying particular attention to the oil industry’. During his visit in May 1953 to Basra, Kirkuk and Khanaqun, where the major oil refineries were situated, Colonel Peters was accompanied by ‘a British officer’, presumably DSO Baghdad, Roger Lees, and detailed advice was given on ‘protective security matters to the managers of oil companies and other important installations’. These security measures included the coverage of ‘the oil producing, refining

575 Ibid..
and storage centres, public utility installations, such as water and electricity, and certain Government departments.  

A report by a senior RAF commander clearly states that the security planning between Roger Lees and Bahjat Attiyah was carried out in ‘great secrecy’, continuing even after the resignation of Nuri al-Said in July 1952 without the knowledge of subsequent Prime Ministers, Ministers of the Interior or Ministers of Defence. As a result of this close liaison with the Iraqis, the security plan was submitted by Roger Lees to the Local Security Board and also approved by Sir John Troutbeck. Although what benefit the Iraqis would derive from this cooperation is uncertain, a document states that, in the event of war, the Iraqis agreed on the provision of a small group of British interrogators to the detention camp where all suspects on the combined-arrest lists would be detained, and, more importantly, the provision of British representatives to the central censorship headquarters, controlling postal and telecommunication censorship throughout Iraq. The report reached Sir Hugh Stephenson, Chairman of JIC in the Middle East, who was ‘extremely gratified’ to learn of such substantial progress despite the ‘difficulties inherent in the unstable political state in the country’, according to a letter sent to the Local Security Board. As already discussed in Chapter Two, it was in this context that Britain was reluctant to allow the Americans to appoint their own security advisers to the Iraqi Police and the CID. The security plan was constantly reviewed as to whether it was still ‘valid and workable’ until at least 1955.

In addition to SIME, MI6 was also operating in the region under the direction of the 1948 Government War Book. The limited literature on MI6 suggests that MI6 incorporated the wartime sabotage organisation, Special Operations Executive (SOE), in the post-war

580 Ibid.
581 TNA: PRO AIR23/8605: minute of a meeting, the Local Security Board, held in the Military Attaché’s office on 9th Jun 1953, by A.J. Douch, Wing Commander, Senior Intelligence Officer, 10 Jul 1953; letter by [name redacted], AHQ detachment, RAF, British Embassy Section, Baghdad, to Wing Commander A.J. Douch, Senior Intelligence Officer, Air Headquarters, Habbaniya, ‘report on security planning’, 16 Jun 1953.
reorganisation of the British intelligence community in the late 1940s, and, based on the lessons of the war, largely those of SOE, the Directorate of War Planning (D/WP), later renamed the Special Political Action Section (SPA), was formed in MI6 to establish stay-behind networks in foreign countries. Recent declassified files of the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department (PUSD) confirm that the preparations for war planning were also underway in MI6 from the late 1940s. JIC records in 1952 indicate that MI6 was tasked by the Chiefs of Staff to create a stay-behind network in independent foreign countries of the Middle East. Regardless of the intentions of the regional governments to cooperate in the event of war, the minutes of the JIC/ME meeting in September 1952 show that the British pressed ahead with war planning, which included establishing stay-behind networks in Egypt - one of which was established in the early 1950s, headed by James Swinburn. In 1956, after the Egyptian Government, which had been aware of the Swinburn network since 1953, became more hostile to Britain, the stay-behind network was rounded up, although John McGlashan, an MI6 officer, who had been involved in plotting to assassinate Nasser, was successfully smuggled out of Egypt.


587 TNA: PRO FO1093/386: PR769/73/G: memorandum ‘intelligence for a political warfare executive in the event of mobilisation’, 1 Apr 1949; PRO FO1093/370: confidential annex to COS (48) 155th meeting, ‘intelligence requirements for “Cold War” planning’, 3 Nov 1948. See also TNA: PRO FO1093/373: letter by ‘C’ to William Hayter, 2 Nov 1948, which mentioned some planning in Turkey. And TNA: PRO CAB301/16: memorandum ‘C’s preparations for war’, 16 Dec 1950, which contains a reference to the Middle East.


589 TNA: PRO FO141/1465: JIC (ME) (52) – 44, minute of the JIC (ME), ‘the co-operation to be expected from the Egyptians in the event of a major war’, 18 Sep 1952. The file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 0894-11), 27 Oct 2011. The minutes were circulated to relevant authorities, including Robin ‘Tin-eye’ Stephens, Head of SIME, and George K. Young, the Middle East Controller of MI6.

590 Nigel West suggests that ‘Swinburn was the head of SIS’s stay-behind network’. See, idem, Friends, 141.

SIME Wound UP: A Shift in Conducting the Cold War

The authorised history of MI5 briefly notes that SIME was closed down in 1958.\textsuperscript{592} However, this does not necessarily mean that the roles MI5 had played in the region were regarded as insignificant. On the contrary, the importance of MI5 in fighting the Cold War was most certainly recognised by the British Government by the mid-1950s. As Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, for instance, made available ‘technical advice on Communist subversion’ to the signatory powers of the Baghdad Pact, later renamed the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), and proposed multilateral intelligence/security cooperation.\textsuperscript{593} As will be shown in detail in Chapter Four, the British delegation was led by MI5. Regular biannual meetings were held for the exchange of information on Communist activities with its American, Turkish, Pakistani, and Iranian counterparts, and continued until the dissolution of CENTO in 1979. Moreover, SIME was only one of many other imperial or quasi-imperial intelligence organisations being wound up during the same period.\textsuperscript{594} The closure of SIME should therefore be understood in the wider context of British decolonisation and, more importantly, the Cold War, towards which competing approaches existed within Whitehall.

The process of winding down SIME had already begun when Sir Dick White assumed the position of Director-General of MI5 in late 1953. The number of personnel was substantially reduced and the three supervisory posts (Head of SIME, Deputy Head, and Head of the Counter-Intelligence Section) were merged into one post.\textsuperscript{595} SIME was then staffed with 13 officers, and 25 female staff.\textsuperscript{596} In addition, while senior MI5 officers complained that the Head of SIME was ‘bound to be handicapped in fulfilling his advisory responsibilities to the BDCC (ME)’, Sir Dick White also abolished the counter-espionage section, the JID, headed by an MI6 officer in late 1955.\textsuperscript{597} In his mind, SIME had unnecessary burdens, such as the collation of intelligence in the region, which could be

\textsuperscript{592} Andrew, \textit{Defence of the Realm}, p.464.
\textsuperscript{593} Cf. documents cited by Aldrich (ed.), \textit{Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain}, pp.223-5.
\textsuperscript{594} They included such as SIFE and one in Germany. Also internal developments within the Ministry of Defence, see Huw Dylan, \textit{The Joint Intelligence Bureau: Economic, Topographic, and Scientific Intelligence of Britain’s Cold War} (Aberystwyth: PhD thesis, 2010), ch.7.
\textsuperscript{595} TNA: PRO KV4/426: note of a meeting held in DG’s room on 5\textsuperscript{th} Jan 1954, 6 Jan 1954. A similar development was also taking place in the Far East, where SIFE was reorganised accordingly. TNA: PRO KV4/427: letter by DG to R. Thistlethwaite, H/SIFE, 31 Aug 1955.
transferred to London, White sought to reduce SIME to a ‘security advisory role’. In addition, despite maintaining a good relationship between SIME and MI6, Sir Dick White was also concerned about MI6’s activities in the field of counter-espionage for which MI5 was officially responsible. This was not only in the Middle East but also elsewhere where the JIDs of the regional headquarters of MI5, headed by MI6 officers, were ‘geared almost as much to the broader objects of MI6’.

It is noteworthy that the reference to ‘the broader objects’ of MI6 was to its ‘cold war’ activities, associated with clandestine activities including paramilitary operations, often referred to as ‘special political action’ or ‘disruptive action’. William Magan explained the reasons for closing the JID of MI5’s regional headquarters to his officers overseas that Dick White was ‘worried about the extent to which the JID may be involved in steering MI6 stations and concerned in “cold war” activities’.

The problem for MI5 was that the clandestine operations of MI6, its so-called ‘cold war’ activities, were often a cause of concern regarding their maintenance of a good liaison relationship with local authorities who were not informed of such clandestine activities. In March 1955, SIME only had a total of 12 staff (5 officers and 7 female staff), and was outnumbered by MI6, the strength of which was four times larger (total 56 staff at all ranks – 12 officers, plus 2 in SIME, 27 secretaries, and 15 operators) than SIME.

Not only were MI5 concerned about the activities of MI6 in their territory, but there was also an undergoing shift in thinking with regard to the conduct of the Cold War in the same period. More precisely, as suggested in Chapter One, there was a growing concern within Whitehall at the way in which the Chiefs of Staff were involved in the decision-making process. Since the end of the Second World War, the Chiefs of Staff had been one of the key decision makers regarding the conduct of the Cold War and in directing the activities of the intelligence and security services, including the clandestine operations of MI6. However, with the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons, it gradually became clear to British policymakers by the mid-1950s that a war with conventionally armed forces against the Soviet Union seemed unlikely and that the presence of a large military force in the region was

601 Ibid.
602 This will also be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.
603 TNA: PRO CAB 176/52: JIC/671/55: JIC report ‘Existing Intelligence Staffs at HQ ME Command’ by EEGL Searight, 8 Mar 1955. The differences between MI6’s ‘officers’ and ‘operators’ are unclear from the records.

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thus less important. In addition, the Britain’s defence policy became more focused on European defence and the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) at expense of committing military forces to the Middle East at the outbreak of war.\textsuperscript{604} This was the context in which General Sir Gerald Templer conducted his review of intelligence organisations overseas, including the Colonies.\textsuperscript{605}

As a result, any attempt at directing intelligence-related activities overseas, especially in foreign territories, by the Chiefs of Staff was often considered as interference in matters which were ‘essentially the business of the Foreign Secretary’.\textsuperscript{606} Moreover, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, was concerned with ‘the inflated size’ of intelligence staff at regional headquarters, particularly those who were associated with the military planning of the Chiefs of Staff, which he regarded as unnecessary.\textsuperscript{607} Furthermore, Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, also considered ‘large regional intelligence organisations [as] being outmoded’.\textsuperscript{608} At a JIC meeting in March 1955 concerning intelligence organisations in the Middle East, Sir Patrick Dean, Chairman of the JIC, noted ‘some duplication’ between London and the Middle East in ‘the collation of intelligence’ and suggested that ‘it would be better if this was done in London’.\textsuperscript{609} Sir Dick White also added that the work being done by SIME ‘could be done as easily from the UK’.\textsuperscript{610} This is the context in which SIME was closed down in 1958.

It is noteworthy that during the same period, the balance between civilian and military uses of intelligence had continually been an issue in the British Government and the JIC was moved to the Cabinet Office from 1957 onwards.\textsuperscript{611} Moreover, as noted earlier, there was a gradual shift of Britain’s defence policy in the mid-1950s from the retention of the region to European defence and a wider commitment, often termed ‘East of Suez’, and reducing conventional defences, which was at the heart of the 1957 White Paper.\textsuperscript{612} However, while

\textsuperscript{605} Cormac, ‘Organizing Intelligence’, p.805.
\textsuperscript{606} TNA: PRO PREM11/1582: minute by Sir Norman Brook to PM, 28 Nov 1955.
\textsuperscript{607} TNA: PRO KV4/426: note of discussion between DG and Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick on 13.1.55, 17 Jan 1955.
\textsuperscript{609} TNA: PRO CAB159/18: JIC (55) 22\textsuperscript{nd} meeting: JIC minute, 10 Mar 1955.
\textsuperscript{610} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{611} Cf. Cormac, ‘A Whitehall ‘Showdown?’; Herman, \textit{Intelligence Services in the Information Age}, ch.5.
British military forces were gradually retreating from the region, MI5 and MI6 nonetheless continued to serve Britain’s foreign and colonial policy in the region. In addition to the aforementioned activities of MI5 under the auspices of the Baghdad Pact, the authorised history of MI5 notes that representatives of MI5 remained in SIME’s former territory to liaise with local authorities after its closure in 1958.613

Of course, the closure of SIME in 1958 does not necessarily mean that MI6’s activities were also reduced accordingly. As Sir Dick White left MI5 to succeed Sir John Sinclair as “C” of MI6 in 1956, he found it difficult to rein in the ‘cold war’ activities of MI6, especially in the Middle East. These activities were led by so-called ‘barons’, senior MI6 officials who extensively engaged in special operations designed at changing world affairs by clandestine means.614 Jack Easton, Deputy ‘C’, warned the newly appointed ‘C’, Dick White, ‘I’ve had to stop a lot of operations in the Middle East. Too many are suspiciously unsafe’.615 Available evidence makes clear that these activities were still favoured by civilian policymakers at the time, as well as politicians such as Harold Macmillan.616 Owing to the inaccessibility of MI6’s archives, the question of how Sir Dick White saw the closure of SIME in 1958 from his new position at MI6, and how he reconciled the balance between security/counter-intelligence on the one side and ‘cold war’ activities on the other, remains open.

Conclusion

The role of intelligence and security services is subordinate to government policy. The records of MI5 show that SIME was above all an instrument of the Cold War and operated in the Middle East under the direction of the Chiefs of Staff. As noted in Chapter One, in the early period of the Cold War up until the mid-1950s, the presence of British military forces in the region was above all concerned with a potential war against the Soviet Union. This chapter has shown that while SIME was placed under the authority of MI5 in the post-war period, it was regarded as ‘an integral part of the military machine’ in the region – the fate of the wartime SIME was then determined purely by Cold War concerns and its

613 A notable case is Philip Marion Kirby-Green, Head of SIME (1955-58), who stayed in Cyprus as the DSO after the closure of SIME in 1958. See Andrew, Defence of the Realm., pp.463-464.
614 Bower, Perfect English Spy, p.185.
615 Ibid.
616 Cf. Jones, ‘The “Preferred Plan”’. 
activities were driven by war planning directed by the Chiefs of Staff. In addition, its anti-Soviet orientation was not only determined by MI5’s organisational predisposition, but was also driven by government policy during the period. Moreover, the gradual demise of SIME from 1953 to 1958 also reflects the shift in the conduct of the Cold War in Whitehall, as discussed in Chapter One.

The story of SIME in the post-war period is also revealing regarding the nature of intelligence liaison and the subject of intelligence sharing in an un-institutionalised form. This chapter has highlighted that intelligence sharing between the British and their Middle Eastern counterparts was based on mutual benefit but was strictly confined to one particular subject, Communist movements. In order to fulfil its task, SIME worked closely with its sister service, MI6, and its local counterparts. Unlike in the wartime period, it was limited with regard to its intelligence collection and security measures because the region was comprised mostly of foreign countries where SIME’s performance was largely dependent on local authorities, whose concerns only matched British interests in prioritising the fight against the Soviet Union and Communist movements in the region. Despite close cooperation especially in the field of anti-Communist security measures, the biggest difficulty faced by SIME was the maintenance of a good liaison with local authorities in a volatile and politically hostile environment which was often detrimental to intelligence liaison. In spite of these difficulties, SIME and the DSOs under the direction of the Chiefs of Staff maintained their relationship with the local authorities and worked with them on security measures in event of war. It is noteworthy that despite the closure of SIME, the knowledge of these security measures, including compiling the arrest lists, still remained with the local authorities.

This chapter has also shown that towards the mid-1950s, MI5 grew increasingly concerned with MI6’s activities in their territory. While the representatives of MI5 closely worked with MI6 on counter-intelligence in the region, it was concerned that clandestine operations conducted by MI6 would potentially undermine its own relationships with local authorities, which had been built on mutual trust. This practical but important concern – from MI5’s point of view to liaise with its Middle Eastern counterparts – was not recognised by the policymakers in London. However, these incompatible counter-subversive measures, between security liaison and special political actions, were still carried out in the region under the direction of government policy. MI6’s involvement in the region, and its implications for

617 Quoted from TNA: PRO KV4/472: the Liddell Diaries, 6 Jul 1950.
MI5’s liaison with its Middle Eastern counterparts, will be discussed in Chapters Four and Six respectively.
Chapter Four
Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation and
the Security of Systems
In my personal view the Iranians individually are security conscious and are probably well able to take care of their own secrets; but the protection of common secrets is another matter. Here the slothfulness, venality and love for intrigue and personal animosities of the average Iranian, as well as his unwillingness to assume responsibility, are all hazards along the road to good security.

-Roger Lees

Introduction

The Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), formerly known as the Baghdad Pact (1955-58), was once described as ‘the unknown alliance’ by Air Marshal Sir Neville Stack, British Representative of the Permanent Military Deputy (1970-72) to CENTO.\(^{619}\) This notion is reinforced by Elie Podeh, a Middle Eastern historian, who pointed out a decade ago that studies of the regional alliance were ‘marginal’ in the historiography of American history in the Middle East.\(^{620}\) His point is equally relevant outside American scholarship: the only existing literature addresses the formation of the Baghdad Pact \(^ {621}\) and even when some studies focus on the intelligence and security aspects of the signatory countries, they tend to neglect the Baghdad Pact and CENTO.\(^ {622}\)

Similar to the other Cold War treaty organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), CENTO was a military alliance against the aggression of the Communist bloc. However, a lesser known fact

\(^{618}\) Roger Lees was the DSO in Baghdad (1951-53) and later advised the Shah of Iran on the establishment of the Iranian national intelligence/security organisation, known as SAVAK. Quoted from TNA: PRO CAB176/61: SF303/1/1/C: report annexed to ‘security training of Iranians’, by E.M. Furnival Jones of MI5, 24 Apr 1957.

\(^{619}\) Neville Stack, ‘CENTO – The Unknown Alliance’, RUSI Journal, vol.117, no.3 (1972), p.51. He compares it with the other Cold War treaty organisations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO).


is that CENTO was also concerned with the internal affairs in the Pact area to contain the spread of subversive activities, and strong ties were maintained between the security services to counter this threat. Below the highest body, the Council of Ministers, CENTO was comprised primarily of ‘four major’ Committees: the Military Committee, the Economic Committee, the Counter-Subversion Committee, and the Liaison Committee. 623 It is noteworthy that the latter two committees – the Counter-Subversion and Liaison Committees – were distinctively political in nature, their activities were more secretive, and more importantly, they were mostly concerned with the internal affairs of the Pact signatories.

This chapter will show the numerous forms of multilateral intelligence/security liaison directed against Communist and subversive activities in the region. While mainly focusing on the Liaison Committee under the Baghdad Pact, other forms of intelligence liaisons will also be discussed. This chapter will highlight the nature of the intelligence/security liaison between Britain and Middle Eastern states, including any obstacles or preconditions associated with the subject of intelligence liaison. In addition, it will also show that since any form of intelligence cooperation requires a secure organisation, a by-product of the multilateral intelligence and security cooperation under the Baghdad Pact was the formation of the Iranian national intelligence and security organisation, known as SAVAK, in 1957. Moreover, owing to the lax security of the Pact, Britain was the most reluctant to share its own intelligence with the Pact members and sought to exchange intelligence on a bilateral basis.

**Prelude to the Security Cooperation under the Baghdad Pact and the Formation of Liaison Committee**

The formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 has been studied elsewhere. 624 Elie Podeh in particular has shown that the formation of the Baghdad Pact resulted from the desires of the Iraqi and Turkish governments to establish their positions in the region, converging with

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623 Stack, ‘CENTO – The Unknown Alliance’, p.51. Note that the Military Committee was aimed at military coordination against the aggression of the Communist bloc; the Economic Committee was for economic and societal developments of the signatories including developing atomic energy, proposed either by the United Kingdom or United States through their financial support.

624 See Note 622 above.
the interests of both Britain and the United States. It is noteworthy that high level policies were not the only contributing factor in the formation of the Baghdad Pact, there was also a security dimension at work. As briefly discussed in Chapter Two, before the establishment of security cooperation under the Baghdad Pact, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq had collaborated on informal security cooperation on subversive activities in the region since the early 1950s under the so-called ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’. This security cooperation was gradually institutionalised following Coghills’s appointment in Jordan in 1952 and grew out of a realisation amongst the Triangle countries that subversive activities in each country were directly connected with, or indirectly instigated by, external actors such as the Soviet Union, Egypt, Syria or Saudi Arabia.

According to Coghills’s diaries, the three members of the ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’ had also attempted to involve the Syrian government under Adeeb al-Shishakli in anti-subversive measures in early 1953 as it was believed that most subversive activities in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq were originating from Syria. After attempting for over a year, however, they decided to abandon this plan as the Syrians were ‘far too unreliable’. Meanwhile, the Egyptian leader, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, contemplated establishing a similar form of security cooperation on his own initiative, ‘an Anti-Communist Bureau in Cairo’, during the same period and called a conference in Cairo inviting all members of the Arab League. Before sending their own delegations to the Cairo conference, Coghill, Chehab and Attiyah had met together in Beirut to ‘hammer out the line to take to ensure the failure of the conference to set up such a Bureau’, which was believed would ‘only increase the power of Egypt’. Nevertheless, ‘thanks to the blunt rudeness of the Syrian delegate’, Coghill recorded that the Egyptians failed to establish their own Anti-Communist Bureau.

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626 The foundation of this cooperation were personal connections between Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, Director-General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion (1952-56), Emir Farid Chehab, Head of the Sûreté Générale (1948-58), and Bahjat Beg el-Attiyah, Director of the Iraqi CID, later promoted to the newly-created Director-General of Security (1947-58).

627 See Chapter Two.


631 Ibid. Coghill noted in his diaries that Coghill, Chehab and Attiyah ‘had in fact ganged up to wreck the plan’ to disrupt the creation of the Egyptians’ Anti-Communist Bureau, but before the attempt was made, the Anti-
The culmination of the Jordan-Lebanon-Iraq ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’ activity was a multilateral secret discussion held in Baghdad in January 1956 – the group of three (Coghill, Chehab and Attiya) met with the Heads of the Turkish and Iranian Security Services to discuss and exchange intelligence on subversive activities in the region.632 While there had been bilateral talks on the subject between most of these countries, this was the first multilateral discussion between the Arab and non-Arab security services in the region.633 Before this meeting, Coghill, Chehab and Attiya had conducted a preliminary conference together streamlining how they would make the meeting successful to gain ‘mutual confidence in one’s opposite number’ by showing a united front against subversive activities in the region, which was, Coghill noted, ‘the only way of making this sort of liaison work’.634

There was a similar on-going arrangement around the same period under the Baghdad Pact. At the inaugural meeting of the Pact Council held in Baghdad on 21 and 22 November 1955, the Iraqi Foreign Minister raised the dangers of Communist infiltration in the Middle East, particularly in Syria.635 The idea of forming ‘joint anti-subversion machinery’ under the Pact was then discussed.636 Harold Macmillan, then Foreign Secretary, suggested establishing multilateral intelligence and security cooperation on this matter. He also proposed that Britain ‘make available technical advice on Communist subversion’ to the members from its experience in the Far East, where Britain had also been involved in a similar arrangement under the SEATO.637 In addition to Iraqi concern about the spread of subversive activities, despite its more robust counter-measures after the 1953 coup, Iran also had its own problem with the resilience of the Tudeh Party.638 The Iranian Ambassador in Baghdad, who

633 IWM: Private Papers of Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill: vol.2, p.119. The fact of this highly secret meeting is also confirmed by a record of the Turkish counterpart. C.f. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü [The State Archives in Ankara]: 30/0/18/12: 141/133/20, 9 Jan 1956.
634 Sir Michael Wright, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, noted in early 1956 that the Americans were in agreement on Iraq’s claim that the Soviet Union was ‘launching a major Communist offensive’ in the region. See TNA: PRO PREM11/1938: telegram by Sir Michael Wright, Baghdad, to FO, 18 Jan 1956.
636 TNA: PRO FO371/121283: V10710/2: letter by A.A. Dudley, Singapore, to W.D. Allen, FO, 24 Jan 1956. In the Far East, the Committee to Combat Communist Subversion, also known as the Committee of Security Experts (CSE), had been formed a few months earlier, and the British delegation was headed by Dick Thistlethwaite of MI5, Head of Security Intelligence Far East (1956-59). See also David McKnight, ‘Western Intelligence and SEATO’s War on Subversion, 1956-63’, INS, vol.20, no.2 (2005), pp.288-303.
637 Zabih, Communist Movement in Iran, pp.208-245.
represented Iran for the Baghdad Pact, was willing to learn ‘practical measures for combating Communist subversion’ from more experienced countries such as Britain.\(^{639}\)

Based on the policy laid out by the Baghdad Pact Council meeting, a discussion to form ‘joint anti-subversion machinery’ between the regional counterparts, later known as the Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees, was then followed by the meeting of the Security Committee, where the representatives of the security services of the signatories came together for the first time. Directed under the policy suggested by Macmillan, Philip Kirby-Green, Head of SIME (1955-58) and Britain’s representative at the committee meeting, who had been fully briefed on similar arrangements in the NATO and SEATO before leaving for Baghdad, gave a proposal in detail to form such an anti-Communist committee at the meeting. Kirby-Green’s proposal was supported by Britain’s closest ally, Bahjat Beg Attiyah, the Director of the Iraqi CID; A.M.S. Ahmad, a Pakistani counterpart; and an American ‘observer’.\(^{640}\)

The Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees were formally established after agreement was reached by the Council of Deputies of the Baghdad Pact on 25 January 1956. These committees under the Pact were intended for collaboration in anti-Communist measures between the signatories, including an ‘observer’, the United States.\(^{641}\) The purposes of the Liaison Committee, consisting of the security services of the signatories, were to ‘facilitate exchange of information relating to Communist subversive activities and Soviet bloc espionage’ and ‘recommend ways and means by which security services can best discharge their tasks’. The Liaison Committee also aimed to ‘facilitate and encourage bilateral liaison and practical cooperation between the security services’.\(^{642}\) Throughout the period between 1956 and 1963, with some exceptional cases, the meetings were routinely held in a signatory twice a year.

The security services of the regional members had their own reasons to welcome Kirby-Green’s proposals for multilateral intelligence cooperation in countering Communism in the region. As noted earlier, there had been ‘informal’ security cooperation on subversive activities between the regional security services (Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and Iran) around the same period. At the first meeting of the Liaison Committee of the Baghdad Pact in

\(^{639}\) TNA: PRO FO371/121283: V10710/1: telegram by M Wright to FO, 27 Jan 1956.
\(^{640}\) TNA: PRO FO371/121269: V1074/7: a summary of the meeting held in Baghdad by MI5, Jan 1956.
\(^{641}\) TNA: PRO FO371/121283: V10710/8: telegram by Sir R. Stevens, Tehran, to FO, 5 Apr 1956. Also see Aldrich (ed.), Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain, pp.223-5.
April 1956, a copy of the ‘convention’ outlining the cooperation in anti-Communist measures, signed by the members (the Jordanian, Lebanese, Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish security services) of the so-called ‘Club’ at their meeting on 14th January 1956 was submitted by the Turkish delegate as a foundation for their security cooperation. It was later, nevertheless, withdrawn in favour of one submitted by the British government, which was seen as a more experienced ally in this field.643

**British Concern about the Security of the Baghdad Pact**

At the inaugural meeting of the Baghdad Pact, a by-product of the discussions was the creation of a Security Committee, often referred to as ‘the Security Organisation’ in Foreign Office correspondence.644 The Security Committee was formed under and directed by the Secretary-General of the Baghdad Pact.645 The purpose of the Security Committee was to ensure proper standards of protective security for the Baghdad Pact, including the maintenance of information security (classification of documents and physical access to classified records) and vetting procedures under the security regulations of the Pact.646 The Security Committee routinely conducted security inspections of the registries of the signatory powers, where classified CENTO documents were handled and held, and recommended improvements in protective security for each country.647 Setting security standards was particularly important for multilateral intelligence liaison as information security was a prerequisite for the efficacy of the alliance.

Protective security was the domain of MI5. Philip Kirby-Green, the Head of SIME, was duly chosen by General Sir Gerald Templer, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to attend the first meeting of the Security Committee in December 1955 to discuss security practices with his counterparts in Baghdad.648 At his first meeting, Kirby-Green learned that

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644 The name of the Security Committee as the ‘security organisation’ also appears in Gallman, *Iraq Under General Nuri*, p.71.
646 TNA: PRO PREM11/1938: V1073/1361: report by Sir Michael Wright, Baghdad, to Harold Macmillan, ‘First Meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact’, 22 Nov 1955. The main idea was to protect the classified documents, chiefly handled by the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact, and to enhance the security of the Pact.
648 TNA: PRO FO371/121269: V1074/7: letter by MI5 to P.L. Carter of FO, 26 Jan 1956.
there was no comparable protective security in the member states, and he was then asked by his counterparts to provide such security training to them using Britain’s experiences in NATO and SEATO. After the meeting, Kirby-Green warned in his telegram to the Ministry of Defence that, owing to ‘no adequate security’ and ‘no proper vetting procedure’ in some regional member states, ‘any information passed to other deputies and planners may be in Moscow in a matter of days’. With an urgent request by the Foreign Office, MI5 was instructed to improve the standards of protective security in the Baghdad Pact. Michael Clayton of MI5, an expert in protective security, was then despatched to Baghdad on 17 January 1956. Clayton remained as Deputy Security Officer of the Security Committee until 1958, providing training in protective security to the security officers of the member states of the Security Committee.

Philip Kirby-Green estimated that it would take at least six months to get a minimum standard of security within the Baghdad Pact. However, his estimate was far from a reality. Despite a series of lectures by Clayton on protective security during his tenure as the Deputy Security Officer (1956-58) to his Middle Eastern counterparts at the Security Committee, there was not much improvement in the protective security regime. Concerning the state of security at the Registry of the Pact headquarters, Sir Michael Wright reported to the Foreign Office in November 1956 that there was ‘little appreciation of how to classify documents correctly’ amongst non-British civilian staff, and classified documents were ‘frequently lost’ and handled inadequately. In addition, when Clayton was to end his official duty as the Deputy Security Officer at the Pact headquarters towards the end of 1957, despite some improvement in protective security at the CENTO headquarters, the state of security of the individual member states remained far below the minimum standard. Despite the British-made structures of protective security (including security regulations, vetting procedures,

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651 TNA: PRO FO371/121269: V1074/1G: minute by R.J. Bray of FO, 2 Jan 1956.
652 Ibid.
physical access to classified documents), there had been little improvement in the protective security of the regional members.\(^{656}\)

In 1961, when James Robertson of MI5 inspected the state of security of all regional alliances, including NATO, SEATO and CENTO, he observed that the representatives of the CENTO Security Committee had received little ‘support forthcoming from [their] superiors’, and also that recommendations for improving security in the signatories were ‘hardly carried out’, except for ‘inspections of CENTO registries in member countries’.\(^{657}\) After a year’s attempt at improving the protective security of the Pact, Britain decided to abolish the Security Committee in 1963 as the chief organisation to maintain the security of the Pact, and instead proposed that the Liaison Committee take over this task. After a series of lengthy discussions with the signatory powers, the proposal was eventually accepted and from 1963 onwards the Security Committee became the Security Sub-Committee under the Liaison Committee of the Pact.\(^{658}\)

A combination of several factors appear to have prevented the improvement of the Pact’s protective security. First and foremost, the regional Pact members totally lacked the idea of protective security as an element of essential security measures and so it was never prioritised by those states – they were overwhelmingly concerned with countering subversive elements in their countries. Sir Roger Hollis, the Director-General of MI5, once reported at a 1960 JIC meeting that the regional members were ‘concentrating unduly on the threat’ against the internal security of their countries, while, Hollis thought, ‘they should give greater attention to [protective] security’.\(^{659}\) Moreover, it is noteworthy that, in addition to the lack of security awareness amongst the regional members, Philip Kirby-Green also identified at his first encounter with his regional counterparts that some members had no understanding of the difference between security, counter-intelligence and counter-subversion.\(^{660}\) As will be discussed further in Chapter Five, this difference in the understanding of security was a cause of the difficulties in coordinating anti-Communist measures from the British perspective.


\(^{659}\) TNA: PRO CAB 159/34: JIC (60) 40\(^{th}\) meeting: minutes of the JIC meeting, 28 Jul 1960.

\(^{660}\) TNA: PRO FO371/121269: V1074/7: a summary of the meeting held in Baghdad by MI5, Jan 1956.
Secondly, there was also a structural issue at the levels of both CENTO (as the Pact was renamed after the Iraqi Revolution in 1958) and regional members. Unlike the Liaison Committee, where very senior officers of the security services were represented and who were also responsible for the internal security in their countries, the Security Committee was composed of middle-ranking security officers of the member states, who were seconded to the Pact headquarters in Baghdad (1955-58) and Ankara (from 1959 onwards). As a result, the regional representatives to the Security Committee were considered ‘international civil servants’ by their own governments and thus ‘cut off’ from direct contact with their own governments.\footnote{TNA: PRO CAB176/60: JIC/528/57: annex A, ‘state of security in Baghdad Pact organisation’, by A.C.I. Samuel of FO to Sir Michael Wright, Baghdad, 14 Dec 1956.} Despite an attempt to reorganise the structure of the Security Committee by Michael Clayton, who demanded that regional representatives wear ‘two hats’ for both international and national roles, there was also a problem at the national level. The problem was that, even if these representatives were in close contact with their national governments, there were ‘no effective’ security authorities in their countries ‘with whom they could correspond and from whom they could obtain such briefs’.\footnote{TNA: PRO CAB176/60: JIC/528/57: annex B, ‘state of security in Baghdad Pact organisation’, by R.S. Crawford, Baghdad, to A.C.I. Samuel of FO, 12 Feb 1957.} As a result, it was thought that it would be better for the Liaison Committee, comprising higher ranks of the security services, to take over the duty of protective security in the Pact.

Thirdly, the final problem associated with the lack of security was that there was often departmental infighting over internal security in the regional countries. This, in addition to the second problem above, was the main reason that Britain insisted that the Shah of Iran establish the national security organisation, later known as SAVAK, and provided training in protective security to the Iranians. However, even after SAVAK nominally assumed full responsibility for internal security from the military in 1957, a conflict of jurisdiction with the military was reported in August 1961, when the security organisation of the military still sought to represent Iran at the Liaison Committee of the Pact.\footnote{TNA: PRO FO371/157497: EB1693/4G: letter by C.A.G. Simkins of MI5 to P.G.D. Adams, Security Department of FO, 16 Aug 1961. The whole file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 0894-11), 27 Oct 2011.} These kinds of problems were also common among the regional members. In the case of Iraq, which hosted the headquarters of the Pact until 1958, there had been antagonistic relationships between the police and the military. As a result, the CID, which was part of the police, responsible for the internal security of the country, was unable to inspect the security of the military, which...
might have contributed to the failure of the Iraqi government to forestall the coup plot by a small group of Iraqi Army officers in July 1958. While Turkey and Pakistan, both of which were members of NATO and SEATO, were considered to have better security, the responsibility of the military for internal security in these countries was still a concern for the British.

The available evidence suggests that Britain was right to be concerned about the security of the multilateral intelligence liaison – classified information was indeed leaking to Egypt from the Iraqis. In addition, there were also leaks to the Soviets from one regional member state’s embassies abroad. According to a KGB defector, Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a conversation between Turkish diplomats led to a discovery of a KGB officer in Azerbaijan, A. Guseinov, who was about to defect to the West in Turkey in late 1955. The conversation had been recorded through a listening device planted in the Turkish Embassy in Moscow. Similar to the defection attempt by Konstantin Volkov in 1946, which was intercepted by Kim Philby, Guseinov would have provided fruitful information on Soviet activities in the Middle East. According to Dzhirkvelov, Guseinov was carried to Moscow semi-conscious on a stretcher by a special KGB team. Guseinov’s wife, who was the main conspirator in the plan to defect to the West, leapt from a third-floor window and killed herself. Nevertheless, Britain indeed had more experience in protective security than other members, but it is interesting to note that it also had defects in its own security. George Blake of MI6, another Soviet mole, was at the time compromising secrets of Britain’s NATO allies.

The British Contribution to the Origins of SAVAK

According to the existing historiography, the Iranian national security and intelligence service, known as SAVAK, was established in 1957 under the auspices of the CIA and Mossad. Britain’s involvement in this process is little discussed. Mansur Rafizadeh, a former SAVAK officer clearly states in his memoirs that SAVAK was created on ‘the joint

669 For instance, Ephraim Kahana & Muhammad Suwaed (eds.), *The A to Z of Middle Eastern Intelligence* (Plymouth: Scarecrow, 2009), pp.122-123.
advice of the CIA, British intelligence service, and Mossad. Supporting this testimony, the available documentation clearly attests that the formation of the Iranian national intelligence and security organisation was largely a British initiative and MI5 was instrumental in establishing SAVAK, arising from their concerns with the state of protective security in Iran, which would affect the efficacy of multilateral intelligence liaison under the Baghdad Pact as a whole.

Concerning the state of security, at the first meeting of the Security Committee in 1955, Philip Kirby-Green identified Iran as the weakest link in protective security. While Michael Clayton was in Baghdad to provide courses on security practices, he was then also tasked to assess the standards of security in Iran. Roger Hollis, the Deputy Director-General of MI5, asked Clayton if the Iranian government would need to establish an organisation ‘officially charged with full responsibility for enforcing security’. Hollis also assured Clayton that MI5 was willing to accommodate a ‘limited number of senior Iranian security officials’ for training in Britain if necessary. Clayton was then told by the Iranian representative on the Deputy Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact, General Hadjazi, that Iran had ‘no security organisation’ at all.

Despite the presence of the American Military Mission in Iran, one of whose tasks was ‘the production of an adequate security system’, the state of security in Iran was inadequate. Although there had been three organisations responsible for security (the aforementioned ‘G-2’, the counter-espionage organisation of the Iranian armed forces; the Special Branch of the Iranian Police; and the Military Governors’), none of these organisations had any responsibility for protective security in civilian departments, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Discussing the matter with his Iranian colleagues in Baghdad, Clayton soon reported back to Hollis:

670 Mansur Rafizadeh, Witness (New York: William Morrow, 1987), p.393, n.4. Also see Ali Akbar Dareini (ed), The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty: Memoirs of Former General Hussein Fardust (Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi, India, 1999), ch.4, which also refers to a close connection between the Iranian and British intelligence services. On the other hand, a recent PhD on SAVAK, using mostly Iranian but secondary sources, only refers to the British involvement with a sentence. See K. Moravej, The SAVAK and the Cold War: Counter-Intelligence and Foreign Intelligence, 1957-1968 (Manchester: PhD thesis, 2011), p.76.
672 TNA: PRO FO371/121269: V1074/8: telegram by Hollis of MI5 to Clayton, sent through FO cable, 1 Feb 1956.
673 TNA: PRO CAB176/57: letter (Annex A) by FO to Sir Roger Stevens, British Ambassador in Tehran, 17 Feb 1956. Clayton was also privately asked by General Hadjazi to provide security training to a few Iranians in Britain.
I judge that knowledge of protective security practice is limited to the army only. I cannot say how effective it is. There is certainly no national security authority as we know it, and no system of interdepartmental security co-ordination...I agree that the first essential is to establish [a] national security authority, but consider that unless we advise on how this should be done and additionally give detailed instruction on methods to implement details of regulations, the prospect of any reasonable degree of security in Iran in the foreseeable future is very remote.  

The matter was also discussed in Baghdad between Sir Michael Wright, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, and Francis Marten, a diplomat at the British Embassy in Tehran, who was on his route to Britain through Baghdad. They agreed that training a few Iranians in Britain was ‘not enough’, and instead suggested the Foreign Office ‘despatch a fully qualified officer to Tehran from London’ to advise the Iranians on improving the security matters. Sir Michael Wright concluded that ‘unless some such arrangement is made, the prospect of a fundamental improvement in Iranian security standards, on which the ability of the Baghdad Pact to undertake serious planning of sensitive matters depends, is remote’.  

Training of the Iranians in protective security in either London or Tehran was, however, not sufficient to solve the security problems in the forthcoming meetings of the Baghdad Pact. To solve this short-term problem, the Iranian authority was urged to set up an interdepartmental organisation responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the various intelligence and security organisations in the country. As a result, the Iranian Chiefs of Staff established a new joint staff of the armed forces, named J-2, which was also given responsibility for national security matters. However, under the security regulations of the Pact, it was also essential for Iran to have a “national security authority” responsible for the security of Baghdad Pact classified information. The matter was then referred to the British Ambassador in Tehran, Sir Roger Stevens (1954-58), who responded to the request from the Foreign Office that he would ‘take next suitable opportunity to impress on the Shah the importance of security’ and to ‘ask him about Iranian plans for establishing a “national security authority”’.  

Concern about the lack of a unified national security service and of the efforts to coordinate intelligence between the departmental services in Iran was also noted at the first

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677 TNA: PRO CAB176/57: letter (Annex A) by FO to Sir Roger Stevens, British Ambassador in Tehran, 17 Feb 1956  
678 TNA: PRO FO371/121269: V1074/19: telegram by Sir R. Stevens, Tehran, to FO, 16 Mar 1956. It was considered at the Foreign Office that ‘the Iranians should be persuaded to settle the identity of their national security authority without delay’. Quoted from TNA: PRO CAB176/57: letter (Annex A) by FO to Sir Roger Stevens, British Ambassador in Tehran, 17 Feb 1956.
meeting of the Liaison Committee in April 1956. After the meeting, Philip Kirby-Green, the British representative on the Liaison Committee, reported that:

The Liaison Committee will face continuing trouble both in the day to day cooperation between the Iranian and the other member security services and also in the committee owing to the absence of a unified security service in Iran, and the resulting jealousy of departments including those of the Military Governor, G.2 [Military Intelligence], the police and the newly formed J.2 [Joint Staff of the armed forces] etc., which produces a very complicated position. Ultimately essential that the functions of these departments be co-ordinated and their respective spheres demarcated, but hesitate to recommend that pressure to this end be exerted immediately as only the Shah himself can resolve this problem and, if done hastily might well result in the creation of yet another department and confusion become worse confounded. Full details of the various powers and functions often over-lapping, of these departments can best be given by Her Majesty’s Embassy in Tehran.\textsuperscript{679}

As a result, at the request by the Iranian government through the Baghdad Pact, MI5 despatched Roger Lees, formally DSO in Baghdad (1951-53), to Tehran in May 1956 to advise the Shah on enhancing the state of security in Iran.\textsuperscript{680} In addition to his career in the Middle East, Lees was considered well qualified for the task following his long career in the Indian Police (over twenty years until 1948), with a supervisory role in the Special Branch (Patna).\textsuperscript{681}

Lees visited Tehran twice during the period between 1956 and 1957, in which the Iranian national security and intelligence organisation was being established. During his first, three-month visit to Tehran in 1956, Lees, in the guise of the first secretary at the British Embassy, was personally assigned by the Shah himself to give security advice to General Haj-Ali Kia, the Chief of Military Intelligence. At the time, Military Intelligence was temporarily responsible for supervising the implementation of the security regulations of the Baghdad Pact.\textsuperscript{682} Once SAVAK was established and assumed responsibility for the internal security of Iran, taking over from Military Intelligence, Roger Lees was then assigned to

\textsuperscript{679} TNA: PRO FO371/121283: V10710/11: telegram by John Swithun Harvey Shattock, POMEF, to FO, 7 Apr 1956.


\textsuperscript{681} He was also in Egypt until 1950 as a SIME officer, assisting the Head of SIME, Brigadier William Magan. His role as the DSO in Baghdad was praised in Whitehall especially in conducting security measures with his Iraqi counterparts, Bahjat Beg al-Attiyah, the Head of the Iraqi CID, in the event of war in Iraq. Although no reference to his career in MI5 was made, his service as Head of the Special Branch in India a few years earlier is revealed in his autobiography. Lees, In the Shade of the Peepul Tree, p.89.

\textsuperscript{682} TNA: PRO CAB176/61: SF303/1/1/C: report annexed to ‘security training of Iranians’, by E.M. Furnival Jones of MI5, 24 Apr 1957.
advise the first Head of SAVAK, General Teymour Bakhtiar (1957-61), and to train the SAVAK officers in protective security.  

From the outset, Roger Lees’ objective was to ‘train the Iranians in the proper implementation of the Baghdad Pact Security Regulations’. His role in Tehran was thus primarily limited to providing the Iranians with an effective security system in the country through his advice and the training of senior Iranian officers in protective security. During his first visit, he supervised the setting up of a registry system and trained the Iranians in handling classified documents and vetting procedures, and also drafted a set of ‘national security regulations’. All of his recommendations and drafts were approved by the Shah himself and implemented accordingly. During his second, six-month visit to Tehran, his primary task was to ensure that the newly-established SAVAK would meet the security requirements of the Baghdad Pact, including arrangements for the protection of classified documents, which were constantly inspected by the members of the Security Committee of the Baghdad Pact. Meanwhile, Iranian female staff at the Registry of SAVAK were trained in London in protective security. At the end of his visit, Roger Lees wrote to the Head Office of MI5 in 1957 that:

I did…find, among those Iranians with whom I was working, a genuine desire to establish a sound security system in the country. It remains to be seen whether this keenness is reflected in those who actually have to give effect to the security procedures, and whether the Iranian national characteristics, which militate against collective security, can at least be neutralised. In my personal view the Iranians individually are security conscious and are probably well able to take care of their own secrets; but the protection of common secrets is another matter. Here the slothfulness, venality and love for intrigue and personal animosities of the average Iranian, as well as his unwillingness to assume responsibility, are all hazards along the road to good security.

This was Britain’s contribution to the establishment of SAVAK. The British contribution mainly came from the need to raise Iranian security standards to meet the security


685 Ibid.


arrangements of the Pact and assign the responsibilities necessary to establish sufficient national security in Iran.\(^{689}\)

During the same period, the CIA was also in Tehran to provide training to SAVAK officers not in protective security but foreign intelligence collection, counter-intelligence, and intelligence analysis.\(^{690}\) Mansur Rafizadeh, a former SAVAK officer, also noted that, unlike the CIA and Mossad, both of which were actively involved in interfering with SAVAK’s operations, by ‘consent of the three foreign [American, Israeli and British] intelligence groups, Britain had no active involvement’ in SAVAK’s operational aspects.\(^{691}\) It is beyond the scope of this research to explore the reasons for the Americans and Israelis’ active involvement in establishing or training SAVAK – it has been suggested that while the Israeli involvement concerned their common enemy – post-coup Iraq –\(^{692}\) the United States was more interested in Iran’s strategic role in the Cold War given its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union.\(^{693}\) In addition to Sir Patrick Dean’s involvement in the collusion with the French and Israelis in the Suez debacle, there is also evidence to suggest that British Intelligence began to rebuild its relationship with the Israeli counterparts towards the late 1950s.\(^{694}\)

It might have been the case that Britain was not interested in the internal affairs of Iran. Britain’s major ally in the region was Iraq, not Iran, at the time of SAVAK’s

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\(^{689}\) The recent (unpublished) PhD on SAVAK based mostly on secondary sources, but non-English sources, argues that it was Iran’s concern about their enemies, the Soviet Union and Iraq, which contributed to the establishment of SAVAK. See Moravej, *SAVAK and the Cold War*, pp.65-76.

\(^{690}\) Earnest Oney, interviewed by Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Maryland, 22 and 29 May 1991, the Oral History Office of Foundation for Iranian Studies, transcript file no.3, p.54.


\(^{692}\) According to Ian Black and Benny Morris, Mossad had a growing interest in establishing the ‘periphery’ countries during the period, and Iran and Israel also shared a common enemy, i.e. Iraq. Through intelligence liaison with SAVAK, it appeared that Mossad desired to conduct its own operations against Iraq and ‘in support of the clandestine exit of Iraqi Jews to Israel’. Morris et al., *Israel’s Secret Wars*, p.183. See also, Samuel Segev, *The Iranian Triangle* (New York: Free Press, 1988).


establishment. However, Britain also had long regarded Iran as within its sphere of influence. While Operation Ajax/Boot to overthrow Mossaddegh was a joint-venture with the Americans, the development of the events leading up to the coup from 1951 until August 1953 clearly shows that the coup was chiefly initiated by the British, and that the American involvement came from British, and Iranian, necessity – the logistics, the money, and the oil.\(^{695}\) This was the continuation of the tradition sustaining Britain’s influence in Iran, while there was also a great deal of economic necessity – oil revenue was a major source of Britain’s economic recovery in the post-war period.\(^{696}\) Britain became more actively involved in the internal affairs of Iran after losing its closest ally in the Iraqi Revolution. As part of Britain’s policy towards Iran, General Hussein Fardust, a childhood friend of the Shah, who supervised the development of the Iranian Intelligence Community, came over to Britain from 1959 onwards for his personal training in intelligence and security matters, including techniques and methods of espionage, counter-intelligence, and also protective security.\(^{697}\) British-Iranian intelligence liaison will be discussed further in Chapter Six.

**Multilateral Intelligence Liaison: the Liaison Committee**

The Baghdad Pact was not only a Cold War defence treaty against the Communist bloc, but also an alliance for the maintenance of the internal security in the Pact area. The regional member states were above all eager to tackle subversive activities in their countries. Their eagerness mainly came from the views of Middle Eastern policymakers that political developments and crises were orchestrated by external powers.\(^{698}\) These conspiratorial views were also exacerbated by the nature of Middle Eastern politics in which political assassinations, plots and intrigues were chronic, and any crisis in a country alarmed and

\(^{695}\) Cf. Woodhouse, *Something Ventured*, chs. 8-9; and Wilber, ‘Clandestine Service History’, the declassified American account of which clearly shows Britain’s, i.e. MI6’s, active involvement in the operation. Also see Eveland, *Ropes of Sand*, pp.108-9; Dorril, *MI6*, pp.558-599; Lapping, *End of Empire*.


\(^{697}\) Dareini (ed), *Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty*, ch.4. General Fardust was once Deputy-Chief of SAVAK and Head of the Special Information Bureau (SIB), the Iranian counterpart of the British JIC. He visited Britain for intelligence and security training three times: in 1959, before the establishment of the SIB; after assuming the post of the Deputy-Chief of SAVAK in 1961; and also in 1963, when he was also accompanied by Brigadier-General Mohootian, the then Deputy-Chief of SAVAK, and Samadianpour, the Deputy of the Iranian Police, both of whom also attended the training course. Ibid., pp.152-153.

\(^{698}\) For a discussion of this, see Daniel Pipes, ‘Dealing With Middle Eastern Conspiracy Theories’, *Orbis*, vol.36, no.1 (1992), pp.41-56. Also see Rathmell, *Secret War in the Middle East*.
influenced policymakers’ perceptions in another country.\textsuperscript{699} There were therefore good reasons for the regional members to cooperate on subversive activities, a common enemy in the region.

From the mid-1950s onwards the security services of the signatory powers probed into the activities associated more specifically with the Soviet Intelligence Service in the region. The aforementioned Ilya Dzhirkvelov stated in his memoirs that a new department was established in the First Chief Directorate of the KGB at the beginning of 1955 to spy on the Soviet Union’s ‘frontiers’, including Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India and China.\textsuperscript{700} Amongst them, Turkey was the main target as it was a member of NATO and maintained close contacts with the Americans and British. Dzhirkvelov was personally involved in organising a network of agents in Turkey from 1955 onwards.\textsuperscript{701} In addition, during the periods between the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union pursued two ways of achieving its objective: while seeking to exploit anti-colonial sentiment in the region, such as radical Arab Nationalism, to eliminate Western influence in the region, the Soviet Union still regarded Communist Parties as the instrument for the Communist cause in the region, despite anti-Communist sentiment throughout the region.\textsuperscript{702}

Available records suggest that the members of the Liaison Committees might have cottoned on to the Soviet offensive in the region in the late 1950s through CENTO intelligence sharing. In May 1957, the Turkish representative reported on the methods and techniques employed by the Soviets, demonstrating that from at least 1956 the Soviet Union targeted the ethnic minorities in Turkey for both espionage and subversion purposes. They included the use of a former young Nazi officer, named Wilfried Herbrecht, and an Armenian-born reserve officer of the Turkish military service, named Arman Vartanian, to obtain information on NATO defence plans and the cryptographic system used in NATO communications.\textsuperscript{703} In addition, Herbrecht also confessed to the Turkish authorities that the

\textsuperscript{699} The nature of the Middle East and the way in which conducting internal security measures in the Pact area were affected by it will be discussed in more details in Chapter Six.

\textsuperscript{700} Dzhirkvelov, \textit{Secret Servant}, p.215.

\textsuperscript{701} Ibid., ch.9, p.211.


\textsuperscript{703} Vartanian had attended the ‘special NKVD espionage course’ in Austria before joining the military service and sentenced to imprisonment for life. TNA: PRO FO371/127861: VB1692/9: report by the Turkish Delegation on Communist Activities in Turkey, 23 May 1957.
Soviets instructed him to contact a group of Kurds to instigate subversion against the Turkish government for Kurdish independence.\textsuperscript{704}

The Liaison Committee focused more on Soviet subversive activities than espionage. The main discussion between the security services of the member states was thus on the Communist movements in the Pact area. One of the advantages of intelligence-sharing under the Pact was that the members shared their knowledge of Communist activities, which enabled the member states to obtain a wider picture of the threats posed by International Communism in the region.\textsuperscript{705} The subjects of their information exchange included, for instance, the strength and activities of the Communist Parties; propaganda broadcasts by various radio stations of the Eastern bloc countries aimed at an instigation of subversive activities in the Pact area; and any scheduled Communist-sponsored international meetings.\textsuperscript{706} The information exchanged between the member states also included a list of known Communist members in the region. This was considered more important after the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact; thereafter the members of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) operated freely and became more active in the region.\textsuperscript{707} In addition, as international organisations and groups were regarded as sources of Communist subversion, a ‘watch list’ containing forthcoming Communist and non-Communist meetings or events, was regularly exchanged for relevant authorities to ‘take action’ against it.\textsuperscript{708} Moreover, their discussions also extended to counter-measures by the respective governments which had proved effective against Communist activities. The consensus amongst the regional member

\textsuperscript{704} TNA: PRO FO371/127861: VB1692/9: report by the Turkish Delegation on Communist Activities in Turkey, 23 May 1957. Herbrecht was sentenced to death, later commuted to imprisonment for life, due to his activities concerning his contact with the Kurdish independence movement, which was considered a direct threat to Turkish national security.

\textsuperscript{705} These discussions were highly important not only to the British, who sought to grasp a picture of the Communist activities in the region, which were always hidden and underground movements, but also to the security services of the regional powers as their abilities to counter internal threats were essential for the stability of the regional governments.

\textsuperscript{706} Concerning the discussion on the schedule of the communist-sponsored international events, the role of the security services was indeed to take necessary measures against them: for instance, making recommendations to their own authorities to refuse any applications of any individuals for exit visas in order to participate in the events. TNA: PRO FO371/127861: VB1692/9: report by the Turkish Delegation on Communist Activities in Turkey, 23 May 1957.


\textsuperscript{708} TNA: PRO FO1110/1353: PR146/20: monthly report on the CSO (January) by Peter Joy of FO, 5 Feb 1960.
states regarding ‘effective’ measures against any Communists and their sympathisers was ‘heavy penalties in accordance with the Criminal Code’.\(^{709}\)

Apart from the RAF bases in Habbaniya, Iraq, and also those in Cyprus, Britain faced no direct threat to its security in the Pact area. However, this does not necessarily mean that MI5 was not involved in the discussions with their regional counterparts on internal security in the Pact area. Declassified records under the FOIA show that, unlike the Americans, who were mostly a passive participant as an ‘observer’ (at least until 1959),\(^{710}\) MI5 actively contributed to discussions about the methods and techniques of Communist bloc espionage and subversion, and Communist activities. Alex Kellar of MI5, who chaired the Liaison Committee in January 1961 on a routine basis, used his chairmanship to include a report on ‘communist penetration of the labour movement’ in the Pact area, and ‘the student problem’, covering the ‘causes and nature’ of unrest among students in the ‘Afro-Asian area’.\(^{711}\) In addition, as Chairman of the NATO Special Committee, Kellar also made available classified NATO documents to his counterparts, who were keen on finding out more about ‘Soviet Bloc intelligence operations’ against regions outside the Pact and the way in which other security services were coping with ‘their own student communities within and without their countries and in and around the CENTO area and Europe’.\(^{712}\) Moreover, as the Chairman of both NATO’s and CENTO’s Committees, Kellar decided to exchange security reports between the CENTO Liaison and NATO Special Committees on the grounds, as he noted, that ‘what was sauce for the goose was sauce for the gander’, meaning that the intelligence exchange would be valuable to the both parties.\(^{713}\) The regional members welcomed Kellar’s suggestions.\(^{714}\)

\(^{709}\) TNA: PRO FO371/127861: VB1692/9: report by the Turkish Delegation on Communist Activities in Turkey, 23 May 1957. In addition, even those who had been released from prison after their initial imprisonment were put under surveillance by the authorities.


\(^{711}\) TNA: PRO FO371/157497: EB1693/3G: report by A.J. Kellar of MI5 to P.G.D. Adams, Security Department of FO, 17 Jan 1961. The whole file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 0894-11), 27 Oct 2011. Kellar was then Director of E Branch (responsible for security throughout the Empire, 1958-62).

\(^{712}\) The NATO Special Committee had very similar functions to the Liaison Committee of CENTO. He was the chairman from 1960.

\(^{713}\) Ibid. Kellar’s suggestions were also endorsed by MI6.

Limitations of Intelligence Liaison

Despite the advantages of cooperation on anti-subversive measures in the Pact area, there was an inherent problem with regional intelligence and security liaison under the Liaison Committee. Although the regional members maintained their anti-Communist stance throughout the period, their focus on subversive activities often extended to non-Communist activities, which caused difficulties in coordinating anti-Communist measures in the Pact area. While a collective effort for anti-Communist measures was mostly conducted in the form of propaganda under the Counter-Subversion Committee, the difficulty of coordination was also apparent at the Liaison Committee, where the threat assessment reports from each representative were shared and a consensus on the threats was sought between the committee members.

It is noteworthy that there was a peculiar aspect to CENTO’s Liaison Committee, which Alex Kellar noticed as the Chairman of his first meeting in 1961. Kellar noted to the Foreign Office that their discussions were ‘more of the kind that one would expect from a political committee’, and that the intelligence assessments submitted by his regional counterparts ‘trespass[es] much too much on the preserves of the political experts’. The implication of this peculiar nature of the Liaison Committee was that the intelligence assessments by the regional members were heavily influenced by the policy of their own governments. A senior official of the Foreign Office also commented on the differences between the CENTO Liaison Committee and the NATO Special Committee, which were ‘endemic’, and noted that:

The three CENTO Regional countries are governed by dictatorships, established in two cases through coup d’état. Their Intelligence Services have no continuing tradition of semi-independent non-political action to compare with those of most of the European countries grouped in NATO. The senior officers depend for their appointments and for funds on their ability to keep in favour of a very small ruling minority. They are thus intensely involved in politics, both internal and foreign, in a way quite distinct from the members of NATO’s Special Committee. This is a disadvantage; but it cannot be helped.

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715 The Counter-Subversion Committee will be discussed in Chapter Five.
717 TNA: PRO FO371/157497: EB1693/5G: minute on CENTO Counter-Subversion and Liaison Committee’s report by C.F.R. Barclay, 2 Feb 1961. The whole file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 0894-11), 27 Oct 2011. Emphasis original.
This comment highlights the nature of the relationship between the British and the Middle Eastern counterparts throughout the period. As will be discussed further in Chapter Five, the security services of the regional members were loyal to their own governments and thus strongly committed to suppressing subversive activities in their countries by any means necessary.

The difficulty of reaching a consensus on internal threats amongst the member states also came from the limitations in intelligence sharing. Despite their security cooperation at the highest level, the Liaison Committee was a place for sharing intelligence-based assessments between the Pact members. The problem with the limitations in intelligence sharing was the fact that the protection of intelligence sources was a prerequisite for any intelligence liaison, especially multilateral cooperation. As any intelligence services had their responsibilities for the security of their own sources, the only solution for multilateral intelligence liaison, according to John Bruce Lockhart, the Deputy Chief of MI6 (1961-66), was thus to only share intelligence in ‘a collated form where it would be impossible to identify the source’. This, however, often made it difficult for other members to verify a claim made by a member based on their intelligence-based assessments.

The problem was apparent from the early period of the Baghdad Pact. At the meeting of the Liaison Committee in May 1957, the Pakistani delegate frequently referred to the activities of the Indian Communist Party supporting subversive activities in Kashmir. The assessment by MI5 confirmed that there was indeed a threat from the Indian Communist Party in the form of propaganda attacking Pakistan’s self-proclaimed ‘neutralism’, and that the situation in Kashmir also presented a ‘substantial threat to member countries particularly Pakistan’. However, there was no supporting evidence that these subversive activities in Kashmir had a direct link to the Indian Communist Party. The heart of the problem lay in the inaccessibility of the sources (of evidence) as the Pakistani claimed. A report from the Head of SIME to the Head Office of MI5 recorded that:

…here is clearly a limit to the degree to which I can over-ride the DIB [Director of the Intelligence Bureau: Pakistani Security Service] when, complying with the roles of the Liaison Committee, they produce their own National Assessment. Equally, there is a limit to which I could challenge their evidence, although it was clear that some of their statements were somewhat dubious and others highly exaggerated, but when outrightly challenged, SADULLA

The Pakistanis’ claim that ‘Indian subversion against Pakistan was, in fact, Communist inspired’ was considered by the Foreign Office as a technique to widen the mandate of the Liaison Committee, as they had used the same technique earlier in the SEATO Committee. Indeed, these kinds of local and regional problems were not only present in the Pakistani case. All the regional members, the Iraqis, Turkish and Iranians, were preoccupied with countering their own national subversive elements. As a result, the coverage of the Liaison Committee was widened from ‘Communist’ to ‘Communist-inspired’ threats from 1957 onwards. In 1962, it also included ‘non-Communist’ threats at the firm request of the regional governments. The difficulty was then to have an agreed assessment on the nature of subversive activities in the region. The preoccupations of the regional members with their local or regional problems continued throughout the period. A report on the meeting of the Liaison Committee in 1964 recorded that ‘the main subjects that had been expected to cause difficulty were the respective preoccupations of Turkey with Cyprus, of Iran with the UAR [Egypt], and of Pakistan with India and Afghanistan’.

The Separationist Movement: The Question of the Kurds

In addition to the spread of Communist movements in the Pact area, the independence separatist movement of the Kurds, the largest minority in the region, spread across Turkey, Iraq and Iran, was a major concern to these three states. While the subject of the Kurds was often raised by the regional members of the Baghdad Pact for discussion in connection with anti-Communist measures, the dynamics of the Pact’s policy prevented serious discussion of the issue. While the dynamics of the Pact will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five, a comment by Wilbur Crane Eveland, a personal adviser to Allen Dulles, the Director of CIA,
on Middle Eastern affairs, illustrates the different perceptions of the various governments, which were directed by their own policies:

…Iraqi Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa al Barzani was then in Russia seeking Soviet support for an independent republic to unite his tribesmen with the Kurds in Iran and Turkey. To the Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish governments, the possibility of Moscow’s encouraging Kurdish and other tribal separationist movements represented a far greater danger than did the growth of local communist parties or the threat of an invasion of the Middle East by the Soviet Union. To the West, the area’s oil was of primary importance; bolstering strong central governments to control the tribes was considered the best way to regain access to the oil fields.  

For instance, when the Turkish representative sought for the Kurdish problem to be put on the agenda at the Committee meeting in January 1963, insisting that the Kurds were linked with Communists or were at least Communist-inspired, the Foreign Office responded that the Turkish claim was ‘nonsense’.  

There were indeed not only political but logical reasons for the regional governments to claim a link between the Communists and the Kurds, and that the Kurds were working alongside the Soviet Union. Firstly, the intelligence collected by local security services proved that the Soviet Union was using minority groups, such as the Armenians and the Kurds, as a means to contact local Communist Parties. This connection became apparent from the interrogation of Iraqi Communists by the Iraqi CID in 1949, after which MI5 was informed. This Soviet method was also noted by the Lebanese Sûreté Générale. In addition, as noted earlier, the intelligence shared at the Liaison Committee provided by the Turkish representative clearly indicated that the Soviet Intelligence Services incited the Kurds to subversion against the Turkish central government. Thus, the distinction between Communist and non-Communist threats was in fact not often as clear-cut as the Foreign Office assumed.

Secondly, besides non-Communists who adopted a revolutionary policy to overthrow the central governments to change the status quo, there were also committed Kurdish Communists in the region. The long-standing Syrian Communist leader Khaled Bakhdash (1936-95) was a Kurd, and was closely observed by the Lebanese Sûreté Générale. Despite their dismissive attitudes towards the Communist-Kurdish-connection, the Foreign Office

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725 Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p.53.
727 See Chapter Three.
728 Cf. TNA: PRO KV4/470: the Liddell Diaries, 29 Dec 1948; Document of 16/9/34 in Asseily et al. (eds.), A Face in the Crowd, pp.84-85.
729 Youmna Asseily et al., A Face in the Crowd, pp. 74-76, 78, 80, 89-92, 94-95, 104.
also followed Bakhdash’s activities from 1952 as the leader of the Syrian Communist Party, and was aware of the Communist-Kurdish connection elsewhere.\textsuperscript{730} In addition, as the quotation from Wilbur Eveland indicates, the regional governments were aware that the Soviet Union actively supported the Kurds’ efforts to achieve independence through propaganda, chiefly led by the Iraqi Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who was exiled from Iraq and Iran after the Second World War and lived in the Soviet Union until 1958.

Some accounts of clandestine activities of the Soviet Union have begun to appear in recent years. They now tell us that the Soviet Union strategically supported post-colonial liberation movements in the 1950s onwards to win the Cold War.\textsuperscript{731} In addition, the targets of the Soviet Union in their global grand strategy were chiefly against Britain and France, both of which were heavily committed to maintain their position against insurgents in their Colonies/territories. The KGB Chairman, Aleksandr Shelepin (1958-61), was a chief instigator of this global grand strategy.\textsuperscript{732} Vladislav Zubok has shown in the case of the Middle East that supporting radical Arab nationalists was the Soviet foreign policy to undermine Western influence in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{733} More importantly, Mulla Mustafa Barzani (often called Mulla Mustafa by his colleagues) whose activities had been at the centre of concerns by Iraqi, Iranian, Turkish and even Syrian governments, was indeed a long-running KGB agent (code-named RAIS) from the end of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{734} According to Zubok, in July 1961, by which time Barzani had returned to Baghdad from his exile in Moscow after the Iraqi Revolution, Shelpin suggested to the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev that ‘old KGB connections’ with Barzani, now the chairman of the Kurdish Democratic Party, be used to ‘activate the movement of the Kurdish population of Iraq, Iran and Turkey for creation of an independent Kurdish’ state.\textsuperscript{735}

The Foreign Office was in fact fully aware of the concerns of the regional governments about the Soviet support for the Kurds at least from 1949 as the IRD monitored

\textsuperscript{730} TNA: PRO FO371/98532: letter by the British Embassy, Moscow, to the FO, 23 Oct 1952; PRO FO371/132747: E1821/13: report ‘The Kurdish Problem’, undated (circa Aug-Nov 1958), which recorded that ‘the small groups of Kurdish intellectuals active in European capitals such as Paris, which are penetrated by Communists’.

\textsuperscript{731} This point was raised by Andrew et al., Mitrokhin Archives II, p.9.


\textsuperscript{733} Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill, USA: University of North Carolina, 2007), p.110.


\textsuperscript{735} Zubok, ‘SPY vs. SPY’, p.29.
Kurdish broadcasts from inside the Soviet territories which were directed primarily against the Iranian, Iraqi and Turkish governments. In addition, after Barzani was expelled from Iraq in 1949, the Iraqi government sought cooperation with the British, Turkish and Iranian governments on intelligence sharing on Barzani’s move, and the Foreign Office then made available to the Iraqis ‘any information’ which might affect security in Iraqi Kurdistan provided this did ‘not compromise top secret sources of information’. Moreover, the British Embassy in Baghdad suggested that the Foreign Office take action against this development as, after a field trip to Kurdish areas, Sir Henry Mack noticed that the Kurds were generally ‘radio-conscious’, and were ‘better informed about what was happening in Korea than about affairs in the next village and could only attribute this to their habit of radio-listening’. The IRD also recognised this as a vulnerable point for Communist exploitation, and suggested broadcasting anti-Communist programmes in Kurdish through their own Sharq Al-Adna station. By late 1950 the Foreign Office was aware that the Soviet Union was skilfully exploiting the Kurdish question as an anti-imperial weapon to damage the pro-British governments by giving their moral and material support to the Kurds for their independence. Nevertheless, identifying it as a very delicate issue, the Foreign Office dropped the suggestions by Sir Henry Mack and the IRD and decided not to get actively involved. This was mainly owing to the long-standing British policy in the region – to support the Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish governments, all of which had actively been assimilating the Kurds in their countries to different degrees respectively.

In the second half of the 1950s, when the stability in the region began to deteriorate, these three governments were more concerned about Mulla Barzani and his influence on the Kurds in their countries. During the Suez Crisis, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, Said Qazzaz, was seriously alarmed by Nikita Khrushchev’s speech (a probable bluff) over the Suez Crisis. The British Military Attaché in Baghdad noted that ‘if the Iraqis were not showing themselves very active in support of the Egyptians - the Russians might send back

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741 TNA: PRO FO248/1497: E1822/14: report ‘The Kurdish Problem’, undated (circa 1950). In late 1950, Barzani’s connection with the Soviets was confirmed by information from the United States.

743 The Foreign Office recognised that Turkey was the most adamant; next Iran and then Iraq, which gave some autonomy.
Mulla Mustafa with some of his partisans and parachute them into Iraq.\footnote{TNA: PRO FO371/121646: VQ1015/84G: letter by N.F.B. Shaw, Office of the Military Attache of the British Embassy, Baghdad, to the Under-Secretary of State, War Office, 4 Sep 1956.} In the wake of the Iraqi Revolution, when a rumour was spread in the Foreign Office that the Iraqi Kurds were fighting the revolutionary government in Baghdad, the Turkish and Iranian governments sought to ‘expropriate’ Iraqi Kurdistan in order to keep the Kurds in their countries.\footnote{Telegram (classified SECRET) by the British Embassy, Istanbul, to FO, 18 Jul 1958, in Massoud Barzani, \textit{Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, 1931-1961} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp.167-168.} The problem of the broadcasts to the Kurds in the Pact area from the Soviet Union was that while the radio programmes were broadcast in the Kormanjo (northern Kurdish) dialect, and were thus ‘unintelligible’ to many Iranian and Iraqi Kurds, they highlighted the contrast of ‘the oppression of Kurds by the Governments of Iran, Turkey and Iraq with the pleasure of being a Kurd in the Soviet Union’.\footnote{TNA: PRO FO371/132747: E1821/13: report ‘The Kurdish Problem’, undated (circa Aug-Nov 1958).}

Once Mulla Barzani returned from the Soviet Union to Baghdad after the Iraqi Revolution, there was an influx of refugees of anti-Barzani Kurdish tribes to both Turkey and Iran. The Turkish and Iranian governments agreed bilaterally to set up a ‘Turco-Iranian bureau’ to work on the matter and to share any intelligence on Barzani’s activities in Baghdad.\footnote{TNA: PRO FO371/132747: E1821/1: letter by Chancery in Ankara to FO, 15 Aug 1958. Although it is beyond the scope of this research, Barzani was indeed at the centre of regional politics from the mid-1960s until his death in 1979. Documentary evidence and oral testimonies indicate that Barzani was considered as an agent by SAVAK and also by MOSSAD against the Ba’ath government of Iraq. See The Harvard Iranian Oral History Project (HIOHP): memoirs of General Hassan Alavi-Kia, interviewed by Habib Lajordee, Paris, France, 1 Mar 1983, transcript 2, sequence 36, accessible on-line at \url{http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/2823712?buttons=y} (accessed, 30 Aug 2013); The US Department of State Archive: EO12958: memorandum by Harold Saunders, US Department of State, for General Haig, ‘supporting the Kurdish rebellion’, 27 Mar 1972, accessible on-line at \url{http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/70886.pdf} (accessed, 30 Aug 2013); Black et al., \textit{Israel’s Secret Wars}, p.184.} In addition, the change in the Iraqi government was proving to be the emerging threat in the region not only for political reasons but also owing to subversive activities, which were spreading into the neighbouring countries such as Turkey and Iran. In 1960 MI5 submitted its own threat assessments to its counterparts at the Liaison Committee stating that once Iraq had left the Baghdad Pact in 1958, the direct threat to the Pact area from radical Arab Nationalism ‘receded’. Instead, ‘new threats’ came from the Iraqi Communists, whose activities were tolerated by the new Iraqi government, including ‘subversive Kurdish broadcasts from Radio Baghdad’ directed at the Kurds in Iran and Turkey.\footnote{TNA: PRO FO371/149746: draft report by MI5 to FO ‘special study II: effects on the security of the CENTO area of the relationship between international communism and radical Arab nationalism’, 3 Mar 1960.} The Turkish representative at the Liaison Committee reported in 1960 on the activities of the ICP in Iraq...
and the Kurds in the region; the latter were allegedly being supported by the Kurdish Youth Association based in Switzerland.\textsuperscript{748}

Nevertheless, throughout the period between 1949 and 1963, the Foreign Office maintained the same attitudes towards the Kurds. The British representatives in the region were encouraged not to bring unnecessary attention to the Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish governments unless there was any specific request from the regional governments on the grounds that they were ‘extremely sensitive about the Kurdish minority’.\textsuperscript{749} As a consequence of this policy, intelligence collection on the Kurds was not prioritised, and the Foreign Office even apparently turned down a Kurdish volunteer who approached the British Embassy in Paris in 1950, wishing to enrol himself as an agent for MI6 and offering to travel to Soviet Azerbaijan to find out ‘what Mustapha was up to’.\textsuperscript{750} When the War Office requested information on Barzani in 1957, for instance, the Foreign Office held no information on him at all.\textsuperscript{751} Any intelligence on him and his activities came mostly from liaison with the Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish governments, and from the United States through the Liaison Committee.\textsuperscript{752}

\textbf{The Importance of Mutual Trust in the Liaison}

The Liaison Committee was one example of high-level security cooperation amongst the members in the Pact area. While Britain and the United States normally sent senior officials (of MI5 and the CIA respectively) to the committee meetings, the regional countries were represented by the heads of the intelligence and security services. In addition, unlike the first-half of the 1950s, in which the British-Middle Eastern intelligence liaison had exclusively been based on an ad hoc arrangement, the Liaison Committee was an institutionalised multilateral intelligence liaison. An intriguing question is, however, to what extent these intelligence and security services shared their secrets with their counterparts –

\textsuperscript{748} TNA: PRO FO371/149746: report by the Turkish delegation to the Liaison Committee’s 8 session, 6 Feb 1960.
\textsuperscript{750} TNA: PRO FO371/82318: EP10111/1/G: minute by H.M. Carless, 27 Sep 1950. The information was passed onto MI6 and MI5.
\textsuperscript{752} For the earlier period, see TNA: PRO FO248/1523: E1821/8: letter by G.W. Furlonge of FO to B.A.B. Burrows, Washington, 26, Feb 1951.
more precisely, whether Britain was willing to share its own intelligence with its Middle Eastern counterparts.

Archival research indicates that, unlike the other members, who were willing to cooperate on subversive activities in the region, Britain was in fact the most reluctant to give full assessments on the issue to the member states especially in the early years of the Baghdad Pact. H.P. Goodwyn of MI5 once noted to the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department (PUSD) of the Foreign Office that:

…hitherto we have not provided any comprehensive paper on subversion in the Baghdad Pact area. Rather we have confined ourselves to snippets of information on individual matters. H/SIME [Head of SIME, Philip Kirby-Green] has pointed out that on the last occasion the US Observer contributed something a good deal more elaborate than anything we have produced and he, H/SIME, has observed that it is for consideration whether we (as a matter of fact “we” involves mainly your friends [MI6]) should produce a paper something like it ourselves. The reasons for Britain’s reluctance to make its own contribution to the intelligence sharing at the Liaison Committee came from the lax protective security of the Pact. As noted earlier, the protection of intelligence sources was a prerequisite for any intelligence liaison. Thus, any intelligence shared with the member states was intelligence-based assessments, carefully concealing the identities of intelligence sources, rather than raw or single-source intelligence.

As noted earlier, the protective security of the Baghdad Pact was considered non-existent during the Baghdad Pact’s early period. Britain was mostly concerned that sensitive information might leak to unintended recipients through intelligence sharing with the Pact members. John Bruce Lockhart of MI6 noted about multilateral intelligence cooperation that ‘if you have nine nations together swopping secrets and you include details about sources, the security risk of revealing those sources is multiplied by nine, or even nine-plus’. A declassified record released under the FOIA reveals that during the early period of the Pact, Britain considered using a securer bilateral intelligence liaison with individual members on certain topics instead of intelligence-sharing with all its counterparts in the multilateral form of the Liaison Committee. This bilateral intelligence exchange, sometimes one-way traffic, was mostly conducted through other channels than the Liaison Committee. One of the

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754 Lockhart, ‘The Relationship Between Secret Services and Government in a Modern State’, p.7. He was referring to NATO.
755 TNA: PRO FO371/127861: VB1692/5G: telegram by Karachi to FO, 28 May 1957. The passages of the file have been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1145-11), 2 Dec 2011, which noted ‘more bilateral exchange of intelligence information’ was preferred to multilateral intelligence exchange at the Liaison Committee.
channels for bilateral liaison was conducted through the Counter-Subversion Office, a permanent working body at the headquarters of the Pact for counter-propaganda purposes; the members were mostly seconded from the security services.\textsuperscript{756} Using this channel, a report on Communist activities in Syria was passed to the Turkish representative by the British counterpart, at least in early 1957, as the Turks were ‘thirst’ for finding out more about ‘the Syrian situation’.\textsuperscript{757} On a different occasion, the Turks supplied intelligence to the British demonstrating that ‘Communism in Turkey is directed by exiles in Paris’.\textsuperscript{758}

It is noteworthy that MI5’s concerns about its lack of contribution to the Liaison Committee meetings may have come from the nature of its relationship with its regional counterparts. Since it was largely dependent on mutual trust, gaining credibility from the member states as a liaison partner was a cause of concern for MI5 as the British delegate. A difficulty was that, as discussed in Chapter Three, MI6 officers were also operating as a covert network, mostly without the knowledge of the local authorities, in the region.\textsuperscript{759} The exposure of MI6’s covert activities would risk the mutual trust of MI5’s liaison with the local authorities. Thus, the extent to which intelligence could be shared with the Pact members was indeed a very delicate concern – the identities of the agents controlled by MI6, and also its activities, had to be carefully concealed before sharing any intelligence with the counterparts.

Of course MI6 was not MI5’s only intelligence source. The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was, and still is, the largest and most fruitful intelligence organisation in the British intelligence community. A retired British diplomat noted that signals intelligence, known as SIGINT, provided by GCHQ, was ‘important’, ‘highly competent’ and ‘highly accessible’.\textsuperscript{760} Richard Aldrich’s book, \textit{GCHQ}, reveals that Britain maintained listening stations at RAF Habbaniya, Iraq, until 1958, and at the Army headquarters in Cyprus throughout the period.\textsuperscript{761} Other studies show that RAF Canberra aircraft modified for SIGINT interception/collection were flying from RAF Habbaniya and actively collecting wireless communications close to the Soviet border. Paul Lashmar has noted that ‘recordings made from missions were handed over to GCHQ or, in Cyprus, to

\textsuperscript{756} Apart from Britain and the United States.
\textsuperscript{757} TNA: PRO FO371/127860: VB1691/1: letter by A. R. H. Kellas, Baghdad, to FO, 5 Jan 1957.
\textsuperscript{759} See Chapter Three.
\textsuperscript{760} Private information obtained through an interview, 18 Oct 2011.
\textsuperscript{761} Aldrich, \textit{GCHQ}, pp.155-164,
GCHQ’s local station’. 762 Despite the reduction in manpower and the retreat of regional headquarters overseas to Britain in the mid-1950s, including SIME, a JIC report recorded that ‘no transfer of Sigint effort from the ME [Middle East] to the UK could be made without reducing the efficiency of the service to Middle East consumers’. 763

Indeed, SIME was also involved in SIGINT in the region. In his memoirs, Sir Alistair Horne, writes that the headquarters of SIME, attached to the headquarters of the British Army in the region, housed its own signals interception unit. He noted that:

The heavily protected SIME villa was like a tabernacle within the temple of GHQ; and within SIME, where none dared tread or even ask what went on, was a small holy of holies, manned by strange signals personnel and topped by a tangle of aerials. That was in fact the very heart of British intelligence, where all the intercept work of SIGINT (signals intelligence) went on – of which none of us normal mortals had an inkling until three decades later, when the story of Ultra and Enigma came to be revealed. 764

In addition, a former RAF officer recollects that he flew from Habbaniya with a group of ‘technicians’, who had university degrees in Russian, listening in on ‘Russian wireless traffic’, and that the recorded and interpreted materials were sent to the British Embassy in Baghdad. 765 The DSO in Baghdad was indeed serving in the guise of the Assistant Air Attaché to the British Embassy in Baghdad.

Further evidence suggests that Britain’s efforts were targeted at not only the Soviet Union, but also Middle Eastern states. In his memoirs, Peter Wright, a former MI5 officer, noted that his efforts to bug the Egyptian Embassy in London, with technical support from the Post Office, enabled GCHQ to decrypt the Egyptians’ Hagelin code machine. 766 This combined MI5 and GCHQ operation, he claimed, ‘enabled us to read the Egyptian cipher in the London Embassy throughout the Suez Crisis’. 767 Of course his revelation must be treated with some caution. 768 Documentary evidence, nevertheless, supports his claim that Britain

765 Email exchange with Norman Denman, a former member of RAF 192 Squadron (stationed at Habbaniya), 4 Jun 2012.
766 Peter Wright, Spy Catcher (Victoria, Australia: William Heinemann, 1987), pp.82-84.
767 Wright, Spy Catcher, p.85.
was able to read Egyptian communications during the crisis – the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, congratulated Sir Eric Jones, the Director of GCHQ, on his organisation’s success in breaking the Egyptian cipher during the Suez Crisis.\textsuperscript{769} In addition, while a detailed account is lacking for the 1950s, especially, the American counterpart of GCHQ, the National Security Agency (NSA), which worked intimately with GCHQ, also targeted Middle Eastern states.\textsuperscript{770} Moreover, declassified materials during the Second World War show that the GC&CS, the predecessor to GCHQ, competently decrypted the diplomatic communications of most Middle Eastern states, including the Pact members, such as Turkey, Iraq and Iran.\textsuperscript{771} This fact indicates that GCHQ may possibly have continuously, or even intermittently, been reading the communications of the Pact members in the post-war period. In this context, intelligence sharing on a certain topic with its Middle Eastern counterparts might also have revealed Britain’s intelligence gathering capabilities and compromised its sources. Therefore, British contributions to the liaison had to be carefully tailored.

There remains the question of the extent to which Britain was able to contribute fruitful intelligence assessments on subversive activities in the region to its counterparts. The available evidence suggests that MI6 had limited sources of intelligence on subversive activities in the region and so was unable to make much contribution to MI5’s assessments. Firstly, MI6 was responsible for counter-espionage in the region, not counter-subversion as agreed with SIME in 1951. Secondly, as demonstrated earlier, British Intelligence as a whole was largely dependent on the local authorities for information on Communist activities in the region.\textsuperscript{772} Thirdly, in his biography of Sir Dick White, Tom Bower claimed that MI6 had only very ‘few Arabists’ to understand the nature of the Middle East throughout the 1950s. Moreover, instead of collecting intelligence, MI6 was occupied with conducting clandestine political operations in the region, including an assassination plot against Nasser.\textsuperscript{773} In order to

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\textsuperscript{769} ‘How valuable we have found this material and how much I appreciate the hard work and skill involved in its production’, quoted in Aldrich (ed.), \textit{Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain}, pp.55-56.


\textsuperscript{771} Cf. TNA: PRO HW12/298: 128879 of telegram from Foreign Ministry, Angora, to Turkish Charge d’Affaires, London, 1 Mar 1944; 128898 of telegram from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Tehran, to the Persian Legation, Washington, 2 Mar 1944; and 128928 of telegram from Iraqi Minister, Cairo, to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baghdad, 3 Mar 1944.

\textsuperscript{772} See Chapter Two and Chapter Three.

overcome this intelligence deficiency in the region, John Bruce Lockhart, the Deputy Chief
of MI6, held a three-day conference in the summer of 1960, to which all MI6 heads of station
in the region were ‘summoned’ to discuss ‘how to penetrate the Nasserite movement
[subversive activities in the region]’. 774

The issue is also true for SIGINT: it is questionable how useful SIGINT was for
identifying subversive threats in the region. As briefly mentioned in the Introduction, the JIC
meeting in 1958 recorded that ‘subversive threats’ to ‘British interests throughout the world’
held the highest priority for intelligence collection – the same rank as a strategic nuclear
attack by the Soviet Union against Great Britain. 775 During the Second World War, Sir Dick
White noted that SIGINT was indeed ‘the biggest source of intelligence’ for detecting Axis
agents engaged in espionage and subversive activities in the region. 776 In addition, David
Easter has claimed that GCHQ was able to trace the connections between Nasser and
subversive activities in the late 1950s, which were directed against pro-British governments
in the region, such as Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. 777

Indeed, the subversive activities of radical Arab Nationalism, associated with Nasser,
were certainly a concern for the British during the period. However, it is important to note
that, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five, Nasser’s subversive activities were not
considered as serious a threat as Communist activities until the early 1960s – they were
certainly a subversive threat to Iraq but not to the Pact as a whole, the target of which was
exclusively set as Communist activities during the period between 1956 and 1962. In
addition, when the security services studied Communist activities in the region and radical
Arab nationalist movements associated with Nasser in 1960, the members of the Liaison
Committee clearly distinguished between the two threats. 778 As will be shown in Chapter
Five, nevertheless, as a result of the strong insistence from the regional members, non-

the period up to the early 1960s, when the reform of MI6 by Sir Dick White began to take effect, the status of
MI6 in Whitehall as an intelligence provider was ‘not high’: MI6 itself was ‘tolerated rather than admired’.
Email exchange, 18 Sep 2011.
774 Bower, Perfect English Spy, p.236.
775 TNA: PRO CAB158/33: JIC (58) 72 (Final): report by the Joint Intelligence Committee, ‘Intelligence
777 Easter, ‘Spying on Nasser’.
778 C.f. TNA: PRO FO371/140777: EB1691/7G: attached report of SF303/2/Supp/C/E2 by MI5 to S.J.
Whitewell of FO, 23 Jul 1959; PRO FO371/149746: draft report by MI5 to FO ‘special study II: effects on the
security of the CENTO area of the relationship between international communism and radical Arab
nationalism’, 3 Mar 1960. Also see TNA: FO371/157497: EB1693/3G: report by A.J. Kellar of MI5 to P.G.D.
Adams, Security Department of FO, 17 Jan 1961. The whole file has been declassified under the FOIA at my
Communist threats, including Nasserite subversive activities, were finally included in the category of ‘subversive’ threats to the Pact in 1962.\footnote{TNA: PRO FO371/164061: EB1692/3: draft note, ‘UK delegation brief for the twelfth session of the Counter-Subversion Committee of CENTO’, undated, circa 1962.} This was mainly due to the fact that non-Communist threats were viewed regionally as equally as subversive as Communist threats in the region from the regional point of view, and also that non-Communist threats threatened the existence of the pro-Western member states, which was ‘directly in the interests of Communism’.\footnote{TNA: PRO FO371/164060: EB1691/1: letter by B.A.B. Burrows, Ankara, to G.H. Hiller of FO, 15 Feb 1962.} It is thus doubtful whether Britain’s SIGINT could make much of a contribution to the picture and intentions of underground Communist movements in the Pact area especially during the period between 1956 and 1963.

This point also raises the question of the value of SIGINT as a useful source on Communist activities in the region. It is known that in the immediate post-war period, SIGINT was a critical source for exposing a web of Soviet espionage networks (with American Communists) in the United States and elsewhere (codenamed VENONA).\footnote{John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, \textit{VENONA} (New Haven, US: Yale University Press, 1999); Nigel West, ‘Venona': the British dimension', \textit{INS}, vol.17, no.1 (2002), pp.117-134. On the Australian dimension, see Andrew, \textit{Defence of the Realm}, pp.367-381.} However, no documentary evidence suggests that VENONA had any impact on the Middle Eastern context.\footnote{All VENONA materials are accessible at TNA. According to the GCHQ historian, ‘there is no secret store of VENONA material which has not been released’. Email exchange with the GCHQ historian, 19 Sep 2011.} Moreover, given the abrupt end of VENONA as an on-going valuable intelligence source in the early 1950s, the value of SIGINT on the connections between Moscow and Communists in the Middle East, especially in the late 1950s and early 1960s, is questionable.\footnote{VENONA was tipped off the Soviets by Kim Philby in the late 1950 and early 1951. See Andrew et al., \textit{Mitrokhin Archive}, p.206.} Moreover, there was no evidence to suggest that Communists in the region were using wireless communication, a medium which could potentially be intercepted by GCHQ, at least, during the period. Evidence suggests that owing to the nature of the Middle East, where Communist activities were prohibited by local authorities, the contact between Russians and Communists in the region were rare. Even if the contact had been made by landline or post, for instance, the first organisations to intercept the communication by either wire-tapping or censorship would have been those of the local authorities – the police but not GCHQ. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter Two, the techniques and methods for contacting
local Communists employed by the Russians were exposed by the interrogation of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) members by the Iraqi CID.\footnote{See Chapter Two. According to the Liddell Diaries, the Russians used a small circle of minorities, such Armenians and the Kurds to contact Communist members in the region. See TNA: PRO KV4/470: the Liddell Diaries, 29 Dec 1948. Also note that the use of Armenians and the Kurds for contacting Communists by the Russians both in Lebanon and Syria was also noted by the private papers of the late Emir Farid Chehab. See Published as Document of 16/9/34 in Asseily et al. (eds.), A Face in the Crowd, pp.84-85.}

In this context, it is questionable whether Britain had much intelligence on subversive activities in the region beyond the capacity of MI5 during the period, especially, in the first years of the Baghdad Pact. Britain may have been then largely dependent on the intelligence assessments submitted by the members of the Liaison Committee. Nevertheless, documentary evidence suggests that after the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, Britain had several sources of information on the internal affairs of Iraq, including the activities of the ICP.\footnote{TNA: PRO FO371/149746: EB1691/2/G: draft report of the UK contribution to the CENTO Liaison Committee papers by MI5, ‘special study 1: the Iraq Communist Party’, 3 Mar 1960.} In the biography of Sir Dick White, Tom Bower noted that, ‘despite the antagonism of the Kassem [Qasim] regime’, Britain’s old relationship with the Iraqis, including the Police, the armed forces, and businessmen, allowed MI6 to ‘penetrate government agencies’.\footnote{Bower, Perfect English Spy, p.236. See also Corinne Souza, Baghdad’s Spy: A Personal Memoir of Espionage and Intrigue from Baghdad to London (London: Mainstream, 2003).}

### Conclusion

This chapter has detailed the establishment of multilateral anti-Communist cooperation under the Baghdad Pact and the activities concerning the Liaison Committee of the Pact. As noted in Chapter One, there was the shift in the balance in London concerning anti-Communist measures in the mid-1950s. This chapter has demonstrated that from 1956 onwards the Baghdad Pact became an instrument of Britain’s anti-Communist policy in instituting and coordinating its activities in the region. Richard Jasse once claimed that the Baghdad Pact was a form of colonialism – meaning that it was essentially run by British imperial interests in keeping Britain’s own influence in the region.\footnote{Jasse, ‘The Baghdad Pact’, pp.140-156.} To some degree, Jasse’s claim is right – Harold Macmillan’s offer to the regional members to train them in the techniques and methods of Britain’s anti-Communist measures was indeed to prevent the spread of Communist activities in the region, which was equally meant to serve British
interests in maintaining influence over the pro-British governments in the region. It is noteworthy that despite Macmillan’s suggestion, intelligence exchange under the Baghdad Pact was, nevertheless, strained. This was mainly owing to the security of the Pact – Britain considered that sharing classified intelligence with the regional members was unsafe. A by-product of this lax security was the establishment of SAVAK in 1957. The security concern was not only about the Iranians, however. Throughout the period between 1956 and 1963, Britain sought to improve the state of the security of the Pact members. The extent to which the state of CENTO security improved after 1963 is a matter of speculation. However, given the state of conditions up to 1963, and the problems associated with them, it seems most unlikely that the state of security improved substantially soon after 1963.

This chapter has also shown that the anti-Communist threat was not monolithic, nor clear-cut. Britain (and the United States) were mostly concerned on the one hand about the spread of Communist activities in the region – though of course Britain’s policy shifted its focus onto Nasser for a while, but it appears that this did not much affect MI5’s commitment to intelligence exchange on the Communist threat as the primary concern for the Liaison Committee. The regional members’ concerns on the other hand were wider – they were not exclusively about Communist activities, but also other threats such as the Kurdish separatist movement, which were also seen as ‘Communist-inspired’ threats by the regional members. As demonstrated in this chapter, disentangling Communist from non-Communist threats was in fact very difficult as the demarcation line between Communist and non-Communist activities was often blurred - because Communist Parties were illegal in the Pact area, their subversive activities were often conducted in tandem with non-Communist groups against the local governments. In addition, the difference in the perceptions between Britain (and the United States) on the one hand and Middle Eastern states on the other demonstrates the dynamics of the Pact, a topic which will be further discussed in Chapter Five. The limitations of Britain’s influence will be further discussed in different contexts in both Chapters Five and Six.
Chapter Five

Counter-Subversion by Propaganda:
The Conflicting Interests of the Baghdad Pact
Our main concern at the start of the meeting was that the Asian members [i.e. the regional members] would tend to interpret counter-subversion as simply an excuse to discuss and develop operations by their own police and security services...[comprising] Generals and Colonels, who took rather a physical view of counter-subversion, and no one even remotely connected with information work as we know it.

- Sir Leonard Figg

Introduction

Panagiotis Dimitrakis, a military historian, argues that, unlike NATO, CENTO was a ‘failed alliance’ since it did not survive beyond the Cold War. He asserts, above all, that ‘there was no real threat to be deterred in the first place’.

The absence of the threat of a Soviet invasion, nevertheless, does not necessarily mean that there was no threat at all in the Middle East. Owing to the nature of the Middle East, where political intrigues, assassinations and coups d’état were commonplace, most Middle Eastern governments were not concerned about the threat of a Soviet invasion but instead internal subversion. In addition, the perceptions of Middle Eastern leaders were fostered by their views on the development of regional affairs, which Daniel Pipes called the ‘conspiracy mentality’. In this context, looking at propaganda is crucial – the perceptions of the policymakers were formed by both real and imagined threats of internal subversion.

The existing literature clearly indicates the significance of propaganda in shaping regional affairs. A classic study on the techniques of Soviet propaganda in the region by Baruch Hazan, for instance, shows that the Soviet Union had undoubtedly been the chief instigator for calling the local population to arms against ‘imperialists’ and ‘reactionary’ (pro-western) governments in the region since the late 1940s.

The fear of internal subversion was also fostered by the rise of radical Arab nationalist movements in the region from the mid-1950s, associated with the Egyptian leader, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser. By the time the Baghdad Pact was formed in 1955, Nasser had recognised the power of propaganda and considered it his only weapon against ‘imperialists’, i.e. largely Britain and to a lesser extent the United States, and, above all, pro-imperialist Middle Eastern governments, such as

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789 Dimitrakis, Failed Alliances of the Cold War, p.4.
790 Pipes, ‘Dealing with Middle Eastern Conspiracy Theories’, p.43.
Iraq. Sir Sam Falle, the Oriental Counsellor at the British Embassy in Baghdad (1957-61), believed that the Iraqi Revolution was clearly instigated by Egypt’s propaganda through the Voice of the Arabs, a popular programme of Cairo Radio, and noted that ‘its virulence and incitement to violence were horrifying’. Wilbur Crane Eveland, his American counterpart, also wrote that the Iraqi Revolution resulted from a series of propaganda efforts emanating through ‘Nasser’s radio’. Moreover, the power of radio was an important symbol of emerging nationalism in the region, and the Voice of the Arabs certainly played a role in fostering Algeria’s revolutionary movements.

This chapter will show the nature of the threats which Middle Eastern governments encountered; how Britain and the local authorities utilised propaganda as an anti-Communist measure; and above all how a schism in propaganda approaches can be seen as a microcosm of the problems affecting the regional cooperation as a whole. The discussion of the limitations in intelligence sharing in the previous chapter has indicated that the regional security services held different views on internal security from their British counterparts. The main purpose of this chapter will then demonstrate that these security services dominated in both internal security and propaganda in their home countries, and that these services frequently held views on security and intelligence that contrasted sharply with the policing and information-oriented approach of the British. This rift was most noticeable and most destructive in the Counter-Subversion Committee. This chapter will mainly focus on the nature of collective counter-subversion by propaganda between Britain and the regional members of the Baghdad Pact (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and to a lesser extent Pakistan). It will show that although all members considered Communist movements as the main threat and they took this threat very seriously, there were limitations in the collective efforts under the Pact, mainly stemming from its dynamics – while Britain and the United States considered the Pact as an alliance against the Soviet Union or International Communism, the regional members were more concerned about local or regional problems. The problem was reinforced by the fact that the Counter-Subversion Committee of the Baghdad Pact, the highest policymaking committee for propaganda, consisted of the heads of the security and intelligence services of

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792 Heikal, Nasser, p.159.
794 Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p.287, which also recorded the impact and influence of Cairo Radio on politics in Lebanon. Ibid., pp.205, 266, 291.
795 Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1965), pp.53-80.
the regional states, which also handled counter-subversive propaganda campaigns in their respective countries.\textsuperscript{796}

\textbf{The Nature of Threats in the Middle East}

As noted in Chapter Two, despite the Communist Parties in the region being outlawed by the late 1940s, there were some differences among the Middle Eastern governments in their anti-Communist stances. However, all the local security services were engaged in anti-Communist measures, arresting Communists, and confiscating subversive publications and printing machines of alleged subversive activists or groups. The Private Papers of Emir Farid Chehab, Head of the Sûreté Générale in Lebanon, which was considered the country most tolerant of Communist activities in the region, illustrate how seriously the local security services treated the Communist threats in the region.\textsuperscript{797} The intelligence obtained by the Lebanese Sûreté Générale, for instance, came not only from its own agents but also through liaising with other Middle Eastern security services under the framework of the Arab League, and also perhaps in the form of informal arrangements. Through these arrangements, the Lebanese Sûreté Générale ‘kept up its surveillance and monitoring, and watched’ over Communist movements not only in Lebanon, but also in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and the Arabian Gulf area.\textsuperscript{798}

There were certain limitations in anti-Communist measures by Middle Eastern security services especially against the spread of subversive publications. The local security services found it difficult to intercept and confiscate subversive (i.e. illegal) publications, which circulated in the country or even across the region. A British diplomat in Lebanon, for instance, which was considered to be a smaller country in the region, noted that an illegal publication, “Akhbar”, was believed to have a circulation of ‘about 10,000 copies a day’ in Lebanon, ‘which for Lebanon is very large’.\textsuperscript{799} These subversive publications were the main source for Communist activists for agitating local populations to turn against their own

\textsuperscript{796} An exception was Pakistan where a senior official of the Ministry of Interior was the Pakistani representative.
\textsuperscript{797} MECA, St. Antony's College, Oxford: CHEHAB Collection: GB165-0384: Box 10, which contains 179 separate items, including extensive records on Communist movements, activities and the organisational structure and members of Communist Parties in various countries in the region, dating back since the 1920s until the 1980s.
\textsuperscript{798} Asseily et al. (eds.), \textit{A Face in the Crowd.}, p.68. Also see Chapter Two and Chapter Four.
\textsuperscript{799} TNA: PRO FO371/128002: VL1017/1: letter by Sir George Middleton, the British Ambassador in Beirut, to Selwyn Lloyd, 18 Mar 1957.
governments. In addition, some materials were smuggled into countries from outside the jurisdictions of the local security services, which made the local security services unworkable to eradicate a root of subversive activities, and the activists were also often moving across the borders. Moreover, the printing presses of these illegal publications were reported to be located either in the Soviet Union or in the Soviet Embassy itself, against which the local security services were unable to take further actions.

Indeed, subversive Communist publications were not only the threat. Extraterritorial radio broadcasts were often more subversive and threatening to the existence of local authorities, especially associated with the West. Above all Nasser extensively used Cairo Radio and employed the power of the masses to force out British influence from the Middle East. He targeted not only Britain itself, but also pro-British Middle Eastern governments, namely the Hashemite dynasty, Iraq, Jordan, and pro-western Lebanon. Similar to Communist activities, Nasser also sought to generate internal subversion, ‘revolution’ in Nasser’s words. Diplomatic correspondence in July 1957 also records that King Hussein of Jordan was being attacked by ‘hostile Egyptian propaganda.’ A ‘clandestine radio station’ named ‘Radio Free Jordan’ was being established and the Egyptians were ‘trying to recruit Jordanians for it.’ Similarly, another radio station situated outside Iraq, named ‘Radio Free Iraq’, was calling on the people of Iraq to revolt against the Iraqi government led by Nuri al-Said.

In addition to his Cairo Radio broadcasts, Nasser further encouraged ‘revolution’ by providing material support for coup d’état. Egyptian Military Attachés acted as vehicles of revolution in the region. According to Yaacov Caroz, Nasser ‘considered subversion to be a legitimate means of achieving his objectives’. Prime Minister Anthony Eden wrote in his memoirs that there was evidence that Nasser was preparing ‘to mount revolutions of young officers’ in various countries in the region. Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the Director-General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion (1952 - 56), once noted that, in addition to

801 TNA: PRO FO371/128002: VL1017/1: letter by Sir George Middleton, the British Ambassador in Beirut, to Selwyn Lloyd, 18 Mar 1957.
806 Caroz, Arab Secret Services, p.84.
Communists, ‘the worst’ subversive activity he had to deal with in fact came from Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

They [Egyptians] are entirely unscrupulous…[T]hey broadcast a stream of vitriolic abuse of Nuri Said in Hebrew. So much for Arab brotherly love. For months recently they have been trying to organise sabotage gangs to operate from Jordan into Israel, in order to compromise this country. Their local M.A. [Military Attaché] is the mainspring of this. For all the time I have been here – nearly four years – Egypt has flooded the Press and Air of the Middle East with bitterly hostile attacks on “Imperialists” and “Colonizers”…Saudi Arabia is working hand in glove with Egypt… – [through] lavish bribes on a fabulous scale which include or included subsidies to the Jordan royal family – Cabinet Ministers, Deputies and newspapers, one and all on their pay-roll. Their principal objects of dislike are the members of the Hashemite family…So all is directed at weakening Hashemite influence.

In this report, Coghill suggested that ‘the only right and safe line’ for Britain was to ‘build up Jordan and back Iraq against the destructive and dangerous influences of Egypt and Saudi Arabia’. 809 Although it is uncertain whether his suggestion had any impact on subsequent decisions, declassified Overseas Planning Committee records show that ‘particular attention’ was paid to Syria and the Committee gave MI6 and the IRD ‘the region-wide task of diminishing Egyptian and Saudi influence’ and ‘breaking the Egypt/Saudi axis’. 810

Documentary evidence shows that Egyptian Military Attachés were expelled from countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia between 1956 and 1957 on the grounds that the Egyptians were conducting subversive activities, such as instigating subversive activities and even supplying arms and explosives to politically-motivated locals for use against their own governments. 811 According to a JIC report in August 1958, a number of pro-Nasserite ‘influential opponents’ of regimes such as Jordan and Lebanon were provided with ‘weapons and explosives for use in promoting disorder and, if necessary, to overthrow the established government by revolution’. 812 As Nasser’s popularity grew, the reactionary pro-British regimes, including even Iran, felt increasingly threatened by internal subversion. 813

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809 Ibid.
810 A minute by Patrick Dean to the Foreign Secretary, 19 Mar 1956. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013.
811 TNA: PRO FO371/133792: V10316/1: minute ‘Egyptian subversive activity in the Middle East’, 19 Jul 1957. See also Caroz, Arab Secret Services, pp.63-86; Wheelock, Nasser’s New Egypt, pp.251-252.
Besides the Egyptian Military Attachés, Britain also viewed Egyptian teachers throughout the region as subversive propagandists.\textsuperscript{174} MI6 reported in 1958 that the number of Egyptian teachers throughout the region had increased from about 300 before the Egyptian coup of 1952 to 3,000 in 1958, and that there was ‘evidence’ obtained from various countries, such as Lebanon, the Persian Gulf States, and Jordan, that the Egyptian government used ‘Egyptian teachers’ for both espionage and subversion. It concluded that this ‘large and well-placed body of propagandists abroad’ presented ‘a grave threat to the future stability of the countries in which they are working, and to the Middle East as a whole’.\textsuperscript{815} The Overseas Planning Committee, successor to the AC (O) Committee, tasked MI6, MI5 and the IRD to counteract their activities in the Persian Gulf States in March 1956, noting that ‘we should do whatever is possible to counteract Egyptian influence, especially the influence of Egyptian teachers’.

As noted in the previous chapter, there were indeed a series of MI6’s attempts to overthrow Nasser in the course of the Suez Crisis in 1956.\textsuperscript{817} According to Heikal, George K. Young, the Vice-Chief of MI6, said to his American counterpart, James Eichelberger of the CIA, ‘[MI6 will] do a Mossadeq’ with Nasser’.\textsuperscript{818} MI6 was not of course acting alone, but these operations were directed by the British Government. Amongst all, it was Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who wanted Nasser ‘destroyed’.\textsuperscript{819} At the working level, Douglas Dodds-Parker, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Overseas Planning Committee, formed a special committee with Sir Charles Hambro, a former chief of the wartime Special Operations Executive (SOE), to suggest any clandestine actions against

\textsuperscript{174} TNA: PRO CAB158/34: Annex to JIC (58) 121: an MI6 memorandum ‘the subversive potential of Egyptian teachers in the Middle East and Africa’, undated (circa.1958).
\textsuperscript{815} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{816} A minute by Patrick Dean to the Foreign Secretary, 19 Mar 1956. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013. In addition to the Egyptian teachers, Britain also saw school teachers with ‘communist leanings’ elsewhere also as a threat since they might inspire students for possible subversive activities. See TNA: PRO CO1035/59: file entitled ‘subversion inspired by school teachers with Communist leanings: background for Joint Intelligence Committee paper’, from Jan to Dec 1956.
\textsuperscript{817} On MI6’s plot to kill Nasser, see Obituary of John McGlashan, The Telegram, 10 Sep 2010, accessible online at \url{http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/7995221/John-McGlashan.html} (accessed, 10 Sep 2013); Caroz, Arab Secret Services, pp.21-27.
\textsuperscript{818} See Heikal, Cutting The Lion’s Tail, pp.103-4.
Egypt and Nasser. By the mid-August 1956, Dodds-Parker was already contemplating Britain’s strategic position in the Middle East on the assumption of Britain’s relationship with a new Egyptian government after Nasser. In addition, the existing evidence also suggests that there was also an attempt to overthrow Nasser led by Conservative backbenchers, such as Julian Amery, also a former SOE officer. These attempts, nevertheless, failed, and Nasser’s popularity significantly grew after the Suez Crisis.

Communists and radical Arab nationalist propaganda was a clear threat to local authorities whose populations were always targeted by the UAR and Soviet Union with calls for revolution. As noted by Baruch Hazan, who studied the techniques and methods of Soviet propaganda in the region, the association of the Baghdad Pact with Britain and the United States ‘created a community of interests’ between Nasser’s Egypt and the Soviet Union as a target for propaganda. The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-Said, also felt that the existence of the Hashemite dynasty of Iraq was threatened by propaganda from Moscow, Cairo and Damascus. From the mid-1950s, the problem only worsened as non-Communist forces, chiefly radical Arab nationalists, grew increasingly hostile to the local authorities.

From the perspective of the regional members, regardless of their political affiliations, these threats were substantial, often spreading across the borders, and were considered Communist-inspired for their ‘revolutionary tendency’. Worst of all, as CENTO’s regional members all agreed, it was the Voice of the Arabs, a non-Communist threat, which was most vocal in calls for revolutions in the region. Nevertheless, countering these threats with propaganda under the single authority of the Baghdad Pact proved more complex as a
response. This was mainly due to the fact that there was no consensus at the policy level as to whether these non-Communist activities constituted a subversive threat. As the perceptions of these substantial threats differed between Britain and the United States on one hand, and the regional members on the other, this was a significant cause of frustration for the regional states who insisted that these non-Communist activities posed an existential threat to their regimes.

The Dynamics of the Baghdad Pact and the Committees

The Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees of the Baghdad Pact were clearly tasked from the outset to tackle the Communist problems in the region. As the regional members were well-aware of the potential danger of Communist movements, throughout the period between 1956 and 1963 they maintained a strong anti-Communist stance and cooperated in anti-Communist propaganda with the members through the Counter-Subversion Committee. The Iraqis were at the forefront of anti-Communist propaganda until their withdrawal from the Pact in 1958. After the Iraqi withdrawal, Sir Roger Stevens, the British Ambassador in Tehran (1954-58), noted that the Turks became ‘by a long way’ the leading force with the Iranians ‘second’ and the Pakistanis ‘a very poor third’.  

Under the Counter-Subversion Committee, which was the highest policymaking body for countering subversive propaganda efforts, there was a ‘permanent executive arm’ of counter-subversion, the Counter-Subversion Office (CSO). The CSO, consisting of representatives from each member, was placed under the administrative control of the Secretary-General of the Baghdad Pact and housed in the headquarters of the Pact in Baghdad (1956-58) and Ankara (1958-79). A day-to-day contact amongst the Pact members took place though the CSO which essentially coordinated counter-subversive measures between the member states, and acted as a channel for disseminating propaganda materials from the members. For instance, a selection of IRD materials, especially anti-Communist publications, was shared through the CSO, whose members translated the materials into their own languages and then distributed them through their own national channels. These

materials included a comparative study of Soviet aid to Israel and the Arab states, stories exposing a life behind the Communist Bloc, and about the ideas of Communism, such as ‘What is Communism?’.

For example, as a result of the CSO’s work, there was an ‘impressive increase’ in anti-Communist material published in Turkey. During the first eight months of 1959, over 388 articles ‘based on IRD materials’ appeared in the Turkish press. The CSO members constantly visited Britain to attend training courses organised by the IRD. The CSO also studied the methods and techniques of Soviet disinformation activities; such as how the Soviet Union forged documents and disseminated these forged documents through the local press in the Pact area.

Although the CSO was a multilateral body of cooperation, it also facilitated closer bilateral relationships. D.C. Hopson of the Foreign Office noted that:

...because the CSO has to work on a basis of multi-lateral agreement its sphere of activity is necessarily limited. But meanwhile a great deal of bilateral co-operation in activities which can be called “counter-subversive” is taking place on a routine, day-to-day basis between the Iranians and ourselves - and, in fact, between all the CENTO allies. For example, we are exchanging information about Communist activities, helping each other with the training of broadcasting staff, arranging educational, cultural and technical exchanges, etc. This distinction - between the CENTO allies on a bilateral basis and the relatively small but still useful contribution that can be made through the CSO on a multi-lateral basis - is very important.

As noted in Chapter Four, this sort of bilateral cooperation also extended to the exchange of ‘secret intelligence’.

Despite close cooperation on anti-Communist propaganda, as a multilateral organisation, CENTO was limited in its propaganda efforts. Any decisions for collective propaganda campaigns were taken on the basis of consensus, and they were often vetoed by a Pact member. Although the members worked well on conducting anti-Communist measures in the region, their national interests clashed when their policies differed. As a result, the effectiveness of counter-subversive campaigns by propaganda was hampered by the dynamics of the Pact, and a sense of frustration was very clear in the late 1950s and early

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831 TNA: PRO FO1110/934: IRD report ‘anti-Communist and other material supplied by the Information Department, Baghdad, and reproduced by the local press during May 1956’, 2 Jul 1956.
833 TNA: PRO FO1110/1048: IRD monthly report by Regional Information Office, Beirut, 3 Aug 1957.
1960s. Recollecting his time in Ankara (1964-67), Charles Naas, a former member of the State Department’s policy-planning staff of the United States, encapsulates the dynamics of the Pact, writing that:

CENTO was a disappointment to the regional members, all of them, because they hoped – or had hoped – to use the organization and therefore the united US-UK prestige…We [US and Britain] took a, very, I’d say, fairly rigid line, that the CENTO organization was intended to deal with a communist threat, and basically a Soviet Communist threat obviously. Whereas Iran would have liked us very much in public statements, the communiques, or actual activities to use the organization against Iraq [after Iraq had left]…The Pakistanis wanted us to use the organization against India in some fashion or other. The Turks would have been [sic] if we fully sided with them on the Cyprus question.\(^{838}\)

In this regard, as seen before, the Pact was broadly divided into two camps – the regional members on the one hand, and Britain and the United States on the other. The regional members’ frustration was often directed at Britain and the United States, yet they were also dependent on ‘British skill’ and ‘American material resources’ for their own counter-subversive propaganda campaigns.\(^{839}\)

The growing frustration was particularly seen after Iraq withdrew its membership in 1958, and Britain abandoned its anti-Nasserite policy in 1959.\(^{840}\) Amongst all, Iran was the most concerned with this ‘negative’ counter-subversive policy of the Pact as the Iranians still feared ‘subversion’ by its neighbouring states, the Soviet Union, Egypt (through Cairo and Damascus Radio) and Iraq, until the early 1960s.\(^{841}\) These concerns were frequently made at the Counter-Subversion Committee by the Iranian representatives, General Teymour Bakhtiar (Head of SAVAK, 1957-61) and General Hassan Pakravan (Deputy-Head of SAVAK, 1957-61).\(^{842}\) The senior SAVAK officers criticised that ‘the British nor the Americans intended to make the Committee anything more than a talking shop’.\(^{843}\) Nevertheless, the United States maintained its firm stance that the scope of the Counter-Subversion Office of the Pact should


\(^{840}\) The British policy towards Nasser will be examined later in this chapter.


\(^{842}\) SAVAK had two deputies. General Pakravan was responsible for external affairs, while General Hassan Alavi-Kia (1957-62) was responsible for internal affairs. General Pakravan later succeeded Bakhtiar as Head of SAVAK (1961-65).

be placed ‘exclusively on meeting the Communist and Communist-inspired subversive threats’ and nothing more.  

The American attitudes towards the region merit brief attention here since the Americans’ involvement in the Pact sometimes acted as an obstruction to propaganda efforts. Despite maintaining the official status as an ‘observer’, the United States in fact exercised influence on the policy of the Pact through substantial financial and moral support to the regional members. The United States’ own policies towards Nasser and radical Arab Nationalism have been studied elsewhere: while maintaining its official neutral position towards the region throughout the period, it pursued its own policy to contain radical Arab Nationalism by supporting Saudi Arabia as a challenger to Nasser’s popularity in the region in the late 1950s until the end of the Eisenhower Doctrine in September 1960. However, at the Pact during the period between 1956 and 1963, as indicated earlier, their focus was exclusively on anti-Communist activities.

Their ambivalent attitude towards the region was, nevertheless, unsurprising since their departmental policies were often in conflict. Their indecisive and often non-existent national strategy, based on a short-sighted and ill-founded policy towards the region, has also been criticised. For instance, Robert McClintock, the Ambassador of the United States to Lebanon (1958-61), who himself felt that it was ‘a mistake to be anti-Nasser’, informally spoke to his British counterpart, Sir Moore Crosthwaite, about a division of opinion about the Eisenhower doctrine to undermine Nasser’s popularity in the region. The indecisive US attitude towards the region was also a cause of confusion to the Pact members and was frequently criticised by the regional members – the Iranian delegate, General Teymour Bakhtiar (Head of SAVAK, 1957-61), complained to his British counterpart that a representative from the Department of State, and another from the CIA, ‘did not even agree with each other’ over what constituted a ‘subversive’ threat in the region.

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845 A specific strategy was formed (Project OMEGA) to confront with the increasing Nasser’s popularity throughout the region. See Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (University of North Carolina: London, 2004), p.265.
847 TNA: PRO FO371/141825: V1015/2: letter by P.M. Crosthwaite, Beirut, to Sir Roger Stevens of FO, 25 Apr 1959. Robert McClintock reasoned that Nasser’s stand on Communism was of ‘priceless advantage’ and above all Nasser ‘had saved Syria from Communism’.
Similar to the Liaison Committee, the meetings of the Counter-Subversion Committee were mostly a place of political discussions, where there was no consensus amongst its members beyond the Communist threat in the region. For instance, as noted in Chapter Four, the regional members were concerned by the activities of the Kurds, and their connection with the Soviet Union. When the Turks insisted that Kurdish nationals were suspected of being Communists or at least communist-inspired, for instance, the British response was ‘nonsense’.\textsuperscript{849} In addition, from the establishment of the Pact, Pakistan frequently raised its concerns about subversive activities in Kashmir and claimed that activities were supported and instigated by propaganda from the Indian Communist Party.\textsuperscript{850} Once their claim was rejected, the Pakistanis appealed to revise the mandate of the Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees to deal with not only Communists, but also all subversion in the Pact area.\textsuperscript{851} Nevertheless, Britain was reluctant to accept the Pakistani claim and the Foreign Office sought to avoid the ‘subversive’ label due to its concern over diplomatic relations with India.\textsuperscript{852}

The exclusion of a non-Communist or even Communist-inspired threat from the coherent counter-subversion policy of the Pact caused a sense of frustration among the regional members. As a result, despite the fact that the Liaison Committee of the Pact, most of whose members also sat at the Counter-Subversion Committee, had already agreed that Nasser was clearly not a Communist puppet;\textsuperscript{853} the regional members, especially the Turks and Iranians, wished to label Nasser as ‘a tool of Communist subversion’ to conduct anti-Nasserite propaganda campaigns under the Pact.\textsuperscript{854}

The dynamics of the Pact policy limited the efficacy of the cooperative propaganda efforts. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the regional member states restricted their propaganda campaigns in their own countries. As the responsibility for conducting propaganda operations always remained in the hands of local authorities, the regional member states certainly used the techniques and CSO materials for their own purposes. For

\textsuperscript{849} TNA: PRO FO371/170252: minute, ‘CENTO Liaison Committee (Washington, January 21-25)’, by deGourcy Ireland, 14 Jan 1963.
\textsuperscript{850} TNA: PRO FO371/127861: VB1692/5: telegram by Karachi to FO, 28 May 1957.
\textsuperscript{851} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{852} TNA: PRO FO371/127861: VB1692/6: minute by W.G. Lamarque of FO to P.H. Laurence of FO, 31 May 1957.
\textsuperscript{853} TNA: PRO FO371/157497: EB1693/3G: report by A.J. Kellar of MI5 to P.G.D. Adams, Security Department of FO, 17 Jan 1961. The file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 0894-11), 27 Oct 2011.
instance, while the British policy ordered a halt to the IRD’s all-out anti-Nasserite campaigns towards the end of 1959, the regional member states did not follow the same practice. In 1959 the IRD asked its outposts in the region to assess the extent to which the anti-Nasserite propaganda materials, so-called ‘Transmission X’, were still being disseminated in each country of the Middle East.\(^{855}\) Since the IRD had halted the supply of such materials to the region, nearly all Arab states, including Jordan and Lebanon, stopped disseminating these materials in their countries.\(^{856}\) On the contrary, the members of CENTO (now Turkey, Iran and Pakistan), where anti-Communist and the ‘Transmission X’ materials were pooled at the headquarters, were, nevertheless, still disseminating these materials, while they slightly tailored for their purposes, broadening the focus from not only anti-Nasserite but also to anti-Soviet Communism. The British Embassy in Ankara estimated that ‘up to 60 per cent’ had been placed in the local press in Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.\(^{857}\)

It is important to note, however, that, despite the dynamics of the Pact, CENTO functioned on the basis of a democratic principle: any decisions at either the Counter-Subversive Committee or the CSO were made collectively through a majority of the signatories. This principle gradually acted in the regional members’ favour, and eventually, after long deliberation at a series of the committee meetings, a request from the regional members was accepted. At a meeting of the Counter-Subversion Committee in Lahore in 1962, the term ‘subversion’ was finally broadened to include ‘non-communist threats’.\(^{858}\) As noted in Chapter Four, this was mainly because non-Communist threats were equally as important as Communist threats in the region, and that non-Communist threats were threatening the existence of the pro-Western member states, which was ‘directly in the interests of Communism’.\(^{859}\)

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\(^{855}\) TNA: PRO FO1110/1236: PR1125/43: letter ‘Transmission “X”’ by FO to the Regional Information Office, Middle East (attached to the British Embassy in Beirut), 10 Sep 1959.


\(^{857}\) TNA: PRO FO1110/1236: PR1125/50: letter by the British Embassy in Ankara to FO 30 Sep 1959.

\(^{858}\) TNA: PRO FO371/164061: EB1692/3: draft note, ‘UK delegation brief for the twelfth session of the Counter-Subversion Committee of CENTO’, undated, circa 1962.

British Propaganda Policy in the Middle East

It is clear from the literature that Britain maintained a rigid anti-Communist stance in the post-war period and the IRD was at the forefront of British anti-Communist propaganda campaigns. In his study of IRD activities in the Middle East, James Vaughan noted that by the mid-1950s ‘significant evidence’ suggested the IRD was ‘extremely successful in establishing high-level contacts within Middle Eastern governments’ – the Middle Eastern governments were willing to cooperate with the British on anti-Communist propaganda and accepted its materials for use in their anti-Communist policy.860 It is noteworthy that the formation of the Baghdad Pact was an additional boost for British anti-Communist propaganda in this regard. Once the Counter-Subversion Committee of the Baghdad Pact was established in 1956, it provided Britain with the opportunity of obtaining additional resources and channels through which anti-Communist propaganda materials could be circulated.

The significance of the Baghdad Pact in this context cannot be underestimated. Since anti-Communist propaganda campaigns were in fact conducted by the regional countries, this was more advantageous for British interests in the region. Firstly, the region became a hotbed of anti-British sentiment, and British membership of the Baghdad Pact was exploited by Radio Cairo and Radio Moscow. While Britain maintained the initiative in anti-Communist propaganda campaigns by giving guidance and direction, the regional governments assumed the front line of anti-Communist propaganda in the Pact area. An IRD officer noted that the consequences of becoming known of the ‘British-made programmes’ to the local public would most likely have been ‘politically embarrassing’ not only to Britain but also to the local authorities.861 British involvement in anti-Communist efforts in the region ostensibly became invisible.

Secondly, owing to their inexperience in anti-Communist measures and especially in propaganda, the regional members welcomed British experience and expertise. Britain’s role was thus to provide the regional members with technical support including training and materials for broadcasting and publications. This was mutually beneficial for Britain and the regional members as John A. Speares, First Secretary at the British Embassy in Baghdad, noted regarding the Iranian case:

860 Vaughan, *Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East*, p.103
861 TNA: PRO FO1110/1074; PR146/12: telegram from FO to Baghdad, 14 Jan 1958.
Even if our policemen [the regional representatives of the Baghdad Pact] lack propaganda expertise, they have at least in this case issued some Western material under a Middle East dateline, and this seems important. Although the regular local propaganda services are more experienced they may also be more sophisticated and therefore less open to our influence...these police channels even if they are inexpert and incomplete are at least open to us...General Kia [the Iranian representative, Head of Military Intelligence] has, incidentally, already indicated willingness to accept a training and advisory survey of information services. This training role served British interests in the region well. As discussed in Chapter One, the principal objective of British policy towards the region was to maintain security over oil resources, and the Baghdad Pact was ‘the main instrument’ to achieve this. By providing the regional members, especially Iran and Iraq, with support for anti-Communist measures, Britain hoped to gain the ‘goodwill’ of its regional partners, and thus ensure that they would remain in the sphere of Western influence.

The existing literature also establishes that British propaganda efforts were directed against not only Communists but also Nasser. The British anti-Nasserite propaganda policy started in the early 1950s, but it was during the 1956 Suez Crisis that Britain adopted outright anti-Nasserite propaganda campaigns through an inter-departmental committee comprising both the IRD and the military against the strongest anti-British voice, Cairo Radio. In addition, by the eve of the Suez Crisis, the IRD was employed as an instrument of psychological warfare against Nasser. Jack Rennie, head of the IRD, was given a specific brief to lead IRD’s Middle Eastern operations in an anti-Nasserite and anti-Arab nationalism direction while Norman Reddaway, Rennie’s deputy, was left in charge of the day-to-day anti-Communist work.

Documentary evidence records that these anti-Nasser propaganda operations were secretly conducted and named using the bracket term of ‘Transmission X’ to conceal their intent and activities. Britain’s anti-Nasserite propaganda campaigns sought to ‘rebut’ Cairo Radio’s anti-British propaganda in the Middle East, and ‘to discredit Nasser and to expose

866 Vaughan, Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, p.207.
Egyptian expansionism’ by using ‘unattributable propaganda’. The themes for this propaganda included Nasser’s future economic plan, which was portrayed as being ill-prepared for building the Aswan Dam; ‘the dangers of Egypt’s pan-Arab imperialist ambitions’; and ‘Nasser’s link with the Russians’. However, the activities associated with the ‘Transmission X’ were short-lived. Once the Hashemite dynasty of Iraq was swept away in the Revolution of 1958 and after British-Egyptian relations began to improve towards the end of 1958, the Foreign Office decided to redirect the IRD back to its original anti-Communist task of countering ‘Communist-bloc propaganda’.

The change in direction came from a change in British policy towards Egypt. Records released under the FOIA show that soon after the Iraqi Revolution, Britain re-examined its national interests in the region, and decided to adopt a policy of ‘disengagement’: in other words, ‘not taking sides in inter-Arab disputes’. This meant that the British anti-Nasserite policy in the region also softened. In order to maintain good relations with the Baghdad Pact members, who would be unlikely to welcome Britain’s ‘disengagement’ policy, the British government decided that the Americans, who had had so far ‘no wish to support or protect British interests’ in the region, ‘should be induced to join the new organisation’. While British policy was being repositioned, the process of restoring British-Egyptian relations after the Suez Crisis also began in the first half of 1957, and an exchange of Ambassadors finally happened in February 1961. The negotiations included delicate issues such as the release of the MI6 officers, James Swinburn and James Zarb, who had been captured during the Suez Crisis of 1956.

Even before Britain’s anti-Nasserite propaganda policy was reset after the Iraqi Revolution, its propaganda strategy overseas had been reviewed by 1957. Records declassified under the FOIA show that the Macmillan Government stepped up its

868 TNA: PRO FO1110/1220: PR10104/106G: letter by D.C. Hopson to C.F.R. Barclay, Regional Information Office in the Middle East, Beirut, 6 Nov 1959.
869 TNA: PRO FO1110/880: PR10131/10AG: EC (56) 62: memorandum by Foreign Secretary, Egypt Committee, ‘propaganda and political warfare in the Middle East’, 24 Oct 1956.
871 TNA: PRO PREM11/2754: ME (M) (59) 6: memorandum ‘Middle East Policy’ by FO to PM, 10 Mar 1959. The file has been released under the FOIA at my request (RFE: F0029264), 17 May 2012.
872 TNA: PRO PREM11/2754: memorandum ‘short-term policy in the Middle East’, 23 Jul 1958; COS (58) 183: memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff ‘position in the Middle East’, 28 Jul 1958. Also see PRO PREM11/2754: M87/59: minute by PM to Foreign Secretary, 11 Mar 1959. The file has been released under the FOIA at my request (RFE: F0029264), 17 May 2012.
874 Ibid., pp.115-9.
broadcasting and publication propaganda campaigns in the region from 1957. Compensating for cut in defence spending, propaganda was recognised as being of prime importance, and the focus of British propaganda efforts shifted away from Europe, where ‘BBC broadcasts are doing little good’.\(^\text{875}\) This decision was made on the basis of a committee chaired by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Charles Hill, which reviewed the performance of Britain’s information services overseas throughout the world in 1957.\(^\text{876}\) Before this review, Britain spent the most money on non-Communist Europe (26.1 per cent – a fourth of the total expenditure), with the Middle East in second place at 14.1 per cent.\(^\text{877}\) After the review, the Middle East, where Harold Macmillan had felt that ‘our propaganda’ was ‘not strong enough’, was given the highest importance, followed by the Far East, Europe and the United States.\(^\text{878}\)

The Macmillan government also oversaw a change in the general approach to propaganda in the Middle East – before outright anti-Nasserite propaganda campaigns were abandoned in 1959 – with cultural propaganda efforts put forth to forward British interests in the region.\(^\text{879}\) In February 1957 a working party was formed under the chairmanship of William Alfred Wolverson, the Director of the Radio Services Department, General Post-Office Headquarters (1955-60), to consider the possibility of ‘a light programme of entertainment and news directed to Arab countries of the Middle East’. This soft approach to propaganda in the region was intended to attract ‘the uneducated masses’ in the region ‘away from Radio Cairo’.\(^\text{880}\) For this purpose, Sharq Al-Adna, a Foreign Office owned Arabic-broadcasting station in Cyprus, which had unsuccessfully conducted anti-Nasser propaganda

\(^{875}\) TNA: PRO T219/1044: GS298/011: minute ‘Oversea Broadcasting OI (57)2’, 23 Jan 1957. The file has been released under the FOIA at my request (REF: 10/915&10/920), 1 Feb 2011.
\(^{876}\) See also Vaughan, *Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East*, p.248.
\(^{877}\) Followed by Africa (9.9 per cent), Communist Europe (8.8 per cent), the Indian subcontinent (8.4 per cent), and the Far East (7.6 per cent).
\(^{878}\) TNA: PRO T219/1045: GS298/011: memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘Overseas Information Meeting’, 31 May 1957. The file has been released under the FOIA at my request (REF: 10/915&10/920), 1 Feb 2011, which recorded that the areas of priority in order were the Middle East, Far East, Iron Curtain and United States. TNA: PRO T219/671: GS6/65/014: M442/57: minute by Harold Macmillan, PM, to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 28 Aug 1957. The file has been released under the FOIA at my request (REF: 10/915&10/920), 1 Feb 2011.
\(^{879}\) According to James Vaughan, since the end of Second World War until 1957 not only the IRD but also other bodies such as the British Council sought to bolster British prestige by a softer and were cultural approach to the region. Vaughan, “A Certain Idea of Britain”.
\(^{880}\) The members of the working party included representatives from the Cabinet Office, the Treasury, two of FO, one of CO, CRO, two of Central Office of Information, and one from Post Office as secretary. TNA: PRO T219/670: GS6/65/014: minute of 1st meeting, ‘Working Party on Broadcasting in the Middle East’, 22 Feb 1957. The file has been released under the FOIA at my request (REF: 10/915&10/920), 1 Feb 2011.
campaigns over the Suez Crisis, was handed over to the BBC. Under its new ownership, Sharq Al-Adna started broadcasting ‘bazaar’ music throughout the region using a second medium wave transmitter of 100 kilo-watts. According to Douglas Boyd, the new Sharq Al-Adna ‘became the most consistently popular and credible Arabic-language radio service[s] in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s transmitting in Arabic’.  

The Propaganda War

At the centre of the propaganda war in the region, the most influential broadcasting station was Cairo Radio. According to official figures recorded by the IRD in 1961, the Voice of the Arabs, one of the most popular programmes, extolling Nasser’s concept of Arab Nationalism, was on the air for a hundred-and-fifty-six hours per week, and was being broadcast throughout the Middle East and North Africa in twenty-three languages. Cairo Radio steadily increased its capacity from 1953 and became the most powerful broadcasting station in the region with twelve medium wave transmitters (including two 300 kilo-watts and one 100 kilo-watts) and eleven short-wave transmitters (among them, two 140 kilo-watts and two 100 kilo-watts). By comparison, Baghdad Radio, established under the Baghdad Pact, had only four 100 kilo-watt transmitters. According to Mohamed Heikal, Nasser’s closest confidant, Nasser understood the power of radio as an instrument in his foreign policy and believed that it was the only way to reach his people and mobilise the Arab masses beyond the borders of Egypt. This was particularly true in the cases of Lebanon and Jordan, where

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884 The existing literature clearly suggests that the Egyptian government led by the Free Officers, firstly General Muhammad Nagib and later Colonel Nasser, utilised the power of propaganda to consolidate their positions after the coup in 1952, and that the Egyptian propaganda efforts were assisted by a small group of CIA officers. George K. Young, the Vice-Chief of MI6, complained to the American counterparts that the CIA ‘created a monster in Nasser’. See Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p.170. Also Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), pp.100, 127.
886 TNA: PRO FO371/121283: V10710/3G: letter by R.W.J. Hooper, Baghdad, to E.M. Rose of FO, 2 Feb 1956. Gary Rawnsley has noted that the use of the medium wave was ‘more reliable’ and thus ‘more popular’ method of transmission for the British. See Rawnsley, ‘Overt and Covert’, p.501.
Egyptian newspapers were banned and the Egyptian embassies were under surveillance by local security services.\textsuperscript{887}

As noted earlier, Britain operated outright anti-Nasserite propaganda campaigns in the course of the Suez Crisis of 1956, which continued until 1959. The propaganda war against Nasser became more intense as the United States joined towards the end of the 1950s. A declassified CIA report records that Nasser claimed through Cairo Radio that ‘some of the nine clandestine radio stations’ under the control of the Counter-Subversion Committee of the Baghdad Pact were attacking him.\textsuperscript{888} Although the source of information on ‘the nine clandestine radio stations’ is unclear, according to Heikal, Nasser understood that telling the truth to the masses was the only way to make the masses become the ‘weapon of the Arab Revolution’.\textsuperscript{889}

There was also a regional dimension to this propaganda war. Amongst all the regional players, Nuri al-Said, a long-standing Iraqi Prime Minister, who wished to see Iraq lead the Arab countries by unifying with Syria, was also willing to confront Nasser in a propaganda war.\textsuperscript{890} ‘Attaching so much importance to radio propaganda’, Nuri al-Said welcomed British help in developing Iraqi propaganda capabilities against Moscow Radio and Cairo Radio, and Baghdad Radio was established in 1956 under the Baghdad Pact.\textsuperscript{891} Britain provided the materials and financial support for the Iraqi broadcasting operation.\textsuperscript{892} However, while the Foreign Office backed Baghdad Radio to counter the increasingly popular but hostile broadcasting of Cairo Radio, Britain also sought to distance itself from the operational matters of Baghdad Radio. Michael Hadow, Head of the Levant Department of the Foreign Office, noted that ‘we would not wish it to become branded in Arab eyes as an instrument of

\textsuperscript{887} Heikal, \textit{Nasser}, p.159.
\textsuperscript{889} Heikal, \textit{Nasser}, p.211. Indeed, Heikal’s highly-entertaining narrative of the events must be treated with caution as he was a prominent spokesman for Nasser’s Egypt. Sir Colin T. Crowe noted in his unpublished memoir that ‘Heikal is a curious character; he is not everybody’s cup of tea. He is intense and nervous, brusque and can be very rude. But he is genuine, extremely intelligent and a first-class journalist’. Quoted from MECA, St. Antony’s College, Oxford: Private Papers of CROWE: CROWE Collection GB165-0070: unpublished memoir, p.102.
\textsuperscript{890} Nuri al-Said, \textit{Arab Independence and Unity} (Baghdad: Government Press, 1943). Also see Gallman, \textit{Iraq Under General Nuri}, pp.133-166; Podeh, \textit{Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World}.
\textsuperscript{892} Cf. Vaughan, ‘Propaganda by Proxy?’. 
the Pact rather than an Iraqi national station’. While there was no reason for not advising on the conduct of any operational matters, Michael Hadow limited its commitment to advising only on ‘future planning’ at request from the Iraqi government, rather than on ‘the programming side’. In this way, Hadow also envisaged that the Iraqis would be helped by more experienced regional members, such as the Pakistani, who had also been involved in similar operations under the SEATO.

However, in reality Britain was also involved in developing the broadcasting programmes of Baghdad Radio, in line with the policy of the Pact as ‘a Moslem alliance to challenge the pan-Arab doctrines sponsored by Egypt’s Voice of the Arab broadcasts’. These anti-Communist propaganda efforts by Baghdad Radio were largely targeted at ‘all key moulders’ of ‘public opinion’, especially in the spheres of ‘politics, commerce and labour, science, literature and education’, by exposing ‘Communist aims, tactics and pretensions’ through broadcasting and publicity media. More specifically, particular attention was given to ‘youth, students, intellectuals and leading academic figures’.

Iraqi control over the Baghdad broadcasting was a cause of concern for some British diplomats as the Iraqis had their own ambitions for regional leadership. Baghdad Radio promoted Iraq as the leader in the region, not only in Iraq, but also throughout the region, against Nasser’s pan-Arab Nationalism, with themes which included ‘internal progress in Iraq’ and ‘Iraq’s role in international affairs’. In addition, the Iraqi government appointment of Yunis Bakri, the ‘Arab “Lord Haw-Haw”’, a ‘mercenary prepared to abuse anyone if paid enough’, to lead the Iraqi Information Services was seen by the British as evidence that the Iraqis were ready to wage a ‘radio war’ against Cairo, which some British diplomats thought would only create political instability in the region. Gordon Waterfield, Head of the BBC Eastern Services, working closely with the IRD, noted that there would be

894 Ibid. The British adviser on the future planning was note as a ‘high ranking British Broadcasting Corporation expert’.
896 TNA: PRO FO1110/1353: PR146/95: draft paper, ‘Proposals for the re-orientation of the functions and organisation of the Counter-Subversion Office’, 12 Jul 1960. The subjects propagated by Baghdad Radio, fed through the CSO, included the communist attitude to the Palestine question, including Soviet support for Israel; a series of talks on ‘the monarchy’ and on the ‘merits of a religious life containing a few anti-communist angles’; and ‘Islam in Soviet Central Asia’, the materials of which were supplied by the Iranian counterpart. See TNA: PRO FO371/121288: V10710/105G: letter from Baghdad to L.C.W. Figg, IRD, 1 Oct 1956.
897 Ibid. The attention to youth and students is noteworthy that they were often a driver of spreading national revolutionary movements across the region. Also see Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism, pp.13-18.
898 TNA: PRO FO371/121284: V10710/33: summery record of the first meeting of the working party on information and counter-subversion held at Baghdad, 21 May 1956.
‘confusion in the Middle East air with one radio station fighting another’, and ‘British policy, as I understand it, is not to try to divide the Arab world, but to try to create understanding and cooperation among the Arab countries’.\footnote{899 TNA: PRO FO371/121287: V10710/75G: letter by Gordon Waterfield, Ankara, to P.G.D. Adams, Beirut, 28 Jun 1956.}

Nevertheless, Britain’s regional partners could not compete with Nasser’s influential and powerful anti-imperial rhetoric. A growing anti-British sentiment and the rise of Arab Nationalism throughout the region, all of which moved in Nasser’s favour, especially after the Suez Crisis, also acted to the anti-Nasserite governments’ disadvantage. James Vaughan has observed that the development of regional affairs and crises in the mid- and late 1950s were a consequence of Nasser’s propaganda war: the dismissal of Glubb Pasha; Jordan’s abstention from joining the Baghdad Pact; the Jordanian and Lebanese Crises of 1958; and even the Iraqi Revolution.\footnote{900 Cf. Vaughan, ‘Propaganda by Proxy?, pp.169-170.}

**Dominance of Security Services**

One of the difficulties faced by IRD officers cooperating with the Pact members was how to establish common ground on which to conduct their anti-Communist propaganda efforts. The representatives of the regional members at both the Counter-Subversion Committee and the CSO were predominantly members of the security services: the Director of the Iraqi CID; Head of the Iranian Military Intelligence (G-2), later replaced by Head of SAVAK; the Director-General of the Turkish National Security Service; and a senior official of the Ministry of Interior of Pakistan. On the other hand, Britain was represented by an IRD officer. The United States, which remained an ‘observer’, not a member, until 1959, was represented by either USIS (United States Information Service) or CIA officers. As a result, the discussions at the Counter-Subversion Committee were mostly dominated by security concerns, which were in particular expressed by the regional representatives who had strong security-mind-sets. At the outset of the Counter-Subversion Committee, L.C.W. Figg of the IRD recorded his concerns that:

> Our main concern at the start of the meeting was that the Asian members [i.e. the regional members] would tend to interpret counter-subversion as simply an excuse to discuss and develop operations by their own police and security services…[comprising] Generals and
Colonels, who took rather a physical view of counter-subversion, and no one even remotely connected with information work as we know it.\footnote{901} This domination by the regional security services often led to situations in which the British representative from the IRD was the subject of complaints by the regional counterparts for being too soft about counter-subversion efforts. This was often seen as evidence that Britain was less committed to collective efforts by them.

This was in particular the case from the summer of 1956 onwards, when unrest and instability in Syria was a cause of central concern for all the regional members, who became more frustrated with the ineffectiveness of the Pact. General Behcet Turkmen, the Turkish representative (Director-General of the Turkish National Security Service), who chaired the Counter-Subversion Committee, demanded ‘more drastic weapons’ – setting up ‘a sort of SOE’ for conducting more aggressive operations in Syria for the Pact to stabilise the situation. General Haj-Ali Kia, the Iranian representative (Head of Iranian Military Intelligence), sought to give more authority to the Liaison Committee, which he chaired, to conduct clandestine operations against Syria on behalf of the Counter-Subversion Committee. The Pakistani and Iraqi representatives respectively endorsed proposals for creating Pact intelligence service and also underlined ‘the need for action in Syria’.\footnote{902} Nevertheless, the British representative vetoed the proposal on the ground that it would lead to ‘inefficiency and confusion’, and were supported by the Americans, who at the time sought to maintain their neutral stance towards the region.\footnote{903} This sort of proposal was a recurrent theme in the discussions between the Pact members, and Britain constantly ‘blocked’ such proposals.\footnote{904}

This formed the context of Operation Straggle: based on the assertion that Iraq was ‘the central point of British support and area stability’, George K. Young, the Vice-Chief of MI6, explained to his American counterparts, the operation envisaged that Syria and King Saud, in that order, would be overthrown, and then Nasser would be eliminated.\footnote{905} Evidence suggests that the blueprint for overthrowing the Syrian government was laid out by the

\footnote{903} Ibid.
\footnote{904} TNA: PRO FO371/127861: VB1692/3G: a jacket ‘Committee of Counter-Intelligence Experts’, May 1957. The whole jacket of the file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1145-11), 2 Dec 2011.
British, perhaps George Young. The master plan was, nevertheless, entirely initiated and conducted by the regional players, and it was above all the Iraqis, Nuri al-Said and Abdul Ilah, the Crown Prince, who contemplated engineering a coup d’état in Syria – replacing the Communist Syrian government with the former Syrian leader, Colonel Adeeb al-Shishakli, and also invading Syria with Iraqi troops to force Syria into a ‘union with Iraq’. This was codenamed ‘Operation X’ by the Iraqis. The Turkish government endorsed the Iraqi plan and ‘was ready to help’. In this, the role of Britain, and also the United States, was then to provide financial and material support for the Iraqis, and to ‘restrain’ any Israeli actions against the Iraqi move. However, as the Iraqi Revolution occurred, there could be no coup d’état as Nuri al-Said and Abdul Ilah had envisaged. This episode indicates that the regional players were willing to initiate drastic actions when an opportunity came, rather than being pressured by their Western partners.

There was also a conceptual difference between the Pact members concerning counter-subversion. The term counter-subversion was understood by the British, as information experts, as largely a passive activity – exposing and refuting subversive propaganda campaigns by the enemy. However, for the regional members, it ought to be ‘more far-reaching and “forward”’, including offensive counter-subversive measures. The difference came from their backgrounds and professions – from the viewpoint of security officers, counter-subversion often meant the elimination of existential threats, ‘the habit’ to deal with subversive elements ‘by locking them up’. There was also the nature of the threats in the region. The subversive threats were internal and external – indigenous Communist activists in their countries and those who instigated them from outside.

The extent to which the regional security services successfully contained the spread of Communist movements in their countries is noteworthy. A document released under the FOIA – a threat assessment prepared in July 1958 on the indigenous Communist Parties in the Pact area and categorised as ‘Top Secret’ by MI5 – indicates the extent to which the

906 The Iraq Times, 26 Aug 1958. An Iraqi General, Ghazi Daghistani, Deputy Chief of Staff, the chief contact of MI6 in Operation Straggle, confessed at the revolutionary court that the plan had been ‘drafted at the British Embassy…in agreement with the British Ambassador and at the British Embassy itself’.
907 Ibid.
908 Ibid.
regional security services effectively contained Communist activities in their countries. Despite the anxieties of the regional members, MI5 assessed that the Communist threat had been ‘well contained’ by the security services of the regional members. The leadership of the party had been forced into exile ‘either in Europe or in such Middle Eastern countries’ which were not actively hostile to Communism.\textsuperscript{913} SAVAK continued to ‘harry and disrupt’ the Tudeh ‘rump’, which was ‘split with dissension’, and did not ‘appear to obtain any effective direction from its exiled leaders’. Likewise, the Iraqi Communist Party had been ‘subject to increasing pressure’ from the Iraqi CID, and appeared to ‘find difficulty in maintaining its organisation’. As to the Turks and Pakistanis, it was confidently reported by MI5 that ‘the problem does not exist in organised form in either Turkey or Pakistan’. Indeed, although these Communist threats were contained by the regional security services for the time being, MI5 also noted that it ‘must not be allowed to breed complacency’ as ‘the nationalist movements’ could be ‘expected to be targets for Soviet penetration’.\textsuperscript{914} Although the threat assessment report by MI5 was circulated to the Middle Eastern counterparts, the documentary evidence does not show whether the regional members felt less threatened by Communist activities thanks to on the basis of the MI5’s assessment.

The strong presence of the security services on the Pact committees also reflected the dominance of the security services in the internal affairs of these member countries. As these services regarded counter-subversion as their own domain, it followed that counter-subversion by propaganda must also be controlled by the same services. General Teymour Bakhtiar, Head of SAVAK (1957-61), for instance, noted that it was not an information expert, but only an intelligence or security expert, who ‘could understand the problems of subversion thoroughly’.\textsuperscript{915} He also attempted to create the Counter-Subversion Committee as a ‘psychological warfare headquarters’.\textsuperscript{916} This sort of strong security-minded thinking troubled the British representative, who believed that propaganda operations should be left out of the hands of intelligence and security officers. Ironically, the name of the committee, Counter-Subversion, encouraged the regional security services to participate in propaganda, as Gordon Waterfield of the BBC, closely working with an IRD officer in Ankara, noted:

\textsuperscript{914} Ibid., pp.1-2.
\textsuperscript{915} TNA: PRO FO1110/1251: PR146/65: letter by F.J. Leishman, Tehran, to D.C. Hopson of FO, 1 Oct 1959. Bakhtiar’s view also reflected that of the other members.
The use of the term counter-subversion in relation to radio encourages the Security Services, so active in Turkey, Persia and Iraq, to think that they should have control of the radio and the press...kept out representatives from the Turkish Directorate-General of Press and Publications...None of them have any understanding of what can or cannot be done with broadcasting...The increasing power of security officials in the organisation is an unfortunate trend since it encourages those forces of reaction which we, the British and the Americans, wish to discourage, and which has made it difficult to encourage popularity of the Baghdad Pact, both within the Pact countries and outside.917

The domination of the security services in the internal affairs meant that, despite British efforts to the contrary, the information experts of these regional countries were excluded from anti-Communist propaganda measures.

As a result of the domination of the security services in these Pact countries, information and broadcasting experts of the regional member states were ‘frightened off’ or appeared ‘not interested’ in getting involved in anti-Communist propaganda measures.918 The British representative made several attempts to make contact outside the security circle, for instance, the Head of the Turkish Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was regarded as ‘well qualified on press relations and publicity matters, both in Turkey and abroad, particularly in the Arab States’. However, there was no success owing to the domination of the security officials in the internal affairs, who were also confident of their own abilities to handle all such matters.919 Philip Adams, the Regional Information Officer in Beirut, noted to John Rennie, Head of the IRD, that:

The views of delegates expressed at this restricted meeting have of course been known to us in general terms all along. They stem from the fact that the Asian [the regional member] countries have very little in the way of organised information services and from their more physical view than ours of what is meant by counter-subversion. I am afraid that this difference of approach is bound to continue so long as the Asian [regional] member governments are represented on the Counter-Subversion Committee by the heads or members of their security services.920

From the outset, the fear of the British representative was that the presence of the security services on the Counter-Subversion Committee would make it unlikely to produce effective plans for joint publicity in the sense that the British desired.921 Even as their propaganda skills and experience grew, there remained persistent frustration among the regional representatives who wished to develop the CSO into a ““psychological warfare” centre”

918 Ibid.
operating against ‘subversion from the USSR, the UAR, Afghanistan and even India’. The representation of the security services at the Committee continued between 1956 and 1963.

Limitations in Influencing Local Anti-Communist Propaganda Measures

Britain found the Iranian government particularly vulnerable to subversive broadcasting by Radio Moscow, and Iran was believed to be the main target of Soviet propaganda in the late 1950s. In August 1957, Reginald Burrows, an IRD officer, observed that:

...To date, the Iranian information services have been ineffectual both in countering Communist propaganda and in publicising Iranian achievements...the USSR is devoting more time to broadcasting, in various languages, to Iran than to any other country in the world.

As the Iranians were ill-equipped to counter these threats, they were undoubtedly willing to receive British support. Moreover, Iranian propaganda efforts largely depended on the British and the CSO from the outset. As noted in Chapter One, British policy towards the post-war Middle East was principally to secure access to oil, especially from the mid-1950s. The Baghdad Pact, including two major oil producing countries, Iraq and Iran, was seen as an instrument for achieving this objective. After the loss of their strategic ally in the Iraqi Revolution, Britain became more proactive in intervening in anti-Communist propaganda measures local authorities might take. The Iranian case illustrates not only the extent to which the regional members conducted their own domestic propaganda campaigns, but also the limitations of British engagement with the Iranians on counter-subversion by propaganda.

The Iranians primarily focused on two types of propaganda campaigns, agreed at the CSO and directed by the Counter-Subversion Committee. The first type sought to discredit the reputations of the Soviet Union and the Tudeh Party, exposing life under the Communist regime and also envisaging what life in Iran would be like under Communist rule. The second type praised Iranian ‘social well-being’ and economic development with support from

Cento. One of the methods of propagating these campaigns was broadcasting. The Shah of Iran recorded in his autobiography that there were numerous transmitters in operation throughout Iran mainly intended for internal radio broadcasting. Archival evidence shows that these broadcasting programmes were designed to discredit the reputation of the Soviet Union and the Tudeh Party amongst the population, and they included a factual account of ‘Russian activities during the wartime occupation of Iran’. In addition to the broadcasting, publications, such as Boris Pasternak’s novel Dr. Zhivago, were supplied by the IRD and translated through the CSO into Persian for the purpose of dissemination throughout Iran.

As noted in Chapter Four, after its establishment in October 1956, SAVAK gradually expanded the focus of its security duty from military to civilian departments from 1957 onwards. SAVAK assumed responsibility for conducting a range of political, economic and cultural anti-communist campaigns in Iran throughout the period between 1957 and 1963. One theme, on which the Iranians placed much importance, was the use of Islam, religious faith against Communism. An Iranian delegation, Professor Furuzanfar, who had taught at the Religious College of the University of Tehran and then worked for the Iranian government, reported on the progress of the on-going programme to the Counter-Subversion Committee in June 1956:

After our adherence to the Baghdad Pact…We decided…to establish a school where Marxist ideologies would be fought by means of religious faith…while educating men of religion we are at the same time trying to train young men faithful to the nation…Actually 320 students are receiving training in these courses. It is hoped that their number will increase to 1,000 by the end of this year…in the near future we shall be able to have our religious representatives and orators in all parts of our country.

The main objective of the Iranian government for the use of Islam was indeed political. It was designed to train the ‘efficient religious orators’, through whom ‘political, economic and cultural programmes’ were relayed to the population ‘in compliance with the directives of the central government’. Professor Furuzanfar emphasised that this was the only way to ‘avoid

925 TNA: PRO FO1110/850: PR10523/4: planning report of the CSO, CENTO, 'global publicity for Iran', 22 Nov 1962
929 Ladjevardi (ed), Memoirs of Fatemeh Pakravan, p.20.
the infiltration of harmful elements into the people and obstruct their way in their subversive activities’. 931 While the degree to which similar operations were conducted in their countries was different, the use of Islam and praise for the monarchy (as well as the government) became common practices as anti-Communist propaganda campaigns in the Pact countries. This theme was also propagated through Baghdad Radio as the Iraqis were ‘very keen to keep up this positive aspect of the work’. 932

Despite Iranian counter-subversive efforts, the threats of internal subversion – riots, disturbances and propaganda against the Iranian government and the Shah – were endemic. They were to a large degree instigated by both Radio Moscow and Radio Cairo. Denis J. Speares, an IRD officer, residing as First Secretary of the British Embassy in Tehran (1958-60), after speaking with the Deputy Head of SAVAK, General Pakravan (1957-61), noted:

A particular difficulty was that the Russians did not even have to attract people to their own cause in order to carry out their subversive aims; any unstable situation in the Middle East tended to react to their advantage, so that all they needed to do was to stir up trouble whenever an opportunity occurred (he [General Pakravan] particularly stressed the Kurdish problem as an example of a situation which could easily be exploited by the Russians). 933

The frustration of SAVAK officers, who saw internal subversion being directed by external threats such as the Soviet Union or Egypt, often turned against the British and Americans. Consequently, as noted earlier, the Iranians frequently demanded the Pact set up a committee of counter-intelligence experts to act firmly against these external threats. 934

In addition, from the Iranians’ point of view, the British-led focus on anti-Communist measures was too narrow. Their frustrations were exacerbated by subversion from the UAR. This concern was frequently raised by General Pakravan to the British. 935 A senior IRD officer, Norman Reddaway, observed about the Iranian attitudes towards the counter-subversion efforts of the Pact that:

The Iranians...feel that the CSO, while useful as a source of training, information and useful minor operations, hardly touches on their major problems. The Iranians worry about the many challenges to the Regime. Disaffected students, non-co-operative peasants, unenthusiastic officials, critics of the Shah – these are the main preoccupations of the Iranians. They struggle on, recognising that the CSO can be marginally helpful by providing information about foreign subverters of students, hostile radios and front organisations and by getting for them the odd piece of favourable publicity, but they feel that the CSO’s help is marginal and that the solution

931 Ibid.
934 TNA: PRO FO371/127861: VB1692/3G: a jacket ‘Committee of Counter-Intelligence Experts’, May 1957. The whole jacket of the file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1145-11), 2 Dec 2011.
to their problems lies elsewhere – they have no idea where. The Iranians are saddened but hardly surprised when the Americans and ourselves are coy about requests to analyse and do something about Nasser’s anti-Shah propaganda. 936

Aside from external threats, dealing with the member states on domestic counter-subversion was a delicate issue as they exclusively regarded it as their domain. Like other member states, while Iran was willing to learn the methods and techniques from the British, it was averse to being instructed by outsiders on how it should approach its own problems. Peter Joy, an IRD officer in Ankara liaising with the regional counterparts, observed in 1960 that, on the issue of domestic anti-Communist counter-subversion, the regional member states saw only ‘purely local and internal problems’ and ‘they would each prefer to deal with in their own way with the minimum of outside “interference”’. 937

As the same issue has been earlier, one of the difficulties in dealing with the domination of the security services in the internal affairs from a British point of view was that although the Iranian government had the Department of Publications and Radio, SAVAK had substantial practical control of the national press and broadcasting as anti-Communist propaganda measures were considered a matter of national security. 938 As a result, SAVAK totally precluded any consultation with the Department of Publications and Radio on this matter. Concerning SAVAK’s propaganda efforts, Denis J. Speares observed in 1960 that:

> Our opinion is that there is at present no shortage of either material or funds available to the Iranians. The real difficulty is the relative inexperience of SAVAK in [the] information field (a view which has been unofficially endorsed by officials in the Department of Publications and Radio) and the lack of conviction in at least parts of SAVAK of the value of real propaganda and information work, as opposed to the simple dragooning of the national press into echoing current governmental thinking. 939

As raised in the aforementioned threat assessment by MI5, SAVAK had been successfully containing the domestic Communist front, the Tudeh Party, since its establishment in 1956/57, but domestic unrest and disturbances were still common in the country. These subversive activities were not necessarily Communist-oriented, but they were against the Shah himself and their slogan was the same as that of the Tudeh Party.

The IRD had recognised issues with Iranian’s anti-Communist measures by mid-1959. Peter Joy of the IRD visited Tehran in August 1959 and observed two main problems associated with the way in which SAVAK conducted anti-Communist measures. The first

939 Ibid.

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was that the Iranians’ use of anti-Communist material, which was combined with ‘exaggerated eulogies of the Shah and the regime’, was causing the Iranian general public to identify ‘anti-Communist comment solely with the regime and thus to discount it in advance’. As a result, the value of anti-Communist measures, which were intended to influence and foster the antipathy of the general public towards Communism, became meaningless. The second was the compartmentalisation of SAVAK into external and internal functions. While external liaison with foreign intelligence, especially with the Pact members and the CSO, was done by the external department, anti-Communist measures including information control and propaganda were conducted by the internal department. A turf war between these departments made the matter even worse. As a result, counter-subversion was above all chiefly managed by the internal department, which countered subversive elements against the Shah and was applied to any opposition movements against him.

SAVAK was ‘a bottle-neck’ of distributing and using anti-Communist materials, so the IRD decided to bypass SAVAK and to distribute its own material to the Department of Publications and Radio through its own IRD officer in Tehran, Donald J. Makinson (1960-63). Until August 1960, ‘two thirds’ of IRD materials were supplied to the Department of Publications and Radio without informing SAVAK. However, once this ‘breach’ of bypassing SAVAK was discovered, it caused strains in relationships of the British and the Iranians on the one hand, and SAVAK and the Department of Publications and Radio on the other. After the ‘breach’, Donald J. Makinson had to devote most of his time in Tehran to

940 TNA: PRO FO1110/1251: PR146/48: minute by Peter Joy, 6 Aug 1959. A classified US document stated that ‘The primary objective of security in Iran is preservation of the monarchy. Other main objectives are to counter the Soviet threat and to counter the threat from other countries in the area; i.e., Iraq and the UAR. It is from the latter country, as personified by Nasser, that the Shah sees the biggest threat to Iran in this decade. By contrast, the Iranian attitude toward the Soviets is more relaxed than it was in 1960’ The Asnad-I Laneh-yi Jasusi (these are the documents taken from the US embassy in Tehran in 1979), [thereafter Asnad], vol.60, p.5, report by ‘United States Military Information Control Committee: Security in the Government of Iran’, by Donald S. Harris, the Secretary, 7 Feb 1966.
941 IOHP, Memoirs of General Hassan Alavi-Kia, interviewed by Habib Lajordee, transcript 1, sequence 7.
946 Ibid.
repairing whose relationship with SAVAK and to mediate with the Department of Publications and Radio.  

Britain was also severely limited in the extent to which it could help the Iranians in anti-Communist measures. Iran had been a chief target of subversive propaganda since the mid-1950s, firstly by Radio Moscow and joined later by Radio Cairo, and Britain recognised the vulnerability of the Iranian government to this subversive broadcasting. Britain operated jamming technology as a counter-measure against similar broadcasts in the Colonies, but it is unknown whether Britain provided the Iranians with similar technical support. Archival evidence suggests that, while the topic of jamming had been raised in Iran, the IRD made its position clear to Donald J. Makinson in 1962 that he should avoid any discussion of jamming with the Iranians. The reasons for the IRD’s anti-jamming stance were that firstly jamming could never technically be ‘100% effective’; and secondly, the costs incurred by jamming were ‘enormously expensive’. Most of all, the IRD’s policy held that the practice of jamming was also ‘an admission of weakness’ and implied that the hostile radio being jammed was ‘successful in its subversive aims’. Above all, it recorded that ‘it goes against the principle of freedom of information, for which we stand’.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused primarily on anti-Communist propaganda campaigns under the Pact and highlighted the nature of the cooperation and the differences between the Pact members. Looking at the nature of the threats in the Middle East, where political intrigues, propaganda, and transnational underground activities destabilised local governments, there is a parallel with the contemporary situation in the region. Conflict in the region is and has been multifaceted – not only traditional combat between states in dispute, but also internal, inter-state and regional tensions. A notable example is Lebanon, where a number of external

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947 TNA: PRO FO1110/1383: PR1034/41: letter by D.J. Makinson, Tehran, to D.C. Hopson of FO, 6 Dec 1961. The relationships gradually improved towards the end of 1961, and the BBC also had a role in repairing the relationships by giving the Iranians training for broadcasting and constant visit in London.

948 Cf. TNA: PRO T220/676: the file entitled ‘Broadcasting facilities to countries in Middle East and propaganda activities elsewhere’, 1956-57. The file has been released under the FOIA at my request (REF: 10/915&10/920), 1 Feb 2011. Cyprus was a prime example of this.


951 Ibid.
players, Israel, Syria, and Iran, have actively been involved in vying for control of domestic politics. 952 ‘The conspiracy mentality’ of Middle Eastern leaders, as Daniel Pipes termed it, grew out of their experiences of dealing with these threats, and in turn fostered their views on the development of regional affairs. 953 Panagiotis Dimitrakis, who neglects to examine these aspects, arguing that CENTO was a ‘failed alliance’ on the ground of being no Soviet military invasion of the region, misses the significance of these regional affairs. This chapter has demonstrated that it was internal subversion with which the Pact members, including Britain and the United States, were most concerned in the region. This was the context in which the Iraqi, Iranian, Turkish and Pakistani governments saw the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) as a solution to their problems.

This chapter has demonstrated that the cooperation in anti-Communist propaganda under the Pact was often perverse – the schism in propaganda approaches can be seen as a microcosm of the problems affecting the regional cooperation as a whole. The difficulty for the British cooperating with the regional members was the dominance of the security services in their home countries, and that the regional security services frequently held different views on security and intelligence that contrasted sharply with the policing and information-oriented approach of the British. This rift was most noticeable and most destructive in the Counter-Subversion Committee. All members considered Communist movements as the main threat and they took this threat very seriously. However, Britain (and the United States) seem to have been most cautious in propaganda operations than their CENTO partners, owing to the different national interests of the Pact members. In addition, inter-allied tensions in the field of propaganda restricted propaganda cooperation, just as they restricted intelligence sharing. The western powers sometimes had narrower targets than the regional members would have liked. As a result, Britain’s efforts to maximise the effectiveness of the anti-Communist propaganda measures of the Pact members suffered since ultimate control was left in the hands of the local governments with their own propaganda and security objectives. In this regard, Britain’s anti-Communist propaganda must inevitably be seen as failure. Moreover, Britain’s unsuccessful intervention in the Iranian case only reinforces this conclusion. The limitations of Britain’s influence will be further discussed in the next chapter.

953 Pipes, ‘Dealing with Middle Eastern Conspiracy Theories’, p.43.
Chapter Six

The Use and Abuse of State Power and the Limits of British Influence.
I tried to give them a rough idea of what the Security Service was like and what it should do. I began by telling them that it should be wholly non-political and merely concerned with the security of the State, regardless of the Government in power; otherwise it could have no stability and no continuity. This did not, of course, mean that it was not entitled to investigate the activities of political parties which advocated the overthrow of the State by unconstitutional means. I realised from the expressions on their faces how unpractical they felt my suggestion was!

- Captain Guy Liddell

...scientific interrogation in the world’s intelligence and security organizations has a limit, and wherever, because of a sensitive political situation, this method becomes somewhat ineffective, torture is resorted to in order to get speedy results or to create terror and fear. In normal circumstances, the aim of the interrogation is to extract information and so naturally the more scientific and thorough the methods the better! But in sensitive political situations where security is seen to be threatened, the interrogators’ aim is not only at getting information, they also aim at breaking the suspect and creating panic in society.

- General Hussein Fardust

**Introduction**

British Intelligence has been in the spotlight over the last few years in the context of the ‘War on Terror’ and its alleged complicity in human rights abuse. Recent studies on British counter-insurgency have also suggested that British measures against colonial problems were more violent than previously understood. The recent discovery of ‘sensitive’ Colonial Office documents, the so-called Hanslope archives, highlight a particularly dark side of British decolonisation. In the case of Kenya, for instance, where

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954 Guy Liddell was the Deputy Director-General of MI5 (1946-51). Quoted from TNA: PRO KV4/472: the Liddell Diaries, 6 Nov 1950.
955 General Hussein Fardust was a childhood friend of the Shah, who supervised the development of the Iranian Intelligence Community. Quoted from Dareini (ed), *Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty*, p.270.
the Colonial Office confronted the Mau Mau insurgency, the chief security forces at the front line of the counter-insurgency campaigns were the Special Branch and the British Army, both of which were implicated in the conduct of torture and human rights abuses against the Kenyans. Concerning the role of British Intelligence, Calder Walton has claimed that an MI5 representative in Kenya was not directly involved in such misconduct, but played a ‘guiding role over Special Branch interrogation practices at the time’. As identified in the previous chapters, Britain was also involved in anti-Communist training of its Middle Eastern counterparts. An intriguing question is to what extent Britain was complicit in anti-Communist measures conducted by Middle Eastern governments, which often lacked democratic principles in the western sense and often engaged in human rights abuses especially when dealing with subversive activities.

This chapter will discuss how far Britain was involved in the conduct of anti-Communist measures by Middle Eastern governments. Since the details of training courses chiefly associated with MI5 were little known, it will firstly explore what was meant by “training” and what areas these courses covered, and it will also discuss the different approaches towards the training of colonial and Middle Eastern security services. It will then examine the usefulness and limitations of intelligence liaison between British Intelligence and its Middle Eastern counterparts, and intelligence activities for influencing the policy of Middle Eastern governments. It will finally look at Britain’s attitudes towards the security measures conducted by Middle Eastern governments, often in violation of human rights.

**Setting of Anti-Communist Training**

It is known that in order to maintain the internal security of the British Empire, MI5 regularly organised a series of training courses for colonial security officers either in Britain or in the Colonies in the post-war period. These training courses were designed for senior police officers, such as the heads of Special Branch or equivalent ranks, of all colonial, and protectorate, territories. As recommended by the Templer report in April 1955, training for colonial security forces expanded and the number of these training courses grew, seeing MI5

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959 Bennett, *Fighting the Mau Mau*, pp.194-228.
helping ‘to train an average of 250 colonial police and security officials per year’. From June 1956, these training courses were conducted at either the headquarters of MI5 at Leconfield House in London or a Regional Training College located in the Colonies. A series of lectures were given by senior British officials, including the Director-General of MI5 himself, Sir Roger Hollis, and colonial security officers attending the training courses were also greeted by a speech from the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd. Such training was indeed not only provided to colonial security forces, but also to MI5’s Middle Eastern counterparts. The British police and security advisers were introduced to Middle Eastern governments and Middle Eastern police officers received training in Britain as part of Britain’s anti-Communist policy.

There were caveats, however. Firstly, it is wrong to assume that these training courses were merely a sort of training for police officers in maintaining law and order. These training courses were mainly designed specifically to be part of anti-Communist measures, and MI5 was the chief organiser of these security training courses from the outset. Thus, the aforementioned training courses for colonial police officers in anti-Communist measures, as identified by Calder Walton, were based on the foundation laid by the AC (O) Committee in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Secondly, there were indeed different functions and responsibilities for internal security between Britain, the Colonies and Middle Eastern states. MI5 had been principally responsible for the internal security of Britain since 1931, whereas the Special Branches, as part of the colonial police forces, were empowered to function in the Colonies as counterparts to MI5. In the Middle East, either the police or the army, or both, were responsible for internal security in their countries. Despite these differences in functions and responsibilities, the training courses provided by the British were particularly concerned with counter-intelligence and counter-subversion. The purpose of providing such

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962 Ibid., p.145.
963 Ibid., p.146.
964 See Chapter Two.
965 Training of colonial security forces in maintaining law and order can be traced back to during or even before the Second World War, but these security training courses – more associated with anti-Communist measures – started in the course of the Cold War, in the late 1940s. Cf. Curry, Security Service, pp.396-399.
966 MI5 was a non-official member at the AC (O) Committee until 1953. See Chapter Two.
967 See Chapter One and Chapter Two.
968 According to General Sir Gerald Templer, a Special Branch in the Colonies was responsible for ‘all forms of counter-intelligence’, and was ‘the basis of the whole security intelligence system’. Cf. TNA: PRO CAB21/2925: Report on Colonial Security by General Sir Gerald Templer, 23 Apr 1955, pp.13, 25. See also Andrew, Defence of the Realm, passim, but esp. p.159.
969 Cf. Caroz, Arab Secret Services, p.14-19. In countries, such as Iraq and Jordan, the CID of the police was equivalent to a Special Branch in the colonies responsible for counter-intelligence and counter-subversion. See also Chapter Two.
training either in Britain or local countries was, in Templer’s words, for the ‘stepping-up of intelligence activity’ against the spread of Communist movements overseas.\footnote{TNA: PRO CAB21/2925: TNA: PRO CAB21/2925: Report on Colonial Security by General Sir Gerald Templer, 23 Apr 1955, p.25.}

MI5’s training course, also known as anti-Communist training, appears mainly to have consisted of two different curricula – one was a series of lectures conducted by senior MI5 officers, and the other was a number of Special Branch training sessions run by Scotland Yard. These curricula developed as ad hoc arrangements in 1950 and became gradually institutionalised in the early 1950s. The first group to attend such training was in fact an Iranian delegation – this opportunity arising from the meeting on anti-Communist measures between Haldane-Porter of MI5 in Tehran and General Razmara.\footnote{TNA: PRO KV4/473: the Liddell Diaries, 7 Feb 1951, 7 Mar 1951.} Importantly, providing anti-Communist training to Middle Eastern countries was also given priority by the AC (O) Committee, where the maintenance of internal security in the region was considered most important to Britain’s defence policy, even over other regions such as Europe.\footnote{TNA: PRO FO371/82391: EP1641/1G: letter by Francis Shepherd, Ambassador to Persia, to Michael Wright, 26 Jun 1950; PRO FO371/82391: EP1641/3G: minute by Nigel Bicknell, 18 Sep 1950. The vetting procedure, nevertheless, seems have been relatively relaxed especially to foreign police officers who would attend the police training courses. Two essential requirements were: an application officially sponsored by their own governments, and a good command of English. See further TNA: PRO FO371/98773, fine entitled ‘decision of Assistant Police Commandant Hamid Al-Hussaini to defer his training course in the UK until 1953’, 1952.} At the agreement reached between General Razmara and Handane-Porter of MI5, four Iranian officers (two from the Iranian Police and two from the Iranian G-2), all of whom had also been vetted by MI5 prior to their visit, came over to Britain to study ‘methods of dealing with subversive activity’ in October 1950.\footnote{TNA: PRO FO371/82391: EP1641/2G: minute by [name deducted, presumably by MI5] to G.N. Jackson of PUSD, 3 Aug 1950; PRO FO371/82314: EP1017/17G: letter by Haldane Porter of MI5 to G.N. Jackson, 26 October 1950. The specific requests for training by the Iranians were in ‘investigating, the following up of clues and the discovery of suspects’, and also technical matters such as a use of ‘invisible inks, the methods of opening correspondence and leaving no trace’. Quoted from TNA: PRO FO371/82391: EP1641/1G: letter by Francis Shepherd, Ambassador to Persia, to Michael Wright, 26 Jun 1950.} The AC (O) Committee welcomed the Iranians’ interest in anti-Communist measures and, as the Iranians specifically requested anti-Communist training, the AC (O) Committee also requested MI5 to meet the Iranians’ requests.\footnote{TNA: PRO FO371/82391: EP1641/2G: minute by [name deducted, presumably by MI5] to G.N. Jackson of PUSD, 3 Aug 1950; PRO FO371/82314: EP1017/17G: letter by Haldane Porter of MI5 to G.N. Jackson, 26 October 1950. The specific requests for training by the Iranians were in ‘investigating, the following up of clues and the discovery of suspects’, and also technical matters such as a use of ‘invisible inks, the methods of opening correspondence and leaving no trace’. Quoted from TNA: PRO FO371/82391: EP1641/1G: letter by Francis Shepherd, Ambassador to Persia, to Michael Wright, 26 Jun 1950.} After a careful consideration of these requests by Guy Liddell, the Deputy-Director General of MI5, in consultation with Jack Easton, the Vice-Chief of MI6, the course was arranged accordingly – the reason for this careful consideration will be discussed below.\footnote{TNA: PRO KV4/472: the Liddell Diaries, 30 Oct 1950.
In the anti-Communist training course, three lectures were given to the Iranians by senior MI5 officers. In addition, in order to meet the Iranians’ specific requests, a four-week-long practical training session was arranged to be run by Scotland Yard at the Metropolitan Police Training School, Hendon. The Iranians stayed in Britain nearly a year as further ad hoc training followed at a War Office Field Security course and one of the higher police training courses at Hendon. The available evidence suggests that senior Middle Eastern security chiefs, such as Emir Farid Chehab and Bahjat Attiyah, also attended such anti-Communist training courses in Britain. Similar arrangements were also made for the Lebanese, who were selected in July 1950 by J.M. Kyles, the British Security Adviser in Lebanon, and for the Jordanian security officers, who were sent at the request of Glubb Pasha in 1951. These training courses were also made available to the Iraqis sent by Duncan Macintosh, the British Police Adviser to the Minister of the Interior, in the mid-1950s.

Following these ad hoc arrangements, anti-Communist training courses were also extended to colonial police officers and became institutionalised in the mid-1950s. Learning from the lessons of the Malayan Emergency, the AC (O) Committee noted the importance of training colonial police forces in dealing with Communists in the colonial territories in July 1950. Chaired by Sir Charles Jeffries, Deputy Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office, a conference was held in April 1951 at the Police College, Ryton-on-Dunsmore, where the Commissioners of Police from sixteen Colonies gathered together to review the state of colonial police forces throughout the British Empire. At the conference, the importance of proper training was addressed, and the Commissioners of Colonial Police were encouraged to

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976 Ibid., 6 Nov 1950. Guy Liddell gave a lecture about ‘a rough idea’ of the roles and responsibilities of MI5; Roger Hollis, Director of C Division (Security) talked about protective security; and Malcolm Cumming gave a lecture on ‘technical aids’ with ‘the crudest form of microphone’.
978 See Chapter Two and Chapter Three.
981 TNA: PRO CAB134/3: AC (O) (50) 34: note by the Official Committee on Communism (Overseas) on ‘internal security: lessons of the emergency in Malaya’, 10 Jul 1950.
982 TNA: PRO CO885/119: record of the Conference of Colonial Commissioners of Police at the Police College, Ryton-on-Dunsmore, Apr 1951. Sir Percy Sillioe, Sir John Shaw, and Dick White were also present at the conference to represent MI5.
send their colonial police officers to training courses at the Police College, Ryton-on-Dunsmore, and the Metropolitan Police Training School, Hendon.983

In the mid-1950s, after the recommendation made by General Templer, several Regional Training Colleges, also known as Special Branch Training Units, were established in different regions of the Colonies for the purpose of anti-Communist training.984 A report submitted to the JIC in November 1957 shows that by that time a majority of anti-Communist training courses were conducted at these Regional Training Colleges.985 It is noteworthy that, as mentioned in Chapter Two, there was also a regional training course in Libya especially designed for Middle Eastern security forces from the mid-1950s. The training course was run in Arabic by a British officer, Arthur Giles, former Commissioner of Police in Cyrenaica (1949) and in Tripolitania (1952), who had served in the Egyptian Police (1919-38) and Colonial Police (1938-49).986 A mixture of Middle Eastern security officers from different countries attended the training course. As all instructions were in Arabic, there was ‘no language problem’, noted Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the head of the CID in Jordan.987 In addition, until 1958, training facilities were provided in Iraq for Middle Eastern security officers, and also Iraqi police officers acted as Commandant of the Police Training School in Mukalla, Aden.988

The significance of these training courses was that they were distinctively anti-Communist in character. The series of lectures given by MI5 officers included, for instance, one given by Dick White at the Police College in 1951 on ‘the methods of Soviet subversion throughout the world’, and ‘the objects and capabilities’ of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB).989 In addition, one of the lectures given by Haldane Porter in 1955 to

983 The Police College, Ryton-on-Dunsmore, was especially for senior police officers at ranks of Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents, whereas the Metropolitan Police Training School, Hendon, provided ‘specially designed courses’.
985 TNA: PRO CAB158/30: annex to JIC (57)115, 8 Nov 1957. Four different courses were offered: 1) a Special Branch basic training and refresher course in London; 2) Three weeks Senior Officers Courses for Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners and Heads of Special Branches; 3) Technical training courses; 4) Special Branch courses run in the colonial territories.
986 TNA: PRO FO371/111043: VQ1641/7G: memorandum ‘police expert for Iraq’ by P.L.V. Mallet of FO, 29 Jan 1954. Arthur Giles was also one of the candidates for the Police Adviser in Iraq against Duncan MacIntosh.
989 TNA: PRO CO885/119: record of the Conference of Colonial Commissioners of Police at the Police College, Ryton-on-Dunsmore, Apr 1951. This resembles a recollection by Peter Wright that when he joined in MI5 in the
colonial police officers was entitled ‘Why Communists are subversive’. In addition, the training sessions associated with Special Branch activities were also purposefully arranged. The Home Office, a non-AC (O) Committee member, once commented on a blueprint of a Special Branch training course designed for the Syrian security officers that ‘they [Special Branch] indulged in anti-Communist activity’.

Differences in Training of Colonial and Middle Eastern Security Services

A distinct characteristic of Middle Eastern states was that they were politically non-democratic in the western sense, with domestic politics dominated by a strong security force, which has often been labelled as a secret political police. Owing to the diversity of the region, where each state had a different set of security standards and practices, not all Middle East security services can necessarily be called a secret police. Nevertheless, Middle Eastern security services in most cases deserve such a reputation. In Britain the general principles of MI5 were defined by the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive in 1952, which served as MI5’s charter until 1989 when it was superseded by the Security Service Act. Under the Directive, MI5 was essentially to act in the interest of ‘the Defence of the Realm as a whole’. It was ‘essential’ that MI5 ‘should be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influence’ and ‘no enquiry is to be carried out on behalf of any Government

early 1950s, he was given a series of similar (but recorded) lectures by White on the links between the Soviet Intelligence Service, KGB, and International Communism. Wright also noted that Sir Dick White ‘believed in the fashionable idea of “containing” the Soviet Union, and that MI5 had a vital role to play in neutralizing Soviet assets’, meaning that successful counter-subversive measures could prevent the spread of Communist movements. See Peter Wright, Spycatcher (Australia: William Heinemann, 1987), pp.34-35.


According to Thomas Plate and Andrea Darvi, there are at least five functions of the secret police: surveillance, searches, arrests, interrogation (including methods of physical and psychological torture), and indefinite detention. Once all these practices constitute, they categorise, ‘type-A’ secret police behaviour. See Thomas Plate and Andrea Darvi, Secret Police: The Inside Story of A Network of Terror (London: Robert Hale, 1981), p.11.

Department’. In this, the constitutional principle was that the operations of MI5 were entirely the responsibility of the Director-General of MI5, who was responsible to the Home Secretary, but MI5 was not, however, a part of the Home Office. In addition, the government could not direct whom MI5 would investigate. A former Director-General of MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, noted that this was ‘an important safeguard against the politicisation of the Service’s work’.

The use and abuse of the police force as an instrument of political parties in power was also a discussion topic at a training course of the Police College for senior colonial police officers in the context of the British decolonisation, in which Colonies became independent and the police forces fell under the control of a new local (indigenous) government. Indeed, the anti-Communist training course was used to assert the principle of being apolitical to foreign police officers. However, how seriously this principle was taught is questionable. Guy Liddell reflected in his diaries on his lecture to the Iranian officers that:

I tried to give them a rough idea of what the Security Service was like and what it should do. I began by telling them that it should be wholly non-political and merely concerned with the security of the State, regardless of the Government in power; otherwise it could have no stability and no continuity. This did not, of course, mean that it was not entitled to investigate the activities of political parties which advocated the overthrow of the State by unconstitutional means. I realised from the expressions on their faces how unpractical they felt my suggestion was.

A crucial difference between the Colonies and foreign countries was, however, that while a new colonial constitution could be introduced to safeguard the position of the police forces before its independence, this was not possible in foreign countries, in which the introduction and the implementation of such a constitution was entirely in the hands of foreign governments. Being asked to organise anti-Communist training courses at the Police College for foreign police officers, Sir Frank Newsam, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Home Office, wrote to Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the Chairman of the AC (O) Committee, that ‘I cannot help doubting whether a foreign police officer, however well indoctrinated in British police methods he might become after a course at the College, will be able to apply them in the very

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995 Ibid.
997 TNA: PRO CO885/119: record of the Conference of Colonial Commissioners of Police at the Police College, Ryton-on-Dunsmore, Apr 1951, P.15
different circumstances of his own country’. Sir Frank Newsam was not a member of the AC (O) Committee, and his voice was ignored.

It is noteworthy that despite being the central figure in organising such anti-Communist training courses, MI5 was also critical of the idea of providing training in anti-Communist measures especially for Middle Eastern security officers. Guy Liddell wrote in his diaries in February 1951 after his meeting at MI5 Head Office about the line MI5 should take with the AC (O) Committee concerning the training of foreign police officers that:

We wished to point out, first of all, that we were bound to look at the problem to some extent from the point of view of defence priorities. This caused us to feel that in the matter of building up foreign security organisations we should do more profitable work with the Western European countries, who thought, at least to some extent, on the same lines as ourselves.

Guy Liddell also wrote on the same day in his diaries about his conversation with Brigadier Johnstone, Deputy Director of Military Intelligence, over lunch after the JIC meeting that:

I told him [Johnstone] that I was rather worried by the attitude of the Chiefs of Staff, the Cold War Committee [the AC (O) Committee], and, to some extent, the Ds of I [Directors of Intelligence], on the question of Communism...The views held by the Chiefs of Staff were not our views and the views of other departments on the working level. It seemed to me, therefore, somewhat dangerous that they should be so misguided at the top.

Nevertheless, amongst all foreign police forces, the AC (O) Committee prioritised the training of Middle Eastern security officers as the defence of the Middle East was given paramount importance by the British Government in the early 1950s. MI5’s views were also ignored by the AC (O) Committee.

In addition to disciplinary differences, there was a problem in communication. When Guy Liddell gave the lecture to the Iranian officers in November 1950, he had to speak ‘very slowly’ and repeat it ‘at least three times’ as ‘none of them understood much English’. As discussed in Chapter Two, this was the main reason why Guy Liddell suggested at the AC (O) Committee the dispatch of British police officers who would speak in the local language to conduct such training to local Middle Eastern security services. Otherwise, Britain might have ‘little chance of improving national security services’ in the Middle East.

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1000 TNA: PRO KV4/473: the Liddell Diaries, 7 Feb 1951.
1001 Ibid.
1002 TNA: PRO KV4/472: the Liddell Diaries, 6 Nov 1950. This was not only with the Iranians, but also Jordanians. ‘Only one of them [Jordanians] could speak much English, but they seemed to think that they had learned something.’ Quoted from TNA: PRO KV4/473: the Liddell Diaries, 8 Oct 1951.
More importantly, there was also a fundamental issue of providing training to foreign police forces, which was a major cause of concern for British Intelligence as a whole and inevitably limited what MI5 could offer to foreign police officers. A major difference between colonial and foreign police forces was that, above all, colonial police forces worked towards the internal security of the British Empire. However, as far as training of foreign police forces was concerned, as Guy Liddell noted in his diaries that:

[I]n so far as attempting to teach [REDACTED] in London how to set up an efficient Security Service in their own country was concerned, it was to a large extent a waste of time; in fact MI5 did not stand to benefit at all directly; the only percentage lay with SIS who might acquire a certain amount of goodwill which would enable them to operate from bases in [REDACTED]...The only people we could teach profitably here were those from Western European countries whose conditions were in some measure comparable to our own; we regard them as a first priority.\textsuperscript{1004}

In addition, while providing training to foreign police forces was considered one of the pillars of Britain’s anti-Communist policy at the AC (O) Committee, this was a double-edged sword in practice. Providing training for foreign police forces also meant that Britain would enhance the counter-intelligence capabilities of foreign countries, which could potentially act against them. Guy Liddell noted that:

I made it clear at the [AC (O) Committee] meeting that the training by MI5 in a general way could not last more than about four days, and in some cases not more than two days. It was necessary to take a realistic view of what the word “training” meant. You could explain the general principles on which a security organisation worked, and in some branches you could give a certain amount of detail, but in other cases it was not possible to do so without running the risk of our own methods being used against us.\textsuperscript{1005}

This was indeed the deciding point on what kinds of training could be provided for foreign police forces – if a friendly country turned against Britain, the training would above all affect MI6’s operations on foreign soil.\textsuperscript{1006} This was mainly the reason for Guy Liddell’s reluctance to develop the anti-Communist capabilities of Middle Eastern security forces.

There may have been some exceptions to these limits on training, but they were individual cases. One of them was a senior Iranian army officer, General Hussein Fardust, a life-long friend of the Shah of Iran, who oversaw the development and the activities of the Iranian Intelligence Community from the late 1950s until 1979.\textsuperscript{1007} At the order of the Shah himself, General Fardust claims to have visited Britain three times during the period between

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item\textsuperscript{1004} TNA: PRO KV4/473: the Liddell Diaries, 7 Mar 1951.
\item\textsuperscript{1005} TNA: PRO KV4/473: the Liddell Diaries, 17 May 1951.
\item\textsuperscript{1006} A case which acted against the British can be in Egypt in the early 1950s. See Chapter Three.
\item\textsuperscript{1007} As there is no backup from archival sources, his memoirs (written in Farsi but later translated into English and published in Delhi) must be treated with caution. However, his memoirs reveal some unusual aspects of the training that he experienced in Britain.
\end{thebibliography}
the late 1950s and early 1960s to receive training for establishing an intelligence organisation to coordinate and supervise the activities of all intelligence and security services, including SAVAK.\textsuperscript{1008} He was alone in the first and second visits and was escorted throughout his stay in Britain by MI6.\textsuperscript{1009} In the four-month training programme of his first visit in 1959, he wrote that he mainly learned the system and the functions of the JIC.\textsuperscript{1010} In the four-month training programme of his second visit in 1961, he received more practical training such as MI6 recruitment methods, counter-intelligence, and ‘psychological war’ aiming at ‘weakening the enemy’ and also ‘influencing public opinion’ through propaganda.\textsuperscript{1011} Regardless of the credibility of his claims above, an important point here is that General Fardust felt that he had only been given what he needed to know, and noted that ‘the British were always playing safe in their statements and did not talk in detail’.\textsuperscript{1012} More importantly, as will be discussed further below, in addition to enhancing the Iranian Intelligence Community, the training provided to him was also aimed at influencing the domestic policies of the Shah.

One of the main claims made by Calder Walton has been that Britain’s post-war imperial interests throughout the British Empire were largely maintained on the basis of the contributions of its intelligence and security services. Importantly, particular credit has been given to the successful ‘formula’ adopted by MI5 for dealing with colonial problems: exporting its own model of separating intelligence from law enforcement work in local security forces.\textsuperscript{1013} According to Walton, MI5 also educated colonial security officers through the training courses that there was a ‘fundamental difference between policing and intelligence work’, and that ‘the two required completely different outlooks for officers’. Walton asserts that this was a ‘central tenet’ of the training courses.\textsuperscript{1014} Following the introduction of Templer’s recommendations for enhancing colonial security, three MI5 officers, seconded to the Colonial Office under the title of the Security Intelligence Adviser

\textsuperscript{1008} The organisations were later known as the Supreme Coordination Council (SCC), the State Security Council (SSC), and the Special Information Bureau (SIB), which was also known as the Special Intelligence Office (SIO). See Dareini (ed), \textit{Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty}, p.200.

\textsuperscript{1009} Ibid., p.146.

\textsuperscript{1010} Training in summary and report assessment; protective security; classification of sources; report writing; the overview of the British system, including the JIC. See ibid., pp.159-161.

\textsuperscript{1011} Ibid., pp.161-164. In the course of his visits in Britain, he also received ‘48 hours of special military training’ at Plymouth, where he ‘underwent gun-shooting special training by a military expert’, who explained ‘all parts of the pistols and pledged that whoever was trained there would be easily able to carry out accurate assassinations even if strict security measures were imposed’. Ibid., p.151.

\textsuperscript{1012} Ibid., p.158.

\textsuperscript{1013} Walton, \textit{Empire of Secrets}, passim, but see pp.146-147, 271.

\textsuperscript{1014} Ibid., p.146.
According to a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) report in 1957, in the period between 1954 and 1957, the SIAs paid 57 visits to 27 colonial territories, where 21 Colonial Special Branches were formed with guidance from the SIAs to Colonial Governors.1016

As shown in Chapter Two, this ‘formula’ was indeed introduced to the ‘informal’ British Empire of the Middle East by British security/police advisers in Lebanon, Iran and Jordan. In the words of Thomas Plate and Andrea Darvi, the intelligence function is ‘the brain’, and law enforcement is ‘the body’.1017 In the case of the Middle East, however, given the strong presence of the security forces, and the use and abuse of them, which will be discussed later, the success of separating ‘the brain’ from ‘the body’ is questionable. In addition, although Britain’s influence in particular intelligence and security aspects has been identified, it is difficult to claim Britain made a positive contribution toward the development of local security forces in the field of anti-Communist measures.

The Usefulness of Intelligence Liaison and British Influence

An intelligence liaison with local authorities was essential if British foreign policy sought to maintain its good relationship with them. In addition, an intelligence liaison was also the means of obtaining invaluable information from local authorities. Sir Patrick Dean, then Chairman of both the AC (O) Committee and the JIC, once noted to the Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan, when explaining the functions and responsibilities of both MI6 and MI5 overseas, that an intelligence liaison with local authorities was ‘one of the functions of the Security Service to obtain secret intelligence by its own means’.1018

This was particularly true in the case of the Middle East, where clandestine Communist movements were exclusively dealt with by the local security services. Until the mid-1950s, before which security intelligence was in the domain of SIME, MI5 representatives maintained a close liaison with their counterparts in each country. SIME regularly sent their analyses on Communist activities to British Embassies in the region, and also contributed to the Joint Intelligence Committee in the Middle East (JIC/ME) assessment

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1015 Cormac, ‘Organizing Intelligence’, p.805.
1016 TNA: PRO CAB158/30: annex to JIC(57)115, 8 Nov 1957.
1017 Plate et al., Secret Police, p.9.
1018 A minute by Patrick Dean to Secretary of State, 16 Dec 1955. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013.
on Communist activities.\textsuperscript{1019} Good relations were particularly important as the sources of these assessments were mostly local security force insiders.\textsuperscript{1020} As noted in Chapter Three, when anti-British riots broke out in Egypt in early 1952, over the issue of the British military presence in the Suez Canal zone, British officials at the British Embassy in Cairo assumed that either the Soviet Union or International Communists must have been behind the anti-British riots. However, this view of the British Embassy staff was soon refuted by an SIME analysis. This analysis was a direct result of their close contact with their Egyptian counterpart, and was sourced to ‘a senior official in the Special Section of the Ministry of the Interior’.\textsuperscript{1021}

There was, however, a downside to the over-reliance on intelligence liaisons with local authorities. Evidence seems to suggest that while Britain maintained a good liaison with local authorities, there was no advance warning about the series of the regional crises erupting at the time, such as the Egyptian coup in 1952 and the Iraqi coup in 1958.\textsuperscript{1022} As a result of these crises, Britain lost its anti-Communist allies and also its influence in the region ultimately diminished, inevitably changing the direction of British policy towards the region.\textsuperscript{1023} Concerned that no warning was provided by MI6 about the Iraqi Revolution in 1958, Jonathan Bloch and Patrick Fitzgerald claimed in their book that ‘MI6 had committed a classic intelligence error by recruiting agents among its allies rather than anti-British elements. General Daghestani [Dashistani], for example, was arrested not because he was an MI6 agent – which he was – but because he was a leading figure in the government’.\textsuperscript{1024} They make a fair point – there was indeed a tendency for British Intelligence to focus on intelligence liaisons with local authorities as a source of intelligence in the region during the period. More precisely, while MI6 was closely working with General Daghestani on special

\textsuperscript{1019} TNA: PRO FO371/111043: VQ1641/5: letter by H.S. Stephenson of BMEO to R. Allen, 24 Jan 1954, which recorded that ‘from an intelligence point of view and in our concern with Communism, we are largely dependent in Iraq on our CID [Criminal Investigation Department] liaison [the SIME representative]’ by Sir Hugh Stephenson, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee in the Middle East.

\textsuperscript{1020} When an MI5 officer, P.G.B. Giles, was sent to the Canal Zone as the DSO, Guy Liddell noted that Giles’s ‘aim and object would be to obtain sources of information, the most profitable being bribeable remnants of the Egyptian Police’. Quoted TNA: PRO KV4/474: the Liddell Diaries, 2 Jan 1952.

\textsuperscript{1021} TNA: PRO FO141/1455: 1016/3/52G: a letter by H.S. Stephenson, Chairman of JIC/ME to Creswell of FO, 15 Apr 1952. The whole file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 0903-12), 9 Oct 2012. Sir Hugh Stephenson, Chairman of the JIC/ME, reported to the Foreign Office that SIME ‘discounted suggestions of communist participation in the riots of 26th January because no acceptable evidence has been produced in support of them’. This has also been noted in Chapter Three.

\textsuperscript{1022} On the Egyptian coup in 1952, Michael Thornhill suggests that the British government ‘may well have been sounded out’ about the coup from a Sunday Times journalist, who was approached by Egypt’s military attaché in London. Idem, \textit{Road to Suez}, pp.93-94.

\textsuperscript{1023} Cf. Lucas, ‘The Path to Suez.

\textsuperscript{1024} Bloch et al., \textit{British Intelligence and Covert Action}, p.127.
political action, the aforementioned ‘Operation X’, to overthrow the Syrian regime; MI5’s liaison with the Iraqi CID inhabited MI6’s traditional espionage role. Nevertheless, this point has to be taken further. The lack of advance warning should not solely be blamed on British Intelligence, but ultimately the blame should be laid on the policy of the British Government which directed all intelligence activities at the time. Above all, since British foreign policy sought to sustain its relationships with local authorities, the intelligence requirement was to maintain a liaison relationship with them.

It is important to note that intelligence liaisons were made on the basis of mutual trust. Even in the institutionalised form of an intelligence liaison, such as the so-called ‘Five Eyes’, the intelligence cooperation of the Anglosphere nations (Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) based on the UKUSA Agreement in 1946, trust-building was crucial to cooperation between the parties. In order to establish such a relationship, the liaison had to be mutually advantageous and also there would be no espionage activities without the knowledge of the host country. In other words, cooperating nations were not to spy on the host country. If such activities were exposed, trust in the intelligence liaison would be undermined. In addition, according to Anthony Cavendish, for the purposes of maintaining a good liaison relationship, Sir Maurice Oldfield, as ‘C’, ‘promised the Shah of Iran that while he was Chief, SIS [MI6] would not conduct any internal espionage against Iran’.

Moreover, this was the main reason for the closure of SIME’s Counter-Intelligence Branch, JID – Sir Dick White became concerned about MI6’s clandestine political activities, which would potentially undermine the credibility of local representatives of MI5 in the host countries. The authorised history of MI5 also shows MI5’s general attitudes towards the so-called special political action (SPA), stating that its use in a host country would undermine the trust that had been built upon the good liaison between MI5 and local security.

1025 Earnest Oney, former CIA officer, noted that ‘Five Eyes’ ‘was based on an agreement between the United States and the Commonwealth countries as to relatively free exchange of information, as well as an agreement not to carry on operational activities in each other’s countries. For example, CIA would not carry on any clandestine activities in England or in Australia or New Zealand, and those countries would not carry on clandestine activities in the United States. It was a gentleman’s agreement. Maybe a little more than a gentleman’s agreement. I think it was formalized. But that was the basis for the cooperation’. Quoted from OHOFIS: Earnest Oney, interviewed by Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Maryland, 22 and 29 May 1991, script no.1, p.26, accessible on-line at http://fis-iran.org/en (accessed 20 Aug 2013).
1026 This can be seen from the agreement reached with General Razmara. See Chapter Two. Some exceptions in Iraq, where espionage in the host country was considered risky but conducted as a necessity, were noted in Chapter Three.
1027 Cavendish, Inside Intelligence, p.141.
1028 See Chapter Three.
services. Therefore, Britain was in fact facing an inherent problem of maintaining good liaisons with its Middle Eastern counterparts: its intelligence necessarily came from the very same local authorities, and not from other local sources. This was the reason that no advance warning was provided by local authorities, which were also caught by surprise.

A retired British diplomat has observed that intelligence services have activities which constitute two different but interwoven roles. The first is to collect intelligence from their agents, and the second is to exercise influence through their agents. Similarly, a former intelligence officer has also commented on the role of MI6 in influencing a foreign government that MI6, which sometimes had better access to a higher level of a foreign government than a British Ambassador, exercised its influence on a foreign government through its own agents under the direction of the Foreign Office. This indicates in theory that a highly-placed agent in a foreign government is able to exercise influence on the policymaking of the foreign government on behalf of Britain itself. In the context of the Middle East, Anthony Cavandish has also claimed that MI6 officers had more influence on the Shah of Iran than anyone else, including British Ambassadors and the Americans.

The Shah asked that [Edward] de Haan [of MI6 (1954-57)] and subsequent Station Chiefs, such as Alexis Porter [of MI6 (1958-61)], report to him regularly, and the more competent of the MI6 representatives in Tehran soon had more influence with the Shah than the British Ambassadors, which proved an irritant to most Ambassadors [who lost their direct contact with the Shah]. The Shah was surrounded by sycophants and there were really only two people who could speak freely to him. One was the longstanding British SIS officer in Tehran and the other was Assadollah Alam, a former Prime Minister. Other sources also support the claim that the Shah had a good personal relationship with MI6 officers. Richard Deacon has also made a similar claim that after the coup in 1953 Britain still had closer relations with the Shah ‘on an intelligence level’ than the American counterparts, and that Maurice Oldfield, then Head of Station in Washington (1960-64), even ‘helped’ the Shah to ‘accept American aid’ when the Shah visited the United States on the subject of military assistance in March 1962.

MI6 also had its own agent right next to the Shah himself, Sir Shapoor Reporter, a personal friend of the Shah, who was recruited by Monty Woodhouse when Woodhouse was

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1029 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, pp.478-479.
1030 Private information obtained through an interview, 18 Oct 2011.
1031 Private information obtained through an interview, 4 Sep 2012.
1032 Cavendish, Inside Intelligence, pp.140-142.
1033 Cf. Dareini (ed), Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty, pp.143-163.
1034 Deacon, ‘C’, p.139.
the MI6 Head of Station in Tehran in the early 1950s, before the 1953 coup. According to General Hussein Fardust, Reporter was ‘Britain’s top spy’, who was ‘clearly superior to the Chief of the MI6 station in Iran’ in being able to exercise British influence in the decision-making process of the Shah and other high-ranking Iranian officials. Archival evidence also confirms the scope of his influence on behalf of Britain as an MI6 agent – the Ministry of Defence noted him as a “close and trusted confidant of the Shah”. Evidence suggests that Reporter’s role seems to have been confined to sealing arms deals between Britain and Iran, rather than counter-subversive matters, and that, rather than being interested in preserving British interests in Iran, his motivation was mercenary. The Shah himself lost his confidence in Reporter in the late 1970s after he found out that Reporter merely acted on a profit basis rather than as his close friend.

Britain indeed had far more numerous influential pro-British figures in the Iraqi government throughout the period until 1958. Above all, the head of state, King Faisal II of Iraq, and the Crown Prince, King Faisal’s uncle, Abd al-Ilah, who exercised substantial control over the administration of the Hashemite Kingdom of Iran, were pro-British.  

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1035 KCLHMA: GB0099 Woodhouse Paper 8/1: draft of his autobiography, Something Ventured, 16 Aug 1976, p.101. It noted that ‘I employed in the humble capacity of translator a young Parsee from Bombay called Shapur Reporter, who also worked for the Times. He had been a school-fellow of the Shah, and later rose to eminence (which included a knighthood) as the Shah’s go-between in all sorts of major contracts, principally for arms, between Britain and Iran. See Dareini (ed), Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty, pp.146-7, which noted that Reporter, whose family migrated from India, was born in Tehran in 1921 and later knighted. See also, TNA: PRO HO334/391: BNA38416, R.60203: certificate of naturalisation, ‘Shapoor Ardeshirji Reporter’, 9 Aug 1955. Some classified records, confiscated by the revolutionary forces in 1979, concerning him as a British agent throughout the period, have been published on-line, accessible at http://www.shahbazi.org/pages/Reporter5.htm (accessed on 3 Apr 2013).

1036 Dareini (ed), Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty, pp.146-7. Richard Deacon has claimed that Shapoor Reporter had an important role as ‘a key man’ in the coup of 1953’. Deacon, ‘C’, pp.113-114, though his claims in the book are difficult to verify due to a lack of references.

1037 TNA: PRO DEFE23/198: HDS/PO/1077, letter to PUS, signed by HDS, 28 Apr 1978, which noted that Sir Shapoor Reporter was ‘employed by MTS as a representative and consultant in Tehran with the full knowledge of the Iranian Government…His very considerable abilities lay in the access he had to the highest levels of the Iranian Government and the Military and he is an acknowledged expert in the Persian language…Sir Shapoor’s job was therefore to set up appropriate meetings in Tehran with members of the Iranian Government, attend any negotiating meetings and then follow up after the negotiating team had left in order to clear any misunderstandings or complete any work left undone by the negotiating team’. TNA: PRO DEFE23/198, HDS/PO/860, loose minute to PUS, ‘Shapoor Reporter’ by HDS, 16 Mar 1978, which noted that ‘Sir Shapoor had advised that if closely questioned by taxman on his activities he would plead the Official Secrets Act because of his involvement with Mi6.’ His role in selling British arms to Iran was quoted by Mark Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p.89. Also see, David Leigh & Rob Evans, ‘Biography: Shapoor Reporter’, The Guardian, 8 Jun 2007, accessible at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/08/bae41 (accessed on 3 Apr 2013); Dorril, MI6, p.654.


1039 Sir Sam Falle noted ‘the unfortunate man genuinely liked England, which he often visited, and, most unwisely, he tried to imitate the British’. Falle, My Lucky Life, p.164.
addition, the post-war Iraqi government was mostly dominated by Nuri al-Said, who also appointed his close colleagues in his cabinet, such as Said Qazzaz, the Minister of Interior. British Intelligence also maintained close connections with its Iraqi counterparts, such as Bahjat Attiyah, the Director of the CID, later the Director-General of Security, and General Ghazi Daghistani, Deputy Chief of Staff, who was the chief operator in a plot to overthrow the Syrian government in the 1950s, ‘Operation X’, also known as Operation Straggle in the West. After the 1958 Revolution, a total of 108 senior civilian and military officers, including Qazzaz, Attiyah, Daghistani, Fadhel Jamali, a former Prime Minister, and Yunis Bakri, the Iraqi broadcaster, (who also appeared in Chapter Five), were interned at Abu Ghraib and tried by Military Tribunal.

These pro-British Iraqis were charged with corruption and ‘conspiracy against the state’, meaning that they were acting on behalf of the interests of foreign powers, i.e. Britain, and also conspiring in a plot to overthrow the Syrian government. Amongst them, Said Qazzaz and Bahjat Attiyah were the first civilians to be hanged. The death sentence of General Daghistani, who admitted Iraq’s plot of ‘Operation X’, and its connection with MI6, was later commuted. A retired member of the British intelligence community recalled that ‘we had agents hanged in the main square in the late fifties’. Indeed, it is arguable whether these pro-British figures were actually Britain’s agents as they were mostly serving the Hashemite dynasty of Iraq under their own government. From Britain’s point of view, however, they were invaluable assets through whom British interests could be preserved as they pursued their own domestic policies.

The Limits of British Influence

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1043 Waldemar Gallman, US Ambassador in Iraq, recalled that ‘I watched his [Qazzaz’s] trial on television. He stood erect and strong for hours under a barrage of charges, accusations, and tauntings [sic]. He made no apologies. He did not ask for mercy. He maintained throughout the trial what he had done, he had done from conviction, to save his country and his people from communism, and if he had it to do over again he would do the same. As he and everyone who watched the proceedings anticipated, he was sentenced to death and hanged’. Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, p.96.
1044 The Iraq Times, 26 Aug 1958. He was released from prison and moved to Britain. See Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p.291, n.*.
1045 Quote from email exchange, 18 Sep 2011.
Regardless of the benefits of an intelligence liaison for obtaining information or exercising influence, there is a question to what extent Britain was able to enjoy its influence over the policy of Middle Eastern governments through the liaison. Evidence suggests that the value of the liaison as a means of influence was, however, questionable. There was the fact that Britain’s influence was based on the policy of maintaining pro-British governments in a region which was becoming increasingly anti-British. As Andrew Rathmell noted in his study of post-war Syria, because the Middle East had experienced a long colonial history for centuries, there was a tendency for ‘political opponents commonly [to] accuse each other of being agents of a foreign power’.1046 This was in fact apparent even before the Suez Crisis. While King Hussein of Jordan had a long established relationship with Britain, he also often had to dissociate himself from the British, whose role in Jordan was ‘the object of deep popular suspicion’ in the eyes of the Jordanians.1047 Subsequently, King Hussein of Jordan dismissed General Sir John Bagot Glubb from the command of the Arab Legion in March 1956, until which point Britain had enjoyed considerable influence over the defence and security policies of Jordan.1048

The existence of the intelligence liaison between Britain and the Middle Eastern governments was kept absolutely secret. From Britain’s point of view, it was mostly for security reasons. Such liaisons would be vulnerable to penetration or might become the subject of a propaganda attack by the Soviet Union.1049 For the Middle Eastern governments, it was for exclusively political reasons. Middle East policymakers with links to the West were vulnerable to being attacked by political opponents and risked forfeiting their political lives, or even their lives, as in Iraq. As a result of anti-British sentiment throughout the region after the Second World War, intelligence liaisons between Britain and the Middle Eastern states thus had to be built on the basis of absolute secrecy, or sometimes at personal discretion, in non-institutionalised forms.1050 They remained on unstable foundations until the formation of the Baghdad Pact.

Despite the fact that Britain was constantly being asked for its advice on anti-Communist measures, Britain’s image was far from positive even amongst Middle Eastern policymakers. This was especially the case in Iran. As a result of Britain’s earlier collusion

1046 Rathmell, *Secret War in the Middle East*, p.2.
1048 Ibid., p.50; Gallman, *Iraq Under General Nuri*, p.139.
1050 See Chapter Two.
with the Americans to overthrow Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953, Britain was often seen as a conspiratorial force in international affairs. During the Suez Crisis, the Shah became ‘deeply suspicious’ of the British collusion with Israel against Nasser’s Egypt, but Sir Roger Stevens, the British Ambassador in Tehran, who had indeed no prior knowledge of his own country’s ‘collusion’, repeatedly assured the Shah that ‘there had been no prior collusion with the Israelis’. In addition, when the Iraqi Revolution occurred, General Teymour Bakhtiar, the Head of SAVAK, publicly announced that ‘the British had engineered the Iraqi coup d’état’ and the new Iraqi government was ‘the newly chosen instrument of the British’.  

In addition, Britain itself seriously undermined its relationship with its allies – the Suez Crisis, in which Britain colluded with France, and above all, Israel, the enemy of the Arabs, to attack Nasser’s Egypt. Although Middle Eastern governments maintained their existing intelligence liaisons with the British, the political costs were much greater in the long term – pro-British Middle Eastern governments found it more difficult to handle their domestic politics in the face of anti-British sentiment throughout the region. Amongst all, Britain’s closest ally, Iraq, which was at the centre of British foreign policy at the time, became more vulnerable to a barrage of hostile propaganda attacks both by Nasser and International (Soviet-sponsored) Communists. The US Ambassador in Baghdad, Waldemar Gallman, observed that, despite all the efforts Nuri al-Said put into enhancing the reputation of the Baghdad Pact against Nasser’s Arab Nationalism, the Suez debacle ‘came close to being Nuri’s undoing’. Nuri ‘felt that the British had let the Arab world down badly’, and that ‘Iraq was being forced into a position of opposition to the British’. Not only was Iraqi policy towards Britain under attack, but so too was the credibility of the Baghdad Pact questioned by the Iraqi opposition and attacked by Cairo Radio. Fadhel Jamali, a former Iraqi Prime Minister, recollected that Iraq ‘was being undermined from within’, contributing to the Iraqi Revolution.

1051 TNA: PRO FO248/1568: minute by Sir Roger Stevens, 19 Nov 1956. Indeed, the true story would not be exposed in public until at least a decade later, the assurances made by Sir Roger Stevens about ‘no prior collusion with the Israelis’ would in effect deceive the Shah many years later.


1053 During and after the Suez Crisis, anti-British riots and demonstrations were forcefully put down by the Police in Iraq, and, according to the official figure, twenty-five were killed in these riots. Waldemar Gallman noted that ‘the actual figure was generally believed to have been higher’. See idem, Iraq Under General Nuri, p.78. Duncan McIntosh, Police Adviser in Iraq, put the precautionary security measures over the Suez Crisis. See TNA: PRO FO371/121646: VQ1015/80G: telegram by Sir Michael Wright to FO, 6 Sep 1956.

1054 Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, p.75.

1055 King (eds.), Inside the Arab Nationalist Struggle, pp.273-274.
All of these limitations raise the question of whether Britain enjoyed any influence at all over the policy of Middle Eastern governments. Indeed, the intangible extent of influence is incredibly difficult to assess, and the degree of influence depended on the sensitivity of the issue and the convergence of mutual interests of both parties, which was constantly shifting with domestic and overseas events. However, evidence seems to suggest that there was a certain limit to British influence over the policy of Middle Eastern governments. Middle Eastern governments were above all foreign governments – all decisions were in their hands to act on at their own discretion. When Iran faced a situation that subversive activities, riots, students’ demonstrations were commonplace in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Britain’s plan was seemingly to try to influence the Iranian government policy through General Fardust, one of the Shah’s closest confidents. In his first four-month stay for training in Britain in 1959, the training courses especially designed for him consisted of three sessions, two of which mostly involving political education. While one was concerned with intelligence matters taught in English through a translator, the remaining two sessions were taught in Persian: one was all about Communism by a ‘Communist professional teacher’, including its social and economic system; and the other was about Iran’s economy by a ‘British Iranologist’, who was ‘very critical of Iran’s economic conditions’ and believed that the Shah ‘had to make some fundamental reforms otherwise his government could not remain in power for long’. 1056

Once General Fardust returned from Britain after the training, he suggested some economic reforms to the Shah as instructed by the British Iranologist. However, the Shah rejected his suggestion outright and replied that ‘he [the British Iranologist] has nothing to do with our policies’, and ‘it is none of his business’. 1057 According to General Fardust, the instruction given by the British expert on Iran’s economic affairs ‘ran exactly against’ Shah’s ‘White Revolution’, a series of measures for reshaping the political, social and economic life of Iran, which was implemented in 1963, a few years later. 1058 The initiation of the White Revolution was acutely opposed by some of Iran’s clergy, including Ayatollah Khomeini, and has been said to be the beginning of the fall of the Shah in the course of a long battle between the Shah and Khomeini. 1059

1056 Dareini (ed), Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty, p.150.
1057 Ibid., p.152.
1058 It noted that ‘the teacher believed that Iran should avoid money-consuming big industrial projects and instead implement small and medium-sized projects in order to save hard currency and create as many jobs as possible to solve one of the country’s big problems, unemployment…’. Quoted from ibid., p.153.
Iran was not the only ally to act against British wishes, but Iraq also acted against Britain’s policy and desires. Despite receiving no advance warnings, Britain was indeed aware of the danger of a coup by the Iraqi Army prior to the 1958 Revolution. William Magan wrote in his autobiography that, even during his tenure as Head of SIME, he had been acutely aware of the disaffection in the Iraqi Army, and he duly passed his concerns on to Bahjat Attiyah, then Director of the Iraqi CID.  

A JIC assessment made after the coup attests to Magan’s recollection that his concerns had been already reported to London, presumably either by Duncan MacIntosh or the representative of MI5 in Baghdad. The problem was that despite repeated warnings by its own chief of the Secret Police, Bahjat Attiyah, Iraqi ministers were completely blinkered by their anti-Communist concerns.

In addition, it is noteworthy that in his memoirs Sir Sam Falle, the Oriental Counsellor at the British Embassy in Baghdad (1957-61), dismissed the idea of Iraq as a ‘British lackey’ and noted that:

Nuri was very much his own man and nobody’s stooge. The British Ambassador, Sir Michael Wright, was in Nuri’s pocket, not the other way round. Wright had an immense and quite understandable respect for Nuri…When I used to give Wright my political observations, he would counter with: “But Nuri says…” Occasionally and most reluctantly, at my most urgent prompting, Wright used to mention mildly to Nuri that there was a need for social and economic reforms and that it was important to curb the power of the tribal shaikhs. Unfortunately, Nuri took absolutely no notice; it might have been better if we had been able to exercise some influence.

As noted, the degree of influence depended on the sensitivity of the issue and the convergence of mutual interests of both parties. However, the Shah’s attitudes towards Britain’s suggestion of Iran’s domestic reforms, and Sir Sam Falle’s point about Nuri’s determination to pursue his own policies, demonstrate the limitations faced by British intelligence when attempting to exercise influence over the policy of the Middle Eastern governments.

Adherence to the Rules of Law: Use and Abuse of Secret Police

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1060 In his memoir, Magan states that ‘I felt particularly nervous of the Iraqi Army which might try to seize power and which I felt that the Iraqi intelligence authorities had not got sufficiently covered’. Magan, Middle Eastern Approaches, pp.146-7.
1062 Cf. Falle, My Lucky Life, pp.181-187, 205. This point has also been noted by Hashimoto, ‘British Security Liaison in the Middle East’, pp.848-874.
1063 Falle, My Lucky Life, p.163.
The practices associated with the secret police were not all illegal. Rather, most Middle Eastern states had passed laws defining Communist and subversive activities as illegal and authorising the practices of the security services in countering these threats. The conduct of counter-subversive measures in dealing with Communists, radical Arab nationalists, and separatists were thus mostly lawful under domestic penal codes or defence regulations. Under these conditions, the suspects were often interned without trial, and some cases resulted in capital punishment. However, the rule of law differed in each country and some countries adopted extreme measures. In the case of Iraq, for instance, the introduction of the ‘Association Law’ under the government of Nuri al-Said in 1955 gave the Minister of the Interior extensive power over political groups and their gatherings. Waldemar Gallman, a former US Ambassador to Iraq, observed that under the Iraqi Association Law, ‘any party would be completely dependent on the Minister’s benevolence for its existence’.  

In addition to the differences in political systems, there were of course cultural underpinnings which made the practices of Middle Eastern security services more akin with those of a secret police. For instance, Bahjat Attiyah, the long-standing head of the Iraqi CID, once explained to Guy Liddell about the adverse conditions for recruiting local agents in Iraq, on which Liddell noted that they were ‘very different’ from Britain. In Iraq, Attiyah said, ‘the Police get no voluntary assistance whatever from the population’, for whom, ‘the idea of doing something because it is in the national interest never enters their heads’. According to the Liddell Diaries:

[Attiyah] gave me an example of a murder committed in a café, when he and some friend were sitting in an adjoining house. He went round himself immediately and interrogated the proprietor, who pleaded that he had seen nothing. Even two men who had been sitting on the same bench as the murdered man pleaded the one that he was reading a newspaper at the time, and the other that he was thinking of something else and had only heard the report of the revolver! The only method of coping with a situation of this kind, Colonel Bahjat said, was to take some fifty people who were present in the café and put them all in jail. After some hours of confinement, people began to admit that they had seen something and eventually fifteen witnesses, corroborating each other’s stories, were procured. This story, he said, would indicate how difficult it was to get informants; the only method is by using a personal or family connection and exploiting some situation where money is the primary factor. The average citizen in Iraq does not see any reason why he should court trouble by becoming an agent, and he further takes the view that it is contrary to the tenets of the Koran to act as a spy on his fellow men.  

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Whether religion was another factor in preventing Muslims from becoming spies or informants for their own country is beyond the scope of this research.\textsuperscript{1066} However, Attiyah’s story at least demonstrates the different conditions, not only in Iraq, in which Middle Eastern security services had to operate and the reason that some of the secret police behaviour was seen as a necessary instrument for maintaining the nation’s precarious internal security.\textsuperscript{1067}

In the Middle East, there were no comparable principles to the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive in Britain defining the roles and responsibilities of the security services. They often served the interests of particular political groups or elites, who used and abused the power of these security services. Political opponents were sometimes arrested by the security services on account of being security threats against the government. When a group of Turkish military officers (both serving and retired) were arrested by the Turkish authorities in January 1958 on the grounds of a ‘serious plot’ against the government, Sir James Bowker, the British Ambassador in Ankara (1954-58), who believed the affair to be ‘simply another by-product of the general bitterness engendered by the elections’, commented that the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was ‘determined to teach the army a sharp lesson about the desirability of keeping out of politics, or at least out of opposition politics’.\textsuperscript{1068} Indeed, the Menderes Government was overthrown in 1960 and Adnan Menderes himself was hanged by the military government.

There are other examples of the power of the security services being abused for the personal interests of particular elites. For instance, it appears that Princess Ashraf, the Shah’s sister, ordered SAVAK to ‘eavesdrop’ on her boyfriend’s ‘telephone conversations and closely watch his activities’ for her own personal reasons.\textsuperscript{1069} Moreover, the security services were also bedevilled by corruption. According to General Hussein Fardust, during his reign at SAVAK, General Teymour Bakhtiar accumulated ‘a fortune’ by confiscating properties from ‘wealthy’ bazaar tradesmen with fabricated files accusing them of ‘being a Communist’ and


\textsuperscript{1067} Iraq was indeed not unique in this case. The similar difficulty was also identified in Jordan, the ‘main troubles’ of which was that the police did ‘not get the co-operation of the public’. Quoted from TNA: PRO KV4/473: the Liddell Diaries, 8 Oct 1951.


\textsuperscript{1069} The Shah himself authorised SAVAK to conduct such operations, and SAVAK received a ‘200 to 300 page report daily’ on Princess Ashraf’s boyfriend. Quoted from Dareini (ed), \textit{Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty}, p.119.
throwing them into jail.\textsuperscript{1070} In the case of Jordan, for instance, corruption was not limited to the security services themselves, but also the ministers who directed them.\textsuperscript{1071}

Moreover, the security services were controlled by the head of state in some monarchical states. For instance, Jack O’Connell, the former CIA station chief in Jordan (1963-71), recalled in his autobiography that when he asked King Hussein of Jordan if he could see the head of the Jordanian Intelligence Service, King Hussein himself said to O’Connell, ‘I’m the head of the Intelligence Service’.\textsuperscript{1072} Similarly, Richard Helms, the former Director of the CIA (1966-73), recollected on his dealing with the Shah of Iran that the Shah himself was ‘the chief Iranian intelligence officer’ \textit{de facto}.\textsuperscript{1073} As a result, the power of security forces did not reside in the organisation itself but was ultimately in the hands of the head of state.\textsuperscript{1074} As a result, a danger was that the power of security forces was likely to be politicised to support the policies of the monarch’s own government.\textsuperscript{1075} In addition, nominal post-holders of the security services who became too powerful were often fired by the head of state. A notable case is General Teymour Bakhtiar, the first Head of SAVAK (1957-61), who was dismissed by the Shah in 1961 on the grounds of backing a plot against the Shah and was exiled to Europe the following year.\textsuperscript{1076}

The unregulated extraordinary state power displayed in these cases often promoted the misconduct of counter-subversive measures and violation of fundamental human rights. After the fall of Mohammad Moseddeq in 1953, the Iranian government became even more unsympathetic to the Tudeh Party and conducted a security purge of Tudeh sympathisers

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{1070} Ibid., p.223.
\item\textsuperscript{1071} TNA: PRO KV4/473: the Liddell Diaries, 8 Oct 1951, in which Guy Liddell noted that ‘one of their main troubles is that the [Jordanian] Police have not got the co-operation of the public, and another thing, of course, is that most of their Ministers are probably corrupt’.
\item\textsuperscript{1072} O’Connell, \textit{King’s Counsel}, p.4.
\item\textsuperscript{1074} According to a classified CIA report, the Shah himself took a ‘deep and personal interest in the day to day operations’ of the various intelligence and security organisations and made ‘all major, and many minor, decisions in this field’. Quoted from Asnad, vol.60, p.5, report by ‘United States Military Information Control Committee: Security in the Government of Iran’, by Donald S. Harris, the Secretary, 7 Feb 1966. See also an oral testimony by the CIA station chief in Tehran in the late 1950s and early 1960s. OHOFIS: Colonel Gratian Yatsevitch, interviewed by William Burr, Washington, D.C., 5 Nov 1988 and 12 Jan 1989, script no.1, p.33, accessible on-line at \url{http://fis-iran.org/en} (accessed 20 Aug 2013).
\item\textsuperscript{1075} See Chapter Five.
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\end{footnotesize}
within the administration and security apparatus, mainly the Army and Police. The security purge was not well-executed: suspects were often inappropriately treated and even executed without firm incriminating evidence. Observing the situation, David Stewart of MI5, former Deputy Head of SIME specialising in Middle Eastern affairs, identified underlying potential problems in the long run of these security measures, and reported that:

All the officers were young and a high proportion drawn from the technical, i.e. better educated, branches of the Armed Forces. The Persian Foreign Minister has admitted privately that many were honest and efficient and that most were probably idealists driven into communism by the rottenness of Persia. This is the general impression both inside and outside Persia, and the executions have consequently aroused strong feelings, particularly since they have been conducted inefficiently. In short the incident has been a particularly successful exercise in repression, but emphasises once again the vital importance of constructive action by the Persian regime to remedy a situation in which so many honest, efficient and idealistic young men can find no alternative to communism.

This statement is indicative that these actions were taken as “anti-Communist measures”, which were originally designed to prevent, or suppress, subversive activities. However, these inefficiently conducted and executed measures cultivated anti-governmental sentiments amongst the population.

The eruption of deep discontent amongst the people against their own government can also be seen in the context of the Iraqi Revolution. As noted earlier, Iraq, Britain’s most reliable ally in the region, especially under the premiership of Nuri al-Said, was considered to have the strongest anti-Communist government in the region, introducing repressive security regulations, such as the Association Law. Under the law, Said Qazzaz, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, Nuri al-Said’s right hand man for internal security, was exclusively empowered to conduct robust anti-Communist measures. After the Iraqi Revolution, Qazzaz and also Bahjat Attiyah were the first civilians to be executed by the revolutionary government on the grounds of ‘multiple murders and physical torture of anti-government demonstrators and political detainees’.

Sir Sam Falle, Oriental Counsellor at the British Embassy in Baghdad

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1077 As a result, SIME reported that at least about ‘600 and 800’ officers in the Iranian Armed Forces (the total number of officers was approximately 10,000) were arrested and that ‘twenty-one’ were executed and ‘more are expected’.


1079 Quoted from author unknown, ‘Late News Briefs’, Sunday Independent, vol.LII, no.86, 4 Feb 1959, available on-line at http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=ib1aAAAAIBAJ&sjid=ZVUDAAAAIBAJ&pg=3163,630291&dq (accessed, 15 Sep 2013). Also see Falle, My Lucky Life, pp.230-231. Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, p.96, which noted that ‘Qazzaz was among the first to be arrested by Qasim and among the first of Nuri’s associates to be tried publicly by Qasim’s military tribunal. I watched his trial on television. He stood erect and strong for hours under a barrage of charges, accusations, and tauntings. He made no apologies. He did not ask for mercy. He maintained throughout the trial what he had done, he had done from conviction, to save his country and his
(1957-61), who observed the developments in Iraq before and after the Revolution during his stay in Baghdad, recollected on the fate of Said Qazzaz that ‘his crime was that he was an effective anti-communist’. Indeed, Nuri al-Said, who had just escaped from his house on the morning of the day of the Revolution, was discovered the next day disguised as an Arab woman, and killed in the street. His body was dragged through the streets by the mob.

An intriguing question is, however, to what extent Britain contributed to the excessive use and abuse of interrogation techniques, such as torture. As torture was illegal in British national law, the security service abstained from its use. Eliza Manningham-Buller, former Director-General of MI5 (2002-07), proudly noted MI5’s strict adherence to the rule of law during the Second World War. Cases of abuse of power, such as the ill-treatment of prisoners, were indeed brought to a Court Martial, as can be seen from the case of Bad Nenndorf, a post-war interrogation centre in Germany. The Commandant, Colonel Robin ‘Tin-eye’ Stephens, faced Court Martial for claims of ill-treatment and brutality by his subordinates, but was later acquitted and employed by MI5. Owing to a lack of documentary evidence, the existing literature can only lead to an assumption that the training in interrogation techniques given to Middle Eastern security services at a course run by Scotland Yard was likely conducted on the basis of the adherence to the rule of law and was thus unlikely to have suggested torture or ill-treatment.

This assumption is also supported from the other side of the Atlantic. As noted earlier, the CIA was deeply involved in training SAVAK officers and even interfering in their operational matters. However, Earnest Oney, a former CIA officer, whose mission was to train SAVAK officers in Iran in the late 1950s (1957-59) and early 1960s (1962 and 1964), has refuted any allegation that the Americans were involved in training the officers in the Third Department of SAVAK, responsible for the internal security of Iran, and particularly denies training in the use of torture. Documentary evidence now seems to support his people from communism, and if he had it to do over again he would do the same. As he and everyone who watched the proceedings anticipated, he was sentenced to death and hanged.’


Hoare (ed), *Camp 020*, pp.1-30. It was Colonel ‘Tin-eye’ Stephens’s subordinate who conducted such ill-treatment and brutality there.

Similarly, there was a lack of documentary evidence in the case of the colonies. See Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, pp.250-258.

claim. The declassified CIA interrogation manual, codenamed *KUBARK – CIA’s counter-intelligence interrogation manual* – drafted in July 1963, states that ‘intense pain is quite likely to produce false confessions, concocted as a means of escaping from distress’, and that interrogation must be ‘conducted for the sake of information and not for police purposes’.

Moreover, according to a former SAVAK officer, who noted that the organisation was largely trained by the Americans, British and Israelis, SAVAK officers were ‘trained by those countries *not* for torture’, ‘but to learn how to spy, to do research – that sort of thing’.

According to General Fardust, who admitted that ‘the brutal method of torture’ was commonplace in SAVAK, one of the reasons why SAVAK resorted to such interrogation techniques was that:

> …scientific interrogation in the world’s intelligence and security organizations has a limit, and wherever, because of a sensitive political situation, this method becomes somewhat ineffective, torture is resorted to in order to get speedy results or to create terror and fear. In normal circumstances, the aim of the interrogation is to extract information and so naturally the more scientific and thorough the methods the better! But in sensitive political situations where security is seen to be threatened, the interrogators’ aim is not only at getting information, they also aim at breaking the suspect and creating panic in society.

This indicates that the circumstances in the Middle East were a contributing factor in facilitating excessive security measures conducted by the security services. Ernest Oney also recalled that SAVAK received ‘dozens of reports of plotting against the Shah’ over the years, which was an ‘endemic’ condition in Iran. Additionally, Sir Sam Falle notes that ‘the Shah’s tyranny came from fear’. Similarly, MI5 itself was also concerned that Nuri al-Said ‘might at any moment be assassinated’.

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1087 Ibid., p.94.

1088 Quoted from Plate et al., *Secret Police*, p.55.

1089 Dareini (ed), *Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty*, p.270.


1092 TNA: PRO KV4/473: the Liddell Diaries, 8 Nov 1951.
Finally, an intriguing question is how Britain saw these counter-measures as conducted by the local security services, often violating fundamental human rights, and to what extent Britain endorsed them. A case in the late 1940s illustrates the extent to which Britain was able to exercise its influence on the policy of the Iraqi government concerning human rights abuses. In late 1948 and early 1949 the Iraqi CID raided houses of Iraqi Communists and arrested hundreds of revolutionaries, which also led to a retrial of the three foremost leaders of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), who were later convicted of ‘having led the party from the prison’. In February 1949 the three leaders, plus another individual, were hanged in different squares in Baghdad, and their bodies were ‘left hanging for several hours so that the common people going to their work would receive the warning’. Sir Henry Mack, who had not been informed by the Iraqi government about the executions of the Communist leaders, reported to the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin that:

Information received from secret sources indicates that the trial was not conducted in accordance with British ideas of judicial impartiality, but it must be admitted that the Iraqi Government needed to make an example and there is no doubt that these men were intent on undermining the Iraqi States. All of them had long records of subversive activity... [and evidence for their connection with the Soviet Union] shows that their aims were revolutionary and Government in Iraq is not so firmly established that it can afford to be lenient when such men fall into their hands.

Once the news reached Britain that 160 other alleged Communists were still being held in custody and more executions were likely to be carried out, a number of protests were made to Ernest Bevin to take action against them. The Foreign Office decided to intervene to stop further executions by the Iraqis who were ‘violating fundamental human rights’.

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1093 Batatu, Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, p.568. See also, Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism, pp.195-197.
1094 Batatu, Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, p.568.
1095 TNA: PRO FO371/75130: E3419: letter from Sir H. Mack, Baghdad, to Ernest Bevin, 3 Mar 1949, which noted that ‘Yusuf Salman Yusuf’ is believed to have twice visited the USSR and the efficiency of his organisation makes it probable that he received his revolutionary training there. There is some evidence that Yahuda Siddiq was about to leave for the USSR at the time of his arrest, while both Shabibi and Bassim were reported to have been sent to Kirkuk during 1946 to create trouble among the Iraq Petroleum Company workers.”
only intensify Communist activities and be exploited by propaganda accusing the Iraqi government of human rights abuses.  

Observing the executions of the Iraqi Communist leaders by the Iraqi authority, Arkady Suvorov, the secretary of the Soviet Legation, noted that:

Does Nuri as-Said [al-Said] or the ruling class...think that the hanging of these men or of others will put an end to the Communist movement in Iraq? They are only being foolish...They may now shatter the party and incarcerate thousands of its members...but this will not avail them for long. The rotten state of things will of necessity rouse the people and not only the Communists to protests and eventually to revolution.

Despite a strong anti-Communist stance by the Iraqi authorities, the Communist activities in Iraq persisted and further intensified throughout the 1950s. In his study on the Communist movement in Iraq, Hanna Batatu judged that the execution of the Iraqi Communist leaders in 1949 was a turning point for the Communist struggle against the Iraqi government. Noting that Suvorov’s remark was ‘correct’, Batatu also wrote that ‘to what he said we should add that Fahd [one of the executed Communist leaders whose body was exposed in public] dead proved more potent than Fahd living’, and that ‘Communism became now surrounded with the halo of martyrdom’.

Sir Henry Mack duly but gently reproved the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said for his action, which had ‘gone quite far enough’. Nuri al-Said, however, responded that this practice had been adopted since 1921 in accordance with the law, and told Sir Henry Mack that ‘with a third world war possible it was essential to ensure that these anarchists would not be able to repeat what they had done in the past’. Despite the intervention by Sir Henry Mack, the Iraqi government nonetheless carried out further executions, and another ICP leader was hanged in May 1949, though the dead body was not exposed in public this time.

Another case is in Iran in the second half of the 1950s, in which British officials became aware of the Iranians’ excessive anti-Communist measures, involving the torture of political prisoners. Britain contemplated an intervention, but in the end simply looked on at the unwelcome developments. The stepping-up of the Iranian measures against the Tudeh Party after the 1953 coup has been noted earlier; the person in charge of this operation was

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1097 TNA: PRO FO371/75130: E5390: telegram by FO to Baghdad, 4 May 1949, which noted that ‘the Communists themselves may bring harm upon Iraq’s good name’.
1098 Quoted from Batatu, Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, p.569.
1099 Ibid.
1100 It was noted that this had been introduced by the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Dobbs. TNA: PRO FO624/153: minute by Sir Henry Mack, 8 Mar 1949; PRO FO371/75130: E3202: telegram from Sir H. Mack, Baghdad, to FO, 9 Mar 1949.
General Teymour Bakhtiar, Military Governor of Tehran, who supervised the purge of the Tudeh elements within the Iranian government – mainly in both the Police and the Army in the mid-1950s. The allegation was widely propagated by the members, or sympathisers, of the Tudeh Party that the Iranian government flogged political prisoners with a whip at ‘the renowned “bath-house” (hammam)’, and that General Bakhtiar was also personally involved in the torture of prisoners.\textsuperscript{1102} The British Embassy in Tehran was mostly kept out from the matter by the Iranian government, but the only explanation given by General Bakhtiar himself was that he had been received an order from the Shah that he ‘should use whatever methods he considered necessary to gain information’.\textsuperscript{1103}

As the Tudeh elements, and International Communists, gained ground by exploiting the situation with subversive propaganda, the diplomats at the British Embassy in Tehran judged that the allegation was accurate on the basis of patchy evidence and discussed whether they should intervene in the situation by suggesting the Shah dismiss General Bakhtiar from his post. The argument for intervention was that ‘our reputation will suffer unless we do something about it’.\textsuperscript{1104} However, an MI6 officer, Edward de Haan, who headed the Tehran Station (1954-57), intervened in the discussion and noted that:

whatever one may say against General Bakhtiar’s methods, he is an extremely able individual who is likely to have many years of service under the Shah. He is, as you know, highly regarded by the Shah...[who] has no intention of keeping him in the post of Military Governor for very much longer...If General Bakhtiar believed that he had been dismissed from his post because of British objections to his methods of treatment of prisoners, we might alienate him forever. This would be a serious blow when he reaches higher posts, as he almost certainly will. The price would not be worth improving our stock in other quarters of Tehran.\textsuperscript{1105}

Indeed, General Bakhtiar relinquished his post as Military Governor of Tehran and assumed a new post, the first head of the Iranian national intelligence and security organisation (SAVAK). Given his subsequent career as the Head of SAVAK (1957-61), who was also entitled to assume the post of Deputy Prime Minister, it was most likely that no intervention was made regarding his treatment of prisoners. Even if the intervention was made, there was no visible consequence.\textsuperscript{1106}

\textsuperscript{1102} TNA: PRO FO248/1569: a minute by J. T. Fearnley, 11 Mar 1956.
\textsuperscript{1103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1104} TNA: PRO FO248/1569: a minute by H.M. Ambassador, 19 Mar 1956.
\textsuperscript{1105} TNA: PRO FO248/1569: a minute by E.P.N. de Haan, 12 Mar 1956.
\textsuperscript{1106} Although it is beyond the period of this research, Richard Deacon has claimed in his biography of Sir Maurice Oldfield, that Oldfield as ‘C’ also advised the Shah on ‘intelligence matters’ and he was content with the activities of ‘the much condemned SAVAK’. Deacon, ‘C’, p.113.
Britain’s non-interventionist attitude was more apparent towards the treatment of the Kurds by the central governments of Iran, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Iraq, throughout the period between 1949 and 1963 since the policy of the British government towards the region was to maintain good relationships with these governments. As the regional governments were ‘sensitive’ on the question of the Kurds, the Foreign Office insisted the representatives of the British government not raise any issues concerning the Kurds in the region and the way in which they were treated by the central governments. Indeed, the Kurdish minorities were treated differently between Iraq, Iran and Turkey; while the rights of the Iraqi Kurds had been recognised by the Iraqi government since the 1920s. Nevertheless, the question of the Kurds was a politically sensitive topic to the three governments.¹¹⁰⁷

Despite British awareness of this politically sensitive issue in the decades since the end of the First World War, the treatment of the Kurds by the regional governments had never caught much attention outside the region until the heroic return of Mulla Mustafa Barzani from his exile in the Soviet Union to Iraq in October 1958. As noted in Chapter Five, the Iranian and Turkish governments kept a close eye on him and developments in Iraq through intelligence sharing between them. Once Barzani announced his proposal for the unification of his Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) under a single secretary-general, SAVAK readily rounded up ‘250 suspected KDPI activists’ without trial, and the KDPI ‘almost ceased to exist’.¹¹⁰⁸

In addition, the Turkish government also conducted precautionary security measures against the Kurds. Shortly after the civilian Menderes government was overthrown by the Turkish army officers in May 1960, a group of Kurds began demanding Kurdish autonomy. The new military government moved fast and arrested 248 Kurds who were ‘believed to have supported agitation for a free Kurdish State’.¹¹⁰⁹ Once news about the treatment of the Kurds by the Iranian and Turkish governments reached Britain, John Profumo, then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, was asked by William Owen, a Labour MP, at the House of

¹¹⁰⁷ David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, 3rd ed (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p.169. Note that amongst the three, the Turks were the most sensitive on this matter. ‘…the Turks are extremely sensitive about the Kurdish minority…if he [Mr Baker] wants to obtain cooperation from the Turkish authorities he would, we suggest, be well advised not to show too great a public interest in the Kurdish problem’. Quoted from TNA: PRO FO371/144805: letter by L.M. Minford, Ankara, to E.J.W. Barnes of FO, London, 29 Jan 1959.
¹¹⁰⁸ McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p.252. One of the KDPI leaders, Azia Yusifi, was detained until 1977, when he was released due to his ill health. See ibid., p.260n.
¹¹⁰⁹ TNA: PRO FO371/153093: press-cutting from the Daily Telegraph, ‘Turks Release Tribesmen’, 23 Nov 1960, which noted that ‘The last rebellion of the Turkish Kurds occurred in 1926 in the time of Kemal Ataturk’, After over five months in custody, 193 Kurds were released, and 55 Kurdish leaders were ‘charged with holding their fanatically-religious followers almost in slavery and inciting them to rebellion’.
Commons in May 1960 about Britain’s view on ‘the recent disturbances in Turkey and Iran’ and if Britain was consulted with by these authorities as a CENTO member.\footnote{Hansard, HC Deb, vol.624, c102W, 30 May 1960, accessible on-line at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1960/may/30/central-treaty-organisation-turkey-and#S5CV0624P0_19600530_CWA_69 (accessed, 20 Aug 2013).} John Profumo replied that Britain was not consulted by them and restated Britain’s non-intervention policy towards the minority movements that ‘the internal affairs of each country are a matter for that country alone’.\footnote{Ibid. Also see TNA: PRO FO371/149686: EB10113/1: note for supplementary, draft reply, 27 May 1960.}

**Conclusion**

As shown in preceding chapters, the training of Middle Eastern security services in anti-Communist measures was a recurrent theme of Britain’s anti-Communist policy in the region. Based on the findings from earlier chapters, this chapter has discussed the meanings and the value of this training. It is noteworthy that Calder Walton suggests in his book, *Empire of Secrets*, that Britain successfully exported its ‘intelligence culture’ by training colonial security forces throughout the British Empire.\footnote{Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, passim, but see pp.146-147.} This chapter has shown that the training colonial security forces in fact originated from British anti-Communist policy to train and facilitate the effectiveness of anti-Communist measures by local security services in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. Akin to the security training implemented throughout the Colonies, policymakers in London, such as those of the AC (O) Committee, also hoped that through British training strong Middle Eastern security services would safeguard British interests in the region – above all, pursuing Britain’s national interests – chief defence policy and then oil – was prioritised. However, as Sir Frank Newsam and Guy Liddell rightly doubted, the value of this training was largely questionable.

This chapter has also discussed that the implications and the consequences of Britain’s anti-Communist measures in the region. Strengthening the political police certainly forestalled the Communist advance in these countries and sustained the existence of the local governments, but once internal subversion by the Communists, the Soviet Union or Egypt intensified, the local authorities felt increasingly threatened. The inevitable consequence was that Middle Eastern security services became part of the problem rather than the solution. As the local security services were the only means to maintain the governments in power,
Middle Eastern governments often adopted more vigorous and ruthless counter-measures, including torture of prisoners. Despite these efforts by the Middle Eastern authorities, internal subversion persisted, and the repression fostered anti-governmental feelings amongst the population. As a result, Middle Eastern governments faced internal subversion, not by International Communists, but by their own people. To maintain good relations with the local authorities, Britain looked the other way as the local authorities conducted excessive counter-subversive, and ultimately kept intervention at a minimum. Consequently, British influence over the policy of Middle Eastern governments was also limited.
Conclusion
The Limited Benefits of Intelligence Liaison
Those who consider it [Britain’s engagement in the post-war Middle East] to have been a period of failure, are the sentimentalists who do not understand why things should not have gone on as they were before. A more correct judgement is that though we made mistakes like everyone else involved, we have so far come through an unusually difficult and complex period without more damage to our real interests in the Middle East.

- Lord Trevelyan

It is just possible, I suppose, that the West knows how a country like Persia ought to be governed in the best interests of the people, but that it knows how it could be so governed has always seemed to me very unlikely.

- Lit-Col. Geoffrey Wheeler

Common Intelligence Culture? – Britain’s ‘Informal’ Empire in the Middle East

Britain’s engagement in the post-war Middle East was firmly connected to its imperial past. As Sir Alan Munro, a former British diplomat, later admitted, his dealings with the Middle Eastern and African affairs were based on ‘the legacies of imperial history’. Sir Anthony Parsons, another Middle Eastern specialist at the Foreign Office, recalls that though the Middle East was not part of the post-war British Empire, Britain, still known as ‘the lion’ across the Arab world, retained a ‘predominant’ influence over the region. Indeed, while Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and Jordan, in the post-war period were not under the colonial administration of the British Empire, their relationships with Britain had certainly developed since the First World War. Britain had closer connections with Middle Eastern governments than any other power except France which maintained its influence in the Levant (Syria and Lebanon) until the Second World War. This thesis has shown that common interests in anti-Communist policy encouraged an even closer relationship between Britain and Middle Eastern authorities (Chapters One and Two). In the

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1113 Lord Trevelyan was the British Ambassador in Cairo (1955-56) in Baghdad (1958-61). Quoted from Trevelyan, Middle East in Revolution, p.ix.
1118 Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East, chs. 7, 8; Martin Thomas, The French Empire at War, 1940-45 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); idem, The French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).
post-war period, Britain was seen as the most reliable and experienced ally by several Middle Eastern authorities, including even Lebanon, where British officials were very much in demand for their advice on anti-Communist measures. This was the context in which Britain maintained closer relationships with Middle Eastern states and in which British Intelligence established close connections with its Middle Eastern counterparts (Chapter Two).

As noted in the Introduction, Sir Stephen Lander noted that international intelligence cooperation, not only intelligence sharing but also other forms of liaison, such as intelligence and security training, happened ‘where there [was] a pressing shared need that [went] beyond the capacity or capability of one country to address’.1119 As has been shown throughout the thesis, British intelligence liaison with its Middle Eastern counterparts was essentially driven by Britain’s post-war anti-Communist policy – Middle Eastern governments and their security services were considered ill-prepared for or incapable of conducting security measures in the case of a war against the Soviet Union; and also strengthening Middle Eastern security services was thought essential to safeguard British anti-Communist and economic interests in the region (Chapter One). Intelligence and security liaison between Britain and Middle Eastern countries was based on their common interests in anti-Communist measures in the region (Chapters Two and Three). Nevertheless, there were also conflicting interests in the region. The schism in propaganda approaches can be seen as a microcosm of the problems affecting regional cooperation as a whole. Britain saw the threats more narrowly than its Middle Eastern counterparts (Chapters Four and Five).

The authorised history of MI5 has noted that MI5 officers were expected to spend ‘a quarter to a third of their careers on overseas posting in the Empire and Commonwealth’ in the post-war period.1120 The secret linkage of MI5’s network with the colonial authorities was pronounced by Philip Murphy as exporting a ‘Commonwealth intelligence culture’.1121 Calder Walton recently claimed that Britain rather successfully implemented its own policy through intelligence liaison with local authorities of the British Empire, through which particular techniques and methods were transported with the movement of MI5 from one Colony to another.1122 This thesis has also identified similar dynamics in Britain’s ‘informal empire’ in the Middle East (Chapters Two and Three). For instance, all Heads of SIME, William Magan (1947-51), Robin ‘Tin-eye’ Stephens (1951-53), William Oughton (1953-

1120 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p.332.
1121 Murphy, ‘Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture’, pp.131-162.
1122 Walton, Empire of Secrets, pp.26-29.
55), Philip Kirby-Green (1955-58), either had colonial backgrounds or later moved to serve in the colonial territories. The DSO in Baghdad, such as Jack Morton (1947-48), Philip Ray (1948-51), and Roger Lees (1951-53), all had Indian Police backgrounds. Security and police advisers, such as J.M. Kyles, the Security Adviser in Lebanon (1950-51), and Duncan MacIntosh, the Police/Security Adviser both in Iraq (1955-58) and Jordan (1958-62), also had extensive experience in the Colonies.

Nevertheless, in the case of the Middle East, despite a close connection with the local authorities, including the training in anti-Communist measures provided by Britain, there was no common intelligence culture between British Intelligence and its Middle Eastern counterparts. The intelligence and security culture of these Middle Eastern regimes derived to a considerable extent from the political culture of the regimes they served. In some cases, such as Iran, for instance, there was strong adherence to the military culture from which the intelligence personnel sprang. From their point of view, MI5’s constitutional principle, stipulated by the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive in 1952 as being apolitical in the defence of the realm, was perhaps incomprehensive (Chapter Six). As shown in this thesis, Middle Eastern security services dominated in both internal security and propaganda in their home countries, and, despite frequent interactions with their British counterparts, these services frequently held views on security and intelligence that contrasted sharply with the policing and information-oriented approach of the British. This rift was most noticeable and most destructive in the Counter-Subversion Committee and excessive security measures, including torture of political prisoners (Chapters Five and Six). This thesis has found that, despite the fostering of cooperative anti-Communist measures by organisations like the AC (O) Committee and on the initiative of individual leaders like Harold Macmillan (who offered to share British methods and techniques of anti-Communist measures with the signatories to the Baghdad Pact), there was no evidence of a common intelligence culture between Britain and Middle Eastern countries. The reality was above all that British intelligence liaison with its Middle Eastern counterparts was based on a narrow interest of anti-Communist measures in the region; and when there were conflicting interests, it became even more restricted.

The year 1958 has been the subject of scholarly attention as the year in which a series of crises in the Middle East, especially the Iraqi Revolution, formed a turning point for British Middle Eastern policy. Some imperial historians have claimed that this was a pivotal moment in the decline of Britain’s ‘informal’ Empire in the region. An intriguing question is when the British-Middle Eastern intelligence/security liaison ended and to what extent it continued beyond it. The year 1958 was certainly a setback for British intelligence/security liaison. As a result of the Iraqi Revolution, Duncan MacIntosh’s career as Security/Police Adviser in Baghdad came to an abrupt end (Chapter Two). Indeed, a total of 108 pro-British influential Iraqis, including the key liaison contacts, such as Said Qazzaz, Bahjat Attiyah, and General Ghazi Dashistani, were arrested and accused of being ‘criminal traitors’ by the revolutionary government (Chapter Six). In addition, the Lebanese Crisis in the same year led to the resignation of Farid Chehab from his post as the Head of the Sûreté Générale.

Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, meanwhile, noted in his diaries that 1958 marked the end of the informal regional intelligence/security cooperation between Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and Turkey on subversive activities in the region.

It is clear, however, that a degree of continuity in intelligence liaison remained after 1958 and was even sustained beyond the period of this study. A notable example is the Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees under CENTO (Chapters Four and Five), which continued until the dissolution of CENTO in 1979. Duncan MacIntosh moved to Jordan as Police Adviser from 1958 to 1962, and until 1979 the Shah of Iran maintained a close connection with MI6 officers, including Sir Maurice Oldfield, as well as MI6 agents, Sir Shapoor Reporter and General Hussein Fardust (Chapter Six). There is also evidence to suggest that MI6 continued to benefit from ongoing British intelligence relationships with contacts in the Iraqi Police, armed forces, and businessmen after the 1958 Revolution (Chapter Four). A retired member of the British Intelligence Community recalls that even the

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1124 Cf. Louis et al. (eds.), A Revolutionary Year; Ferrea et al. (eds.), Iraqi Revolution of 1958.


1126 Assieily et al., A Face in the Crowd, p.147. Also see Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p.321. After 1958, when General Fouad Chehab, a former Commander of the Army, became the Lebanese President, the Army, instead of the Sûreté Générale, assumed the main responsibility for internal security in Lebanon.


Egyptians in the 1970s/80s, who had been uncooperative during the period of Nasser’s rule from 1952 to 1970, were ‘good allies’ with Britain Intelligence especially against Libya.\textsuperscript{1129}

The continuation of British intelligence liaison with its Middle Eastern counterparts did not, however, entirely substitute for the relationships that had constituted the systems of ‘informal’ Empire in the region. Above all, given the limits of Britain’s influence over the policy of Middle Eastern governments, it is questionable whether the notion of a British ‘informal’ Empire accurately reflects the limited reality of Britain’s ability to exert its influence across the region. This thesis has demonstrated that British intelligence liaison with its Middle Eastern counterparts only operated on the basis of common interests. In this regard, Britain’s ‘informal’ Empire in the post-war Middle East was only sustained on the common but thin ground of anti-Communism.

\textbf{Failure of Intelligence Liaison and Britain’s Counter-Subversion in the ‘Informal’ Empire in the Middle East}

The quotation of Lord Trevelyan indicates that, despite some mistakes in the short-run, Britain’s engagement in the region was successful in the long-run. Were Britain’s efforts towards intelligence liaison and fulfilling its anti-Communist policy in the post-war Middle East then successful? There are caveats. It is difficult to judge the degree to which they succeeded or failed as there were many factors contributing to the general failure of the Communist Parties to make significant headway in the region. In contrast to Britain’s Colonies where Britain could implement policy directly, in the Middle East anti-Communist measures were implemented by local authorities, meaning that Britain’s influence was inevitably more limited. In addition, since several Middle Eastern governments were already anti-Communist in inclination, it is possible that anti-Communist measures may have been implemented without significant British encouragement or assistance.

There are also important questions relating to the extent to which British policymakers understood the role of intelligence, and how far the implications of anti-Communist measures in the region were considered. Calder Walton, for instance, gives credit to both the role of intelligence and its use by the British Government in the Colonies on the grounds that intelligence was vital for perpetuating Britain’s influence overseas, which

\textsuperscript{1129} Private information obtained through an interview, 28 Feb 2012.
'allowed London to punch far above its weight in the years after 1957, for the rest of the Cold War'.1130 This thesis is more critical, especially of the British decision/policymakers at the time. It has shown how the role of intelligence was understood by British policymakers especially in the context of counter-subversion.

Harold Macmillan also had a particular view of the role of intelligence in the conduct of the Cold War (Chapter One), and his initiative to share the methods and techniques of anti-Communist measures with the members of the Baghdad Pact had at least some influence on counter-subversive measures conducted by local authorities (Chapters Four and Five). As strong security services were considered essential for preventing the spread of Communist activities and maintaining British influence in the region, British Intelligence, MI5 in particular, was tasked with strengthening the repressive capability of Middle Eastern governments (Chapters One and Five). However, as the thesis has demonstrated, there were unintended consequences relating to the development of security forces in the Middle East. More precisely, it is arguable that certain Middle Eastern governments actually undermined their own security as the repressive nature of their regimes alienated and bred resentment among their own populations (Chapter Five).

In this regard, Britain’s anti-Communist policy in the region was arguably flawed in the first place. It was particularly the case in the Middle East, where Communist activities were illegal and operating often in tandem with other underground groups. As a result, the demarcation line between Communist and non-Communist subversive activities was often blurred (Chapter Four). In addition, most Middle Eastern governments were already anti-Communist and maintained strong security services which had the reputation of a secret police, infringing human rights. Indeed, it was often Middle Eastern governments that took the initiative in requesting British advice on anti-Communist measures, which the British decision/policymakers then proceeded to provide as a means of pursuing their own interests. The paradox was that while the maintenance of Britain’s interests in the region was of the foremost importance, in the long-term, the policy served mainly to prop up increasingly unpopular, authoritarian regimes against a rising tide of anti-British sentiment. The failure was not specific to British Cold War policy in the Middle East, however. The United States, Britain’s closest ally against the Soviet Union, also used similar methods and techniques to sustain its own short-term interests, but failed in the long-term, for instance, in Guatemala.

1130 Walton, Empire of Secrets, p.304.
and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{1131} From a rather different perspective, similar arguments have been made about Soviet Union with regard to Eastern Europe in the post-war period.\textsuperscript{1132}

The role of intelligence is to guide the policymaking process. Until the release of MI5’s own archives, it was extremely difficult for historians to assess how the role of MI5 was understood and its intelligence was used by policymakers. In this regard, despite certain passages being redacted in the declassification process, the Liddell Diaries, which Liddell himself would have never imagined would be exposed to public eyes, contain unusually detailed frank and often critical views on MI5’s relationship with other departments and its intelligence customers. They make clear that there were those within MI5 who remained sceptical about the prospect of strengthening the repressive capability of Middle Eastern governments (Chapter Six). These sceptical voices were overridden by Britain’s strategic, anti-Communist, and oil interests in the region. This thesis thus reinforces the interpretation of the authorised history of MI5, \textit{The Defence of the Realm}, that it was not MI5, but the decision/policymakers who were mostly occupied with the spread of ‘the Communist menace’ and ignored advice from MI5.\textsuperscript{1133}

**Quid Pro Quo – the Requisite for Intelligence Liaison**

The central theme of this thesis has been the subject of intelligence and security liaison. Henry Kissinger once observed that ‘there is no such thing as “friendly intelligence agencies”’, and that ‘there are only the intelligence agencies of friendly powers’.\textsuperscript{1134} Kissinger’s observation implies that intelligence services do spy on friendly nations. However, spying on a friendly nation is a delicate issue as it can undermine diplomatic relations once it is found out. There is certainly a historical precedent, such as the case of Jonathan Pollard, a US Navy intelligence employee who spied for the Israeli Intelligence Service in the 1980s, when the United States and Israel maintained a close relationship.\textsuperscript{1135} The issue of spying on a friendly nation is also entailed in the subject of intelligence liaison.

As noted in the Introduction, the subject of intelligence liaison is a developing area. There are a few scholars who have started to engage in the subject in the context of the ‘War

\textsuperscript{1131} Cf. Prados, \textit{Safe for Democracy}.
\textsuperscript{1132} Cf. Andrew et al., \textit{Mitrokhin Archive}.
\textsuperscript{1133} Andrew, \textit{Defence of the Realm}, passim, but see pp.837-838.
\textsuperscript{1134} Quoted from Lowenthal, \textit{Intelligence}, p.146.
on Terror’. Academic discussion is centred on intelligence sharing. According to Stephane Lefebvre, for effective intelligence sharing, ‘confidence and trust’ and ‘the perceived benefits to both sides in the liaison’ are ‘essential ingredients’. In the context of the ‘War on Terror’, he suggests Western intelligence and security services obtain trust from their Middle Eastern and Central Asian counterparts for intelligence sharing.1136 Derek Reveron similarly argues that the United States must obtain ‘high levels of trust on the part of all countries involved’ to operate its intelligence services on foreign soil and to obtain intelligence through its liaison with local authorities.1137 Chris Clough argues further that ‘mutual trust is the most important factor’ in driving intelligence liaison.1138 Their points are essentially that trust is a necessary condition for intelligence liaison, and that if countries did not trust each other, they would not share intelligence. On the contrary, James Walsh argues that it is not trust but a hierarchy that dictates intelligence cooperation; countries ‘may share intelligence even when they do not have much trust in each other’, and they do so ‘by substituting a hierarchical relationship for trust’.1139 According to Walsh, the ‘dominant state’ can force a ‘subordinate partner’ to share intelligence, and establish ‘oversight mechanisms’ to determine the security of intelligence, and also ‘punish defection without the subordinate state’s having the right to retaliate’.1140

This thesis has identified that there were at least three essential requirements for intelligence liaison in the Middle East during the early Cold War – all three are prerequisite for effective intelligence liaison. The first and foremost was common interests between the parties, encouraging liaison and the significance of conflicting interests in restricting it. The connection between British intelligence liaisons with its Middle Eastern counterparts was anti-Communist measures in the region. There was little effective intelligence liaison outside anti-Communist measures. Concerning intelligence sharing more specifically, Colonel Jenkins, the DSO Cairo, was, for instance, able to obtain intelligence from his Egyptian counterparts on ‘Communist, Russian and Jewish matters’, but not topics which might ‘harm Egyptian interests’ (Chapter Three). Similarly, conflicting interests also affected the application of anti-Communist measures in the region, such as dealing with the Kurdish problem (Chapter Four).

1136 Lefebvre, ‘The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation’, p.528.
1138 Clough, ‘Quid Pro Quo’, p.603.
1140 Ibid., p.17.
The second was the security of systems. Even if common interests existed, when there was a defect in the security of a liaison partner, there was no effective intelligence liaison. This was the case of intelligence sharing in particular. As this thesis has demonstrated, the establishment of SAVAK was a good example of this (Chapter Four). Prior to effective intelligence sharing, MI5 sought to build up the security of the Iranian intelligence system, which included the recommendation for establishing a national security organisation, i.e. SAVAK; training of Iranian officers in protective security; and setting up an efficient system at its Registry. Until the state of Iranian protective security was improved to a minimal standard, Britain sought to avoid sharing intelligence in the form of multilateral intelligence liaison, but instead shared intelligence with its counterparts on a bilateral basis. In the latter way, a risk of secret intelligence leaking out to unintended recipients could be minimised.

This thesis thus reinforces the argument of a recent study on Britain’s attitudes towards the insecurity of the French system and Britain’s reluctance to share its own intelligence with France under NATO in the early Cold War.1141 Similarly, this research also identified that in 1955, when Sir Charles Duke, the British Ambassador in Jordan (1954-56), was approached by his French counterpart to share intelligence on Communist activities in the region, the British Embassy in Jordan was ‘not very keen on too close contact with the French on this or any other subject’ on the ground of the lack of protective security of France at the time. Instead, the British decided to arrange for ‘periodical talks’ with their French counterpart ‘of a general character’.1142 Indeed, the security of systems is vital for effective intelligence sharing. A retired intelligence officer notes that the security of communications is a precondition for intelligence liaison, which is ‘the norms of behaviour’.1143

Based on her theoretical assumption that the international system is ‘essentially one of self-help and anarchy’, Jennifer Sims presupposes that intelligence liaison occurs only on the basis of the costs and benefits of its cooperation. She then suggests that an intelligence service ‘must penetrate its liaison partner to determine if losses are likely to exceed gains in the relationship, to independently vet the partner’s sources, and to ensure that the partner is not penetrated by a hostile third party’.1144 Indeed, she also recognises the importance of information security for intelligence liaison, but her suggestion is associated with the

1143 Private information obtained through an interview, 4 Sep 2012.
1144 Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison’, pp.196, 205.
mentality of an extreme counter-intelligence officer, such as James Angleton, the long-time head of counterintelligence at the CIA, whose philosophy of counter-intelligence has been seen as most destructive not only within the Agency but also with its allies.\footnote{Cf. David Robarge, ‘Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions: James Angleton and CIA Counterintelligence’, The Journal of Intelligence History, vol.3 (2003), pp.21-49. Also see William Johnson, Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad: how to be a counterintelligence officer (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2009), pp.172-174.} However, her suggestion risks the third essential requirement for intelligence liaison, which is trust in the liaison.

The findings of this thesis therefore reinforce the argument of earlier researchers, such as Lefebvre, Clough, and Reveron, concerning the importance of trust in the liaison. This thesis has shown that mutual trust was an important element for effective intelligence liaison not only at state level but also at the individual level. At the state level, Britain, not the Americans nor the French, was seen by Middle Eastern governments as the most reliable ally for their fight against Communist movements in their countries. At the individual level, the close connections of Colonel Jenkins with his Egyptian counterparts are an example; once his liaison partner changed, Jenkins had to ‘win the good will’ of the new partner before any secret intelligence was shared (Chapter Three). The ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’ between Colonel Coghill, Farid Chehab, and Bahjat Attiyah was also institutionalised on the basis of personal relationships (Chapters Two and Four). The relationship between Coghill and Chehab, including a sort of intelligence exchange, even continued after Coghill’s dismissal from the post in 1956.\footnote{A personal letter from Farid Chehab to him, for instance, containing detailed information on the internal situation in Lebanon as well as the regional situation during the Lebanon crisis in 1958, was passed onto the Foreign Office, and treated as ‘very top secret’, noting that if this was known to the Lebanese, ‘he [Farid Chehab] would probably be killed’. TNA: PRO FO371/134116:VL1015/10/G: letter by Sir John Glubb to Rose of FO, 24 Mar 1958, including ‘extracts from a letter dated 26/2/58 from Emir Farid Shehab [Chehab]’.} Maurice Oldfield also maintained a personal friendship with Farid Chehab.\footnote{Deacon, ‘C’, p.52; Chehab Papers “F”: letter, designated ‘17N’, from Oldfield was written to Farid on 17 Jul 1975.} William Magan stated in his autobiography that Bahjat Attiyah had remained his ‘close friend’.

In addition, the importance of mutual trust in the liaison can also be seen from MI5’s general attitudes towards MI6’s espionage activities and its concern about covert action in host countries which would potentially undermine MI5’s good liaison relationships with local authorities (Chapters Three and Four). While this thesis has also identified that Britain did spy on its host country (Chapter Three), it was not through counter-intelligence

\footnote{Attiyah even visited Magan’s house in Britain several times before the events of 1958, when the Nuri el-Said government was overthrown by the ‘Free Officers’ coup, led by General Abd al-Karim Qasim. Magan, Middle Eastern Approaches, p.146-147.}
operations to determine the security of a liaison partner, as Jennifer Sims presupposes. However, espionage activities without the knowledge of local authorities could undermine a liaison relationship once exposed.

James Walsh presupposes a hierarchy of intelligence liaison – the power of a dominant state over a subordinate state. There was indeed a senior-and-junior relationship which existed in the British-Middle Eastern intelligence liaison, but not a hierarchical relationship as Walsh presupposes. Britain was seen as senior and more experienced by its liaison partners in the field of anti-Communist measures, protective security, and intelligence sharing (Chapters Two and Four). However, this thesis has not found any evidence to suggest that Britain forced its junior partner to either provide intelligence to it or ‘punish defection without the subordinate state’s having the right to retaliate’. Indeed, Britain provided its Middle Eastern counterparts with the system of protective security. However, this was for the security of systems for intelligence sharing (Chapter Four). Therefore, effective intelligence liaison requires common interests, the security of systems, and mutual trust in the liaison.

Besides the prerequisites for effective intelligence liaison, this thesis has also identified issues surrounding intelligence liaison. Firstly, intelligence liaison requires a sensible balance. Intelligence liaison was cost-effective and above all it yielded intelligence that would have been otherwise unobtainable (Chapters Two and Four). However, the limit of intelligence liaison in turn was to provide intelligence that is only available from a liaison partner. This thesis has shown that British Intelligence, MI5 in particular, was tasked with liaising closely with local authorities (Chapter One). Its close liaison with local authorities meant that Britain would be more dependent on official channels for collecting intelligence. The irony was that there was no advance warning about the Egyptian coup in 1952 and the Iraqi Revolution in 1958. As mutual trust in the liaison was an essential requirement for effective intelligence liaison, there was tacit understanding between liaison partners that they would not spy on each other (Chapter Six). Thus, there is a necessity to maintain a delicate balance between spying and liaison.

Secondly, and finally, there remains further scope for academic discussion of intelligence liaison. This thesis has identified that the British Government used intelligence liaison as a means to influence the anti-Communist policies of Middle Eastern government

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1150 A retired intelligence officer also notes that intelligence liaison to become functional necessitates ‘political will’, ‘high level of trust’, and ‘the role of individuals’. Private information obtained through an interview, 4 Sep 2012.
(Chapters Two and Six). A retired senior intelligence officer notes the role of intelligence liaison is ‘maintaining influence’ over a liaison partner.\textsuperscript{1151} It is interesting to note that the role of intelligence in this regard is identified in the academic literature as a part of special political action (better known as ‘covert action’ in the academic literature), more specifically being referred to as so-called ‘agents of influence’, whose task is to ‘influence directly government policy rather than to collect information’.\textsuperscript{1152} As this thesis has shown, while the presence of a liaison officer was declared to the host government as the means of communication, it was used by the British Government to gain political leverage or political influence through the liaison channel. The reason for maintaining such a secret connection between Britain and Middle Eastern governments was mainly the concealment from the population or opposition parties, who were hostile to the British, as was common in the post-war Middle East (Chapter Two). Thus, intelligence liaison as a means of secret diplomacy was indeed useful in such a hostile environment. Indeed, British Intelligence already had plenty of experience of intelligence liaison as a form of secret diplomacy.\textsuperscript{1153} Therefore, in this context, the subjects of intelligence liaison and special political action certainly overlap.\textsuperscript{1154}

In addition to intelligence liaison which fulfils the functions both of intelligence collection and influence, a highly-placed agent in a foreign government could also function similarly to intelligence liaison, such as Sir Shapoor Reporter in Iran (Chapter Six), in terms of functions of both intelligence collection and influence. Looking at intelligence liaison or a highly-placed agent in a foreign government as the means of exercising influence on the policy of a foreign government also raises the question of the distinction between diplomacy (conducted by a diplomatic service, the Foreign Office, for instance) and secret diplomacy (by an intelligence service, MI6 as an example). These aspects are significantly understudied in the literature, and need to be explored further.

\textsuperscript{1151} Private information obtained through an interview, 28 Feb 2012.
\textsuperscript{1152} Shulsky et al., \textit{Silent Warfare}, pp.78-80.
\textsuperscript{1154} On the role of liaison or clandestine diplomacy in the form of clandestine actions or covert action in general, cf. Len Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy’, \textit{INS}, vol.19, no.2 (2004), pp.322-341.
Len Scott and Peter Jackson remarked nearly a decade ago that the subject of intelligence liaison was ‘a final ‘missing dimension” in the field.\textsuperscript{1155} It is still a developing subject.\textsuperscript{1156} This thesis has shown that a historical study of the subject can certainly contribute to fill the gap in our knowledge. Historians tend to jump on to the declassified records at the TNA. However, Richard Aldrich once reminded us of a consequence of an indiscriminate scrutiny of an intelligence history, noting that ‘historians who feast only on the processed food available in the PRO’s efficient history supermarket may begin to display a flabby posture’.\textsuperscript{1157} This thesis has also demonstrated that a historical enquiry into state secrets needs to be conducted diligently and that such multi-archival research can yield fruitful results to fill the gap.

\textsuperscript{1156} A similar point was also made in 2011 by Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Aidan Wills (eds.), International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability (London: Routledge, 2011).
\textsuperscript{1157} Aldrich, “Grow Your Own”, p.148.
APPENDIX I
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE MIDDLE EAST CHATER

1. Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) is an inter-service organisation and a part of the Security Service (MI5)

2. Head/SIME is responsible to the Director-General of the Security Service, and for local policy and executive action to the Middle East Defence Committee jointly and individually.

3. SIME is responsible for the collection, collation and dissemination to the interested and appropriate Service and Civil Authorities of Security Intelligence affecting British interests in the Middle East. It is also responsible for such executive action as may be approved by the Service and/or Civil Authority concerned.

4. SIME will, with the approval of the relevant authorities, maintain representatives under appropriate Service or other suitable cover wherever they are considered to be necessary throughout the Middle East area. Such representatives and responsible to Head/SIME from whom they receive directions and funds, and locally to their respective Service Commanders and/or Civil Authorities.

5. SIME will maintain close relations with MI6 in the Middle East to ensure thorough integration of all security information affecting the area. It will also maintain liaison as required with the Police and/or Security Authorities of the countries within the area, and with all representatives and links of the Security Service.

6. SIME cannot be called upon to reveal its sources of information to any other organisation or outside authority. It is, however, within the discretion of Head/SIME to do so in a case where he considers it desirable or expedient and subject to obtaining the consent of any other organisation which may control or have an interest in the source. In important cases the matter should be referred to the Director-General of the Security Service.

7. Head/SIME will be a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Middle East.

8. SIME has an establishment sponsored by the Army which allows for any appointment to be held by a member of any of the three Services or of the Security Service.

9. The Army will continue to furnish Field Intelligence funds upon estimates submitted by Head/SIME. It will also provide accommodation and other services.
APPENDIX II

List of Key Personnel (Selective)

Cabinet Committees

*Official Committee on Communism (Overseas) (1949-56), Chairman*

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (1949-50)
Sir Pierson Dixon (1950-53)
Sir John Ward (1954-55)
Sir Patrick Dean (1955-56)

Foreign Office

*Overseas Planning Committee (1956-57), Chairman*

Douglas Dodds-Parker (1956-57)

*British Ambassador to Egypt*

Sir Ralph Stevenson (1951-55)
Sir Humphrey Trevelyan (1955-56)

*British Ambassador to Iraq*

Sir Henry Mack (1948-51)
Sir John Troutbeck (1951-54)
Sir Michael Wright (1954-58)
Sir Humphrey Trevelyan (1958-61)

*British Ambassador to Iran*

Sir John Le Rougetel (1946-50)
Sir Francis Shepherd (1950-52)
Sir Roger Stevens (1954-58)

*British Ambassador to Jordan*

Sir Roderick Parkes (1962-66)

*British Ambassador to Lebanon*

Sir William Houstoun-Boswall (1947-51)
MIS

Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME)¹¹⁵⁹

Colonel Raymond Maunsell (1939-44)
Brigadier Douglas Roberts (1944-46)
Alex Kellar (1947)
Brigadier William Magan (1947-51)
Colonel (later Brigadier) Robin ‘Tin-eye’ Stephens (1951-53)
William Oughton (1953-55)
Philip Kirby-Green (1955-58)

Defence Security Officer (DSO), Cairo

Colonel Geoffrey Jenkins, the DSO Cairo (1943-50)
Walter Bryan Emery (1950-51)

DSO, Baghdad

John Percival Morton (1947-48)
Philip Bicknell Ray (1949-51)
Roger Edward Rowley Lees (1951-53)
Norman Himsworth (1953-) – serving as Security Liaison Officer (SLO)

DSO, Beirut

Major David Beaumont-Nesbitt (1949)

Police/Security Advisers

J.M. Kyles, Security Adviser to Lebanon (1950-51)
John Albert Briance, Security Adviser to Iran (circa 1950-52)
Roger Edward Rowley Lees, Security Adviser to Iran (1956-57)
Duncan MacIntosh, Police Adviser to Iraq (1955-58); Police Adviser to Jordan (1958-62)
Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the Director-General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion (1952-56)
Michael Clayton, Deputy Security Officer of the Security Committee, the Baghdad Pact (1956-58)

Middle Eastern Counterparts

Iraq

¹¹⁵⁹ SIME was housed within (sequentially) the Army headquarters in Cairo (1939-1946); Fayid, in the Canal Zone of Egypt (1946-1953); and Cyprus (1954-1958).
Said Qazzaz, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior (1953-58)
Bahjat Beg Attiyah, Director of the Iraqi CID (1947-58)
General Ghazi Daghistani, Deputy Chief of Staff (1954-58)

**Iran**

General Haj-Ali Kia, the Chief of the Military Intelligence (circa, the mid-1950s-early 60s).
General Teymour Bakhtiar, Head of SAVAK (1957-61)
General Hassan Pakravan, Deputy Head of SAVAK – external affairs (1957-1961), later Head of SAVAK (1961-65)
Hassan Alavi-Kia, Deputy Head of SAVAK – internal affairs (1957-62)
General Hussein Fardust, Chief of the SIB (1959-)

**Lebanon**

Emir Farid Chehab, the Head of the Lebanese Sûreté Générale, (1948-1958).
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CAB134: Miscellaneous Committees (General Series).
CAB158: JIC Memoranda.
CAB159: JIC Minutes.
CAB175: War Books.
CAB176: JIC Minutes.
CAB179: JIC Weekly Reviews and Surveys.
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Colonial Office Files
CO885: Subjects Affecting Colonies Generally.
CO1035: Intelligence and Security Departments (ISD Series).

Ministry of Defence Files
DEFE13: Private Office.
DEFE23: Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Defence.
DEFE28: Directorate of Forward Plans.

Foreign Office Files
FO141: Embassy and Consulates, Egypt.
FO195: Embassy and Consulates, Turkey.
FO248: Embassy and Consulates, Iran.
FO371: Political Departments (1906-1966)
FO1093: Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department.
FO1110: Information Research Department (PR and IR Series).

Home Office Files
HO334: Immigration and Nationality Department.

GC&CS Files
HW12: Diplomatic Section and predecessors: Decrpts of Intercepted Diplomatic Communications (BJ Series).

Security Service Files
KV2: Personal (PF Series) Files.
KV3: Subject (SF series) Files.
KV4: Policy (Pol F Series) Files.
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