Community Policing From the 'Bottom-Up' in Sarajevo Canton
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Community Policing from the ‘Bottom-Up’ in Sarajevo Canton

This article analyses the implementation of a Swiss community policing model in Sarajevo Canton, Bosnia-Herzegovina. It accounts for how officers from one community policing unit were able to facilitate cultural legitimation for their community policing role within their sector by linking it to established, subcultural definitions of police work. This was achieved through the officers’ interactions with colleagues and supervisors as well as their partnership-building activities in the community. The difficulty experienced by a second unit which attempted to replicate their success further indicates that rank-and-file police officers may also represent an obstacle to ‘bottom-up’ reform. The article makes a contribution to a growing body of research on police reform in developing and transitional countries by providing empirical support for the idea that the agency of enthusiastic and perceptive officers can act as a mechanism for cultural transformation. This in-turn may establish a foundation for developing contextually appropriate models for locally-responsive policing in developing and transitional countries.

Keywords: community policing; police reform; policy transfer; police culture

Introduction

Over the past two decades, ‘community policing’ has emerged as a popular template for police capacity-building in developing and transitional societies [(see Brogden and Nijhar}
Implicit in a growing body of scholarship on transnational policing is a recognition of the fact that the policy transfers associated with police reform projects constitute complex processes, the outputs of which are shaped by an interplay between structure and agency as well as international and local influences [(see Blaustein 2014; Ellison and Pino 2012; Ryan 2011)]. This article argues that local police officers represent important policy mediators who play an important part in determining the nature of policy outputs generated by police development assistance projects related to community policing.

A multi-site, single case study is used to contrast the progress of two community policing units working to implement a Swiss community policing model from the ‘bottom-up’ [(Marks and Sklansky 2012)] in Sarajevo Canton, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) in 2011. Motivated police officers from one unit (RPZ1) used their agency to support the initiative by facilitating cultural validation of community policing in their sector. This process involved linking what Herbert [(2001)] elsewhere identifies as ‘effeminate’ aspects of community police work to ‘masculine’ definitions of policing. This enabled members of RPZ1 to retain their credentials as police officers while communicating the operational utility of a non-adversarial policing role to colleagues and supervisors. Subcultural validation had practical benefits for the officers from RPZ1. It afforded them operational autonomy and discretion which allowed them to devote much of their time to partnership-building activities. The officers believed this autonomy was necessary for outwardly improving the perceived legitimacy and responsiveness of the Sarajevo Canton Police.

The success of this unit is then contrasted with the obstacles encountered by a second unit, RPZ2. Officers from RPZ2 struggled to implement the reform in their sector due to a combination of contextual obstacles and limited managerial support. Their progress was further constrained by the officers’ personal hesitations about embracing what they perceived to be a ‘feminised’ policing role. Their primary concern was that doing so would jeopardise
their perceived credibility as professional police officers. The second case study therefore highlights how the agency of these officers can also limit the prospects for achieving bottom-up reform. Taken together, the case studies support the argument that even in weak and structurally dependent states like BiH, rank-and-file police officers have the capacity to act as agents of institutional change. In other words, this agency has the potential to make an important contribution to the development of culturally and contextually appropriate models for ‘downwardly responsive’ [(Bayley 1999: 7)] or ‘democratically responsive’ policing [(Aitchison and Blaustein 2013)].

The article begins with a methodological discussion. It then proceeds to contextualise the case study with a concise review of the history of policing in the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and BiH. The key components of the Swiss community policing model that was introduced to Sarajevo Canton by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in 2008 are accounted for and this is followed by a review of the challenges associated with achieving cultural transformation of the police. The remainder of the article then contrasts the experiences of the two RPZ units.

**Methodology**

The case study referenced in this article draws from five weeks of qualitative field work conducted by the author between March and April 2011 while he was completing his doctorate and conducting participant observation as an ‘intern’ with UNDP in BiH’s Safer Communities project. The aim of the research was to develop insights into how local police officers interpreted community policing and the extent to which they had been successful in implementing the reform. The field work was initially carried out to provide empirical support for recommendations contained within a UNDP policy brief that outlined the
possibility of introducing formal community safety partnership structures Sarajevo Canton. Access to conduct the research was negotiated by UNDP and approved by the Ministry of the Interior for Sarajevo Canton (MUP KS) in February 2011. The author’s permission to reference this data for scholarly publication was established through his Terms of Reference agreement with UNDP and research protocol approved by the MUP KS.

The data was generated using ethnographic methods including four-weeks of observation with officers from two community policing units and semi-structured interviews conducted in the final week. Blaustein personally completed over seventy hours of observation with the two RPZ units during the first four weeks of the fieldwork. He accompanied the officers during their shifts, attended meetings with different ‘partners’ in the community and observed their interactions with colleagues and supervisors. He jotted field notes in a journal and wrote them up as field notes which were later analysed using open coding techniques. The choice of methods was very much determined by the nature of the access and the need for flexibility due to the unpredictable schedules of the officers as well as that of the author whose time was split between this research and a placement with UNDP. A research assistant acted as a translator and interpreter for the observation with RPZ2. He also was present at the semi-structured interviews which were not tape recorded. The research assistant’s reflections represent an important source of inter-coder reliability which contributed to aspects of the analysis presented in this article.

RPZ1 and RPZ2 were purposively selected for the study following consultations with colleagues at UNDP and the RPZ Coordinator for the Sarajevo Canton Police which revealed them to be the most experienced policing units in Sarajevo Canton. This was important because it ensured that the officers were already well-versed in the SDC’s model and thus, any shortcomings could not be attributed to inexperience. Rather than organising the analysis around thematic subheadings that correspond to different factors that are known to obstruct or
facilitate the implementation of community policing projects (e.g. lack of motivation, contextual obstacles, managerial resistance), the article presents the experiences of both units separately in order to illuminate important linkages between these factors. The identity of the officers, their units, and the specific location of their sectors has been obscured. All quotations are paraphrased unless explicitly stated. The author did not have a formal working relationship with the SDC or any personal interest in the evaluated ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of their community policing project.

A final point to make relates to the issue of generalizability. Bosnia-Herzegovina is not a representative example of the categories of developing, transitional, post-conflict or weak states. Indeed, representative examples do not exist for these categories. In many respects, Bosnia-Herzegovina provides a relatively hospitable environment for reformers. This is down to the country’s political and economic stability, at least in comparison to other developing and transitional countries in North Africa, the Middle East and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. The challenges which confront reformers operating in these environments must not be dismissed [(see Hills 2009)] and it must therefore be acknowledged that cultural and structural factors ultimately determine the long-term viability of police reform projects [(see Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Ellison and Pino 2013)].

**Police Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Policing in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) remains poorly documented in the English language policing literature. It is clear however that the institution exhibited elements of what [Broduer (1983)] has elsewhere described as ‘high’ and ‘low policing’. ‘High policing’ was evident from the centralised, state policing body known as the ‘Resor Državne Bezbednosti’ (RDB). The RDB was responsible for intelligence and counter-
intelligence activities and was comprised of a paramilitary force of approximately fifteen-thousand officers who ‘...could be deployed in times of political unrest or disorder when the local police were expected to side with the populace against federal authorities’ [(Soper, 2007)]. This suggests that the RDB primarily worked to insulate the Yugoslav government and its political ideology from political dissidence. By contrast, ‘low policing’ in the SFRY was decentralised and administered by each of Yugoslavia’s six individual republics following liberalisation initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s [(Stojanovic and Downes 2009: 75-76)].

The fact that each individual republic had a certain degree of control over local ‘milicija’ (public police) meant that local policing varied throughout the SFRY. While descriptive accounts of low policing within these constituent republics are scarce, anecdotal evidence does suggest that its provision was generally viewed more favourably by the Yugoslav public than its state-level counterpart. This was at least the case in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina where [Bringa (1995: 74)] suggests that the local milicija derived a certain degree of legitimacy from its capacity to act as a de facto arbitrator of inter-ethnic disputes. This is not to suggest however that the institution was highly regarded by the public or that members of the public were overly keen to interact with their local police officers. This analysis is supported by a 2003 project proposal for DFID’s community-oriented policing project which states that neighbourhood policing in the SFRY was characterised by ‘a lack of trust between police and communities’ [(Atos KPMG 2003: 2)]. The possibility that the police might be seen as legitimate but lack the public’s trust can be explained by the fact that the SFY was not a liberal-democracy. Rather, their authority was a product of both local tradition and the institution’s association with a state that derived its authority from a ‘party monopoly of truth and representation’ [(quoting Beetham 2013: 21)].
If policing in the SFRY could not be described as ‘democratic’, its role during the Bosnian War was clearly ‘anti-democratic’ [Aitchison and Blaustein 2013]. [Bieber (2010)] describes how the collapse of SFRY during the early 1990s prompted the local police to redefine their function for the duration of the conflict while [Aitchison (2007: 327-328)] observes that between 1992 and 1995, local police officers actively participated in various human rights abuses including acts associated with ethnic cleansing, forced population transfers, mass detention, and mass murder. The role of the public police during the war and its complicity with human rights abuses inevitably tarnished the reputation of this institution as a legitimate provider of local security. It also further diminished its operational capacities for maintaining general order. It was in relation to the perceived non-democratic character of policing in the SFRY and its anti-democratic character during the Bosnian War that international reformers identified police reform as an important state-building priority in BiH beginning in the late 1990s.

Significant progress was made by the international community between 1996 and 2004 in terms of establishing a foundation upon which democratically responsive policing could be established [(Aitchison and Blaustein 2013)]. By 2008, multiple community policing projects had been introduced to BiH by international organisations intent on enhancing the delivery of local police and improving police-community relations. Research by [Deljkić and Lučić-Ćatić (2011: 180-181)] indicates that most of these initiatives, particularly those which attempted to promote a ‘philosophy’ of community policing at the macro- or institutional levels, failed to have a discernible impact on the actual mentalities and practices of rank-and-file officers. Specifically, [Deljkić and Lučić-Ćatić] found that by 2008, most uniformed patrol officers interviewed were aware of the rhetoric of community policing but struggled to distinguish it from the ‘traditional’ Yugoslav model of sector-based patrol. Similar views were expressed during interviews conducted by Blaustein with project workers.
and external evaluators contracted by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in 2011 (interviews, SDC project associate and external evaluator). These sources indicate that multiple attempts to implement community policing reforms from the ‘top-down’ had failed to have a significant impact on how rank-and-file police officers throughout BiH constructed their professional identity.

**Community Policing: The Swiss Way**

Unlike its predecessors, the SDC aspired to promote a micro-level community policing model that defined community police work as a specialist activity to be carried out by designated community policing specialists assigned to dedicated ‘RPZ’ units. Between 2008 and 2011, the SDC supported the Ministry of the Interior for Sarajevo Canton in introducing RPZ units to different sectors. It provided the officers assigned to these units with training that was modelled on what the SDC identified as the ‘best practices’ of community policing in Switzerland. This training introduced the officers to four components of community policing: ‘security marketing’, ‘intelligence sharing’, ‘transactional analysis’ and ‘partnership-building’. The SDC describes these components in its 2010 *Manual for Community-Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina* which also features input from local RPZ officers from across BiH who were involved with early implementation efforts [(SDC 2010; henceforth ‘Manual’)](SDC 2010; henceforth ‘Manual’)). The terminology employed by the SDC was ultimately adopted by local RPZ officers throughout Sarajevo Canton who used it to structure and interpret their work. This section reviews its four key components and links them with recognisable aspects of community police work from the United States and Western Europe.
Security Marketing

‘Security marketing’ was introduced as a problem-solving methodology conducive to what [Goldstein (1979: 236)] has elsewhere labelled ‘problem-oriented policing’. The Manual lists six steps for ‘achieving a security marketing process’: ‘find out the causes of insecurity of the population’; ‘identify the problem’; analyse the problem; ‘searching for partners in order to find an efficient solution to the problem’; ‘[find] a solution to the problem, together with partners’; and ‘evaluate’ results [(SDC 2010: 65-67)]. Elements of the ‘security marketing process’ are quite similar to the ‘SARA’ methodology (‘Scanning’, ‘Analysis’, ‘Response’ and ‘Assessment’) that is commonly used by community police officers in Europe and North America. The difference between the two approaches, at least according to the Manual, is that ‘security marketing’ provides community policing specialists with a toolkit for addressing ‘complex security problems’ whereas SARA is to be used by the officers to ‘[solve] local problems of lower intensity’ (SDC 2010: 81). The Manual does not actually distinguish between ‘complex security problems’ and ‘problems of lower intensity’ so it is safe to assume that this was left to the judgment of RPZ officers.

Intelligence Sharing

‘Intelligence sharing’ reflects the idea of community policing as a form of knowledge work used to communicate risk to internal and external stakeholders [(see Ericsson and Haggerty 1997)]. To this effect, the Manual prescribes that RPZ teams should take the lead in presenting the local intelligence gathered via ‘security marketing’ to colleagues throughout the organisation and to partners in the community [(SDC 2010: 56)]. To perform this
‘intelligence sharing’ function within the police organisation, the Manual states officers should maintain an ‘affairs board’ within their station that lists recent incidents and events and that the officers present their analyses of these findings to their colleagues during daily briefings [(SDC 2010: 54)]. It also suggests that community policing specialists should work directly with station managers and supervisors to streamline communications and by-pass hierarchical reporting procedures that restrict the flow of information within this organisational setting. To perform this intelligence sharing function with partners in the community, the Manual calls for RPZ specialists to ‘know their area/sector of responsibility and the citizens living there’ [(SDC 2010: 39)] so that they can establish a functional network of partners throughout the community. Specifically, the Manual states:

‘Community policing officers should contact all citizens, whatever their social status, origin, culture and lifestyle might be. They should also partner with other stakeholders, mainly from the social and educational areas which requires (sic) good knowledge of stakeholders...Community policing officers will be asked various questions, which will not always be related to their scope of competences, but anyhow the attitude of service to the population should be a guide. [RPZ] officers will make efforts to find solutions, resorting to the partners’ competences and services.’ [(SDC 2010: 46)]

Theorising the significance of intelligence-led community policing in the Canadian context, Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 70-71, 73) reference the work of Stenson (1993) in arguing that community policing constitutes a particularly important ‘institutional methodology for communicating risk management’ that ‘constitutes the police as professional experts… [who possess]…abstract knowledge about risk that is valuable to others’. This idea is implicit in
the SDC’s belief that appealing to community values and interests through positive, non-adversarial interactions is particularly important for establishing police legitimacy and reaffirming the traditional role of the public police as an important institution for risk communication in the community. Establishing a network of contacts is also important in relation to this idea of policing as risk communication because it seeks to develop what Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 72) identify as ‘[improved] connections with the communications circuitry of other risk institutions’.

**Transactional Analysis**

The third element of the SDC’s community policing model was derived from Canadian psychiatrist Eric Berne’s (1959/1996; 1961) theory of ‘transactional analysis’. In an article published in the *Indian Journal of Psychiatry* in 1959, Berne (1959/1996: 154-155) describes transactional analysis as follows:

“...The system is based on the observation that psychic functioning and social behavior are related to states of mind which may be called ego states. An ego state may be described phenomenologically as a coherent system of feelings, and operationally as a set of coherent behavior patterns; or pragmatically, as a system of feelings which motivates a related set of behaviour patterns. It can be further observed that there are three types of ego stages, each derived from a psychic organ: exteropsychic, neopsychic, and archaeopsychic. After patients (or therapists) become somewhat adept at diagnosing between exteropsychic, neopsychic, and archaeopsychic ego states, they may proceed to simple transactional
analysis. The problem here is to distinguish direct transactions from complex transactions. The latter are of two kinds: crossed and ulterior.'

Research on transactional analysis has evolved since the late 1950s but the fundamental idea is that it provides individuals with a schema and vocabulary that supports continuous reflection about how different psychological influences shape their social interactions. The ‘theory’ posits that individuals can use this reflective process to understand and improve the quality of their communication and relationships with others. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider the merits and limitations of transactional analysis but it is worth accounting for how the idea was interpreted by the SDC and why it was prescribed as a method for achieving a ‘security marketing process’ in Sarajevo Canton. Essentially, the SDC viewed transactional analysis as a means of enabling and encouraging rank-and-file police officers to take the initiative of working to improve their relationship with different segments of the community and it was thought that this would improve the prospect of inter-agency cooperation. According to the SDC’s website, ‘more than 10,000 employees of police agencies’ undertook training in transactional analysis which was delivered by ‘100 trainers’ between 2006 and 2010 (see ‘SDC Bosnia and Herzegovina…’). I did not personally have the opportunity to observe or take part in the SDC’s transactional analysis training so it is not clear from this research which specific elements of Berne’s (1961) ‘system’ were being utilised by the officers. What was clear from my observation was that officers from RPZ1 frequently made reference to the rhetoric of ‘transactional analysis’ while performing community police work and they appeared to embrace it as a valuable resource for interpreting their approach to nurturing trust in the community. This was particularly evident in relation to their role in implementing a youth outreach programme developed by the SDC.
called ‘Civilian Courage’. By contrast, the officers from RPZ2 demonstrated less awareness and enthusiasm for transactional analysis despite having completed the same training as their counterparts from RPZ.

**Partnership-building**

A final element of the SDC’s model is linked with the previous three: ‘partnership-building’. The *Manual* states:

‘In this partnership model the police are one of the stakeholders in solving local problems, and do not have a professional problem-solving monopoly. Therefore, the police do not consider it has exclusive competence, it sees itself as a partner. All partners must assume their roles in their respective fields of competence. The correlation of various field of competence helps identify sustainable solutions.’ [SDC 2010: 29]

The discourse evoked in the *Manual* are very similar to those associated with community-based policing models across Western Europe, specifically, the cliché that ‘the police can’t do it alone’. In England and Wales for example, Crawford [(1999: 56)] describes how in the 1990s, ‘…a growing body of opinion both in in academic and government circles…endorsed the need for greater multi-agency ‘co-operation’ primarily at the local level, as providing the modest effective means of policy formation and service delivery’. From the SDC’s perspective, the appeal of these discourses was linked with the agency’s belief that many police officers in BiH continued to resist the idea of taking on a broadened mandate.
Embracing new roles and responsibilities was considered by the SDC to be a prerequisite for addressing mundane yet complex public safety issues that fell beyond the traditional police remit. Visibly responding to issues like the city’s stray dog population and poor street lighting was also thought to represent an important means by which the Sarajevo Canton Police could bolster its perceived legitimacy and establish a more collaborative approach to policing.

‘Bottom-Up’ Reform

To facilitate the implementation of this model, the SDC adopted what has elsewhere been identified as a ‘bottom-up’ approach to police reform [(see Marks and Sklansky 2012)]. In other words, the SDC project team embraced the agency of these low ranking officers as a potential asset for overcoming the organisational resistance that had undermined earlier community policing initiatives. The idea was that the specialists from the RPZ units would use the SDC’s methods to demonstrate the utility of community policing to colleagues and supervisors. This was believed to be necessary for promoting cultural acceptance of the model within the Sarajevo Canton Police (interview, SDC project associate). To situate the obstacles confronting the SDC, this section accounts for the challenges associated with the implementation of community policing reforms in modern, bureaucratic police organisations, namely cultural resistance. It then draws from the work of Chan [(1996)] and Marks [(2000; 2005)] to suggest that rank-and-file police officers have an important role to play in facilitating cultural transformation within this organisation. Accordingly, their agency is argued to represent an important resource to reformers working to facilitate the development of service-oriented policing models in developing and transitional countries like BiH.
MacKenzie and Henry (2009: 31) argue that when it comes to community policing, ‘implementation failure is so common as to largely neutralise the capacity of researchers to say whether CP would ‘work’ if its concept(s) ever were to make a flawless transition into practice.’ In liberal democracies, subcultural resistance to community policing by the rank-and-file has been linked with the idea that the model is perceived as conflicting with a romanticised ethos of police work [(Herbert 2001: 64)]. This ethos is shaped by institutional discourses that emphasise ‘danger and authority’ [(Skolnick 1966)], ‘violence’ [(Loftus 2009: 96-99)], and ‘masculinity’ [(Herbert 2001: 57-59)].vi The activities and the values associated with community policing are often viewed by the rank-and-file as a threat to their authority because they aspire to establish ‘a more conciliatory, nonaggressive style of policing’ [(Miller 1999: 197 quoted by Herbert 2001: 64)]. In other words, community policing challenges the assumption that the police possess a unique ability to administer coercion and control crime through its aspiration to reduce the social distance between the police and members of the public [(Herbert 2001: 64)]. This implies the creation of a model of policing whereby ‘everyday definitions of neighborhoods developed by residents’ are no longer ‘rendered subordinate to the demands of apprehending dangerous suspects’ but rather, accorded ‘dominant’ status in relation to the process of negotiating orders [(Herbert 2001: 64)].vii

The degree and manifestations of organisational resistance to community policing reforms will inevitably vary due to cultural differences between police organisations operating in different contexts and structural differences relating to the socially defined functions of the police. [Reiner (2010: 136)] acknowledges that significant cultural differences in fact exist between organisations within countries yet argues ‘certain commonalities in cop culture…arise from the police role in liberal democracies’. These commonalities reflect the fact that all police organisations in liberal democratic societies
share a ‘fundamental remit to control crime and disorder in unequal, divided societies while adhering to principles of the rule of law’ [(Reiner 2010: 137)]. Accordingly, [Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 82)] identify a set of universal ‘parameters’ that structure police subculture in different jurisdictions. These include: ‘the ability to use coercion to ‘get the job done’’; recognition that ‘[i]nformation is considered the ‘life-blood’ of policing’; ‘the role that law plays as part of the tools of the trade, and the double-edged qualities of counter-law’; ‘modern police management’; ‘the political framing of policing; ‘masculinity’; ‘racism’; and…the ‘danger-authority nexus’. Many of these parameters appear to be consistent with the hyper masculine values that are argued by [Herbert (2001)] to have underpinned subcultural resistance to community policing in the United States. The implication is that regardless of context, the philosophical embrace of community policing by senior managers regularly fails to translate into concrete changes in terms of street-level policing activities or changes in how rank-and-file police officers construct their professional identity in established and aspiring democratic societies alike (see Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Frühling 2007; Weisburd et al 2002).

Additional factors that may impede upon the implementation process include: a lack of resources; challenges associated with measuring the performance of community police officers and demonstrating its strategic value in a performance management regime; and of course, obstacles that arise from exogenous factors [(see Mastrofski et al)]. The issues of limited resources and measuring performance are linked with the issue of cultural acceptance because police managers who do not appreciate the strategic utility of community policing are unlikely to resource or staff it adequately. It is worth reiterating that these obstacles may present themselves differently in different contexts but it is reasonable to assume that implementation challenges which stem from limited resources and a lack of external support for partnership-based policing activities may be greater in developing and transitional
countries [(see for example Deosaran 2002; Ryan 2007)]. In fact, [Brogden (2005: 88)] goes so far as to argue that in some developing contexts, namely those in Sub-Saharan Africa, ‘[community policing], as designed in the West, is simply largely irrelevant…not simply a product of ineffective implementation’. Indeed, a lack of cultural resonance represents a substantial barrier to implementation but it also raises important questions about the appropriateness of the model to begin with.

Despite these obstacles, the policing literature indicates that change is possible. Assuming that the changes in question are culturally and contextually appropriate, the prospect of ‘successfully’ implementing a model is enhanced when members of the police organisation wilfully incorporate its elements into established cultural definitions of their work. The fact that ‘cop culture’ is mutable and continuously shaped by a combination of individual, institutional and structural factors [(Chan 1997)] allows for this possibility assuming that capable and motivated agents are available to initiate the change. According to [Chan (1996: 112)], this implies that ‘a sound theory of police culture should recognize the interpretive and active role of officers in structuring their understanding of the organization and its environment’.

For change to occur, members of the occupational culture must accept the proposed changes and use their agency to align them with existing subcultural values. This requires two things: the ability of officers to alter subcultural definitions of police work and their motivation to do so. The ability of rank-and-file police officers to act as ‘agents of change’ is linked with what [Bayley (2012: 22)] identifies as their ‘craft knowledge’, that is, their ‘understanding of the tactics needed to achieve control, justice, amelioration, and legitimacy in daily encounters with the public’. It is also a product of their cultural knowledge and social capital within the organisation. For example, [Manning (1977)] describes how police officers regularly utilise impression management techniques to shape their interactions with
colleagues and supervisors. These interactions are necessary for visibly asserting their commitment to shared institutional values and they allow police officers to continuously reaffirm their professional identity. Interactions with internal and external audiences provide police officers with ‘a thorough, nuanced understanding of their fellow officers’ which is necessary for developing creative strategies for promoting acceptance of non-traditional policing strategies and tactics [(Marks and Sklansky 2012: 6)]. Their membership in the organisation and their impression management skills together represent an important source of professional capital within the police organisation. If it is utilised strategically, this capital may allow motivated officers to negotiate their roles by reconstructing their professional identity. Over time, acceptance of these modified roles may support broader institutional changes with respect to the values and norms associated with police work. To this effect, Goldsmith (original emphasis 1990: 91) has argued that we can embrace police discretion as ‘a potential resource in the formulation of rules governing police powers and practices’. Marks’s [(2000; 2005)] research on police reform in South Africa illustrates this possibility by describing the possibility of generating institutional support for police reforms from the ‘bottom-up’. [Marks (2000: 558)] writes:

‘...internal resistance or challenge is one of the most effective and direct mechanisms for bringing about change in policing agencies, but that for this challenge to be successful, a commitment, on the part of the police agency itself, to a change in the formal rules of policing must be evident.’

As evident from the experiences of RPZ1 and RPZ2, the agency of rank-and-file can at best be described as a potential resource for change because the motivation for officers to assume the role of change agents is not always present. Motivation may be intrinsic, extrinsic, or a combination of the two. In other words, individual officers may voluntarily embrace
community policing because they accept its purported benefits or, they may feel compelled to implement it at the behest of their managers. In Sarajevo Canton, enthusiasm for community policing was inconsistent amongst RPZ specialists and police managers alike. As the case study demonstrates, managerial support,

**RPZ1**

RPZ1 consisted of four, full-time officers including two young male officers with undergraduate degrees, a young female officer and veteran male officer who had previously lectured on the topic of community policing at the Sarajevo Canton Police Academy. The educational attainment of the officers from RPZ1 was a major factor in their willingness to embrace the model and it also informed their recognition of the importance of generating trust between the police and members of the public. For nearly three years, the officers from RPZ1 had proactively worked to promote the SDC’s model for community policing. They did so by initiating regular, informal encounters with members of the public and local organisations in their sector. These interactions were used to generate publicity for their role and to attract external support for the idea of partnership. The officers from RPZ1 were initially effective in using these relationships to identify local public safety issues that affected local citizens but they struggled to actually develop ‘holistic’ solutions to address complex problems like stray dogs or inadequate street lighting. According to the officers, the municipal agencies responsible for addressing these issues frequently refused to recognise the authority of police officers to intervene in matters that traditionally lay beyond the remit of police work (personal communication, RPZ1). Similar accounts of bureaucratic inertia and institutional resistance to partnership-based community policing models are documented extensively in Anglo-American [(for example Crawford 1999: 107-108; Greene 2004)] and Western European [Terpstra 2008: 219]) policing literatures.
The officers from RPZ1 recognised that achieving public recognition for their expanded policing mandate and generating enthusiasm for the concept of partnership-based policing would take time (personal communication, RPZ1). They also appreciated that important contextual differences existed between BiH and Switzerland. One of the officers observed that from his perspective, “[community policing] is a very good idea in terms of relationships and partnerships and building high levels of trust but the way we get there is not the same” (personal communication, RPZ1). This sentiment was also voiced by members of a newly established RPZ unit operating on the outskirts of the city (personal communication, RPZ4). x

While the officers recognised the need for patience, they also acknowledged that their lack of demonstrable short term ‘results’ initially jeopardised the long term sustainability of their ‘specialist’ role and the autonomy it afforded them. Specifically, one of the officers from RPZ1 described how the unit’s early inability to achieve results using the ‘security marketing’ methodology fuelled cynicism from patrol-based colleagues who appeared to be resentful of the unstructured and improvisational nature of community police work (personal communication, RPZ1). This problem was particularly evident in relation to what the officers determined to be an important intelligence sharing ritual: drinking coffee with local residents. One of the officers described how “when we go and drink coffee at a shopping centre, we are also doing work, gathering intelligence, meeting with the manager” but added that this was potentially controversial because “the other officers don’t see this” (personal communication, RPZ1).

It was even more crucial that the officers retained the support of senior managers, specifically the Sector Chief who, as one of the RPZ officers noted, “makes all the station’s strategic decisions so if he doesn’t care about [community policing] or know about [community policing], it won’t work” (personal communication, RPZ1). Without the support
of this individual, the officers anticipated that they would be denied the privilege of defining their own operational priorities which allowed them to attend community meetings at which local residents would voice their concerns about various public safety issues. One of the officers described the importance of maintaining their flexible working schedule.

...meetings take place between 18:00 and 19:00...Normally we work from 7:30 to 16:00 however there are 27 [local community centres] in [the sector] and 6-7 meetings take place each month. We try to go to all of them because attendance is part of the trust building exercise. If they see you are interested when there is not a problem, this will build trust. You must always go through, not just when you need something. (personal communication, RPZ1)\textsuperscript{xii}

Along these lines, the officer added that “if the Chief is made to recognise the benefits of [community policing] as a problem-solving tool, he will facilitate it” (personal communication, RPZ1).\textsuperscript{xii} In other words, the officers from RPZ1 recognised that it was up to them to carve out a cultural space for their prescribed role as well as to sustain managerial support for it. Unable to initially present their colleagues and supervisors with an immediate sense of the tangible benefits of partnership-building, the officers accepted that they would need to identify other ways to convey the strategic value of security marketing. In other words, they recognised that they needed to use their craft knowledge to construct a favourable definition for community policing that would appear to complement culturally entrenched definitions of police work rather than threaten them. This was achieved by emphasising the benefits of their intelligence sharing role through their interactions with colleagues and supervisors.

To this effect, the officers from RPZ1 assumed responsibility for managing the sector’s crime map and drew from their growing network of ‘partners’ to generate what they
described as ‘intelligence’ on criminal activity in the sector. One of the officers described how the unit used its ‘security marketing’ methodology to understand why bet shops\textsuperscript{xiii} were being disproportionally targeted. They determined that bet shops represented attractive targets because they regularly held up to 30,000 KM\textsuperscript{xiv} in cash on site and the owners refused to hire security guards or invest in preventative technologies because the money was insured. The officer added that previously, lottery shops represented ideal targets until the Canton introduced legislation requiring the owners to employ armed security guards as a condition of their licence. Subsequently, the officer explained that the sector had only experienced one recorded incident of an armed robbery at a lottery shop in the past year. The political connections of the bet shop owners gave the officer little reason to believe that the politicians from the Canton would develop similar legislation to increase security. However, they were nonetheless able to use this intelligence sharing role to identify high risk locations (i.e. ‘hotspots’) and feed this information to Shift Commanders who would strategically deploy uniformed and plain clothes officers at and around these ‘problem areas’ (field notes).

The unit’s ability to translate its work into culturally acceptable practices clearly benefitted from the social capital that the officers had accumulated through their on-going partnership building activities. They also drew on these connections to support criminal investigations. This was observed in the aftermath of an aborted bank robbery that occurred approximately 200 meters from the police station where I sat drinking coffee with the officers during my second day of observation with RPZ1. The officers’ decision to respond to the call enabled them to communicate their solidarity with their colleagues in patrol and the investigators called to the scene. It therefore served to reaffirm their professional identity as police officers by outwardly emphasising the masculine attributes of their interpretation of community police work. This use of impression management was important because it allowed them to reassert their professional credibility as police officers.
The subsequent investigation of the incident also provided the officers with an opportunity to show off their unique ‘intelligence sharing’ abilities and thus, express the utility of what was perceived by their colleagues to represent a more feminised approach to policing as an adjunct to traditional response-based policing activities. \textsuperscript{xv} Throughout the day, the officers placed calls to various contacts to solicit information about the incident. Hours later, one of the officers received a phone call on their personal mobile phone from a local shop keeper who confirmed the identity of the suspect (field notes). The following morning, a different officer from RPZ1 explained that based on this tip, the unit filed an anonymous report with the criminal investigation unit and an arrest was imminent. Asked how the unit was able to obtain the suspect’s identity so easily, the officer explained that the informant knew the officers and trusted that they would “keep their identity secret” (personal communication, RPZ1). Implicit in this response was the officer’s belief that members of the public also viewed the officers from RPZ1 as being distinct from their ‘traditional’ rank-and-file counterpart and thus, more approachable. Interestingly, the ‘feminine’ scripts for community policing being implemented by the officers from RPZ1 appeared to enhance their professional identity and legitimate authority in the eyes of the public rather than diminish it. While the officer’s comment does not alone provide a sufficient empirical basis for determining whether or not the public actually ‘trusted’ the officers from RPZ1, it does highlight the fact that the officers were comfortable with dissociating themselves from traditional police roles for strategic reasons. Their rank-and-file colleagues were aware of their flexibility and appeared to be willing to accept it.

RPZ1 was also successful in translating its script for ‘transactional analysis’ into intelligence sharing practices that enhanced the department’s capacity to respond to what the sector chief identified as a growing problem in the sector: youth anti-social behaviour. One of the officers from RPZ1 described how the sector chief directed the unit to focus its energy
on local schools because they felt that their problems could not be adequately addressed through the traditional patrol-based model of policing (personal communication, RPZ1). RPZ1 responded enthusiastically to the chief’s request because the unit was already engaging with the sector’s youth through its efforts to implement the SDC’s ‘Civilian Courage’ curriculum in local schools. One of the officers reflected on the linkage between the values of active citizenship inherent to this curriculum and the problem of youth anti-social behaviour in suggesting that:

“…youth issues are one of the most significant problems in Sarajevo given that parents continue to subscribe to this mentality that denies their own responsibility…they are not adapted to the democratic values which require active citizenship … parents continue to tell their kids to ignore social problems as they do not feel it is their responsibility but the state’s…” (personal communication, officer from RPZ1)

The officers used their school visits to meet with school directors and to learn about the problems experienced by individual students. To promote the idea of partnership between the police and schools, the officers provided school administrators with their personal contact details and instructed them to call them “at any time” to schedule follow-up on the officers’ progress, report new incidents or request police assistance (personal communication, RPZ1). Whenever an issue was brought to their attention, the officers claimed that they used their security marketing methodology to analyse the problem. They would then identify an appropriate solution that frequently required the officers to draw from their network of partners and initiate a multi-agency response. For example, one of the officers confronted the sector’s municipality office about inadequate street lighting based on a complaint from a school director. Another officer contacted a representative of social services to investigate allegations of child abuse (field notes). Whenever the unit managed to resolve an issue, it
openly attributed its success to cooperation and partnership-working. These interactions were essential for according ‘dominant status’ to the ‘everyday definitions of neighborhoods developed by residents’ [(Herbert 2001: 64)].

Within the police organisation, these interactions also enabled the unit to take credit for improving the department’s capacity to generate strategic intelligence relating to on-going issues such as low level drug dealing in the vicinity of schools and organised fights between gangs of students from different sectors. The officers relayed this information directly to the sector chief who used it to adjust the sector’s policing strategy or raise the issue with local policy makers if it warranted a policy response (field notes). One of the officers from RPZ1 elaborated on the strategic advantages of establishing this direct communication link with the chief. This took place in the aftermath of a community meeting that was organised in response to an incident in which a child had been attacked by a stray dog on the way to school. Recognising that the community was growing frustrated and the officers lacked the authority to address the problem, the officer explained:

“We went to the meeting and heard their problems. Tomorrow we will meet with our chief. He will ask us about it and help us to deal with it. However, if this happened in another municipality, the chief or the commander would not make himself available for a meeting. [In another sector the RPZ officer] would make promises at the meeting but without support they would not be able to show results. This would ultimately mean that the community would not respect them or take them seriously.” (personal communication, RPZ1)

By translating the SDC’s scripts for community policing into culturally accepted roles and practices, the officers from RPZ1 made important progress towards validating the model. Blaustein encountered further evidence of this during a follow-up interview with RPZ1’s Station Commander and a Shift Supervisor. The commander reflected that “for the last 10-15
years, the police station has been working to find a way to implement similar strategies, aimed at improving public trust in the police” but previous initiatives had failed because they emphasised the idea that “every officer should be a [community police] officer” (interview, RPZ1 station commander). This sentiment was echoed by the shift supervisor who noted that “…in theory, every officer should be a [community police] officer but the reality is that patrol officers have too many other responsibilities”. The shift supervisor added that this model of community policing “is excellent because it contributes to improved communication with the public that serves to enhance trust with the police” (interview, quoting RPZ1 shift supervisor). In this case, managerial support for community policing appeared to reflect the officers’ demonstrated success rather than the need for managers to demonstrate their compliance with an agenda for change. This analysis is supported by the fact that during the time of the research, community policing was not formally recognised by the MUP KS.

RPZ1’s concerns about the long term sustainability of their progress highlights their important, individual contributions to generating support for the model. Responding to the question “what happens when you get promoted or when [one of the officers] leaves the department”, one of the officers acknowledged “this is a big concern…we have discussed it with our chief and he agrees that the success of [community policing in this sector] …is down to [us] and the trust [we] have established” (personal communication, RPZ1). This response indicates that the social capital accumulated by the officers from RPZ1 allowed them to render community police work legitimate in the eyes of their colleagues and supervisors. However, it also suggests that lacking a wider mechanism for collective action ([Marks 2000; 2005]), this progress was not necessarily sustainable. For instance, if the officers were promoted or reassigned, the legacy of community policing in their sector would depend at least in part on the ability and the willingness of their replacements to use their agency to advance a similar agenda.
RPZ2

The officers from RPZ2 failed to match the success of their colleagues from RPZ1 in terms of generating cultural acceptance of CP because they were restricted from exercising their mediatory potential. This was due to a combination of contextual obstacles, managerial resistance and the officers’ personal insecurities and dismissive attitudes towards community police work. The main contextual obstacle affecting the officers from RPZ2 was the fact that the unit was based in what the RPZ Coordinator described as ‘the most demanding sector’ in the city centre (personal communication, ‘RPZ Coordinator’). The station’s limited budget and personnel resources meant that they were frequently redeployed by their sector chief on short notice. For example, the officers were regularly required to work protests and assigned to security details for international diplomats. The sector chief justified the practice of assigning the officers to public order activities by arguing that they were ‘not involved with repressive activities’. Rather, he stated that they were ‘used as go-betweens between the patrol officers and citizens’ (interview, Sector Chief from RPZ2). The policing I observed at a large protest in response to the arrest of former Bosnian General Jovan Divjak in March 2011 did not appear to be particularly aggressive but such deployments restricted the unit’s operational autonomy. This in-turn prevented them from attending local community meetings and developing meaningful partnerships. To this effect, one of the officers from RPZ2 described how “protests are not predictable which means that on days when we are assigned to work [them], [we] cannot make other plans because [we] will not know how long [we] are there” (personal communication, RPZ2). Reflecting on Herbert’s [(2001: 66)] discussion of ‘reform as resistance’, this practice can be interpreted as an example of a senior manager selectively implementing a community policing reform in a manner that ‘reinforce[s] the
professional/masculinist model’ and ‘resists any seeming feminization of the occupation…and the greater potential democratic oversight it implies’.

Another way that managerial resistance, or perhaps more accurately, indifference, prevented the officers from capitalising on their potential as change agents was through staffing decisions. One of the officers from RPZ2 noted that when the reform was first introduced to Sarajevo Canton, the sector chief failed to take an interest in their work because “he was old and looking towards retirement” (personal communication, RPZ2). Thus, rather than recruiting enthusiastic young officers to pilot the initiative, the former Sector Chief staffed the unit with two veteran officers who had not volunteered for the post and a junior officer whose enthusiasm was overshadowed by the scepticism of senior colleagues. The officers from RPZ2 explained that their current Sector Chief appeared to be more supportive of their unconventional role than their predecessor. However, my observations (described below) and the successor’s inability to articulate the benefits of community policing during a follow-up interview indicate that this ‘support’ was primarily rhetorical (interview, Sector Chief RPZ2).

Elsewhere, [Greene’s (2000: 341-342)] research on community policing in Philadelphia indicates that enthusiasm is generally an important determinant of whether community policing initiatives will be operationally effective. The practice of staffing community policing units with veteran or out-of-favour officers is a form of managerial resistance or disinterest that is documented in the Anglo-American community policing literature [(for example, Skogan (2008: 24)). Specifically, [Skogan (2008: 24)] suggests that the discretion required for community police work may threaten police managers who view it as undermining their ability to exercise hierarchical control over their subordinates. While staffing a unit with veteran or disinterested officers may constitute a strategy for harnessing discretion, [Skogan and Hartnett’s (1997: 88)] research also suggests that ‘older officers’
involved with the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy were ‘generally less aggressive in their policing style’ than young officers. This suggests that veteran officers could hypothetically play a positive role in supporting bottom-up reform. In this particular case, the lack of ‘aggression’ described by [Skogan and Hartnett (1997: 88)] appeared to manifest itself as a lack of enthusiasm rather than a reflective attempt to ‘feminise’ police work. This was evident from the officers’ relatively passive and defeatist approach to operationalizing the SDC’s model.

The officers’ passivity was evident from their indifference to the sector’s settled Roma population which they described as ‘deviant’ and ‘vulnerable’ (personal communications, RPZ2). Instead of proactively working to develop functional partnerships with Roma community leaders, the officers maintained their social distance. This reflected and reaffirmed an institutionally-entrenched belief of the Sarajevo Canton Police that “[the Roma] have their own system and culture which the police do not understand…whenever there is a problem, they prefer to handle it themselves” (personal communication, RPZ2). Similarly, the officer’s dismissive attitude towards community policing itself was evident from their unwillingness to follow-up on a ‘problem’ that was brought to their attention by a local community secretary. During what appeared to be an impromptu meeting between the officers and the community secretary, the community secretary informed the officers that local residents were complaining about the noise from a local café. The secretary stated that the issue had previously been brought to the attention of the officers who had not followed up with it. This suggestion led to a heated exchange between the officers and the secretary (field notes). Following the meeting, one of the officers reflected on the encounter and stated, “this is the job of environmental police” (personal communication, RPZ2). The response highlights the officer’s continued resistance to an expanded mandate and the types of partnership-building activities prescribed by the SDC.
Comparing the approaches that each of the units took to implementing the SDC’s curriculum for transactional analysis in local schools further highlights the resistance of the officers from RPZ2. Whereas the officers from RPZ1 took the lead in administering a series of activities that were designed to promote friendly interactions between children and the police, the officers from RPZ2 enlisted teachers and school psychologists to administer these exercises. Rather than participating in the activities, they observed them and took photos to present the RPZ Coordinator and other RPZ units. In one instance, an officer decided to excuse themselves from one of these events all together after complaining that it was not a good use of police time (field notes).

This passivity and resistance was partially attributable to a lack of managerial support which was itself a product of contextual factors. Equally, it was also attributable to the agency of the officers who continued to adhere to entrenched subcultural definitions of police work. For example, one of the veteran officers from RPZ2 described how colleagues from the ‘Intervention Unit’ regularly mocked community policing as “a very easy job” that had little to do with policing. Another member of the unit appeared to appreciate the potential benefits of partnership-building and the progress demonstrated by their counterparts in RPZ1 but feared that they were being negatively perceived by their former rank-and-file partners from patrol (personal communications, RPZ2). Whereas the officers from RPZ1 developed strategies for promoting collegiality as a means for confronting hostile attitudes in their station, the officers from RPZ2 remained protective of their traditional police identity. This in-turn limited both their capacity and motivation to assume the role of change agents with respect to both the organisation’s culture and the community’s perceptions of the organisation and its role in that sector.
Conclusion

This article has used a comparative analysis of a multi-site, single case study to account for the significance of the agency of rank-and-file officers in supporting ‘bottom-up’ police reform in the context of a developing and transitional context. It has described a process of cultural transformation that was initiated by motivated and enthusiastic rank-and-file police officers from within the police organisation and also considered the factors that restricted police officers from replicating this success in another sector. Reflecting on the difficulties experienced by the officers from RPZ2, one of the officers from RPZ1 commented, “successes are down to the people and their approach to work [but] the quality of the people is the most important thing” (personal communication, RPZ1). The officer added, “[they] must fight for this if they really want community policing to succeed” (personal communication, quoting RPZ1). The officer was not suggesting that the officers from RPZ2 were incapable of doing community police work. Rather their point was that the officers from RPZ2 failed to exhibit the intrinsic motivation necessary for creatively addressing institutional and contextual obstacles. These included the officers’ unwillingness to challenge established subcultural definitions of police work, limited managerial support and contextual obstacles that constrained the availability of resources.

By comparison, the experience of the officers from RPZ1 illustrates that the absence of institutional and contextual constraints may enable and perhaps even encourage capable and motivated rank-and-file officers to assume the role of change agents. It was in relation to their ongoing efforts to reconcile their interpretations of the SDC’s model with culturally-entrenched beliefs and practices that this transformational abilities were evident. Their educational status and supportive managers also enabled them to thrive and their interactions with colleagues and supervisors represented an important strategy for negotiating recognition
of their role within the sector. Local knowledge and social capital, both out in the community and within the police organisation, constituted important resources that enabled the officers to perform these tasks. This suggests that while the agency of rank-and-file officers is not in itself be sufficient for ensuring the successful implementation of a community policing project, it is a necessary prerequisite for doing so. This agency provides a vehicle for institutionalisation vis-à-vis subcultural transformation and the development of a sustainable community policing model from the ‘bottom-up’.

It is worth considering that representatives of international development agencies including the SDC in BiH generally lack these cultural resources and thus, the ability to negotiate subcultural definitions of police work. They are therefore dependent on institutional champions to assume responsibility for the implementation process. This implies that reformers should seek to enlist the support of motivated personnel when pursing an ‘early-riser’ approach to introducing community policing reforms in developing and transitional societies. Of course, as Brogden [(2005)] argues, community policing may not constitute an appropriate model to begin so questions of cultural and contextual fit need to be taken seriously at the design phase of any project if the project is to be a success from the perspectives of local stakeholders. The analysis presented in this article does not conclude that the SDC’s project in BiH was either a ‘success’ or a ‘failure’ but rather, a ‘work in progress’. This is perhaps the most accurate label that one might aspire to ascribe to any police reform initiative because, to paraphrase one the officers from RPZ1 observed, ‘it can work but it takes time’ (personal communication with RPZ1).

References


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i The data yield consisted of 30,000 words of field notes including the author’s observations, ethnographic interviews with officers from RPZ1 and RPZ2 and personal reflections. Interviewees included the station commanders for both units (n=2), members of other RPZ units working based in different sectors in the Canton (n=3), the Canton’s designated ‘RPZ Coordinator’, a project associate from the SDC and a member of the project’s external evaluation team.

ii I searched English-language scholarly databases and asked fellow researchers from BiH to search local academic libraries for any Serbo-Croat resources on policing in the former Yugoslavia. The only Serbo-Croat reference that I have located on policing in the former Yugoslavia (pre-1991) was an NCJRS Abstract for Anzic, (1992). The abstract indicates that the article describes the repressive function of high policing in Yugoslavia but I have unable to access the full text.

iii Prior to liberalisation, public policing was overseen by the Federal Secretariat of the Interior. The six constituent republics of the SFRY included the Socialist Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.

iv I encountered anecdotal evidence of this historical aversion to police contact during an interview with a senior police officer in Sarajevo. The officer suggested that even today, older generations in BiH continue to mistrust the police because they associate sector-based policing with neighbourhood policing styles of the Yugoslav era (personal communication, ‘Station Supervisor’, 04 April 2011).

v This is not to suggest that an objective benchmark or threshold exists for measuring the ‘democratic’ character of this institution, rather that it was not intended to be ‘democratic’ and nor does the limited anecdotal evidence suggest that it was viewed as
democratic by citizens of the SFRY or prominent Western political scientists of the era like Rummel (1997) who associated the RBD with ‘democide’.

vi A more expansive list of subcultural values that are commonly associated with the rank-and-file is provided by Fielding (1994: 47): ‘(i) aggressive, physical action; (ii) a strong sense of competitiveness and preoccupation with the imagery of conflict; (iii) exaggerated heterosexual orientations, often articulated in terms of misogynistic and patriarchal attitudes towards women; and (iv) the operation of rigid in-group/out-group distinctions whose consequences are strongly exclusionary in the case of out groups and strongly assertive of loyalty and affinity in the case of in-groups’. This list is for the most part consistent with that provided by Reiner (2010) as well as the themes of ‘danger and authority’ and ‘masculinity’ which have been identified by Skolnick (1966) and Herbert (2001), respectively.

vii The differences between ‘street cop culture’ and ‘management cop culture’ are well documented but it is important to consider that there may exist some important commonalities between the two. In other words, the subcultural values that are used by the rank-and-file officers to construct their role are familiar to management cops who, in the vast majority of police organisations, were once themselves rank-and-file officers. While their understanding of police work is likely to have changed due to the nature of their role, it must be acknowledged that police managers may also prove resistant to changes that are perceived to be a threat to the romanticised values.

viii The ten most significant challenges to implementing community policing identified by Mastrofski et al (2007: 227) include: ‘getting sufficient resources to do CP right’; ‘getting the support of rank-and-file officers’; ‘meeting calls for service demands and conducting criminal investigations while doing CP’; ‘getting officers to accept a greater role for the community in setting police priorities, shaping policies, and assessing results’; ‘getting rank-and-file officers to try innovative approaches to problem-solving’; ‘getting accurate data on the CP performance of officers’; ‘getting middle managers to take the initiative of solving problems’; ‘getting the support of middle managers’; ‘getting officers to accept the importance of dealing with problems that the community thinks are most important’; ‘getting officers to take the initiative of solving problems’. Further down their list, Mastrofski (2007: 227) identify the four main ‘external’ challenges to implementing community policing reforms: ‘overcoming the objections of the union when changes are required’; ‘getting the support of the community’; ‘getting
cooperation from other organizations’; ‘getting the support of elected/appointed officials’.

ix By contrast, the officers from RPZ2 were assigned to the unit (see ‘RPZ2’).

x Like RPZ1, this unit was comprised of young, enthusiastic officers who volunteered for the RPZ role. Members of this newly established unit shadowed the officers from RPZ1 as part of their training which explains why they exhibited similar attitudes about implementing the model.

xi Previous work by [Pino (2001: 202-203)] describes the emphasis on trust-building in community policing as ‘social capital building’.

xii Research by [Wycoff and Skogan (1994)] supports the idea that participatory management and operational autonomy can have a significant positive impact on the receptiveness of community police officers themselves to change and the extent to which they perceive the significance of their work.

xiii Elsewhere referred to as ‘betting shops’ in the UK.

xiv Approximately 15,000 EUR.

xv This was confirmed during a follow-up interview with one of the unit’s shift supervisors who observed that members of the public who were familiar with community policing were more willing to come forward with information to RPZ officers than patrol officers because they trusted them to protect their identity (interview, RPZ1 shift supervisor).

xvi This study does not sufficiently account for the question of sustainability as this would require longitudinal research. As an exploratory study, it does highlight a number of potential threats to sustainability including the effects of promotion or retirement of highly capable RPZ officers, leadership changes, budgetary constraints and the lack of formal recognition for the RPZ role within the MUP KS Regulation of the Job Classification document. The latter concern was subsequently addressed by the MUP KS and the RPZ role was officially recognised by the Sarajevo Canton Police in July 2011 [(Pekic 2011)].

xvii Insofar as the sector was home to numerous international organisations as well as government agencies and commercial premises, one might even question whether it could even be accurately described as a ‘community’.