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‘A Friendly Neutral’: Churchill and Turkey in the Second World War

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ABSTRACT
By utilizing published and unpublished speeches, memoranda, and letters, this article examines Churchill’s influence on Anglo Turkish relations during the Second World War resituating Churchill in the diplomatic history of Anglo-Turkish relations. By exploring Churchill’s nineteenth-century youth and background, this article will reveal that Churchill attitudes and views of an Anglo/Turkish alliance in the Second World War was shaped by the context of nineteenth-century geostrategic politics like the ‘Great Game’ and the ‘Eastern Question’

‘A friendly neutral’

On 4 January 1942, while in Washington, Winston Churchill wrote to General ‘Pug’ Ismay about his view of the war situation in the light of the changing terrain with the US formally entering the war against the Axis power. As Churchill considered the front in the East, he reflected on Turkey’s role in the war and its position between Germany, Russia and Great Britain. He argued that as a ‘friendly neutral’, Turkey should be ‘stimulated in every way’ to encourage resistance to towards the Germans; this included ‘sending whatever supplies possible in aircraft, anti-aircraft, tanks and anti-tank equipment’.1

This letter goes some way in explaining Churchill’s view of Turkey during the Second World War. It was clear he respected the Turkish decision to pursue what had been characterized as ‘active neutrality’,2 but he naturally pursued an alliance in which Turkey would move towards belligerency against Axis forces. Often confining itself to purely strategic dimensions, the literature concerning Britain and Turkey in the Second World War follows this line, beginning with Churchill himself in his War Memoirs3 and to a lesser degree the memoirs of the British ambassador in Turkey, Hughe Knatchbul-Hugessen.4 This is more often than not, examined through the diplomacy surrounding the Montreux Convention5 or the temporal limitations of the Second World War, in which Churchill’s pragmatism became a strategic necessity for British policy.6 His pursuit of Turkish neutrality and potential belligerency was presented in his Second World War (1948) as something of a pet project.7 Highlighting Churchill’s role while relying on his narrative, A.J.P. Taylor, also argued

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that Churchill pursued the Turkish alliance with ‘unshakable consistency’. This was also taken up later on by Robin Denniston’s work on signals intelligence concerning the Anglo-Turkish relationship from 1942 to 1944. Scholarship on Anglo/Turkish relations during the Second World War typically cast the role of a strategy obsessed Prime Minister bent on a Turkish alliance, in particular, after Churchill met with President İsmet İnönü in 1943. This narrative has been recently critically explored by Nicholas Tamkin in Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, 1940–45: Strategy Diplomacy, Intelligence in the Eastern Mediterranean (2009). Turning from the role of Churchill, Tamkin foregrounds the diplomatic and institutional processes as well as the figures (including Churchill) involved in policy making process to establish ‘Turkey’s place on the “mental map” of British policymakers’ during the Second World War.

Of course, no one man was responsible for the shape of Anglo/Turkish relations in the Second World War and as Tamkin has warned, a focus on Churchill alone will not ‘adequately explain Britain’s Turkey policy throughout the Second World War.’ This paper will not challenge that assertion. The policy making process is subject to many factors and, especially in times of duress, is infinitely more complex than a single individual’s opinions and desires. However, as Margaret Macmillan has pointed out, as historians ‘we must accept the possibility that sometimes a single individual can alter the course of events.’ It therefore remains a worthwhile endevour to try to build a bridge between the uneasy gulf which separates biographers and historians as we consider the formulation of strategies and policies. So bearing in mind, the enormous role Churchill took on as Prime Minster (including the amalgamation of Minister of Defence, and the First Lord of the Treasury) during the Second World War, it is clear his contribution must be considered an important and, at times, a driving factor in British war time strategy, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean. This begs the question, what were Churchill’s views of Turkey? How did they evolve? How did they shape his strategies in Anglo-Turkish relations?

This article examines Churchill’s importance in determining the direction of Anglo-Turkish relations during the Second World War and illuminates how he shaped British policy and how his policy was itself shaped by his world view. In order to understand Churchill’s view of and relationship with Turkey during and after the Second World War, there are three areas of his understanding which will need to be considered. The first is regarding the traditional nineteenth-century view of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. This will need to be examined to gauge how his father’s influence and indeed the influence of the Conservative party may have affected Churchill’s understanding of Turkey’s strategic role in Europe and the Middle East as a counter to Russian expansion. The second area of understanding is to analyse Churchill’s strategy for Turkey in the earlier phases of the Second World War, including how to bring it into the allied camp or failing that, keep it neutral. The final area to examine is his strategy for Turkey in the latter phase of the Second World War including Churchill’s 1943 ‘Morning thoughts’ and meetings with the United States which he records in his Second World War memoirs, where he most clearly articulates his vision for the role of Turkey in the future of Europe. The article ultimately reveal’s the extent to which Churchill’s traditional nineteenth-century mind set helped form his pursuit of an Anglo-Turkish alliance.
Winston Churchill’s relationship with Turkey has always been a complex one. At times Churchill saw Turkey as a natural friend of Britain and at others, as a terrible foe. Despite the British defeat (and in many ways a personal defeat) by Ottoman forces at the Dardanelles in 1915 and the political collapse of the Coalition Government brought on by his and Lloyd George’s aggression during the Çanak Crisis in 1922, Churchill held no grudge against Turkey. He sought alliances with Turkey and the Ottoman Empire during the Edwardian period and after the First World War he opposed the draconian terms of the Treaty of Sevres (1920) calling it too harsh. He applauded Atatürk’s reforms and modernization in the interwar period. He wrote that Mustafa Kemal was ‘a man of destiny’ (a phrase, he often used for himself), a ‘warrior prince’, and spoke of his quality as a military tactician. These and other praises prompted TE Lawrence to write to Churchill saying he ‘was glad to see [Churchill] say a decent word about Mustapha Kemal’.

Beyond Churchill’s admiration of Mustafa Kemal, he saw Turkey as a strategic ally in the interwar period. When Italian submarines (disguised as Spanish pirates) were attacking cargo ships in the Eastern Mediterranean during the autumn of 1937, he approached Anthony Eden about working with Atatürk to allow heavily armed, Royal Navy personnel to man tankers and merchant ships in order to ‘get a few’ of the pirate submarines. In Churchill’s mind ‘Mustapha would like the idea very much, would be a good confederate, and all the better friend thereby’. This resulted in the Nyon Conference in which Britain and France invited 12 naval powers to take measures to end the piracy. Though Italy and Germany refused to attend, the conference was a successful one, with Eden telling Churchill that ‘smaller Mediterranean powers … played well under the effusively friendly lead of Turkey.

So as the Second World War approached, Churchill saw Turkey as a potential ally and partner much as he did during the Victorian and Edwardian periods. Sharing this view, David Reynolds has argued that Churchill’s thinking on Turkey in 1939–1940 ‘reflects that of a quarter-century before—bulged battles ships’, and ‘the significance of Turkey’ in his search for opportunities in the Mediterranean. Churchill’s desire for a front in Eastern Mediterranean and the primacy of a Turkish alliance also echoed Churchill’s presentation of Turkey in his World War One memoir The World Crisis (1923). This presentation of Turkey has been criticized by the official histories of the Second World War and Reynolds has characterized Churchill’s view of Turkish neutrality and potential belligerency in the Second World War as hopeful. Reynolds also argued that Turkey’s position became ‘an obsession in [Churchill’s] wartime correspondence. But if it was in fact, hopeful, why was it so?

This might be explained by the similarities of Britain and Turkey in Churchill’s mind. Turkey, like Britain, is a geographical outlier in Europe. Another crucial point is that to some degree, both nations struggle with their ‘European’ identity. For Britain, there has always been a tension between its imperial character and its European character. This of course posed no problems for Churchill, who saw these two characteristics as a part of the three interlinked circles: ‘The first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire, with all that that comprises. Then there is also the English-speaking world in which we, Canada, and the other British Dominions and the United States play so important a part. And finally there is United Europe.’ In terms of its relationship to Europe, Turkish identity is far more fractured, at least it was in Churchill’s mind. Turkey
has dealt with questions of being Eastern or Western, being secular or non-secular, and of being European or Asian for centuries. Churchill’s conceptualization of Turkish identity had to evolve as Turkey changed over time especially after the First World War when Turkey entered the Atatürk period. Like, Churchill’s complex reading of British character and Europe, modern scholarship has moved beyond such mutually exclusive, binary questions.\(^{25}\)

It follows that Churchill’s interlinking circles of identity for Britain might be applied to Turkey as well. In this way, Churchill saw Turkey as more than just a European state or Near Eastern state. Rather, he retained strategic ideas of nineteenth century (from his youth) such as Britain’s ‘Eastern Question’ strategies and applied them to Turkey during the Second World War and the post-war world. After all, Britain had been an ally with the Ottoman Empire against Russian Imperial expansion in the nineteenth century.\(^{26}\) In Churchill’s mind, this might help provide a model for dealing with Soviet expansion in the latter half of the 20\(^{th}\) century twentieth century.

**Traditional nineteenth century thinking**

In order to understand Churchill’s view of Anglo Turkish relations in the Second World War it is necessary to evaluate context of the creation of his world view. The importance of gaining a ‘firm grasp on the world in which [Churchill] grew up’, the age in which the British Empire started to rapidly expand and became increasingly drawn into ‘great power rivalries’ in order to fully appreciate Churchill’s strategic thinking has been highlighted by Richard Toye in Churchill’s Empire (2013).\(^{27}\) Winston Churchill, like his father Lord Randolph, Churchill came from a Conservative political background and shared a Conservative world view which framed issues around the East such as the ‘Eastern Question’\(^{28}\) and the ‘Great Game’\(^{29}\) in geostrategic terms. How Britain conducted its foreign affairs with respect to both of these areas of concern might be understood as ‘traditional nineteenth century thinking’. While British aims and intentions oscillated between a Tory and Liberal approach in ways to achieve security, hegemony, and perhaps even dominance in the Great Game and Eastern Question, the objective remained the same; to limit Russian encroachments towards the straits by propping up the Ottoman Empire and by containing its expansion in central Asia to protect India.\(^{30}\) Therefore, to understand Churchill’s view of Turkey, it must be explored in discourse with his view of Russia.

One the architects of this strategy was the Arch Tory, Benjamin Disraeli who championed the Ottoman Empire as an ally against Russian Expansion in Asia and the Near East, despite the outcome of the Congress of Berlin (1878).\(^{31}\) Winston Churchill later described the Tory mood on the Russia and the Eastern question as ‘tremendous and inflexible’.\(^{32}\) Disraeli unquestionably left a major impression on Lord Randolph Churchill.

A wide range of scholarship has shown Churchill took much of his world view from his father.\(^{33}\) Lord Randolph was in no way a diehard protector of Ottoman sovereignty.\(^{34}\) He welcomed limitations on Ottoman territory in the Balkans. He even approached Charles Dilke the liberal enfant terrible, arguing that the aim of the British government should be ‘the complete freedom and independence of the Slav nationality, as opposed to any reconstruction of the Turkish Empire’.\(^{35}\)
But Lord Randolph’s view of the Ottoman position were mostly private. In the fray between Conservatives and Liberals regarding the Eastern Question ‘Lord Randolph Churchill took no public part’ and it is only from his ‘private letters that we may learn how decided were his sympathies’. 36 Therefore, understanding Lord Randolph’s actual position is difficult because of his contradictory positions on the matter. In an article in *Fortnightly* in 1883 called ‘Elijah’s Mantle’ Randolph Churchill praised Benjamin Disraeli’s policies on ‘imperial rule’ and the great Eastern development of the empire.’ 37 Owing to this and evidence of Randolph’s opposition to Gladstonian policies in Egypt and elsewhere, Lord Randolph was in foreign policy terms a Tory imperialist. 38

However, Lord Randolph’s views of Russian expansion and the Great Game were far more evident. When he was appointed the Secretary of State for India in June 1885 a major focus point for him was to help negotiate a settlement in the Panjdeh Crisis, when Russian forces captured an Afghani border fort and the Russia and British Empires nearly came to war. 39 He was firm in negotiations but wrote Queen Victoria, ‘there is great reason to believe that in September or October the Russians will make a further advance or aggression, just before the General Election here, causing the greatest alarm, confusion, excitement, and party feeling among the people, and consequently the greatest possible danger to the interests and security of India’. 40 His imperial stance in Asia was even noted by the Times which feared his appointment was ‘more likely to participate than to avert war’. 41 This view never left Lord Randolph. In 1888, while discussing frontier politics with the Tsar he was though largely ambivalent about the fate of the Dardanelles, but insistent that Britain ‘ought to take Afghanistan’. 42

Though the influence of his father has been clearly noted on his world views, Winston Churchill clearly inherited the British strategic world view not just from his father but from his formal education at Harrow as well. He displayed this Tory perspective from an early age. While at Harrow, he wrote an essay ‘an imaginary future invasion of Russia by Britain—illustrating the superiority of John Bull over the Russian bear’. 43 Churchill’s view of Great game politics can be seen in his early writings as a war correspondent on the Northwest Frontier of India. Here Churchill publicly endorsed the Forward Policy to counter Russian aggression. 44 His first book, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force* (1897) discusses ‘Russian intrigues’ in Anglo-Afghan relations, and even warns that ‘a predominance of Russian influence’ would give them ‘the ability to invade India at their discretion’. 45

Churchill’s views on the Eastern question and Anglo-Ottoman relations are also evident in this period. One of his earliest reflections on the Ottoman Empire was before his departure for India in 1897. In a series of letters between Churchill and his mother, they argued over the situation in the Balkans and the impending Greco-Turkish War. 46 Despite initially criticizing the Salisbury government’s support for the Ottomans against the Greeks, Churchill ultimately declared that he would be embedded on the Turkish side. In a letter to his mother on 21 April 1897 Churchill said while his sympathies were ‘entirely with the Greeks’, he thought that ‘the Turks are bound to win, they are in enormous strength and will be on the offensive the whole time’. 47 By 28 April, Churchill was asking for money to be sent to the Ottoman bank. However, the Balkan War was over too soon for Churchill to get involved. According to Churchill’s autobiography *My Early Life* (1930), he met Ian Hamilton (later Sir General Ian Hamilton) on a transfer boat, and while Hamilton had promised his service to Greece, Churchill had promised his to
Turkey. While Churchill’s allegiance to Turkey largely owes to his lust for glory, an additional explanation might be that he inherited a ‘Turkophile’ attitude from his father. Churchill went on to write that Hamilton was a ‘romantic’ and was thus ‘for the Greeks’, while he ‘having been brought up a Tory . . . was for the Turks’.\(^4\)

The flexibility of Churchill’s views on Turkey might be seen in light of his own ambiguous political identity during the early years of his career. Despite moving away from traditional Conservative views, for instance when he changed parties in 1904 owing to free trade disputes, his world view around Britain’s foreign policy remained closer to the traditional Conservative perspective.\(^4\) That is to say that the Ottoman Empire would be best treated as an ally, despite the formation of the entente with Russia in 1907. This was because a number Muslims in India, who had an allegiance to the Ottoman Caliph were still British subjects. Churchill maintained the traditional Tory perspective of the Ottoman Empire and pushed for an Anglo-Ottoman alliance in 1911 during the Tripolitanian War.\(^5\) Here it is obvious that Churchill saw Turkey as an Islamic and thus Asian power while still being a European power, much as Britain is a European power with a large number of Muslim subjects in Asia.

Clearly, the decline of Anglo-Ottoman relations and the eventual loss of Ottoman neutrality in the First World War significantly altered Anglo-Turkish relations. Churchill himself suffered a catastrophic defeat when as First Lord of the Admiralty he laid plans to force the Dardanelles Straits by ships alone which resulted in the disastrous Gallipoli campaign.\(^5\) And yet Churchill still hoped a peace might be formed or at least friendly relations after the war.\(^5\) After the First World War, Churchill kept a hopeful view of the possibility of Anglo-Turkish relations. His Cabinet memorandum of 7 June 1920 strongly criticized the Treaty of Sèvres, which awarded Thrace and Smyrna to Greece, as unjust and noted that it was unenforceable, because it ‘would condemn to anarchy and barbarism for an indefinite period the greater part of the Turkish Empire’.\(^5\) In his memoirs of the First World War Churchill praised the Turkish nation saying ‘The Turk was still alive. In his breast was beating the heart of a race that had challenged the world, and for centuries had contended all victoriously all comers’.\(^5\)

However, Churchill’s views of Anglo-Turkish relations took another blow in 1922, when he reluctantly accepted Lloyd George’s position that the new Turkish nationalist forces led by Mustapha Kemal (Atatürk) must halt their advance towards reclaiming Constantinople and pushing back into Europe.\(^5\) But despite his role in the Çanak Crisis, Churchill maintained a nineteenth century view of Turkey. Churchill’s view of Turkey and Atatürk softened through the 20s and 30s as Churchill saw Turkey as regional ally in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. It is revealing that in as late as 1939, Churchill was prophesying that German battleships might be sent to the Mediterranean to clinch the resolution revolution? in Spain’ and that these ships would ‘play the part that the Goeben did in Turkey in the late War’.\(^5\)

**Churchill’s strategy for Turkey 1939-42**

As demonstrated in the introduction recent scholars, such as Nicholas Tamkin, have sought to analyse the Anglo/Turkish relations during the Second World War through the prism of foreign policy processes. Rather than relying on the traditional Churchillian narrative, Tamkin argued that the British approach to Turkey should be
understood in the context of three larger views of Turkey in British diplomacy. The first was that Turkey was ‘the leading Balkan nation’; the second that Turkish and the Soviets were actually far closer than they were diplomatically, which remained a holdover from the cooperation between the Turkish nationalists and the Bolsheviks in after 1918; and finally, British diplomats whole heartedly endorsed Atatürk’s reforms and believed they were westernizing, modernizing, and essentially democratic. This might be seen as a juxtaposition to the old orientalist view of the despotic Ottoman misgovernment. According to Tamkin, however, each of these perceptions confused British policy and assumptions regarding Turkey. That Turkey was a major mover in the Balkans was a holdover from nineteenth-century diplomacy and had little real influence in the region. Despite this, in late November 1940, once it became obvious that the Germans were moving towards the Balkans, the War Cabinet decided to ‘try to bring the Turks into the war at once’, in part because they were now ‘under the influence of the Prime Minister’s opinion that we should put pressure on Turkey’. Many in the government were not aware of Soviet ambitions of Turkish territory and even Churchill evoked friendly relations between Moscow and Ankara when petitioning Turkey to enter the Allied cause (which would ultimately include the Soviets). This also did not take into account Stalin’s personal hostility towards Turkey and the role of the Nazi Soviet Pact on Soviet/Turkish animosity. Often when Turkish goals did not line up with British diplomacy, cries of a return of the sick man of Europe could be heard in the Foreign Office. Beyond this, Turkey’s modernization was actually relatively more aspirational than real. So when Britain made certain demands they were unrealistic on the burgeoning Turkish economy. Additionally, other players also caused tension. Anthony Eden’s ambivalence towards the Turkish policy, Harold Macmillan’s personal relationship with Turkish officials and the British Ambassador, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen’s belief that neutrality was all Britain could hope for and that an alliance would never materialize, all played a role in the British approach to Turkish neutrality.

For Churchill, Turkey was perfectly placed geographically in the Mediterranean and occupied a space that might provide an eastern front in Europe, or a staging ground to launch attacks on Nazi-occupied Europe. When Churchill was appointed to the Admiralty in September 1939, he brought nineteenth-century ideas and these strategic notions with him. In the Cabinet meeting 7 September 1939, Churchill agreed with the General Ironside that in terms of supplying their allies, Turkey was among the most important owing to that fact their forces were ‘inadequately equipped’. A week later, a ship containing 1000 tons of munitions was headed for Istanbul in convoy. Fully, confident of Turkish intentions, Churchill also argued that the Foreign Office suggest to Turkey that she and Yugoslavia put pressure on Bulgaria to declare her intentions. Within another week after it had become clear that Russia would not challenge Germany owing to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, Churchill said ‘he would like to see all Balkan countries and Turkey to be brought into the war’. Churchill concluded arguing that ‘it seemed the Cabinet was ‘unwilling to encourage an extension of the war in the East, while at the same time, we do not look forward to the coming war in the West. Without any sign of aid from Russia, Churchill saw Balkan and Turkish hostility as a means to encircle the German Reich.
Yet, Churchill was still unclear about Russian intentions. To discern Russian strategy regarding the straits, he relied on nineteenth century imperial, strategic notions. On the 25th of September, he noted that the ‘arrival of the Germans on the Black Sea would be a deadly threat to Russia and Turkey’ and hoped that the two might make ‘common cause’ to prevent this from happening. Churchill had even warned of German presence on the Black Sea in the House of Commons on 5 October 1938. Breaking with tradition, he went on to conclude that this ‘in no way conflicts with our policy towards Turkey.’

While this clearly represents one of Tamkin’s ‘pre-war precedents’ of Anglo-Soviet collaboration which was invoked by Churchill, it was still predicated on the Victorian notions of imperial strategy. Regardless, Churchill continued to push for Turkish hostility despite neutrality ‘being great deal’. Churchill called for a new Turkish treaty to replace the ‘sham one’ which he claimed only had ‘diplomatic value’. The complexities of Turkish neutrality here echo Anglo/Ottoman relations, and Churchill would have certainly been aware of this. After all he once told the Ottoman leadership to ‘remain thecourted party rather than one which is engaged’. It also further underscored Churchill desire to secure a Turkish alliance, since such an alliance was lost in the First World War.

Churchill was acutely aware that the Montreux Convention greatly marginalized British interests in favour of Turkish and Soviet interests. However, the possibility of a new treaty also gave him hope that a deal with Turkey in which there were guaranteed provisions and aid (already promised), as well as the promise of French and British troops in the event it necessary - might assure Turkey that together with Britain, the French and the Soviets they might be able to hold the Eastern front. Convinced of this, Churchill delivered a speech to the nation in which he outlined these ideas where he said that in South-eastern Europe, Russian interests ‘fall into the same channel’ as those of Britain. France, and ‘above all, Turkey’. Drawing on his nineteenth-century imperial mind set and his First World War experiences he concluded the speech by reminding his audience that he had been in the post of Lord of the Admiralty 25 years ago and compared the situations as like for like, noting that the ‘brave warlike Turks were about to join our enemies’. Tellingly, he also drew comparisons of the US Civil War and the ‘famous days of the nineteenth century’.

By the nineteenth of October 1939, after the signing of the Anglo/French/Turkish treaty, Churchill had changed his thinking on Soviet–Turkish relations and returned to a more traditional view of Anglo-Turkish relations. He feared the Soviets might declare war on Turkey or Britain. He wrote to Admiral Pound and Admirals Philips asking what British forces and especially submarines might be able to aid Turkey and protect the Black Sea. He asked that the possibility of this occurring be studied and concluded saying that ‘if Russia declares war upon us, we must hold the Black Sea’. Churchill pursued this line of thinking in the Cabinet five days later, arguing that now the new treaty was signed ‘our ships would always be available to assist in Turkey’s defence . . . Should Russia make an assault on Turkey, we would be in a position to prevent any maritime aggression.

Once the Assistance to Turkey Committee had been convened, Churchill’s fear of Russian aggression was increasingly obvious. He warned the committee about ‘importance of preventing the Russians? seizing the mouth of the Bosphorus’ but that Britain could only become directly involved if ‘Turkey were a belligerent or if she were directly threatened’. Churchill was instructed by the Cabinet to inform General Rauf Orbay, the Turkish Ambassador that in this event Britain would ‘lend assistance with naval forces
provided they had suitably defended bases'.\textsuperscript{71} By 1 November, Churchill had informed General Orbay that ‘in the event of Turkey being menaced by Russia’ Britain would come to the aid of Turkey. But Churchill also assured Orbay it was unlikely this contingency would arise because’ we hoped that Russia would maintain strict neutrality or even possibly become friendly.’\textsuperscript{72}

Throughout 1939–40, Churchill continued the traditional thinking of Anglo/Turkish relations. This was evident in a BBC broadcast on 12 November 1939 when Churchill stated: ‘Turkey and the whole of Islam have ranged themselves instinctively but decisively on the side of progress’.\textsuperscript{73} Lump ing in Turkey, a secular state, with ‘the whole if Islam’ was clearly a call back to the nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire. He often referred to the ‘resolute Turks’\textsuperscript{74} in his broadcasts, referring in Cabinet meetings to the strategic importance of Turkey. For instance, 27 March 1940 Churchill thought that bombing German oil fields in Baku would be useful from Turkish bases. Churchill hoped that by sending the Foreign Secretary to pay a visit, Turkey would be more disposed to that and to sending British submarines into the Black Sea. Churchill argued this would ‘not only interrupt the Russian Oil traffic’ but also would ‘have a terrifying moral effect on Russia’ while protecting Turkey.\textsuperscript{75}

Throughout 1940 Churchill maintained the view that Turkey was a ‘leading Balkan nation’\textsuperscript{76} and continually urged the Cabinet to try and bring them into the war,\textsuperscript{77} while reminding the British public that despite Turkish neutrality, Turkey was a ‘friend and ally’ which needed to be reminded of the ‘unweakening power of Great Britain on the Seas’.\textsuperscript{78} While this was frequently tied to the Balkan strategy as Tamkin explores,\textsuperscript{79} Churchill also conceptualized Turkey as a Middle Eastern power. In a letter to Lord Halifax, Churchill argued that since Britain was moving towards ‘obtaining control of Syria’ the best thing to do would be to raise a ‘de Gaullist movement’ but this might not be counted on. Churchill proposed that the Turkish approach might be better, reasoning that ‘The French have only a Mandate and the Turks have a vital interest. Can we not encourage the Turks to become active in their addresses to Vichy on the subject, and to put pressure on locally by every means in their power’.\textsuperscript{80} Bringing Turkey in as an actual ally or at least keeping Turkey neutral, remained a key element of Church il’s Eastern Mediterranean strategy. Further linking together Europe and the Middle East, Churchill wrote to Anthony Eden in Feb 1941, as he was preparing to go on a mission to the Eastern Mediterranean, placing Turkey with Greece and Yugoslavia as well as part of the Middle East.\textsuperscript{81} It was, however, becoming clear that in early 1941 Churchill was having difficulty on deciding if Britain should pursue Turkish belligerency or actual neutrality. Frustrated by Turkey ‘shirking her responsibilities’ Churchill argued to the Cabinet that ‘We are not bound to the Turks. They had not accepted our offer, and it might suit us to have a genuinely neutral Turkey blocking our right flank’.\textsuperscript{82}

Despite this, Churchill supported maintaining a positive view of Turkish neutrality, even after the Turco-German Treaty of 18 June 1941 which guaranteed friendship between Turkey and Germany was signed. Churchill explained to the Cabinet on 16 June that the ‘central fact was that Turkey remained neutral’ and that it was important ‘that the Press should not heap abuse on Turkey’ once the agreement was more widely known.\textsuperscript{83} He also defended Turkey’s signing of the Treaty in the House of Commons on
24 June, arguing to Earl Winterton that ‘we should not seek to probe and define too clearly the attitude of certain Powers who surrounded by very great difficulties, may not wish, or may not be in a position to declare themselves’.\textsuperscript{84} Once the Germans had violated the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on 22 June 1941, the situation changed drastically for Churchill. The prospect of an alliance with Russia completely changed the balance of power in Europe. Churchill’s desire for a formal Turkish alliance subsided for a time. He wrote to Oliver Lyttleton and Knatchbull-Hugessen that it seemed ‘unnecessary to say anything more to the Turkish authorities for the present’.\textsuperscript{85} Churchill warned the nation that Hitler had signed a non-aggression pact with Turkey, just like he did with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{86} Despite this, Churchill still kept a hope Turkey would join the Allied cause. In a letter to Stalin, 18 September 1941, Churchill explained, ‘Again in the South the great prize is Turkey; if Turkey can be gained, another powerful army will be available. Turkey would like to come with us but is afraid, not without reason’.\textsuperscript{87} But the ghosts of Gallipoli still haunted Churchill. In the House of Commons, the steadfast Labour politician Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, warned Churchill that he should ‘listen to the dictates of his own heart, to the memories of Marlborough, to the memories of what he himself did in Gallipoli—how rash he was’.\textsuperscript{88}

Turkey nevertheless remained neutral, and Churchill remained frustrated, as seen in his letter to Knatchbull-Hugessen on 9 December 1941, regarding Turkey’s position on Britain’s new friendship with Russia. Churchill proclaimed that ‘I have never approached the Turks with the attitude they have adopted since the outbreak of war, because I feel their own conscience prick them and because I hope they will redeem their character as allies when events become more clear’.\textsuperscript{89}

Through 1942 Churchill’s Mediterranean strategy remained centred on Turkish neutrality and not belligerency. In February, Churchill wrote a letter to Present İnönü, urging him to adopt a strict neutrality and not allow anyone to pass through Turkish territory.\textsuperscript{90} As Turkish neutrality became a strategic objective in the Eastern Mediterranean, Churchill had to manage his new partner’s suspicions of Turkey. Similarly, thinking in traditional geostrategic terms, Stalin feared that Turkey might attack Russian forces in Turkestan. Churchill assured him of Turkish neutrality and ‘would certainly not quarrel with England’.\textsuperscript{91} But even so Churchill hoped that by the winter of 1942, Turkey might enter the war as an ally after receiving munitions.\textsuperscript{92} Churchill believed that Turkish neutrality hinged on aid and munitions and so focused on it frequently through 1942.\textsuperscript{93}

On 24 November Churchill cabled Stalin, laying out the benefits of Turkish belligerency again. He told Stalin that he planned a ‘new intense effort to make Turkey enter the war on our side in the Spring’. In aid of this Churchill proposed to Stalin that the US, UK and the Soviet Union all offer a ‘guarantee of territorial integrity and status of Turkey’. This Churchill reasoned would keep open supply lines to Russia via the straits and provide a base for operations against Rumanian oil fields.\textsuperscript{94} Here again Churchill’s reliance on traditional thinking is obvious. These strategic objectives replicate Churchill’s objectives in 1915 during the Dardanelles campaign, another indication that Churchill’s ideas were heavily predicated on nineteenth-century ideals and Edwardian concepts. Tamkin has called this letter evidence that Churchill was trying to employ ‘a revised version of his First World War strategic concept’.\textsuperscript{95}
Churchill’s strategy for Turkey 1943-45 and ‘morning thoughts’ from Adana

Even Tamkin has conceded that by 1943, Churchill sought to develop the relationship almost personally. Churchill believed that advances in North Africa, lands previously held by the Ottoman Empire, combined with Soviet victories in the East might help bring Turkey into the war and that a personal visit from him might help seal the deal. In addition, Churchill grew increasingly frustrated with the efforts from Eden’s Foreign Office and especially with Knatchbull-Huggessen. In September 1942, Churchill wrote Eden complaining about Knatchbull-Huggessen’s negative ‘hypothetical outlook’ in which he would ‘spread himself in his usual length and give us a number of glimpses into the obvious’. Churchill complained again to Eden in November that the Foreign Office’s entire strategy for Turkey ‘are expressed in one word “Chrome”’ and that Eden’s ‘pertinacious secretariat and verbose Ambassador continue to wear out the cypher staff . . . to say nothing of wearing out my eye sight’. Another of Churchill’s impulses from the First World War era can be seen in this frustration, Churchill simply felt like he had better than judgement than his men on the spot, echoing a lesson Churchill learned during the Dardanelles fiasco. In any case, the Cabinet was not enthusiastic about the ‘intense effort to make Turkey enter the war’ as it meant taking the risk of Churchill going to Turkey. But Churchill remained focused on this. Eden even shared Churchill’s telegrams with the Soviet Ambassador, Ivan Maisky. Maisky recorded that ‘Churchill’s mood is joyful, cheerful- almost boyish’ and that Churchill had ‘long nurtured the idea of drawing Turkey over to our side’.

Despite the fears of Eden and the Foreign Office, after the Casablanca Conference Churchill flew to Cairo and then Adana in early February 1943, to personally pitch the legacy Anglo-Turkish friendship, but being careful not to place open demands on the President İnönü. The British Press followed the sudden trip and was eager to support the relationship. The Daily Telegraph especially ensured its readers that the ‘friendship bonds were strengthened’ between Britain and Turkey and that assurances had been given for ‘defence help for Turkey’.

At the meeting, being translated into French by Paul Falla, Churchill even reflected on role of the First world War on Anglo Turkish relations: ‘Certainly it is clear that the old friendship between Great Britain and Turkey, which was so grievously slashed across by the tragedies of the last war is now in fullest strength and sincerity.’ Though Churchill became frustrated with the translation and began speaking French himself, the translator later reflected that Churchill’s French was too English and so ‘the Turks could only form a hazy idea of what the whole thing was about’. Churchill continued on the merits of joining the allied cause and the importance of Turkey as a leading Balkan nation but also warned that the Soviets would be approaching the Balkans soon, making this a ‘very dangerous time for Germany’. Nevertheless, Churchill remained careful not to suggest Turkey make any engagement.

Churchill certainly dropped hints that Turkey would best be served by having a seat at the victor’s table. Relying on the traditional Eastern Question strategies, he remarked that Russia would have a seat at this table and that postwar Russia, would not be the same as ‘Russia of former years, that it would likely return to its old ways by becoming “more imperialistic”. Therefore, Turkey’s best protection would be “in an international arrangement” so that if Turkey joined the Allied cause, it would “furnish an absolute guarantee
that Russia would not act against Turkey”. This alarmed the Turkish Prime Minister, Şükrü Saracoğlu who explained that this was why Turkey had to be very “prudent” and asked what would happen if Russia and the Western powers were not in accord. Churchill assured him that Russia would focus on “reconstruction for the next ten years”. He also explained that communism had already been modified and if “Russia imitated Germany” he would not be a friend of Russia. This pacified Saracoğlu, who believed that Churchill intended to communicate his support for a “strong and independent” Turkey, whether it was threatened by either German or Russia. Churchill’s traditional thinking was obviously reciprocated in Saracoğlu’s world view as well. That evening Churchill wrote to Roosevelt and Attlee to explain that he pursed Turkish relations in ‘perfect trust and confidence’ and that he had made friends with İnönü ‘at once’. He also reported that İnönü ‘longed for the victory of England’. The Daily Telegraph evenm reported that the Turkish president had been deeply impressed by ‘Mr Churchill’s powerful personality.\(^{110}\)

After the conference, Churchill was very hopeful that Turkey would weight up its position and come into the war. Maisky recorded that to judge by Churchill’s messages, he was evidently in high spirits. İnönü, Saracoğlu, Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu and others came to meet him.\(^{111}\) Despite this, the trip accomplished little by way of getting Turkey to move off the fence. However, it also apparently confused and angered the Axis\(^ {113}\) but more importantly it had led to Churchill penning his ‘Morning Thoughts’. which are preserved in his memoirs, laying out his vision for the post war order in Europe and how Turkey might fit into that vision.

Churchill imagined what might have been the first iteration of a European Union. He argued that this new ‘European government’ would ‘only be made up of the great nations of Europe and Asia Minor as long established’, which not only implies that Turkey had a major role to play in Europe but also that Churchill continued to think of Turkey as a great power, much as it had been in Churchill’s youth.\(^{114}\) Churchill then imagined that this European Union will be made up of smaller units of countries including a Scandinavian bloc, a Danubian bloc and a Balkan bloc.\(^{115}\) The role then Churchill imagined for Turkey was to be something of a guarantor and leading nation of South Eastern Europe, largely replicating the European order prior to the First World War. This role easily replicates the sphere of influence once held by the Ottomans Empire, operating as a European and Middle Eastern nation simultaneously.

The importance of Turkey was also reflected in his address to the House of Commons on 11 February 1943. Churchill urged the House not to condemn Turkey for its neutrality after his meeting with President İnönü and said ‘[A]t our Conference I made no request of Turkey ... It is no part of our policy to get Turkey into trouble. On the contrary, a disaster to Turkey would be a disaster to Britain and to all the United Nations’ He continued, ‘It is an important interest of the United Nations and especially of Great Britain that Turkey should become well-armed in all the apparatus of modern war’ and that ‘Turkey is our Ally. Turkey is our friend. We wish her well, and we wish to see her territory, rights and interests effectively preserved’. Though this lays out Churchill’s support for an Anglo-Turkish alliance as well as the significant role Turkey would play after the war, it still left a question mark over Turkish–Soviet relations. Churchill’s
conclusion ended on a positive note, ‘We wish to see, in particular, warm and friendly relations established between Turkey and her great Russian Ally to the North-West, to whom we are bound by the 20-years Anglo-Russian Treaty’.  

However, these relations were not as rosy as Churchill would have hoped. Stalin was all too aware of the traditional Russo-Turkish relations. With Russia and Turkey imperial antagonists and then ideological opponents, Stalin remained wary of Turkish intentions. At their meeting in Moscow in August 1942, Stalin continually returned to the idea that the Turks might ‘attack him from the rear and if they did, he would smash them’. After being de-briefed about Churchill’s talks with Turkish leaders, Stalin responded that the Soviets had made steps towards friendly relations with Turkey but ‘the Turks did not react to our steps . . . But if Turkey wishes to make her relations with the USSR more friendly and intimate let her say so. In this case, the Soviet Union would be willing to meet Turkey halfway’. However, Stalin also continued the tradition of pushing for Russian control of the Straits and was totally dissatisfied with the Montreux Convention. As early as July 1940, Maisky was gathering assurances from Britain that ‘Soviet interests in the Straits should be secured’. By August 1943, Churchill realized that Stalin and the Soviets would never be happy with their limitations in the Straits. He wrote to Eden saying he did not suppose ‘they have forgotten that we offered them Constantinople in the earlier parts of the late war’. Here Churchill further qualifies that Turkey’s ‘greatest safety’ lay in the active association with the United Nations’ along the lines he had proposed in his ‘Morning Thoughts’, and of course through active belligerency against Germany.

While the ‘Moring Thoughts’ outline a clear and large role for Turkey in the European order, it was not until Churchill’s meeting on 22 May 1943 with the American delegation at the British Embassy in Washington that he fully articulated his vision. He explained to Henry Stimson, US Secretary of War, and Vice President Wallace among others, that the post-war European order should be composed of ‘some twelve states or Confederations’, who would form the Regional European Council and in South-eastern Europe ‘there might be several Confederations’. Further illustrating his desire to base the new post-war order on nineteenth-century frameworks, Churchill even proposed ‘a Danubian Federation based on Vienna and doing something to fill the gap caused by the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire’. He also proposed that ‘the Balkan Federation’ might be joined by Greece and Turkey who would ‘play some part in the Balkan system’. It is also important to note that Churchill told his private Secretary Jock Colville as early as December 1940 that he envisioned the Balkan confederation would have ‘Turkey at its head and Constantinople as its capital’. Further demonstrating his reliance on nineteenth century thinking Churchill even postulated that postwar Europe would be composed of ‘five great European nations’ including ‘Prussia’.

However, this role Churchill imagined for Turkey would not be possible if it remained inactive in the war. Turkey remained neutral and this grew increasingly tiresome for Churchill but more importantly for Stalin. Churchill telegraphed Eden to explain that Turkey was quickly approaching its last chance to ‘come in on the side of the victorious nations’. Churchill urged Eden to use his power of persuasion because if Turkey failed to join Britain ‘she may be told that not only will British import of arms be stopped at once, but we shall be unable to plead Turkey’s case with the Soviet’ and ‘the whole question of the straits will open up’. However, a few days later a disheartening telegram came from
Eden, who said they had ‘a tough a day with the Turks’. He blamed the allegedly pro-German\textsuperscript{124} Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu, who refused to let Britain use Turkish air bases and who was ‘deeply suspicious of the Russians’.\textsuperscript{125} This was not unlike Churchill who, despite his positive relationship with Stalin, was starting to feel outmanoeuved by Roosevelt and Stalin at Tehran. When Churchill asked about Soviet demands, he was told ‘there is no need to speak at present on Soviet desires’, with the worrying rejoinder ‘when the time comes, we will speak’.\textsuperscript{126}

Following this Churchill pled his case to President İnönü again at the Second Cairo Conference in December 1943. İnönü resisted Churchill’s pleas, despite Churchill warning that ‘matters would proceed without the Turks’. Churchill also included a vague threat about Russian power. If Turkey came in now, Churchill reasoned, it would be associated with Russia, ‘one of the strongest military powers in the world’.\textsuperscript{127} The implication was that failure to do so would leave Turkey to cope with Russian territorial ambitions, particularly in the Straits. President İnönü remained largely unmoved beyond allowing British use of Turkish airbases.\textsuperscript{128}

By January 1944, Churchill had begun to give up on the Anglo-Turkish alliance. He wrote to the Senior British Representative on the Combined Chiefs of Staff, General John Dill that they were ‘having very unsatisfactory responses from Turkey’ and that with two weeks or so ‘we have to warn them the Anglo-Turkish alliance is in peril’. But he still said he would do his ‘utmost to bring Turkey into the war’.\textsuperscript{129} Again the ghosts of Gallipoli came to haunt Churchill. After the American landings at Anzio had disappointed him in January, he told General Smuts that it was ‘Suvla Bay over again’\textsuperscript{130} and later told his physician Dr Moran, that ‘Anzio was the worst moment in the war. I had most to do with it. I didn’t want two Suvla bays in one lifetime.’\textsuperscript{131} But Churchill’s fears were relieved after Soviet victories combined with the D-Day operations in June left a serious impression on President İnönü and his cabinet. By 15 June, Menemencioğlu was forced out of the cabinet and the more sympathetic, Mehmet Şükru Saracoğlu was restored as Minister of Foreign Affairs By August Turkey had ceased diplomatic relations with Germany.\textsuperscript{132}

But it was too late. Churchill wrote to Stalin in July to inform him of the diplomatic victory in getting Turkey to cease relations with Germany and he added that ‘the Turkish alliance in the last war was very dear to the Germans and the fact that Turkey had broken off relations would be a knell to the German soul’.\textsuperscript{133} Beside revealing the excessive importance Churchill placed on Turkey this also implies the importance Churchill placed on a Turkish alliance as well. This is evident in Churchill’s address to the House of Commons, 2 August 1944 in which he revealed that ‘Turkey has broken off all relations with Germany’. He placed Anglo-Turkish alliance in a long tradition from the Victorian and Edwardian era:

[I have a great regard for the Turks and there is a military tradition in the British Army of sympathy and alliance with them. In the last war they were turned against us by the influence of a handful of men and the arrival of a single ship-of-war. We must not forget that Turkey declared her alliance with us before the present war when our arms were weak and our policy pacific.\textsuperscript{134}]

Churchill further illuminated his view of the nineteenth century traditional thinking playing out in the war when he hinted at a great possibility of a Turkish-Soviet alliance as well. He concluded, ‘It was the policy of Mustapha Kemal to bring about close unity of
action between the Russian and Turkish people. The elements are all there and he endeavoured to bring to an end the antagonism of centuries. I hope this new step will contribute to the friendship between Turkey and Russia.\(^{135}\)

But Stalin’s opinion had shifted. In his response, he outlined the numerous failed attempts to bring Turkey into the alliance and he concluded by saying he saw ‘no benefit’ in bringing them in for the Allies. He reasoned that ‘it is better to leave Turkey in peace . . . and not exert fresh pressure on Turkey. This, of course, means that the claims of Turkey, who had evaded war with Germany, to special rights in post-war matters, also lapse’.\(^{136}\) Reynolds and Pechatnov have pointed out that Stalin’s re-positioning would ‘strengthen his hand in the traditional issues of Soviet-Turkish contention’ namely access to the Straits.\(^{137}\)

At the Fourth Moscow Conference in October 1944, Churchill indeed bent to Stalin’s will. Eager not to let Roosevelt outmanoeuvre him again he worked up secret percentage agreements, without American knowledge, on the future of Greece and Southern and Eastern Europe.\(^{138}\) Here he also told Stalin that he was ‘in favour of Russia having free access to the Mediterranean’ and that it was ‘Russia’s right and moral claim.’ Churchill added he wanted to ‘bring Turkey along by gentle steps, not frighten her’.\(^{139}\) Eden was shocked by this and later told Churchill that he doubted the wisdom of such a concession. However, Churchill defended his position saying ‘that it was like breeding a pestilence to try to keep a great nation like Russia from free access to broad waters’.\(^{140}\) Eden was not alone in his criticisms. Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office Sir Orme Sargent was worried that giving free access through the Straits to Russia would ‘endanger Turkey’s integrity and sovereignty in general’. It was better, he reasoned, to maintain the age-long British tradition of opposing Russian ambitions.\(^{141}\) This was echoed by Alexander Cadogan, Permeant Secretary of the Foreign Office, who was suspicious of Russian intentions and called for at least some *quid pro quo* from Russia in exchange for access to the Straits.\(^{142}\)

In spite of his discussions with Stalin, Churchill remained hesitant. On 28 January 1945, after being asked by Eden about altering the Montreux Convention in Stalin’s favour, he reflected ‘naturally one does not wish to give away things which are not asked for’ but he would not ‘be prepared to deny a Russian demand for freedom of the Straits’.\(^{143}\) Even after the war with Eden and other Foreign Office officers becoming a chorus of caution on Russian ambitions and Churchill’s genuine admiration and affection for Stalin, Churchill was still reluctant to give up nineteenth century strategic notions. However, he continued his willingness to offer access to the Straits to Stalin at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, where he told Stalin the he would ‘support a Russian request for a revision of the Montreux Convention’. However, he said he would do so on the condition that ‘Turkey be given some assurance that their independence and integrity will be guaranteed’.\(^{144}\) According to Tamkin, this assurance was ‘the *quid pro quo* sought by Cadogan’.\(^{145}\)

After the Yalta Conference, there were seismic shifts in Anglo-American and Soviet relations, particularly concerning Poland and its reconstruction after the war. Amidst rumours of Turkish collaboration in German espionage against the Soviets and increased Soviet demands such as a permanent base on the Gallipoli peninsula and the creation of a Soviet Mediterranean fleet, Turkey’s position was becoming precarious.\(^{146}\) By 20 March 1945 Russia had denounced its treaty of friendship with Turkey and demanded
a new Straits treaty. The Turkish ambassador in Moscow, Selim Sarper returned with an offer, of which Churchill was made aware of by Foreign Office intercept, which demanded that Kars and Ardahan be restored to Soviet control. These had been ceded to the Ottoman Empire in the Brest-Litovsk treaty (1918) and held by Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Churchill wrote to the Chiefs of Staff Committee saying ‘the changes in Russian attitude and atmosphere since Yalta are grave’. He then urged a policy of ‘closer cooperation with Turkey’. Further complicating the matter, by April Roosevelt had died and been replaced by Truman who was far more suspicious of Soviet intentions.

At Potsdam in July 1945, Churchill was still willing to welcome Russia into the Mediterranean, but when the Straits were formally mentioned at the Sixth Plenary session of conference, Churchill demurred. He was concerned regarding Molotov’s treatment of Sarper and noted this would make it far more difficult to negotiate a new agreement around the Straits. Here Churchill’s nineteenth-century thinking revealed itself again. Tamkin notes that ‘the antiquity of Churchill’s vocabulary is striking, referring to the Turkish concern “for the integrity of her empire”. Utilizing the Soviet demands for Kars and Ardahan, Churchill argued that these demands were beyond anything which he and Stalin had agreed to. Truman, who took the American State Department’s view that the US could act as arbiter in the Anglo-Soviet issue around the Straits, shared a paper which suggested internationalization of certain waterways which Churchill seized on to avoid Soviet bases at the Straits.

Churchill was voted out of office on 26 July during the general election, though he continued to act as Prime Minister Attlee assured him there would be no radical revision of British foreign policy, much to the relief of the Turkish leaders. However, Clement Attlee did approach the Anglo-Turkish-Soviet relationship differently from Churchill and was fairly free of the nineteenth-century Tory strategic attitude which had guided much of Churchill’s preoccupation with Turkey throughout the war. Attlee tended to see the Anglo-Turkish-Soviet relationship in real power terms. He made it clear to the Foreign Office and his Chiefs of Staff that Britain was not in a position to stop Russia, if it wished to dominate the Straits, and that Turkey was at the mercy of Russia ‘as indeed without the support of other powers she has been for decades’.

Though in opposition, Churchill continued to push his antiquated thinking on the Anglo-Turkish alliance. As the realities of the Cold War were beginning to set in Churchill gave his famous ‘Sinews of Peace’ speech at Fulton Missouri in March 1946, which divided the world between the ‘special relationship’ of the US and British Empire, and the Soviet sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Here he included Turkey with the western powers and said that Turkey was ‘profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which are being made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government’. Two days later, when Churchill learned that the US intended send the, the USS Missouri to enter the straits and return the body of the much-loved Turkish ambassador Mehmet Münir Ertegün, Churchill wrote to Attlee. He exclaimed that this was a ‘very important act of state and one calculated to make Russia understand she must come to reasonable terms with Western Democracies. I am sure the arrival and stay of such a powerful American fleet in the straits must be entirely
beneficial'. For Churchill, the continued support of Turkey, even by America, must have felt very similar to British support of the Ottoman Empire in the close of the nineteenth century.

**Conclusion**

This article has explored Churchill’s importance in determining the direction of Anglo-Turkish relations during the Second World War by tracing how he shaped policy and how his policy was itself shaped by his world view. While Tamkin is certainly correct in highlighting the structural and departmental forces at work in building Anglo-Turkish relations, his narrative places Churchill in far too ‘episodic’ a role. Moreover, in dispelling what John Charmley has called the ‘politics of nostalgia’, Tamkin is perhaps too eager to cast Churchill as an old fashioned, slightly out of step Prime Minister who failed to understand ‘strategic implications of Soviet hegemony in the region’ without a full examination of what motivated Churchill’s positions. By exploring the construction of Churchill’s world view in his youth and considering his view of Turkey beyond the temporal limitation of the Second World War, a more sympathetic view emerges of Churchill’s wish for an Anglo—Turkish alliance.

Churchill’s views of Anglo-Turkish relations were far from being purely reactive or pragmatic. They were, in fact, influenced heavily by the education in his youth and his perception of his father’s views of Turkey and Benjamin Disraeli’s imperialism. This can be seen in his own earlier writings and his biography of his father as well as in his early views on an Anglo-Ottoman relations. This context of the Eastern question and Great Game politics, moulded Churchill’s world view so much that he relied on this traditional nineteenth century themes in his own imagination regarding, the role of Russia, Turkey, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Anglo-Turkish relations during the Second World War.

In the period between 1939 and 1942, Churchill hoped to bring Turkey in on the allied side, in part because he thought that Turkey still had some connection with political Islam, despite Atatürk’s secular reforms. Though Churchill desired to reconstruct the Montreux Convention with something more favourable to British interests, he still sought to defend Turkey against Russian expansion in the Black Sea. During the period before Operation Barbarossa, Churchill repeatedly called for an Anglo-Turkish alliance and active belligerency. Churchill only moved towards accepting friendly Turkish neutrality when he felt Turkey had begun to shirk its responsibility. Even after the signing of the Turko-German Treaty of Friendship, Churchill continued to defend Turkish neutrality in the House of Commons. Though Russia’s entry into the war was an ally forced Churchill to alter his thinking, he still continued to push for a tripartite alliance with Russia and Turkey to bolster the Eastern flank.

In the period from 1943 to 1946, after frustrations mounted between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office, Churchill took a more hands-on approach to developing an Anglo-Turkish alliance. Ever a believer in summits, Churchill personally met with President İnönü and members of his cabinet. While this was not particularly successful in bringing Turkey into the war, it did reveal the significant role Churchill imagined for Turkey in the post war world, provided it joined the allied powers. Continually frustrated by the unflinching Turkish attitude of friendly neutrality, Churchill resigned his position to allow the Soviets access to the Straits and to the Mediterranean. He verbally agreed
with Stalin at Moscow and Yalta that he was happy to see Russia on the seas, but as relations deteriorated with Stalin in 1945, Churchill reneged at Potsdam and, with the approval of Truman, called for the Straits to be internationalized, at least guaranteeing Turkish sovereignty. After the war, still informed by the strategies of his youth, Churchill divided the world between the West and Soviet spheres of influence and clearly sought to help the United States in bolstering Turkey from an expansionist Russia once again.

In the end, Churchill’s understanding of the Turkish strategy of friendly neutrality during the Second World War was grounded in nineteenth century terms. He relied on the tradition of Anglo-Ottoman relations to guide his imagination despite being repeatedly frustrated by Turkish prevarications and constantly changing real world events. So Churchill wanted to believe in friendship between Turkey and Britain and found ways to make it a reality.

Notes

7. See for example, Churchill Second World War, op.cit, Vol. 4, pp. 560–69.
10. See Selim Deringil, ‘The Preservation of Turkey’s Neutrality during the Second World War: 1940’, Middle Eastern Studies, 18(1), 1982, p. 49; Mustafa Sitki Bilgin and Steven Morewood, 'Turkey’s Reliance on Britain: British Political and Diplomatic Support for Turkey against Soviet Demands, 1943-47', Middle Eastern Studies, 40(2), 2004, p. 28; Egemen B. Bezci, ‘Turkey’s intelligence diplomacy during the Second World War’, Journal of Intelligence History, 15(2), 2016, p. 89. While this article includes the impact and legacy of the Adana Talks in early February 1943, it does not engage in an in-depth history of this conference since the majority of scholarship on Churchill Turkey and World War Two has overly focused on this meeting.


12. Ibid., p. 2.


28. The ‘Eastern Question’ has a long historiography in which the chronology, parameters and character are often contested. It is best understood as the decline of the Ottomans Empire and its effect on great power relations in Europe between late 18th Century and 1923. While a full study of the Eastern Question is beyond the scope of this article, a brief explanation to what may have influenced conservative thought in the late nineteenth century will be useful. What might be characterized as the ‘French School’ on the Eastern Question focused more on religious dimensions such as administration of Islamic and Judeo-Christian Holy Places (M.A. Ubicini, La question d’Orient devant l’Europe: documents officiels, manifestes, notes,

29. The ‘Great Game’ likewise has along historiography and complicated parameters. It is best understood as the rivalry which developed between the British and Russian empires for domination of Central Asia in the nineteenth Century. Recent scholarship includes Hopkirk, op.cit., which contains a brief traditional historiography of this rivalry. Meyer and Brysac contributed to this historiography in The Tournament of Shadows: The Great game and the race for Empire in Central Asia Basic Books, Boston 1999, and most recently Evgeny Sergeev, wrote The Great Game 1856–1907: Russo-British Relations in Central Asia, Johns Hopkins University Press Washington DC, 2013.

30. A liberal example of this policy might be seen in Lord Grey’s views of Anglo-Ottoman relations prior to the First World which was based around a three-pronged strategy which focused on keeping British influence in the region, building British commercial interests in the Ottoman territories, and maintaining peace in Europe, with particular regard to Russia and Germany. See F Hinsley, British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 148–9.

31. Disraeli greatly favoured the Ottoman Empire against the Russian Empire. In secret, before the Congress opened he had made a secret alliance to with the Ottoman Empire against Russia called the Cyprus Convention. In exchange for British diplomatic support, Britain would be allowed to keep ships on Cyprus, effectively giving them control over the Eastern Mediterranean. As a result, at the Congress, Disraeli frequently threatened war against Russia if they failed to meet Ottoman demands. See Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914: European relations from the Congress of Berlin to the eve of the Sarajevo murder, OUP, Oxford, 1952.


36. Ibid., p. 99.


40. Lord Randolph Churchill to Queen Victoria, 11 July 1885, Churchill, Lord Randolph, op.cit., p. 87.


49. Toye, Churchill's Empire, op.cit., p. 90.
51. For more on Churchill and Gallipoli see Dockter, 'A Great Turkish Policy', op.cit., pp. 68–91.
52. Churchill’s complete view on Anglo-Ottoman relations is beyond the remit of this article but for this see, Ibid., p. 69.
55. For more on Churchill and Çanak see Dockter, Churchill and the Islamic World, op.cit., pp. 184–94.
57. Tamkin, Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, op.cit., p. 3.
61. Ibid., pp. 92–3.
62. Britain became aware of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact when it was announced on 17 September 1939, though it had been signed on 23 August. Churchill remarked to Lord Hankey of the similarities with the First World War, especially in naval matters. Lord Hankey to Lady Hankey, 19 September 1939, Ibid p. 118.
64. Churchill argued that, 'the system of alliances in Central Europe upon which France has relied for her safety has been swept away, and I can see no means by which it can be reconstituted. The road down the Danube Valley to the Black Sea, the resources of corn and oil, the road which leads as far as Turkey, has been opened...', Churchill, 'Policy of His Majesty's Government', Hansard HC Deb 5 October 1938, vol. 339 cc337-454.
66. Ibid., p.148.
69. Churchill to Admiral Pound and Admiral Philips, 19 October 1939; Ibid, p. 266.
71. Assistance to Turkey Committee Minutes, 26 October 1939, Ibid., p. 295–96. It is notable that the formal name of the committee was ‘Assistance to Turkey against German and Russian Aggression Committee’. This goes some way in showing the anti-Russian, traditional mindset in Whitehall.
76. Tamkin, Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, p. 6.
77. Through November 1940 Churchill frequently pushed to bring Turkey into the war and was frustrated when the Foreign Office rejected his view. For example Cabinet: Confidential Annexe 25 November 1940 or Churchill to Gen Wavell, 22 November 1940 in which he said...
‘we shall certainly be bound to urge Turkey to the utmost to enter the war’; for his frustrations see his private Secretary Jock Colville’s diary for 25 November 1940; Jock Colville, Fringes of Power Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1985, p. 300.


79. Tamkin, Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, p. 32–51.


82. Cabinet Minutes, 10 February 1941, Ibid., p. 200.

83. Cabinet minutes, 16 June 1941; Ibid., p. 808.


90. Churchill to Inouun 8 February 1942; Ibid., Vol. 17, p. 233.


93. For examples see Churchill to Eden 15 and 22 May 1942, pp. 673–4; Churchill to Gen Ismay 28 August 1942, p.1129; Churchill to Brig Leslie Hollis 20 September 1942, p. 1219; in ibid Vol. 17.


95. Tamkin, Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, p. 80.

96. For instance, for Churchill’s frustration see Churchill’s letter to Eden 15 May 1942, in which Churchill criticized Eden for moving towards ‘our usual conclusion, viz. to do nothing.’ Gilbert (ed), Churchill Documents, op.cit., Vol. 17, p. 673.


98. Churchill to Eden 5 November 1942, ibid., p. 1360.


100. Reynolds and Pechatnov, op.cit., p. 201.


102. See Daily Telegraph, ‘Mr Churchill Flies to Turkey’, 2 February 1943.


104. Sir Ian Jacob 30 Jan notes, Jacob Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Jacob Papers, JACB 1/21 Ibid., p. 321.

105. Ibid., p. 322.

106. Ibid, p.323. Tamkin, characterized Churchill discussion on an ‘imperial’ Russia as ‘striking’ and ‘surprisingly frank’. Tamkin, Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, p. 86.


108. Eden to Churchill, 16 May 1943, Prime Minister’s Papers PREM 3/446/18, italics are mine.


112. Reynolds and Pechatnov, op.cit., p. 207.
113. Special Correspondent, 'Axis Confusion at Adana news', Daily Telegraph, 3 February 1943.
122. Colville, op.cit., p. 312.
123. Churchill to Eden, 3 November 1943, Chartwell, CHAR 20/123/48. Here Churchill refers to 'import' but means British export of Arms to Turkey.
124. Reynolds and Pechatnov, op.cit., p. 437. There has been considerable debate on Numan Menemencioglu's pre-German sympathies. For good examination on how the Foreign Office viewed him and his actual position, see Süleyman Seydi and Steven Morewood, 'Turkey's Application of the Montreux Convention in the Second World War', Middle Eastern Studies, 41(1), pp. 79–101.
125. Eden to Churchill, 6 November 1943; Chartwell, CHAR 20/123/79.
128. The Turkish airbases would have been used in Operation 'Saturn' from which British firepower would use Turkish bases to attack Rhodes in conjunction with landing craft in operation 'Hercules'. See ibid., p. 598.
129. Churchill to Gen Dill, 9 January 1944, Chartwell papers, CHAR 20/154/59.
133. Churchill to Stalin, 11 July 1944; Reynolds and Pechatnov, op.cit., p. 439.
135. Ibid.
137. Ibid., p. 441.
139. PM minutes, 'Records of meetings at the Kremlin, 9 Oct-17 Oct', PREM 3/434/2; Vol. 7, p. 994.
142. Cadogan minutes, 24 January 1945, FO 371/44188; Tamkin, Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, p. 170.
143. Churchill to Eden, 28 January 1945, FO 954/28.
144. Minutes of the Seventh plenary of the Yalta Conference, 10 February 1945, CAB 66/63.
145. Tamkin, Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, p. 171.
147. Ibid., p. 175.
148. Churchill to Chief of Staffs Committee 3 April 1945, CHAR 20/209.
149. Tamkin, Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, n. 103, p. 252.
150. Ibid., p. 177.

152. Tamkin, Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, p. 185.


154. Churchill to Prime Minster 7 March 1946; CHUR 2/4. Indeed this did signal to the Soviets the West’s intention to prevent Turkey becoming a Soviet satellite. See Baskin Oran, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press2001).


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