Chikara Hashimoto on intelligence and counter-subversion during the twilight of the British Empire
Hughes, Geraint; Hughes, R. Gerald

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The task of reviewing a book becomes a harder one when the author is deceased. As readers of Intelligence and National Security are in all likelihood aware, Chikara Hashimoto (who was an assistant editor of this journal) died in September 2016 a month short of what would have been his forty-first birthday. Every reviewer has an obligation to provide an objective and fair account of a book’s quality, and that requirement comes far more important when work is published posthumously. It is hoped that what is written here does this monograph - and its author - justice.

The Twilight of the British Empire is based on Hashimoto’s PhD thesis (entitled ‘British Intelligence, Counter-Subversion and “Informal Empire” in the Middle East’) which was awarded the Leigh Douglas Memorial Prize in 2014, an honour for the best doctoral thesis on a Middle Eastern topic awarded by the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies. It is a history of British intelligence liaison in the Middle East in the immediate post-war era, at a time when the United Kingdom was determined to maintain its sphere of influence in the region, where Britain had a long-standing presence. After 1945, successive British governments sought to protect their imperial possessions and semi-colonial protectorates in the Middle East, and also secure access to Arab and Iranian oilfields. Those same governments saw the primary threat to British power in the Middle East as being Soviet-inspired Communism, and as the threat of a third global conflict receded, the challenge posed by subversion directed against pro-British régimes was deemed to be more important. William Magan, onetime head of Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) – the regional headquarters of the British security service, MI5 - later noted that the ‘Soviet
[Union] was intent on destabilising the Middle East. I was heavily committed to keeping it stable. After 1945, there was some confusion (and in-fighting) between MI5 and SIS as to the demarcation of responsibilities in the Middle East (where SIME operated in a number of countries: some independent, some – such as Palestine – under British control). The director of SIS, Sir Stewart Menzies, asserted that, ‘I cannot but believe that the energies of the Security Service [MI5] would be better devoted to problems confronting it in this county, where I suspect that a great deal of work could usefully done in combating Communist penetration.’ Successive British governments after 1945 were wholly aware overseas policy played far well internationally when it cast Britain as a bastion of stability against Soviet-sponsored nationalists engaging in KGB-orchestrated subversive activities. As British governments struggled with decline and decolonisation, policy makers sought to appease the rising tide of Third World nationalism and anti-imperialism. Following the deposition of the pro-British government in Iraq in 1958, and whilst US forces intervened in Lebanon to prevent civil war, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd rather unconvincingly assured the House of Commons that Britain did not regard nationalism in the Middle East as its enemy.

We have no quarrel with nationalism. We have done a great deal to meet the aspirations of nationalism in many parts of the world. Both sides of the House have responsibilities in that matter. We made no difficulty about modifying our treaty with Iraq concerning the handing over of the Habbaniya air base to the Iraqi Government. We agreed to the ending of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty.

It is suggested that in these areas we support only reactionary régimes, whatever that may mean. So far as material developments are concerned, however, the achievements of the régime in Iraq were outstanding. It was the place where the oil revenues were spent most wisely. The statesmanship of the Iraqi leaders has provided great benefits for the people of that country. Perhaps they failed in not making clearer to their people how much had been done and there were, perhaps, certain weaknesses in the way of urbanisation; but so far as concerns the material results of the work of the Iraq Development Board, they were very much better than anything done in any other part of the Middle East. I spoke to somebody yesterday who had just been to the Iraq Development Week and he spoke of the great surprise with which he had seen the extent of the work that was being done.

So this is not a question of nationalism. It is part of the hostile propaganda to say that this is all a question of the West against Arab nationalism. The question is one of perverting nationalist feelings and perverting those who wish to overthrow the established order of society so that they serve to further indirect aggression.

As anti-British propaganda poured forth from Moscow, London sought to portray Third World nationalist movements as mere stooges of a tireless campaign of global
Communist subversion. Nearly a year earlier, Lloyd had deployed the standard line in anti-Soviet rhetoric (the tone of which typified official British attitudes).

All the Soviets’ current actions seem designed to cause the maximum trouble to Britain and our friends … In his speech on Wednesday, [Soviet General Secretary] Khrushchev said: ‘The imperialists are trying at all costs to prolong their domination in the Asian and African countries. One must not minimise the danger threatening the peoples of the East. Immutable historic facts, however, prove that the decline of imperialism in the East is about to begin. The peoples of Asia and Africa possess disinterested friends in the Soviet Union.’ Never has so much suppression of the truth and suggestion of the false been crammed into a few short sentences. […] Meanwhile, the only empire which has steadily grown since 1945 has been that of the Soviet Union.

The global Cold War saw British governments attempt to manage their empire in the age of decolonization against the background of the rise of global Communism. In December 1955 Prime Minister Anthony Eden was very precise in his definition of the manner in which Britain was to rise to the challenge: ‘The term ‘counter-subversion’ is used in this paper to mean clandestine activities, whether by propaganda or operations, directed against Communism or, in the Colonies, against subversive forms of nationalism’. In his rendering of the British struggle against subversion, Hashimoto’s book builds on research by authors such as Richard Aldrich, Rory Cormac and Calder Walton. The Twilight of the British Empire analyses the role that SIME played in co-ordinating the counter-subversive efforts of the police and security services of regional allies, including the founding states of the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organisation, or CENTO). In the process, Hashimoto provides an incisive and intriguing account of a hitherto neglected aspect of British policy in the post-war Middle East, which will be invaluable to scholars of the Cold War, Middle Eastern studies, imperialism, intelligence history and British post-1945 foreign policy.

CENTO is widely considered by Cold War historians to have been a ‘failed alliance’ (to paraphrase the title of one of Panagiotis Dimitrakis’ books). In military terms, it certainly was a pale imitation of its North Atlantic analogue, but as late as August 1957 Prime Minister Harold Macmillan mused as to whether the or not ‘the Baghdad Pact [could] be extended and remodelled’. Confirming and amplifying this point Hashimoto demonstrates that, as far as intelligence and security co-operation were concerned, the Baghdad Pact had real substance to it, with the British liaising with their Iranian, Iraqi (until the July 1958 overthrow of the Hashemite dynasty), Pakistani and Turkish counterparts. Such liaisons were very important to British intelligence as Britain’s SIS was every thinly spread across most of the Middle East. SIME also developed contacts with the Egyptian, Jordanian and Lebanese security services – the extent of the latter, and the relationship MI5 developed with Emir Farid Chehab (the head of Lebanon’s Sûreté Générale) were very much a revelation for these reviewers. That said, Farid Chehab’s anti-Communist sentiment was well known and, in 1954, he informed a Middle East Time correspondent that
If it comes to [a] war, the Middle East will fall to the Communists inevitably. Just as inevitably you’ll have to take it back. The West could not abide Russia controlling the Middle East. It’ll be a lot easier to take it back if the people are on your side. If they’re not on your side it will be almost impossible to take it back.  

Such fears underpinned the British recourse to Realpolitik in their policy towards the states of the Middle East. In October 1955 British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan noted that Syria was ‘moving into the Moscow-Cairo axis. … Altho’ [sic] there are grave objections to an Iraqi [sic] coup to take over Syria, there are equal (perhaps greater) dangers in allowing Syria to go Communist.’  

In his memoirs Sir Anthony Eden (prime minister, 1955-7) recalled that ‘Russia regarded Cairo as a future Soviet outpost, and communist sympathizers were busy in the [Middle East], notably in Syria and Iraq.’ Eden recalled that, a few days before his murder in the coup of July 1958, Iraqi’s pro-British prime minister, Nuri al-Said, had warned: ‘All this shows that unless Nasser is checked, events in the Middle East will continue on a large scale in favour of Russia.’  

In July 1956, a few days after Nasser had nationalised the Suez Canal, Eden outlined the danger posed to British interests in the House of Commons.

As the world is today, and as it is likely to be for some time to come, the industrial life of Western Europe literally depends upon the continuing free navigation of the [Suez] Canal as one of the great international waterways of the world […]

Is it possible for us to believe the word of the present Egyptian Government to the extent of leaving it in their power alone to decide whether these supplies shall reach the Western World through the Canal? I truly think that we have done everything in our power during the years - sometimes under criticism - by our actions and by our Treaty, to show our good will. I think that we have. Our reward has been a broken faith, and broken promises. We have been subjected to a ceaseless barrage of propaganda. This has been accompanied by intrigue, and by attempts at subversion in British territories.

Colonel Nasser’s arbitrary action in breach of Egypt’s solemn undertakings, many of them recently given, without previous consultation or previous notice-reveals the nature of the régime with which we have to deal; and I think that the action of the Egyptian Government in compelling the Canal Company employees to remain at their posts under threat of imprisonment is certainly, to say the least, a violation of human rights.

A day earlier Eden had been more succinct in outlining the British position. ‘No arrangements for the future of this great international waterway could be acceptable to Her
Majesty's Government which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single Power which could, as recent events have shown, exploit it purely for purposes of national policy. As the crisis over Suez continued, British official concern only seemed to mount. On 10 September 1956, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, wrote that:

> If we sit back while Nasser consolidates his position and gradually acquires control of the oil-bearing countries, he can and is, according to our information, resolved to wreck us. If Middle Eastern oil is denied to us for a year or two, our gold reserves will disappear. If our gold reserves disappear, the Sterling area disintegrates. If the sterling area disintegrates and we have no reserves, we shall not be able to maintain a force in Germany, or indeed, anywhere else. I doubt whether we shall be able to pay for the bare minimum necessary for our defence. And a country that cannot provide for its defence is finished.

Eden had four main goals during the Suez Crisis of 1956. First, to secure the Suez Canal; second, to ensure that the canal remained open and that oil shipments to Britain and the West were not disrupted; third, to depose Nasser (by any means necessary); and, fourth, to halt the rise of Soviet influence in the Middle East. In all of these aims his policy failed. As D.R. Thorpe has noted: ‘The immediate consequence of the crisis was that the Suez Canal was blocked, oil supplies were interrupted, Nasser’s position as the leader of Arab nationalism was strengthened, and the way was left open for Russian intrusion into the Middle East.’ Eden later lamented that, despite British protests and press reports of Soviet penetration of Egypt, the United States continued to press the British to withdraw from the Canal Zone as quickly as possible after the Suez War. In truth, and despite the fact that Britain and the United States enjoyed the supposedly closest imaginable ‘Special Relationship’ in the Cold War, Washington had long sought to displace the British Empire as the predominant power in the Middle East. From London’s perspective, Washington’s perceived lack of concern over Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956, was thus seen as nothing short of neglecting the vital interests of its closest ally. Years afterwards, Eden recalled a conversation with the Conservative MP Enoch Powell in which Powell had apparently told him, in the late 1940s, that ‘I want to tell you that in the Middle East our great enemies are the Americans.’ When Eden relayed the story he added, mournfully, ‘You know, I had no idea what he meant. I do now.’

In late 1957, by which time Harold Macmillan was prime minister, ‘events’ in the Middle East had engendered an event greater sense of pessimism. ‘The situation is very like that over Suez. How to find an occasion or reason for intervention?’ Macmillan feared that ‘if nothing is done, there may be a rapid, and perhaps fatal, deterioration in the M.E., with its ultimate loss to Russia. … Even King Saud [of Saudi Arabia] is said to be alarmed at the spread of Communism. All the same, nothing is done.’ Of course, the British government’s strategy of harnessing regional antagonism to Soviet Communism in the Middle East was repeated elsewhere - and by many states - across the globe. (In line with this notion of my ‘enemy’s enemy being my friend’, Hashimoto notes that MI5 also played an advisory role in the establishment of Shah Reza Pahlavi’s notorious secret police, the
SAVAK, in Iran after 1957). Such efforts notwithstanding, in 1960 Eden reflected bitterly on the demise of British, and Western, influence in the Middle East.

[After 1958 no] attempt was made redeem Iraq or to halt the deterioration in the Middle East. With communist influence and authority in Iraq, the Russian dream of access to the Persian Gulf draws nearer. These developments will not be checked by support for Nasser in the role of anti-communist dictator. To attempt this would be as useless as it was to seek to use Mussolini against Hitler [in the 1930s] and would result in the final annihilation of the West.

Notwithstanding the ultimate failure of British grand strategy in the Middle East, both Calder Walton and Christopher Andrew argue that the British had considerable success in preserving influence with their former colonies in the intelligence security spheres, not least through the efforts of MI5’s Security Liaison Officers (SLOs) in advising their counterparts in newly independent states. But, as Hashimoto notes, similar efforts in the Middle East and South-West Asia largely ended in failure. The work done in building liaison ties with Chehab was undermined when he lost his job after the Lebanese crisis of July 1958. The overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq meant that the head of the Iraqi CID, Colonel Bajhat Beg Attiyah, was executed along with other allies of the UK by Brigadier Abdel Karim Qassim’s régime. Hashimoto convincingly demonstrates that there were five main factors contributed to this failure.

The first failure identified by Hashimoto involved inter-service and inter-agency disputes. This was partly the result of the fact that demarcation of the domestic and foreign intelligence missions (represented by MI5 and SIS, respectively) was very difficult to achieve in territories controlled, either directly or indirectly, by the British government. (In late 1948 Sir Percy Sillitoe, Director General of MI5, had warned Sir Edward Bridges, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, that: ‘We are faced with a situation in which S.I.S. is given an ill-defined security responsibility which overlaps with mine.’) There was an inherent clash of interests between SIME’s task of building security co-operation with regional governments, and the role of the Secret Intelligence Service in conducting ‘special political action’ (covert operations) in the Middle East. In Iraq, SIME had to contend with the mistrust of the Royal Air Force (RAF), which had been largely responsible for the military defence of British interests there since the 1920s, because of its institutional ties with the British Army. British security co-operation with pliant allies also foundered because of rivalries between local bodies. Hashimoto points out that one reason why the 1958 Iraqi revolution took the UK by surprise was because the Iraqi police – the main point of contact for the British in intelligence matters – enjoyed a very poor relationship with the armed forces there. In Iran, the SAVAK was divided between its internal and external branches, hampering counter-subversion co-operation in the process. Co-operation with the Egyptian police foundered well before the Free Officers’ coup against King Farouk in July 1952, not least because the latter were openly supporting guerrilla attacks on the British garrison in the Suez Canal zone.
The second factor Hashimoto deals with involves the growing unpopularity of British imperialism in the Middle East, which also manifested itself in the popular support corded to nationalist figures such as Jamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, and Mohammed Mossadeq in Iran. Mossadeq was actually ousted by an Anglo-American orchestrated coup in 1953, and, although the US is usually credited with taking the lead in Iran, it was the Labour Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison who first sanctioned subverting Mossadeq’s government after Prime Minister Clement Attlee had vetoed military against it. Robert T. Harrison noted in his recent history of British involvement in the Middle East that, after 1945, it seemed that ‘Britain’s control of the Middle East would once more become that vital entity of deliverance and triumph as it had been in the Great War. Yet this unchallenged policy unknowingly and inevitably bore the seeds of Britain’s demise in the region and retreat in the world.’ After the Second World War, suspicion and fear of Britain even extended to nominal allies. Conspiracy theories have a long pedigree in the Middle East, not least because not only have external powers (such as the USA and UK) been repeatedly involved in covert coup plotting, but the indigenous governments have also constantly schemed against each other. The Suez Crisis did Britain’s reputation no favours – not least because its diplomats (kept out of the loop by Anthony Eden) repeatedly assured allied governments in the region that their country had not colluded with the French and the Israelis against Nasser. Nonetheless, the image of the British as master conspirators had some odd consequences, not least the conclusion by General Teymour Bakhtiar (the chief of SAVAK) that the Iraqi revolution of 1958 was actually orchestrated by *Perfidious Albion*, and that the fiercely anti-British Brigadier Qassim was actually Britain’s puppet.

A third problem discussed by Hashimoto involves national priorities. If the UK was focussed on the threat of Soviet-backed subversives, CENTO allies had their own specific concerns, with the Pakistanis focussed on India, the Iranians on Iraq (after 1958) and the Turks on the Kurds. The politicisation of intelligence and security matters was also an inherent risk. Regional rulers such as Shah Reza Pahlavi and King Hussein of Jordan became the effective heads of their own secret services, and in Iran anti-Communist propaganda was devalued because it was conflated with sycophantic eulogies for the Shah. Part of the appeal of ideologies such as Communism and anti-Western nationalism was that they capitalised on local discontent with corrupt and repressive régimes that blocked any progress on much-needed internal reform. Britain’s allies and their security police services created their own enemies, a point that to take one example, was graphically demonstrated by the Shah’s overthrow forty years ago.

Fourth, Hashimoto outlines the problems arising from the fact that there were inherent linguistic and cultural difficulties between Britain and its regional partners. When Captain Guy Liddell (MI5’s Deputy Director General) lectured visiting Iranian military intelligence officers on the Communist threat in November 1950, he noted that he had to speak ‘very slowly’ while repeating what he had to say ‘at least three times’ in an attempt to get his audience to understand him. (Hashimoto’s sources, alas, appear not to indicate if Liddell – like any true Englishman - also raised his voice during his briefing). There were also fundamental differences between the British security service and those of regional allies. The UK’s security service was supposed to be politically neutral, serving the interests of
the UK as a whole rather than those of the political party in office.\textsuperscript{65} Scholars such as Bernard Porter may question whether MI5 was truly apolitical,\textsuperscript{66} but for states such as Iran, Turkey or Jordan the core role of the SAVAK, MIT or \textit{Mukhabarat} were the absolute guarantor of régime security.\textsuperscript{67} The model of ‘policing by consent’,\textsuperscript{68} which supposedly remains part and parcel of the domestic British approach to law enforcement, was also alien to states such as Iraq, where policing by coercion occurred by default.\textsuperscript{69} The experiences of more recent interventions in the Middle East indicate that this is not a purely historical problem.

Finally, Hashimoto points out the inherent paradox in British counter-subversive policy: ‘Whitehall’s anti-Communist approach therefore had an unintended consequence: it hampered Britain’s own independent espionage operations through fear of eroding goodwill’.\textsuperscript{70} Successful examples of bilateral or multilateral intelligence co-operation such as the ‘Five Eyes’ relationship rely on mutual trust, which in this case involves the informal agreement that the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand will not spy on each other.\textsuperscript{71} With British intelligence and security co-operation with South-West Asian partners, an implicit part of the bargain was that liaison work involved close co-operation with the ruling regimes, at the expense of any effort by the UK’s representatives on the ground to develop their own independent sources of intelligence within the societies they worked with. Britain (and, for that matter, the USA) were tied to working with autocratic regimes that had an ultimately weak support base in society, and that were inherently fragile. Hashimoto also portrays the British as being in a position of responsibility without influence with their allies, not least with reference to security force atrocities conducted by their allies. To take one example, SAVAK was not trained by its British – or for that matter its American or Israeli – founders to torture or murder detainees, and the UK’s diplomats and intelligence officers were clearly disconcerted by its ally’s human rights abuses. Yet Britain was complicit in its silence about such activities, with all the consequences as far as its reputation is concerned.\textsuperscript{72}

\textit{The Twilight of the British Empire} is an outstanding piece of historical research, reflecting Hashimoto’s diligence and prowess as a scholar; Rory Cormac should also be commended for his work in editing this book and ensuring its publication. Hashimoto’s book also has enduring relevance for more recent history, not least with the dangers of major powers viewing the complexities of regional politics through their own ideological lenses (such as during the Cold War in the past, and in the ‘War on Terror’ more recently).\textsuperscript{73} The ethical and political pitfalls of aligning with police states as allies, and also the danger of overlooking the fact that political beliefs that may be an anathema to Western societies may be seen elsewhere as a means of liberation from corrupt and despotic regimes.\textsuperscript{74} When finishing it, one inevitably feels a sense of sadness that we have been denied the fruits of further research from a historian of such promise. We were all been privileged to have had the gift of his scholarship, even if it was for such a brief period of time. \textit{Rest in peace Chikara.}

\begin{flushright}
 Geraint Hughes  
 King’s College London  
 E-mail: geraint.hughes@kcl.ac.uk
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R. Gerald Hughes is Reader in Military History and Director of the Centre for Intelligence and International Security Studies at Aberystwyth University. He is the author of The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (2014); and Britain, Germany and the Cold War: The Search for a European Détente, 1949-1967 (2007). A reviews editor of Intelligence and National Security, Hughes is the author of a number of book chapters and articles (including, most recently, ‘Fear has large eyes’: The History of Intelligence in the Soviet Union’ in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies; and ‘Between Man and Nature: The Enduring Wisdom of Sir Halford J. Mackinder’ in the Journal of Strategic Studies). He has also edited, or co-edited, a number of scholarly volumes. These include The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal (2016); Intelligence and International Security: New Perspectives and Agendas (2011); Intelligence, Crises and Security: Prospects and Retrospects (2008); and Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State (2008). R. Gerald Hughes is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.

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Notes

1 Catterall (ed.), *The Cabinet Years*, 481.

2 Catterall (ed.), *Prime Minister and After*, 205.


4 Editorial note: As a reviews editor for Intelligence and National Security, and on behalf of all Chikara’s friends and colleagues from his time at Aberystwyth, I should like to acknowledge the dexterity and sensitivity demonstrated by Geraint in the making of this review essay. His efforts serve as a fitting memorial to Chikara, whose loss we feel every day. R. Gerald Hughes, reviews editor (UK and RoW), 1 March 2019 (St. David’s Day).

5 On this history of British interests in the Middle East, see Harrison, *Britain in the Middle East*.


7 On this, see Arditti, ‘Security Intelligence in the Middle East (SIME)’.

8 Quoted in Hashimoto, ‘British Security Liaison in the Middle East’, 873.

9 Technically, MI5 (the Security Service) was the responsible for intelligence in the domestic sphere, whilst SIS (the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6) was the responsible agency for foreign intelligence operations.

10 Jeffery, *MI6*, 635.


12 *Hansard*, HC Deb, 5th series, volume 577, columns 481, 482, 8 November 1957.

13 From almost first days of the Bolshevik Revolution, the British had cause to fear Soviet Communism. On this, see Neilson, *Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939*; and Redfern, ‘The Comintern and Imperialism’.


15 See for example Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*; Cormac, *Confronting the Colonies*; Cormac, *Disrupt and Deny*; Walton, *Empire of Secrets*.

16 On the archival basis of Hashimoto’s research, see Hashimoto, ‘Fighting the Cold War or Post-Colonialism?’

17 The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), originally known as the Baghdad Pact or the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), was a military alliance formed in 1955. Its membership consisted of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The pact was formally dissolved in 1979 after the Islamic Republic of Iran withdrew from the alliance following the Iranian Revolution. On the origins of CENTO, see Jalal, ‘Towards the Baghdad Pact’. The British, hoping for solidarity in the Middle East, were disappointed that the Americans failed to follow them into signing the pact in 1955. Thorpe, *Supermac*, 293.
18 Dimitrakis, Failed Alliances of the Cold War.
19 Diary entry for 23 August 1957. Catterall (ed.), Prime Minister and After, 55.
20 Nigel Ashton asserts that it was the Iraqi revolution of 1958, and not the Suez affair of 1956, that marked the watershed moment in the decline of British influence in the Middle East. Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, 216-217. On the obstacles facing British policymakers in their dealings with Iraq after 1958, see Worrall, “Coping with a Coup d’État”.
21 Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 4.
22 Jeffery, MI6, 688.
24 Quoted in Hashimoto, ‘British Security Liaison in the Middle East’, 857.
25 Diary entry for 26 October 1955. Catterall (ed.), The Cabinet Years, 496.
26 Eden, Full Circle, 566.
29 Jeffery, MI6, 688.
30 Anthony Nutting, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, recalled that Eden angrily informed him that: ‘What's all this nonsense about isolating Nasser or ‘neutralising’ him as you call it? I want him destroyed, can’t you understand? I want him murdered, and if you and the Foreign Office don't agree, then you'd better come to the cabinet and explain why.’ When a shocked Nutting replied that, since there was no alternative government (‘hostile or friendly’) to replace Nasser, Eden supposedly replied, ‘But I don’t want an alternative. And I don’t give a damn if there's anarchy and chaos in Egypt.’ Cited in Dorril, MI6, 613.
31 Thorpe, Supremac, 357-358.
32 Eden, Full Circle, 567.
33 On this, see Barr, Lords of the Desert. Barr’s books covers the years 1941-1967.
34 Heffer, Like the Roman, 123; Hughes, The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement, 57.
35 ‘Events, dear boy, events’ was supposedly one of Macmillan’s favourite sayings. Thorpe, Supremac, 750(n).
36 Diary entry for 22 September 1957. Catterall (ed.), Prime Minister and After, 60. Emphasis in the original.
37 For scholarly treatments, see Selverstone, Constructing the Monolith; and Dongen, Roulin and Scott-Smith (eds), Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War.
38 Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 97-101. SAVAK: Sāzemān-e Ettelā’āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar (trans. ‘Organization of National Intelligence and Security of the Nation’). Founded in 1957 the SAVAK was the secret police, domestic security and intelligence service of the Shah of Iran. In 1977 Parviz Sabeti, the deputy director of SAVAK, told a journalist: ‘You know that since the [Shah’s] White Revolution, the mullahs have been against universal suffrage, the freedom of women, [and] the distribution of the land. We have had to treat them very badly, very harshly.’ Sale, ‘SAVAK’.
39 Eden, Full Circle, 578.
40 Walton, Empire of Secrets; Andrew, The Defence of the Realm. See also McGarr, ‘Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Subversive’.
41 Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 155.
42 Jeffery, MI6, 635-636.
43 Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 84-85.
44 On this, see Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, 19-23, 39; Napier, The Royal Air Force, 35-37.
45 Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 68.
46 Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 96, 152.
47 Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 142-143.
48 Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 74.
49 French, British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 49-50, 114.
50 Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 60-61, 75-76.
51 On this, see Louis, ‘Britain and the Overthrow of the Mossadeq Government’ in Gasiorowski and Byrne (eds), Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. See also Etges, ‘All that Glitters is Not Gold’.
52 Cormac, Disrupt and Deny, 92.
53 Harrison, Britain in the Middle East, 167.
On this, see Zonis and Joseph, ‘Conspiracy Thinking in the Middle East’; and Gray, ‘Explaining Conspiracy Theories in Modern Arab Middle Eastern Political Discourse’.

Andrew Rathmell makes this point in Secret War in the Middle East.

On Britain and Suez, see Kyle’s definitive Suez; and Hughes, The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement, 45-59. For a recent work on the military history of the Suez War and its consequences, see Henkin, The 1956 Suez War and the New World Order in the Middle East.

Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 156.

Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 125-126, 135-139.

Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 161. The same was true of one regional potentate omitted from The Twilight of the British Empire – namely, Sultan Said bin Taimur of Oman (1932-1970).

Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 142.

Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 162.

Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 176.

Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 38.

Idries Shah (1924-1996) once noted that ‘[t]he rest if the world has for long believed that when faced with a foreigner, the English reaction has been limited to talking, slowly, in English, in a loud voice.’ Idries Shah, The Englishman's Handbook, 13.

Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 148.

Porter, Plots and Paranoia.

Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 104.

When referring to ‘policing by consent’, commentators are usually put in mind of Robert Peel’s so-called ‘Nine Principles of Policing’. In truth, there is no evidence of any link between these principles and Peel and the concept was most likely devised by Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne (the first Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis). The nine principles which were set out in the ‘General Instructions’ (issued to every new police officer from 1829). Home Office (UK), Definition of policing by consent. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent/definition-of-policing-by-consent (accessed 18 March 2019).

Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 160.

Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 172.

Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 152-153.

Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 163-169.

On so-called ‘cultural incompatibility’ between US forces and native Afghans, see the declassified 2011 US Army report by Jeffery Borodin (N2KL Red Team Political and Military Behavioral Scientist). Bordin, A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility. In his report Borodin observes that: ‘Four years ago after the May 6, 2007 murder of two U.S. soldiers … by an ANA soldier, an Afghan government official urged “patience” regarding ISAF’s response to this killing. After an additional 54 murders of ISAF personnel since then the time for “patience” is long past. Decisive actions in countering this murder epidemic are called for.’ Bordin, A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility, 54.

These points are also made by Byman, ‘Friends like These’; and Hamid, ‘How Iraq Warped Obama’s Worldview’.

69 Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 160.
70 Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 172.
71 Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 152-153.
72 Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire, 163-169.
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