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Review article

Islam in South Asia: The Deobandis and the current state of Pakistan

Owen Bennett-Jones and R. Gerald Hughes

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Jawad Syed, Edwina Pio, Tahir Kamran and Abbas Zaidi (eds), *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2016), pp. 570, hardback, £80, ISBN-13: 978-1349949656.

‘You are free, free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed **-** that has nothing to do with the business of the State.’ Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948).

Deobandism is a revivalist movement within Sunni (primarily Hanafi) Islam.[[1]](#footnote-1) It was established at the *madrasa* (religious school) of Dar ul-Ulum in Deoband, northern India, in 1866. It was inspired by the experience of the suppression of the Indian Mutiny a decade earlier and was designed to encourage orthodox Islamic practice in India (then ruled by the British). Deobandism’s raison d'être was the preservation the purity of Islam in eras of non-Muslim rule. This movement of reformist *ulama* (scholars)[[2]](#footnote-2) were disciples of the revolutionary Indian Islamist Syed Ahmad Shaheed Barelvi(1786-1831), who wandered far and wide preaching Islamic renewal and jihad. The central goal of Deobandist thinkers was to preserve the teachings of the faith during periods of non-Muslim rule. Deobandism has long been influential in parts of India, Pakistan,[[3]](#footnote-3) Afghanistan, Bangladesh and East Africa and today the movement claims to have tens of thousands of Deobandi schools across the globe.[[4]](#footnote-4) Deobandi militants have been active in regions including the West and the Middle East in support of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS).[[5]](#footnote-5) Since 2011, the bloody and extended civil war in Syria has seen Deobandi adherents flock from many nations to fight jihad against Assad’s godless regime.

It is an oft-cited fact that the Taliban emerged from the solid grounding of Deobandi instruction. After the Soviets left Afghanistan, Deobani seminaries were often the only source of education for the three million refugees who had flooded into Pakistan (the word ‘Taliban’ means ‘students’). These included the founder of Taliban Mullah Mohammed Omar (c.1960-2013) who fled Afghanistan to study at the Deobandi seminary at Jamia Uloom-ul-Islamia in Karachi in 1979.[[6]](#footnote-6) In recent years, Deobandism has become increasingly influenced by Wahhabist ideology.[[7]](#footnote-7) In the West, the fact that 15 out of 19 of the 9/11 attackers were Wahhabists,[[8]](#footnote-8) along with Taliban connection, has helped make the word ‘Deobandi’ readily associated with extremism, sectarianism, violence and terrorism.[[9]](#footnote-9) Misconceptions about the nature of Deobandism continue to proliferate and, although the Deobandis comprise a fifth of the Pakistani population,[[10]](#footnote-10) there has been a surprising dearth of attention paid to this sect. This is especially surprising given the focus on Pakistan and Islam in recent as Pakistan has become ‘a global center for political Islam’.[[11]](#footnote-11) In a valiant attempt to make up for the lack of literature on the Deobandi movement, this substantial book sets itself the task of answering some important questions interspersed over eighteen chapters.[[12]](#footnote-12) These questions include: How tolerant is Deobandism and what are its links with violence? What is the role of Saudi Arabia in financing Deobandism? And how does the movement relate to Salafism and Wahhabism?[[13]](#footnote-13)

In tackling the question of Deobandism’s relative position within Islam, Arshi Saleem Hashmi outlines how Deobandism shares with Salafism a deep hostility to Ahmadis and Barelvis.[[14]](#footnote-14) But it is not just a question of having the same doctrinal opponents. Like Salafis and Wahhabis, the Deobandis place greater weight on the jurisprudence of more ancient Islamic scholars as opposed to more recent ones. They also have similar views on the role of jihad. But differences remain. When it comes to Pakistan’s salafis in the Ahle Hadith religio-political movement, the key point of difference concerns the schools of Islamic jurisprudence adhered to.[[15]](#footnote-15) (The Ahle Hadith do not follow any of the four schools, whilst the Deobandis follow the Hanafi school).  Zulqarnain Sewag goes into the relationship between Deobandism and Wahhabism in more detail, describing how one of the most influential of all scholars in Deoband, Husain Ahmad Madni, was highly critical of Wahhabism. Madni claimed that Wahhab was a tyrant who preached falsehood, killed innocent Sunni Muslims and forced others to accept his false beliefs. However, this fundamentally hostile position did not endure and more recent works by Deobandi scholars have praised Wahhabism as a force for good.[[16]](#footnote-16)

A number of the authors in *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan* make the point that the Saudi state has long been willing to overlook any differences between Wahhabism and Deobandism. Saudi Arabia was the major donor to the Deobandi movement in Pakistan from the 1980s until the early 2000s, when funding was diverted to other groups.[[17]](#footnote-17) Saudi Arabia provided financial support for Tablighi missionaries, praising their attempts to urge Muslims to live more observantly while funding Deobandi militant madrasahs in Pakistan (especially during the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. The Deobandi seminaries in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan saw an upsurge in recruits, and these men were indoctrinated with the Deobandi take on jihad. Whilst the US opposed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan for their own geopolitical ends, the Saudis determined to support the Islamic resistance there and spread Wahhabi ideology.[[18]](#footnote-18) In 1984 a United States’ intelligence assessment blithely asserted that ‘[a]lthough fundamentalist groups can cause national crises overnight with terrorist acts, they usually lose more than they gain as the government undertakes repressive measures against them.’[[19]](#footnote-19) In Riyadh, meanwhile, Afghanistan was now becoming a cause for *all* Muslims everywhere. In early 1980, the Saudi foreign minister, Saud bin Faisal, called on all Muslim countries to adopt a ‘clear position’ against Soviet aggression as ‘all Islamic…countries were [now] threatened by [this] danger’.[[20]](#footnote-20) So long as the common enemy of Soviet communism existed the alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia could persist.

In a repeat performance of the war in Afghanistan, the US looked favourably upon Saudi support for the Bosnian Muslims in the 1991-5 Wars of Yugoslav Succession (and covertly used Islamists to arm the Bosnian government).[[21]](#footnote-21) Enthusiasm for intervention in Bosnia was widespread in the Islamic world, and Muslim radicals were strengthened by the perception that the West was indifferent to the fate of the Muslims as the victims of Serbian (and Croatian) aggression. In late 1992 the Organisation of the Islamic Conference concluded a two-day meeting in Jidda, Saudi Arabia by calling for the lifting of the United Nations arms embargo on Bosnia. Although this was dismissed as ’gesture politics’ it played well in the Islamic world. By this time there were already estimated to be some 400 Saudi volunteers, many veterans of the Afghan War, fighting in Bosnia alongside volunteer forces that included Algerians, Egyptians, Sudanese, and Pakistanis. Khaled al-Maeena, a Saudi newspaper editor, observed that the ‘war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has become the emotional equivalent of the fight against fascism in the Spanish Civil War ... [and the men] who [have] died there are regarded as martyrs who tried to save their fellow Muslims.’[[22]](#footnote-22) As in Afghanistan, the Americans turned a blind eye to clandestine Saudi aid to fellow Muslims resisting ‘aggression’ despite the fact that, once again, Saudi aid had an explicit additional goal of spreading Wahhabism.[[23]](#footnote-23) In 2007 John R. Schindler, a former National Security Agency analyst and US Navy counterintelligence officer, opined that while the West agonised over what to do about the Bosnian Muslims, ‘on the other side of the globe hard men were doing more concrete things to aid their coreligionists in Bosnia and spread the global jihad in the hopes of winning a strategic victory for the forces of radical Islam.’[[24]](#footnote-24) As it is, and less than a decade after Schindler’s pessimistic prognosis, the ISIS was recruiting hard in Bosnia.[[25]](#footnote-25)

Those commentators who believe (and argue) that the links between Deobandis and violence are over played often point to the Deobandi’s missionary movement as exemplifying an organisation that seeks to do nothing more than promote good religious practice. Such naïveté is not sustained under scrutiny and Liyakat Takim demonstrates convincingly that many violent jihadists who have carried out attacks have at some point attended mosques of the Tablighi Jama’at.[[26]](#footnote-26)  Discussing Deobandi ideology in a transnational context, Takim considers views its role in the spread of Islamic extremism and intolerance as an ally to the Salafists and Wahhabis. Takim also explains why certain ideological differences exist and the role of the Deobandis in promoting violence and extremism. Takim demonstrates that the Deobandis have a long history as sponsors of jihad having contributed materially to Al Qaeda’s terrorism and, more recently, to the caliphate declared by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The chapter also discusses the Deobandi movement’s collusion with the SSP (the army of the companions of the Prophet) in its sectarian warfare against the Shi’is in Pakistan. Disappointingly, however, his account does not get beyond the rather limited press coverage of this issue.[[27]](#footnote-27) Disappointingly, however, Takim’s chapter only underlines the fact that a thorough survey of Tablighi connections to violent jihad remains a study that still needs to be done.

Many Pakistanis consider the battle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to be the time when their country’s problems with violent jihadism began. Pakistan’s president at the time, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq,[[28]](#footnote-28) was particularly sympathetic to Deobandism[[29]](#footnote-29) and instigated a national programme of ‘Islamisation’.[[30]](#footnote-30) Saudi Arabia provided staunch support for Pakistan in its longstanding dispute with India over Kashmir (a situation which the Saudis liken to that of Israel and the Palestinians).[[31]](#footnote-31) The level of Saudi activity leads Eamon Murphy to argue that the Saudi role in promoting ‘terrorism and sectarian violence’ in Pakistan has been under-estimated.[[32]](#footnote-32) In his study on Deobandism in the Punjab, Pervez Hoodbhoy directly contradicts this and he goes so far as to speculate that even if one took the anti-Soviet jihad out of the equation, Saudi influence would still have encouraged the growth of a highly conservative and sometimes violent form of Deobandi Islam. The attitudes championed by the Saudis spread into Pakistan not only because of what was happening in Afghanistan but also because the failure of the Pakistani state to provide education facilities to the population.[[33]](#footnote-33) In truth, this was always a gap which the oil-rich Saudis were likely to fill.

Pakistan has long been accused of being a sponsor of international terrorism (not least by India). Certainly, its intelligence service ([the notorious ISI](http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/isi-terrorism-behind-accusations/p11644))[[34]](#footnote-34) has been a long-time patron to international mujahedeen forces, many of them Pakistan-based Sunni extremists, and there is even speculation that Islamabad may have facilitated rise of the ISIS.[[35]](#footnote-35) As ever in Pakistan, however, things are far from being black-and-white. Islamabad thus protests (correctly) that it, too, is itself a victim of terrorism. In this part of the world few have clean hands and all states have to think seriously about how they are going to fight terrorism. Naeem Ahmed assesses Islamabad’s dedicated Islamabad’s counterterrorism strategy. This was adopted after the fallout of 9/11 unleashed Al-Qaeda and saw the rise of a network of domestic jihadi terror groups adhering to Deobandi takfiri ideology. This strategy has not been overly successful. Ahmed asserts that only a root-and-branch excision of the ideology underpinning violent extremism will allow the Pakistani state to defeat the urban-based militant sectarian terrorist groups, whose ruthless leaders are well-educated, highly-motivated ideologues. This, Ahmed suggest, needs to be accompanied by counter-radicalisation programmes, and reforms in public education in order specifically aimed at curbing sectarianism, religio-political extremism, and xenophobia.[[36]](#footnote-36) This is all well and good but the difficulties encountered by the UK’s anti-terror *Prevent* strategy – in a society that is far more stable than Pakistan - demonstrate the immense difficulties of successfully implementing such policies.[[37]](#footnote-37)

When assessing the prospects for reducing extremist violence, cynics point to what they see as the inherent structural deficiencies in Pakistan’s state structures and society. And variations in the attitudes of Deobandis are partly a function of the government policies of whichever states in which they operate. In India, where successive governments have taken a tough line at the first sign of any links between Deobandis and violence, the movement is largely quiescent and has explicitly rejected terrorism. In Pakistan, by contrast, many hardline Deobandi clerics are part-and-parcel of the machinery of the state.[[38]](#footnote-38) Deobandis sit in powerful institutions like the Senate; whilst violent Deobandi groups - ranging from the Pakistan Taliban to sectarian outfits such as Sipah-e-Sahaba – are effectively above the law.[[39]](#footnote-39) The fact that Deobandis are so active in the various campaigns against Ahmadis, for instance, is wholly reflective of the Pakistani state’s overt discrimination against the group. This official chauvinism includes classifying Ahamadis as ‘non-Muslims’ under the law.

Meanwhile, in the UK, Deobandism remains virtually unknown and yet comprises the largest single group amongst British Muslims, controlling some 44% of Mosques there.[[40]](#footnote-40) I a refreshingly forthright piece, Sam Westrop argues that many Deobandi clerics have strongly resisted integrating into British society. This, it can be argued, reflects nothing more than the traditional British state policy of multiculturalism. Indeed, Westrop opines that the failure of the British government, media and much of academia to look at Deobandi attitudes as a distinct and different to other sets of Muslim attitudes, has been deftly exploited by Islamist and ultra conservative groups to assert themselves as representatives of British Muslims when in fact that represent only part of that community’s opinions. He notes that the British state has appointed Deobandis clerics to be prison chaplains in the hope of that they will propagate moderate messages on issues such as integration whereas they, in fact, do precisely the opposite.[[41]](#footnote-41) In April 2016, a secret official report highlighted the prevalence of clerics favouring radical Islam in UK prisons was leaked. It revealed that eextremist Islamic hate literature was freely and widely available in British prisons jails and distributed to inmates by Muslim chaplains. These literatures included anti-Semitic, misogynistic and homophobic pamphlets along with tracts lauding the killing of apostates as a good thing.[[42]](#footnote-42) After initial expressions of concern, these revelations elicited little real action from the political classes in the UK. For too many people in the UK, religious fundamentalism remains a foreign country.

*Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan* is a step forward in the quest to achieve a better understanding of the Deobandis (and, indeed, of all faith-based political movements). It is a useful contribution to a neglected area of study. On close inspection one can see almost see *why* there was a gap: it is obvious that the editors of *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan* faced a stiff challenge when putting this volume together. It would have been particularly difficult to secure contributors who could, taken together, give a comprehensive account of Deobandism in a consistent way. Some of the volume’s chapters, such Abbas Zaidi’s analysis of pro-Deobandi media bias in Pakistan,[[43]](#footnote-43) are too narrowly-focused to be used for comparative purposes. In choosing case studies one has to be very careful so as to ensure that the subject matter will fit a remit whereby the study of the specific will illuminate the generality. At the same time other chapters within the book, such as Pervez Hoodbhoy’s reflections on the evolution and impact of Deobandism on the Punjab, are too broad and suffer from the inevitable constraints on space. [Preview](http://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781349949656) [Buy Chapter](http://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781349949656) A fewof the authors deal not so much with the Deobandis, as with the victims of their sectarian violence.[[44]](#footnote-44) These are interesting as standalone pieces – but they do not enhance the volume’s coherence. There are also, perhaps inevitably, some cases of unnecessary repetition. (For instance: Jinnah’s famous speech of 11 August 1947, in which he declared that ‘You are free to go to your temples’,[[45]](#footnote-45) is quoted in three of the book’s chapters. These quibbles aside, this is an important book. Regardless of one’s view of modern-day Islam, there is little doubt that, in the West, ignorance of the Muslim world remains alarmingly prevalent. In the introduction to *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan*, Jawad Syed observes that ‘systematic faith violence there has reached unprecedented levels in terms of death and destruction for Sunni Barelvis, Sufis, Shias, Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus and other communities. Addressing this issue is of global importance.’[[46]](#footnote-46) This is, of course, an eminently laudable goal, although history and experience give one limited grounds for optimism.

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* Eamon Murphy, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism* (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2013).
* Vali Nasr, ‘Military Rule, Islamism, and Democracy in Pakistan’ in [*The Middle East Journal*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Middle_East_Journal), 58/2 (2004), pp. 195-209.
* J.E. Peterson, *Saudi Arabia and the Illusion of Security*, Adelphi Paper 348(Abingdon: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2005 [2002]).
* V.G. Julie Rajan, *Al Qaeda’s Global Crisis: The Islamic State, Takfir and the Genocide of Muslims* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).
* Sushant Sareen, The Jihad Factory: Pakistan’s Islamic Revolution in the Making (New Delhi: Har Anand, 2005).
* John R. Schindler, *Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida, and the rise of Global Jihad* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2007).
* Owen L. Sirrs, *Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert Action and Internal Operations* (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2017).
* Andrew T.H. Tan (ed.), The Politics of Terrorism: A Survey (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2010).

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1. The Hanafi school is one of the four religious Sunni Islam schools of *figh* (trans: jurisprudence). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Ulama: lit. ‘the learned ones’ [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. On this, see Muhammad Moj, *The Deoband Madrassah Movement: Countercultural Trends and Tendencies* (London: Anthem Press, 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Author (Bennett-Jones) interview with Maulana Abdul Khalik, Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Dar ul-Ulum Deoband, May 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Jawad Syed, ‘Introduction: An Alternative Discourse on Religious Militancy’ in Jawad Syed, Edwina Pio, Tahir Kamran and Abbas Zaidi (eds), *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2016), p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Liyakat Takim, ‘Violence and the Deobandi Movement’ in Today’s Pakistan’ in Syed, Pio, Kamran and Zaidi (eds), *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan*, p. 489. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Wahhabism, which emerged in Nejd in the late eighteenth century, has been the predominant Saudi sect since this time when the first of several failed Wahhabi ‘states’ was formed. Wahhabism achieved official status with the foundation of the state of Saudi Arabia in 1932. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Owen Bennett-Jones, ‘The Overlooked: The Deobandis’, *London Review of Books*, 38/17, 8 September 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Eamon Murphy, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism* (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2013), p. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. V.G. Julie Rajan, *Al Qaeda’s Global Crisis: The Islamic State, Takfir and the Genocide of Muslims* (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2015), p. 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Husain Ḥaqqānī, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The volume consists of Jawad Syed, ‘Introduction: An Alternative Discourse on Religious Militancy’; Pervez Hoodbhoy,’Could Pakistan Have Remained Pluralistic?’ (pp. 1-34); Pervez Hoodbhoy, ‘[Preview](http://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781349949656) [Buy Chapter](http://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781349949656) The Genesis, Evolution and Impact of “Deobandi” Islam on the Punjab: An Overview’ (pp. 35-64); Tahir Kamran, ‘The Genesis, Evolution and Impact of “Deobandi” Islam on the Punjab: An Overview’ (pp. 65-92); Abbas Zaidi,’Covering Faith-Based Violence: Structure and Semantics of News Reporting in Pakistan’ (pp. 93-132); Arshi Saleem Hashmi, ‘Historical Roots of the Deobandi Version of Jihadism and Its Implications for Violence in Today’s Pakistan’ (pp. 133-61); Faiza Ali,’Experiences of Female Victims of Faith-Based Violence in Pakistan’ (pp. 163-85); Edwina Pio and Jawad Syed, ‘Marked by the Cross: The Persecution of Christians in Pakistan’ (pp. 187-207); Fatima Z. Rahman,’Pakistan: A Conducive Setting for Islamist Violence Against Ahmadis’ (pp. 209-30); Jawad Syed, ‘Barelvi Militancy in Pakistan and Salmaan Taseer’s Murder’ (pp. 231-710; Abbas Zaidi, ‘The Shias of Pakistan: Mapping an Altruistic Genocide’ (pp. 273-311); Zulqarnain Sewag, ‘The Intra-Sunni Conflicts in Pakistan’ (pp. 313-44); Tahir Kamran, ‘Genealogical Sociology of Sectarianism: A Case Study of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan’ (pp. 345-67); Thomas K. Gugler, ‘Islamization and Barelvis in Pakistan’ (pp. 369-97); Raza Mir and Mohammad Ali Naquvi, ‘Fighting the Takfiris: Building an Inclusive American Muslim Community by Countering Anti-Shia Rhetoric in the USA’ (pp. 399-421); Humayun Kabir,’The “Othering” of the Ahmadiyya Community in Bangladesh’ (pp. 423-52); Sam Westrop, ‘Hidden in Plain Sight: Deobandis, Islamism and British Multiculturalism Policy’ (pp. 453-80); Liyakat Takim, ‘Violence and the Deobandi Movement’ (pp. 481-503); Naeem Ahmed, ‘Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: A Critical Overview’ (pp. 505-29). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Salafism is an ultra-conservative movement within Sunni Islam which calls for a return to the ways of ‘devout ancestors’ (the *salaf*). Although Salafism is often deemed to be identical to Wahhabism the former reject this claim out of hand. Many authors identify Wahhabism an ultra-strict version of Salafism. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Ahamedism was founded during the Raj in nineteenth century. It is regarded as heretical by followers of orthodox Islam. An amendment to Pakistan’s constitution in 1974 declared that Ahmadis were not Muslims. The followers of Barelvi, the moderate form of Islam that Muslims in south Asia have followed for centuries, has some 200 million followers. The conservative Wahhabis consider many Barelvi practices to be un-Islamic and even heretical. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Arshi Saleem Hashmi, ‘Historical Roots of the Deobandi Version of Jihadism and Its Implications for Violence in Today’s Pakistan’ in Syed, Pio, Kamran and Zaidi (eds), *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan* , pp. 133-61. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Zulqarnain Sewag, ‘The Intra-Sunni Conflicts in Pakistan’ in Syed, Pio, Kamran and Zaidi (eds), *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan*, pp. 313-44. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Sushant Sareen, The Jihad Factory: Pakistan’s Islamic Revolution in the Making (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2005), p. 282. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Takim, ‘Violence and the Deobandi Movement’ in Today’s Pakistan’, p. 487. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. National Archives, Washington DC: CIA Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, ‘Islam and Politics: A Compendium: A Reference Aid’, 2 April 1984. The report also noted that ‘[r]uthless suppression has had its successes, most notable in the Communist states. Other secular states, such as Syria, Iraq, and Indonesia, have also found that repression keeps opposition manageable.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Panagiotis Dimitrakis, *The Secret War in Afghanistan: The Soviet Union, China and Anglo-American Intelligence in the Afghan War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), p. 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Richard J. Aldrich, ‘America used Islamists to arm the Bosnian Muslims’, *The Guardian* (London), 22 April 2002. Saudia Arabia provided some $300 million in arms (and another $500 in aid) to the Bosnian government, in violation to the embargo and with the knowledge of the US government. Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (New York: M.E. Sharp. 1999), p. 339. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. # Chris Hedges, ‘Muslims From Afar Joining ‘Holy War’ in Bosnia’, *The New York Times*, 5 December 1992.

    [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. John R. Schindler, *Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida, and the rise of Global Jihad* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2007), pp. 125-31. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Schindler, *Unholy Terror*, pp. 110-3. Quote at p. 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Walter Mayr, ‘Sharia Villages: Bosnia’s Islamic State Problem’, *Der Spiegel* ONLINE, 5 April 2016, URL:http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/islamic-state-presence-in-bosnia-cause-for-concern-a-1085326.html (accessed 9 July 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Tablighi Jama’at (trans: ‘Society for spreading faith’) is a global ‘non-political’ missionary movement that focuses on urging Muslims to return to the original teachings of Sunni Islam. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Takim, ‘Violence and the Deobandi Movement’, pp. 481-503. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq was president of Pakistan from 1978 until his death in an air crash in 1988. On this time in office, see the memoir by Zia’s vice chief-of-staff: Khalid Mahmud Arif, *Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977–1988* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Takim, ‘Violence and the Deobandi Movement’, p. 483. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Owen Bennett-Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 16-7. In his first televised address to the nation as president Zia asserted that ‘Pakistan which was created in the name of Islam will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of [an] Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country.’ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998). p. 251. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. J.E. Peterson, *Saudi Arabia and the Illusion of Security*, Adelphi Paper 348(Abingdon: Taylor and Francis for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2005 [2002]), p. 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Murphy, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan*, pp. 93-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Pervez Hoodbhoy, ‘[Preview](http://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781349949656) [Buy Chapter](http://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781349949656) The Genesis, Evolution and Impact of “Deobandi” Islam on the Punjab: An Overview’ in Syed, Pio, Kamran and Zaidi (eds), *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan*, pp. 35-64. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate. On the ISI, see Hein Keissling, *Faith, Unity, Discipline: The Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan* (London: Hurst, 2016); and Owen L. Sirrs, *Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert Action and Internal Operations* (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. # Carlotta Gall, ‘Pakistan’s Hand in the Rise of International Jihad’, *The New York Times*, 6 February 2016. In her book *The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 2001-2014* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014) Gall argued that the US should have concentrated on fighting the War on Terror against enemies in Pakistan rather than attacking Iraq in 2003.

    [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Naeem Ahmed, ‘Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: A Critical Overview’ in Syed, Pio, Kamran and Zaidi (eds), *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan*, pp. 505-29. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Patrick Cockburn, ‘Britain refuses to accept how terrorists really work – and that's why prevention strategies are failing’, *The Independent* (London), 8 June 2017. For an interesting book-length treatment of the issues, see M.S. Elshimi,De-radicalisation in the UK Prevent Strategy: Security, Identity, and Religion (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Takim, ‘Violence and the Deobandi Movement’, pp. 487-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP, trans:‘Corps of the Prophet’s Companions’) – later renamed *Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat* - was banned as a terrorist organisation in Pakistan in 2002. SSP was founded by Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, to counter Shi’ite influence, which had supposedly increased since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Andrew T.H. Tan, ‘Glossary of major terrorist incidents and groups’ in Andrew T.H. Tan (ed.), The Politics of Terrorism: A Survey (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2010), p. 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Innes Bowen, *Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam* (London: Hurst, 2014), p. 11. On this, see also James Fergusson, *Al-Britannia, My Country: A Journey Through Muslim Britain* (London: Bantam Press, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Sam Westrop, ‘Hidden in Plain Sight: Deobandis, Islamism and British Multiculturalism Policy’ in Syed, Pio, Kamran and Zaidi (eds), *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan*, pp. 453-80. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. # Sophie Jamieson, ‘Islamic hate literature distributed in British prisons, leaked report finds’, *The Daily Telegraph* (London), 19 April 2016.

    [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Abbas Zaidi,’Covering Faith-Based Violence: Structure and Semantics of News Reporting in Pakistan’ in Syed, Pio, Kamran and Zaidi (eds), *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan*, pp. 93-132. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. See, for example, Edwina Pio and Jawad Syed, ‘Marked by the Cross: The Persecution of Christians in Pakistan’ in Syed, Pio, Kamran and Zaidi (eds), *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan*, pp. 187-207. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. In a famous speech to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), leader of the All-India Muslim League (1913-47) and founder of Pakistan, stated: ‘You are free, free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed **-** that has nothing to do with the business of the State.’ Jinnah quoted in Farahnaz Ispahani, Purifying the Land of the Pure: A History of Pakistan’s Religious Minorities (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Jawad Syed, ‘Introduction: An Alternative Discourse on Religious Militancy’ in Syed, Pio, Kamran and Zaidi (eds), *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan*, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)